Dreadnought

• Continuous at Sea Deterrence

• 4 Submarines

• New Design • New Reactor

• New Common Missile Compartment

• New Facilities- Barrow, Derby

• New tools- IT systems

• Support Infrastructure- Faslane, Devonport

• Trainers- Faslane, USA

• National Endeavour

Programme Context: Megaprojects (£ Billions)2

The Challenge

Trident debate: MPs vote to renew UK's nuclear deterrent system

• “It will be managed by a new delivery body for the procurement and in-service support of all nuclear submarines. That will ensure that, unlike in previous warship programmes, the submarines are delivered on time and on budget.”

Michael Fallon MP, House of Commons, 18 July 2016 (Hansard)

Risk Context

•Dreadnought programme has considerable risk characterised by;

• Novelty: the design incorporates a new reactor, Common Missile Compartment, secondary propulsion, hull design and weapon handling system.

• New Technology: With only limited prototyping opportunity, new technology will only be proven on the first of class.

• Complexity: Delivery and operation of Dreadnought will be dependent on the integration of the many different systems on the platform, and of the platform with the support infrastructure at Clyde and Devonport and the firing chain.

• Pace: Dreadnought has to relieve the Vanguard Class on time to maintain Continuous At Sea Deterrence - the pace is high.

• Programme management arrangements need to be designed to manage the risks inherent in such a novel and complex submarine.

4

The Problem- Avoid this report by NAO/PAC

“Management of the … programme has been extraordinarily poor.

Oversight has been characterised by a failure to understand properly the

nature and enormity of the task, a failure to monitor and challenge

progress regularly and a failure to intervene when problems arose.

Senior managers only became aware of problems through ad hoc

reviews mostly conducted by external reviewers, as inadequate

management information and reporting arrangements had not alerted

them that things were amiss.” King (2013).

King, A., Crewe, I. The Blunders of Our Governments, One World, 2013.

Reality of Major Programmes

• “managers must work at the edge of chaos, where linear

systems begin to fail and non-linear systems begin to

dominate. It is at this edge that managers can continue to

exercise basic controls while hunting for new ideas and

systems to change the way projects are constructed”.

Singh and Singh (2002)

Resilient Themes

Robust Requirements

Pragmatic Processes

Adaptive Organisations

Relational Contracts

Care of the programmecommunity

Training and Learning

Contingent Approvals

Respect for Quality

Mindful Leadership

Relational Contracting

“...of significant duration….. Many individuals with individual

and collective poles of interest are involved in the relations.

Future cooperative behaviour is anticipated. The benefits of

the relation are to be shared rather than divided and

allocated….. Trouble is expected as a matter of course…. It

is an ongoing integration of behaviour in a largely

unforeseeable future.”

Macneill (2001)

The need for Collaboration in addition to managing the transactions.

Design the Programme=Design the Submarine

• “The lesson is that we have to ensure that we give as much

attention to the design of the programme as we do to the

design of the artefact. We have to give as much attention to

the development of the programme plans as we do to the

working drawings and we have to have the power of

assessing the extent to which the.…facilities are likely to be

sufficient, and we have to ensure quality at every stage.”

Brown, 1983 quoting Sir Rowland Baker RCNC reflecting on

delivering the Dreadnought and Resolution Nuclear Submarine

Programmes in the 1960s

Resilient Organisations Act Mindfully

• Mindfulness - a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and the ability to organise to notice the unexpected, halt it, or contain it or, if it breaks through containment, focus on resilience to restore system functioning

• Anticipation:

- Preoccupation with failure. They encourage reporting of errors when more options exist for rectifying them.

- Reluctance to simplify. They resist oversimplification by carefully categorising errors and encouraging dialogue between teams with diverse backgrounds so errors are better understood.

- Sensitivity to operations. They record what is actually happening and not what is supposed to be happening.

• Containment:

- Maintaining capabilities for resilience. This includes the use of expert networks, an extensive action repertoire and improvisation.

- Deferring to expertise. In response to unexpected events, the organisation can take advantage of shifting locations of expertise within the organisation for easy access to expert resources.

• Culture:

- Reporting culture where people are prepared to report their errors and near misses which requires care in handling blame.

- Just culture where people are encouraged to provide information but there is a clear boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

- Sources:

- Weick K., Sutcliffe, K., (2007), Managing the Unexpected. Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, John Wiley and Sons, San Francisco, CA.

- Reason, J., (1997), Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants, pp. 195.

Coping with Uncertainty

• Processes including project controls are essential but

insufficient.

• “Something one cannot understand constitutes a painful

void, a puncture, a permanent stimulus that insists on being

satisfied.” Primo Levi (1987)

• Truth emerges from arguments between friends- David

Hume

• Relationships to allow questioning, discussion, challenge

and support.

Use of Imperfect Data - Maieutic Machine

Macintosh and Quattrone (2010, pp. 330-334) define a maieutic machine as amachine “for producing knowledge by asking questions rather than giving answers”.

Megaprojects and Wicked Problems

• Heifetz and Linsky “Leadership on the Line” (2002) emphasise the need to stand

back and reflect on the whole problem to develop the next action. They use the

metaphor of moving between the dance floor and the balcony. They also emphasis

the need to think politically and build relationships but regulate the tension to

maintain progress.

• Grint(2005) which shows that as the solutions to problems become less certain the

need forcollaborative compliance increases. The leader needs to enable more

questions through effective relationships.

Wicked Problems- No obvious solution. • Stand Back, • Reflect, • Build Effective Relationships, • Ask Questions

Problems don’t come with labels. Problems often

contain elements that are critical, tame and wicked.

Problem Solving

Learning

Black Box Thinking by M Syed.

• Failing Fast to Learn Fast

• Just Culture• Humility• Perseverance

Trusted to deliver excellence

© 2017 Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries

The information in this document is the property of Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries and may not be copied or communicated to a third party, or

used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries.

This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries, no warranty or representation

is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Rolls-Royce plc and/or

its subsidiaries.

DreadnoughtProgramme Management of a New Reactor Plant

• Complexity and Uncertainty

• In a Collaborative Environment

Trusted to deliver excellenceRolls-Royce Proprietary Information

Rolls-Royce SubmarinesReactor Compartment –

RR is TA and sole supplier

Key Facts

• A naval reactor core is the size of a TRENT XWB engine, has

greater maximum power and does not need refuelling.

• The sound energy transmitted into the water is equivalent to a

modern car engine at idle.

• The plant has a similar rate of change of power to a gas turbine.

• Naval reactor plant must operate safely and meet naval shock

criteria whilst in a highly manoeuvrable submarine.

Propulsion system –

RR supplies key equipment as

OEM

The Challenge ….. 18

RISK FACTORSNOVELTY, NEW TECHNOLOGY, COMPLEXITY & PACE

+ first all new project in a generation and critical path activity

All new design of plant

New ways of working

New people & bigger team and inexperienced leaders

Re-Capitalisation & Capability Development

Raynesway Engineering Labs

Atlantic House

Factory

Factory

Managing the Uncertainty20

• Get Help and Value the Views of Others

• Set Out Our Way & Identity

• Focus on Project Framework and Stick to it

Project Framework21

BAE Systems – Shipyard Whole Boat Design Framework

MoD Customer Governance and Approval

Agree the Collaboration Fundamentals

Division of Responsibilities

Design management Arrangements

Integrated Project Teams - managing master schedules

MoD Phase contracting with developing maturity

Rolls-Royce accept contractsas uncertainty reduces

contract phased release

Trusted to deliver excellence

The Integrated Programme Management Team (IPMT)

Successor IPMT

MoDBAE

SystemsRolls

RoyceBabcock Marine

Electric

Boat

•Client

•Design Authority

•Supplier of GF*

•Submarine

•Design

•Build

•Commission

•WBTA

•Design the

support

•Support the

design

•CMC•NSRP

•Design

•Make

•Commission

•NSRP TA

Enduring Collaboration from Sustained Focus

Key lessons Learnt – no surprise and no magic

• SECURING AND KEEPING TO KEY DECISIONS & DO IT

COLLABORATIVELY

• BUILD A STABLE AND COMMITTED TEAM – KEY PEOPLE STAYED IN

KEY POSTS

• HEARTBEAT OF STRUCTURED REVIEWS + LEADERSHIP ‘IRON WILL’

• FOCUS ON THE WAR NOT THE BATTLES letting stuff go

• ORGANISATIONAL HUMILITY - KEEP LISTENING AND ACTING ON

EXPERT ADVICE … always seek and face up to the facts, be aware of your

weaknesses and act on these things

24

People and the whole enterprise matters

• A programme team needs the support of the whole business

and surrounding enterprise and mobilising that energy was

key in the latter stages of detailed design

• ENGAGEMENT KEY – working with unions and operations

management

• Do lots of little things that enable staff focus eg deferring non

critical activities identified by them, flex the holiday rules +

many late night whole team sessions fuelled by pizzas

25

Challenge Now – Design to Production

APQP framework – Integrated Product and Production Readiness at Rolls- Royce

Long lead buys and supply chain mobilisation

Develop the Integrated project team to the next stage for build

Achievements to Date – on time to the day (5yrs and £3bn+)

• Design Maturity

• Supply Chain- Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE)- Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)

• Enablers- Facilities- IPDE- Build processes

• Construction

• Programme Management

• Training solution

• In-service- Support solution

Conclusion

• Project Controls are necessary but

insufficient

• Mindful Leadership

• Effective Relationships- high challenge

and support

• Questions to inform discussions

• Solutions emerge

• Culture - just and reporting and learning

• Planned uncertainty remains high

• Phased release of build will manage this

• The Project Organisation & Frameworks

will continue to evolve ….

Larciani Giovanni di LorenzoAllegoria della fortunaDescribed as the allegory of uncertainty in Uffizi Museum Florence.

“It is what you don’t think about that gets you”

• TV signals 'being blocked' by huge new BAE submarine

complex for building Trident replacement

• Defence contractors BAE are building the 135 foot high

extension at their Barrow shipyard, in Cumbria. Daily Mirror

Dec.2015.

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