Can Turkey Consolidate Democracy?

Introduction

The process of democratic consolidation is a matter of great interest to scholars because

democratic freedom is viewed as a basic human right. The current research explores the

process of democratic transition and the prospects for consolidation in Turkey. There is a

voluminous amount of research regarding recent democratic transitions also known as the

third wave of democracies;1 however, comparatively little attention has been given to

Turkey. Although Turkey is sometimes discussed as a third wave democracy, it must be

noted that Turkey’s first attempt at democracy was in 1950 and it is, therefore, both a

second wave and a third wave democracy. This is an important factor because Turkey’s

transition process has continued much longer than other third wave democracies.

Furthermore, several countries that began their transition process in the 1990s have

already come closer to consolidation than Turkey.

Turkey is an interesting case because it has had a cyclical pattern of democracy

and authoritarian rule, reverting back to democracy relatively quickly compared to other

countries. In addition, Turkey was never a praetorian state in the classic sense2 like many

other authoritarian third world regimes, especially in the past. The military regimes that

1 The third wave democracies refer to the phenomenon of the most recent wave of democratic transitionsstarting in the 1970s and culminating in the mid 1990s. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave:Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991).2 Although the military is the final arbitrator of power, the ambitions of military leaders have not been thoseof political entrepreneurs in the sense that they use their positions to obtain unrestricted power and wealth.In the South American states the actors who usurp power are often refereed to a cuadillos and much hasbeen written about their pursuit for personal wealth and power. For a discussion of praetorian states seePaul W. Zagorski, Democracy vs. National Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), ch. 1.Also see Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1987), ch. 6.

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governed Turkey did not do so solely for personal power or political entrepreneurship.

This is evidenced by the fact that military regimes were short lived when compared to

military dictatorships in other countries. The question, therefore remains, why has

democracy in Turkey stagnated for so long? What are the factors that have prevented

Turkey from consolidating its democracy? The preliminary research suggests that

democratic consolidation in Turkey has failed because of the high degree of factionalism

and political polarization between political parties. Turkey’s highly ideological and

factional political parties are ineffective at negotiating pacts and this has prevented them

from becoming progressive political forces of change that can work toward consolidating

democracy. An intervening variable is the high level of military autonomy of the Turkish

armed forces.

Concepts and Definitions

Before continuing on it is important to clarify concepts, as there has been a great deal of

debate and criticism in the literature regarding the meaning of both democracy and

democratic consolidation.3 In the current case, Turkey is viewed as a hybrid democracy.4

Transitions to democracy generally happen in two phases. The first phase occurs when

an authoritarian regime is disposed and a democratic government is installed, the country

then becomes an electoral democracy. Turkey has reached this phase and has since

stagnated. It is therefore, in a hybrid stage according to Larry Diamond’s classificatory

3 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions About Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7 (April1996), 34-51. Also see David Collier & Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: ConceptualInnovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 44 (1997), 430-451. And Samuel Huntington, “AfterTwenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 8 (October 1997), 3-12.

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scheme.5 However, it is in the second phase where democratic consolidation occurs and

a liberal democracy is created.

The second phase of democratic consolidation occurs when a government

becomes an effective democratic regime.6 As this is somewhat ambiguous, Robert

Dahl’s definition of a polyarchy is a starting point many scholars take when describing a

country in which democracy has been consolidated. Dahl’s conception of democracy

(polyarchy) requires free, fair, and competitive elections. It also requires the

accompanying freedoms that make democracy truly meaningful such as alternative forms

of information and institutions that guarantee that government policies will be a reflection

of the people’s voice.7 In addition to Dahl’s description of the requirements for

democracy, it should be added that the democracy makes the country immune from the

possibilities of regression to authoritarian rule and makes “democracy the only game in

town.”8 By only game in town it is meant that democratic means are the only legitimate

method of overturning elected officials and actors work within the system to change

political policy and/or elect new representatives. Turkey does not meet the criteria for

consolidated/liberal democracy. The absence of these features will be discussed below in

the analysis.

Competing Theoretical Perspectives on Democratic Transition and Consolidation

A number of theoretical perspectives have been used to explain democratic transitions,

stagnation, regression or the lack of any form of democratic transition at all. Two

4 Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002), 21.5 Ibid., p. 24.6 See O’Donnell p. 18.7 Robert Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1-5.

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competing models are structural, and agent/actor centered arguments that develop

theories about processes of democratization.

Structural arguments often use class structure and the economic system to explain

democratic transition or the absence of it. A seminal work in this area is Capitalist

Development and Democracy by Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens.9 The central

argument of Rueschemeyer et al. is that the link between capitalist development and

democracy is a product of class structure. The class that has the most to gain from

democracy, the working class, is the one most likely to support it. On the other hand, the

class most likely to oppose democracy, the land owning class, has the most to loose from

democracy and will not support it. In other words, capitalist development is associated

with democracy because capitalist development weakens the upper class and strengthens

the lower class. The working class is empowered by capitalism because capitalism gives

the workers the skills necessary for organization and self-mobilization.10 Workers then

mobilize themselves and negotiate with the elite for a larger voice in society. This

mobilization is able to occur because capitalism creates a shift in the occupational

structure of society in which the urban working class grows in importance and, therefore,

has bargaining power against the elites, when effectively organized. The living and

working conditions of capitalism create the environment in which workers can organize.

This is, of course not the only structural base argument. Several researchers have

demonstrated a link between economic development and democracy.11 Most, however,

8 Andrew Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9 (April 1998), 91.9 Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development & Democracy (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1992).10 Ibid., p. 6.11 For a detailed research study on the influence of economic development and democracy see RobertBarrow, “Determinants of Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy 107 (December 1999), 158-159.

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have not shown a causal link as Rueschemeyer et al. do. The causal link makes their

argument more convincing than the other arguments. However, the structural

prescription for the development of democracy is critiqued because the approach is to

deterministic (economic structure determines democratic development).12

On the other hand, actor centered approaches posit that democracy either develops

or fails to develop because of actors.13 Authoritarian rulers may be forced to liberalize in

trying to reduce opposition or even co-opt the opposition.14 Many scholars suggest that

actors either on the bottom or the top of the political hierarchy influence liberal change in

authoritarian regimes. When pressure is coming from the bottom the regime has two

choices, either repress the people or cede some of its power. When it comes from the top,

it is the result of a split in the power block. Wherever the influence comes from,

authoritarians end up ceding some of their power in order to stay in power or they are

overthrown. This can sometimes cause a spiral effect in which the regime continues to

loose power15 especially if it resorts to repression to control oppositional forces.16

However, Adam Przeworski argues that this model of liberalization may explain

some transitions, but for the most part is too crude and simplistic and that decision to

liberalize comes from both the top and bottom.17 His approach posits that successful

transitions occur where the actors involved are able to form pacts (negotiated

12 Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49 (April1997), 176.13 Ibid.14 Juan Linz, “Transitions to Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly 13 (Summer 1990), 150.15 Adam Przeworski, “The Games of Transition,” in Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., Issues in DemocraticConsolidation: The New South American Perspective (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),111-112.16 Linz, p. 15017 Przeworski, p. 108.

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settlements). Przeworski calls this process transition by extrication.”18 Przeworski

views democratic transition as a game in which the relevant actors are hardliners and

reformers within the authoritarian regime and moderates and radicals in oppositions to

the authoritarian regime. Extrication of the authoritarian regime can only occur if a pact

is formed between the reformers and the moderates. The reformers negotiate consent

with the hardliners and the moderates control the radicals. In this process of negotiation,

hardliners are induced to go along with reformers and radicals are discouraged from

attempting to extract greater concessions from the incumbent regime.19 Although at first

sight the dynamic seems very simple, it is, indeed, quite complex. Perhaps the

complexity of the negotiation dynamic can best be explained in Przeworski’s words:

If Reformers are a viable interlocutor for the Moderates only when they cancontrol or deliver the Hardliners, Moderates have no political control unless theycan restrain the Radicals…. As Reformers must negotiate a deal acceptable toHardliners, Moderates must deliver terms tolerable for Radical. And if theycannot obtain such terms from Reformers, their only solution is to leave enoughpower in the hands of the apparatus of repression to intimidate the Radicals. Onthe other hand Moderates need Radicals to be able to put pressure on theReformers; on the other hand, Moderates fear that Radicals will not consent to thedeal they work out with reformers.20

Figure 1 shows the potential outcomes of this negotiation dynamic.

Radicals Reformers

Hardliners

18 Ibid., p. 117. Also note that the process of extrication is what Huntington simply calls transformation.Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 114.19 Przeworski, pp. 117-118.20 Przeworski, pp. 118-119.

Authoritarianregime

survives inold form

Authoritarianregime holds

withconcessions

Democracywithout

guarantees

Democracywith

guarantees

7

Moderates (opposition)

Figure 1This dynamic involves strategic choices on the part of both reformers and moderates.

Reformers must choose to either remain in alliance with the authoritarian regime or seek

democratic alliances with the moderates. While moderates can seek the entire destruction

of the political forces represented by the authoritarian elite by allying with the radicals or

they can seek to ally with the reformers.21 However, only one choice for each of them

can lead to a consolidated democracy. It is the failure of the Turkish political elite to

make the necessary choices that lead to a consolidated democracy that is the focus of the

current research.

Theory and Method

The current research will use the elite actor-centered approach, while taking into

consideration the fact that actors make decisions within particular historic context and

within the constraints of this context. The model used in the current research is a slightly

altered version of Przeworski’s “Game of Transition” as outlined above. The goal of this

research is to test Turkey’s multiple breakdowns and subsequent transitions against

Przeworski’s elite actor centered model of transition. See Figure 2 for Turkey’s game of

transition.

21 Ibid.

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Radicals Reformers (opposition)

Hardliners (state elite)

Moderates (opposition)

Figure 222

Each breakdown/transition is tested against Przeworski’s model and the factors

leading to each breakdown are compared to see if there are consistent patterns in

Turkey’s failure to consolidate democracy. Although Turkey is the main focus and a

unique and interesting case in its own right, references are made to South American

countries for comparative purposes. Many South American countries share similarities

with Turkey. First and foremost, several South American countries, at least in the past,

were “protected democracies.”23 A protected democracy is one in which the military has

a high degree of autonomy because the state is a national security state due to some

internal security threat. Threats to internal security in South America were typically

leftist/communist in nature. Turkey is also a national security state with a high level of

military autonomy. Turkey’s internal security threats are primarily the threat of Islamic

fundamentalism and terrorism. However, both left wing and right wing groups have been

22 Transition/Breakdown model adapted from Przeworski, p. 117.

Breakdown ofDemocracy/Authoritarian

regime

1

HybridDemocracy/

State elite remainin power withconcessions

2

ElectoralDemocracy

withoutguarantees(unstable)

LiberalDemocracy with

guarantees

4

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a threat in the past. However, the main focus of the current research will be to compare

the individual Turkish transitions using Przeworski’s elite transition model as a guide.

Case Study

The discussion of Turkey’s attempts at establishing democracy will start with the role of

the state centered ideology and the military. This section of society, as represented by

cell # 1 in the transition dynamic, has been a constant source of power regardless of

electoral outcomes. Next, the study will address each one of Turkey breakdowns in

democracy and analyze them against the Przeworski elite transition model. Turkey

provides an interesting test for Przeworski’s game of transition model because of its

several breakdowns in democracy. The model shows what is necessary for democracy to

consolidate and, therefore, provides insight regarding the features of the Turkish political

system that are lacking and have caused it to breakdown so many times. As discussed

earlier, transitions toward democracy occur in two phases. It is the second transition,

which involves consolidating democracy, that is the primary focus of the paper.

Any discussion of Turkish politics needs to consider the role of the state

elite/military and the political elite. The state elite is comprised of the military, senior

government official and military officers. These actors view themselves as protectors of

the official state ideology– republicanism, nationalism, etatism, and reformism.24 The

state elite believes in a state-centered “rational democracy.” While the political elite, on

23 For a detailed description of protected democracies in Latin America see Brian Loveman, “ProtectedDemocracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993,” Journal ofInter-American Studies and World Affairs 36 (Summer 1994), 105-189.24 Metin Heper, “Consolidationg Turkish Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 3 (April 1992), 6.

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the other hand, see themselves as representatives of the people and are thus at odds with

the state elite.25

The role of the state is of paramount importance to the study of Turkish politics.

The Turkish republic formed in tumultuous times. The Ottomans had fought a war of

independence against the European powers, who were trying to divide Turkey. Shortly

thereafter there was a war of independence against the Ottoman regime. During the same

era, ethnic nationalism further threatened the state. Elites, therefore, worked toward

integration and in doing so, smothered the rights of a large portion of the population.26

The founders of the republic set goals of Westernization, modernization and most

importantly secularization. An important element to this process was democracy.

However the founders of the republic believed in a “rational democracy” that had no

place for Islam in politics.27

The role of the military in the state elite cannot be under-stated; they are a

powerful influence in the shaping of public policy. Since the Ottoman period, Turkey’s

military have been ardent guardians of the state and a major goal of theirs became

safeguarding the democratic-secular state.28 In fact, they have garnered wide support for

their interventions and are seen by many as guardians of the state and, in some ways, seen

as a necessary to protect the nation form itself.29 The military view themselves as above

the state and above the political parties as protectors of the “national will,” as determined

25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Metin Heper & Aylin Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent TurkishExperience,” Armed Forces and Society 26 (Summer 2000), 636.28 Ibid.29 George Harris, Turkey Coping with Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 154.

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by their conception of the state-centric ideology. Some have even described the military

as a separate social class or even a state within a state.30

The first two attempts at forming a multiparty system in Turkey failed. Attempts

to form opposition parties came from within the only existing party, the Republican

Peoples Party (RPP). The state elite initiated the new parties in 1924 and again in 1930

with the approval of the President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As soon as the parties began

to speak publicly, they drew wide spread political support, and it became clear that

people were dissatisfied with the governments secularist and economic policies.31 In

both cases, the parties were promptly disbanded. In terms of the transition model, the

state elite/hardliners anticipated this as a reform movement that would keep power in the

hands of the state elite (the RPP). In other words, they anticipated a move from cell # 1

to cell # 2 in the transition game outlined above. When they saw that moderates and

radicals were aligning, they disbanded the parties within a few months.

The next attempt to transition toward a multiparty democracy occurred in 1945.

The president of Turkey, Ismet Inonu, agreed to allow a multiparty system and opposition

parties quickly formed. Again popular support for the major opposition party, the

Democratic Party (DP), developed rapidly and relations between the RPP and the DP

became strained.32 Initially the DP was a moderate party and with their 1950 electoral

victory there was a smooth transition of power. The DP received 53% of the popular

30 William Hale, “The Turkish Army in Politics, 1960-73,” in eds. Andrew Finkle & Nukhet Sirma, TurkishState, Turkish Society (London: Routledge, 1990), 54.31 Arif T. Payasioglu, “Political Leadership and Political Parties,” in eds. Robert Ward & DankwartRustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 420.32 Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder:Lynne Rynner, 2000), 15.

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vote while the RPP received 39% of the popular vote.33 Because of the design of

Turkey’s voting and parliamentary system, this was a landslide victory of the DP. They

received 416 seats out of the 487 Assembly seats in the parliament.34 The victory of the

DP was unexpected and tensions rose between the RPP and the DP when the DP began to

antagonize urban workers, intellectuals and other supporters of the RPP. When RPP

began to gain greater support because of the DP poor performance, the DP regime

became very oppressive and began to limit freedom.35

Again the state elite anticipated that the transition to a multiparty system as

transition by “reform” and did not anticipate loosing a significant amount of power.

They essentially thought they were making a lateral move in the game of transition

scheme as outlined above, a move from cell #1 to cell # 2. Unfortunately, voting patterns

did not conform to the hopes of the state elite.

The first coup

A variety of factors lead the military to seize power in the first coup. The DP drew wide

support solely because it was an opposition party to RPP. This support came from many

sectors of society including the business class who resented the state managed economy

and the religious who resented the RPP’s militant secularism.36 Another problem from

the state elites perspectives was that they lost economic and political power during the era

of the DP. Furthermore, a large economic crisis developed that brought students into the

streets to protest the government’s economic policies. As voices of dissent grew louder

33Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri.http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.genel_secimler34 Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics (Washington: TheBrookings Institution, 1963), 7.35 Dankwart Rustow, “Turkey’s Travails,” Foreign Affairs 49 (Fall 1979), 92.36 Weiker, pp. 7-8.

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the DP increasingly turned away from political liberalism and increasingly toward

authoritarianism.37 When the DP was confronted with opposition from the RPP, the DP

responded with legislation that restricted freedom of speech and the press.38 The

economic crisis and restricted freedoms led to violent student protests against the DP and

the DP tried to use the military to quell protests. When the DP leader asked the Military

to step in on behalf of the government against the students, a core of military officers saw

this as the final straw. In others words, it looked as though the DP was reverting back to

a pre-1950 type of one-party authoritarian rule.39 The DP government was overthrown

by a group of military officers because they were viewed as a threat to the state/national

interest. A primary fear was the DP’s appeal to those interested in bringing Islam into

politics.

Again, the state elite initially envisioned making a lateral move by ceding more

power to the RPP (cell # 2). However, an alliance between moderates and radicals

produced an unstable government as cell # 3 illustrates. As the opposition radicalized

even further, the hardliners took control, as cell # 1 in the transition model predicts.

Rather than compromising with the reformers who were allied with the state elite, the DP

sought allies with radical political groups. This produced instability, as the transitions

model predicts in cell #3, and the failure of Turkey’s first attempt at democracy. It is

interesting to note that in both the pre 1950 attempts to form a multiparty system and in

the one that resulted in the 1960 coup, the elite attempted to make a lateral move in the

transitional dynamic model to cell # 2. The first two times (pre-1950) the state elite saw

37 Cem Erogul, “The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-1971,” Irvin Schick & Ertgrul Tonak eds.Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987), 112.38 Ben Lombardi, “Turkey – The Return of the Reluctant Generals?” Political Science Quarterly 112 (April1997), 204.

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that a lateral move in the transition dynamic was not going to happen and stopped the

initiative before it was too late. The third time produced the unstable events that led to

the coup of 1960.

This attempt to make a lateral move on the transition dynamic may be analogous

to Pinochet’s attempt to stay in power in 1988. He organized a plebiscite to approve his

continued tenure as president and to his surprise he lost.40 In some sense, by organizing a

plebiscite he wanted to appear as a reformer or at least change status from dictator to

presidents. However, the electorate did not meet his expectations. More important than

this similarity is how Pinochet’s loss came about. To defeat Pinochet victory required

political actors to moderate their ideological differences. Chile had learned from the

mistakes of their past hyper-polarization and were able to unify to oust Pinochet.

Pinochet was, however able to control the system and secure himself substantial exit

guarantees. More will be said below about moderating political ideologies below.

It is interesting to note that once the DP came into power, they radicalized and in

some sense acted like an opposition party even when they were in power. This was also

the case in Argentina where once the opposition (UCR) party was elected, it continued to

use the same antagonistic tactics that helped it win the election. This inflexible stance

was one of the factors that led to the breakdown in Argentina’s democratic government in

1930.41 Peter Smith suggests two reasons for the UCR’s behavior in the Argentina case.

First, the long experience of the UCR as the “out” group created a firm oppositionist

39 Frank Tachau & Metin Heper, p. 21.40 Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile: Origins of Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy,” in LarryDiamond, Jonathan Hartlyn et al. eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin American SecondEdition (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999), 193.41 Peter Smith, The Breakdown of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-1930,” in Juan Linz & Alfred Stepaneds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes in Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,1978), 22

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mentality. Second, the new political opportunity offered unprecedented power and the

party professionals were unwilling to share this power.42 These factors could have been

responsible for the DP opposition in Turkey as well. Although it is unlikely that the DP’s

original leaders initially had such a strong oppositionists mentality as they were born

from the traditional state elite tradition. However, their constituent base quite likely had

an opposition mentality because they were excluded from politics for so long, which may

explain their rapid success as an opposition party. The opposition mentality of the

masses probably radicalized the leaders of the DP. In terms of the second factor, the

newfound power of the DP leaders was probably something they did not want to

relinquish.

In 1960, the military assumed a guardian role of the state in which it tried to re-

establish and preserve the status quo.43 The coup can be characterized as what Samuel

Huntington calls “reformist.” The junta did not only clean up the government, but also

made reforms in political, social, and economic structure.44 Among these reforms was a

new constitution designed to prevent the circumstance that led to the 1960 coup from

happening again.

Perhaps the most significant change was the development of a National Security

Council (NSC). The NSC gave the military a wide range of powers and institutionalized

its role in politics. It is of note that the military did not set up a praetorian state in which

they used the state for personal entrepreneurship, as was the case in many South

American countries. The military regime did, however, establish a much wider base of

42 Ibid.43 The status quo as outlined by the state-centered ideology, Ibid.44 Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns in Military Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 32-34

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power through the exit guarantees they created for themselves.45 These guarantees

included a broad mandate to influence all matters concerning security through the NSC.46

The NSC interrupts security matters quite broadly and, therefore, has a great deal of

influence in government.

The constitution created by the junta represented a pact between the military (state

elite) and reformers in the RPP.47 The 1961 constitution established a legal framework

that had never been seen in Turkey. Its aim was to restrain the state political institutions

and safeguard the basic rights of the people. It broke down the power of the state into

legislative (bicameral parliament), executive, and judiciary branches each with

independence form one another.48 It also provided unprecedented political freedoms for

the citizens by allowing more freedom of speech, religion, and the formation of unions.

It is not uncommon for authoritarian regimes to make liberalizing concessions to pacify

and co-opt some of those who were opposed to the regime.49 These new freedoms in

civil society caused a rapid transformation in politics, a transformation the military

guardians did not anticipate.

Again the plan of the authoritarian regime upon re-establishing democracy was to

make a lateral move in the transition dynamic, from cell # 1 to cell # 2. However, the

electoral results did not produce the desired outcome. The RPP received only 36.7% of

the vote. The DP’s successor parties, the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party

45 Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder:Lynne Rynner, 2000), 116.46 George Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s,” in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin eds.,State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 183.47 Kemal Karpat, p. 142.48 Cem Erogul, p. 131.49 Linz, p. 150.

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(NTP) received 34.7% and 13% of the vote respectively.50 Since these were the

successor parties to the DP, the voters essentially put back into power the party that was

ousted by the military in preceding year.51 This again was not the landslide victory the

state elite were hoping for because the JP and the NTP technically had the ability to from

a coalition government. The state/military elite, however, did not allow this coalition to

occur.

The Coup by Memorandum

The first parliamentary cabinet after the restoration of civilian rule was established with a

forced coalition between the RPP and the DP. The state elite would not let the two

successor parties of the DP form a government themselves until the following election.52

The RPP/JP coalition was short lived and was followed by several coalitions between the

RPP and the minority parties. However, by 1965 the JP had over 50% of the popular

vote and was able to form the government. During this era splits occurred within the

RPP. Those who were more oriented toward the center split off and formed the Reliance

Party. While the RPP redrafted their platform to appeal to the more radical left, hoping

this would help bring a parliamentary majority in the following election.

By 1968 the new multiparty system was out of control. The left became

increasing fragmented and radicalized. The right “regrouped” to counterattack the rise of

leftist radicalism and in turn became radical themselves. Violent clashes began to occur

between right wing and left wing groups. The government (JP) took an aggressive stance

50 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri.51 Kemal Karpat, p. 143.52 Ibid.

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toward the left and jeopardized the new era of pluralism by taking sides with the right.53

Political/ideological divisions were wide spread even inside the parliamentary majority

party, making the government impotent to mitigate the crisis.54 In 1971, again the

military went beyond its background role and issued a communiqué to the JP which

threatened a coup if the government could not put an end to anarchy, which had arose

from their impotency.55 Once again the military’s goal was to preserve the secular statist

regime. The cabinet was dissolved and the government managed to prevent a “full

coup.” However, instability within the government remained and four separate prime

ministers tried to establish a cabinet between the time of the military communiqué and

the scheduled 1973 elections.56 By 1973 the military agreed on a bipartisan caretaker

government to oversee the upcoming election and democracy was restored. The RPP

received 33% of the vote and the JP 29% of the vote.

The game of transition model does not explain this breakdown as well as the

previous case. In this case, both the JP and RPP moved toward the right and left

respectively. The RPP was increasingly isolating itself from the state elite. At the same

time, the moderates and the radical right opposed the state elite, which created the

instability that cell # 3 predicts. Furthermore, achieving some sort of negotiated pact to

move toward the consolidation was not possible with the fractionalized relationship of the

right and the left. Although Przeworski’s model does not account for the

multidimensional dynamic exactly as they occur in the real world of Turkey, it still

retains a predictive benefit. Again, Turkey’s politicians failed to establish a viable center

53 Ibid., p. 134.54 Ibid., p. 136.55 Dankwart Rustow, “Turkey Travails,” p. 90.

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by which they could negotiate public policy decisions and work toward consolidation of

democracy.57

The Third Coup

The RPP under the leadership of Bulent Ecivet moved even further to the left and

began to ally itself with groups that were against the state centered tradition of the RPP.58

This was a total shift in the state-centered ideology and a move toward creating a socialist

party.59 The RPP began to push what they called a socialist democratic agenda. While

the main opposition party had a conservative market oriented agenda. With this genuine

ideological shift of the RPP both parties began to look toward the periphery to find allies.

In doing so, they allied themselves with radical groups. By allying itself with radical

groups, the RPP completely alienated itself from the military as they saw these leftist

groups as a threat to national security. As the left and right ideologies shifted away form

the center, polarization between the political parties increased.60

The formation of the “Nationalist Front” government in 1975 as coalition between

the supposedly center right AP government and two other radical parties caused further

tension between the political parties and the military.61 The coalition government formed

56 Mehmet Ali Birand, The General’s Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980 (London:Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1987), 15.57 This phenomenon is not uncommon. Deep-rooted polarization between political parties is common factorleading to the breakdown of democratically elected governments and has occurred in Latin America onnumerous occasions. Chile in 1973 and Venezuela in 1948 are two examples58 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, p. 117.59 Karpat, p. 147.60 Heper, p. 118.61 Ibid., p. 119.

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afterwards by the RPP and minority parties was equally as disastrous.62 The polarization

characterized by the political sector spread to other sectors as well including, the teaching

profession, security services, and the civil bureaucracy.63 Waves of violence broke out

against both extremists and moderates. The continuing violence polarized political

divisions even further.64 The violence and the fragmentation in Turkish politics and

Turkish society for that matter, led to the military second overt coup in twenty years and

its third intervention in democracy. The threat posed from both Islamic fundamentalism

and radical violence was of paramount concern.

The events leading up to the coup were complex. As stated with the previous

transition case, the multi-dimensional aspects of Turkish politics are not specifically

accounted for in Przeworski’s model. However, the model does predict when a stable

democracy will develop, and Turkey, again, did not meet the criteria. The traditional

reformers (the RPP) had changed significantly and no longer had a real power base in the

state elite. With the radicalization of the RPP, no political parties supported the reformist

agenda or the state elite. Rather than the center right and the center left (the moderates

and reformers) forming pacts to work out a reasonable political agenda, each aligned

themselves with radical elements on the right and left respectively. Although, the

transition dynamic does not account for this exact situation, cell # 3 suggests that

instability would result from such a combination of occurrences.

This intervention was different than the others in that the military was no longer

aligned with the RPP, or any other social group for that matter. In fact, there was so

much political fragmentation that the military was the only homogeneous group in

62 Karpat, p. 148.63 Heper, p. 122.

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society.65 There was no state elite to align with as they had in the 1960 coup. Rather

than creating a new body to run the government, the NSC took control and made

governing decisions with little outside consultation. They abolished all of the old

political parties in an attempt to limit partisan competition and also reaffirmed the powers

of the NSC. The new constitution also restricted freedoms regarding the formation of

groups that were allowed under the 1961 constitution.

This high level of polarization between parties and within parties has remained.

In several elections, five separate parties were able to pass the 10% voting threshold and

made it into parliament. This provided for several unstable coalitions. No government

had been able to establish a ruling majority in parliament until the most recent election.

Furthermore, the military has maintained a high level of autonomy and has continued to

influence political decisions behind the scenes, using the threat of Islamic

fundamentalism and terrorism as their justification. And indeed, internal security was

threatened by Kurdish separatism through the late 80s to the late 90s.

Discussion

When the above cases of democratic breakdown are compared it is observe that

Przeworski’s model has predictive value for the Turkish case. A couple of patterns

emerge. Since the initial development of the multiparty system, the moderates have

continually allied themselves with the radicals on the right, most notably religious

fundamentalists. Initially, the RPP was consistent in that it allied with the state elite.

However, later the RPP changed their party platform and broke off their alignment with

64 Ibid.,

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the state elite. From each breakdown it can also be observed that the lack of ideological

consensus prevented the government from keeping order. Each breakdown resulted from

a stalemate in parliament due to the inability or political parties to obtain a consensus on

how to handle important political crisis, primarily relating to the economy and internal

security (Islamic fundamentalism and separatist terrorism). In other words, the left and

the right were unable to establish centrist parties in which they could negotiate to solve

the emergent political problems. Further complicating the problem were the most radical

groups on each side of the spectrum trying to take advantage of the chaos by promoting

their own ideological agenda.66

It appears that the right and the left strived to differentiate themselves in the hopes

of gaining some electoral advantage. Perhaps they realized that this rigid differentiation

would cause voters to choose sides. And indeed, these competing ideologies polarized

Turkish society as well. The polarization and fragmentation is reflected in voting

patterns throughout the 1980s and 1990s.67

A continual intervening variable has been the high degree of military autonomy.

Even when the military were not the figureheads of government, they had a high degree

of influence in the political process. At times, they did not allow opposition parties to

form governing coalitions. They were also able to control the selection of the president.

In most cases, they ensured that the president was a former high-ranking military officer.

On the other hand, overt military control was short lived and an elected government

quickly returned to office. Albeit, not a government free of military constraints.

65 Ahemet Evin, “Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980,” in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evineds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 211.66 Evin, p. 203.67 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimler.

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By the 1980 intervention there existed no group that could work to create a

consensus by which to govern the state. The situation in Turkey gives support to the elite

consensus model of democracy in that it shows how the lack of consensus prohibits

progressive change toward a consolidated democracy. As one can see from this case

study, Turkey’s history supports an elite actor-centered approach to the study of

democracy. Furthermore, it shows that Przeworski’s model is a useful heuristic by which

to view the transition dynamic. In none of the above cases were the political parties able

to establish a true center right and center left by which they could effectively govern and

establish a consolidated democracy. However, the question still remains, why have the

Turkish elite not been able to form governing coalitions that work toward consolidating

democracy?

The Turkish political elite and the state elite have not developed a political culture

conducive to the necessities of democratic governance. The political culture necessary

for democratic governance includes: moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and

accommodation among political elites.68 Dankwart Rustow lists four conditions that

make democracy happen – national unity, entrenched and serious conflict, conscious

decision to adopt democratic rules and the habituation of these rules.69 Although Rustow

does not refer to these characteristics as political culture, they are indeed features of

political culture because they are manifest in reoccurring patterns of behavior.

Unfortunately the only one of these characteristics that the Turkish elite seems to

have is entrenched and serious conflict. There has not been national unity. Although the

68 Larry Diamond, “Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy,” in ed. Larry Diamond, PoliticalCulture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 10.69 Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2(April 1970), 361.

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founders of the Republic tried to create unity through the indoctrination of Turkish

nationalism and the denial of various ethnic identities, these strategies have failed to

develop a national unity. Militant secularism has also been a problem because it is

divisive. The conscious adoption of democratic rules has not occurred as can be

demonstrated by the willingness of the military to intervene in politics. Needless to say,

habituation to the rules of the democratic process has not occurred either. There must be

agreement on these rules before they can be adopted.

Several South American cases illustrated how the development of a democratic

political culture is important to the development of democratic institutions. An example

is the Venezuela case, which established democracy in 1958. Although it is not a perfect

democracy it has endured for almost 50 years and illustrates how the institutionalization

of the political culture is necessary for democracy. In Venezuela, it was widely

recognized that political factionalism led to the military take over of 1948.70 To prevent

this form happening again, political elites made a conscious decision to reduce inter-party

tensions by signing a pact. The pact recognized the legitimacy of competing parties,

depersonalized conflict, and called for the elimination of violence. The pact was

solidified by the relevant parties with an agreement to form a coalition government

regardless of the outcome of the election.71 Venezuela maintained a stable level of

democracy until recently. As discussed early in the paper, Chile was also able to

overcome political polarization through establishing consensus.

70 Daniel Levine, “Venezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics,” in Juan Linz &Alfred Stepan eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes in Latin America (Baltimore: John HopkinsUniversity Press, 1978), 93.71 Ibid.

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The answer to the previous question begs yet another question. Why hasn’t

Turkey developed a political culture more conducive to democracy? This question is

more difficult to answer than the previous question. This is perhaps due to the types of

regimes transitions that have occurred in each case. From the beginning, reform came

from above. This was the case with all transition to democracy. However, when those

from above did not like the outcome they took control and tried again after altering the

rules by amending the constitution or creating a new one. There was never a rupture in

the traditional power structure. The state elites always remained the ultimate arbitrator of

power. On the other hand, in cases where there is reform through rupture, transitions

seem to happen more smoothly.72 This was the case for Argentina in 1982. The agenda

of the transition was set by the anti-incumbent elites. Without competition from the

incumbent military regime, the two main opposition parties were able to face-off in an

election the following year. The transition was brief and relatively uncomplicated.73

This type of transition is smoother and shorter because the pre-existing power base is

eliminated.

The lack of a bottom up or a transition from outside the traditional elite structure

may explain why Turkey has not developed a political culture more suitable for

democracy. The elite version of democracy was always imposed from above and this is

inherently an undemocratic method of achieving democracy. The state elite maintained

too much power in each case for a true democracy to develop. In order to maintain this

power, they often legitimized their power by emphasizing internal security threats,

specifically Kurdish Separatism and Islamic fundamentalism.

72 Gerardo Munck & Carol Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South American and EasternEurope in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 29 (April, 1997), 353-354.

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Postscript

The recent election of November 2003 gives hope for the consolidation of democracy in

Turkey. A party that openly affiliates itself with Islam (the Justice and development

Party or JPD) was elected as the majority party in parliament. The critical issues were no

longer Islamic fundamentalism or Kurdish terrorism. Rather the most pressing issue was

the faltering Turkish economy.74 From the election results we can assume that Turkish

voters are fatigued by the impotent governments of the past and are willing to take a

chance to the JDP. The voters have elected a party that gives every indication that it is a

progressive center right party.75

The JDP won public confidence with a synthesis of conservative and liberal

elements. First, they promote a democratic, transparent and accountable state. Second,

they have a free market approach that is regulated enough to keep it “honest” and prevent

destructive side effects. And third, they promote social justice.76 Furthermore, rather

than a radical Islamic party they use their religious principle as a guide rather than

inflexible dogma and have been compare to conservatives in the United States.77 Another

important characteristic of the party is that they appear to exhibit democratic processes in

their party deliberations. This is highly uncharacteristic of Turkish political parties. The

party was only organized in 2001, yet was able to garner such a large percentage of the

73 Ibid., p, 354.74 Ziya Onis & E. Fuat Keyman, “A New Path Emerges,” Journal of Democracy 14 (April 2003), 96.75 Metin Heper, Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep TayipErdogan,” Muslim World 93 (April 2003), 158.76 Onis & Keyman, pp. 100-101.77 Ahmet Insel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey,” South Atlantic Quarterly 102.(Spring/Summer 2003), 302.

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vote may indicate that they represent a bottom up movement.78 As suggested earlier the

lack of a bottom up element to Turkish democracy has likely hindered its progress. The

AKP party may provide an impetus for change in this area.

Other recent developments also offer Turkey greater prospects for democratic

consolidation. Most importantly, Turkey’s bid to join the EU has been a catalyst for a

number of changes related to democratic freedoms. In 2001, thirty-four amendments

were made to the Turkish constitution allowing unprecedented freedom for minority

groups.

In addition, the military may be showing signs that it is more reluctant to

intervene in politics. A few years ago the military would have been much more reluctant

to let the JDP establish a majority in parliament because of its religious underpinnings.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU will also require it end its dual government (ie. the

military and the elected government paradox).

78 M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258.