Bringing the Party Back In – Parties as Constitutionalised

Organisations

Isabelle Borucki

Department III – Political Science,

University of Trier, Trier, Germany

Universitaetsring 15, 54286 Trier, Germany,

+49 651 201 2184, isabelle.borucki@uni-trier.de

This is a preliminary, rough draft. It may contain several errors in language

and typo or both. Please do not circulate or cite without permission. Thanks!

Constructing Parties as Constitutionalised Organisations

Parties have an exceptional, typically constitutional status in most advanced

democracies and are therefore special voluntary organisations (van Biezen 2008;

Bolleyer 2013). Classically, as partisan theory emphasises parties are seen as corporatist

collective actors and function as interlocutors between society and the state (e.g.

Lawson 1980, 2004), and research highlights the relationship between parties and

government (e.g. Blondel 1995). That leads to the question which kinds of

repercussions and influences emerge from an interpenetrated relationship between

parties and the state. However, the inquiry to analyse parties’ relations to the state is not

merely how states and parties influence each other. Considerably essential for this paper

is what ensues from this mutual connection. Can the reciprocal interrelations between

parties and the state seen as functionally conceptualised and thus as incorporation of

governmental processes?

Given that party-state interdependence occurs, an integrative perspective linking

both aspects on party-state interactions is required embedded in meta-processes such as

mediatisation (Lundby 2009, Hepp et al. 2010) or globalisation (Kriesi, Lachat 2004;

Goetz et al. 2013). A focus on party-state relations, grasped from the perspective of

these various external processes, bridges the disconnected literature of parties’ external

relations, respectively the cartel party literature, and leads to the following assumption:

Due to that the primary focus lies on the incorporation of governmental processes,

practices and institutions into parties’ organisational structure, this is assumed as a

“constitutionalisation” of parties. How this “constitutionalisation” related to “party

governmentness” (Katz 1987: 43f.) could be specified is then crucial: Can this

incorporation be described as a process with the notion of constitutionalisation

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combined with party governmentness? Will this incorporation of the state into parties’

body lead to a further symbiosis with the state and thus confirm the cartel party thesis?

And will parties hence change into constitutionalised organisations or cartelised

organisations? Having this as reference inquiries on parties’ organisational adaptations

to their changed environment, e.g. their responses to state interventions, are rather

subsidiary.

However, to develop the theoretical argument of this research the following

concepts will be considered: The notion of constitutionalisation intends not to be a

juridical term although it sounds like “constitutionalism” (Bellamy 2007; cf. Dobner

2010). Instead, “constitutionalisation” not only refers to the public regulation of parties

by the state1 but inclines also to parts of Katz’s notion of “party governmentness” (Katz

1986: 39-46; cf. Sjöblom 1987). The hereby addressed conceptual framework

implicates the phenomenon of “constitutionalisation of party governmentness” however

in national or subnational comparative perspectives. Therefore the proposed paper

develops and sketchily tests a first heuristic that allows analysing party-state-relations in

advanced democracies from the other way round than common inquiries of the

partyness of government.

To achieve this, the paper proceeds as follows: First, I will discuss the

mentioned literature on party government, brushing the debates on party change, cartel

parties and the state, as well as literature on party law and democracy (Harmel, Janda

1994; Dalton, Wattenberg 2002; Blondel 1995, 2003; Wiesendahl 2010). Next, I will

develop preliminary assumptions relating to the aim of this paper. Second, I will

develop a conceptual framework of the constitutionalisation of party governmentness,

and third exemplify this with material from an own data set of German party

programmatic texts which will function as an illustrative example. Finally, I will

evaluate and discuss the consequences of the theoretical model.

1 Like party law, party finance and overall rent-seeking or party patronage (which is constructed

as indicator for the partyness of government; cf.van Biezen, Kopecký 2007: 239f.; van

Biezen, Kopecký 2014: 175-6; van Biezen, Borz 2012).

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Defining Constitutionalisation and Party Governmentness

This paper intends to link different research strands to build a conceptual framework of

parties’ incorporation of governmental practice and attitudes that further substantiate the

assumption that parties become constitutionalised organisations. Relying on the

literature2 a substantial understanding of what has to be conceived of as “party

governmentness” has not been thoroughly developed thus far. To define

constitutionalisation and party governmentness this paragraph first discusses the party-

change literature with emphasis on cartel parties, then describes the notion of party

governmentness and debates constitutionalisation to lastly find an own definition.

Amongst the numerous and most crucial changes in modern party systems, the

most prominent challenges for parties (e.g. Berman et al. 2013; Mair 2008) are the

following: boundary dissolutions due to volatility, eroding memberships, waning

confidence and an overall disaffection of voters and party supporters weakens the

linkages to and standing of parties in societies (Harmel, Janda 1994; Dalton,

Wattenberg 2002; Blondel 2003). Within the hereby proliferated party-change concepts

only one challenge is pivotal for this paper: In fact, the cartel party thesis of Katz and

Mair (1995, 2009) builds the theoretical basis. Thus the challenge of ‘reigning’, here

understood as keeping persistence within the government policy process to maintain

power, will be approached. Which central mechanisms to contend this challenge could

then be identified when a government wants to be stable, actually govern and provide a

good government as Bergman et al. (2013: 34) describe the central requirements for

todays’ governments? This notion inclines that facing the societal changes due to

globalisation and other transformation processes “governing is the parties’ least

dispensable function” in modern democracies (Müller, Narud 2013: 4) Other functions,

especially aggregating and articulating citizens’ needs and demands, have been

questioned in the debate recently (Bolleyer 2009: 559). Relying on this, it has to be

2 The examined literature stretches from party constitutionalisation and party law (e.g. van

Biezen 2012; van Biezen, Kopecký 2007, 2014; Janda 2005; Müller 2000) as well as the

research on “party government” (e. g. Castles, Wildenmann 1986; Castles, Wildenmann,

Katz 1987; Blondel, Cotta 2000; Blondel 2003; Mair 2008; Müller, Narud 2013) and, to a

lesser degree, “party state” (e.g. von Beyme 1996; Pasquino 1997) and cartel parties (Katz,

Mair 1995, 2009; Bolleyer 2009).

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differentiated between parties in government (cartel party) and in opposition (catch-all

party) (Bolleyer 2009: 575f.).

Preliminary to this, parties are seen as collective and cohesive actors but they are

no rational actors because the internal factions and individuals (leaders, backbenchers,

and parliamentary party members) compete with each other. Therefore parties have to

be characterised as “loosely coupled anarchies” (Orton, Weick 1990) or “stratarchies”

(Katz, Mair 1995, Carty 2004). Still, what was treated as an orphan of party research

until yet is the inter-relational perspective on party-state interactions in regard to the

form or constitution of “party governmentness” and the repercussions resulting from

this: Namely, any adaptation of parties to governmental mechanisms or any shaping of

governing parties’ organizational structures was unattended so far, despite of the fact

that “governments influence and at the limit wish to control parties” (Blondel 1995:

131) and the question of whether there are cases where supporting parties have been

shaped by government and governing processes, namely how this bizarre “party

governmentness” could be conceived of.

According to Katz (1987: 8) party governmentness “refers to the degree to

which parties, […], actually are in charge, not just of the formal government apparatus,

but of social power overall”. In this definition, governmentness seems to be a somehow

measurable degree of “being in charge of power” and as such relies on the ‘responsible

parties doctrine’ (Katz 1986: 40). A slightly earlier notion of Katz (1986: 45-46) implies

that “party governmentness describes a general societal characteristic” and “refers to a

characteristic of the Herrschaftsorganisation of the overall society, and indicates the

proportion of all social power exercised by parties within the framework of the party

government model” (Katz 1986: 46; italics added). Resulting from this, the notion

“Herrschaftsorganisation” and its indication of proportion of power in the light of party-

state literature entails three implications:

1) The description of how and who is being represented by whom, and is based

on classical partisan representation theory. Given that “party governmentness” still

suggests a comprehension of representation as hierarchical mechanism or “chain of

delegation” (Müller 2000: 312; Bergman et al. 2013) neglecting the extent of

governmentness in party research remains opaque. Consequently “party

governmentness” suggests that representative government has to be necessarily party

government because both are linked with each other. This is a prerequisite regarding

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modern democracies although the boundaries between parties’ organisations, party

memberships and society have become volatile, fluid and uncertain. As such party

governmentness and party government can be seen “as a strategy within a democratic

government” (Katz 1986: 51) but not entirely dependent on party government. This is

no mono-causal connectivity. Necessarily, any orientation of parties towards the state

occurs in a democratic system which has a codified party system wherein parties have

constitutional status. This leads to another implication concerning this notion.

2) Concerning party “constitutionalisation” parties are seen as “constitutionally

defined both in terms of their representative capacity and as an essential component of

the institutional infrastructure of the state” (van Biezen 2012: 210). Thus, according to

the cartel party thesis parties are on the one hand parts of the democratic body of states

and thus are able to shape their own environments (due to the ability to shape laws in

parliament). On the other hand they are also recipients of state interventions and

benefits such as public subsidies, the management of party organisation, public laws,

and constitution forms (e.g. van Biezen, Kopecký 2007, 2014). Parties are in this

perspective constructed as “an essential public good for democracy” and their

constitutionalisation, defined as public regulation and as progressive codification into

public law recently (van Biezen, Kopecký 2014: 174), is a “key element of the party-

state relations” (van Biezen, Kopecký 2007: 240). Consequently, in this reading of the

research regarding parties’ permanent linkages with the state and their rather temporal

linkages with society (van Biezen 2008: 351; cf. van Biezen, Kopecký 2007) parties are

supposed as “semi-state agencies” (Katz, Mair 1995: 16). This effects party democracy

becoming “a service provided by the government” (ibid.). The notion of ‘semi-state

agencies’ challenges the status of parties as interlocutors between society and state and

thus the responsible parties doctrine which we should turn to a more functional

understanding. Another implication of this development is the advancing change of

parties’ nature from voluntary organisations to constitutionalised or governmentalized

organisations which refers to the goal of this paper to show how this process could be

conceptualised. Resulting from this, the notion of “constitutionalisation” implicates,

wider understood, an increasing penetration of parties by the state and an

interdependence of both spheres with each other going beyond Blondels (1995: 131)

levels of favour, appointments and policies. This penetration does not describe the

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mutuality of the party-state-relations. This is proposed by the notion of governmentness

within the idea of party government.

3) Katz’s definition oriented on Herrschaftsorganisation is related to power and

power-gaining as parties derive from the “desire to make or influence authoritative

(government) decisions according to their values” (Bergman et al. 2013: 34). But this is

no convincing definition or complete understanding of governmentness. What is

inherent in the definition of Katz is the notion of proportion of all social power

exercised by parties. Yet, this was conceived of as degree or width of the public sector,

measured by the percentage of public expenditures by GNP, as Sjöblom (1987: 188) put

it. But what has the public sector in fact to do with the overall proportion of governing

power distributed by parties? My argument goes in another direction: When we are

constructing partyness of government as patronage (van Biezen, Kopecký 2014: 176)

how can the extent of the public sector and therefore another measure for patronage be

an indicator for governmentness? According to Blondels (1995: 131f.) levels3 of

relationship between parties and the state (favours, policies, patronage) the fusion of

parties’ elites with the state elites (the government leading politicians) could support the

cartel party thesis. Therefore, an analysis of the policies within states and their

genealogy, say how they developed and derived from almost ‘autonomous’ independent

movements to parties in government into governmental decision-making organisations

that use favours and patronage to increase the partyness of government is crucial to

investigate. The process of institutionalising decision-making from the the

governmental administration or bureaucracy into governing parties is party

governmentness. The extent of which decision-making within parties is

institutionalised, for instance, and to what degree parties have built their organisations

like governing authorities (with several policy departments in the central headquarters

aso.), at least is the degree of how parties are governmentalized in respect of policy-

making and decision-taking, namely in governing and the use of power. Thus, party

governmentness addresses an adaptation of parties to governmental mechanisms,

orientation on attitudes of governing and shaping of governing parties’ organizational

3 Which are likely similar to the micro, meso and macro-analytical levels.

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structures due to this – they have constitutionalised themselves as governing-decision-

making incorporation.

The underlying theoretical premise of the herein proposed notion of

incorporation is then as follows: Parties’ transformation into “state institutions” refers to

the cartel thesis and at least a stabilisation of parties as cartels when gaining and holding

office. This occurs by operating in government and being confronted with “functional

pressures of government” (Bolleyer 2013: 234) which results in a process of shaping

parties actively by these characteristics and functional pressures. Constitutionalisation

then is constructed conversely to the common reading of the cartel party thesis: Namely,

constitutionalised parties are organisations that are shaped by governmental

incorporation as a process or movement from the state into the parties. This

corresponds to the above-discussed notion of governmentness as being

governmentalized and being in charge of decision-making. Resulting from this, the

herein thematised shift of party-state interrelations, especially the transformation of

parties into constitutionalised organisations is part of the societal characteristic of

“being in charge of reigning or governing”.

Constitutionalisation of party governmentness” thus requires several conditions.

a) In a juridical and narrower sense it refers to the fact that parties give themselves a

codified document like a statute which rebuilds their fractioning, intra-organisational

differences and heterogeneities as intermediate organisations as well as their ideological

position on the left-right dimension (Mair 2008: 228f.). b) In a broader sense

constitutionalisation means a procedural diffusion process of mechanisms and

“behaviour” from government practice to party-internal practice, policy development

and implementation like an orientation on self-practiced governance, types or patterns

of negotiations or strategic foci on policies that gained high media and/or public

attention. The characteristics of this diffusion differ from whether parties are being in

government or in opposition. Still, the notion refers to a mutual reciprocity of parties

and the state and as such to the symbiosis of parties with the state. Within this

reciprocity “parties are likewise shaped by government participation” (Bergman et al.

2013: 39) and, following from this, parties as governing and decision-making

organisations are challenged because of the fusion of the governing party with the

“executive realm” (ibid.). Concluding from this, one could state that parties have lost

their former status as interlocutors and are no longer special organisations per se as

often assumed thus far (Bolleyer 2013: 248)

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Therefore, concerning parties as former or partly interlocutors and parts of the

symbiosis with the state the following premises are assumed for this research. First, a

state-organisational interpenetration as kind of symbiosis or fusion is seen as intense

which allows a higher amount of government stability and power maintenance. Parties

are thus central organisations that produce and construct legitimacy bottom-up or top-

down (cf. Blondel 1995; Cansino 1995). Second, within the above-sketched

“constitutionalisation of party governmentness” paradigm there is a diffusion process

from government practice into party-internal practice and policy. Thus, party-state

relations are modelled as interpenetration that implies the co-orientation of policies

(Bolleyer 2011: 472) and adaptation of parties to rules, norms and institutions of the

state as well as the processes of intra-party democracy (Cross, Katz 2013), and their

impact on their external appearance and behaviour. These deliberations on the definition

of party governmentness and the hereby induced incorporation of the state into parties

are shown in the following table with some extreme examples.

Table 1: Adaptation or rejection of party governmentness.

Patterns/

Examples

Attitudes (practices) Mechanisms

(rules, norms)

Structures

(institutions)

Position

adaptation Differentiation in

Backbenchers/politic

ians in central office

and top politicians

Administrative

communication

ways;

implementation of

codified statutes;

communicative

centralization

Structure

mirroring

public

administration

;

Centralisation

Government

participatio

n

rejection No internal

differentiation into

party in public office

and party on the

ground

Broad

communication;

everyone speaks;

implementation

only of party law

to get approved to

elections

Basic

democracy

Opposition;

social

movement;

protest

movement

The patterns shown in the table reflect the conceptualisation of party

governmentness in a sketchily way and have to be seen as ideal poles of a spectrum.

Especially the pattern of rejection is no option for parties who act as collective actors

with the will to power. Theoretically, the close relationship of interpenetration could

lead to different settings or scenarios:

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1) The additional maceration of party membership borders, declining

boundaries in media communication and further professionalisation of

the parties in public office with the result of a vanishing of the party

on the ground as basis is thinkable.

2) What would follow from the incorporation of parties into the state as

impact of party governmentness is the dissolution of parties in the

traditional sense and as traditional voluntary member organisations

we know thus far. This implicates not necessarily the disappearance

of parties (e.g. van Biezen, Kopecký 2014: 179).

3) What could probably happen is a decomposition of parties’

organisational borders and parts in terms of fragmentation. An

optimistic scenario in this direction would be that parties withstand

the embracement of the party-state symbiosis and remain self-

reflexive, self-conceived and partially autonomous in concerns of

their internal structure and organisation (which depends strongly from

party law and national constitutions in the judicial reading). A more

pessimistic scenario is that parties dissolve into the state’s body and

thus disappear almost as voluntary organisations. What would result

from the last scenario are façade parties that simulate democracy

(Blühdorn 2007) and symbolic politics to maintain posts and power

for the remaining party elites and government and party leaders.

Despite this, the aim of this research is to show how parties appear nowadays in the

sense of the notion of constitutionalised organisations/parties. The following paragraph

tries to build a framework that considers and reflects the above-mentioned deliberations

on “constitutionalisation” and “party governmentness” as an incorporation of

governmental mechanisms into parties’ bodies.

Conceptualizing a Framework of Party Governmentness

The herein proposed notion of incorporation will now be exploratory conceptualised by

integrating both perspectives of the state and the parties. The suggested framework thus

includes parties’ interpenetration with the state and it refers to the above-mentioned

diffusion processes from governing into parties as well as boundary dissolutions of

national processes in the context of globalisation or European integration. Parties as

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probably fully constitutionalised organisations in the paradigm of “constitutionalisation

of party governmentness” now function as boundary translation agencies into at least

two directions: First, between the “bottom” (society) and the “top” (governmental

institutions) and second the repercussions resulting from this.

As parts of this party-state symbiosis parties are no longer independent or ‘real’

interlocutors, they are rather components of governmental institutions and permanently

linked with the state (van Biezen, Kopecký 2007: 237; 2014). Independent variables are

then the political system (presidential or parliamentary), especially the party system

(moderate or pluralist), the parties (their types, genealogy, and ideology), and external

transformative processes such as globalisation or mediatisation. Dependent variables are

the influenced and influencing governments and coalitions, parliaments and legislation,

and party organisations, especially their social base, internal structure and composition.

The following illustration (figure 1) shall visualise this interdependent relationship.

Figure 1: Model of party-government-relations adapting Wiesendahl 2011.

Starting from this, the theoretical framework consists of at least three

dimensions. 1) First, boundary dissolutions and organisational external effects on

parties as voluntary originally member organisations have to be considered. Though,

Party Democracy: Partyness of Government

Party Organisations,

Societyness of party democracy

(permanent linkage)

External Factors

(Medialisation, Globalisation)

Party State: Party Governments, Legislatures, Law/Rule of Law

Party governmentness

Party Types (Cartel party, catch-all,

mass party)

Party Change Political System

(presidential, parlamentarian,

republican)

Society: Individualisation, pluralisation, fragmentation

(temporal linkage)

Constitutionalisation of Parties

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this tends processes like volatility, eroding memberships, decreasing trust and an overall

alienation of voters from parties with the result that the linkage of parties to the society

is of temporal character at least in elections times. 2) Second, the notion of parties as

special interlocutors and as boundary translation agencies is contested because of the

incorporation of governmental practices, attitudes and mechanism into parties. Thus, the

party government is dissolving (“subject to a severe challenge”, Mair 2008: 230) or

rather temporarily active as well as the societyness of party democracy and the

partyness of government which is indicated by patronage and other indicators that show

how much parties depend on governments’ subsidies and public regulation. This is

rather subsidiary when looking at the extent of the party-state symbiosis and

relationships seen as “constitutionalisation of party governmentness”. 3) This process,

third, functions in at least two directions in the vertical dimension: from the top to the

bottom and the bottom to the top. Plus, horizontal repercussions between parties and the

state, or more specifically, between parties and the government should be conceived of

as horizontally oriented communication processes which are mutually co-oriented.

These processes of constitutionalisation of party governmentness are concentrated in

institutionalisation, i.e. the incorporation of governmental mechanisms into parties due

to the practice of governing, i.e. decision-making and -taking. Simply put, it is the

extent or degree to which parties exert power.

This extent or degree to which parties operate power and thus party

governmentness will be discussed in the following by observing the social policy4 of

German parliamentary parties in the federal “Bundestag”, namely the two Christian

democratic parties (CDU, CSU), the Social democrats (SPD), the Greens, the Lefts (Die

Linke), and the Liberals (FDP).5 This results in the anticipation of governments’

requests by German political parties in social policy using own qualitative data and

4 This is defined as policies that concern labour, social welfare like pensions or family care. For

this analysis the focus lies on labour because this was and is the biggest problem of

advanced welfare states in regard to the assumed demographic change in modern societies

(Häusermann, Picot, Geering 2013).

5 The German liberals failed to enter the “Bundestag” in the last General election in 2013 for

the first time due to the five-percent threshold of the electoral system. Thus, the last

General election was excluded from analysis.

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refers to the thesis that parties become constitutionalised organisations, and cultivate a

symbiotic relationship with the state. This is, in a first grasp, a social policy analysis

which shall be complemented by future analyses in comparative perspectives as well as

other political dimensions like polity or politics, and other policy areas as social policy

as well (cf. Debus, Müller 2013). This first approach is fruitful because social policy

almost naturally is more administrated and contested within a government(-coalition)

and thus features a high degree of interdependence and thus suggests high analytical

output (Blondel 1995: 133). Plus, social policy and economic policy typically build the

classical conflict dimensions of party competition (Debus 2007).

To examine the party-state relations in-depth Germany is an ideal case because

the codification of parties into public law was one of the first since WWII. Thus, one

can assume that the long-time of having a constructive and positive role in policy-

making would have changed the German parties most, namely in structure as well as in

behaviour, policy-addressing and -positioning and, according to the cartel party, a party-

cartel must be widely developed due to the long existence of the codified party law and

institutionalised state subsidies to parties like public finance (van Biezen, Kopecký

2014: 175). Thus, a high degree of party governmentness is assumed.

To operationalise the concept of “constitutionalisation of party governmentness”

and to show first insights the following topics were addressed: An assumption for this

analysis was that being in government has had fundamental changes in positions

towards social policy actions such as pensions or labour. Then, diffusion of governance

practice occurs in related election platforms and basic programme updates. Thus, initial

search topics in the range of social policy for the qualitative and quantitative analysis

are roughly dichotomised into parties being in government or in opposition.6

This results in the anticipation of governments’ requests by German political

parties in social policy using own qualitative data. To trace the processes of whether

governments’ programmes diffuse into parties’ programmatic texts, it has to be

analysed whether the difference between being in charge of governing or of being in

opposition has any consequences for parties’ policy orientations and therefore

consequently long-term shifts in their organisational body could be observed (whereas

6 Other categories would be in further research the organisational structures, so e.g. the

organisational charts of parties could be analysed.

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the last would be a second step of the inquiry to examine structural changes). The

analysis of changes of policies refers not entirely to policy shifts (Meyer 2013) induced

by voters’ perception but to the alteration of policies generated or shifted by

government involvement. This diffusion process-tracing contains five steps or stages

and is modelled like figure 2 shows and will be outlined in more detail now.

(i) Consequently, at the moment of an election (t-1) a party constructs

and publishes its elections manifesto which is shaped by ideology7,

the party internal structure and preferences as well as the fact of

whether the party is in opposition or in government.

(ii) Next, after being elected, a party has to negotiate policy orientations,

programmes and implementation within its organisational structure

and/or within the governing coalition. But what do coalitions and

their duration say us about party governmentness and the

incorporation of governmental practices into parties’ organisation?

This refers to the already mentioned thesis that the longer a party is

governing (regardless of whether in a grand coalition or in an

asymmetric one), the more it could be constitutionalised and thus

“governmentalized”. Thus, being a “Volkspartei” with high

governmentness and high symbiosis with the state would follow in a

kind of state character of the respective party.

(iii) This leads to the implementation of policy programmes and goals

which vary from the original ideological goals of the party. Thus,

7 „For most political parties, ideologies and ideas are embodied in party platforms, manifestoes,

and programs. These official party statements contain some mix of ideological statements,

abstract principles, broad goals, and specific policy proposals. Party manifestoes provide

scholars with an indication of both abstract party ideologies, and narrower, concrete policy

proposals to implement that ideology. (...). Manifestoes generally stress the importance of

various policy areas, and sometimes also contain promises (...) about policies that the party

will pursue if granted the reins of power. The promises are concrete representations of the

broader ideological principles that the parties have staked out.” (Vassallo, Wilcox 2009:

415-416)

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policies are influenced by governance practices, functional pressures

and structural constraints (e.g. financial resources).

(iv) In advance of the next-ahead election which is in the time-planning of

the party central office (t1), a draft of the new party policy

programme is sketched out. This has either to be oriented on the

parties’ practised governance or its opposition work with reference to

own achievements in respective policy fields or reference to failures

and mistakes of the actual government.

(v) Finally, what results is a new party platform that has been shaped by

the relevant position of the party in its past.

In this respect, the model of diffusion-tracing rests somewhat ideal and roughly

sketched out but it could systematize the qualitative analysis and sort out the results by

means of changes and continuities as well. What is of central relevance within this

model is that it focuses on policies only, and not on other forms of party

governmentness like mechanisms, attitudes or structures that were mentioned in table 1.

Thus, the model serves to explore a part of the concept that should be further

operationalised.

Figure 2: Diffusion process-tracing within programmatic texts.

But how does this work in parties’ real life? What would happen when different

types of political system, party system and partyness or governmentness occur? Are

there other intervening variables to be considered? According to Blondel (1995) it has

to be said that the following deliberations are of impressive character and have not the

t-1: election

•party policy programme

•shaped by ideology, party structure aso.

•gov./opposition

policy negotiations amongst governing

parties/within parties

implementation and variation of policies

and goals in governance practice

draft of new party policy programme

•orientation on practised governance:

•government vs. opposition

•reference to own achievements in a policy field

•reference to failures of the government

t0: next election

•new party platform

•shaped by having been in gov./opposition

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intention to deliver hard empirical evidence. This has to be addressed in further

research. Concerning this, the following reflections try to fill the described model with

some empirical impressions of one single case.

Empirical Exploration of Parties’ Social Policies as One Indicator for Party

Governmentness

The method of the following tentative inquiry is firstly qualitative. The whole elicited

body of the material stretches from the early 1980s to the 2000s’ party platforms and

manifestoes, party statutes and basic programmes. The data was obtained through own

investigations at the parties’ foundations, in national archives and internet databases.

The corpus consists basically of 64 documents with varying character: 40 party

platforms for general elections beginning from 1980, 17 basic programmes beginning

from 1979, and six current party statutes. The sampling variety between these different

genres of party programmatic texts ensure that transformations or adaptions in respect

of social policy shifts in the parties induced by government participation could be

captured. Data analysis was conducted by using the software tools MAXqda and

TextSTAT.8 Plus, the inquiry was accomplished by analyses of the CMP data to

quantify the percentages of welfare policies within the manifestoes.9

The hereto conducted analysis investigates programmatic data of a set of the

mentioned six German parties (see p. 12; obtained from the CMP/MPPI I/II-project) but

the qualitative analysis focused on three parties: In the following, I will first sketch out

the duration of governing and constitution of coalitions in Germany and second

examine the perceptions towards social policies of the Christian Democrats, Social

Democrats and the Greens as different kinds of parties both on the ideological and on

the party typical level.10

One of the two German great mass parties, the Christian

Democrats, was the longest period part of the governing coalition (Picot 2014: 139;

Wildenmann 1987: 92, table 2). Surprisingly, the party with the longest period of being

part of the German government are the Liberals with 47 years. They functioned mostly

8 But is of limited character due to the deadline for the workshop.

9 Therefore the variables per504 and per 505 were used to achieve this (see appendix).

10 In the long-run an analysis of more countries, more parties, more documents, and policies is

intended to test the model and theoretical argument.

15

as stabiliser and crucial decider of General elections’ outcomes and coalition building

recently (cf. Hofferbert, Klingemann 1990).

Table 2: Coalitions in Germany since WWII.

Time period Governing

party

Coalition

partner

Governing

time

CDU/CSU

Governing

time SPD

Governing

time FDP

1949-1963 CDU/CSU FDP,

DP,

GB/BHE;

FVP11

14 14

1963-1966 CDU/CSU FDP 3 3

1966-1969 First Grand Coalition:

CDU/CSU and SPD

3 3

1969-1974 SPD FDP 5 5

1974-1982 SPD FDP 8 8

1982-1998 CDU/CSU FDP 16 16

1998-2005 SPD Greens 7

2005-2009 Second Grand Coalition:

CDU/CSU and SPD

4 4

2009-2013 CDU FDP 4 4

2013- Third Grand Coalition:

CDU/CSU and SPD

- -

Total 44 27 47

Time moments for investigation are several government changes, namely 1983

because this general election legitimated Helmut Kohl into office, 1998 with the power

shift to the Social Democrats and 2005 that brought the second Grand coalition into

government. Finally, six elections that could be clustered into three time periods were

considered for analysis (cf. table 3).

Table 3: Government and opposition in the investigated years. 12

1983 1987 1998 2002 2005 2009

11 The DP (=Deutsche Partei), GB/BHE (=Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der

Heimatvertriebenen und Enrechteten), and FVP (=Freie Volkspartei) are disappeared from

the German party landscape or dissolved in other party streamings.

12 Relevant for analysis is the incumbent party in the year of the elections.

16

Government CDU/CSU

FDP13

CDU/CSU

FDP

CDU/CSU,

FDP

SPD,

Greens

SPD,

Greens

CDU/CSU

SPD

Opposition SPD,

Greens

SPD,

Greens

SPD,

Greens

CDU/CSU,

FDP

CDU/CSU,

FDP

FDP,

Greens

Concluding from this, a sub-corpus of 18 election manifestos was examined,

supplemented by the three parties’ basic programmes from the relevant moment. The

following documentation of the analysis is systematized chronologically and by party;

this suggests no classification in regard to the notion of party governmentness.

Consequently, the programmes of the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and

the Greens were analysed for the first period with 1983 as beginning and according to

the conceptual model 1987 as following election. At that time the SPD was originally

the governing party (together with the FDP as ‘junior-partner’), and the CDU/CSU and

the Greens were in opposition (1983 was the election that brought the Greens into

parliament for the first time).

The self-perception of governing parties is centrally shaped by an idea of being

part of the state or even the state, especially when parties remained a long time in public

office. For instance, the SPD sees itself as strong social force that uses the state to fence

in economic market power, whereas the CDU/CSU sees itself more as being a part of

the state. This is predominantly the case for the CDU/CSU election platforms where the

achievements of the government are seen central by the party. This is dominant in most

of the material as the example of 1983 shows, when the party was formally in

government but had to confirm the decision of the parliamentary parties by the voters.

The achievements of the party in financial and social policy are compared with the ones

who former Christian democratic governments since Adenauer reached:

“In 1969 a jobseeker could choose between four vacancies, the economy

flourished, a new debt did not exist. This capital was squandered. 13 years of SPD-

led Government – the consequences of this policy are known: unemployment,

social decline, bankruptcy, ruined Government finances and inflation. Socialists

cannot handle the money of citizens and understand nothing of the economy: while

13 Until October 1st, the SPD-FDP government was in office but due to the no-confidence vote

of the Bundestag and the parliamentary parties of the government, especially the FDP

against Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl was elected as chancellor.

17

all Governments of the CDU/CSU from 1949 to 1969, in 20 years, had only 14

billion mark debt to cover the budget contracted, the former Chancellor Helmut

Schmidt alone had in eight years from 1974 to 1982 debts of 200 billion German

Mark. Finance Minister Strauß borrowed not only one mark in 1969 but paid back

in the same year, which also was an election year, nearly 1.3 billion German

Mark.” (Party manifesto CDU/CSU 1983: 4, italics added)

The offence against the political opponent results in the wording “socialists cannot…”

which is repeatedly dubbed in the manifesto at the beginning of paragraphs. To solve

the problems of labour the party emphasises the necessity of individual self-initiative in

social welfare and combines it with market logics (cf. “economic and social order are

undividable related with each other”, Basic programme of the CDU/CSU 1994: 69).

Thus, the party trusts especially in the self-regulation mechanisms of the economy and

backs this with private investments to create jobs. It is not the state though who is held

responsible to build job opportunities and get people into work, it is the economy and,

resulting from this, each individual has to be self-future-oriented. A main point then is

the fight against unemployment. Thus labour becomes an important part of the welfare

state beside pensions, education and healthcare. This nexus of economy and welfare is

essential for the whole material concerning this party in later programmes: The party

sees itself as the most competent and potent actor to solve the national problems

induced by the German reunion.

Complementary to this, the party platform from 1987 is interwoven with

negative campaigning issues (Ansolabehere, Iyengar 1995) against the reigning parties:

“The SPD, however, is the party of stagnation; it creates the anonymous ‘State of care’

which promotes the development of a cold, thoroughly bureaucratized society”

(Platform of the CDU/CSU 1987: 32). This kind of negativity and assaults against the

opponent parties was found in all texts from other elections, too. Naturally, negative

campaigning is part of election campaigns and thus this instrument is used frequently.

The 1998 governing parties CDU and CSU stated in their joint programme that

they would continue their reform policies, especially emphasizing the own

achievements in the fight against unemployment: “CDU and CSU have created the

conditions for this upturn with its reform policy for more growth and employment.

These reforms have to be continued. The may not be withdrawn, as announced by the

SPD” (Platform of the CDU/CSU 1998: 3). This is accompanied by a further

18

deliberation and emancipation of the market logics combined with individual freedom

(ibid: 19). Concerning the reform of the social state, own achievements are highlighted

such as the introduction of nursing care insurance as well as a pension reform (ibid: 21).

In contrast to the 1980s programmes, the party remains restrained and moderate in tone

e.g. “socialists” is no more cited and negative campaigning has turned into accenting

own governmental performance in the last legislature and though acting not only as

party but as trouble-shooter for problems.

The negative attacks to attract probable voters and known from the 1980s seem

to be rediscovered in the 2002 election platform of the CDU/CSU. At that time the party

campaigned from opposition and wanted to win power again. That they wanted to

govern is shown in fact by naming their ‘platform’ ‘governmental programme’, entitled

“Performance and Security”. This aspiration is central for the programme when stating

against the actual red-green government:

“People in Germany are working hard for their future. They deserve a government

that works hard for the people and runs the country effectively. […] Schroeder is

the chancellor of the ‚promise – broken‘. His record is desolate: more than four

million unemployed, a health system on the brink, increased taxes and charges.

People are rightly disappointed of this government.” (Party platform of the

CDU/CSU 2002: 3)

This culminates in the recommendation to change government by stating: “Only

a strong Union [CDU/CSU] is a guarantee that the negative trend [of increasing

unemployment] is stopped and reversed” (Party platform of the CSU/CSU 2002: 3).

And again the party refers to own successes in subnational governments: “We bring

good results. The balances of Union-governed federal states show: One can govern

well.” (Platform of the CDU/CSU 2002: 4) Thus, the CDU/CSU keeps at the self-

perception of being a part of the state by highlighting: “We Christian Democrats have

politically developed the social market economy against fierce oppositions and have

shaped it in decades of governmental responsibility” (Basic programme of the

CDU/CSU 1994: 219)

In 2005 the CDU/CSU opposition stressed that the red-green-coalition has not

only solved problems but even created new ones and so caused a crisis in economic

respect with stagnation as a consequence. The platform of the CDU/CSU attacks

sharply the government for having squandered the future of the people: “7 years of red-

19

green government have plunged Germany into a deep crisis. The social, economic and

financial foundations of our country are acutely vulnerable. […] we have mass

unemployment.” (Platform of the CDU/CSU 2005: 3) This is most relevant in the social

policy field where the opposition sees most faults of the government in weakening the

social security systems: “The crisis affects in particular the social security systems. The

finances of the social security systems are broken down, their power is threatened.”

(Platform of the CDU/CSU 2005: 5) Again, the opposition couples this critique on the

social systems with economical questions and the causally links social stability with

economic prosperity. This emphasis on the social market economy is another reference

to the achievements of the Christian Democrats in government. Plus, this contains again

a linkage between economy and social policy that shows the linkage between welfare

and a demand-oriented social policy with subsidiarity as a central idea. The orientation

of the Christian Democrats to the state concludes in the notion that only this party can

lead the country adequately and give people good welfare.

What in 2009 basically has changed is the motion of the CDU/CSU under

Chancellor Angela Merkel into the middle of the left-right scale and in the policy

dimension to a more modest and state-driven appearance of the party due to the fact that

having governed since 2005. Therefore the platform is again a governmental

programme. This again corresponds with the self-perception of the party of being best

for reigning and of evenly being the state or an embodiment of it: “Our success in

government […] The State ensures the framework in which the people freely act in the

social market economy. It ensures that fair competition creates jobs, reward

performance and protects weak.” (Party programme of the CDU/CSU 2009: 5, 6)

Especially the achievements of the Merkel-Government within the economic and

financial crisis are mentioned in the programme and accomplished by the ideologically

driven notion of the party as parts of a semi-active state in standby: “The Government

has to step in at the moment of the emergency – but only then. More than ever it would

be a big mistake if we incorrectly understood the role of the state and now wanted to

confer new permanently tasks to it.” (Party programme of the CDU/CSU 2009: 7)

Opponent or varying opinions and assessments towards the governments’ work

and achievements on social policy result from the manifestos of the SPD. They are

emphasizing the importance of the state as surveyor of social peace and freedom. The

SPD also refers to own achievements in government and the struggles the SPD-

administrations had to face in past.

20

“Despite all resistances and difficulties the Federal Governments under Willy

Brandt and Helmut Schmidt have achieved greater social justice, expanded the

welfare state and brought the people significant improvements in their material

situation. […] Today hundreds of thousands of people additionally would be

unemployed without our economic, social and financial policies.” (Platform of the

SPD 1983: 162-163)

Thus, the own position as former governors is strategically instrumentalized to degrade

the opponent. Plus, the SPD uses blaming of the government for “going the wrong way”

in social policy, too: “The Coalition is going the wrong way: it increases unemployment

through its policy. […] It is necessary, therefore, to bring the social state together with

citizenship and not to divide both.” (Platform of the SPD 1983: 165-166) As alternative

to this the party plans to renew and reform the social insurance systems by installing “a

new sustainable balance between the generations in the field of social protection which

puts an end to the constant back and forth manoeuvring between the social systems on

the one hand and the federal budget on the other hand.” (Platform of the SPD 1983:

175)14

The Social Democrats too emphasise a strong nexus between social policy,

welfare and economy but turn the argument the other way round:

“The reverse is true: there are only stable economic conditions if we keep the

welfare state work. This means: we must focus on the fight against mass

unemployment, and on the major tasks of the investment spending. It will take more

than four years until the damages are repaired which have been added to the

social safety net by the current Federal Government. Now we must begin to re-tie

this network so that it does not tear apart. Therefore, we will take back the unsocial

cuts in unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance. […] In doing so, we

are committed to a meaningful connection between social security and self-help.

(Party programme of the SPD 1987: 24, italics added)

This leads to the analysis of the shift in government in 1998 and the following

social reforms introduced by the government. This election was accompanied by a

14 This refers to the ongoing problem of financial dependence of the federal member states

from the Federation and the increasing constraints on the functions of the member states

until now.

21

mood of change in the country. The SPD as opposition at that time stated to change and

reform the country from scratch in demanding a new policy, a new government and new

jobs when getting elected:

“Germany needs a new optimism. The change of Government in Bonn is the best

emergency programme for more growth and new jobs. The SPD is ready to assume

government responsibility for Germany. We will lead our country in the 21st

century - safely and just.” (Party platform of the SPD 1998: 5).

A key element in this platform is the promise to fight against unemployment

which is basically no new issue but was to this time extremely active discussed in the

public sphere. A first instrument to achieve this was the so called “alliance for work” a

confederative circle which brought together represents of the government,

administration, industry and the unions to reform employment. In sum, the campaign of

1998 of the SPD was the German ‘third way’ and started the parties’ tendency to the

political middle that climaxed after the general election of 2009 as the CMP data show

(see figures in the appendix). In the following, facing the increasing unemployment

statistics it was the Red-Green-coalition that invented the so called “agenda 2010”. This

federal job creation plan began in 2003 with deep cuts into the social system and the

integration of unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance into “Hartz IV”

which was part of an unpopular reform of the social insurance system.

Since 2002 the SPD stresses the success of the red-green-coalition and wants to

continue this project (Platform of the SPD 2002: 70). Thus, the party named its platform

‘governmental programme’, too. The reference to own successes and reliability in

government is especially strong concerning labour policy. This again shows the self-

perception of the SPD seeing itself as central social force and as advocate for socially

disadvantaged people.

“With the fight against unemployment, we have made progress, from 4.279.200 in

the year average in 1998 to 3.851.636 in 2001. The number of employees rose by

1.2 million. But that is not enough. External influences slowed the initially rapid

advances. We do not resign ourselves to the unemployment.” (Platform of the SPD

2002: 7)

These measures were influenced by the opposition which in the view of the SPD

blocked most reform initiatives: “Most of these initiatives for renewal and cohesion had

22

to be enforced against the often massive resistance of the CDU and CSU. Without our

policy since 1998 Germany would become less modern, less social, and less liberal.

(Platform of the SPD 2002: 6) That form of reference or link shell reason that promised

measures had not been realized to that time because of political gridlocks in policy

implementation due to the majority of the opposition in the minor, federal chamber.

This is coupled by the emphasis on the continuation of the “alliance for work” as a

“vital platform in the joint efforts of all social forces to employment” (Platform of the

SPD 2002: 7). Thus, the goal of the party to get re-elected seems to be transported via

the maintenance of begun projects for which the party requests voters’ support. In

difference to the 1980s programmes where the party referred on former successes it now

gives an outline for the country’s future that is coupled with the party’s persistence in

government and the next legislature.

The capability to reform and re-activate economics and welfare was contested in

the earlier next election in 2005. The SPD as leader of the red-green government stated

as overall slogan “trust in Germany” as title for the election manifesto. Interestingly, the

Social Democrats refer in this programme to the faults and failures of the former Kohl-

Administration and thus conduct negative campaigning against the opposition. This

directly refers to other programmes from the 1980s and 1998 when the Socialists were

in opposition. Consequently, as a governing party, the SPD denotes to its main project

“agenda 2010” and stresses its success in reforming the labour market as answer to

global and societal changes by referring to higher export quotes than ever and

decreasing labour costs (Platform of the SPD 2005: 7-8). Centrally, the programme tries

to convey the idea of the “agenda 2010” as best measure to reform the labour market

and decrease unemployment, and lastly secure the welfare state. From the SPD’s

perspective the reforms were necessary but most unpopular as the voter turnout in 2005

meant the loss of power for the Red-Greens. In 2009 the SPD claims more initiative of

the state in the financial crisis and a strong leadership to fence in the economy,

combined with a reference to own achievements at the time of the red-green coalition

and not whilst the second grand coalition:

“It decides whether we draw the right lessons from the global financial and

economic crisis and put the forces of the market rules and boundaries. […] It

decides whether we want to be a solidarity-based society where the strong carry

23

greater loads and the weak get real opportunities, to be strong.” (Party programme

of the SPD 2009: 5)

This leads to the policy positions of the last party in government which was

analysed: the Greens. A rather elementary change in policy positions has been

witnessed by investigating the programmatic texts of this party. They originally had a

‘mission’ and totally wanted to change the way of governing and policy

implementation.

“We promise one thing anyhow: to bring the challenges we face so wholeheartedly

in the Parliament for discussion that CDU/CSU and SPD (not to mention the FDP)

are no longer undisturbed on past ruling the life and survival issues and past rule.”

(Party Programme of the Greens 1983: 3)

This promise is backed by attacking the “mainstream parties”: “The policy announced

by all mainstream parties to boost economic growth to overcome mass unemployment is

illusory, misleading and devastating in its impact on the living conditions.” (Party

Programme of the Greens 1983: 8). So, especially the Greens brought up new policies at

this time like disarmament, human rights, equality and internationalism, education,

feminism, ecology. Classical social themes like labour were secondary then. Clearly

above all is the environmental and educational direction of the new party. Though,

window dressing exercises of the government are criticized by the party:

“The established parties are trying to save the decaying building of economic- and

bio-forms, they miss him new wallpaper and curtains. As lip service announced the

reconciliation of ecology and economy, actually their economics of short term and

short breath has priority, as the commissioning of the power plants Buschhaus and

Ibbenbühren [two coal power stations with extreme high degrees of nitric oxide] or

other environmental scandals have shown again and again. But also the social

conflicts find only verbal reconciliation in Kohl’s recovery rhetoric or get out of

decency sermon. In reality, there is no reconciliation.” (Party Programme of the

Greens 1987: 33)

In contrast to the 1980s programmes the opinions upon market and economy of

the Greens changed radically, as the example of 2002 shows: “Competition is more

innovative and efficient as monopolies and thus is useful for the consumer. But to allow

24

a high intensity of competition, the state must provide fair conditions of competition.”

(Party Programme of the Greens 2002: 38-39) Plus, the Greens emphasize their

government participation since 1998: “With the participation in the Government since

1998 we have assumed responsibility and could resolve many points of the reform

gridlock of the Kohl-Administration.” (Party Programme of the Greens 2002: 1) This

quotation entails the shift from the originally alternative movement with a parliamentary

represented group to an established party. This ideologically stands against some of the

original ideas of the greens. Instead, the party refers to own successes in party

government and thus to not only take responsibility but even resolve problems – and not

to rescue the world. This was accompanied by internal struggles of whether grassroots

democracy is adequate (Poguntke 2002). The Greens started their election programme

in 2005 as opposition by stressing emerging anxieties of people from the middle of

society to lose their jobs and the overall insecurity of labour – linked with ecology.

“Due to the change of economy and age structure our social insurance systems are

eroding. We are witnessing an increasing exclusion of parts of our society. The

working environment is dramatically changing […] millions are unemployed and

many live in unsecure labour relations” (Party program of the Greens 2005: 7)

As a policy measure to fight unemployment the party wants to decrease labour costs in

the service industries (ibid: 25) that should decrease moonlighting too. Other measures

are a guaranteed minimum wage and new jobs including self-employment. The Greens

in 2009 underline a reform of the social market economy with their ‘Green New Deal’.

That is a reform in social, economic and ecologic manner in contrast to the ‘old social

deal’ that, in their perspective, dissolved due to the economic and financial crisis of

2008. They directly link this crisis with the loss of labour and climate change as main

problems to be solved (party programme of the Greens 2009: 11). Plus, they claim to

create 1 million new jobs and refer to the party’s role as admonisher of politics and

creative idea generator to solve problems (party programme of the Greens 2009: 12)

which is linked with a critique of the coalition: “The Grand Coalition has disappointed

many people. Grand crises – Grand Coalition? What a mistake. What have the last four

years brought? They brought a stagnation and mutual paralysis in the midst of a breach

of the era.” (Party programme of the Greens 2009: 19). This is complemented by

highlighting the participation of the Greens in government for seven years of whose

performance in several policy areas (except social policy) bear a “green handwriting”

25

(Party programme of the Greens 2009: 20). Interestingly, in this programme the party

seems to be self-reflexive and admits faults and failures (ibid.). Though the party was

part of the government and changed from a protest movement and an alternative

muticulti-hotchpotch to an established party in the party system, the extent of

governmentness in regard of being interpenetrated with the state seems to be less

marked.

To sum up the deliberations on the programmatic texts one can say that negative

campaigning and assaults against the political opponent, and highlighting of own

successes in government dominate the material. Interestingly most of these quotes are

located in the preamble of the documents. Thus, the achievements and successes of

governing parties are addressed in a prominent section of the election platforms to

acquire more attention. In concerns of the social policy a strong connection between

social policy and economy was identified that the particular parties fill with different

meanings (CDU: Economy has to build and create jobs; SPD: State has to create jobs

and fence in economic forces; Greens with a connection of ecology, sustainability and

job-creating). It could be accordingly concluded that the Christian Democrats have the

highest ‘degree’ of governmentness due to the fact that they were the longest time part

of the government and steered the states’ daily business. What could not be precisely

described is the extent of which the party itself is interpenetrated by this perception of

“being the state in cause of governing”. Therefore, the SPD tried to present itself more

as another political force that balances social security, whereas the CDU/CSU focused

more on socio-economic and individual topics. What has further to be recorded is that

the assumption of the governmentness model of changing policy within government

could be slightly confirmed thus far. This is limited because the degree or extent of

party governmentness has to be further conceptualised and analysed, probably with

other material and another research design by means of methodology.

Conclusions

This contribution had the goal to conceptualise the constitutionalisation of parties as a

reciprocal party-state interrelation with emphasis on the notion of party governmentness

rather than on public regulation. Therefore, within the theoretical section the terms of

constitutionalisation, incorporation and party governmentness were discussed to

conclude the following: Parties can become constitutionalised institutions when they see

26

themselves as part of the government or as even to the government. This was illustrated

by the empirical example of the attitudes of German parties concerning social policies

within their programmatic texts to several time periods. Therefore, the framework

seems to be helpful to identify traces of government participation in programmatic texts,

but the question whether governments’ programmes, mechanisms and practices diffuse

into parties’ programmes and thus their ideological body remains empirically opaque.

To conclude in regard to the central question of this research the following is

stressed: The overall impression of the analysis of the particular programmes is that the

parties have changed their perceptions of welfare, social policy and reform of the social

system in respect of whom of them holds governing positions or not. This implies that

government participation intensively shapes how parties present their programmatic

issues in their campaign material and how these influences the parties’ written self-

perceptions of whether being part of the state or – what is especially the case for the

Greens – reform or even abolish the state. In regard to the central question and the

theoretical argument developed in this research it has to be stated that party

governmentness seems to be a phenomenon of policy implementation in public office,

but this is not the whole picture. What really has impact on the degree or extent of party

governmentness seems to be additionally an organisational question and rather one of

only policy planning and implementation.

Regarding the limited range of the analysed material it could be still stated that

within this limited range an impression of influences of governing on the policy level

could be attested. What is of interest for future research is twofold: First, the measures

and theoretical framework should be improved. Second, comparative and more

diachronically work has to be done including not only the data from CMP and other

party political texts but examining the organisational and thus internal and structural

perspective of parties in advanced and probably new democracies as well. This is the

intention and the aim of further research and future occupations for research.

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Appendix

1,829268293

4,219409283

1,454545455

5,839416058

8,130081301 9,252669039

2,43902439

8,058608059

0,609756098

0,421940928

1,818181818

1,459854015

0

0

1,463414634

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Green SPD FDP CDU/CSU Green SPD FDP CDU/CSU

06.03.1983 06.03.1983 06.03.1983 06.03.1983 25.01.1987 25.01.1987 25.01.1987 25.01.1987

Percentages within manifestos (MPPI II data) 1983-1987

Welfare State Expansion Welfare State Limitation

5,5

7,657657658

3,484320557

1,727115717 2,325581395

0

0

0,522648084

0,690846287

0,465116279

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

90/GreensAlliance

'90/Greens

PDS Party ofDemocratic

Socialism

SPD SocialDemocratic

Party

FDP FreeDemocratic

Party

CDU/CSUChristian

DemocraticUnion/Social

Union

Percentages within manifestos (MPPI II data) 1998

Welfare State Limitation positive

Welfare State Expansion positive

33

7,088846881 7,600950119

4,244694132

2,612826603 2,33281493

0 0

0,74906367

2,375296912

0,933125972

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

90/GreensAlliance

'90/Greens

PDS Party ofDemocratic

Socialism

SPD SocialDemocratic

Party

FDP FreeDemocratic

Party

CDU/CSUChristian

DemocraticUnion/Social

Union

Percentages within manifestos (MPPI II data) 2002

Welfare State Limitation positive

Welfare State Expansion positive

-19,58724896

-34,57339221

-23,56797843

14,03644864

2,564102799

-12,65328816

-2,73972702

90/Greens Alliance‘90/Greens

LINKE The Left

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany

FDP Free Democratic Party

CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union/ChristianSocial Union

Pirates

AfD Alternative for Germany

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20

Right-left position of parties in 2013 (Laver/Budge 1992; based on CMP 2013)

rile

34

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

1983 1987 1998 2002 2009 2013

RILE-Index (based on CMP 2013)

90/Greens Alliance‘90/Greens

LINKE The Left

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany

FDP Free Democratic Party

CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union