Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy
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Transcript of Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy
Policy Brief
Canada’s RetuRn to east asia: Re-engagement thRough maRitime diplomaCy1
James manicom
intRoduCtion
After a decade of neglect, the Canadian government is prepared to re-engage
East Asia, particularly China. Adding a maritime component to Canada’s re-
engagement efforts would help mitigate threats to the strategic stability that
makes economic growth possible and build Canada’s prestige in the region.
Recognizing that re-engagement must go beyond bilateral economic issues,
Canadian policy makers are seeking to deepen Canada’s regional diplomacy.
Canada has signalled its support for regional institutions by acceding to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (Job, 2010). In an effort to reverse early
missteps in Canada’s relationship with China, Canadian Minister of Foreign
1 This policy brief draws on research conducted by the author for “Canadian Debates about China’s Rise: Whither the China Threat?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 3, no. 3 (September 2012): 287–300.
Key points• To rebuild its reputation in the region, Canada should support its East Asian re-
engagement efforts through maritime defence and cooperation endeavours, which would improve the region’s strategic stability and foster economic growth.
• Canada should strengthen maritime exchanges in East Asia, including joint exercises with Chinese and other regional navies, and partner with East Asian states to build coast guard capacity through tabletop exercises, personnel exchanges and training exercises.
• Drawing on its own diplomatic experiences, Canada should foster dialogue in the East Asian region on cooperative living and non-living resource management in disputed waters.
no. 25 FebRuaRy 2013
James maniCom
James Manicom is a research fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the development of the Global Security Program. Previously, he held fellowships at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His current research explores Arctic governance, East Asian security and China’s role in ocean governance.
2 the CentRe FoR inteRnational goveRnanCe innovation
www.Cigionline.oRg poliCy bRieF no. 25 FebRuaRy 2013
Copyright © 2013 by The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial — No Derivatives Licence. To view this licence, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice.
Affairs John Baird declared in 2011 that “my government
gets it” before departing for a visit to China and to attend
the ASEAN ministerial conference in Bali (Perkins and
Hoffman, 2011). At the 9th ASEAN-Canada Dialogue
in June 2012, Baird pledged CDN$10 million to fund
various ASEAN initiatives.
Nevertheless, the region still perceives Canada as a
fair-weather Asia-Pacific country that only seeks to
establish the basic elements of trade and investment
relations to diversify its trading partners. According
to then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan,
Canada’s admission to the region’s leading economic
and defence forums — the East Asian Summit (EAS)
and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
— remain out of reach until Southeast Asian states are
convinced of the durability of Canada’s re-engagement
(Clark, 2012). As it is widely accepted that “process
matters in an Asia Pacific context...contributing as well
as receiving is important,” Canada should round out its
economic re-engagement strategy with contributions to
regional peace and security (Asia Pacific Foundation of
Canada, 2012: 12).
Maritime diplomacy contributes to regional peace and
stability by addressing urgent problems, such as those
affecting trade and fishing in East Asian waters. The
region relies heavily on these sectors for growth, but
is afflicted with numerous maritime and territorial
disputes that are negatively impacting them. By adding
maritime diplomacy to its economically oriented
regional re-engagement strategy, Canada signals its
determined return to the region, building the reputation
that it requires for membership to East Asia’s premier
institutions. This could, in turn, pave the way for closer
economic ties with East Asia. As Canada has no military
forces permanently deployed to the region, no formal
treaty allies and limited bilateral trade relationships,
3 Canada’s RetuRn to east asia: Re-engagement thRough maRitime diplomaCy
www.Cigionline.oRg poliCy bRieF no. 25 FebRuaRy 2013
maritime diplomacy is the optimal means to convey
its long-term commitment to the region. Above all,
Canada’s strategy must transcend the electoral cycle;
relationships are built in East Asia over the long term.
maRitime pRoblems in a maRitime Region
Canada’s return to East Asia is occurring during a
strategic transition in the region. After 60 years of stability
that underwrote unprecedented economic prosperity,
East Asia is undergoing a strategic shift, as the United
States re-evaluates its global strategic commitments
at a time when China seems prepared to assert itself.
American primacy in East Asia is being questioned
as a function of its domestic financial woes and the
legacy of fighting two wars in the Middle East. Despite
China’s positive contributions to East Asian regionalism
and free trade, concerns abound over its ambitions
for disputed maritime areas, coupled with the lack of
transparency in its military spending. Although US
President Barack Obama announced an unambiguous
foreign policy shift from the Middle East to Asia in
November 2011, there is no doubt that the American
presence in the region will be different than it has been
(Obama, 2011; US Department of Defense, 2012). All
signs point to a United States that leans more heavily on
its allies to share the burden of military responsibility.
At the 11th International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta pledged to keep 60 percent of
the US Navy forward deployed in the region, the most
clear outline of US forces structure “rebalancing” in
East Asia (2012). This amounts to an effort to reassure
regional states of the credibility of the US presence in
the region.
Amid this strategic uncertainty, China has asserted its
maritime claims in the East, and the South China Sea
in particular, with unprecedented vigour. Chinese coast
guard vessels patrol disputed waters more frequently
and have enforced China’s claimed jurisdictional rights
against civilian and military vessels from Japan, Vietnam
and the Philippines. This has resulted in a number of
dangerous armed confrontations at sea. Lurking in
the background is the increasingly capable and active
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. Recent Chinese
behaviour is widely viewed with apprehension,
and threatens to divide East Asia. Indonesia, which
is not a party to a maritime boundary dispute with
China, lodged reservations with the United Nations
in response to ambiguous Chinese claims to the South
China Sea. Japan, which has typically avoided comment
on Southeast Asian maritime security concerns for fear
of alarming both local and Chinese sensibilities, has
reversed course and moved to support Southeast Asian
states that are party to disputes with China, such as
the Philippines. Furthermore, regional meetings have
become staging grounds for diplomatic confrontations
over Chinese activities at sea. Former US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton reminded the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) that “legitimate claims to maritime space
in the South China Sea should be derived solely from
legitimate claims to land features” (2010). Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reacted angrily, calling
the remarks an “attack on China” (“Foreign Minister
Yang,” 2010). Most recently, Cambodia, which occupied
the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2012, was pressured by
China not to include any mention of maritime tensions
in the final communiqués of ASEAN-centred meetings.
As a state that seeks to capitalize on East Asia’s economic
dynamism, Canada should concern itself with these
challenges to regional peace and security because
they threaten to undermine the economic dynamism
4 the CentRe FoR inteRnational goveRnanCe innovation
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upon which its regional interests are predicated. This
strategy, however, needs to be carefully calibrated to
avoid alienating China, with whom Canada has only
recently resuscitated relations. Furthermore, maritime
diplomacy will fail if China perceives Canada to be an
extension of the United States.
the Case FoR maRitime diplomaCy
Maritime diplomacy is the best way forward for
Canada because it is instrumental to Canada’s broader
regional strategy. It builds on Canada’s long-standing
track record in the region and it adopts a role familiar to
regional states. Building confidence is Canada’s legacy
in East Asia. Canada has a long and quite successful
track record of Track-Two diplomacy on non-traditional
security issues in East Asia (Evans, 2009), through
efforts such as the Canadian International Development
Agency’s support of the Indonesian-hosted South China
Sea dialogues in the early 1990s. These were important
confidence-building measures, representing the only
set of meetings where all claimants were present,
particularly at a time of escalating tension (Djalal and
Townsend-Gault, 1999). Canada’s role as an honest
broker in the proceedings is evidenced by the fact that
the Chinese were on record as preferring Canadian
funding to US- or Japanese-funded workshops (Snyder,
Glosserman and Cossa, 2001: 2; 13). Conversations
in the region reveal an expectation that Canada’s re-
engagement will carry some of these elements with it.
Contributing to regional peace and security will build
Canada’s regional prestige, which supports the deeper
institutional engagement that Ottawa is pursuing.
Although the East Asian diplomatic calendar can be
burdensome, these meetings drive regional decision-
making processes. As then US Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell
has suggested, “These institutions, these regular
meetings, tend to drive the process inside government”
(Campbell, 2012). Similarly, Canadian Minister of
National Defence Peter MacKay attended the 2012 IISS
Shangri-La Dialogue to support Canada’s bid for an
invitation to the ADMM Plus; a more active regional
engagement strategy could open doors to the region’s
primary institutions. By leveraging its credentials as
a maritime state as a member of the ARF’s Maritime
Security Working Group, Canada increases its standing
in East Asia. This could, in turn, create momentum
for Canadian participation at the next ADMM Plus
meeting, which has its own maritime security working
group.
Maritime diplomacy and deeper institutional
engagement bring closer political ties and, over time,
improved relations to support Canada’s regional
economic objectives. Canada has been long-time
supporter of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum and is pursuing membership in the
related Trans-Pacific Partnership. ASEAN-centred
trade liberalization has long existed alongside APEC
initiatives, but has historically excluded non-Asian
states (Stubbs, 2002). By paving the way for membership
in institutions like the EAS, Canada gains a window
into the ASEAN-centred process of regional trade
liberalization including trade, finance and regulatory
discussions. This also supports its efforts to pursue
bilateral trade agreements with East Asian economies.
poliCy ReCommendations
Maritime diplomacy deliberately goes beyond Canada’s
Track-Two legacy; East Asian states have mastered the
“habits of dialogue” (Dewitt, 1994). In an era of growing
naval spending and numerous maritime flashpoints,
5 Canada’s RetuRn to east asia: Re-engagement thRough maRitime diplomaCy
www.Cigionline.oRg poliCy bRieF no. 25 FebRuaRy 2013
the region is in need of inclusive security cooperation
that builds transparency between navies and coast
guards. Canada is already deepening military ties with
the region, through, for example, its discussions with
Japan towards an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement, and is negotiating access to military
facilities in Singapore. These will support Canada’s
proven record of humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR) within the region, evidenced in Sri Lanka
in 2004, and offered to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis
in 2008. The proposals outlined below are deliberately
ambitious and are designed to spark debate about
their suitability and feasibility in the context of strained
budgets.
Given Canada’s previous track record as a trusted
bridge builder between China and other states, naval
engagement could be one component of maritime
diplomacy (Adams, 2012). China’s efforts at defence
diplomacy have increased in the past decade, creating
opportunities for more frequent and in-depth Sino-
Canadian defence exchanges. Both countries participate
in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Given that
direct military exercises between the United States
and China are banned by US law, there may be an
opportunity for Canada to conduct its own bilateral
exercises with China; Australia has already done so. In
September 2010, the Royal Australian Navy conducted
an exercise with the PLA Navy in the Yellow Sea,
which included live fire drills, search and rescue (SAR)
operations and joint helicopter missions. The Australian
Defence Force has also conducted a HADR exercise
with the PLA. More ambitiously, Canada and Australia
could work together to foster regular naval interaction
with China, and bring in new partners over time. This
effort would build on the steady stream of Canadian
naval port visits to the region since 1995, and build ties in
advance of China’s participation in the 2014 Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. The ideal geographic focus
of this engagement would be the western Pacific Ocean,
but a more economical alternative is the Indian Ocean
where many of these potential partners are engaged in
anti-piracy missions.
Frigate HMCS Ottawa (FFH 341) at RIMPAC 2012. Source: Royal Canadian Navy.
If deeper naval links are too politically sensitive, coast
guard cooperation is an alternative avenue that is
valued in East Asia. For instance, despite their often
acrimonious relationship, Chinese and Japanese coast
guards have conducted three SAR exercises together
in an effort to build confidence (Shen and Chen, 2011).
Canada, China, Japan and South Korea are members
of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF),
which coordinates efforts among members to address
maritime security challenges. Canada could reach out
to other nations, such as South Korea and Japan, who
are interested in conducting joint exercises, exchanges
or tabletop exercises with Chinese coast guards.
Canada already has close working relations with both
the South Korean and Japanese coast guards through
its membership in the North Pacific Anadromous
Fish Commission, which promotes conservation of
anadromous fish stocks in the North Pacific. Like
Canada, East Asian states confront the challenge of
6 the CentRe FoR inteRnational goveRnanCe innovation
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policing a large exclusive economic zone with limited
resources, thus Canadian expertise and lessons learned
are likely to be appreciated.
Canada could also contribute to coast guard capacity
building in Southeast Asia. Japan trains a number
of Philippine and Indonesian officers at its Coast
Guard Academy. Canada could partner with ASEAN
states to assist these capacity-building efforts, which
could involve Canadian vessels in theatre or simply
educational exchanges. Canada could also explore
regional interest in the establishment of a Southeast
Asian equivalent of the NPCGF. The United States,
China and Japan have all used maritime security
capacity building as part of their efforts to contribute to
regional security in Southeast Asia.
Finally, Canada could foster dialogue on cooperative
resource exploitation in disputed areas. Although the
marginal utility of Track-Two dialogues in East Asia is
on the decline due to their proliferation and a reduction
in earnest participation by Chinese participants, they
are not entirely without value. Canada could lead
discussions toward a regional fisheries management
organization for Southeast Asian waters. Similarly,
Canada could share its experience in maritime
boundary delimitation and resource development in
disputed waters. All East Asian claimant states have
rhetorically committed to this idea, but have been
unwilling to share jurisdiction in contested areas. In
one attempt, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking
agreement, Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine oil
companies collaborated in exploration activities in a
disputed area of the South China Sea. Although the
agreement collapsed due to domestic opposition in the
Philippines, this initiative was the deepest cooperation
witnessed among the South China Sea claimants, and
merits resuscitation with Canadian support.
ConClusion
While maritime diplomacy is an ambitious re-
engagement strategy for Canada, two potent
counterpoints are worth considering. Because Canada is
familiar with European security issues and pan-Atlantic
security institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, it could be argued that it is ill-equipped
to involve itself in matters of East Asian security. East
Asia is home to a different set of multilateral structures
that operate under different rules. In this view, the
proposals herein risk alienating important economic
partners, such as China. Canada should, therefore, limit
its East Asian engagement to economic issues while
leaving strategic questions to those countries directly
affected. For instance, taking a stand on Chinese threats
to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea risks
alienating China for little strategic gain (Manicom, 2012).
An alternative perspective advocates adopting a
“whole-of-country approach” to re-engagement that
seems out of touch with Canada’s history, ongoing
priorities and capacity (Asia Pacific Foundation of
Canada, 2012: 13). Australia, often cited as a model for
Canada’s Asia policy, has doubled-down on the Asian
Century by pledging to strengthen its Asian literacy
(Government of Australia, 2012). However, Canada is
not Australia and will always have important links with
the Americas and with Europe.
By contrast, maritime diplomacy offers a more modest,
if ambitious, route by building on Canada’s past
contributions to regional security and leveraging its
capacity to contribute to stability in East Asia, which
supports its regional economic aspirations.
7 Canada’s RetuRn to east asia: Re-engagement thRough maRitime diplomaCy
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S. McDonough. Pages 160–173. Toronto: University
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Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2012). Securing
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Campbell, Kurt (2012). “The South China Sea and Asia
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CAMPBELL_TRANSCRIPT.pdf.
Clark, Campbell (2012). “Canada Denied Seat at East
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9 Canada’s RetuRn to east asia: Re-engagement thRough maRitime diplomaCy
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John higginbotham, andrea Charron and James maniCom
introdUCtion
The shrinking Arctic ice cap is creating unprecedented geophysical change in the
circumpolar region, a trend that is very likely to continue. Together, this “great
melt” and the delineation of extended national economic zones afford increased
access to economic resources in the Arctic Ocean. Intense activities in commercial,
investment, diplomatic, legal, scientific and academic sectors abound in the new
Arctic, but the region’s long-term significance is only gradually penetrating North
American public consciousness. Media reports such as the recent, virtually ice-
free trans-polar transit of a Chinese icebreaker through the Russian Northern Sea
Route, or the transit of the Northwest Passage by a large cruise ship, are only the
tip of the proverbial economic iceberg. In preparing for the commercialization
1 This policy brief is drawn in large part from discussions at the Arctic Marine Corridors and Resource Development Round Table. The event was held in a House of Commons facility in Ottawa, June 2012.
Key pointS• The Arctic region stands at the cusp of tremendous economic development. Efficient,
secure, environmentally sensitive marine transportation systems and smart public infrastructure could facilitate offshore and onshore energy, mineral, ecotourism and local community development.
• Current Canadian and American government policies, regulations and investment in support of Arctic maritime infrastructure and resource development are inadequate. There is an urgent need for strengthened, comprehensive and innovative national Arctic economic development policies, and Canada-US federal, regional and corporate cooperation in the Arctic.
• Public leadership and private investment, through the development of smart and strategic transportation infrastructure, is urgently needed in the North American Arctic to drive development and facilitate economic activity.
no. 24 noveMber 2012
John higginbothaM
John Higginbotham is a senior distinguished fellow at Carleton University. In his previous roles with the federal government, he coordinated Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative at Transport Canada, was an assistant deputy minister in three departments and served abroad in senior positions in Washington, Hong Kong and Beijing.
andrea Charron
Andrea Charron is assistant professor in political studies at the University of Manitoba. She is also a research associate at Carleton University’s Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), where she was a post-doctoral fellow.
JaMeS ManiCoM
James Manicom is a research fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the development of the global security program. Previously, he held fellowships at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His current research explores Arctic governance, East Asian security and China’s role in ocean governance.
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None of the nuclear-weapon states “has an employee, let alone an inter-agency group,
tasked full time with figuring out what would be required to verifiably decommission
all its nuclear weapons.”
— Jessica T. Matthews, Preface to Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Where black is the color, where none is the number.
— Bob Dylan, “A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall”
Key PoinTS
• The threat of nuclear war is more multi-dimensional than ever, requiring
sustained attention by the world’s leaders and citizens. Nuclear weapons
must be abolished. Zero is the right number of weapons in the world.
• A robust, deep and sustained appreciation of the Cuban missile crisis
— a nuclear war that came within an eyelash of happening — is the
prerequisite for energizing movement toward nuclear abolition. Focusing
on the nearness to doomsday can provide an engine for paralyzed
mechanisms of global governance that are already, at least on paper,
committed to zero nuclear weapons.
• The existing global governance mechanisms for reducing nuclear threats
are more than adequate to reach zero nuclear weapons if empowered to
do so by the international community. These include the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
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JameS g. BlighT and janeT m. lang
James G. Blight is the CIGI chair in foreign policy development and professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA), and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo.
janet M. Lang is research professor at the BSIA and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo.
Blight and Lang are the authors or co-authors of six previous books on the Cuban missile crisis. Their newest book, The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy/Khrushchev/Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis, was published in September 2012 by Rowman & Littlefield.
For information about the project, see:
•armageddonletters.com
•facebook.com/armageddonletters
•twitter.com/armageddontweet
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iNTroDUcTioN
The international community has become adept at responding to disasters.
When a disaster hits — whether natural or as the consequence of human
activity — humanitarian relief can be on the ground almost anywhere in the
world in less than 24 hours. The international community has developed an
elaborate network to respond to catastrophes involving the collaboration
of international agencies, humanitarian relief organizations, national
governments and concerned individuals. The collective ability to help save
lives quickly is unprecedented in human history; the problem remains,
however, that one never knows in advance where disaster will strike, what
the immediate needs of those affected will be or what conditions the first
responders will confront. Given these uncertainties, how can disaster-response
planners best position themselves to take action?
It is natural, inevitable and desirable to look to past disasters in order to
improve responses to future ones, but lesson-drawing, in such cases, is rarely
systematic, as responses to disasters are, by their very nature, typically ad hoc.
Key PoiNTS• Disaster responders must develop communications strategies that clearly identify
both what is and is not known in a timely way, and provide, if at all possible, a basis for risk assessment by individuals, communities, national authorities and international contributors.
• Responders must search for ways to provide urgently needed public goods without undermining public authority.
• Responders must address the psychological as well as the physical needs of victims.
• Greater steps must be taken to improve global and regional disaster preparedness.
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Unleashing the nUclear Watchdog: strengthening and reform of the iaea
Key Points• TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)isthenucleusoftheglobalnucleargovernancesystem.
• Sinceitsestablishmentin1957,theIAEAhasevolveddeftly,sheddingunrealizablegoalsandaddingnewroleswhenrequested,whilecopingwithandlearningfromcatastrophesandalarmingnon-compliancecases—Chernobyl,Iraq,NorthKorea,Iran—andadaptingtotectonicinternationalchangessuchastheendoftheColdWarandthe9/11attacks.
• Today,itfulfillsirreplaceablefunctionsintheareasofnuclearsafeguards,nuclearsafetyandthepromotionofthepeacefulusesofnuclearenergy,andissteadilydevelopingaroleinnuclearsecurity.
• TheAgencyhasmaintainedareputationfortechnicalproficiencyandeffectiveness,despite(orperhapsbecauseof)zerorealgrowthimposedonitformuchofthepast27years.
• TheIAEAcanthusberegardedasa“bargain”forinternationalpeaceandsecurity;ifitdidnotexistitwouldhavetobeinvented.
• Nonetheless,theAgencyisinneedofbothstrengtheningoverallandreforminsomeareas.
• Inrecentyears,theAgencyhassufferedincreasingpoliticizationofitsgoverningbodies,becomeembroiledinaprotractedcompliancedisputewithIranandfalteredinitsresponsetotheFukushimadisaster.
• Inaddition,likeany55-year-oldentity,theAgencyfaces“legacy”issues—notablyinitsmanagementandadministration,useoftechnology,financingand“publicdiplomacy.”
• TheIAEAalsofacessignificantexternalchallenges:avoidingnon-compliancesurprisesbyexploitingnewtechnologiestodetectundeclarednuclearactivities;preparingfortheuncertaintrajectoryofnuclearenergypost-Fukushima;gearingupforequallyuncertainrolesinverifyingnucleardisarmament;meetingstakeholders’expectationsofimprovedtransparencyandaccountability;andmakingendsmeetinaperiodofinternationalfinancialstringency.
• Aboveall,theAgencyneedstherenewedsupportofallitsstakeholders,butespeciallyitsmemberstates,indepoliticizingtheAgency’sgoverningbodies;complyingfullywiththeirobligations;providingtheorganizationwiththenecessarylegalandotherauthorities;andcontributing,incashandkind,toalloftheAgency’sactivities.
no. 23 JUne 2012
trevor findlay
A CIGI Senior Fellow since 2006, Trevor Findlay holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, where he is a professor and director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. He is a graduate of the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University, and a former Australian diplomat. For seven years he was Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in London, United Kingdom. His previous project for CIGI, from 2006 to 2010, culminated in his four-volume report on The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030: Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation. Professor Findlay is currently a joint fellow with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, where he is writing a book on the IAEA.
Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA Trevor Findlay
The conclusions of the June 2012 report on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Trevor Findlay are outlined in this policy brief, which contains recommendations for strengthening and reform of the IAEA.
Cigi papeRs
CIGI PaPersno. 13 — February 2013
Strengthening international Financial inStitutionS to Promote eFFective international cooPerationThomas a. bernes
Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation Thomas A. Bernes
The current global financial crisis resulted from the failure of major economies and global institutions to address emerging fault lines in global financial markets and global
institutions. No single country has the ability or resources to fix things on its own — a near-unprecedented degree of collective action is required.
CIGI PaPersno. 12 — January 2013
Another Fine Mess: repAiring the governAnce oF internAtionAl FinAnciAl regulAtionPIerre sIklos
Another Fine Mess: Repairing the Governance of International Financial Regulation Pierre Siklos
Five years after the onset of the global financial crisis, policy makers seemingly continue to believe that the severity of any crisis-led downturn can be divorced from its
source. Credibility in new international regulatory frameworks must begin at home with a determination for monetary policies to work together.
CIGI PaPersno. 11 — January 2013
Leadership in a TurbuLenT ageFen osler HamPson and Paul HeInbeCker
Leadership in a Turbulent Age Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker
Sound economic policies, which are in short supply in most key nations of the world, are fundamental to national security and international leadership. The United States must work alongside others — and accept that others will sometimes work together
without it — to deal with a wide range of persistent and emerging global problems and issues.
CIGI PaPersno. 10 — January 2013
SuStainable Development anD Financing critical global public gooDSBarry CarIn
Sustainable Development and Financing Critical Global Public Goods Barry Carin
The idea of a “Green Super Fund” can be framed as a positive sum game, with a win-win-win allocation that would garner widespread global support and ultimately be accepted by all the major players.
CIGI PaPersno. 9 — november 2012
A Policy MisMAtch: cAnAdA And the United stAtes in the AsiA-PAcific RegionJames manICom
A Policy Mismatch: Canada and the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region James Manicom
The United States and Canada, two of the world’s closest allies, have reinvigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the Asia-Pacific region. On balance, however, Canada may not be an ideal
Pacific partner for the United States.
10 the CentRe FoR inteRnational goveRnanCe innovation
www.Cigionline.oRg poliCy bRieF no. 25 FebRuaRy 2013
about CigiThe Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.
CIGI’s current research programs focus on four themes: the global economy; global security; the environment and energy; and global development.
CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.
Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l’appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l’Ontario.
For more information, please visit www.cigionline.org.
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