BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on...

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BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Transcript of BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on...

Page 1: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

BRN482Corporate Financial Policy

Clifford W. Smith, Jr.Summer 2007Handout 7

* Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Page 2: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Payouts to Stockholders Can Take a Number of Forms

Regular cash dividends

Open market repurchases

Intra-firm tender offers

Targeted repurchases

Specially designated dividends

Page 3: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Payouts to Shareholders by NYSE Firms (1983 - 1986)

(Barclay/Smith, JFE 1988)

Total Payout ($Billions)

Percent of Firms

Percent ofEquity

Regular Cash Dividends 67.40 80.65 4.26

Open MarketRepurchases 19.27 10.67 1.15

Intra-Firm Tender Offers 3.46 0.76 0.21

Targeted Repurchases 3.51 2.81 0.21

Specially Designated Dividends

0.34 2.22 0.02

Page 4: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

The Dividend Payout Process

(1) Adoption Date

(2) Announcement Date

(3) Ex-Dividend Date

(4) Record Date

(5) Payment Date

1 2 3 4 5 Time

Page 5: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Questions About Payout Policy

How does payout policy affect firm value?

How have dividends varied over time?

What determines the level of payouts?

What determines the form of payouts?

How does the market react to announcements about changes in payouts?

What is the behavior of the stock price at the ex-dividend date?

Page 6: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Dividend Policy

What do we mean by the question, "Does a firm's dividend policy affect firm value?"

Cash flow identity sources of funds = uses of funds

NCFt + St + Bt = DIVt + Rt + Pt + It

It is not possible to change dividend payments and hold everything else constant

Page 7: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?

The bird-in-the-hand fallacy

– Consider two alternatives

A 50/50 chance at $100 or $105 $1 for sure and a 50/50 chance at $99 or

$104

– Holding real investments constant, dividend payments do not make the firm less risky

– Absent taxes and transaction costs, investors can manufacture any dividend level they desire

Page 8: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) JACF, Vol. 7, pp. 4-19.

Historical Evidence

Page 9: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Miller/Modigliani II

If the choice of payout policy affects current firm value, then it does so by

– Changing tax liabilities

– Changing contracting costs

– Changing investment incentives

Page 10: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Dividends reduce transaction costs for some investors

– Some investors consume from their portfolios and dividend payments save them the costs selling stock to generate income.

– Other investors are saving and have increased transaction costs associated with reinvesting the dividends.

– Paying dividends and raising external capital creates additional transaction costs for the firm.

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?

Page 11: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Dividends payments can provide better investment incentives by reducing the conflicts between managers and shareholders.

– Monitoring management and the free cash flow problem.

– The role of investment bankers in the capital acquisition process.

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?

Page 12: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Corporate Bonding Mechanisms

Bond Ratings

Audited Financial Statements

Insurance Purchases

External Board Members

Investment Bankers

Page 13: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Investment Opportunity Set

Assets inPlace

GrowthOpportuniti

es

Cost of Dividends Low High (Flotation Costs)Benefits of Dividends High Low (Free Cash Flow)Predicted Dividend Yield High Low

Page 14: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Barclay, Smith, Watts (1995) JACF, Vol. 7, p 4-19

Page 15: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Firm Characteristics Payout Policy

Growth Options (Merck) Lower

Credence Goods (Eastern)

Product Warranties (Yugo)

Future Product Support (Yugo/Wang)

Supplier Financing (Campeau)

Closely Held Firm Lower

Size

Regulation Higher

Firm Specific Assets

Investment Tax Credits

Marginal Corporate Tax Rate

Marginal Personal Tax Rate

Page 16: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Investment Opportunity Set

Assets in

Place

Growth

Opportunities

Capital Structure

Leverage High Low

Maturity Long Short

Priority Diffuse Concentrated

Leasing High Low

Compensation

Level of Pay Low High

Conditional Pay Low High

Hedging Low High

Dividends High Low

Page 17: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and

Compensation Policies

(Smith/Watts, 1992)

Correlation Matrix

D/P Log (Salary)

Use of Stock Options

E/V -0.49* 0.70** 0.73**

D/P -0.19 -0.64

Log (Salary) 0.70**

Page 18: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)
Page 19: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Managers use dividend payments to "signal" their private information to the market.

– Dividend changes contain information, but the quality of the signal is poor.

– Signaling related to dividend changes and provides little insight about optimal dividend levels.

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?

Page 20: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Unexpected Change in Dividends

The Information Content of Dividend Changes

(Watts)

Unexpected Change in Earnings in the Following Year

Positive Negative

+ 53 47

– 49 51

Page 21: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

The Information Content of Dividend Changes

There is strong empirical evidence that changes in dividend levels are associated with changes in firm value.– Charest

Div. Stock price 1.3%

Div. Stock price 3.8% – Asquith/Mullens

Div. initiation Stock price 3.7%– Brickley

SDD Stock price 2.1%

(Size adjusted, the SDDs have smaller stock price effects than regular dividend increases.)

Page 22: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

The association between stock price changes and dividend changes is most easily interpreted in conjunction with the cash-flow identity.

sources of funds = uses of funds

NCFt + St + Bt = DIVt + Rt + Pt + It

DIVt = NCFt + St + Bt - Rt - Pt - It

The Information Content of Dividend Changes

Page 23: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Securities Issuance Process

(1) Management contacts investment banker/ investment banker begins evaluation of the firm's demand for capital

(2) Firm begins to contact others to assist in preparation of the registration statement (public accounting firm, law firm, consulting engineers, etc.)

- Investment banker begins to contact other investment bankers to form syndicate

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Time

Page 24: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

(3) File registration statement with the SEC- Make public announcement of the offering

while issue is in registration only tombstone ads and red herring prospectus can be distributed

syndicate begins to solicit indication of interest

(4) SEC notifies the firm that the registration statement is effective- Due diligence meeting is schedule

- All major parties to the offering meet to certify that all required activities have been completed

- Offering date (6) is set

Securities Issuance Process

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Time

Page 25: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

(5) Offer price is set

– Typically after the close of business the day before the offering - but sometimes after the open on the offer date

– Under US securities laws, shares cannot be sold for more than the offer price

– Shares cannot be sold below the offer price unless the syndicate breaks

Securities Issuance Process

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Time

Page 26: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

UNION Bank of Switzerland added a specific reference to the Middle East in the documentation of a new issue launched in the Swiss bond market yesterday, to tighten legal protection for underwriters in the event of war in the Gulf.

The reference was added to the standard 'force majeure' clause in the documentation of a SFr50m private placement for the Japanese company Tokyo Tatemono. This clause, in UBS documentation, typically refers to political, economic or monetary crisis in Switzerland, the borrower's country or elsewhere. At the end of this definition, arranger UBS added the words 'in particular the Middle East'. According to an official at UBS, the addition was made as an 'extra precaution' to ensure the issue could be cancelled quickly should war break out.

Many underwriters believe that existing 'force majeure' clauses are adequate, but because the wording of most clauses is general rather than specific, there has been some uncertainty about the level of protection provided. The issue was discussed at a meeting of the legal committee of the International Primary Markets Association last month, but no formal position was agreed.

The Tokyo Tatemono deal, launched yesterday by UBS, will be signed on January 16. The 'force majeure' protection expires on the closing date, January 23, when the issue goes from the primary to the secondary market. By this stage, all the paper would normally be sold, so underwriters would no longer be exposed.

However, with investors adopting a cautious stance, underwriters are likely to be more than usually careful to participate only in deals which they are confident can be placed within the primary period.

UBS strengthens protection against Gulf war for underwriters

By Tracy Corrigan

FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY JANUARY 9 1991

Page 27: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

(6) Offer date -- securities offered to the public

(7) Offering sold -- frequently within the hour

(8) Settlement date -- net proceeds are paid to the issuer

Securities Issuance Process

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Time

Page 28: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Smith, C.W. (1986) Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Vol. 4, (No.1), p 7

Page 29: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Generalizations about Relative Magnitudes Suggested in Table 1

Average abnormal returns are non-positive

Abnormal returns associated with announcements of common stock are negative and larger in absolute value than those observed with debt or preferred stock

Abnormal returns associated with announcements of convertible securities are negative and larger in absolute value than those for the corresponding non-convertible securities.

Abnormal returns associated with sales of securities by industrials are negative and larger in absolute value than those for utilities

Page 30: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Potential Explanations of the Pattern of Stock Price Effects in Table 1

Optimal capital structure theories

Implied cash flow changes

Degree to which announcements were unanticipated

Information asymmetry hypotheses

Ownership changes

Page 31: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Let's assume that we are learning about an optimal capital structure. The relation between firm value and leverage is convex. Thus, if the function is stable and firms maximize value, announcements of new security sales imply firm value increases.

Optimal Financial Policy

Firm Value

Leverage

New ValueOld Value

OldLeverage

New Leverage

Page 32: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

If the announcement releases new information to the market, then the relation between firm value and leverage shifts and there is no prediction about the sign of the value change.

Optimal Financial Policy

Firm Value

Leverage

New Value

Old Value

OldLeverag

e

New Leverage

Page 33: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Implied Cash Flow Changes

DT + RT + PT + IT = NCFT + ST + BT

where for the period T:

DT = the dividend paid

RT = interest paid

PT = debt principal paid

IT = new investment

NCFT = the firm's net operating cash flow

ST = the proceeds from the sale of new

equity net of transactions costs

BT = the proceeds from the sale of bonds

net of transactions costs

Therefore

NCFT = DT - ST + RT - BT + PT + IT

Page 34: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Smith, C.W. (1986) Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Vol. 4, (No.1), p 11

Page 35: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Smith, C.W. (1986) Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Vol. 4, (No.1), p 13

Page 36: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)
Page 37: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Smith, C.W. (1986) Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Vol. 4, (No.1), p 15

Page 38: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Determine the optimal capital structure for the economic balance sheet.

Look at the trajectory of capital structure.

Whenever the costs of deviating from target exceed the cost of adjustment - adjust.

Toward a Unified Theory of Corporate Financial Policy:

Integration of Stocks and Flows

Page 39: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Differ by transaction

─ Costs of share issues are higher than that for debt

─ Costs of share issues are higher than that of share repurchases

Exhibit fixed costs and scale economics

─ Equity offers are rare while bank loans are common

─ Optimal adjustment frequently involves overshooting

─ Most companies spend considerable time away from their target

Adjustment Costs

Page 40: BRN482 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Summer 2007 Handout 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Barclay/Smith/Watts (1997)

Yogi Berra

"You got to be careful if you don't know where you're going, because you might not get there"