1

TheThe

GoldstoneGoldstonepaperpaper

By F. Goldstone

A report of the running of the Signals Research and DevelopmentEstablishment from its early days up to 1945.

Edited by Louis Meulstee, PA0PCR, June 2013 (rev 2.0)

2

Cover and layout: Louis Meulstee PA0PCR.Cover illustration: Limber part of Mk.I W/T Wagon Set. Note a Marconi Multiple Tuner on the table in the centre right. (1910-1913).

The cover artwork and layout of this publication was prepared in Serif PageplusX6 using Arial and Formal 436 BT fonts. The scanned illustrations and photoswere enhanced and prepared with the use of Adobe Photoshop. The finished pub-lication was directly converted into PDF format.

Version 2.2First published June 2013.Louis Meulstee PA0PCROttersumThe Netherlandsinfo@wftw.nlwww.wftw.nl

June 2013

Any additions to this document and re-marks are appreciated at: louis@wftw.nl

About this publication.This primary documentation and historical account (with some mild criticism) onthe running of the Signals Research and Development Establishment* was writtenin 1945 by Mr Goldstone who was employed at SRDE from the very beginning ofits existence. This document is published with permission of the Royal SignalsMuseum, Blandford, U.K. The text of the original report was retyped exactly as itappeared in the original, with the addition of a few photographs of Mr F.Goldstone.The original (second) copy of this document, which is unfortunately missing its finalpage, is kept in the Archives of the Royal Signals Museum, Blandford Forum, UK.Website: http://www.royalsignalsmuseum.co.uk

*) Created in 1907 as Experimental Wireless Telegraphy Section within the 1stWireless Telegraph Company, renamed into Signals Experimental Establishmentin 1916. It became SRDE in 1942 and lost its identity with its move to Malvern in1980 when it was amalgamated with the Royal Radar Establishment and ServicesElectronics Research Laboratory.

3

Chief Superintendant (Col. G.W. Raby)

Sir,

You suggested that it might be helpful ifI place on record to you my personal opinionof the present structure and build-up of thisEstablishment as it appears to me today. Ithank you for considering that such an opinionmight be worthwhile and, on the assumptionthat you appreciate that I have at heart, thewelfare of this Establishment, I willingly com-ply with your request. There have been periods of depressionduring the present war when I have said that ittook one World War to put the S.E.E. on itsfeet and that it required a second Great Warto topple it over. Before considering anythingin detail, I say that I am not now quite so sure.You will understand better my point if I saythat your present position, not necessarily asChief supt., but as Head of this Establishmenthas been held by 14 different officers betweenthe years 1912-1945. Some, especially in theearly days when they were always senior R.E.officers, strengthened the place and added tothe structure built by their predecessors; oth-ers who came later did much to weaken thestructure. Always however, have we survivedthe bad periods, and reacted strongly whenthe right type took over. What will be the resultof your term of office? I say with all sinceritythat the success of an establishment such asthis depends 95% upon the attitude and ap-proach of the ruling heads. Good material canbe mishandled, natural tendencies can be re-pressed until who is naturally a creator, be-come just part of a machine. Before I criticize the present layout, Ithink it would be as well to give you a pictureof the past internal history of the establish-ment. This will help you to understand myview point, which is I imagine, very largelycontrolled by past history, I joined the Royal Engineers in 1908,after serving 5 years of a 7 years apprentice-ship with Messrs Marconi Co and fate took meto Aldershot early in 1909 just at a periodwhen wireless telegraphy was being lookedupon as a possibility for Army communica-tions, by the more advanced school ofthought.

Experimental work of a kind had been carriedout at Chatham between 1897 -1907 but realdevelopment had been done before the 1stWireless Telegraph Co. was created in 1907 –1908. I joined this company and was the onlymechanic in R.E. at that time who had anyknowledge of wireless. The experimentalWireless Telegraphy Section became a recog-nised official unit at this time and its activities(expenditure etc.) were controlled by the R.E.Committee, War Office. I automatically gravitated to this group,and it is to my opinion that the work done bythis small section of about 3 officers and 10men between the years 1907 – 1911 forcedthe authorities of that time to recognise theimportance of maintaining, under their owncontrol, a permanent section whose terms ofreference were to develop and produce work-ing models of apparatus required for militaryuse in the field. (To my mind this is essentiallystill our main reason for existence. This pointhas, it seemed to me, to be rather lost sight ofat certain periods during this war, but this isby the way.)

The enthusiasm of this Group was tre-mendous, everyone, from the Senior Officerdown to the lowest rank (myself) worked onlyto create something new. Normal workinghours were unknown; on many an occasionthe sounding of reveille notified us that anoth-er night’s sleep had been missed. I realisenow the tremendous disadvantages underwhich we worked. At that time everyone in thegroup was in the service and the only expend-iture was for materials and certain compo-nents. I believe Capt. Evans was allowed tospend £250 in the year 1907 – 1908 but anyexpenditure of over £5 had to referred back tothe R.E.C. for approval and this did not al-ways come easily. In fact, it was well knownthat Capt. Evans paid many bills out of hisown pocket when his enthusiasm forced himto act contrary the rules. Drawings were prac-tically unknown and every item deemed forreproduction was reproduced from sample.For this reason the samples just had to beperfect specimens. It was not allowable to tieon a label stating what was wrong, hoping thatthe corrections would be made in the draw-ings.

4

There were no drawings and for many itemsthey never were produced. We had a verylittle machinery; three 3” treadle lathes (onescrew cutting) and one treadle 5” screw cut-ting plus one forge and certain hand toolscovered this equipment, yet we producedsamples which I noted, were still sealed pat-terns in C.I.E.S.S. pattern room at the end ofthe last war. The handicaps under which weworked were, I think, a spur only to greaterendeavour and resulted in the Group and theindividuals becoming sufficient as well as selfsupporting. I left this Group in 1911 and re-turned in a civilian capacity in 1912. It must be remembered that we weredealing only with spark transmission andcrystal reception. The valve was then un-known but we did also have to deal with theair as well as the ground requirements. Mem-bers of the section flew in with Airship Beta in1913 with a set which I very largely producedmyself and we obtained two way signals forwhat was certainly the first time in this countryand probably in the world, though we hadpreviously made similar experiments from aCaptive Balloon. Our activities came to an abrupt end inAugust 1914 and I went overseas with the 1stSignal Squadron, 1st Cav. Division. With theB.E.F. went two wireless stations. Some otherMarconi lorry stations followed some time lat-er but at the beginning only these two sta-tions existed, and it is pleasant to rememberthat during the retreat from Mons the 1st Cav.Division had to rely on two wireless stationswhich were produced by the forerunner of thisEstablishment and I can say that these sta-tions worked and never seriously let the O.C.down. Still, the experimental bug would notsleep. Capt. Lefroy, who was in charge of thesection at the outbreak of War was also inFrance and he convinced the authorities thatthey required an experimental section in thefield. The result of this move was that I wasrecalled from the front line to the base wherewe carried on with spark set development.Early in 1915 the valve as a practical proposi-tion came into being and the few radio ex-perts who then existed began to spin in smallcircles. I was recalled from France in October1915 and was ordered to report to WoolwichDockyard where a certain amount of experi-mentalwork was in progress, but it was very

quickly seen that an Establishment must becreated to efficiently deal with the possibilitiesopened up by the development of the valve.Colonel H.S. Bagnold, C.B.E. a very able En-gineer Officer, was appointed as Chief Experi-mental Officer. Under his expert guidance thebuildings were erected on Woolwich Commonand the Signals Experimental Establishment.Was created and took possession in July1916. When I returned from France Capt E.D.Carden was running the experimental sectionat the Dockyard. The section then consisted ofCapt Carden, 2 experimental officers (civilian),C.Q.M.S. Johnson, 5 instrument makers, 2carpenters and 2 draughtsmen (note the inclu-sion of draughtsmen for the first time), 6 boysand myself. By October 1916 the Establish-ment was 250 strong and by July 1918, 450men strong. I think these figures should benoted in comparison with our growth duringthe present war. It is true that the Establish-ment is larger now than it was in 1918, but in1939 the Establishment was some hundredsstrong, whereas in 1914 the total number was16 and some of these never joined us at Wool-wich. Yet it cannot be denied that the S.E.E.during the last war in spite of its late start,mushroom growth and mixed assembly didproduce far more new equipment for use in theArmy and Royal Flying Corps than theS.R.D.E. has produced or is likely to produceeven should the war be prolonged for another5 years. Why is this? There are a number offactors which must be explained to give thecomplete answer. Firstly, on the outbreak of war 1914there was only one firm of note in this countryinterested in the manufacture of radio equip-ment. Messrs’ Marconi produced a smallnumber of wireless sets for the British andContinental Powers and had some idea of therequirements, but they had not the capacity tomeet more than the fridge of our demands.Messrs’ Siemens had staged a demonstrationof Telefunken Field equipment in 1912 butthey had not considered production over herechiefly because it takes a war to create aworthwhile demand and although Messrs’ Mar-coni, Siemens, Standard Telephone, Ferrantiand others did produce sets, the demand stillexceeded the supply. This forced the Ministryof Munitions as it then was known, to createtheir own factories.

5

These factories were all controlled by the Min-istry of Munitions usually a military officer wasput in charge. Arising out of this condition ofaffairs, we had a set-up which we exploited tothe full, in the following manner. The RaynesPark Factory produced small parts and com-ponents; the Teddington and Soho Factoriesproduced finished sets calling on Raynes Parkfor small parts, and on the Kilburn Factory formeters. S.E.E. would receive instructions toproduce a set to fulfil certain conditions. I wasat that time running the shops under a Work-shops Officer, Major Spittle ad I very largelycontrolled the mechanical design.(The experimental Officers expected this serv-ice from what they considered to be the practi-cal or engineering side of the Establishment. Iwould point out here that, at that time, (from1916 to late 1918) all senior officers were menof mature years and of some scientific stand-ing. Their only desire was to assist in everyway possible while we were at war and to re-turn to their various interests when it was won.The student class did not begin to join us untillate 1918.) The officer to whom the new re-quirement was passed would at the appropri-ate moment discuss details with the shopsand a model would be produced. We main-tained very close liaison with the factoriesmentioned above and as soon as the modelwas complete, a meeting was called on whichevery factory was represented. I would notehere that the chief of each factory was ap-pointed owing to his pre-war knowledge andexperience on the type of work on which hisfactory now was engaged, and it became afixed rule that this officer personally attendedwhat we termed Design Meetings. I haveknown these meetings to start before lunchand to carry on late into the night. But at theend a true representation of the requirementwas formulated and it was agreed how manywould be produced to model and which facto-ry would produce the various items, and wheninitial deliveries would be made. In these mod-ern times this procedure may appear verycrude. Yet it is on record that the first AircraftTuner Mk.I was conceived on Monday in June1916 and that the first model was tested in theair 9 days later and that 150 were producedand issued by August 1916. It may be quiterightly said that the sets of those days werevery simple.

This is correct, but it must be rememberedthat every part, valve holders, condensers,resistances etc. had to be produced by themanufacturer concerned; there were no com-ponent manufacturers. A second notable example was the pro-duction of what became of the Blandy FieldSet. Colonel Blandy, then C.E.O., S.E.E., putin hand the design of a 30 watt spark trans-mitter and a 3 valve LF receiver which was tofunction in the forward area and be transport-ed as a man pack portable set. The designwas first discussed early in May 1918; 250sets were in the field in August 1918. Speedy development followed by quickproduction was then one of the reasons whyS.E.E. produced far more complete equip-ment than S.R.D.E. A second quite obviouspoint is, as I have already stated, the BritishArmy had practically no wireless sets at theoutbreak of the war. The valve made possiblethe development of small portable equipmentof worthwhile power and range, both for for-ward units and for the air. So although theS.E.E. worked 7 days a week and a 12 hourday, coupled to unlimited keenness and en-thusiasm, the demand for new designs alwaysbeat their ability to supply. After the last war alist was made of complete items (as distinctfrom components) developed and producedbetween 1915-1918. 198 separate items weredeveloped, 185 were reproduced; the per-centage of throw-cuts was very small. On theother hand, the total production of many of theitems did not exceed 500. There is a third point which should beremembered. During the last war, except forcertain specialist designs produced by Marco-ni, all the design work was carried out byS.E.E. There was no arguing, no alternativedesign produced by some other body. Theissue was always clean cut. War Office wouldstate a requirement, R.E.B. would instructS.E.E. to proceed with the project and stage ademonstration on a certain date, covering asmany points in the requirement as possiblewithin the time. R.E.B. with War Office wouldwitness the demonstration and it would beagreed there and then either to accept theresults as they stood, or to allow X days forfurther investigation or to issue the model forimmediate reproduction and proceed immedi-ately with Mk.II.

6

Whatever the decision arrived at, the S.E.E.was given a clean cut mandate and we knowexactly where we stood. Extended field trialswere not carried out during the war. It will be noted that I have said verylittle about the drawing office and its activities.We had, in fact, a very efficient drawing officebut the numbers were too small to meet thedemand. Equipment produced during the warwas still being drawn some years after, somuch detail had to be included. Even blockingcondensers had to be drawn in detail, thenumber and thickness of the mica plates be-ing quoted etc. Also the trade was still quite accus-tomed to working from model and quite com-plicated P.O. equipment, such as theWheatstone Automatic, was at the time stillbeing produced in this way by some firms.The complete swing over to production fromdrawings in lieu of sample did not take placetill the early twenties. I will only touch briefly on the immedi-ate post war period. Shortly after the cessa-tion of hostilities, most of our senior E.O.s leftthe Establishment and returned to their vari-ous pre-war duties. One quite brilliant youngofficer, Capt. Bryden remained with us andeventually became Director. There was, at this period, a very strongcall for reduction of expenditure and it seemedfor a time that the Establishment would beclosed altogether. However, a number ofprojects were put in hand (some quite unoffi-cially) which caused so much interest not onlyin the War Office, but also certain large Com-munication Companies, that the question ofclosing down was shelved indefinitely. In theearly twenties, the equipping of armoured ve-hicles with some system of communicationbecame a major requirement and has re-mained so to this day. This is, I think, the onlytype of development in which we have not atsome time or another, been called upon tocompete with the Trade.I will pass over the period from the early twen-ties to the mid-thirties without much comment.Money was very tight, a number of sets weredesigned but production was always verysmall. If an initial order for 100 was placed,C.I.E.E.S. thought we were doing very well,but during this rather long period, a scientificstaff was built up which was second to none.

There was one weakness only which has per-sisted all through the later history of the estab-lishment. It was considered that a Universitytrained man was all that was required, where-as I always contended and still contend, thatone practical engineer who had had commer-cial experience to every six S.O.s would cre-ate a balance and ensure a design whichcould be passed without fear of adverse com-ment, to the Trade. The type I refer to arenow unobtainable but they could have beenhere before the war had authorities been will-ing to pay for experience at the same rate asthey pay for scientific education. In spite ofthis statement, we did have, just prior to thiswar a very efficient staff who could producepractical working models which could be re-produced by the Trade in bulk. Possible thedesigns, though not having the practical engi-neer behind him, called for more manufactur-ing operations than need be, but in the main,the trade could not find much to criticize, andhad that staff remained at our disposal duringour rapid growth to meet the present waremergency, I think all would have been well. But ‘Radar’ came into prominence andour Establishment, with others, had to foot thebill. We acknowledge the justice of this de-mand and we gave of our best but we were alltoo small to stand a reduction of such a largepercentage of those who must have becomeessential key men. What actually happened?New blood began to pour into the Establish-ment, few had previous training, and requiredsupervision. Prior to this influx the E.O.s (Ex-perimental Officers) we had were all doing ajob of work and producing results by their ownefforts, but the time soon came when they hadto supervise and control others. The net resultwas a big increase of staff and a big reductionin output. The larger the staff became the lesswe appeared to do. The situation was, in fact,ludicrous, had one the perverted sense of hu-mour to see it in that way. One would have thought than anyintelligent person would have known that thefact that you dress up eleven men in say, foot-ball clothes does not make a football team.Much careful training is required with frequentchanges of personnel before goals can bescored and with the training must come sym-pathy and understanding. Neither of theselatter virtues was shown towards this Estab-lishment during the first years of this war.

7

I myself heard members of the headquartersstaff sneer at the efforts and make remarksbelittling the opinion of members of this Estab-lishment to outside contractors. This naturallycame to the knowledge of the staff and whatcould be the result be except to break-up theold spirit of co-operation and desire to do ourbest, to be replaced by a feeling of frustration,and men who, prior to this period, had beencapable of meeting ay demand, developed aninferiority complex which has persisted, in cer-tain instances, to this day.I have kept, as far as possible, my own activi-ties out of this story and endeavoured to giveyou a clear picture in as few words as possi-ble of the history of this Establishment. Iwould like to state, however, that I believe myown break away from this Establishment, firstto assist in the development of GL Mk.II atHMV and then Elsie at Murphy, covering aperiod of six months, was definitely harmful toS.E.E. Prior to this I had charge of the devel-opment section and with Mr Tweedale, War-land and a few others we had formed asound team of practical men who had ac-quired a very complete knowledge of militaryequipment, an eye to standardisation, couldgive a sound criticism on detail of design, andcould and did produce complete station inven-tories which eventually turned into lists by Ma-jor Johnson at E.S.2.This section was never reformed when I re-turned to S.E.E. At Warnham there was fartoo much mechanical work for me to deal withpersonally and eventually Mr. Knight wasadopted from S.T.&C. to lend a hand. But wenever recovered our original position on ques-tions of design. The Trade, backed by ourown headquarters, had got the bit betweentheir teeth and when we eventually expose afault, it was always either too late to alter, orsome messy compromise had to be put onhand, and as the modification was messy anddue to S.R.D.E., it reacted against us and notthe originator.

Scientific Staff What is wrong with the Establishmentas it stands today? Destructive criticism isvery easy. Before the war we periodically heldDesign Meetings at which new developmentswere shown and criticized. At these meetingsW.O. and C.I.E.S.S. would have the models

for some days before the meeting to examineand would bring their comments with them.Adverse comments would usually be made,but seldom did we receive a worthwhile con-structive criticism. The result was that muchtime was wasted discussing faults which wereeither without foundation, or which could notbe improved on. As a matter of fact there is not muchwrong with the Establishment: time will im-prove many of the existing faults and a carefulappreciation as to how the individual can as-sist is perhaps worthwhile. Bearing in mind that we have a verymixed staff, some are very unsettled and evenunhappy in their domestic life, some havebeen moved from pillar to post during the waryears, having been subjected to bombing andhave lost part or all of their homes; some seeno future for themselves in this Establishment,others have been directed here against theirwill and look forward only to the time whenthey can leave. With a background such asthis, how can a staff be so nursed that it willautomatically give of its best, work together asa team, and become so interested in its jobthat they forget their troubles, imagined andreal, and the clock.We have, I think, a very immature scientificstaff and it appears to me that there is some-thing of the more practical side missing intheir training. During the last war, even thejunior officers were practical in their outlook. Itmay be because even the Colleges in thosedays could not buy equipment and the stu-dents had to produce their own, or it may beso that the scientific training has become somuch more complicated and involved thatthere is no time to deal with allocation. What-ever the reason, the fact remains that al-though the senior officers such as Dr. L.B.Turner, Prof. Townsend, Dr. Hodson, Prof.Whiddington, Mr. Mathieu etc. etc. each had anumber of officers working under them, theywere themselves practical and creative. It wasseldom you saw any of them writing. The netresult of this team work was that their knowl-edge and technique was passed on and allgained the benefit of their experience. Therewas always a cordial and healthy exchange ofideas between the various sections.As I see the picture now, the Group Leadersand even the section leaders are usually sobusy either writing, or attending some meeting

8

that you seldom catch them in the laboratory.This seems to me of locking up our availabletalent with a vengeance. Unless the knowl-edge previously acquitted by a leader can bepassed on to his understudies, he would bemore useful to the immediate future doing anindividual job himself. I feel that many of ouryounger members are receptive and wouldrespond to any practical example, but some-thing in their training prevents them from ask-ing for advice. I visited one of the labs theother day and asked a small question of oneof the E.O.s who I knew was engaged on thejob to which the question referred. He repliedthat I better ask the Boss, if I could find him.This stuck me as being all wrong. Surely aSection Leader controlling a group of educat-ed men should be their mentor and friend, notBoss. What condition caused this remark? Ifeel that we shall not get very far until everymember of staff feels that he is an essentialunit and that his job is something for which heis responsible. Nothing gives a man more sta-bility and balance than the knowledge that hiswork is of importance and that he is being de-pended on. The leader should always beavailable to give advice and it should be fullyunderstood that a cordial and friendly spiritdoes not necessarily mean lack of discipline. I think also that the Chief Supt., Supt.and D/Supt. should make it their business tovisit every lab frequently. The visits should beseparate and casual. Nothing tends to makean employee feel he belongs than an informaltalk with the Heads. As soon as a men beginsto feel that he is something more than a unit,his production value rises. Any fault whichmight be found with the conditions in the lab,should be ignored on these occasions or re-marked lightly in the first instance. More harmthan good would be done if the visits wereregimental in their character.

I do not think there is very muchwrong with the present Grouping system, butit seems to me that there is a great tendencyto procrastinate, especially when the actualwork is being carried out by a contractor. Dur-ing the last war all requirements were issued,together with a date for completion. Often itwas not possible to cover the full requirementin the time allowed, but some working modelwas always shown at the date specified andthe job was kept alive.

My experience has been that once a job start-ed to drift it loses its position in the schemeand probably finishes up as something entire-ly different from what was originally intended.Certain it is that the authorities’ eventual looseinterest, an insidious complaint which quicklyspreads through the staff concerned.

Workshops Dealing with the question of work-shop, I hold rather strong views on how anexperimental workshop should be run and Ifeel that those views are somewhat at vari-ance with the present control. I built up atWoolwich, after some years, a workshop staffwhich was second to none. The shop was avery happy one and the work turned out wasexcellent. It became a stock phrase with thevarious contractors when we exhibit someitem or set which had to be reproduced, ‘Ohyes, you can make it, but look at the mechan-ics you’ve got’. Yet when those items werereproduced, they stood the test, and lived inuse in the field for many years. I used to won-der how we held the gang together. The paywas not large, there were a number of otherfactories in walking distance to which theycould have gone and earned more money. I believe that the secret was that theywere interested in their job and liked the typeof work they were doing. As one of them saidto me on one occasion, ‘Another quid a weekis no good to me if I have to spend it on beerto get the taste of the job out of my mouth.’ I contend that the most successful ex-perimental shop is where you use the knowl-edge, experience and talent of the worker tothe full. Whenever I had a mechanical prob-lem to solve, I always discussed it with theinstrument maker and of Bill didn’t know theanswer, Tom did. Somewhere at this time, atsome workshop in the country, someone hadseen something similar and we neverstumped for a sound practical answer. I foundit difficult to reconcile a production workshoptechnique to an experimental or maintenanceshop. I understand that it is now the rule that adrawing must be supplied for every item to beproduced. I agree that this is perhaps correctand proper where trainee or semi-skilled la-bour is involved, but I sincerely hope that it isa rule that is often disregarded where yourexperimental mechanics are concerned.

9

Nothing is more soul destroying to your trueexperimental mechanic than to have to workalways to drawings.I agree also that an experimental shop shouldbe up to date in its equipment, but here againmuch machinery should be used with discre-tion. How often in the past I have blown upwhen I have noted a mechanic going to thetool stone, drawing out a milling cutter andsetting up the machine to mill up half a dozenof panels which as a craftsman he could havefiled up in five minutes. To my way of thinking,the main workshop has two functions and thecan be kept separate and distinct. The first isto produce an original model or models whichcan be produced from rough sketches anddiscussion. (The power to produce a satisfac-tory product without drawings denoted an abil-ity, to meet which, the term experimentalmechanic was coined, and pay a rate higherthan the local trade rate for an instrumentmaker was agreed.) The second is to producedeveloped models from drawings whichshould have been produced in parallel, butwith a slight time lag as the original model.There are, of course, always exceptions to therule, certain items can with advantage be pro-duced on the drawing board before the benchbut this does not apply to set construction. Itcan, of course, be done, but the loss of time isgreat.I think that you can have too many superviso-ry staff in a small shop. I remember that dur-ing the last war in 1918, myself, Mr. Matthewsand Mr. Alwin run the shops containing about175 men and woman. We had Flying Corpsrank and file, R.E. disabled soldiers and civil-ians all working together. We never had anytrouble; one of the three always settled anylittle point before it became serious. It had aletter of thanks from the workshop officerwhen he left in which he said that during thetime he had been with us he had never had tosettle a complaint or make one. I think that asmall staff, providing they know their job, canalways hold a crowd together than a big one. Imistrust the building up of big supervisorystaffs. You reach the stage in the end whereno one is really responsible and everybodyshifts the onus to someone else, only the poorcharge hand really carries the load.

StoresI quite frankly do not understand the storesposition. I run the stores (among other duties)at Woolwich for some years and I know some-thing of the subject. There is quite a reasona-bly store in the shop though I think the cardsshould be marked up with min. stock, but Inotice odd stores in all sort of places. I cannotunderstand how they are controlled. Does itnot lead to unnecessary duplication, or doeseverybody know where everything is kept?Surely a central store is denoted though pos-sibly if all the surplus was removed, the posi-tion would not look so bad to the casualobserver.

M.E.S.Before the war, it was a custom to produce asmall number of development models of newequipment which were sent to units for fieldtrials. This was not in all respects satisfactory.Firstly, it took a long time, secondly, we werenot always sure that the tests were carried outin an efficient manner, so much dependedupon the attitude of the officers in control ofthe unit at the time. Eventually it was agreedthat a Military Section should be posted atWoolwich. The terms of reference of this sec-tion were to carry out Field Trials of newequipment, under the supervision of the Su-perintendent, as and when it was produced.The scheme would have been quite sound ifthe troops had changed periodically, had re-ceived prior experience in the field and if weproduce sufficient new equipment to warranttying up a section. I do not know what is hap-pening within the section at present, but I doknow that some time ago they were develop-ing experimental equipment themselves. Thisto my mind quite defeated the original object.Once a section such as this develop the ex-perimental complex, you might as well let theE.O. carry out his own tests.

Station ListsThe Station List is a very important documentwhich has by the series of events been throwninto the wrong position in the chain of devel-opment. A Station List details all the itemswhich are required to create a complete sta-tion, installation or set, and it is perfectly clearthat both Ordnance and the unit require thisinformation before they receive the equip-ment.

10

Before the war, S.E.E. produced an inventoryor schedule of all new equipment. This inven-tory was sent to War Office where it wasturned into a station list. Major Johnson was inthe Branch concerned and I believe orderingwas started in those days on the inventory.Eventually the Ministry of Supply was createdand the purchasing branch of the War Officebecame a part of the Ministry of Supply at IronTrades House. Now the inventories were sentto Iron Trades House to be dealt with and Ibelieve Major Johnson still ordered all firmitems from the inventory and produced theStation List in parallel with the ordering.As the war progressed, purchasing becamemuch heavier. Instead of hundreds, thou-sands of sets were required. The 19 Set hadto be accepted and was being installed in allsorts of vehicles and tanks creating in itselfquite a station list problem. So E.S.2W be-came the Purchasing Branch, and E.S.5 theRequirements Branch and Major Johnson’sgroup at S.E.5 had a full time job producingthe lists, when ordering being done by E.S.2.Here we see the first snag. E.S.2 did not havethe intimate knowledge Major Johnson had. Ibelieve in the beginning items which could besafely ordered were passed to E.S.2. ButE.S.2 were never sure if they had the wholestory or whether some item would arrive lateand throw out all their estimates. This did hap-pen so often that in the end D.D.S.E. demand-ed that the complete list should be in theirhands before ordering of any sort was com-menced. This was, of course, going from oneextreme to the other, especially as at aboutthis time a very nasty red herring appeared toview. The number of different sets and instal-lations and the number of small items wasbecoming so great that it was clear that Ord-nance could not compete and it was consid-ered expedient to box or carton the items inthe form of kits, so, for a particular 19 Set in-stallation there would be a Set Kit, all theitems appertaining to the set, a Standard Kit,all the items common to any installation, andInstallation Kit No. X to cover a particular re-quirement. When a new installation was pro-duced, meetings were held and it wasdecided what items should be carried in thevarious kits and the items agreed were shownin the station list under the various kits.I believe the creation of the station list in kitform is incorrect and may lead to confusion.

The kitting is only a transitory condition andexists from the time the set leaves the con-tractor until it reaches the unit. As soon as thecardboard cartons are opened, the kits ceaseto exist and the unit is left with an installationand a list in which the same item may appearin two places.One difficulty is this, we can produce early inthe development of any new installation andaccurately schedule of components but wecannot so quickly produce the actual item. Wecan gamble and say that an item will be of acertain size and can be packed in a certaincarton, but with vehicle fittings it is not alwaysso easy and it is safest to see the gear. Anitem may be too heavy or too awkward to gointo the carton at all. Therefore it is not alwayspossible to finalize kitting and produce the sta-tion list before every item of an installation hasbeen produced. But, as I have previously re-marked, it is possible to produce a provisionschedule and show on that schedule the pre-cise condition of every item.I sympathize with E.S.2W. Unless they aregiven a clear cut picture of a new requirement,small items may be missed and it is the devel-opment and completion of the small items(which often do not amount to more than 5%of the total) which fixes the date on which thecomplete information can be handed over.Therefore either a complete station list mustbe issued with the statement that everything iscomplete and in the hands of C.I.E.M.E. or aschedule which shows the condition of everyitem. Before issue, the schedule must be re-viewed by some official with a very completeknowledge to ensure that valuable informationhas not been withheld. For example, whatmight be considered as a very minor item, sayConnector 4 point No. X approx. 6” long, fulldetail cannot be supplied because the actuallength cannot be quoted before the installationhas been completed. To the uninitiated thisseems to be a simple item, but the CableElectric 4 core Cabtire 9/0017 may be difficultto obtain, therefore a schedule should statethis requirement in the appropriate column. Ithink the complete station list can be producedhere better than anywhere else however per-fect the schedule, small points will continuallyarise which can be cleared much more easilyby personal contact.

11

I believe that a special section should beformed to produce the schedules. There is notvery much wrong which the system wherebyindividual officers control design or are re-sponsible as representatives of S.R.D.E. forseeing that a contractor’s development is ac-ceptable but I would feel more happy if theE.Os concerned were more experienced. Per-haps it is because of this fact, as well as out-side interference, that recent developmentshave differed so much in detail. Standardisa-tion should be one of the main themes of thesection preparing schedules and ensure thatthis would mean contact with a project from itsinitiation. This should greatly assist the E.O.concerned as he would be relieved of the

worry of much practical detail although ofcourse, everything that was suggested wouldhave to be approved by him. The sectionshould also keep in touch with the ProvisionBranch after they have been notified of a newrequirement by E.S.5. I feel that the practicaldiscussion with S.E.2 at the initiation of a newcontract where bottle necks occur and if analternative method of production was equallysuitable, we could say so. As an example,quite recently we have developed a number ofsoft rubber mouldings and plug and socketconnectors; this had created a bottle neck.Had we known earlier, a number of thesemouldings could have been produced inP.V.C. and still can be. (Final page missing)

Sergeant F. Goldstone at Wool-wich Dockyard in 1914. (Left)

Cut-out of a Signals Experimental Establishment staff taken out at Woolwichin about 1928. Mr F. Goldstone is seated in the top row , 4th from right. It isinteresting to note that Major-Gen Fuller (the inventor of the Fullerphone) isalso seated at the top row at the first seat from the left.

Photograph of Mr Goldstone takenin 1913. He became manager ofthe S.E.E. Workshops and stayedwith the establishment until his re-tirement in the 1950’s. (Right)

Explanation of abbreviations:C.E.O.= Chief Experimental Officer.E.O.= Experimental Officer.R.E.C.= Royal Engineers Committee.C.Q.M.S.= Chief Quarter Master StoresR.E.B.= Royal Engineers Board.C.I.E.E.S.= Chief Inspector Electrical Engineers Stores