BI-SC JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY JOINT OPERATIONAL...

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe B-7010 SHAPE Belgium

Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation Norfolk, Virginia 23551-2490

United States of America SH/FOR/RER/FSL/AN - 280090 3510 FRP-0010/TT-6908/Ser: TO: See Distribution SUBJECT: BI-SC JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY JOINT OPERATIONAL

GUIDELINES DATE: 22 February 2011 REFERENCES: A. 3211 ISAF HQ/Dir ACE/Personnel Recovery (CRCC), ISAF Personnel

Recovery (PR) Manning and Training Shortcomings, dated January 2009. B. 1170.1/JBJ7IS/016/09, ISAF Personnel Recovery (PR) Training Shortcomings, dated 16 February 2009. C. AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, dated November 2007 3000 TC-5/TT-2593/SER: NR0015, Joint Operational Guideline (JOG) for Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR), dated 4 March 2008.

1. A doctrinal gap concerning NATO Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) could impact mission accomplishment in ISAF and other current and future operations. In an effort to address certain operational issues cited in References A and B, the Strategic Commands (SC), in accordance with Reference C, issue this updated version as an immediate replacement to the current JPR Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) (Reference D). 2. Pending ratification and promulgation of JPR doctrine, the SCs recommend the enclosed Bi-SC JPR JOG for immediate use by all NATO nations and operational headquarters. The JOG combines the draft NATO PR doctrine (AJP-3.3.9 SD8), TTPs (ATP-3.7.1 SD2) and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) training standards (Study 7196 SD5), while taking into account national comments. 3. The points of contact for the Bi-SC JPR JOG are Maj Tim Wilcox at SACT, NCN 555-3405, [email protected] and Col Antonio Nascimento at SHAPE, NCN 254-3707, [email protected]. FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS, EUROPE AND TRANSFORMATION: Manfred Lange R G Cooling General, DEU AF Vice Admiral, GBR N Chief of Staff Chief of Staff

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

mailto:[email protected]�

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ENCLOSURE: 1. Bi-SC Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG). DISTRIBUTION: External – Action: Director General, International Military Staff Director NATO Standardization Agency COS JFC HQ Brunssum COS ISAF HQ COS JWC COS JFTC COS JALLC NATO Defense College Rome NATO School Oberammergau Information: NATO and PfP CHOD & JPR POCs via ACT NLR/PNLR Non NATO ISAF TCNs CHOD & JPR POCs via IMS OPS NTG JSSG COS JFC HQ Naples COS JFC HQ Lisbon COS NSHQ NAEWFC Internal – Action: SHAPE: FOR SACT: DPPI

Information: SHAPE: OPI CPP SPT MCD SACT: (HQ SACT DIR 35-1) Lists I, II, III, V, VI, VII

ENCLOSURE 1 TO SH/FOR/RER/FSL/AN-280090 3510 FRP-0010/TT-6908/Ser: DATE:

Bi-SC JOINT OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

11/01

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY (JPR)

(Jan 2011)

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22 FEB 11

Bi-SC Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG)11/01

Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR)

January 28, 2011

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IntroductionNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Introduction

Introduction

The isolation, capture and/or exploitation of NATO personnel during operations couldhave a significant negative impact on operational security, morale of assigned forcesand public support. In addition, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operationsrely on contract support and interaction with other non-NATO actors, for which NATOmay have a responsibility. The Alliance therefore requires a system to recover militaryand civilian personnel that have become isolated.

Consequential requirements

NATO has therefore a requirement for a system with the following objectives:

a. Protecting the operational security and morale of NATO personnel by providing fortheir recovery and reintegration, in case they become isolated.

b. Enhancing the Personnel Recovery (PR) capabilities of NATO by sharing, wherepossible, the lessons learnt during PR exercises and missions.

and that provides:

a. Applicable documentation for the preparation and conduct of PR operations.

b. A suitable infrastructure plan (including commanders, staffs and recovery forces)prepared for PR and the establishment of agreements with other organisations.

c. Appropriate PR training and equipment standards.

Aim

This JOG is intended to bridge the gap in NATO Personnel Recovery (PR) doctrine andTactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) until new doctrine and TTPs can be written,ratified and promulgated. It should be understood this JOG is not ratified doctrine, butrather the presentation of “best practice” to provide a central frame of reference untilNATO PR doctrine and TTPs can be formally agreed, ratified and promulgated. When thatdoctrine and TTPs are promulgated this JOG will be withdrawn.


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Guidance to the user

The document is set-up in such a way that, dependent on one’s role, one can take therespective volume out of the the JOG and use it as a standalone document. As all usersshould have some knowledge on the fundamentals of PR, all should read the fundamen-tal principles volume in conjunction with the respective “Guide” volume.

All the “Guide” volumes have a text part and an annex part to them. The text is intendedto provide the overview (“the movie”) of that aspect of PR. The annexes provide theformats, templates and checklists. Therefore, whoever is already knowledgeable of onesrole, then the text part can also be discarded and the annexes can subsequently be usedas a standalone package.

Updating

This Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) combines the draft NATO PR Doctrine (AJP-3.3.9SD-8), TTPs (ATP-3.7.1 SD-2) and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE)training standard (Study 7196 SD-5). Any comments and feedback on this JOG aremost welcome. Comments on the content of this JOG may also have relevance to thedevelopment of the aforementioned documents, and should therefore also be forwardedto their custodial POCs. As the PR concepts are “work in progress”, this JOG will beupdated annually in January. Proposals for improvements and commente are thereforeto be sent to the custodians using the addresses given below nlt. 18 November 2011.

Points of contact:

[email protected]

PR Doctrine and [email protected]

SERE training standard (Volume III, Annex [email protected]


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Contents

Introduction iii

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY 1

1 Introduction 3

1.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.2 Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.3 Jointness of Personnel Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.3.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1.3.2 Practical terms for use in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1.4 Operational environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 Scope of NATO PR 7

2.1 Elements of PR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.2 Delineation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.3 The personnel recovery system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.4 Methods of personnel recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.5 Risk considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3 PR guiding principles 11

3.1 Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4 FORCE COMPONENTS 13

4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2 Personnel recovery organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2.1 Embedded JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2.2 Delegated JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2.3 Sector oriented JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4.3 C2 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4.3.1 JFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4.3.2 Component commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16


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4.3.3 Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4.3.4 JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4.3.5 PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4.3.6 PR POC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4.3.7 Mission Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4.3.8 On-Scene Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4.3.9 Rescue Mission Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4.4 Military assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4.5 Civil / diplomatic assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

5 PR OPERATION 19

5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

5.2 JPRC / PRCC tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

5.2.1 Set-up tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

5.2.2 PR CONOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

5.3 Mission specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

5.3.1 Risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

5.3.2 PR response options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

5.4 PR operation essential tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5.4.1 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5.4.2 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5.4.3 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5.4.4 Recover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5.4.5 Reintegrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

I STAFF GUIDE 27

1 INTRODUCTION 29

1.1 The JPRC / PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1.2 PR POC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1.3 JFC’s PR responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1.4 Scale of operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1.4.1 Manning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

1.4.2 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equipped personnel . . . . 33

1.5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

1.5.2 Recovery documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

1.5.3 ISOPREP form and management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33



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1.5.4 PR codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1.5.5 Recovery equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1.5.6 Basic, intermediate and advanced training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1.5.7 PR POC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1.5.8 Pre-deployment and in-theatre training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 37

2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

2.2 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

2.2.1 JFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

2.2.2 Component / sector commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

2.3 JPRC / PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.3.1 Mission coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.3.2 OSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.3.3 RMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.3.4 Liaison authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2.3.5 Mission abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3 INTELLIGENCE 41

3.1 General intelligence principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.2 Intelligence source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.3 Advanced intelligence requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.4 Isolated personnel intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.5 Mission intelligence requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.6 Guidance for intel and ops support staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.6.2 Recovery documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3.6.3 Electronic handling of ISOPREP and EPA documents . . . . . . . . 44

3.6.4 Recovery Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3.6.5 Blood chit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4 RISK ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION 47

4.1 General risk analysis guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4.2 Risk mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47


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5 PR OPERATION 49

5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5.2 Pre-emptive mission planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5.2.1 Preparatory work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5.2.2 Specific missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5.3 Pro-active planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5.3.1 Planning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5.3.2 AO PR SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5.3.3 PR SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.4 Daily operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.5 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.6 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.6.1 Search methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5.7 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.8 Recover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.8.1 Isolated or evading personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.8.2 Hostage release operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.9 Reintegrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.10 Levels of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.11 Theatre specific training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

A JPRC / PRCC set-up checklists 61

A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

A.2 JPRC / PRCC set-up checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

A.3 JPRC / PRCC bullet list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

B JPRC / PRCC activation message 67

C PR asset questionnaire 69

C.1 general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

C.2 Operational capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

C.3 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

C.4 Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

C.5 Recovery capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

C.6 Armament / self protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

C.7 Operational and logistical limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

C.8 Standard combat load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71



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D Boards and matrices 73

D.1 Asset Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

D.2 Asset matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

D.3 Launch / execute matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

D.4 Incident/mission board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

E PR report formats 77

E.1 PRIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

E.2 SARIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

E.3 PR 11-line report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

E.4 PR mission message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

F JPRC / PRCC chief checklist 81

G PR Annex to OPLAN template 83

G.1 Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.1.2 Opposing forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.1.3 Own forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.1.4 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.1.5 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.1.6 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.2 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.3 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.3.1 Commander’s intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

G.3.2 Desired end state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

G.3.3 Concept of operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

G.3.4 Not covered areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

G.3.5 Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

G.3.6 Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

G.4 coordinating instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

G.5 PIERIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

G.6 Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

G.6.1 PR C2 description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

G.6.2 Supporting / supported relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

G.6.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

G.6.4 Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

G.7 Administration and logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88


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G.7.0.1 Pre deployment preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

G.7.0.2 Upon entry preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

G.7.0.3 In theatre continuation training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

G.7.1 Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

G.7.2 Service support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

H PR SOP template 91

H.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

H.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

H.1.2 Reference publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

H.1.3 PR Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

H.1.3.1 4 PR methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

H.1.3.2 Relation to other mission types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

H.2 Theatre PR system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

H.2.1 Not covered areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

H.3 C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

H.3.1 PR C2 description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

H.3.2 Supporting / supported relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

H.3.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

H.3.4 Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

H.3.5 specific tasks / duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

H.3.6 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

H.3.7 Communication conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

H.3.7.1 Use of ISOPREPs and EPAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

H.4 ORBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

H.4.1 Dedicated assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

H.4.2 Designated assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

H.4.3 QRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

H.4.4 Medical facilities for reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

H.4.5 Other capable assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

H.5 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

H.6 PR staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

H.6.1 Proactive mission planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

H.7 PR critical tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

H.7.1 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

H.7.2 Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

H.7.3 Normal mission execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

H.7.4 Recovery mission execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101



xi

H.7.5 Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

H.8 Land procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

H.9 Air procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

H.9.1 Initial actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

H.9.2 Aircrew procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

H.9.3 Downed aircrew procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

H.9.4 Recovery phase procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

H.10Maritime procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

H.11Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

I PR codes message template 107

I.1 General information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

I.2 Rules of engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

I.3 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

I.4 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

I.4.1 Brevity words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

I.4.2 Survivor radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

I.4.3 PR codewords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

I.4.4 PR codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

I.4.5 Non-comms plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

J PR SPINS template 111

J.1 General information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

J.2 Rules of engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

J.3 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

J.4 Recovery mission execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

J.4.1 Special procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

J.5 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

K Communications 113

K.1 COMPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

K.1.1 Checklist for getting the necessary information from the opera-tors/assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

K.1.2 Checklist for checking the complan in annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

K.1.3 Detail the required liaisons plus the comms equipment . . . . . . . 114

K.1.4 Detail required C2 equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

K.2 Standard communication formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

K.3 SATCOM operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

K.4 Contact information table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115


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CONTENTS

L PR shift changeover checklists 117

L.1 Director changeover checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

L.2 PR controller checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

M Intelligence checklists 121

M.1 Pre-operations intel checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

M.2 Intel daily operations checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

M.3 Intel changeover brief checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

M.4 Intel PR incident checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

N Essential elements of information 125

O ELT notification checklist 129

P Recovery mission execution checklist 131

Q Course of action brief 135

Q.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Q.2 Suggested briefing format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

R Launch / execute back brief 137

R.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

R.2 Suggested briefing format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

R.3 PR mission launch criteria checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

S Intelligence and SERE debrief 141

S.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

S.2 SERE debrief of isolated person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

S.3 Outline for survivor / evader interview / debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

S.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

S.3.2 Personal information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

S.3.3 Overview of incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

S.3.4 Take a break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

S.3.5 Detailed analysis of incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

S.4 Biographical information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

S.5 Military biographical information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

S.6 Pre-mission preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

S.7 Events leading up to isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

S.8 Incident details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

S.9 Survival & evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146



xiii

S.10 Contacts with local populace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

S.11 Preparations for recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

S.12 Recovery phase - how were you recovered / rescued? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

S.13 Conventional assisted recovery (planned) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

S.14 Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

S.15 Unplanned contacts - describe/explain any unplanned contact(s) . . . . . . 156

S.16 On-scene military forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

S.17 Unassisted recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

S.18 Any problems? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

T Continuity PR training task list 159

II HELICOPTER BORNE RECOVERY FORCE OPERATOR GUIDE161

1 GENERAL 1631.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1.2 Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1.3 PR SOP and SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1.4 Mission abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1.5 Liaison authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1.6 Risk mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

2 PR OPERATION 1652.1 Pre-emptive mission planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

2.1.1 Preparation and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

2.2 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

2.3 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

2.4 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

2.5 Recover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

2.5.1 Assets / PRTF composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

2.5.2 Mission planning and briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

2.6 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

2.6.1 Enroute procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

2.6.2 Rendezvous point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

2.6.3 RV to IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

2.6.4 Communication procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

2.6.5 Objective area procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

2.6.6 ISOPREP authentication procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

2.6.7 Egress routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

2.7 Reintegrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173


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CONTENTS

3 Formation flights and RESCORT patterns 175

3.1 RW RESCORT types of formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

3.1.1 Combat cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

3.1.2 Free cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

3.2 Enroute contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

3.2.1 Blind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

3.2.2 Altitude de-confliction procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

3.2.3 Inadvertent IMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

3.3 RW RESCORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

3.4 FW RESCORT patterns and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

3.5 RW RESCORT tactics and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

3.6 RESCORT patterns in the objective area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

4 COMMUNICATIONS 183

4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

4.2 Radio communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

4.3 Necessary amount of frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

4.4 Communications checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

4.4.1 Element/section lead initiates comm checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

4.4.2 Communications check continuation procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 184

4.4.3 PLS check procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

4.5 Brevity words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

5 TRAINING 187

5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

5.2 Pre-emptive training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

5.2.1 PRTF and extraction force training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

5.2.2 Types of competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

5.3 Pre-deployment training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

5.4 In-the AO training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

A Helo ops set-up checklist 189

B Capabilities & equipment 191

B.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

B.2 Recovery helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

B.3 Extraction force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

B.4 RESCORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193



xv

C PR report formats 195

C.1 Personnel Recovery Incident Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

C.2 SARIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

C.3 PR 11-line report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

C.4 PR mission message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

D AMC responsibilities and checklist 199

D.1 AMC responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

D.2 AMC checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

E OSC checklist 201

F RMC responsibilities checklist 203

G RESCORT responsibilities checklist 205

H Recovery vehicle checklist 207

I Recovery vehicle to RESCORT brief 209

J 15-line pick-up brief 211

J.1 15-line pick-up brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

J.2 Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

K Joint formation face-to-face briefing guide 215

L RMC task delegation sheet 217

L.1 Mission preparation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

L.1.1 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

L.1.2 Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

L.1.3 Crew tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

L.1.4 Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

L.1.5 Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

L.1.6 Check before walk: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

M Suggested PRTF SOP format 221

M.1 Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

M.2 Joblist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

M.3 Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

M.4 Brainstorm checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

M.5 Planning checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222


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M.5.1 Planning parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

M.5.2 Planning standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

M.6 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

M.7 Start-up and taxi standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

M.8 Enroute flying standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

M.9 Holding standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

M.10FARP standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

M.11Objective area standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

M.12Contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

M.13Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

N RMC mission briefing format 225

N.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

N.2 Mission elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

N.3 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

N.4 Briefing format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

O Extraction force mission planning guide 231

O.1 Extraction force planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

O.2 Extraction force briefing guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

O.2.1 Time hack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

O.2.2 Team mission overview (given by team leader) . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

O.2.3 Marshaling area procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

O.2.4 Infiltration plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

O.2.5 Exfiltration plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

P Communications 237

P.1 Brevity words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

P.2 COMCARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Q Helo lead to RESCORT Briefing 241

R Tactical arming and refuelling 243

R.1 Tasks and responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

R.1.1 RMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

R.1.2 FARP commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

R.1.3 Recommended personnel available on a FARP . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

R.2 FARP and FARP area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

R.2.1 Criteria for landing / refuelling points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244



xvii

R.2.2 Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

R.2.3 Fire fighting equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

R.2.4 Medical crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

R.2.5 Fuel trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

R.2.6 Communications device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

R.3 Refuelling procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

R.3.1 Radio controlled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

R.3.2 Procedural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

R.4 Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

R.4.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

R.4.2 Fire at the FARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

R.4.3 Fuel spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

R.5 Helicopter landing sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

R.6 Procedures for marshalling helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

R.7 Air refuelling briefing checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

S Training 251

III ISOLATED PERSONNEL GUIDE 253

1 INTRODUCTION 2571.1 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

1.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

1.3 Mission abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

1.4 PIERIE vs MRIE and HRIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

2 PREPARATION AND PLANNING 2592.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

2.2 Preparatory work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

2.2.1 Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

2.2.2 Next of kin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

2.3 Levels of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

2.4 Operational planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

2.4.1 Annex V, PR SOP(s) and SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

2.4.2 ISOPREP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

2.4.3 EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

2.4.4 Recovery methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

2.5 Tactical preparation and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

2.5.1 Pre-deployment training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

2.5.2 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

2.5.3 Mission preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262


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CONTENTS

3 SURVIVAL AND EVASION DURING ISOLATION 265

3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

3.2 Report and immediate actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

3.2.1 Ground personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

3.2.2 Aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

3.2.3 Radios / beacons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

3.2.4 General report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

3.2.5 Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

3.2.6 Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

3.3 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

3.3.1 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.3.2 Location if no radio available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.3.3 Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.4 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.4.1 Fire support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.4.2 Additional equipment/resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.4.3 SERE psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

3.4.4 Support to family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

3.5 Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

3.5.1 Actions during extraction procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

3.5.2 Helicopter recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

3.5.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

3.5.4 Extraction tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

4 Reintegration 273

5 Conduct after capture 275

6 Isolated personnel training 277


6.1.1 Levels of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277


6.2.1 Theatre specific training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

6.3 In-theatre training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

6.3.1 Prior to conducting operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

6.3.2 Refresher training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278



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A ISOPREP 279

A.0.3 ISOPREP form (electronic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

A.0.4 Procedures for completion of ISOPREPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

A.0.5 Sending of ISOPREPs and EPAs to the PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

A.1 ISOPREP form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

B EPA 283

B.0.1 EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

B.0.2 EPA form (electronic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

B.0.3 Completion and handling EPAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

B.1 EPA form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

C Notification checklist 287

C.1 Aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

C.2 Non-aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

D Isolated personnel initial action checklist 289

E Report formats 291

E.1 PR 11-line report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

E.2 METHANE report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

F The NATO SERE training standard 293

F.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

F.2 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

F.3 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

F.4 SERE training levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

F.5 Student training objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

F.6 Instructor requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

F.6.1 SERE instructor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

F.6.2 Advanced SERE instructor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

F.7 Level A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

F.8 Level B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

F.9 Level C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

F.10 Pre-deployment training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

F.11 Continuation training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Acronyms 303


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CONTENTS



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xxi

List of Figures

2.1 The PR system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.2 PR vs. complexity, difficulty and risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4.1 Generic command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4.2 Sector oriented command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5.1 Generic decision cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

5.2 Execution matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.1 Standard MS-Outlook E-mail folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3.2 Standard document folder tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

5.1 JPRC / PRCC activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5.2 Capabilities of recovery personnel vs. capabilities of recovery equipment . 53

A.1 Example of a generic JPRC / PRCC set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

G.1 PR command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

H.1 PR command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

2.1 RMC decision cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

3.1 RW (RESCORT) formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

3.2 Rejoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

3.3 Rear RESCORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

3.4 Racetrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

3.5 Attached FW RESCORT patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

3.6 Attached FW RESCORT patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

4.1 Comms prior passing IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

4.2 Comms after passing IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

P.1 A COMCARD example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239


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LIST OF FIGURES

R.1 Generic FARP area layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

R.2 Standard FARP layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

A.1 ISOPREP page 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

A.2 ISOPREP page 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

B.1 EPA page 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

B.2 EPA page 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

F.1 The NATO SERE training concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

F.2 The NATO SERE structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294


NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC1

Volume

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLESOF PERSONNEL RECOVERY



3

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Purpose

0101. This volume provides fundamental principles for NATO Personnel Recovery (PR).

0102. It also provides guidance for determining personnel whose duties make themvulnerable to isolation and exploitation, requiring different levels of training.

1.2 Applicability

0103. This document applies to both military and non-military participants involvedin NATO operations, NATO led operations and training. NATO personnel could becomeisolated while conducting the full spectrum of NATO or NATO led operations or training.Responsibility for the recovery of all personnel (military and civilian) participating insuch operations resides therefore with the appropriate commander.

1.3 Jointness of Personnel Recovery

0104. PR is a joint function. Joint functions need to be considered by the Joint ForceCommander (JFC) in determining the capabilities required for the command. Nationshave differing PR philosophies, policies, priorities and capabilities. In a multinationalforce, differences should be reconciled and an overall combined joint force personnel re-covery policy should be established to facilitate unity of effort and enhance PR measures.

0105. The JFC will most often desire functional or national service components to pro-vide capabilities to conduct PR execution tasks for their own forces and for other isolatedpersonnel within their assigned operating areas. The JFC will need to balance functionalcomponent area of operation PR responsibilities with the capabilities of a PR effort forthe operational area. Depending on the situation, the JFC may want to rely entirely oncomponent PR capability or multinational capability, or some combination of all or sev-eral categories. Nations and components identify their capability and shortfalls to meetthe JFC’s requirements and adjust assigned forces or capabilities where required.

0106. A NATO component experiencing an isolation event within its force or operationalarea may be able to conduct the recovery mission without external support. Often this isdue to need for expediency and proximity of forces. However, components should weighrisks associated and whether or not a joint effort would be a better option.


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1.4 Operational environment

0107. If two or more components are involved, the Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC)coordinates the augmentation of forces and recommend PR mission-specific supportedand supporting command relationships to the JFC or designated supported comman-der for PR. Respective component commanders normally retain Operational Control(OPCON) of their forces and the JFC or designated supported commander for PR will del-egate Tactical Control (TACON) of participating forces to the supported commander.

0108. Nations should identify personnel that may be assigned to a mission, duty / job,or task where they may be at greater risk of isolation or exploitation if captured. Nationsshould ensure these personnel are trained and equipped to NATO standards.

1.3.1 Definitions

Personnel Recovery (PR): The sum of military, diplomatic and civil efforts to effectthe recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

Isolated Personnel: Military or civilian personnel who are separated from their unitor organisation in a situation that may require them to survive, evade, resist exploita-tion, or escape while awaiting recovery.

Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE): Defines the set of tactics,techniques, and procedures that will give isolated personnel the tools to survive in anyenvironment and to evade capture where such a threat exists. Failing that, to resistexploitation by captors and, if the situation permits, escape captivity to finally supporttheir own or assisted recovery and return with dignity.

Reintegration: The operational process of providing medical and psychological careto personnel recovered from isolation and debriefing them for intelligence and lessonslearned purposes.

1.3.2 Practical terms for use in this document

Personnel. Although in principle all military and civil personnel in a NATO operationare at risk of getting isolated, some are at a higher level of risk than others. Nationsare to provide them with the appropriate level of training prior entering the Joint Oper-ations Area (JOA). The different levels of risk and training must be taken into accountevery time the term “personnel” is used in this document1.


0109. Joint forces may conduct a wide variety of activities to include combat, humani-tarian assistance, maintaining order and managing confrontation within the JOA. Theseactivities must be coordinated with other organizations - military operations may onlyplay a relatively minor part during some crises. Nevertheless, experience demonstratesthat a wide range of military activities will be required simultaneously, rather thansingle focus operations.

1Categories of civilian personnel are defined in NATO policy document: EAPC(SNLC)D(2006)0006-REV1. (19 June 2006)



5

Alliance forces will be required to deal with a complex and diverse range of risks, situa-tions and demands to manage the crisis through military operations; and personnel mayencounter a wide range of potential situations when conducting operations. These situ-ations could range from a permissive to a no permissive operational environment withthe expectation of engagement by adversary forces. The development of proper planswill depend on the ability of the designated commander and principal staff officers toobserve and accurately assess conditions within the JOA. Regardless of the operationalenvironment, forces must be trained and ready to respond to recovery missions acrossthe operational spectrum. Commanders should be aware of the pertinent conditionsprior to execution of any mission. Additionally, isolated personnel may encounter differ-ent levels of exploitation if captured and must be trained appropriately.

In any operational environment, intelligence adds substantially to the Allied effort, es-pecially when dealing with isolated personnel. Recovery forces are dependent on qual-ity intelligence for their own safety and that of the isolated personnel. The JPRC andPersonnel Recovery Coordination Cells (PRCCs) need to establish a positive working re-lationship with the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) J-2, and identify PR intelligence re-quirements early in the operation.


Scope of NATO PRNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

7

Chapter 2

Scope of NATO PR

2.1 Elements of PR

0201. PR involves a balance of activities between the three elements of the PR systemas depicted in figure 2.1; commanders and staffs, recovery forces and isolated personnel.

0202. Commanders and staffs trained to integrate and synchronise PR planning andoperations into all operational activities.

0203. A recovery force manned, trained and equipped to plan, exercise and execute PRmissions. The nature of the required recovery force varies in line with the demands ofthe task.

0204. Isolated personnel.

Figure 2.1: The PR system



2.2 Delineation

2.2 Delineation

0205. The following delineation implements NATO policy to ensure a viable PR capabil-ity in all environments. These options govern planning and preparation for PR, but donot prescribe mission execution. The options are as follows:

a. Diplomatic. National governments are the lead for all diplomatic activities toprepare for, support and possibly execute PR events.

b. Military. NATO nations and NATO are responsible for all NATO or NATO led militaryactivities conducted in preparation for and during PR missions.

c. Civil. (Non) Governmental Organisations ((N)GOs) and private citizens have oftenplayed an important role in securing the release of captured and detained person-nel.

2.3 The personnel recovery system

0206. NATO and / or NATO nations may exercise diplomatic, military, or civil options, ora combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel. Within the NATO military optionthe three essential elements of PR must work together through a credible communicationsystem and intelligence architecture. Each of the essential elements must be thoroughlytrained, properly organised and equipped to perform its own unique actions, seamlesslyinterface with the other elements to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, and gainand maintain situational awareness (figure 2.1).

2.4 Methods of personnel recovery

0207. Any service or component may conduct PR. Some methods of PR are illustratedin figure 2.1. For NATO the terms Combat Recovery (CR) and Combat Search And Rescue(CSAR) refer to the status of the isolated personnel. Historically, these acronyms are alsoused to refer to a specific type of mission1.

Search And Rescue (SAR) is the location and recovery of persons in distress in anenvironment where hostile interference is not expected.

0208. Military SAR effort is directed principally toward, but is not restricted to, the res-cue of military personnel. Subject to military requirements and operational practicabil-ity, SAR assistance may also be provided to civil authorities. Additionally, some nationshave parallel civil SAR assets, which can respond to military SAR incidents. NATO na-tions’ SAR services remain a national responsibility operated to meet International CivilAviation Organisation (ICAO), International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and NATO re-quirements. There is no requirement for NATO to maintain a parallel SAR organisation.

0209. In many cases, military requirements for SAR exceed those of ICAO and IMOwhich represent only the minimum acceptable civil standard; thus the facilities pro-vided within Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) are often well in excess of those shownin the ICAO and IMO documents for the region. SAR facilities provided by nations, thoughusually military and military-operated, may also be civil and civil-operated.

1Detailed description of all these methods can be found in the Lexicon. There are a number of otheracronyms used by nations to describe specific recovery methods, e.g. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft andPersonnel (TRAP), Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART), Deployed Search And Rescue (DSAR)


Scope of NATO PRNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

9

0210. For deployed operations where no hostile interference is expected (e.g. peacesupport operations, disaster relief or training exercises), NATO’s capability to search forand recover personnel may need to be provided by deployed assets. This capability maybe either provided by dedicated SAR or other in-theatre assets and is referred to as DSARby GBR forces.

Combat Recovery (CR) is the recovery of isolated personnel from a situation wherehostile interference may be expected. In combat recovery, either the recovery force, orthe isolated personnel, or both, have not been trained in CSAR Tactics, Techniques andProcedures (TTPs)

Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) is the application of specific tactics, techniquesand procedures by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel, who themselves aretrained and appropriately equipped to receive this support, from a situation where hos-tile interference may be expected.

Non-conventional Assisted Recovery. Recovery situations may need the assistanceof non-conventional forces or other types of assistance when conventional means are notsuitable. NATO nations may conduct recoveries using Special Operations Forces (SOF) orother surrogate/indigenous forces trained to assist in moving isolated personnel througha network that returns them to the safety of allied forces.

2.5 Risk considerations

Figure 2.2: PR vs. complexity, difficulty and risk



2.5 Risk considerations

0211. The PR system as depicted in figure 2.1 may give the impression that diplomatic,civil and military ways to recover personnel overlap, but that CR, CSAR, etc are clearlydelineated. This is however not true as illustrated by figure 2.2. This figure showsthat the different types of operations overlap. The colour shading from green via am-ber to red indicates that there is a gradual shift from relatively easy / safe to complex/ risky execution of that particular type of recovery operation. Where SAR typically fo-cuses on people that are isolated, but not evading, CR may range from small to relativelylarge numbers of personnel that may be isolated or evading. CSAR is typically applica-ble for small numbers of personnel that may be isolated or evading. Non-conventionalAssisted Recovery (NAR) may be applicable to both small and relatively large numbersof personnel excluding Hostage Release Operations (HRO). Non-combatant EvacuationOperation (NEO) is not considered part of PR, although it might entail small to largegroups of isolated personnel. Recovery TTPs for the extraction of small numbers of non-combatants will be similar, if not the same, as for CR operations2. A similar situationgoes for the rescue of entire units that have become isolated. Such a recovery operationis also considered to be an operation in its own right.

0212. A clearly separated issue is when isolated personnel are captured and/or heldhostage. Due to the nature of HRO, they require sovereign military, diplomatic, civil orlegal decisions at the highest levels of a nation’s leadership and are therefore a nation-to-nation responsibility. In certain circumstances, however, NATO may be involved inHRO.

0213. The scope of this Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) is depicted by the dottedcircle in figure 2.2.

2The extraction of large numbers of non-combatants is an operation in its own right as described inAJP-3.4.2


PR guiding principlesNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

11

Chapter 3

PR guiding principles

3.1 Principles

0301. Ideally, a recovery by on-scene or nearby assets should be effected whereverpossible. All operations should include recovery procedures planning. Once personnelbecome isolated, and immediate recovery is not possible by on-scene assets, the require-ment will be passed through appropriate channels to the JPRC / PRCC. Depending onthe force posture, forces may be designated for specific PR missions and maintained ata high degree of readiness or they may be double earmarked while conducting othermissions.Additionally, the JPRC and PRCCs have a responsibility to record all events toprovide data for lessons learned.

Early deployment

0302. From the onset of a mission or training, NATO personnel may become isolated.For deployed operations, early deployment of a PR capability is an important elementof the JFC’s operational capability. Therefore, assets that are capable of supporting PRmust be integrated into the deployed force when operations start.

Preparedness

0303. Before entering the JOA, NATO and participating forces should be trained, equippedand prepared to conduct PR operations within their capabilities. JFCs will define theparameters required for recovery operations. JPRC directors should be engaged in theOperational Planning Process (OPP) at the earliest possible time. (N)GOs involved in theNATO JOA should be invited to attend the OPP. They hold invaluable information andthis starts the coordination required for PR.

Time

0304. Expediency is required to prevent exploitation by an adversary, meet urgentmedical needs and limit exposure to extreme environments. A timely response may alsobe required to remain within the adversary’s decision cycle. Similarly, there may bepreferred periods to execute a recovery (i.e. at night) or specific times when the isolatedpersonnel will be contactable or available for recovery. Therefore, potential PR assetsmust remain flexible and able to react rapidly when required.



3.1 Principles

Operational security

0305. In order to share knowledge and TTPs among NATO and Partnership for Peace na-tions and other nations participating in NATO led operations, the security classificationof PR documents should be kept as low as possible.

Commander’s personnel recovery responsibilities

0306. All operational level commanders have a PR responsibility toward their subordi-nate personnel. A JPRC will be formed to coordinate all joint PR activities on behalf ofthe JFC preferably at the JFC level. Alternatively, a Component Commander (CC) may bedesignated by the JFC to command and control all PR activity throughout the JOA. Sub-ordinate commanders are to establish a PRCC or designate a PR Point Of Contact (POC).

0307. NATO commanders and their planning staff must consider all available PR op-tions to successfully plan for PR operations within their operational area. NATO comman-ders and staffs should recommend the composition of, and influence the preparation andtraining for, all NATO dedicated and designated recovery assets necessary to accomplishPR missions within their operational area. In many cases the NATO commanders andtheir staffs cannot control the non-military options, but must aggressively liaise withthese groups and push for Liaison Officers (LNOs) from these groups.


FORCE COMPONENTSNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 4

FORCE COMPONENTS

4.1 Introduction

0401. The JFC has overall responsibility for PR in the JOA. JFCs normally exercise com-mand authority for PR either through a designated component commander whose PRCChas been designated by the JFC to function also as the JPRC, or through a designatedJPRC embedded in the JFC staff (usually in the Joint Operation Centre (JOC)). The JPRCis responsible to facilitate the planning and execution of PR operations by providing theJFC the greatest latitude and flexibility for coordinating and executing joint, component,and unit PR responsibilities and activities. Staffs at all levels should make PR an inte-gral part of planning, and identify and coordinate PR support requirements in advance.It is the JPRC’s responsibility to facilitate coordination both in the planning process andduring PR operations. PR operations may involve forces ranging from a single recoveryvehicle to a complex task force.

4.2 Personnel recovery organisation

0402. PR organisation and operations should ideally be built around forces either ded-icated or designated for PR. When resources are constrained, assets may only be ded-icated for a specific time period. Designated forces are capable of supporting PR, butmay or may not be tasked depending on the commander’s priorities. In addition, othernaval, land or air force resources may be required to assist in detection, coordination,location, authentication, protection, and recovery. These assets may be constituted intoa comprehensive force package called a Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF).

4.2.1 Embedded JPRC

0403. PR operations are similarly organised as the normal Command and Control (C2)structure from the JFC down via the CCs to the operational units. This is depicted infigure 4.1. The JPRC exercises coordinates with over the PRCCs along the same lines asthe “normal” C2 is exercised.

4.2.2 Delegated JPRC

0404. The authority for the joint PR activities may be delegated when the JFC does nothave the means to effectively take on the joint responsibilities and if one of the compo-nents already has the appropriate C2 structure and means or if one of the components



4.2 Personnel recovery organisation

Figure 4.1: Generic command and control structure

has all necessary PR assets organically available. The component that is delegated thejoint PR authority should integrate the JPRC into its operations centre while retaininga PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions. When a CC’s PRCC is designatedthe JPRC for the JFC, the JPRC has the authority and responsibility for coordinating PRrelated matters for the JFC with all C2 nodes, including other CC’s PRCCs.

Figure 4.2: Sector oriented command and control structure

4.2.3 Sector oriented JPRC

0405. In some cases the land CC is effectively the overall commander of the operationin the JOA and has the JOA subdivided in sectors. In such a case the C2 structure may beset-up as depicted in figure 4.2. Again, the JPRC resides over the other PRCCs where C2

is concerned. This has been the case in recent NATO Operations such as KFOR and ISAF.



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4.3 C2 nodes

4.3.1 JFC

0406. PR is a JFC’s responsibility and may be conducted within an JOA. JFC exercisesOPCON over assigned PR forces; however, certain national PR forces may be made avail-able under TACON only, due to national caveats. Integration of contributing nations’military forces which could be used to achieve the PR objective will be attained by estab-lishing a JPRC in a designated operations centre. Other national forces may be allocatedfor specific PR operations through the JPRC. The JPRC / PRCC should be staffed by spe-cialists from contributing nations and the component commands. The JFC may directother components to support a given PR operation.

Coordination

0407. PR operations must be an integral part of any operational planning. Coordina-tion should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously duringall phases of a PR operation. Principle nodes where coordination takes place are withinthe JPRC / PRCC, between the JPRC / PRCC and PRCCs, between the JFC and externalagencies, and through liaison officers.

JFC’s PR responsibilities

0408. JFC has responsibility for PR operations and should:

• Establish a PR organisation within the JOA.

• Establish and maintain command procedures for PR.

• Ensure that PR is an integral part of planning and training.

• Identify PR requirements, to include intelligence, apportion and allocate assignedPR forces.

• identify shortfalls in PR capabilities. If necessary, request additional PR assetsfrom national forces not assigned.

• Establish clear and direct lines of communication between the command and higherNATO authorities.

• Conduct a preliminary assessment of circumstances surrounding the incident andmake a recommendation concerning the individual’s status.

• Conduct recovery operations to undertake safe recoveries.

• Define mission abort criteria and procedures in the PR Concept of Operation (CONOPS)and Special Instructions (SPINS).

• Identify personnel at risk, to include level of risk.

• Establish and coordinate clear reintegration procedures.

• (1)Establish procedures to maintain records on PR organisations and activities toprovide data for lessons learned.



4.3 C2 nodes

4.3.2 Component commands

0409. Each CC has the responsibility, through its PRCC, to plan, coordinate, conductand control PR operations for his own component. The authority to prosecute componentPR missions should rest with CCs and is often delegated to the Operations Centre (OC)director. If a CC is conducting a PR mission within his own capabilities for his component,he should still notify the JPRC for deconfliction and oversight. The CC should exerciseTACON over a PRTF tasked for a specific mission. JFC may direct CCs to make units /troops available to be assigned to other components to support the PR effort.

4.3.3 Units

0410. Unit commanders are primarily responsible for recovering their own personnelwith their own assets, whenever possible. Units are also to plan, prepare and trainfor an isolated personnel incident involving their personnel.Units are to appoint a PRPOC to coordinate with the PRCC and or JPRC on all PR related issues. This may rangefrom the preparation of Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs) via in-theatre isolatedpersonnel training, to providing information and support in case personnel of that unithave become isolated.

4.3.4 JPRC

0411. The JPRC is the central node to coordinate PR C2 on behalf of the JFC. It is to planand coordinate all PR activities throughout the JOA. It records data to support lessonslearned.

4.3.5 PRCC

0412. The role of the PRCC is to plan and coordinate all component PR operations, in-cluding coordination with JPRC and other component PRCCs.

4.3.6 PR POC

0413. The role of the PR POC is to plan and coordinate all unit level PR operations andsupport required training. The PR POC anticipates PR needs and coordination with otherunit PR POCs, component PRCCs and the JPRC. The PR POC is responsible for coordinatingall PR documentation (e.g. ISOPREP, Evasion Plan of Action (EPA), etc.).

4.3.7 Mission Coordinator

0414. The Mission Coordinator (MC) is also responsible for coordinating PR activities,supporting the On Scene Commander (OSC) and the recovery force in conducting theirprimary tasks and for guiding the mission. The MC is the coordinator and link for com-munications and data exchange between the JPRC and the PR assets. In the eventthe MC is operating from an airborne platform he is known as the Airborne MissionCoordinator (AMC). Additional duties include:

• Determines the OSC.



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• Establishing communications among the recovery force elements according to theCommunication Plan (COMPLAN).

• Relaying threat warnings and other information affecting mission progress.

• Requesting additional assets as required and ensuring recovery and support forcesarrive at designated locations to accomplish the PR mission.

• Managing logistic support for all PR assets.

• Coordinating appropriate air space control means and fire support measures in theObjective Area (OA), and advising PRTF participants and the JPRC / PRCC of missionprogress.

4.3.8 On-Scene Commander

0415. The OSC directs operations in the vicinity of the isolated personnel until arrivalof the recovery force. All assets participating in a PR operation should contact the OSC /MC before entering the (restricted) zone of recovery operations. The OSC should contin-uously monitor isolated personnel frequency in case immediate actions are required toprevent isolated personnel capture. The OSC should be familiar with OSC responsibilitiesand should carry the appropriate PR report format as described in the CONOPS.

4.3.9 Rescue Mission Commander

0416. The Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) will be appointed by the appropriatelevel commander, through the JPRC / PRCC and is responsible for the planning and execu-tion of the PR mission. The RMC is normally the asset with the best situation awarenessand capability to command the recovery mission. The RMC will normally have TACON ofassets tasked for the recovery mission. Once appointed, the RMC will lead the missionplanning process. This planning is an iterative process with the support of the JPRC /PRCC, who are to be fully informed to obtain launch and execute approval. During theexecution phase he coordinates his elements’ activities through the MC. The RMC shouldselect ingress or egress routes and objective area tactics based on hostile threat, terrainand the number and status of the isolated personnel being recovered. When in the OA,the RMC will assume OSC duties.

4.4 Military assets

0417. PR assets may range from a lone individual to a complex taskforce consisting ofany combination of conventional / unconventional, manned / unmanned fixed and / orrotary wing air / space assets, ground elements, surface or subsurface naval assets. Keyis to use the assets that are most suitable for the mission at hand. When planning for aparticular mission, limiting factors and (national) caveats (e.g. only used in humanitar-ian operations, aircraft only used to transport own personnel, cannot operated outsideof designated area) may preclude available assets from being used and must thereforebe carefully considered. Limiting factors may also reduce the availability of assets (e.g.no night flying or Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) capability).



4.5 Civil / diplomatic assets

4.5 Civil / diplomatic assets

0418. It is important that the appropriate NATO commands maintain awareness of civiland diplomatic efforts. While military commanders may have little or no control overthese efforts to recover isolated personnel, the affected NATO theatre command may beable to offer guidance, and should be prepared to assist if necessary and feasible. Whilethese situations are difficult to predict or direct, deliberate planning and coordinationprocedures may facilitate successful outcomes. In the case of civil assets a useful POC isthe Civil – Military Cooperation (CIMIC) cell (J-9) in the Headquarters (HQ). In the caseof diplomatic assets the POC should be the local embassy, consulate or national liaison.


PR OPERATIONNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 5

PR OPERATION

5.1 General

0501. JPRC and PRCC PR operations should focus on managing the successful executionof the five PR tasks. Suitably qualified JPRC and PRCC staff members are essential toensure effective employment of the PR CONOPS and operations.

Figure 5.1: Generic decision cycle

0502. PR missions are conducted through a flow of events as depicted in figure 5.1.First the JPRC and PRCC will conduct their decision making process whether a PR missionmay be conducted by the available PR assets. If all signs are “green”, meaning risks havebeen mitigated to an acceptable level, the process continues. If this is not the case otheroptions have to be considered (SOF, diplomatic, civil, etc.). Otherwise, the appointedRMC will start his decision making process (this is preferably done in parallel to theJPRC and PRCC decision making process to save time). At the end of his decision makingprocess the RMC will backbrief the JPRC and PRCC and brief the recovery force. Followingexecution, the mission will be evaluated and the outcome will be briefed to the JPRC andPRCC.



5.2 JPRC / PRCC tasks

5.2 JPRC / PRCC tasks

5.2.1 Set-up tasks

0503. The JFC directed OPP is usually led by the J3 and J5 in the Joint OperationsPlanning Group (JOPG). This OPP validates PR requirements, to include the establish-ment of the PR planning cell. Ideally the PR planning cell chief becomes the JPRC di-rector. PR planning begins as soon as possible to complete the PR annex to the Oper-ation Plan (OPLAN) / Operations Order (OPORD), PR CONOPS, and Standard OperatingProcedures (SOPs). The Legal Adviser (LEGAD), Political Adviser (POLAD), the LNOs and“red card” holders are critical during this process. Direction should be issued as soon aspossible to the components to initiate parallel planning and to identify PR POCs. Thisplanning establishes the foundation for forming the JPRC and PRCCs.

0504. PR operations in theatre begin with setting up the JPRC and component PRCCs.After initial set-up, the first action is to make an inventory of the available assets andto assess the climate, terrain and threat. A PR CONOPS is to be developed based onthis information. Special attention is to be given to the CONOPS development if thefull range of Naval, Land and Air recovery assets is not available, or are only availableunder certain restrictions. The PR CONOPS will drive the development of the Air TaskingOrder (ATO), Airspace Control Order (ACO), COMPLAN, PR SPINS and the JOA PR trainingplan as depicted in subordinate TTPs documents.

5.2.2 PR CONOPS

PR CONOPS campaign phasing

0505. The JPRC will develop the PR CONOPS for the JOA in accordance with the phasesas described in the OPLAN / OPORD, and may be included as the PR annex to the OPLAN /OPORD. the PR CONOPS must address the architecture necessary to accomplish the fivePR tasks. All CCs PRCCs will conduct PR planning for their own personnel, capabilities,and requirements in support of JOA PR CONOPS. The PR CONOPS must be continuallyreviewed to ensure coherence with the progress of the campaign plan. The PR CONOPSshould identify periods of high risk and plan for the use of PR capabilities accordingly.The PR CONOPS should address linkages to diplomatic, host nation, and civil actors asthey may provide a more appropriate PR course of action. This is especially relevantsince PR missions may have strategic impact. PR CONOPS should be updated and refinedas a part of the Joint Coordination Order (JCO).

0506. ISOPREPs are documents that facilitate the identification of isolated personnel.EPAs are documents that make evasion actions predictable to the recovery force. In orderto enhance the PR process, all personnel should complete an ISOPREP and/or EPA beforeentering the JOA. The PR CONOPS should give clear guidance on the preparation andmanagement of ISOPREPs and EPAs.

Launch vs execute

0507. PR missions normally have two steps. The first step is to preposition recoveryforces and their supporting assets. This is historically known as “launch”. This is ap-plicable for ground, air and maritime led missions alike. The second step is the actualapproval to prosecute the PR mission and is historically called “execute”. Authority tolaunch and execute resides with the JFC or the CC. This authority may be delegated to



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an individual (e.g. the JOC chief or the JPRC director), but must be clearly delineatedin the PR CONOPS. However, in the interest of timeliness, launch authority is usuallypassed to the JPRC or the PRCC. The JFC normally retains execute authority, but mayalso choose to delegate it.

5.3 Mission specific

5.3.1 Risk analysis

0508. PR subject to high visibility and to costs/benefits considerations. The risk anal-ysis is conducted in the same manner as other military operations taking into consid-eration that a typical PR mission is executed at the tactical level but may have an op-erational or even a strategic impact. The means to conduct the PR mission will spanthe whole PR spectrum. The JFC must weigh his course of action against the outcomeand assure that the desired outcome is beneficial to the overall operation. PR operationsshould therefore not:

a. Add unnecessary risk to the isolated personnel.

b. Add unnecessary risk to the personnel involved in the recovery mission.

c. Preclude execution of higher priority missions.

d. Divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations.

e. Allow the overall military situation to deteriorate.

f. Allow the unnoticed, gradual change to the mission’s goal, which sometimes isreferred to as “Mission creep”.

0509. The actual assessed level of risk should drive the type and amount of assets andtheir capabilities to ensure economy of force.

0510. The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should be weighedagainst the risk to PR resources and the effect of diverting resources from the ongoingoperations. Commanders at all levels should evaluate these factors before ordering orauthorising a PR mission.

5.3.2 PR response options

Immediate. Recovery may be conducted by accompanying, on-scene assets that can bequickly diverted to execute the recovery (e.g. “buddy recovery”) or by the individualwho self recovers. Given the nature of this kind of recovery, the JPRC / PRCC willnot be involved in the execution of the mission. The JPRC / PRCC are to be informedafterwards for lessons learned purposes.

Alert. Response missions commence from a dedicated ground or airborne alert posture.In order to decrease en-route time to the anticipated recovery area, PR forces maybe located on the ground at a forward location or in the case of aviation assets,loitering in anticipation of an execution order. Additionally, these forces may beembedded in missions to further reduce response time.



5.4 PR operation essential tasks

Deliberate. This recovery response requires knowledge of the location of the isolatedpersonnel. Commanders choose this method when an immediate response may notbe possible due to environmental, political, or threat considerations. Deliberatelyplanned missions give planners the flexibility to utilise all necessary / availableassets to complete the recovery.


0511. PR operations comprise five tasks: Report, Locate, Support, Recover, Reinte-grate. These tasks can be completed sequentially, in parallel or simultaneously. Ageneric flow of events that occur from receiving a distress call to the reintegration ofthe recovered isolated personnel is depicted as the execution matrix in Figure 5.2

5.4.1 Report

Initial notification

0512. Initial notification can come from any source, but verification is of the utmostimportance. Rapid and accurate notification is essential for a successful recovery. Dur-ing the initial reporting period of a PR event, it is likely that there may be numerousand potentially conflicting reports. Therefore, it is essential that each reported locationis logged with an associated time and source. Threat conditions permitting, isolatedpersonnel should attempt to establish contact with friendly forces i.a.w. notification pro-cedures as outlined in the PR CONOPS.

Initial response

0513. Once an actual or potential isolating incident is observed, the JPRC will be noti-fied immediately through the PR communications architecture. The initial JPRC / PRCCthat has been notified, should notify all nodes of the PR C2 structure. A verbal reportshould be sent immediately via voice communication means, and followed up with a for-mal written or electronic report when able. The affected PRCC will attempt to recoverthe isolated personnel utilising available (organic) PR capabilities, and notify the JPRC.If the affected PRCC determines it is unable to accomplish the recovery with its ownresources, the JPRC will coordinate with other PRCCs to gain an initial assessment onthe capabilities within each component and feasibility of component courses of action.As soon as practicable, the JPRC should establish and promulgate supporting and sup-ported relationships, nominate a component PRCC to plan and execute the recovery andallocate additional resources as necessary. Once the nominated component accepts themission, the PRCC will appoint a RMC for the tasked mission. The PRCC or JPRC willnotify responding units and brief pertinent aspects of the mission. The response timeand operations concept will depend on the enemy threat en-route or near the isolatedpersonnel’s location, environmental conditions, available assets, and other factors.

0514. Isolating events tend to generate a lot of press inquiries regarding the isolatedpersonnel and the next of kin. Press and Information Office (PIO) response to an isolat-ing event should therefore be taken into consideration by all PR C2 nodes and should becarefully planned and executed.



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5.4.2 Locate

0515. After notification, the priority is to locate the isolated personnel. Verificationof the location information is of utmost importance. Time, effort and lives can be lostif this is not accomplished. A thorough threat assessment is essential to PR planningand execution. To locate isolated personnel, use all available resources as required (e.g.Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) means or eyewitness reports). Someof these capabilities are nationally controlled, and access should be coordinated wellprior to requesting support in an actual PR event.

0516. Even with precise coordinates that can pinpoint the isolated personnel’s location,recovery forces still have to authenticate the isolated personnel’s identity prior to sup-port and recovery operations. An effective authentication system is essential to preventthe compromise of vital information and minimise risk to isolated personnel and therecovery force. This holds true because PRTF assets are extremely vulnerable during theexecution phase and need exact and reliable authentication information. Accordingly,isolated personnel and recovery forces should take extreme care not to compromise au-thentication information.

0517. Some of the ways that PRTF forces authenticate isolated personnel in hostileenvironments include PR code words, letters, numbers, and visual signals, as well asISOPREP data. The details of these will be included in the PR CONOPS and SPINS and/ or detail promulgated to non-CSAR trained personnel (via JCO, Fragmentation Order(FRAGO), etc.). It is important that the JPRC actively tracks the use and / or compromiseof authentication means in order to promulgate required changes.

5.4.3 Support

0518. Support is the planned effort necessary to ensure the physical and psychologicalsustainment of isolated personnel and the morale of their next of kin and their unit.Support measures begin before an individual becomes isolated. This includes home-station arrangements, training and equipping personnel prior to entering a specific JOA,and the establishment of the JOA PR architecture and theatre PR CONOPS.

0519. Support to the isolated personnel may include establishing two-way communi-cations, providing morale building support, aerial resupply, or aerial escort to a cache.Support may also encompass the suppression of enemy threats to the isolated personnel.This may preclude capture for the isolated person and disrupt the adversary’s responseto PR efforts. When necessary, extraction forces and/or equipment may be pre-positionedto support the isolated personnel until the recovery phase.

0520. Besides support to the isolated personnel, support includes physical and psycho-logical assistance to the isolated personnel’s family and unit. Support to the isolatedpersonnel next of kin is a national responsibility. However, this process may be initiatedby the JPRC through established channels.

5.4.4 Recover

0521. This task reflects activities by commanders, staffs, recovery force, and isolatedpersonnel to physically recover the isolated personnel. This includes the planning,launch and execution stages. As information of a potential isolating incident becomesavailable, the PRCC should assess the situation quickly, determine mission feasibility,and disseminate data to units that may participate in the recovery mission. Once mis-sion execution appears feasible, units may be tasked to initiate/continue planning or




launch from alert. If they launch, the recovery force will include all the necessary sup-porting forces required to execute a recovery operation.

5.4.5 Reintegrate

0522. The reintegration task begins when the recovery force relinquishes physical con-trol of recovered isolated personnel to a designated team member or organisation in thereintegration process. As part of reintegration, perishable essential intelligence andSERE information is collected, while at the same time tending to the physical and psy-chological welfare of recovered isolated personnel. The welfare portion of the reintegra-tion process may be a long-term endeavour with no specific end date and is normally anational responsibility. Ultimately, reintegration reflects the combatant commanders’commitment to return isolated personnel to duty or their unit in the most expeditiousmanner possible considering human life / welfare.



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Figure 5.2: Execution matrix



Volume I

STAFF GUIDE


INTRODUCTIONNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

29

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The JPRC / PRCC

0101. This volume will detail the roles, responsibilities and activities of the Joint Per-sonnel Recovery Cell (JPRC) and Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC). Whereaspects are valid for both the JPRC and the PRCC it will be referred to in the text asJPRC / PRCC. The role of the JPRC is to maintain oversight and coordinate PersonnelRecovery (PR) operations. It is the primary PR facility, suitably staffed by trained per-sonnel drawn from each joint force component as required. The role of the PRCC is toplan and coordinate all component or sector1 PR operations. This responsibility may belimited to that component’s means or Area of Operations (AO). Operations requiringcross-component / -sector support should be coordinated through the JPRC.

1.2 PR POC

0102. Selected personnel are trained as PR Point Of Contact (POC) to assist their unitsin the completion of Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs) and the compilation of Eva-sion Plan of Actions (EPAs). Additionally they have a responsibility for organising theissue of equipment for the AO of operations, and in achieving a level of practical experi-ence in survival in extreme environments.

1.3 JFC’s PR responsibilities

0103. PR is a Joint Force Commander (JFC)’s responsibility and may be conductedwithin a NATO Area Of Responsibility (AOR). PR operations must be an integral partof any operational planning. JFC has responsibility for PR operations and will:

a. General.

(a) Understand the PR mission process and risk assessment.(b) Understand the capabilities and concept of operations for PR assets.(c) Know the overall JPRC / PRCC mission and responsibilities.

1The AO may be subdivided into several sectors where the sector commander is responsible for all oper-ations within that sector. In such cases and for the purpose of this document, the AO / theatre commanderis considered to be the JFC and the sector commanders the component commanders for the purpose of thisdocument.



1.3 JFC’s PR responsibilities

(d) Understand the relationships between the JPRC, PRCCs and host nation PRCCs.

(e) Understand the PR assets tasking process.

(f) Be able to produce & transmit PR specific reports and returns.

(g) Understand the roles of Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF) elements:

• Mission Coordinator (MC).• On Scene Commander (OSC).• Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).• Rescue Escort (RESCORT).• Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP).• Recovery vehicles.• Extraction Force (EF).

(h) Understand the NATO authentication system.

b. Preparation.

(a) Establish a PR organisation within the AO.

(b) Develop personnel augmentation requirement. (JPRC lead)

(c) Establish and maintain Command and Control (C2) procedures for PR.

(d) Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all PR nodes andforce elements (including Psychologal Operations (PSYOPS), Civil – MilitaryCooperation (CIMIC), diplomatic and Host Nation).

(e) Identify requirements, apportion and allocate assigned PR forces and identifyshortfalls in PR capabilities.

(f) Identify intelligence requirements for PR.

(g) Establish clear and direct lines of communication between the command andhigher NATO authorities.

(h) Establish liaison with appropriate outside authorities.

(i) Establish reporting requirements and monitor all PR incidents prosecuted byPRCCs.

(j) Establish dedicated intelligence support requirements and coordinate withthe AO resources.

c. Planning.

(a) Ensure that PR is an integral part of planning and training.

(b) Develop a PR threat decision matrix tailored to the threat analysis.

(c) Develop a “launch” and “execute” authority matrix.

(d) Develop a PR Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to support Operation Plans(OPLANs) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). (JPRC lead)

(e) Ensure guidance is provided to components / sectors establishing appropriateAO specific individual training for personnel at risk of isolation (as required).

(f) Provide PR inputs to the joint and/or component orders (Joint CoordinationOrder (JCO), Fragmentation Orders (FRAGOs), Operational Tasks (OPTASKs),Air Control Plans (ACPs), Airspace Control Orders (ACOs), Air OperationsDirective (AOD), Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) and Communication Plans (COMPLANs)).

(g) Develop, disseminate and update PR Special Instructions (SPINS). (JPRC lead)

(h) Develop, disseminate and update a theatre reintegration plan. (JPRC lead)



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d. Execution.

(a) If necessary, request additional PR assets from national forces not assigned.

(b) When individuals become isolated, conduct a preliminary assessment of thecircumstances surrounding the incident and make a recommendation con-cerning the individual’s status.

(c) If necessary, conduct PR operations to undertake safe recoveries.

(d) Coordinate training and exercises to provide a trained PR organisation,recoveryforces for recovery operations.

(e) Coordinate, de-conflict and recommend priorities concurrent PR support oper-ations by joint force components and other National PRCCs. (JPRC lead)

(f) Alert JPRC / other PRCCs of isolated personnel’s location.

(g) Maintain a database and file on each isolated personnel until recovery is com-plete.

(h) Coordinate with the Joint Force Psychological Operations cell to influence lo-cal populace regarding PR efforts. (JPRC only)

(i) Coordinate deception plans to support PR operations.

(j) Provide PR-brief tailored to various organisational levels in ensure under-stand or PR responsibilities.

(k) Be able to draft an Air Task Message (ATM), Daily Operations Task Air /Helicopters (DOTAH) change, or FRAGO supporting PR requirements.

(l) Be able to obtain, manage and disseminate ISOPREP and EPA data.

(m) Make launch and execute recommendations to the designated authority.

(n) Disseminate documents to actors that do not normally receive the ATO, ac-complan and SPINS.

(o) Assess and identify capabilities and shortfalls of PRCCs and units by usingdedicated JPRC personnel.

1.4 Scale of operations

0104. The organisation, manning equipment and activities of a JPRC / PRCC depends onthe type, scale, duration and circumstances of the operation. For small scale operationsof limited duration and / or operations are conducted only during daytime, a JPRC / PRCCmay consist of only one person. A large scale operation with 24 / 7 operations requires afull manned and equipped JPRC / PRCC including, but not limited to the responsibilitiesas below.

a. Develop supporting PR annex to the OPLAN / Operations Order (OPORD), CONPLANsand SOPs.

b. Provide a trained joint staff element.

c. Provide PR inputs for the ACP, ACO, ATO and COMPLAN.

d. Develop and disseminate PR SPINS.



1.4 Scale of operations

1.4.1 Manning

0105. The JPRC / PRCC must have suitable and adequate manning at all times to beable to properly handle all PR requests including PR training in plans, current ops andother applicable staff sections. Upon start of the operations, personnel operating in aJPRC / PRCC should be fully capable of fulfilling their respective tasks. Detail on theset-up of a JPRC / PRCC can be found in Annex A.

Minimum manning levels

0106. The suggested minimum manning to form a JPRC / PRCC, to cover 24 hour op-erations, is six personnel; three officers, two Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs) and aSurvival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) specialist. One officer and oneNCO to cover each twelve hour shift. The director and the SERE specialist should beavailable during the day shift, since most planning and execution will occur duringthe day. The JPRC / PRCC should work in close coordination with plans, operations, inteland medical personnel. Dedicated plans/intell/medical representative should, as a mini-mum, be assigned as dedicated liaison to the JPRC / PRCC. Whenever possible/applicable,plans/intel/medical personnel should be even permanently assigned to the JPRC / PRCC.

Minimum manning qualifications

0107. Minimum qualifications are as follows:

a. Officers should be experienced in planning PR missions and, preferably, with JPRC/ PRCC experience and at the NATO JPRC controllers course or the US PR-101 / -103and -301 courses or a similar national PR course.

b. NCOs should be experienced in JPRC / PRCC operations and preferably qualified atthe NATO JPRC controllers course or the US PR-101 / -103 and -301 courses or asimilar national PR course.

c. Intelligence officer should be experienced in PR.

d. SERE specialist should be familiar with the AO requirements and assigned units’equipment and preferably qualified at the US PR-300 and -301 courses or a similarnational PR course.

1.4.2 Equipment

0108. The primary equipment of a JPRC / PRCC are robust and interoperable communi-cation means to guarantee its coordination authority. Communications equipment canrange from a (mobile) telephone to highly secure encrypted communication means. Theequipment used should depend on the requirements of the operational ease of use, pro-liferation desired and the need for security. Details on JPRC / PRCC equipment can befound in annex A. As default, the following capabilities should be available:

a. Voice and data exchange between JPRC, PRCC, and PR forces. Depending on thesituation, secure communications may be required.



33

b. Communication and Information System (CIS) connectivity / capability to inter-face with the primary JFC and component C2 systems (e.g. CRONOS, IntegratedCommand and Control system (ICC), Air Command and Control System (ACCS),Maritime Command, Control and Information System (MCCIS), Joint AutomatedDeep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS), etc.)

c. Specific PR management tools (i.e mission manager on ICC / JADOCS), and collabo-rative chat capability.

Location

0109. The JPRC / PRCC should be located within the operations area of the host head-quarters (i.e. the Joint Operation Centre (JOC) or Air Operation Centre (AOC)). Com-munication and means to maintain situational awareness are normally fused in theselocations, which facilitates coordination and time sensitive decision making.

1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equippedpersonnel

1.5.1 Introduction

0110. The successful recovery of isolated personnel in the AO can only be achieved ifthe personnel requiring recovery are sufficiently trained and properly documented priorto the start of their mission. The requirement is to follow similar principles but topresent pragmatic guidance that can be tailored to the art of the possible depending onunit role and mission. The guidance should be incorporated in formation/unit planningand execution procedures.

1.5.2 Recovery documentation

0111. The organisation of personal documentation is essential for the recovery of iso-lated personnel. Collation and timely dispatch to a PRCC is a fundamental first stagein the organisation of recovery operations. This is achieved by structured and detailedISOPREP and EPA. The JFC is likely to mandate that all personnel at risk of isolationcomplete an ISOPREP as it is a proven format. The information contained in an EPA isessentially standard business for many units and covered by unit orders (actions on),patrol traces, equipment lists and PR SPINS. Units are to ensure that this informationcan be passed to the PRCC or directly to the JPRC without delay.

1.5.3 ISOPREP form and management

0112. Full guidance and a template of an ISOPREP can be found in Volume III Chapter2.5 and Annex A. Management of personal documentation for non Combat Search AndRescue (CSAR) equipped personnel should be directed by PRCCs as defined by the PRSOP for the operation. For large formations/units the most pragmatic solution may beto retain the data at unit / brigade level. It is vital those personnel are aware of thecontent of their ISOPREP and that any other individual other than those in the Recoverychain of command does not know the contents. Once complete the ISOPREP is classifiedConfidential.


34NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equipped personnel

1.5.4 PR codes

0113. The PR information contained in SPINS is only relevant for CSAR recoveries anddissemination to a wider audience is neither pragmatic nor desirable. However, PRCCsshould strip and disseminate any relevant information if appropriate. This should notinclude SPINS authentication data (PR Word, Letter, Number, Colour) as wider distribu-tion would compromise Operational Security (OPSEC) and be impractical. Therefore, theJPRC will develop and disseminate theatre wide Combat Recovery (CR) codes that areto be used in CR events. These codes include also Ground-To-Air Signalss (GTASs) andRecovery Activation Signalss (RASs). Furthermore, PRCCs could direct formations/unitto provide additional simple means to initially authenticate isolated personnel (e.g. theunit’s daily changing challenge and response password), taking the directions given inthe PR SOP into account.

1.5.5 Recovery equipment

0114. The JPRC should direct minimum levels of equipment to be carried by personneloperating in the AO as defined by the PR SOP for the operation. This may simply bestandard unit scales with targeted units / individuals provided with additional equip-ment. It is however vital that the detail is available to the PRCC on the occurrence of anisolating event.

1.5.6 Basic, intermediate and advanced training

0115. Levels of PR training for formations / units deploying into AO are directed by theJFC and direction should be promulgated during the operational planning process. na-tions may, but should not, deviate from these requirements through the use of formal“National caveats”. Basic training (SERE Level A) comprises theoretical training in sur-vival, evasion, recovery and Conduct After Capture (CAC) policy. Intermediate training(SERE Level B) includes practical exercises in some of the techniques used in recoveryand is usually associated with Medium Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation (MRIE).Advanced training (SERE level C) includes practical exercises in evasion, recovery andCAC and is usually asicoated with High Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation (HRIE).As a minimum all personnel at risk of isolation should receive SERE Level A trainingtailored to the AO and units should include this requirement in their pre-deploymentpreparation. The degree of training each individual has received is to be recorded ontheir ISOPREP.

1.5.7 PR POC

0116. Units should nominate selected personnel and provide training to enable themto implement mandated policy (train the trainer). Formations liable to form a PRCCshould provide selected ops staff with specific training on the roles and functions of anPRCC. These personnel will then be the principle POC for the JPRC.

1.5.8 Pre-deployment and in-theatre training

0117. Pre-deployment and in-theatre training requirements will be specified in the PRSOP. Where additional pre-deployment or in-AO training in recovery or environmen-tal survival is required by units, a request can be made for additional SERE training



35

through national channels. Personnel assigned to man positions in the JPRC will receiveappropriate training as defined by the PR SOP for the operation.


36NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equipped personnel



COMMAND AND CONTROLNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1 General

0201. The JFC may exercise command authority for PR by himself or through a des-ignated Component Commander (CC). CCs involved in the operation are to establish aPRCC. The JFC normally exercises Operational Control (OPCON) over PR forces; however,certain national PR forces will be made available under Tactical Control (TACON) only.Other national forces may be allocated for specific PR operations through the JPRC. TheJFC or the designated CC will establish a JPRC within his component’s operations centre.Other CCs involved in the operation should also establish PRCC within their operationscentres. The JPRC has primacy over PRCCs and the latter must keep the JPRC informedof any PR operation. The JPRC must have access to the Concept of Operation (CONOPS),valid for the particular AO, of every PR asset.

2.2 Coordination

0202. Coordination should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conductedcontinuously during all phases of a PR operation. Principle nodes where coordinationtakes place are within the JPRC / PRCC, between the JPRC / PRCC and PRCCs, between theJFC and external agencies, and through liaison officers.

2.2.1 JFC

0203. JFC exercises OPCON over assigned PR forces. Integration of contributing nations’military forces which could be used to achieve the PR objective will be attained by estab-lishing a JPRC in a designated operations centre. The JPRC / PRCC should be staffed byspecialists from contributing nations and the component commands. The JFC has bothexecution and launch authority and may direct other components to support a given PRoperation

2.2.2 Component / sector commander

0204. Each CC has the responsibility, through its PRCC, to plan, coordinate, conductand control PR operations for his own component. The authority to launch componentPR missions rests with CCs and will normally be delegated to the Operations Centre (OC)director. A CC designated by JFC will plan, coordinate and control joint PR for the AO



2.3 JPRC / PRCC

and will have the responsibility to launch those missions. The nominated CC may bedelegated OPCON over assigned PR forces. He will exercise TACON over a PRTF tasked fora specific mission. JFC may direct CCs to make units / troops available to be assigned toother components to support the PR effort. Forces not under JFC command and controlmay also support PR missions.

2.3 JPRC / PRCC

0205. The JPRC is to maintain oversight and coordinate all joint PR operations. It isthe primary PR facility, suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equally mannedby trained personnel drawn from each joint force component.

0206. The role of the PRCC is similar to the role of the JPRC but then only within thecomponent’s or sector’s AOR (see AJP-3.3.9 for details regarding the different C2 options).

2.3.1 Mission coordinator

0207. The MC is the link for radio communications and data exchange between theJPRC / PRCC and the PR assets. The Airborne Mission Coordinators (AMCs) is also respon-sible for coordinating PR activities thus supporting the OSC and the RMC in conductingtheir primary jobs. Additional AMC duties include:

a. Designating OSC.

b. Establishing communications among the PRTF elements according to the COMPLAN.

c. Relaying threat warnings and any other information that may affect the missionin progress.

d. Requesting additional assets as required and ensuring that recovery and supportforces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the PR mission.

e. Managing Air to Air Refuellings (AARs) for all PR assets. (AMC only)

f. Coordinating appropriate no-fire zones in the objective area and advising PRTFparticipants and the JPRC / PRCC of mission progress.

2.3.2 OSC

a. The OSC controls operations in the AO.

b. A checklist from staff for OSC needs to be developed. (see Annex E in Volume II.

c. Appropriate details in the SPINS (see annex J).

2.3.3 RMC

0208. The RMC will be appointed by the component / sector commander and will haveresponsibility for the planning and execution of the PR mission. The RMC appointedshould be experienced in leading complex, multi-national, dissimlar type asset task for-ces. He will have TACON of assets tasked for the recovery mission.


COMMAND AND CONTROLNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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2.3.4 Liaison authority

0209. All participating units are to be granted direct liaison authority with the JPRC /PRCC.

2.3.5 Mission abort

0210. Mission abort criteria, including national caveats, and procedures must be clearlydefined and articulated in the PR SOP and SPINS.



2.3 JPRC / PRCC



INTELLIGENCENATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 3

INTELLIGENCE

3.1 General intelligence principles

0301. Detailed intelligence information is the foundation for successful PR operations.Special considerations are required to assess the probability of success before taskingPR missions into hostile territory. Intelligence must be tied into a real-time network cou-pled with analysis of opposing forces tactics and capabilities. During the planning andexecution of the PR mission, dedicated intelligence must be made available at all levels.Experience has shown that, to guarantee real-time access to intelligence information forPR missions, a firm liaison between the JFC’s / CC’s intelligence cell and the JPRC / PRCCmust be established.

0302. To support PR operations, relevant intelligence needs to be provided in a timelymanner to enable an accurate threat assessment:

a. To the isolated personnel (evasion requirement).

b. To the recovery force during ingress, egress and in the pick-up area.

3.2 Intelligence source

0303. Mission intelligence will be developed from:

a. Naval, Ground, Air, Electronic and Missile Order of Battle (ORBAT).

b. Image Intelligence (IMINT).

c. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).

d. Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

e. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

f. National and AO level Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collec-tion assets.



3.3 Advanced intelligence requirement

3.3 Advanced intelligence requirement

0304. Mission intelligence will also need to consider the following in advance of any PRoperations:

a. Political / religious environment.

b. Civilian population.

c. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) assessment.

d. Terrain / weather.

e. Friendly ORBAT.

f. Ongoing operations

3.4 Isolated personnel intelligence

0305. Isolated personnel intelligence will be developed from:

a. ISOPREPs.

b. EPA including Designated Area of Recovery (DAR).

c. Mission Reports (MISREPs) and personnel debriefs.

3.5 Mission intelligence requirements

0306. Intelligence resources may be required for the initial detection and location ofthe isolated personnel and subsequently to determine:

a. Method of recovery.

b. DARs.

c. Opposing Forces (OPFOR) counter-PR activity.

d. Reaction of local civilian population.

3.6 Guidance for intel and ops support staff

3.6.1 Introduction

The successful recovery of isolated personnel in the AO can only be achieved if the per-sonnel requiring recovery are sufficiently trained and properly documented prior to thestart of their mission. This guidance is designed as the template to be issued in the AOas part of the PR SOP or within SPINS. Procedures and requirements regarding survivalequipment and other survival aids detailed in this PR SOP should be driven by a J2 as-sessment and confirmed by operational planning staff. Guidance for units and personnelnot trained and equipped for CSAR recovery is given in Paragraph 1.5 on page 33.



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3.6.2 Recovery documentation

The collation of ISOPREPs and EPAs and their timely dispatch to a PRCC is a typicalresponsibility of the unit’s intel staff and a fundamental first stage in the organisationof recovery operations.

Sending of ISOPREP and EPA to PRCC

To enable rapid filing and sorting of the many ISOPREPs and EPA held by units and theJPRC / PRCC, it is important that all electronic documents arrive with the same formatof labelling.

a. E-Mails Containing EPA should have the following make-up of the subject line:EPA, Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day (Air only) (e.g. EPA, ZIPPY 43,GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).

b. EPA Documents naming convention: Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day(Air only) (e.g. ZIPPY 43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).

c. E-Mail Containing ISOPREPs should have the following make-up of the subject line:ISOPREP, Vehicle Type, Sqn, Base (e.g. ISOPREP, E3D, 8-23 Sqn, PSAB).

d. ISOPREP Documents naming convention: Surname, First name, Middle Initial (e.g.Bigglesworth, John, W).

e. Figure 3.1 is a standard MS Outlook e-mail folder showing correct document titlesand format.

Figure 3.1: Standard MS-Outlook E-mail folder

Any amendments sent are to be indicated by the following conventions:

a. E-Mails Containing EPA should have the following make-up of the subject line:EPA, Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day (Air only) AL (e.g. EPA, ZIPPY43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L AL2).




b. EPA Documents naming convention: Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day(Air only) AL (e.g. ZIPPY 43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L AL2).

3.6.3 Electronic handling of ISOPREP and EPA documents

ISOPREP and EPA protection on operation CIS network. Due to their sensitivenature and mission critical status the folders that contain the ISOPREPs and EPAs on thecomputer must be protected against un-necessary disclosure and accidental deletion.This can only be achieved by the information manager setting the correct ‘properties’.Within the mission CIS network the user cannot define the ‘properties’. At the JPRClevel, access to the folders containing ISOPREPs and EPAs must be restricted to operatorsand the system managers. At the unit and Deployed Operating Base (DOB) access to thefolders must be restricted to the unit intel staff and ops staff.

File layout examples. Careful layout of the filing system may alleviate problems infinding and maintaining the database of ISOPREPs and EPAs. ISOPREPs should be filed inseparate folders and stored under DOB / unit / formations as appropriate. EPAs shouldbe filed in a similar fashion but each EPA should be filed in a folder for the appropriateATO day. The previous day’s EPA folder should be kept to allow for missions that extendover the ATO changeover period. An example layout is shown in figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Standard document folder tree

Mission CIS network and back-up drives. In addition to storing information on ashared drive, the mission CIS network has the potential to create a back-up drive thatmay be lodged on a separate server giving access to the database in the event of theprime server being unserviceable.

Mission CIS network group. To enable smooth 24-hour a-day operation, avoidingconfusing repetition of documents and the potential to miss information, all ISOPREPsand EPAs sent to the JPRC must be sent to a single address. This group address shouldonly be accessible by the JPRC controllers, and as e-mails are received and filed they



45

should be deleted from the Outlook ‘Inbox’. To enable the ISOPREP and EPA informationto be circulated to other nation’s recovery forces, the JPRC controllers must be able toexport the information via floppy disc or CD-ROM Impex accounts.

3.6.4 Recovery Equipment

The SPINS will direct the minimum levels of equipment to be carried by aircraft operat-ing in the AO of operations. Prior to deployment units are to contact the JPRC to establishthe correct scale of equipment. It is the responsibility of units to arrive in the AO fullyequipped and trained to conduct their operations.

3.6.5 Blood chit

0307. Blood chits / promissory notes give an undertaking by a national governmentof a participating nation to provide anyone who helps the bearer of the note with areward of money, goods or services1. No specific value is attached and the bearer isnot to promise any specific reward. The bearer should give a copy of the number ofthe promissory note to his helper with instruction to quote it to the respective nationalauthorities as a reference. To avoid the potential for fraudulent use, it is essential thatthere is strict control and accounting of promissory notes. Each note is to be numberedindividually and a record kept of to whom the note was issued. The number on the noteis to be printed in indelible ink and is to be constructed by using the first 3 letters ofthe bearer’s name, the service number and a random element (e.g. SMI-8027038-TFG).There should be no signatures or features that would identify the originating unit. Thepromissory note should not be left with the individual giving the aid, as there is a riskof punishment by the enemy if it is discovered that help was given.

1There is no NATO blood chit programme, it is a strictly national programme. USA and GBR are knownto have such a programme in place, but all nations are encouraged to create such a programme for theirown personnel. Should a blood chit programme be in place in the operation, this paragraph should be takeninto account by the JPRC / PRCCs / PR POCs


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Chapter 4

RISK ANALYSIS ANDMITIGATION

4.1 General risk analysis guidelines

0401. PR operations are subject to cost / benefit considerations and threat analysisin the same manner as any other military operation. The benefit gained from a PRoperation should equal or outweigh the cost associated with executing the operation. PRoperations should not:

a. Unduly risk isolating additional personnel.

b. Preclude execution of higher priority missions.

c. Divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations.

d. Allow the overall military situation to deteriorate.

0402. Commanders must balance the value of retrieving isolated personnel againstpotential costs. The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should beweighed against the risk to PR resources and the effect of diverting resources from theongoing combat effort. Commanders at all levels should evaluate these factors beforeordering or authorising a PR effort based on the guidance given in the PR SOP. Anexample of a generic decision matrix is given in AJP-3.3.9.

4.2 Risk mitigation

0403. Efforts should be made to prevent isolating events by mitigating the risk associ-ated with all operations and activities. These risks can be mitigated through;

a. Proper route planning to avoid threat areas and utilise terrain cover whereverpossible.

b. Proper (task) force composition.

c. OPSEC measures.



4.2 Risk mitigation




49

Chapter 5

PR OPERATION

5.1 General

0501. JPRC / PRCC PR planning is based on the five operational PR tasks: Report, Lo-cate, Support, Recover, Reintegrate. Suitably-qualified JPRC / PRCC staff members areessential to ensure effective employment of the AO PR SOP and effective conduct of JPRC/ PRCC operations. Figure 5.1 graphically depicts the general flow of preparatory activ-ities. The JPRC / PRCC starts working based on the (initial) guidance given by the JFC.After making an inventory of all available assets and their capabilities / limitations andtaking into account environmental factors a PR SOP will be developed. This CONOPS isthe basis for the PR inputs to the COMPLAN, SPINS, ACO and the PR training plan.

Figure 5.1: JPRC / PRCC activities



5.2 Pre-emptive mission planning


0502. The first action of a newly set up JPRC / PRCC is to make an inventory of the avail-able assets and their capabilities, and assess the climate, terrain, threat and OPLAN.Based on this information a PR SOP is to be developed. The PR SOP will subsequentlydrive the ATO, ACO and COMPLAN inputs, the PR SPINS and the “in the AO” PR trainingplan as depicted in figure 5.1. As the operation moves from one phase to another and /or characteristics of the operation change over time, the PR SOP may need to be updated/ modified accordingly. JPRC / PRCC staffs should regularly challenge the validity of thecurrent CONOPS. During prolonged operation that may evolve into a theatre PR SOP. Inthat case, all references in this document to “PR SOP” are to be read as “ PR SOP”.

5.2.1 Preparatory work

0503. The PR SOP for the AO should be developed by the JFC or by the CC responsible forthe JPRC. CCs may wish to develop a PR SOP with respect to their own personnel basedon the overall PR SOP. The factors to be considered are laid out in annex H.

a. Develop an inventory of all assets in the AO that are usable for PR missions withreference to availability, capability, and interoperability, limitations, logistical andcombat support required. Annex C gives a template for this inventory.

b. Develop a list of medical facilities, including their capabilities and specialisationsand transload to Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), which are available in the AO.

c. Conduct PR route planning (spider routes / spider points), taking into considera-tion:

(a) Threat analysis.

(b) Environmental factors.

(c) Friendly ORBAT.

d. Fuel / time plan and refuel plan if applicable.

e. Develop the PR requirements to the communications plan (detailed in Annex K).

f. Produce a PR SOP for the area. A suggested format for a PR SOP is at Annex H.

g. Produce PR SPINS for the AO, including short term contact procedures for EPA, andas a minimum two spare sets of PR SPINS tobe readily available if the active PRSPINS have become compromised. A suggested format for a PR SPINS is at Annex J.

h. Disseminate standard ISOPREP and EPA formats. The format for both ISOPREPs andEPAs can be found in Annexes A and B in Volume III. These formats should be usedfor all training and operations to enhance interoperability; however, the minimumEPA format is as follows:

(a) Personal data.

(b) Route information.

(c) Short-term evasion plan.

(d) Long-term evasion plan.

(e) Equipment carried.



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i. Collate and disseminate threat information to sub-unit level to assist in the pro-duction of viable individual EPAs.

j. Establish a system of storage and secure transmission of ISOPREP and EPA data.

5.2.2 Specific missions

0504. PR planning should be an aspect in the planning of all missions. Considerationis to be given to the possibility of self recovery or preparing for an immediate recoveryrather than a deliberate one. Wherever possible and practical a PRTF should be pretasked and prepositioned in order to conduct an immediate recovery if needed.

5.3 Pro-active planning

0505. To successfully execute PR missions it is essential that PR planning is included inthe operational planning process and that an appropriate PR organisation is establishedin the AO.

5.3.1 Planning process

0506. The JFC will have overall responsibility for PR within his AO and the joint OPORDshould state the requirement for, and include guidance on PR operations, i.a.w. AnnexH. Operational level PR planning will usually be led by J3/5 but may be delegated tothe JPRC director. It is essential that whichever organisation is tasked to provide a JPRCparticipates in the operational planning process to:

a. Ensure that PR is an integral part of planning and training.

b. Establish an appropriate PR organisation within the AO.

c. Establish command procedures for PR.

d. Conduct a PR risk estimate, identify requirements and allocate or double-earmarkforces for PR, and identify shortfalls in PR capabilities, if necessary, requestingadditional PR assets from national forces not assigned.

e. Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all PR C2 nodes and forceelements.

f. Establish a communications plan with the media during PR events.

Operational planning process

During the Operational Planning Process (OPP) it is essential for the JPRC director toengage with joint staff to assist in the production of the PR annex to the Joint OPORDas detailed at Annex H. It is vital that the authority of the JPRC is established andComponents are tasked to establish PR C2 nodes and/or POCs. The JPRC director shouldconduct a PR estimate in parallel with the OPP. The output of the PR estimate should be:AO PR SOP, to be promulgated either by the JFC Headquarters (HQ) or as an annex to theOPLAN; PR input to SPINS and component orders / plans. Key factors specific to the PREstimate are as follows:




a. Identify intent. The JFC’s overall AO plan should state the requirement for, andinclude guidance on, PR operations. However, it is important to ascertain the JFC’sand Air Component Commander (ACC)’s intent, specifically regarding risk. This isoften a significant issue during the initial phases of an operation when prioritisa-tion of assets and the desired order of arrival may preclude early deployment of PRassets (n.b. for coalition operations this is likely to cause friction and provision ofPR capability may be essential prior to commencing operations). If it does, then theplanner should extract whatever he can. However, the planner should be preparedto have to contribute to the AO plan.

b. Analyse the operational environment. Analysis of the operational environment isessential to determining the requirements for PR forces. Areas to be consideredinclude:

(a) The local- and geopolitical situation.(b) The physical environment, including terrain and weather and their likely im-

pacts on both isolated personnel and recovery forces.(c) Likely target locations and threats at those targets.(d) Rules of Engagement (ROE).(e) The likely threat to recovery forces.(f) Battlespace geometry including likely bed-down locations, distance and spa-

tial relationships to probable recovery areas, overflight constraints in neigh-bouring countries, International waters, Forward Operating Locations andpotential Forward Arming and Refuelling Points (FARPs).

c. Determine the likely number of isolation incidents. For ACC and Maritime Compo-nent Command (MCC) aircrew, determining the likely number of isolation incidentsis fairly simply estimated by multiplying the number of Aircraft (AC) of a particu-lar type in the AO by the number of personnel on board, by the number of sortiesper day, by the expected attrition rate. Summing the results for each AC type inthe AO will give the likely number of PR incidents. However, JPRC must considerCR events across the JFC. To make a judgement the PR Planner must fully engagewith component planners during the OPP and understand not only the Scheme OfManoeuvre (SOM) but also CC’s intended SOM. From this information it is usuallypractical to estimate the likely and worst case number of simultaneous events byPhase.

d. Determine the available PR capabilities. A recovery capability typically comprisesof a recovery vehicle and an EF that conducts the actual extraction of the isolatedpersonnel. An EF comprises specifically trained personnel delivered by the re-covery vehicle with primary responsibility for extracting isolated personnel. EFpersonnel is normally highly trained, but they must not be confused with SpecialOperations Forces (SOF). The extraction team is normally employed as a part of thehelicopter recovery force but might also be part of a non helicopter-borne PR mis-sion. As not all recovery situations are equally complex, they do also not requireequally (highly) trained and equipped recovery forces. Figure 5.2 on page 53 showsthe range of PR capabilities provided by available EF based on their personnel capa-bilities vs. the capabilities of their equipment. The team will be specifically organ-ised, trained, and equipped to conduct PR operations in high threat environments.When the commander accepts the risk, forces lacking this specialised training mayalso be employed as the EF. This will normally be limited to lower threat environ-ments, or when urgent circumstances exist. The number of personnel depends onthe operational needs and member nation’s PR concept.



53

Figure 5.2: Capabilities of recovery personnel vs. capabilities of recovery equipment

e. Determine the PR SOM. The preceding analysis should identify shortfalls in PRcapabilities, allowing the planner to estimate the number, types and locations forrecovery assets. Consideration will have to be given to dedicating assets specifi-cally for PR, or designating them (double-earmarking) whereby they are routinelyused for other tasks and re-tasked for PR missions, if available, when requested.Risk and delays will usually be associated with double-earmarking and a dedicatedallocation of recovery assets for PR is preferable. However, given the usual short-fall of Support Helicopter (SH) lift, designating assets is usually required. The PRplanner should identify particular periods of high risk and, if possible, dedicateassets appropriately. This may need resolution and direction from the JFC . ThePR SOM should be promulgated in the AO PR SOP and form the basis for subsequentmission planning.

Training

PR AO entry requirements should be included in Annex V of the Joint OPLAN / OPORD andin the theatre PR SOP The requirements should also define which personnel at what riskof isolation and / or exploitation and the levels of individual training required. Once intheatre, the JPRC should coordinate collective training events to establish and maintaincapability. This should include training for the PR C2 chain, aircrew and EF.

Establish a personnel recovery organisation

0507. To establish a PR organisation, the PR planner will need to:

a. Ensure the JPRC / PRCC organisation is placed with the correct CCs.




b. Ensure appropriately qualified personnel staff the JPRC / PRCCs in accordance withParagraph 1.4.1. Manning of the PRCCs is a matter for the appropriate CCs, but,ideally, would reflect that of the JPRC. Additionally, the JPRC / PRCCs will needaccess to the intelligence, legal and admin and logs staff, dedicated SERE specialistsand Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on the designated recovery assets. Dependingupon the scale and complexity of the operation the JPRC may need to include othercomponent Liaison Officers (LNOs).

Establish and maintain command procedures for PR

0508. To establish and maintain command procedures for PR, the PR planner will needto:

a. Determine the command relationship for PR forces. Dedicated PR forces wouldnormally be under the ACC OPCON and he would exercise TACON of other forcesassigned for specific PR missions. Designated (double-hatted) forces would usu-ally remain OPCON to their CC but should be identified during the planning pro-cess, ideally by phase. Supporting / supported relationships will be used to iden-tify the Component responsible for planning and executing each mission with thesupported Component exercising TACON over recovery assets for the period of themission. Authority to Launch and Execute PR missions should be clearly identi-fied and promulgated. The command relationships for Non-conventional AssistedRecovery (NAR) missions will also need to be clarified although the details of theseareas should not be promulgated to those without a need to know.

b. Ensure that the C2 structure is publicised and understood. The C2 structure willnormally be described in the PR SOP.

0509. Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all force elements.Once it has been established what recovery assets will be operating from where, the In-formation Exchange Requirement (IER) needs consideration. The minimum equipmentis listed in Paragraph 1.4.2.

Reintegration planning

0510. The PR planner should ensure supporting reintegration plans are developed, pro-mulgated and implemented. This detail is often overlooked and rarely exercised so ad-ditional staff effort and liaison will be required to educate other staff functions. Full de-tails of medical, welfare, administrative, and de-briefing requirements must be includedin theatre PR SOP and the PR planner should ensure that support to PR is included in thecorresponding combat service support plans.

5.3.2 AO PR SOP

General

0511. The Annex V and the theatre PR SOP are the main outputs of the PR OPP andprovide AO specific direction and guidance. They should contain the majority of standingPR information and enable content of PR SPINS to be minimised. There are no firm rulesfor how PR information is split between SPINS and PR SOP; the JPRC Director will need todecide the most appropriate means depending upon communications capability and theexpectations of the JFC, especially in a coalition environment. For guidance the templateformat is given in Annex H.



55

Delineation of responsibility

0512. Particular attention is to be given to the delineation of the responsibility forrecovery in case of an isolation incident. The default responsibility for recovery lieswith the commander of the isolated personnel. However, in some cases (e.g. in thecase of downed aircrew) this may not be the best or most logical approach. In caseof downed aircrew, the aircrew may have come down in the AOR of a land component(sub)commander. In such cases it may be more appropriate to transfer the primaryresponsibility for recovery to the ground force commander as he may have the betterSituational Awareness (SA) and will most likely have recovery assets available in closevicinity of the isolated personnel, thus facilitating a quick recovery. Clear details ondelineation of responsibilities must therefore be put into the CONOPS.

5.3.3 PR SPINS

0513. PR SPINS are issued in order to provide forces that are prone to capture or isola-tion with instructions on actions to take to evade the enemy and the mandatory proce-dures to be followed for subsequent recovery. Although SPINS are normally associatedwith aviation operations they are equally applicable to all participants in an operationwho are at a high risk to become isolated. They are focused primarily for people trainedand equipped for CSAR recovery.

0514. In principle SPINS should be minimised and contain classified perishable andtime-sensitive information, with general standing guidance promulgated as part of thetheatre PR SOP. However, historically, all PR information has been included and the JPRCshould determine the most appropriate format taking into account the composition andexpectations of the JFC. The SPINS format is given in Annex J.

5.4 Daily operations

0515. During daily operations JPRC / PRCC staff are to run and hand-over their shiftsand are to maintain their documentation. A checklist for the JPRC / PRCC director’s dailyactivities is given in Annex F. A template for a shift hand-over brief is given in AnnexL. Besides updating the PR SOP and SPINS the JPRC / PRCC staff is also to maintain aPOC list as given in Annex K.

5.5 Report

0516. Initial notification can come from any source. Key in this phase is verification ofthe notification received. Upon verification of the reliability of the notification the infor-mation is to be spread to the JPRC, PRCC and unit or organisation the isolated personnelbelongs to. If the initial alert is triggered by an Emergency Location Transmitter (ELT),the JPRC / PRCC may expect an “ELT notification message” through an Airborne EarlyWarning (AEW) asset in accordance with Annex O.

5.6 Locate

0517. The aims of the location phase are to fix, find and, if possible, to authenticatethe isolated person. The requirement to know the location of isolated personnel may



5.6 Locate

be a pre-requisite to launch a recovery mission. Initial location and authentication isnormally achieved using covert electronic means and / or visual location methods:

a. The isolated personnel must make every effort to aid the location and authentica-tion process. The correct implementation of the initial contact procedures outlinedin the PR SOP, SPINS or EPA is pivotal to a successful recovery.

b. If the initial electronic search fails or is not available to determine the position ofthe isolated person, a more extensive search may be required. In a hostile area,stand-off search techniques may have to be employed. A risk assessment needs tobe conducted before any asset is used to search in hostile environments.

0518. Planners should attempt to determine location information using the followingpriority:

a. Global Positioning System (GPS) derived and reported coordinates (normally themost accurate).

b. Isolated personnel reported position.

c. Friendly Forces visual observation.

5.6.1 Search methods

0519. Whether at sea or on land, obtaining accurate and timely location information ofthe isolated person’s position may present major challenges for PR forces, thus requiringa search. Though the isolated person’s position may be ascertained via radio or visualsearch, other search modes may be more appropriate. If recovery is not imminent, theisolated person’s position should not be compromised. In addition, the search methodshould be decided following consideration of the level of threat.

Electronic search

0520. If an electronic search is conducted, the following factors should be considered:

Altitude. Determine an initial electronic search altitude based on threat and terrain(to maintain line of sight connectivity to Personal Locator System (PLS), beaconsand radio communications).

Electronic warfare. OPFOR jamming, deception, monitoring and Direction Finder (DF)intrusion.

ADF. Caution should be used with Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) as OPFOR forcesmay also employ DF techniques to locate isolated person. OPFOR DF and intelligence-gathering methods should be understood by all PRTF participants and isolated per-sonnel prior to utilising DF locating methods.

Airborne or surface radar. Airbourne or surface radar should attempt to provide theisolated person’s last known radar position to the JPRC / PRCC.

Satellite. Satellite systems such as Cosmicheskaya Systemya Poiska Avariynich Sudov(COSPAS) / Search and Rescue Satellite (SARSAT) visibility and availability sched-ules should be published in ATO SPINS.



57

Visual search

0521. Search units should consider searching along the isolated person’s intendedroute, areas offering concealment, and pre-briefed locations in accordance with the EPA.They should avoid major lines of communications such as roads, railroads, large riversor open valleys. These areas are normally frequented by people and often pose thegreatest threat to PR forces and evaders.

5.7 Support

0522. Support is the planned effort necessary to ensure the physical and psychologicalsustainment of isolated personnel. This may include establishing two-way communi-cations, providing morale-building support, aerial resupply or aerial escort to a cache.Support may also encompass the suppression of enemy threats to the isolated personneland deception missions to hide the recovery operation. This may preclude capture forthe isolated person and disrupt the adversary’s response to PR efforts. When necessary,ground forces, recovery specialists (e.g. Pararescuemen (PJs)) and/or equipment may bepre-positioned to support the isolated personnel until the recovery phase.

0523. Besides support to the isolated personnel, this task includes physical and psy-chological assistance to the isolated personnel?s family to include information manage-ment (controlling release to media). Support measures begin before and after an indi-vidual becomes isolated. This support is manifested in the AO PR SPINS, home-stationarrangements and training prior to entry in to a specific AO, AO PR regulations, and theestablishment of the AO PR architecture. All of these are component responsibilities thatframe the support mechanism.

5.8 Recover

5.8.1 Isolated or evading personnel

0524. The decision to launch a PR mission can only be made after careful risk analysis.This analysis is implicit in the mission planning cycle and the results will determineboth the composition of the PR package and the conduct of the PR mission. The missionplanning process involves the following steps:

a. Collection of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) data as listed in Annex N.

b. Conduct threat and risk assessment.

c. Evaluate available PR assets and capabilities.

d. Decide go/no go mission.

e. Selection of extraction method.

f. Assignment of assets and supporting forces, including the designation of comman-ders.

g. Coordination with other forces and operations.

h. exchange information with the assigned recovery force.



5.9 Reintegrate

i. Launch approval based on CONOPS and risk analysis assessment.

(a) PR package size and composition.(b) Method of recovery.(c) PR forces availability and capability.(d) Environment.(e) Timing.(f) Command and Control Warfare (C2W) status.(g) Compromise to, or cover from, another mission.

j. Mission briefing.

k. JPRC / PRCC execute approval process.

l. Send complete mission message.

5.8.2 Hostage release operations

0525. If isolated personnel is captured and taken hostage, a recovery should not be con-ducted using normal PR procedures. Transfer of the responsibility for the Hostage Re-lease Operations (HRO) to the Special Operations Component Commander (SOCC) shouldto be considered. Cross component support to national SOF, preparing for, or conductingan HRO may be required at any time.

5.9 Reintegrate

0526. On completion of the “execution” phase of the PR operation, the recovered per-sonnel and recovery forces are debriefed at the earliest opportunity as part of the rein-tegration process of the recovered personnel. Annex S gives a template for this debrief.The JPRC / PRCC should collate the lessons identified and disseminate them to all appro-priate force levels and implement them where appropriate in PR SOP, SPINS etc..

5.10 Levels of training

Knowledge level training. Have basic knowledge of JPRC / PRCC roles and responsi-bilities and is capable of augmenting a JPRC / PRCC.

Comprehensive level training. Have advanced knowledge and experience in JPRC /PRCC roles and responsibilities and is capable of acting as shift leader in a JPRC /PRCC.

Application level training. Have in depth knowledge and experience in JPRC / PRCCroles and responsibilities and is capable of acting as director in a JPRC / PRCC.

5.11 Theatre specific training

a. Validate the PR SOP (through exercises if possible).

b. Become accustomed to the area of operations.



59

c. Evaluate the capability of recovery assets to operate in a realistic environment.

d. Adapt procedures to the AO.

0527. Continuation training in order to maintain operational readiness must be con-ducted by all elements of the PR organisation. Details on this type of training are givenin Annex T.



5.11 Theatre specific training



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Annex A

JPRC / PRCC set-up checklists

A.1 Introduction

Preferably the JPRC / PRCC is integral part of the (joint) operations centre close to themedical / MEDEVAC cell. A typical layout of a JPRC / PRCC looks like this:

Figure A.1: Example of a generic JPRC / PRCC set-up

A.2 JPRC / PRCC set-up checklist

a. Make inventory of available documents. The following documents should be avail-able as a minimum:

(a) AJP-3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery(b) ATP-3.7.1 NATO Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures(c) STANAG 7196 NATO SERE training standard



A.2 JPRC / PRCC set-up checklist

(d) BI-SC PR Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG)

(e) ATP-49 Helicopters in Land Operations

(f) STANAG 7007 Combat Search And Rescue Electronic Equipment (CSARES)

b. Make an inventory of available assets, characteristics and disposition as per AnnexC.

c. Review entry procedures to JPRC / PRCC;

d. Review location and procedures for using message system;

e. Brief supporting personnel (JPRC / PRCC staff, intel, planning cell, etc.) on theirduties;

f. coordinate with PRCCs to:

(a) Develop quick reference list of key personnel and phone numbers

(b) Establish procedures for obtaining current maintenance of recovery assets

(c) Establish procedures for after duty hours notification

g. Transmit a message to all units participating in the operation / exercise requestinga list of life support equipment carried by their respective crews and the locationof authentication and EPA data1.

h. Establish a single point of contact with each of the recovery units participating inthe operation / exercise;

i. Check radio equipment:

(a) Conduct familiarisation training for JPRC / PRCC personnel

(b) Set-up secondary / mobility radios as required

(c) Develop and review frequency list and sweep

(d) Coordinate communication procedures with available facilities

j. Develop and display two wall charts:

(a) Assets board

(b) Incident / mission table

k. Draw and post the JPRC / PRCC planning map with:

(a) Universal Transversal Mercator (UTM) designator letters

(b) Low level routes

(c) Spider points

(d) Tactical / DARs / FARP areas

(e) Orbits, refuelling tracks

(f) Reference points (Search And Rescue Dot (SARDOT))

(g) Recovery resource locations (with type and numbers)

(h) Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT) and Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)when applicable

(i) Known OPFOR threats (received from intel)1This may be need to be re-accomplished once a month



63

(j) Transload locations

(k) Helicopter Contact Points (HCPs) / waypoints

(l) Fire support coordination line

(m) Field hospitals

(n) OPFOR / friendly forces

(o) Airspace Control Measures (ACM)

(p) Current as of Date / Time Group (DTG)

l. Analyse the FRAGO for active operations areas (this analysis will be a major factorin determining if Forward Operating Location (FOL) activity is needed);

m. Separate the FRAGO package into general SPINS, PR SPINS, PR frag missions, andgeneral frag missions;

n. Set-up mission folders and miscellaneous worksheets;

o. Set-up two message folders (incoming and outgoing). Divide the folders into clas-sified and unclassified sections, with log sheets;

p. Set-up a controller information file;

q. Start, set-up procedures for maintaining a 24hr events log;

r. Develop a work schedule;

s. Develop a schedule for a mobile training team;

t. As needed, review:

(a) Authentication / encryption / decryption procedures

(b) Plotting of UTM / georef coordinates

(c) Plotting of Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) radials and Distance MeasuringEquipment (DME) (SARDOT/Bullseye)

(d) ATO / SPINS format and procedures

u. Transmit JPRC/JPRC activation message

v. Start and mission log.



A.3 JPRC / PRCC bullet list


• Task organisation

– Director

– Watch supervisor

– Controller

– Mobile PR training team

• Logs & folders

– Controller

– Mission

• Reference data

– ATO

– SPINS

– ACO

– CONOPS

– COMPLAN

– PR regulation

– ROE list

– Red card holders / Senior National Representatives (SNRs)

– Phone book

• Common information displays

– Incident

– Asset

– Theatre authentication

– Static callsigns

– Phone numbers

– POC list

– Message templates

– Map

– Friendly/ OPFOR ORBAT

– OPFOR Integrated Air Defence (IAD)

– FLOT

– Waypoints

– Spider points

– SARDOT(s)

– DARs

– Refuelling tracks

– Transload locations

• Comm checks with key players (voice and/or data)



65

– PRCCs

– AOC Chief of combat ops

– AOC Intel

– Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) Ops/Intel

– NSA SSA

– Airborne C2

∗ Airbourne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS)∗ Airborne Command, Control and Communications (ABCCC)∗ Rivet Joint∗ Compass Call

• JPRC / PRCC activation message


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Annex B

JPRC / PRCC activation message

UNCLAS

MSGID / GENADMIN / JPRC / PRCC

SUBJ / JPRC / PRCC ACTIVATION

RMK /

THE ????? (JPRC / PRCC) HAS BEEN ACTIVATED AT mmhhmmZ yy.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR RECORDS:

PHONE NUMBER (UNSECURE)

FAX NUMBER (UNSECURE)

STU II / III (SECURE)

SECURE FAX

E-MAIL (UNCLASS)

E-MAIL (SECURE)

SATCOM FREQ: UPLINK: xxx.xxx, DOWNLINK: xxx.xxx, CALLSIGN:

UHF FREQ

VHF FREQ

HF FREQ

I. Contingency Theatre Automated Planning System (CTAPS) IDENTIFIER

COMPONENT PRCC WILL CONTACT THE JPRC / PRCC NLT 0800A DAILY RE-PORTING THE STATUS OF THEIR RECOVERY FORCES AND UPDATES ON OUT-STANDING MISSIONS.

PLEASE RESPOND VIA MESSAGE INDICATING RECEIPT AND PROVIDE INFOR-MATION ON YOUR COMM EQUIPMENT / CAPABILITIES.


PR asset questionnaireNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex C

PR asset questionnaire

C.1 general

a. Unit name.

b. Contact details.

c. Assets.

d. Location.

e. Type and number.

f. National Caveats.

g. Red Card holder.

C.2 Operational capabilities

a. Speed.

b. Range.

c. Instrument Flying Rules (IFR) capable.

d. Night Vision Device (NVD) capable.

e. Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) capable.

f. Air refuellable.

g. Amphibious platform.



C.3 Communications

C.3 Communications

TYPE AVAILABLEYES/NO

FREQ RANGExxx.xxx–yyy.yyy

INCREMENTzz kHz

HFVHF-AMVHF-FMUHFSATCOM CSATCOM MIRIDIUMGSMPLSSecure NA NA

C.4 Navigation

a. Inertia Navigation System (INS).

b. GPS.

c. TACAN.

d. VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR).

e. ADF.

f. Doppler / map display.

g. Ultra High Frequency (UHF)-DF.

h. PLS locator.

i. Blue force tracker

C.5 Recovery capabilities

a. Number of ambulatory passengers.

b. Number & type of litters.

c. Special rescue equipment.

• Hoist.

• Divers.

• Search And Rescue (SAR) swimmer.

• Horse collar.

• Rescue basket.

• Forest penetrator.

• Fast roping capable.

• Special Insertion and Extraction (SPIE) capable.

• Rope ladder.


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• Extractor kit.• Emergency medical kit.

d. EF (numbers and composition).

e. etc.

C.6 Armament / self protection

a. Armament, type and position (e.g. 7.62 minigun, 2000 rnds, sidefire).

b. Electronic Warfare (EW) suite: IRCM, CW jammer, MWS, etc.

c. Flares.

d. Chaff.

e. Ballistic self protection. item Laser range finder / pointer

C.7 Operational and logistical limitations

a. Night flying capability

b. Weather minima.

c. maximum operating altitude.

d. What is the alert status when Quick Reaction Force (QRF)?

e. Other (operational) minima.

f. Maximum number of sorties per day/week/month.

g. Maximum number of flying hours per day/week/month.

h. Who can extend crew duty time or shrink crew rest time?

i. Rotor turning refuel capable?

j. What side is the fuel port on?

k. NATO refuel nozzle capable?

l. How long does it take to refuel aircraft (rotors turning and cold refuel).

m. How much fuel does the aircraft take?

C.8 Standard combat load

a. Number of combat-loaded pax (estimate 250lbs/120kg per soldier).

b. Number of combat-loaded pax (estimate 200lbs/90kg per soldier).

c. Number of civilian pax (estimate 170lbs/80kg per person).

d. Max weight of cargo given flight distances of 30 min, 1 hr, 2 hr, 3 hr.

To be completed.



C.8 Standard combat load



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Annex D

Boards and matrices

D.1 Asset Board

Rec

over

yas

sets

Loc

atio

nR

emar

ks/

#T

ype

(IC

AO

)U

NIT

PO

C/#

Ale

rtSt

atus

Task

edM

SN#

Cur

rent

asof

:

• number and type assets - list the number and type of assets possessed

• location - location of the recovery assets

• unit POC - 24 hr contact numbers

• alert - confirm the alert times from the ATO or phone call

• status - status of the recovery assets

• remarks / tasked msn # - if tasked for a msn, list msn # and / or any pertinentinformation, squawk etc..



D.2 Asset matrix

D.2 Asset matrix

All available assets may be put into a matrix as shown below for quick reference todetermine what asset(s) to use in a particular isolated personnel case, based on theinformation available regarding the training and equipment level of the isolated per-sonnel in question. If not all cells of the matrix can be filled with recovery assets, thecommander should be informed that operations under those conditions pose an elevatedrisk and should therefore be avoided.

Level A Level B Level C NO SERETRG

HighriskMediumriskLowriskNorisk

D.3 Launch / execute matrix

The authority to approve launch and / or execute is depicted in a table as below.

Launch / Own AOR Other AOR Other AORExecute Own Assets Own Assets Other assetsLaunch ... ... ...Execute ... ... ...

D.4 Incident/mission board

• inc # / DTG - the number of the incident (from incident log), with the related DTG

• msn # / DTG - the number of the mission (from ATO), with the related DTG

• type of incident - shot down / lost / mech failure / etc.

• name or call sign - of the individual(s) isolated

• unit - that the individual(s) belongs in the AO

• number of personnel / Persons On Board (POB) - total known number of isolatedpersonnel

• Last Known Point (LKP) / DTG - last known position of the isolated personnel, withthe related DTG

• threat - current threat around position of isolated personnel

• time of last contact - DTG of last known contact with isolated individual(s)

• status / remarks - all notes of importance such as etd / eta / waiting for otherdetails, etc.


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Inc#

/M

SN#/

Typ

eN

ame

Typ

eU

nit

#Pe

rson

nel

LK

PT

hrea

tT

ime

ofSt

atus

/D

TG

DT

Gin

cide

nt/C

alls

ign

airc

raft

PO

B/D

TG

leve

lla

stC

onta

ctR

emar

ks

Cur

rent

asof

:



D.4 Incident/mission board



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Annex E

PR report formats

E.1 PRIR

Obtain the following information and pass it to JPRC / PRCC as it becomes available1:

a. Time of report

b. Callsign (Who’s reporting) M

c. Authentication

d. Time of incident

e. Exact location E

f. Type of vehicle

g. Way to identify vehicle (colour, ID)

h. Type (cause) of incident T

i. Hazards (fire, mines, enemies) H

j. Access to the spot A

k. Number and status of isolated personnel N

l. Nationality

m. Emergency service required type of injuries E

n. Qualifier / source.

o. Authentication of isolated personnel (Y / N and by what means).

p. Point of contact and means of communication.

1This report is to replace the SARIR as still shown in paragraph E.2.



E.2 SARIR

E.2 SARIR

a. Date / Time Group of Report: Z

b. Callsign: Last Contact Frequency:

c. Aircraft type:

d. Nationality / Unit:

e. Persons on Board:

f. Location:

g. Location qualifiers (circle as appropriate): Actual / last known / estimated positionland / water ejection / bailout altitude feet

h. Ejection / bailout winds at knots

i. DTG of Incident Z

j. Cause of loss (circle as appropriate):

k. Interceptors, Surface to Air Missile (SAM), Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA), collision,malfunction, other:

l. Isolated personnel condition: Mobile?

(a) Injured?

(b) Concealed?

(c) Survival equipment?

(d) Signaling devices?

(e) Intentions?

m. Last voice contact at DTG. freq / push with

(a) (Callsign)

n. Threat situation:

o. Friendly units on-scene:

p. Source of information:

q. Reported by:

r. RMC call sign:

E.3 PR 11-line report

The following checklist is used to communicate basic information about a PR situation.As a minimum, the designated AMC uses this checklist to gather information and relayit to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), JPRC /PRCC, and the PRTF. All aircraftshould have this checklist available and use it as appropriate during a PR incident.



79

# Action Data1 Callsign / Vehicle Type /

Mission Number / ParentCommand

2 Location .....Source .....Time* .....

3 Comm with Survivor (Yes /No)

4 Authentication Used (yes/noand by what means)

5 Injuries/Conditions6 OSC / Bingo / Loadout /

POC (Who is reporting andmeans of communication)

7 # Chutes Seen8 Cause of incident9 Hazards / Ground / Air

Threats / Access to the spot10 WX in Survivor Area11 Survivor Radio Frequency a) .....

b) .....

*CAUTION: Line 2 must include all three elements; location / source / time.

NOTE: For brevity, information should be given by reference to each checklist linenumber (Example: Line 1: Flameout 01; Line 2: 30 45N, 046 00E / Wingman / 1000Z;etc.). It is crucial that line #2 always includes all three elements: Location, Source, andTime. The JPRC / PRCC uses this information to discern the most accurate location. Allplayers can then reference the location of the survivor by the associated time and sourceto avoid confusion.

E.4 PR mission message

a. Unit/POC

b. Isolated personnel

(a) Callsign(b) Location(c) Number of isolated personnel

c. Routing

d. Threat assessment

(a) Ingress route(b) Isolated personnel location (area description)(c) Egress route

e. PRTF mission package



E.4 PR mission message

f. Additional support requirements

g. Launch location

h. Launch weather

i. Estimate Time En-route (ETE) to isolated personnel

j. Ingress weather

k. AAR / Helicopter Aerial Refuelling (HAR) track / FARP location

l. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) isolated personnel location (DTG)

m. Weather at isolated personnel location

n. Estimate time on station

o. Isolated personnel transload/recovery base

p. Re-entry location friendly territory

(a) Re-entry time (DTG)

(b) Re-entry altitude (ft acsamsl / acsagl)

(c) Re-entry heading (degrees)

q. ETA transload/recovery base (DTG)

r. Recovery base weather

s. Estimated mission complete time (DTG)

t. Commander assessment

u. ROEs

v. Go / no go


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Annex F

JPRC / PRCC chief checklist

a. If JPRC / PRCC personnel shortages exist, request augmentation through J-1 andJ-3

b. Transmit JPRC / PRCC activation message

c. Assign staff duties (as required):

(a) Deputy chief

i. Update SPINS as requiredii. Coordinate with “plans” to be part of planning process.

(b) Watch supervisor(s)

(c) Controllers

(d) Dedicated intelligence support

(e) LNO support (coordination process)

(f) Communication support

(g) Administrative support

d. Develop a JPRC / PRCC CONOPS and distribute (update as required)

(a) Establish who has launch and execute authority for all recovery forces andsupport assets

(b) Develop and coordinate a PR COMPLAN

(c) Establish reporting requirements for the PRCCs

(d) Request all PRCCs disseminate their SOPs

(e) coordinate AO wide ISOPREP and EPA plan with custodian for that plan.

e. Ensure CC-AIR HQ Izmir and CC-AIR HQ Ramstein receive copies of all:

(a) Theatre SPINS (daily, AO, monthly, quarterly......)

(b) Theatre ATO

(c) COMPLAN

(d) CONOPS

f. Brief the designated commander’s staff on all isolated personnel.

g. Monitor all PR incidents prosecuted by PRCCs



h. Receive the watch supervisor recommendations on closed and suspended incidentsand missions, and take appropriate action

i. Review and release all message traffic in and out of the JPRC / PRCC

j. Ensure all debriefings of recovery crews, Prisoner Of Wars (POWs) and returnees,logs, after action reports, and incident / mission folder forwarded to CC-AIR HQIzmir and CC-AIR HQ Ramstein as soon as possible. Do not destroy anything.

k. Complete after action report for PR missions and operations conducted.

l. Initiate AO PR and SERE training and briefing.

m. Checklist complete


PR Annex to OPLAN templateNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

83

Annex G

PR Annex to OPLAN template

NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR SPINS’.

NOTE. Italicised text is text that may or may not be applicable in the operations / exer-cise at hand, dependant on the situation. The text itself is either intended to be anexample of what should be put in that particular position or needs to be developedbased on the actual situation.

NOTE. This template is written as the Annex V to the JFC’s OPLAN. For component andsector commanders’ OPLANs, references to JFC, etc. may have to be adapted to therespective commander issuing the Annex V.

NOTE. These notes are only for the purpose of this template. They may be removedwhen developing the actual Annex V.

Reference publications

AJPs • AJP-3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery

• ...

ATPs • ATP-3.7.1 Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• ATP-3.3.9.1 NATO Combat Search And Rescue

• ATP-3.3.9.2 NATO Search And Rescue Manual

• ...

STANAGs • STANAG 7007 Combat Search and Rescue Electronic Systems

• STANAG 7196 NATO SERE Training standard

• ...

Other NATO publications • Bi-SC PR JOG

• AD 80-6

• ...

Memoranda Of Understanding • ...

Other publications • iamsar! manual

• ...



G.1 Situation

G.1 Situation

G.1.1 Introduction

Here the information that links PR to the (basic plan for the) overall operation should begiven.

G.1.2 Opposing forces

Here the information on the opposing forces that is relevant for the execution of PR oper-ations should be inserted. This information should be based on and linked to the overallassessment of the opposing forces

G.1.3 Own forces

Here the information on own forces that is relevant for the execution of PR operationsshould be inserted. This information should be based on and linked to the overall assess-ment of the own forces.

G.1.4 Environment

Here the information on the environment that is relevant for the execution of PR opera-tions should be inserted. This information should be based on and linked to the overallassessment of the environment.

G.1.5 Assumptions

Here all for PR relevant planning assumptions should be inserted.

G.1.6 Definitions

Here all relevant PR terms and definitions should be inserted.

G.2 Mission

To recover all <insert name of operation or exercise> and other eligible personnel thathave become isolated in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) within number of hours ofinitial notification.

G.3 Execution

G.3.1 Commander’s intent

The JFC’s commander’s intent will normally have PR as one of his highest priorities.Therefore, reference to the commanders intent, threat / risk assessment, airspace control,ROE, etc. should be given here (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Chapter 5).



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G.3.2 Desired end state

The establishment of an integrated PR system that prepares all <insert name of opera-tion or exercise> personnel and other eligible supporting personnel for SERE commensu-rate with their designated risk of isolation and / or exploitation category. The commandstructure must be capable of ensuring the effective planning and execution of PR mis-sions throughout the JOA within an adequate time frame. This system is to ensure thatall isolated personnel are recovered and reintegrated.

G.3.3 Concept of operations

The JFC intends to establish a joint PR architecture with the capability to use military,diplomatic and civil means to recover isolated personnel. The designated PR authorityis <insert name: JFC, Commander (COM) NATO Peace Support Operation (NPSO) or adesignated component commander as appropriate> and he will establish a JPRC whichwill act as focal point for all PR activities within the JOA and will be responsible forplanning, coordination and control of all joint PR missions. Component and / or sectorPRCCs have the same responsibility in their AOR.

G.3.4 Not covered areas

Despite the PR capabilities as mentioned above, some areas in the AO are not coveredby PR assets. List the areas as mentioned. These may be high mountains, areas undercontrol of hostile elements, etc. (e.g. there may not be PR capabilities available that canoperate at night). Also describe how the commander intends to cater for this problem.

G.3.5 Forces

The Combined Joint Status Of Requirements (CJSOR) outlines dedicated and designatedPR forces. Political and / or geographic constraints, availability of dedicated PR assets,and the need for a more timely response may dictate the use of other assets than thosededicated for PR in the CJSOR. Component and/or sector commanders must be preparedto use organic assets and tailor the PR task force to match the character of the PR mis-sion.

In addition, commanders must be prepared to utilise diplomatic and civil (e.g. io!s (io!s),(Non) Governmental Organisations ((N)GOs) and local entities) means to to effect therecovery of their personnel.

Dedicated forces . Unit name, location and number and type of assets needs to beinserted here.

Designated forces . Unit name, location and number and type of assets needs to beinserted here.

PRCCs . Location, manning and training requirements for the PRCCs needs to be puthere.

.

.

.



G.4 coordinating instructions

G.3.6 Tasks

JPRC a. The JPRC is to develop and maintain a theatre PR SOP in accordance withATP-3.7.1 Vol ?? Annex H.

b. The JPRC is to provide a PR in-brief as part of in-processing programme.c. Other tasks are as per ATP-3.7.1. A more extensive task-list may be inserted

here or as an appendix to Annex V if deemed appropriate.

PRCC a. The PRCC is to develop and maintain a PR SOP for their component / sectorbased upon the theatre PR SOP in accordance with ATP-3.7.1 Vol ?? Annex H.

b. The PRCC is to provide a PR in-brief as part of in-processing programme.c. Other tasks are as per ATP-3.7.1. A more extensive task-list may be inserted

here or as an appendix to Annex V if deemed appropriate.

ACC. only if the ACC is the designated PR authority. If that authority rests with the acjfcor COM NPSO, the ACC responsibilities will be addressed in the item below.

Land Component Commander (LCC)

MCC

SOCC

Sector commanders]

a. ...

Staffs from all branches at all levels are to be prepared to support the JPRC / PRCC toprepare plan and execute PR operations as per Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.7.1 and PR SOP (theatre, component, sector).

Troop contributing nations a. Ensure personnel assigned to <insert name of oper-ation or exercise> have the appropriate level of SERE training as defined bypre-deployment requirements.

b. Ensure all forces are equipped with required survival equipment as definedby pre-deployment requirements

c. Identify requirements for reintegration activities.

G.4 coordinating instructions

All personnel deployed in the JOA is to prepare an ISOPREP and an EPA. Units are to beprepared to forward ISOPREP and EPA to the PRCC / JPRC if required.

G.5 PIERIE

All deployed personnel is to be considered to be Personnel Identified as at an ElevatedRisk of Isolation and / or Exploitation (PIERIE). Consequently, in accordance with NATOpolicy, sending nations and headquarters are to categorise their personnel with respectto their risk of isolation. This categorisation is typically done through the definition ofMRIE and HRIE. Preparation for a potential isolation event is conducted in three consec-utive steps; pre-deployment preparation, upon entry preparation, and normal missionpreparation.



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G.6 Command and control

G.6.1 PR C2 description

Based on the overall C2 structure as described in <insert reference to the main body orannexes as applicable> the PR C2 structure is depicted in the diagram below. Providedescription of where the JPRC, PRCCs and PR POCs are located. Roles and responsibilitiesof the JPRC, PRCCs and PR POCs are described in ATP-3.7.1 Vol I Chapter 1.

INSERT PR C2 GRAPHIC

Figure G.1: PR command and control structure

G.6.2 Supporting / supported relationships

Typically, commanders are responsible for their own personnel and are therefore alsoresponsible for the recovery of their isolated personnel. This is easily implemented whenown personnel has become isolated in ones own AOR and the recovery can be effectedwith own assets / capabilities. However, as soon as personnel has become isolated insomeone else’s AOR and/ or a recovery cannot be effected by solely using own assets /capabilities, coordination is required. In such cases supporting / supported relationshipshave to be defined.

In <insert name of operation or exercise> supporting / supported relationships will bedefined by the JFC through the JPRC on a case by case basis.

G.6.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix

Reference AJP-3.3.9, PR missions normally have two steps. The first step is to preposi-tion recovery forces and their supporting assets. This is commonly known as “launch”.This is applicable for ground, air and maritime lead missions alike. The second step isthe actual approval to prosecute the PR mission and is commonly called “execute”.

Although typically launch and execute authority resides with the JFC, in <insert name ofoperation or exercise> the authority to issue launch and execute approval is delineatedas per the matrix below.



G.7 Administration and logistics

Launch / Own AOR Other AOR Other AORExecute Own Assets Own Assets Other assetsLaunch ... ... ...Execute ... ... ...

G.6.4 Reports

The JPRC will be notified of all PR operations. The PRCCs will submit an initial reportto the JPRC prior to any planned or deliberate PR missions. Mission folders will besubmitted to the JPRC as soon as possible for all other PR missions. The PersonnelRecovery Incident Report (PRIR) will be used to transmit the message.


Training

G.7.0.1 Pre deployment preparation

Education. Personnel that are to be deployed, and based on their risk of isolation, areto be trained in accordance with STANAG-7196.

Training. In addition to the above, personnel is to be trained in the following:

• Items to be listed here may refer to the environment (desert, jungle, arctic, etc.),population, ROE, PR procedures and equipment to be used in theatre

• ...

Equipment. In addition to the equipment specified in ATP-3.7.1, Vol III, Chapter XXXX,all personnel in <insert name of operation or exercise> has to carry the items listedbelow at all times when they leave the base to enhance their chances of survivaland to facilitate their recovery if they have become isolated.

• ...

• ...

G.7.0.2 Upon entry preparation

Education. Upon entry in theatre, all personnel will undergo an initial in-theatre brief.This brief will be given by personnel designated by the JPRC. Commanders will bebriefed additionally on their roles and responsibilities regarding PR.

Training. Upon entry in theatre, all personnel will undergo initial in-theatre training.Items to be listed here may include acclimatisation, familiarisation with the envi-ronment and all types of training that could not be conducted prior to deployment.

Equipment. Upon entry in theatre, personnel will be issued list items will / could nothave been issued prior to deployment.

• ...

• ...



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G.7.0.3 In theatre continuation training

during their deployment in theatre, all personnel will undergo continuation trainingrelated to their role regarding PR. Items to be listed here may include table top and liveexercises.

insert other coordinating instructions as required.

G.7.1 Rules of Engagement

ROEs are as per <insert the reference to the ROEs, in particular if there are specific onesrelated to PR>

G.7.2 Service support

Service support is in accordance with Annex R (Logistics). Specific issues are:

a. Supply. FARP locations capable of servicing PR assets will be identified throughoutthe JOA. FARP locations and status will be monitored by the JPRC to ensure avail-ability during PR missions. The JPRC will also coordinate the use of AAR if requiredfor PR missions.

b. Medical. All dedicated PR assets will be capable of providing initial medical treat-ment to recovered personnel. The JPRC will monitor the status and coordinate theuse of medical facilities in the JOA for PR missions.

medical facilities will designate a helicopter landing site and a method for trans-porting patients to the facility from that landing site.

The JPRC will ensure a capability to provide Phase I reintegration and coordinatefor Phase II and -III reintegration as needed.

the JPRC needs to ensure medical arrangements for PR are not only mentioned inthis Annex V, but also in the annexes related to medical issues as the medical com-munity may not necessarily be familiar with this Annex V.


PR SOP templateNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

91

Annex H

PR SOP template

NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR SOP’.


NOTE. These notes are only for the purpose of this template. They may be removedwhen developing the actual PR SOP.

NOTE. This is the default template for the theatre PR SOP. more detail may be requireddepend upon the theatre and capabilities. Component and sector commands areto use the same template but references to JFC and theatre are to be amended asappropriate.

H.1 General

H.1.1 Introduction

This PR SOP is intended to tailor the generic relevant documents to the operation /exercise at hand. It does no necessary repeat anything from those reference documents.The reference documents must therefore be studied in reference to the content of thisPR SOP.

H.1.2 Reference publications

APs .

• AJP-3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery

• ATP-3.7.1 Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• ATP-3.3.9.1 NATO Combat Search And Rescue

• ATP-3.3.9.2 NATO Search And Rescue Manual

• BI SC PR JOG

• ...

Orders .



H.2 Theatre PR system

• OPLAN XXXXX

• FRAGO XXXXX

• ...

Memoranda Of Understanding .

• ...

H.1.3 PR Characteristics

H.1.3.1 4 PR methods

As described in AJP-3.3.9, PR encompasses four methods; SAR, CR, CSAR and NAR.The four methods will only be referred to if a particular piece of text refers to onlythat particular method. Otherwise, the generic term PR will be used throughoutthis SOP.

H.1.3.2 Relation to other mission types

Medical Evacuation. MEDEVAC is not a subset of PR. Details are described inAnnex H of this OPLAN. However, MEDEVAC assets may be used to support PRmissions1.

HRO. Example: Although some nations might consider HRO as a subset of PR, theconduct of this specific mission is a primarily a national responsibility. If iso-lated personnel have been captured and taken hostage, the JPRC may transferthe supporting responsibility for the coordination of the HRO to the SOCC.

Quick Reaction Force. A QRF is typically not stood up for the execution of PRmissions. However, a QRF may be used to conduct / support PR missions.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. In accordance with NATO policy anddoctrine, Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) is not considered to be asubset of PR. However, PR capabilities and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures(TTPs) may be used to conduct NEO operations as applicable / appropriate.

Persons Designated with Special Status. The personnel listed in <insert ref-erence to the main body or annexes as applicable> are considered Person(s)with Designated Special Status (PDSS). However, that status does not nec-essarily entitle them to the full range of PR support when applicable. In thecontext of PR, only the personnel listed below are to be fully supported withPR support in case of a isolation event.

• ...

H.2 Theatre PR system

Amplification of the overall concept of the PR system as stated in Annex V of the OPLANas is relevant for this PR SOP.

1These items may be considered doctrinal in nature. It is therefore op for debate whether this should bepart of a typical PR SOP as a reminder / amplification or whether they should not be mentioned at all.



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H.2.1 Not covered areas

Despite the PR capabilities as mentioned above, some areas in the AO are not coveredby PR assets. List the areas as mentioned. These may be high mountains, areas undercontrol of hostile elements, etc. (e.g. there may not be PR capabilities available that canoperate at night).

H.3 C2

H.3.1 PR C2 description

Based on the overall C2 structure as described in the OPLAN Annex V, the PR C2 structureis depicted in the diagram below. text is to be copied from the Annex V and expanded ifrequired

INSERT PR C2 GRAPHIC

Figure H.1: PR command and control structure

H.3.2 Supporting / supported relationships

text is to be copied from the Annex V and expanded if required

H.3.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix

text is to be copied from the Annex V and expanded if required

H.3.4 Reports

The JPRC will be notified of all PR operations. The PRIR will be used to transmit themessage. The PRCCs will submit an initial report to the JPRC prior to any planned ordeliberate PR missions. Lessons identified will be submitted to the JPRC as soon aspossible for all other PR missions. Mission folders will be archived upon the completionof the recovery.



H.3 C2

H.3.5 specific tasks / duties

In addition to the tasks and duties as described in ATP-3.7.1 volume 1, Chapter 1, thePR C2 nodes have the following additional tasks and duties:

One may choose to list all or a selection of the task for the respective nodes. This sectionmay be moved to an appendix to the SOP for readability purposes (in particular if the listbecomes long).

JPRC .

• Some of the tasks given in ATP-3.7.1 may be mentioned here for clarity pur-poses.

• Diplomatic. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is toliaise / coordinate with diplomatic sources with respect to PR. The JPRC maybe authorised to do this directly, or through normal Political Adviser (POLAD)channels. In any case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.

• Civil. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is to liaise /coordinate with civil sources with respect to PR. The JPRC may be authorisedto do this directly, or through normal CIMIC channels. In any case, the contactdetails of the POC is to be given here as well.

• Host Nation. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is toliaise / coordinate with host nation sources with respect to PR. The JPRC maybe authorised to do this directly, or through normal liaison and / or CIMICchannels. In any case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.

• ISOPREP / EPA management. Special attention is to be given to the wayISOPREPs and EPAs are managed by the JPRC and what the responsibilities forhandling ISOPREP and EPA are for the JPRC.

• ...

PRCC .


• Diplomatic. Special attention should be given to the way how the PRCC is toliaise / coordinate with diplomatic sources with respect to PR. The PRCC maybe authorised to do this directly, or through normal POLAD channels. In anycase, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.

• Civil. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is to liaise /coordinate with civil sources with respect to PR. The PRCC may be authorisedto do this directly, or through normal CIMIC channel. In any case, the contactdetails of the POC is to be given here as wells.

• Host Nation. Special attention should be given to the way how the PRCC is toliaise / coordinate with host nation sources with respect to PR. The PRCC maybe authorised to do this directly, or through normal liaison and / or CIMICchannels. In any case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.

• ISOPREP / EPA management. Special attention is to be given to the wayISOPREPs and EPAs are managed by the PRCC and what the responsibilities forhandling ISOPREP and EPA are for the PRCC.

• ...

PR POC .



95


• Diplomatic. Special attention should be given to the way how the PR POC is toliaise / coordinate with diplomatic sources with respect to PR. The JPRC maybe authorised to do this directly, or through normal POLAD channels. In anycase, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.

• Civil. Special attention should be given to the way how the PR POC is to liaise /coordinate with civil sources with respect to PR. The PR POC may be authorisedto do this directly, or through normal CIMIC channels. In any case, the contactdetails of the POC is to be given here as well.

• Host Nation. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC isto liaise / coordinate with host nation sources with respect to PR. The PR POCmay be authorised to do this directly, or through normal liaison and / or CIMICchannels. In any case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.

• ISOPREP / EPA management. Special attention is to be given to the wayISOPREPs and EPAs are managed by the PR POC and what the responsibilitiesfor handling ISOPREP and EPA are for the PR POC.

• ...

Recovery forces .

• Recovery forces are to inform the JPRC / PRCC on their status and will informthe JPRC / PRCC about any change in in their status.

• ...

(A)MC .

• ...

OSC .

• ...

RMC .

• ...

Staff sections Staffs from all branches at all levels are to be prepared to support theJPRC / PRCC to prepare plan and execute PR operations as per ATP-3.7.1 and PR SOP(theatre, component, sector).

SNRs .

• SNRs are to collect ISOPREPs for all personnel from their Nation prior to theirentering theatre. Particular attention is to be given to visiting personnel.

• SNRs are to inform the JPRC about where the national ISOPREPs are storedand who the POC for providing them is should the JPRC need them.

Host nation • The host nation will provide SAR services throughout the host na-tion’s Search and Rescue Region (SRR).

• ...

Chatroom The following are to check into the PR chatroom as set-up by the JPRC /PRCC:

• JPRC



H.3 C2

• PRCCs

• PR POCs

• Battle captain• Intel cell• Press and media officer• Dedicated and designated recovery forces• QRFs

• ...

...

H.3.6 Communications

List the available communication means that will or may be used for PR operations.

Within <Insert name of operation or exercise> several means of communication will beused for PR purposes(see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex K. Here the communications archi-tecture for typical PR situations (e.g. delineate SAR from CR from CSAR) should be intro-duced. A graphical depiction of the respective communications architectures (similar toATP-3.7.1, Vol II,figures 4.1 and 4.2) should be added to the PR SOP as appendices.

From JPRC - PRCC - PR POC. Communications between the JPRC, PRCC and PR POCswill be conducted via telephone, e-mail and chat with radio communications asback-up system. The primary means of communication during a PR event will bechat. Telephone numbers, (e-mail) addresses, chat aliases and frequencies will beprovided in the PR POC list as appendix XXXX.

Airbourne recovery assets. Airbourne recovery assets will use frequencies and codesas per the ACC’s COMPLAN.

Land based recovery assets. Land based recovery assets will use frequencies andcodes as per the AO COMPLAN.

Sea based recovery assets. maritime based recovery assets will use frequencies andcodes as per the MCC’s COMPLAN.

H.3.7 Communication conventions

The following conventions will be taken into account to ensure smooth communicationsand prevent confusion as much as possible:

ISOPREPs / EPAs. Details on how ISOPREPs and EPAs are managed are to be insertedhere. As a minimum, information is to be given on the format (if that deviatesfrom the standard as given in Annex A to Vol III of ATP-3.7.1, who is to storeISOPREPs and EPAs (taking into account national regulation, etc.), through whatmeans ISOPREPs and EPAs are to be distributed in this operation/exercise.

E-mail and network folder naming conventions. For the purpose of easy informa-tion retrieval and automatic information archiving, e-mail subject information andand format may de defined. The same goes for network folder naming.

PR chatroom naming conventions. A standardised way of the use of user-names in achat system confusion in this respect may lead to the failure of missions.



97

Intranet homepage usage. Intranet will be used to store information such as orders,but may also be used to store standard briefs (e.g. upon entry theatre PR briefing).

Transfer of information between different systems. In most operations there willbe an operation wide network. In addition to that there will also be several nationalnetworks. In many cases it is not easy to transfer data from one network to another.Details are to be worked out and presented here.

Mission numbering convention. To avoid confusion, a mission numbering system isto be developed by the JPRC that is to be used by all PR entities.

Mission folder contents. Besides the mission-folder itself (as per ATP-3.7.1), specialattention is to be given to other pieces of information that may be inserted (e.g. chatlistings).

H.3.7.1 Use of ISOPREPs and EPAs

Certain items of the ISOPREPs and EPAs may be used in a particular way. E.g. One of thefour statements of the ISOPREP may be reserved for use by the OSC or EF, or the PR colour,or word may be designated as the initial means to authenticate isolated personnel. Suchspecial uses are to be mentioned here wherever applicable.

H.4 ORBAT

Based on the CJSOR, the PR related ORBAT is as follows. This information may be pre-sented in a table for readability purposes.

H.4.1 Dedicated assets

• Dedicated assets are those assets of which the sole purpose is to satisfy the PR re-quirements. If there are no dedicated assets, the term “NONE” should be insertedhere. If there are assets dedicated to PR they should be listed here. At this level thelocation of the assets is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the following items should beinserted (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):

– Type and number.

– Readiness (Alert status).

– Operational range.

– The asset’s AOR.

– Capabilities (including day / night capabilities.

– Limitations (including national caveats).

– ...

• ...



H.4 ORBAT

H.4.2 Designated assets

• Designated assets are those multi-mission assets which are only momentarily as-signed to fulfill PR duties. If there are no designated assets, the term “NONE” shouldbe inserted here. If there are assets designated to PR they should be listed here. Atthis level the location of the assets is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the followingitems should be inserted (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):

– Type and number.– Readiness (Alert status).– Operational range.– The asset’s AOR.– Capabilities (including day / night capabilities.– Limitations (including national caveats).– ...

• ...

H.4.3 QRF

• If there are no QRF assets that can be made available for PR (through the appro-priate channels), the term “NONE” should be inserted here. If there are QRF assetsavailable for PR they should be listed here. At this level the location of the assetsis to be inserted. As sub bullets, the following items should be inserted (see alsoATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):

– Type and number.– Readiness (Alert status).– Operational range.– The asset’s AOR.– Capabilities (including day / night capabilities.– Limitations (including national caveats).– ...

H.4.4 Medical facilities for reintegration

• The medical facilities designated for reintegration phase I and II are to be listedhere with their name and location.

• ...

H.4.5 Other capable assets

• Under this item capabilities that are not, as a minimum, TACON to the Force, butare available through prior coordination, should be listed here. Examples of “othercapable assets” that may be available are; host nation SAR capabilities, local policecapabilities, capabilities of (N)GOs, etc.. If there are no other assets, the term “NONE”should be inserted here. If there are other assets to PR they should be listed here.At this level the location of the assets is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the followingitems should be inserted (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):



99

– Type and number.

– Readiness (Alert status).

– Operational range.

– The asset’s AOR.

– Capabilities (including day / night capabilities.

– Limitations (including national caveats).

– ...

• ...

H.5 Risk assessment

The JFC is to provide generic information regarding:

• Go - no go criteria

• Red card issues

• Risk assessment formats

A PR related risk assessment should be given here. This should be based on the over-all risk assessment and include PR specific issues regarding terrain (high mountains,minefields, etc.), population (friendly or hostile), day / night / weather implications (e.g.adverse weather or very low light levels at night that may limit the use of NVD) and anyother risk / threat to successful execution of PR operations.

H.6 PR staff

In accordance with ATP-3.7.1, Chapter 1, the JPRC has been responsible for the develop-ment of this theatre PR SOP for <insert name of operation or exercise> and is responsiblefor keeping this PR SOP up to date. The PRCC are to use this PR SOP template to develop aPR SOP tailored to their own AOR based on its specific characteristics and their availablecapabilities. If a PRCC chooses to do so, they are to use this template and are responsiblefor keeping it up to date.

H.6.1 Proactive mission planning

SPINS. For “air” and “aviation” PR purposes, PR SPINS have been developed. These PRSPINS will be distributed as part of the overall SPINS (typically together with theATO.

Spider points. For “air” and “aviation” PR purposes, a list of spider points has beendeveloped.This item may only be applicable for the ACC’s PR SOP. The list can befound in the ACO.



H.7 PR critical tasks

H.7 PR critical tasks

The five critical tasks of PR are; report, locate, support, recover and reintegrate. Thesecritical tasks are the foundation on which all PR operations are planned, coordinatedand executed.

Specific items on the five tasks that are not mentioned in ATP-3.7.1 may need to be insertedhere (e.g. “in this theatre the “METHANE” report will be used or reporting PR incidents”).

H.7.1 Locate

Specific information has to be inserted here on the use of coordinates (e.g. UTM, MGRS,LAT-LONG, decimal minutes).

H.7.2 Reintegration

Recovered isolated personnel will brought to one of the designated reintegration facili-ties to undergo reintegration phase I treatment in accordance with the theatre reinte-gration plan. As per NATO policy, reintegration is a national responsibility. However,for lessons learned purposes it is critical that the SERE debrief, that is part of the rein-tegration phase I, is to be reported to the JPRC within seven days of the recovery. TheJPRC will subsequently update PR procedures as appropriate or inform units throughthe appropriate channels of lessons identified where applicable.

H.7.3 Normal mission execution

Prior to execute normal missions, all personnel is to ensure that their ISOPREP and EPAis up to date and they are familiar with its content. Furthermore, personnel is to ensurethat the intended routing and timing is known to their home unit and / or the ops roomat the location of their departure. If there are areas that are not covered by PR capabilities(see paragraph H.2.1 in this PR SOP), operators may be advised to avoid these areas orto take special precautions. Do’s and don’t’s in this respect are to be given here Finallypersonnel is to ensure they carry all the required equipment (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol III,Paragraph 2.5).

Personnel should give special attention to the following items:

• Sanitation

• Maps / evasion charts

• Survival equipment (mention specific, deviating, requirements here)

• ISOPREP and EPA

• Survival radio procedures

• PR codes



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H.7.4 Recovery mission execution

Upon becoming isolated, personnel is to act in accordance with ATP-3.7.1, Vol III. Con-tinue with listing specific items pertaining to the operation / exercise at hand. Particularattention is to be given to do’s and don’t’s with respect to (un)friendly population, mines,other go / no-go areas, etc.. Specifically distinguish between isolating events in friendly,hostile and neutral/unknown territory.

Immediate actions. List appropriate actions based on ATP-3.7.1, Vol III.III

Contact procedures. List appropriate actions based on ATP-3.7.1, Vol III. particularattention is to be given to the use of “clicking” the radio button as means of non-voicecommunication and the use of PLS and associated codes.

Evasion. List appropriate actions based on ATP-3.7.1, Vol III.

H.7.5 Reintegration

Upon recovery, the isolated personnel will be brought to a designated medical facility toundergo reintegration phase I treatment in accordance with the theatre reintegrationplan. The medical aspect of this reintegration treatment will be conducted by the per-sonnel’s national medical staff or by medical staff that is designated in accordance withapplicable Memorandum Of Understandings (MOUs).

H.8 Land procedures

As appropriate, procedures that are specific to the maritime environment are to be listedhere in a similar fashion as with the air procedures.

H.9 Air procedures

H.9.1 Initial actions

Distress call. For aircrew, prior to ejection, transmit on the working frequency: "MAY-DAY" (three times); callsign; and position. The Distress call will be made by the wing-man if the emergency aircraft was unable to transmit or if transmission was not madeon the working frequency. If on a non-secure net, use bearing and range from the appli-cable Bullseye for airborne position reporting.

Emergency Aircraft Ejection / Ditching Over Water: Transmit "MAYDAY, MAY-DAY, MAYDAY" and your call sign on UHF Guard (243.0) or VHF (121,5).

a. Put the ejection seat emergency locator beacon to Automatic / ON. Once in thewater, allow the beacon to transmit for at least five minutes and then attemptperiodic voice contact on UHF Guard (243.0) until you make contact.

b. When you make contact, pass GPS position (DO NOT use the SARDOT in this case)and the medical condition of yourself and other crew-members as applicable.



H.9 Air procedures

H.9.2 Aircrew procedures

During a PR event, all aircraft involved will calculate time to be at refuelling (BINGO)time in ZULU and be ready to respond to an RMC roll call with call sign, BINGO time andweapons load ("as fragged" or "as fragged minus X"). RMC qualified crews should state"RMC-qualified" upon initial call-up with AMC to help the AMC assign tasks appropriately.

OSC procedures. Any aircraft (involved in the operation) can be designated as theOSC, should be familiar with OSC responsibilities and should carry the PR 11-Line check-list / report format (see paragraph J). Wingman shall assume OSC first if threat / fuel /mission permits. Eyewitness to downed aircraft. Mark your position and, if practical,the survivor’s position. Report the shoot down to the appropriate PR C2 assets. Use PRIRchecklist/report format. Assume OSC if threat/fuel/mission permits.

Airborne asset communications with survivor.

a. Use of PR Codes. If specific PR codes are to be used by specific players in the recoverymission, details are to be mentioned here. E.g. One of the four statements of theISOPREP may be reserved for use by the OSC or EF, or the PR colour, or word maybe designated as the initial means to authenticate isolated personnel. Such specialuses are to be mentioned here wherever applicable.

b. OSC / RMC. To avoid unfriendly DF detection, every effort will be made to employdata burst and limit voice communication with the survivor until the final phaseof rescue with the EF.

c. Make every attempt to ask the survivor only yes / no questions and expect databurst or <give number> PTT clicks = yes, <give number> PTT clicks = no. OSC / RMCwill confirm with the survivors that data burst transmissions are being receivedby data-bursting "Message Received, Standby" after each data burst.

d. Pass survivor coordinates via a secure net. If secure net is unavailable, pass en-crypted survivor location using position TO the SARDOT, or use the Search AndRescue Numeric Encryption Grid (SARNEG).

e. SARNEG: Use the SARNEG as an alternate means to pass position when securecommunication is not possible.

f. For coordinates, pass NORTH / SOUTH first, then EAST / WEST in degrees, min-utes and tenths of minutes. Do not say "North" or "East" unless you are forcedout of your aircraft south of the equator or west of 0 Meridian. In this particularcase only, to avoid any confusion or ambiguity, state "South" after passing the firstset of coordinates or "West" after second set. Preface all encoded information with"SARNEG". Do not use any clear text with the encoding that could compromise thegrid or information being passed in the clear.

H.9.3 Downed aircrew procedures

Establishing timely contact with friendly forces and accurately passing initial contactinformation is critical to your rescue. Immediate rescue procedures should be followedfor the first <give number> hours. If forced to evade attempt to follow EPA procedures.



103

Immediate Actions. List actions that deviate from the PR SOP. Specifically distin-guish between isolating events in friendly, hostile and neutral / unknown territory.

Report.

a. Upon parachute landing acquire GPS position and send canned data burst messageadvising rescue forces of status (repeat once) IF APPLICABLE TO YOUR RADIO.

b. If your radio is not designed with data burst feature or if nothing is heard withintwo minutes make voice call in the blind. Limit voice transmissions to short mes-sages (not longer than 3 seconds) and transmit large amounts of information (lo-cation, physical condition, etc.) with several shorter transmissions. When askedyes/no questions, respond with data burst or use <give number> PTT clicks=yesand <give number> PTT clicks=no.

c. Make initial radio call on primary PR A / B to friendly forces with:

• “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY”

• Callsign (and crew position if needed).

• Location TO SARDOT.

• Physical condition (and that of other aircrew if applicable).

• Threats in your immediate area.

d. If no initial radio contact is established, keep the radio on for the first <give num-ber> minutes and transmit on primary PR A/B. Attempt to contact every <givenumber> minutes for the first <give number> hours.

e. If no contact is made after <give number> hours, monitor primary PR A/B for <givenumber> minutes every <give number> minutes for the first <give number> hours.If nothing is heard broadcast Call Sign and condition in the blind. To conservebattery life, ensure that your survival radio is turned off all other times. If aircraftare noticed flying overhead at any time or sonic booms are heard, turn radio on andmonitor the primary PR A/B frequencies in consideration of enemy DF capabilities.

f. Long Range Communications Plan. After <give number> hours, re-attempt contactevery hour at <give number> minutes past the hour and monitor for <give number>minutes. To conserve battery life, ensure that your survival radio is turned off allother times. If aircraft are noticed flying overhead at any time or sonic booms areheard, turn radio on and monitor the primary PR A/B frequencies in considerationof enemy DF capabilities.

g. Once contact is made, discontinue quarterly transmissions and follow all instruc-tions given. If rescue forces direct you to switch to a different frequency, do soand remain on that frequency until otherwise directed. It is critical once contact ismade, that the evader maintains radio discipline and good cover / concealment.

h. Avoid passing your position in the clear unless a rescue helicopter is in sight. Ifin enemy territory the beacon should be used as a last resort only. Remember,in order for friendly forces to interrogate and receive your location using PLS, thePRC-112 (or the other systems) must in the on position.

i. Duress Code Word. If you are captured and forced to transmit over radio, conveythat message by attaching the DURESS WORD to your Call Sign.



H.9 Air procedures

j. Imminent Capture. State that capture is imminent by voice transmission. De-scribe in as much detail any and all information pertaining to the capturing force.This information will be used to profile the captors when formulating liberation/rescueforces. Do not use the Duress Word unless forced to transmit deceptive informa-tion. Once the Duress Word is used, all information will be suspect to rescue forces.

Signaling procedures.

a. Day signaling equipment: mirror and smoke. Flash all friendly A/C with mirroronly when signaled to do so. Respond to an exaggerated wing rock by ceasingmirror flashes. Pop up smoke when you are requested to do so.

b. Night signaling equipment. Prepare your InfraRed (IR) strobe/firefly. Do not acti-vate (crack it) the chemlite unless signaled to do so. Pencil flares should be used alast resort only as they will highlight your position.

Extended evasion. If an immediate recovery is impossible or unsuccessful, it maytake up to <give number> hrs to execute a pre-planned CSAR mission. In this case do notmove unless directed to or unless absolutely necessary. If you are unable to establishcontact with rescue forces within <give number> hours, execute your long-term EPA. Forcommunication to air/space platforms display <give character> as GTAS, approximatelyfifteen feet long using natural or man-made materials, visible from the air. The <givepart> of the vertical line of the <give character> will indicate direction of travel and/orhole-up site. Give more details only when they deviate from standard procedures (e.g.Once the GTAS has been constructed, use a signal mirror to attract attention of friendlyaircraft to the location during the day. At night use an infrared (IR) strobe or fireflyanytime friendly aircraft are overhead. Do not use any hand held visual signaling devicesuntil any approaching forces have been positively identified as friendly. DO NOT holeup near the GTAS and move far enough away to ensure security of the hole-up site whilemaintaining line-of-sight with the GTAS.

Radio Authentication procedure. Detail the applicable procedures here.

a. Any time a downed aircrew recognises a friendly aircraft overhead, the survivorshould monitor primary PR A/B frequency and be prepare to authenticate.

b. Initially, RESCAP / RMC / OSC or helicopter rescue forces will use PR Word from thedate of the isolating event (or from the EPA for ground teams / isolated personnel)to properly authenticate the survivor. PR Word authentication will use only ONEletter at a time. The same rules apply to PR Number which is reserved for RescueGround Teams. You should avoid asking the whole number and instead use onedigit at a time or use mathematic techniques (add, subtract, multiply) between twodigits of the number.

c. The PR letter will be coded in the first message of the Personal Locator Beacon (PLB)for databurst message or used as a near recognition signal for assisted recovery.

d. Extended evasion episodes will use ISOPREP information as a definitive or finalsurvivor / team / isolated personnel authentication.



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H.9.4 Recovery phase procedures

Detail the applicable procedures here.

a. Be prepared to mark your position. DO NOT use any hand-held signaling devicesuntil directed by RMC/EF or until the approaching forces have been positively iden-tified as friendly.

b. Prior to the rescue platform or personnel final approach, secure all gear / equip-ment (holster your weapon). All personnel will keep their Identification (ID) cardin their upper left breast pocket.

c. Be prepared to provide vectors to the recovery helicopter. Identify the significantgeographic landmarks for use in vectoring rescue helicopters and making threatcalls. Once helicopter is in sight, make all calls in clears and vector helicopter.

d. Assume a non-threatening posture by kneeling and facing away from the recoveryvehicle / personnel with hands over your head (if physically possible). Maintainposition until directed otherwise.

e. Expect an additional authentication by rescue ground forces which will normallybe derived from the PR Colour / Letter. Follow all rescue force instructions.

f. DO NOT approach the rescue platform / personnel unless directed by recoveryforces. Remember you are considered potentially hostile until positively identifiedby Rescue Team.

g. Failure to execute all instructions precisely may lead to mission abort.

h. Hoist Recovery. If no landing zone is available, the helicopter may lower a rescuedevice to execute the pickup. PJs will accompany the rescue device and assist withrecovery. If no PJs are available, allow the device to contact the ground before youtouch it.

i. ...

H.10 Maritime procedures

As appropriate, procedures that are specific to the maritime environment are to be listedhere in a similar fashion as with the air procedures.

H.11 Appendices

a. POC list (format as per ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex XXXX)

b. Templates and message formats that deviate from ATP-3.7.1

c. ...



H.11 Appendices



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Annex I

PR codes message template

The PR codes message should include the following:

NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR codes messages.


NOTE. These notes are only for the purpose of this template. They may be removedwhen developing the actual PR codes message.

I.1 General information

This PR codes message are to be considered an addition to the PR SOP for the operation.

The ACC PRCC is primary responsible for conducting a rescue operations and overallmanagement with respect to these PR codes message. Isolated personnel are to actaccording procedures as laid out in Volume III and the current PR SOP.

The following PR codes message is effective for operation from to .

I.2 Rules of engagement

In addition / deviation to the PR SOP, the following ROE are applicable:

• ...

I.3 Risk assessment

Insert the actual risk level in theatre / the applicable AOR



I.4 Communication

I.4 Communication

I.4.1 Brevity words

For use in unsecure radio nets, or as brevity codes an secure nets the following brevitywords are used as appropriate.

NO EVENT MX FROM TO CODE1 RMC LAUNCH M RMC AMC ASHLEY2 EF LAUNCH M EF AMC BARNEY3 EF FEET DRY M EF AMC ...4 RESCORT LAUNCH M RESCORT AMC ...5 PRTF RV & READY M RMC AMC ...6 RMC IN COMM WITH SURVIVOR M RMC AMC ...7 EF / RESCORT AT IP M RESCORT ALL ...8 EF AT SURVIVOR LOCATION M EF ALL ...9 SURVIVOR X RECOVERED M EF ALL ...

10 ALL SURVIVORS RECOVERED M EF ...11 EF RESCORT EGRESS M EF AMC ...12 EF FEET WET M EF AMC ...13 MAINTENANCE ABORT X RMC ALL ...14 ABORT DUE TO THREAT X RMC AMC ...15 WX ABORT X RMC AMC ...16 BORDER X-ING APPROVED X AMC PRTF ...17 REQUEST MORE CAS X RMC AMC ...18 SURVIVOR NOT LOCATED X RMC AMC ...

NOTE: M - MANDATORY CALL. X - OPTIONAL CALL

I.4.2 Survivor radio

Ensure the correct PLS ID code is loaded in the PRC-112 series radio.


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I.4.3 PR codewords

CODEWORD DEFINITIONHAMMER Cleared to execute missionFOG Smokeetc. Survivor injured

Mission abortMission delayTeam insertedPlanned Landing Zone (LZ)Survivor recoveredSurvivor uninjuredSurvivor under duress or hostageCrash site not locatedCleared to survivor lzSOF extractionHostile contactRed flashlightPRTF aircraft downStrobe / IR strobeIR chemlightsWestNorthEastSouthChange routeContinue / push EFReturn to last spider pointOn topMirrorStop signalHold at stated positionHolding point prior to survivorEtc.

I.4.4 PR codes

PR word: <give PR word> valid from to

PR colour: <give PR colour> valid from to

PR number: <give PR number> valid from to

PR letter: <give PR letter> valid from to

SARDOT: <give SARDOT> valid from to

SARNEG: <give SARNEG> valid from to

Bullseye: <give bullseye> valid from to

RAMROD: <give RAMROD> valid from to



I.4 Communication

I.4.5 Non-comms plan

Specific procedures are to be given here.


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Annex J

PR SPINS template

The PR SPINS should include the following:

NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR SPINS’.


NOTE. These notes are only for the purpose of this template. They may be removedwhen developing the actual PR SPINS.

J.1 General information

These PR SPINS are to be considered an addition to the PR SOP and PR codes message forthe operation.

The ACC PRCC is primary responsible for conducting a rescue operations and overallmanagement with respect to these PR SPINS. Isolated personnel are to act accordingprocedures as laid out in ??, Volume III and the current PR SOP.

The following SPINS are effective for operation from to .

J.2 Rules of engagement

In addition / deviation to the PR SOP, the following ROE are applicable:

• ...

J.3 Risk assessment

Insert the additional / different risks to aircrew, if any, in relation to the risk assessmentmentioned in the PR SOP. Particular guidance should be given with respect to evasionand contacting local population.



J.4 Recovery mission execution

J.4 Recovery mission execution

J.4.1 Special procedures

Anything that is not mentionen in the PR SOP and the PR codes message should be men-tined here.

J.5 Communication

Any additional brevity words, codewords and PR codes that are not mentioned in the PRcodes message is to be inserted here.


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Annex K

Communications

K.1 COMPLAN

JFC or a designated CC will publish a COMPLAN capable of supporting PR operations. TheCOMPLAN should cover:

a. PRTF frequencies including as a minimum:

(a) Isolated personnel to / from EF.

(b) EF to / from C2 platform.

(c) C2 platform to / from JPRC / PRCC.

(d) EF to / from JPRC / PRCC (ground communications).

(e) PRTF to JPRC / PRCC (if PRTF is ground forces unit)

b. JPRC / PRCC communication requirements.

c. Emergency / distress / PLB (which should comply with Standard NATO Agreement(STANAG) 7007).

d. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) nets, if available.

e. Codewords / Authentication. This section should include SAR word / letter / number/ colour of the day (or other designated period), SARNEG code and duress word.

f. Callsigns.

g. Messages (as per APP-11).

h. Emission Control (EMCON) plan.

i. Anti-jam nets.

j. Radio relay.

k. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) (to include procedures for non-IFF aircraft).

K.1.1 Checklist for getting the necessary information from the opera-tors/assets.

See Annex C in Volume I on page 69



K.2 Standard communication formats

K.1.2 Checklist for checking the complan in annex

T.b.d.

K.1.3 Detail the required liaisons plus the comms equipment

Liaison and associated equipment must ensure contact with JPRC, PRCC, PR POC as wellas (N)GOs, civil and diplomatic authorities. Contact with these actors must be providedas a minimum through unsecure means. Secure means need to be available as appro-priate.

K.1.4 Detail required C2 equipment

C2 equipment is laid out in figure A.1. The computer equipment must be connected tothe C2 system used in the operation. As a minimum it must be capable of sending andreceiving:

a. ACO, ATO, etc.

b. ISOPREP and EPA information

c. e-mail / chat messages throughout the C2 system.

The computers must also be capable of running the PR mission related software in usein the operation (e.g. ICC, Falconview, etc.).

K.2 Standard communication formats

Standard communication formats should be adopted to ensure accurate transmission ofvital information. Suggested formats from AAP-11 should be used, with the followingbeing the minimum required for PR operations:

a. Search And Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) (see Annex E.2).

b. Other formats may be developed by JFC J6 staff as required.

K.3 SATCOM operations

SATCOM is the primary secure means for monitoring rescue missions in real time.

The radio is programmed to monitor the following SATCOM Channel:

Primary Channel:

TARN Channel xxx

Uplink UHF

Downlink UHF

PR NET: Uplink UHF

Downlink UHF



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Secondary Channels:

AC-1: Channel yyy

Uplink UHF

Downlink UHF

AC-10B: Channel zzz

Uplink UHF

Downlink UHF

K.4 Contact information table

In case of preparing or executing a PR mission a wide range of contacts might be nec-essary. The table in paragraph K.4 is an initial set up and must be expanded withcontacts in the AO as the circumstances depict. It is advised to complete the table asshown in paragraph K.4 as soon as possible after arrival in the AO and add contactswere necessary.

Organisation Contactperson

Contactnumber

E-mail Remarks

MILITARYLaunch AuthorityExecute AuthorityLegal advisor 1Legal advisor xInterpreter 1Interpreter xReachback HQ 1Reachback HQ xJPRCPRCC LCCPRCC xCCPRCC region 1PRCC region xPR POC unit 1PR POC unit xLiaison off unit 1Liaison off unit xAssets unit 1Assets unit xSNR Nation 1SNR Nation xMilitary policeEtc.

CIVILLocal police region1Local police regionx



K.4 Contact information table

Local hospital re-gion 1Local hospital re-gion xLocal emergency(e.g. for ambulance)Etc.

AUTHORITIESEmbassy 1Embassy xNGO 1NGO xCiv government 1Civ government xEtc.


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Annex L

PR shift changeover checklists

L.1 Director changeover checklist

a. Brief the following items to the on-coming shift supervisor/controllers

(a) Location of:

i. JFC or designated execution approval authority / JFC or designated launchapproval authority

ii. JPRC / PRCC directoriii. JPRC / PRCC deputy directoriv. recovery assets (number and status)

(b) The current intelligence situation

(c) Incidents/missions in progress

i. Incidents being workedA. Location of incidentB. Information required to go to missionC. Open checklist items

ii. Missions assigned to recovery forcesA. PR mission commanderB. Tasked PR unitC. Estimated Time of Departure (ETD) or Actual Time of Departure (ATD)

of PR forcesD. Outstanding items required to launch PR forces

(d) Incidents/missions closed during shift

(e) Communications equipment status (as applicable)

i. Phonesii. STU-III

iii. Field phonesiv. Radiosv. Global Command and and Control System (GCCS)

vi. CTAPS

vii. Unsecure/secure faxviii. COSPAS / SARSAT

(f) Messages received and sent during the shift



L.1 Director changeover checklist

i. Mission reports needed to be drafted and sent to higher HQ

ii. Mission reports sent to higher HQ

iii. Messages received during the shiftiv. Message traffic waiting pick-up

(g) Brief special instructions

i. Message for specific individualsii. New read items that change procedures

(h) Ensure the JPRC is clean and neat

(i) Ensure supplies are located at each console

(j) Log “shift changeover briefing complete” on JPRC / PRCC event log

(k) Checklist complete


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L.2 PR controller checklist

a. Changeover brief

(a) Log on to the JPRC / PRCC event log(b) Review events log since end of last shift(c) Be prepared to brief the support resources on any preplanned or expected

recovery activity if Personnel Recovery Duty Officer (PRDO) is not available(d) Inventory Communication Security (COMSEC)(e) Re-key secure communications equipment (as required)(f) Change / destroy COMSEC (as required)

b. Daily tasks (conducted continuously throughout shift)

(a) Conduct communications check radio / phone lines with all customers andHigher HQ

(b) Review current ATO / SPINS

i. Post PR FRAGO (primary and support resources)ii. Post call sign / radio freq

iii. Update asset board(c) Obtain weather briefing

i. Update weather boardii. Update mission folders

(d) Obtain intelligence briefing / get periodic updatesi. Update mission folders

ii. Update situation mapiii. Ensure threat information is current and posted

(e) Review JPRC / PRCC wall displaysi. Update assets board

ii. Incident mission boardiii. Confirm status of support resources

A. Alert statusB. Number and typeC. CallsignsD. Location

(f) Review open incident(s) / mission folder(s)i. Determine follow-up actions

ii. Confirm number and condition of known isolated personnel are currentand accurate

iii. Confirm Coordinates of isolated personnel LKP in folder, on plotting chartand mission status board are correct PR POCs

iv. Check with PRDO for any information on contact with isolated personneland update incident board / mission folder as appropriate

(g) Update AMC on missions in progress and / or opened, as applicable.(h) Analyse open / future missions to determine if primary recovery forces should

be moved to a forward operating location and / or placed in precautionaryorbits



L.2 PR controller checklist

(i) Coordinate with PRCC and PR POCs to monitor PR frequencies for isolated per-sonnel transmissions

(j) When there are no further missions in the AO, place PR units on relaxed alertand inform them when flight activity will resume

(k) Review mission folders

i. Obtain weather forecast for time of missionii. Obtain intel for ingress / egress routes for recovery site

iii. Brief primary and support recovery resources taking mission

(l) Review PR activity (open / closed incidents and missions) and prepare / trans-mit required reports per AO SOP

c. Early morning activities

(a) Update all status boards

(b) Confirm support forces, weather, intel, SERE available for any planned mis-sions

(c) Brief AMC on any morning missions

d. Midnight Zulu time:

(a) Close / open daily JPRC / PRCC event log

(b) Key radios (as applicable)

(c) Destroy classified waste


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Annex M

Intelligence checklists

M.1 Pre-operations intel checklist

National checklists are to be used for pre-mission planning



M.2 Intel daily operations checklist

M.2 Intel daily operations checklist

a. Shift Changeover Briefing

(a) Review JPRC / PRCC event log

(b) Review JPRC / PRCC intelligence journal

(c) Read messages from previous shift

(d) Brief current threat and probable hostile courses of action in relation to iso-lated personnel

i. Significant political eventsii. Areas of major engagement

iii. Weatheriv. Local area situationv. Threat condition

vi. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level / Chemical, Biological,Radiological, Nuclear (CBRNE)

vii. Indications of impending attack

b. Daily tasks

(a) Review current ATO, changes to SPINS and all missions currently in planningstages

(b) Check with JPRC / PRCC director for additional information

i. Discuss potential threats to missions with PR planners

(c) Get Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) or Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE)daily situation briefing

(d) Get weather briefing to cover duration of PR missions

(e) Complete tasks unfinished by previous shift (Request For Information (RFI) ,plotting ORBAT, etc.)

(f) Develop new EEIs and pass as RFIs as necessary

(g) Review open incident / mission folders

i. Check for accuracyii. Compare folders with logs and displays; check for consistency

(h) Review threats for opened missions, update mission coordinator of changes

(i) Check incoming message traffic (telephonic, radio, chat, etc.) look for info thatmay affect recovery forces or personnel

(j) Brief critical changes of information to JPRC / PRCC personnel

(k) Maintain situational awareness of available PR and intelligence assets

(l) Check comms with PR and intelligence units

(m) Prepare shift changeover briefing


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M.3 Intel changeover brief checklist

a. Current as of time

b. Current status of each isolated person

(a) Missions

i. Completedii. Ongoing

iii. Planned

(b) Recent incidents

c. Local area threat situation and significant events

(a) Threat level

(b) Alert status

(c) Etc.

d. Significant political events (surrenders, treaties, declarations of war; policy changes,etc.)

e. Brief any changes to:

(a) Orders of battle

(b) Tactics

(c) Readiness posture

(d) Areas of engagement

f. Other significant military activity

g. CBRNE attacks or indications of impending attacks

h. Probable courses of enemy action

i. Results of debriefings

j. Significant terrorist activity

k. Review the following administrative items. reference intelligence journal as ap-propriate.

(a) Messages, both in and out of the JPRC / PRCC

(b) Comm problems

(c) Unfinished tasks (RFIs, ob plots, etc.)

(d) Upcoming events (briefings, etc.)

(e) Significant events

(f) Status of supplies



M.4 Intel PR incident checklist

M.4 Intel PR incident checklist

a. Upon notification of isolated personnel, plot location on the primary situation dis-play chart with the DTG and source of the report.

b. Immediately notify JPRC / PRCC leadership by most secure means with:

(a) Time of incident #(b) Location(c) Call Sign(d) Primary PR frequency

c. Coordinate incident report i.a.w. PR SOP

d. Assess threat situation in vicinity of isolated personnel and brief:

(a) Director / deputy watch supervisor(b) PR mission coordinator(c) AMC

(d) Other personnel as necessary

e. PR POC must provide the following information about isolated personnel

(a) EEIs

i. Type of vehicle (ground, air, maritime)ii. RAS

iii. EPAs

iv. Route of movementv. Altitude (for aircraft)

vi. DAR

f. Draft RFIs and issue to following personnel:

(a) Director / deputy watch supervisor(b) PR mission coordinator(c) PRTF units(d) Additional recovery units(e) Plot changes on chart

g. Assist controllers in determining:

(a) Ingress / egress routes(b) Spider point routing(c) Airspace around isolated personnel

i. No fireii. Restricted Operation Zone (ROZ)

h. ID intelligence assets available to support recovery

i. Recommend actions to degrade / eliminate threat

j. Provide support to intelligence section of PRTF units (as required)


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Annex N

Essential elements of information

a. Reliable isolated personnel location(with date / time of last contact).

b. Number and physical status of isolated personnel.

c. Suspected cause of incident.

d. Contact with isolated person.

e. Reception of emergency beacon.

f. Threat (to include):

(a) Air / ground / sea superiority.

(b) OPFOR order of battle.

(c) OPFOR equipment and serviceability.

(d) OPFOR C2.

(e) OPFOR night capability.

(f) OPFOR electronic warfare capability.

(g) OPFOR NBC capabilities.

g. Consider: Political / religious / cultural environment.

h. Friendly forces in area (and if they are attempting to search).

i. Weather, sea and astronomical conditions affecting survival and recovery.

j. General description of terrain in the immediate vicinity of the personnel. Identifyoutstanding terrain features and potential landing zones.

k. Availability of isolated person’s ISOPREP, EPA data and type of survival radio andother equipment.

l. Availability of required recovery support forces / medical facilities.

m. Disposition of recovered personnel.

n. Reintegration location and procedures.

Additional information requirements:

a. Planning / briefings (who, where, when)



b. Go / no go decision (who, when)

c. Abort criteria

d. Tactical weather limitations

e. Crew rest

f. Delay plan

g. Success criteria

h. ROE

i. Transfer Of Authority (TOA) (when applicable)

j. COMPLAN

(a) Freq assignment (C2 and weapon codes)

(b) Brevity words

(c) Code words

(d) EW procedures)

(e) Flight following

(f) IFF procedures

k. Survivability equipment (chaff, flares)

l. Intell update

m. Scheme of manoeuvre

(a) Starting point

(b) Forward Operating Base (FOB)

(c) Formation form

(d) Speeds

(e) Lighting procedures

(f) Routing

(g) Rendez vous points

(h) Landing plan

(i) LZ procedures

(j) Aircraft down (emergency handling)

(k) Extraction plan

n. ACO

(a) Spider-routes

(b) Altitude of ops

(c) CSAR procedures

o. Coordination through friendly units (Army)

p. FLOT

q. Coordination to go X-FLOT and return


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r. Coordination with neighbour units

s. Fire support (where, who, freq, C/S)

t. Close Air Support (CAS) (where, who, freq, C/S, what is available)

u. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) (where, who, freq, C/S)

v. FARP, AAR / HAR ((where, who, freq, C/S, what is available, including time plan)

w. Food (where)

x. Personal survival equipment


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Annex O

ELT notification checklist

Upon receiving the initial notification of an activated ELT the following actions are to betaken:

a. Log time and position in official log book.

b. Use all available assets to locate and determine authenticity.

c. Plot ELT position.

d. Is it a mission aircraft or not?

(a) If it is not a mission aircraft and outside of the AO: Call local Air TrafficControl (ATC).

(b) If it is not a mission aircraft but is within the AO: Apply PR checklist.

(c) If it is a mission aircraft within the AO: Apply PR checklist.

(d) If it is a mission aircraft but is outside the AO: Call local PRCC.

(e) If it is a mission aircraft but is over international waters: Comply with SPINSand either apply PR checklist or call local PRCC.


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Annex P

Recovery mission executionchecklist

a. This checklist is for use in JPRC / PRCC as a back up in order to make sure it doesnot miss essential points during execution.

b. All times in “zulu” (or the commonly used timezone in the operation)

c. Not all items may be applicable in all cases.

d. Items are not to be handled strictly sequential.

General

• Case officer name

• DTG case opening.

Report

• Notify senior ops officer / J-3 officer.

• Open a mission folder (JPRC / PRCC mission folder).

• Validate incident

– Validate alerting originator– Validate alerting message content

• Complete PRIR brief with details given (populate as available, do not wait for 100%information before moving on)

• Update chat with with known details (use chat to maintain a log. start and main-tain a log if chat is not DTG stamped. It is essential that all relevant details areentered as it provides and audit trail)

• Form multi-disciplinary team as appropriate.

– J-1 representative. Name contact details– J-2 representative. Name contact details– J-4 representative. Name contact details



– J-5 representative. Name contact details



– PIO representative. Name contact details

– LEGAD representative. Name contact details

– POLAD representative. Name contact details

– Info ops representative. Name contact details

– lno (as rquired). Name contact details

– Other representative. Name contact details

– Other representative. Name contact details

• Transmit warning order to recovery assets as soon as possible with available in-formation.

• Notify all PRCCs and/or JPRC for awareness and parallel planning.

• Notify isolated personnel’s unit / DOB.

• Notify the isolated personnel’s SNR and Press and Information Office (PIO).

• Collect AO level authentication information (ISOPREP, EPA, PLB code etc.)

• Prepare to transmit authentication information to relevant forces and acknowl-edge receipt.

Locate

• Determine location of isolated personnel using all available means.

• Log all location, source and time information.

• Authenticate Isolated Personnel.

• Track use of authentication data.

Support

• Analyse need of support to isolated personnel

– To survive

– Suppress enemies

– During reintegration

• Analyse need of support to next of kin. (Be before CNN)

Recover


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Mission planning

• Pass isolated personnel location to intel and ask them for threat assessment.

– OPFOR defences/response capability

– NBC assessment

– Terrain analysis

– Mine threat

– Request both a complete weather brief for incident location and a forecast forthe entire area of interest, between the recovery asset launch location and theincident location, for the anticipated mission duration

• Determine availability and evaluate nearby assets and capabilities as potentialOSC / RMC / recovery vehicle and assess potential for opportune recovery.

• Notify PRCCs to assist cross boundary coordination process.

• Prepare PRIR (contains all information on PR incident checklist) and transmit to allrelevant units (e.g. JPRC / PRCCs and recovery assets). Do not delay transmissionof the initial report to wait for completed information: transmit best availableinformation immediately. Update the SARIR with Search And Rescue SituationReport (SARSIT) as more detailed information becomes available.

• Receipt of PRIR by action addressees acknowledged.

• Task appropriate PRTF assets.

• Provide mission brief to PRTF

• Analyse all mission briefs. (Include aircraft unit reps, communications rep and in-telligence rep in this analysis, if applicable. Consider diversionary attacks.) Makerecommendation to the officer with launch and execute authority.

• Execute order given.

– For delayed mission TOT is: Z Include in ATO.

– Name of execution authority

• Planned ingress / egress routing:

• Put airspace measures in place (Temporary Minimum Risk Route (TMRR), ROZaround the isolated personnel, etc.).

• Notify the isolated personnel’s SNR and PIO.

Execution

• Monitor applicable communications to follow mission progress. Update all relevantforces with new information as it becomes available.

• PRTF launched: Number / type callsigns

– Recovery vehicles: /

– Mission Commander: /

– Other: /



• Isolated personnel located. Position

• Isolated personnel recovered

• Condition

• Taking isolated personnel to

Reintegration

• ETA Z

• Coordinate arrival of isolated personnel at final destination / medical facility.

• Coordinate isolated personnel debriefing (Operations (Ops), intel and SERE).

• Isolated personnel arrives at transload location, if applicable.

• Isolated personnel delivered to final destination / medical facility.

• PRTF recovered at home station.

– Recovery vehicles– Mission commander– Other

• Determine Phase 2 Reintegration requirement.

Mission completion

• Provide updates as required to:

– Change authentication data.– Change SARDOT.– Change SARNEG.– Other.

• Notify applicable agencies of mission closure / suspense.

– Contact isolated personnel unit/organisation and provide update.

• Contact all unit operation centres which had aircraft participating in the missionto recap take off / landing times and total sorties and hours flown.

• Complete recovery mission folder. Include all paperwork, including copies of allchecklist pages, logs, maps, etc.

• Close out / suspend mission in PRCC event log and update recovery mission num-ber in front of checklist binder. Suspended mission files must be passed to theappropriate authority, to enable the file to be re-opened if circumstances change.

• Recap mission with Chief of Operations (CHOPS)

• Prepare recovery mission summary and any lessons learned for recovery units,support agencies and higher headquarters.

• DTG case closure

• Archive PR mission information.


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Annex Q

Course of action brief

Q.1 General

The “Course of Action (COA) brief” is the staff ’s method to present possible plans to thelaunch / execute authority. It is informal and interactive, designed to show how youplan on utilising the assets available and how you plan to mitigate threat and risk. Thisbriefing is given early in the planning process. This briefing gives the launch / executeauthority an opportunity to supervise the planning and to issue more guidance. Thebriefing should:

a. Describe how you plan to tactically employ the allocated assets

b. Describe how the isolated personnel will be recovered

c. Show the general sequence of events

d. Present unresolved issues

e. Ensure the initial plan meets the commander’s intent. The overall goal of this briefis not format, but content.

Q.2 Suggested briefing format

Slide 1: Mission overview (map view)

Slide 2: isolated personnel situation (from information report – show on map)

Slide 3: Weather forecast (up through next 24-hrs)

Slide 4: Intelligence: Enemy situation (show on map)

• Enemies offensive capabilities

• Enemies defensive capabilities

Slide 5: Intelligence: Friendly situation (show on map)

• PR-capable unit locations

• PR-capable unit capabilities

Slides 6 – 9: Courses of action (possible examples)



Q.2 Suggested briefing format

• LCC

– Scheme of manoeuvre– Threat assessment and counter-tactics– Significant concerns/performance considerations

• ACC


• MCC


• SOCC


Slide 10: Command, control, & communications employment plan

• Available support assets and locations

• Support asset routing plan

• Communication architecture

Slide 11: ROE

• Identification/engagement authority

• Caveats

• Additional critical information (as required)

Slide 12: Initial risk assessment (stoplight: red, yellow, green)

• requirements to mitigate risk


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Annex R

Launch / execute back brief

R.1 General

This brief should convey the entire PRTF plan to the launch / execute authority, thestaff, and those concerned with the operation. The back brief is the end of the planningprocess and should give a big picture view. The Courses of Action slides should be thebasis for the brief, but concentrating on the following:

a. Present scheme of manoeuvre in a logical flow

b. Discuss the support plan

c. Discuss areas where proper integration is critical

d. Present the C2 plan and the flow of critical information

e. Describe de-confliction techniques

This briefing should cover enough information so the launch / execute authority cananswer any mission related questions at higher levels.

Note: Ensure you check the format of this briefing is appropriate for the mission/exercise.Every launch / execute authority may want different and specific items briefed. Whatfollows is a suggested format.

R.2 Suggested briefing format

Slide 1: Mission overview

Slide 2: Commanders intent

Slide 3: isolated personnel situation (updated since COA brief)

Slide 4: Weather forecast (for operation)

Slide 5: Intelligence: Enemy situation

• Enemies offensive capabilities

• Enemies defensive capabilities



R.2 Suggested briefing format

Slide 6: Intelligence: Friendly situation

• PRTF composition and locations

• Support and augmentation requirements (FARP, AAR / HAR, RESCORT, RESCAP,SEAD, ISR, Space, C2, medical, engineer, etc.)

• Minimum force / go/ no-go criteria

Slides 7 – 10: PRTF mission

• Mission statement

• Sequence of events

• Routing ingress / egress

• Rendez-vous / orbit areas

• AAR / HAR tracks

• Objective area(s)

– LZ’s objectives– Ingress– Recovery tactics (airspace de-confliction)– Weapon control status– Fire support plan/coordination– Egress

Slide 11: Command, control, & communications employment plan

• Communication architecture (plan)

• Required reports / critical information flow

• Tanker management and control

• Crypto

• Emission control plan

Slide 12: ROE

• Weapon control status

• Identification/engagement authority

• Caveats

• Additional critical information (as required)

Slide 13: Risk assessment (stoplight: red, yellow, green)

• Performance considerations

• Requirements to mitigate risk

• launch / execute recommendation


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R.3 PR mission launch criteria checklist

This checklist may also be incorporated in slide 13 of the launch / execute back brief.

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R.3 PR mission launch criteria checklist



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Annex S

Intelligence and SERE debrief

S.1 General

Intelligence and SERE debrief will be conducted after initial medical and psychologicalcare for the recovered isolated personnel. This includes questions that are to be utilisedby NPSO HQ JPRC / PRCC and NPSO HQ. J-2 when conducting an intelligence and SEREdebrief of recovered isolated NPSO personnel.

S.2 SERE debrief of isolated person

NPSO HQ JPRC / PRCC shall conduct a SERE debrief of the recovered isolated personnelin order to gain any further information that could be of use to other personnel withinNPSO. If this information in any way affects the conduct of how an isolated personnelshall act while being in distress it must be distributed within NPSO As Soon As Possible(ASAP).

If NPSO conducts a recovery operation in general the isolated personnel will be taken tothe nearest medical facility. If necessary NPSO will take the recovered isolated person-nel to the dedicated Role-2 medical facility for reintegration. If requested by NPSO HQJPRC / PRCC, NPSO can conduct intelligence and SERE debriefing of the recovered isolatedpersonnel at the dedicated role 2 medical facility for reintegration. After medical treat-ment, intelligence and SERE debrief is finished the recovered isolated personnel will bereleased to NPSO and ones SNR. After that, repatriation of a recovered isolated personnelback in to duty becomes a national matter.

S.3 Outline for survivor / evader interview / debrief

S.3.1 Introduction

During the interview/debrief, only the interviewer should ask questions, interact with,and otherwise establish and maintain a relationship with the subject. The other teammembers, camera, note taker, etc., should maintain silence. They may write down ques-tions that they would like the subject to answer, and pass them to the interviewer duringbreaks. Usually, the other team members will find that they will end up crossing off thequestions that they have written down, as an experienced interviewer will, in their ownway and time, get all the questions in. The interviewer will introduce the other team



S.3 Outline for survivor / evader interview / debrief

members, providing the appropriate level of pre-arranged details, and explain the abovequestioning procedures.

The interviewer should:

• Express appreciation for his/her participation.

• Explain how the information will be used.

• Provide a general, but not rigid, structure of how the interview will proceed

• Insure he/she is comfortable, provide something to drink, engage in enough casualconversation to put the subject at ease and then proceed with the interview. Itemsto have within reach of the subject should include:

– Pitcher or bottle of water and glass.– Box of Kleenex.– Pad of paper and pen/pencil.

• Provide maps, charts and imagery (when available) for the operational area as anaid to the subject in explaining actions taken and identify specific locations.

Note: Try and arrange for breaks to come between topic areas on the interview out-line, as this will facilitate picking up the dialogue again without losing continuity andmomentum. However, the interviewer should pay close attention to the subject’s bodylanguage, taking breaks when appropriate. Following each topic area, remember toask if he/she would like to take a few minutes to refresh/stretch/etc. Also ask if therewas something related to the topic that was not asked and they would like to men-tion/discuss. Allow for the camera operator to change setting and angle, if necessary.

If there is ample debrief time available, and use of the debrief is anticipated for training(or will be edited), request that the subject begin their response to each question bypausing (explain how this will aid later in the editing process). Provide an examplesuch as: if the question was “What type of aircraft were you on?” You would begin with“the aircraft I was on was an MH-53”. Explain that at the end of each of their responses,that you too (the interviewer) will pause slightly, prior to asking the next question.

S.3.2 Personal information

Gather personal demographic data. See question set below and select appropriate de-mographic data for each situation.

S.3.3 Overview of incident

If not conducted before, ask subject to give a general overview of their experience frombeginning to end. Let subject know you will go back after this overview and systemati-cally walk through the entire experience in detail and by stages.

• Listen carefully and take notes as you listen to his overview

• Avoid getting bogged down in any specific area too long

• Without abruptness, guide him/her along if necessary. Use comments like “that isvery important and we will discuss that in detail when we are dealing with...”.



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S.3.4 Take a break

Take a break. As a team, review the general overview. Discuss modifications (if any)based on the overview. After the break, come back and fill in the holes in the story.Compare the information with the established interview questions.

S.3.5 Detailed analysis of incident

Proceed through the interview as outlined below. Integrate any notes taken during thesubject’s overview into the sections of the outline where they are appropriate. Allowthe time necessary for the subject to feel as if they have covered each area to theirsatisfaction. Stick with the outline, but be flexible enough to meet the subject’s needs toexpress information so as not to stifle the conversational flow. Use the outline to expandon subjects that are of interest.

NOTE: The following question set is a guide to help debriefing team’s select appropri-ate questions for a variety of situations. It is not expected that every returnee answerall the following questions. The debriefing team should review this question set and cut,paste, and add questions as appropriate to create a tailored debriefing guide for eachsubject.

NOTE: If the subject was recovered via NAR methods, then the debriefing team MUSTinclude a representative from J-3-N. If J-3-N is not present, and the returnee indicatesthat his recovery may have been through non-conventional means, do not ask any ques-tions regarding non-conventional recovery until the J-3-N representative is present. De-briefings containing information pertaining to NAR methods must initially be protectedat the TS/NF/OC/SAR level until evaluated by J-3-N.

S.4 Biographical information

a. What is your full name and any other names (AKAs) you are known by?

b. What is your rank (or civilian equivalent)?

c. What is your registration number (e.g. service number, social security number)?

d. What is your place and date of birth?

e. Did you have any applicable childhood experiences, hobbies, or activities that mayhave prepared you for your isolation experience?

f. Do you have any civilian training, skills, licenses, and/or certifications, that wouldhave assisted in preparing you for your survival/evasion experiences?

S.5 Military biographical information

a. What is your branch of service?

b. What was the date you entered the service? If commissioned, source of commis-sion?



S.6 Pre-mission preparation

c. What is your job title and code?

d. What is your current unit and parent organization?

e. What were your previous assignments?

f. What is you unit address and phone number?

g. Where is your unit based?

h. What was your radio call sign? List all call signs associated with your mission.

i. What was the name of your operation?

j. What was your crew or squad position?

k. What training had you received up to this point in your military career?

l. Do you have any special survival or resistance training?

m. Have you had any other SERE training or experiences?

n. Do you have Joint Service Training Programme (JSTP) training?

o. Did you attend any special military training?

p. Did you have any previous military campaign or conflict experience that helpedprepare you for your survival/evasion experience?

S.6 Pre-mission preparation

a. Did you prepare or have an EPA?

b. Was this a directed plan or did you author it yourself?

c. Describe in general terms your EPA. (Note: Variations to the EPA due to situationalcircumstances will be discussed in evasion phase of this debriefing.)

d. What clothing did you have for this mission?

(a) Was it normal and appropriate for the circumstances?

e. What equipment did you have? Did you have any weapons? Did you use or attemptto use them? Why or why not?

f. Did you have a map or an Evasion Chart (EVC)?

(a) If so, how many were there? Were they of your operational area?

(b) Did you have a compass?

i. If so, what type?

g. Did you have a Blood Chit?

h. Did you a have a pointee-talkee?

i. Did you have a Survival or Escape and Evasion kit?

(a) If so what did it contain?



145

(b) Was it issued or self-made?

(c) Did you attempt to pre-hide any survival/escape equipment in your clothingor on your person? If so, what?

j. What other SERE equipment did you have?

k. What signaling equipment did you have?

l. Describe any pre-mission study (SERE guides, information requirements, web-sites,maps, etc.) that you conducted.

(a) Was this study helpful?

m. Did you receive any theater-specific SERE guidance / intel briefings, including com-munications, prior to your mission? If so, please describe.

n. Were you briefed on any unconventional recovery methods or pre-determined re-covery areas, which might be in the area of your mission? If so, please describe.

o. Did you receive any in-theater briefings on what type of treatment or interroga-tions to expect if you were captured?

p. What was your attitude toward having to evade or being captured by the enemyprior to this mission?

(a) Was this attitude common among people in your group/crew?

q. Did you feel confident in your ability to survive and evade capture or survive cap-tivity?

r. Had other members of your unit ever been shot-down, isolated, or captured?

S.7 Events leading up to isolation

a. What kind of mission were you on?

b. When did your mission start?

c. How long was the mission to last?

d. How long did the mission actually last?

e. Where was the mission to have taken place?

f. From what base did you initially stage?

g. At what point in the mission did the incident occur?

h. How many US/Allied personnel were involved in this incident? (present when theincident occurred)

i. Were there any civilian personnel involved? If so, how many, who where they, whatrole did they have?

j. Describe the circumstances leading up to the isolation from friendly forces of your-self or your group.



S.8 Incident details

S.8 Incident details

a. To the best of your knowledge, what was your location at the beginning of theincident?

b. What time did the incident occur?

c. What was the date of the incident?

d. What were the weather conditions?

e. Did a border penetration actually take place?

f. If the incident began in the air:

(a) What type of aircraft were you on?

(b) What was your approximate airspeed?

(c) What was your altitude?

(d) What circumstances brought your aircraft down?

(e) Were there any visual or electronic warnings prior to the incident?

(f) What was your in-flight reaction to the emergency?

(g) What sort of damage did your aircraft sustain?

(h) Were there any injuries or fatalities associated with the incident?

(i) Did you bail out, ditch, or crash-land the aircraft?

g. Did you report the incident?

(a) To whom did you report the incident?

(b) How did you report the incident?

(c) If you reported the incident, what, if any, guidance were you given?

(d) Did you attempt, but fail, to report the incident? Why?

h. Were you aware of any friendly forces that witnessed, or may have witnessed, theincident?

i. Are you aware of anyone else reporting the incident?

(a) How do you know it was reported?

S.9 Survival & evasion

a. Once isolated, were you aware of enemy forces?

b. If you bailed out/ejected, did you look around to assess your situation while hang-ing in the parachute?

(a) What did you see?

(b) How did it help you?

(c) Were there any communications before hitting the ground?

(d) What type of radio did you use?



147

(e) What frequency(s)?

(f) Duration?

(g) What and with whom?

c. Were you injured/wounded before or during your evasion episode/situation?

(a) What were the specific injuries?

(b) When did you realize you were injured?

(c) What was your initial treatment of injuries?

(d) What materials did you use for treatment?

(e) Did your injuries limit your initial evasion actions?

(f) How? Explain.

d. Did the group/crew become separated after the incident?

(a) Was there a rally point position identified?

(b) Did you use the rally point/location to re-group?

e. Was the aircraft commander in charge on the ground?

(a) If not, who was in command? Why?

f. How did you communicate on the ground with the rest of the isolated crewmem-bers? (e.g., radio, voice, hand signals, etc.)

g. Describe the weather at the time of isolation (hot, dry, wet, cold, winds, clouds,etc)?

(a) Was it a factor in your decisions?

(b) How did it affect your ability to survive and evade (effects on physical health,mental state, light or sound, cover, evidence or travel, etc.)?

(c) Did you think it affected enemy search teams?

h. Describe the terrain in the isolation area (vegetation, elevation, slope, soil, etc).

i. Were there any people in the immediate area of isolation? If yes explain:

(a) How many?

(b) Military or civilians?

(c) Were they armed?

(d) What type of weapons?

(e) Did they know you were in the vicinity/area?

(f) What were their actions?

(g) Were there any patterns to their activities?

(h) How did their presence affect your actions? (i.e. did you hide or move out?)

(i) Do you have any information on internal security forces or population controlmeasures?

j. If you had an EPA,




(a) Were you able to follow it?(b) If not, what variations did you make?(c) What caused you to make the deviations?(d) How were supporting assets notified of the deviations?

k. Did you make any attempts at communication during isolation?

(a) How?(b) If the communication was by radio:

i. What type of radio did you use?ii. What were the frequencies used?

iii. What was the duration?iv. Describe (in detail) the communication to the best of your ability.

(c) With whom?(d) When?(e) Were you successful?(f) Any problems?(g) Was this a pre-briefed procedure?

l. Did you evade alone or in a group?

(a) If in a group, were there any problems making decisions, communicating, etc?(b) How were they resolved?

m. Did you know your approximate location when you started evading? Explain how.

n. Did you know your specific location?

(a) How did you determine this?(b) Did you have maps/EVCs?(c) How many EVCs?(d) Did the EVCs cover the area of isolation/evasion and recovery?(e) Did you have any problems with the EVCs?(f) Did you use a compass/GPS?(g) What type of compass/GPS?(h) How and when did you use it?

o. What equipment/clothing did you have with you?

(a) Was any of it lost or damaged? Explain.(b) Was the equipment protected against loss or damage?(c) How did you cope with equipment problems?(d) When you traveled, did you take everything with you?(e) If you left items behind, how did you make your selection?(f) What did you do with items left behind?(g) Did training prepare you for making the choices you made?(h) Do you think you made any mistakes in selecting the items? Why?



149

(i) Did you make your choices prior to your mission?

(j) What items would you add or delete?

(k) What were the items you carried?

(l) How did you carry them?

(m) In relation to your survival or escape and evasion kit:

i. Was this kit sufficient for your particular experience?ii. If the kit was not sufficient, what was it lacking?

iii. What specific items did you have with you that were not part of yourissued kit, which assisted you in your survival/evasion?

p. What were your water sources while evading?

(a) How much water did you carry on the mission?

(b) Was there additional water on the aircraft? Did you take it with you?

(c) Approximately how much water were you able to obtain each day? Where,and from what source?

(d) How did you carry and store the water?

(e) Did you purify the water? Did you filter the water? Why?

(f) How did you purify water?

(g) Did you have any ill effects from the water?

(h) Describe your evasion actions to procure water.

(i) Did you have to vary your travel plans to obtain water?

(j) Did you go without water to remain secure?

(k) Were there people around/near the water sources you used? Who and howmany?

(l) Was there a time of day that there were more/less people present at the watersource?

q. Did you consume any food while evading?

(a) What was its source? (i.e. survival kit, pocket, ruck sack).

(b) Describe any problems.

(c) Describe any natural foods you procured.

i. How did you know it was edible?ii. How much did you eat?

iii. Did you use a taste test?

(d) If you ate any animal life, describe your procurement techniques and yourmethod of preparation for eating.

(e) Did you steal any food while evading? If so, describe your actions. (time ofday, observations/area layout, approach, items stolen and quantity, retreat,preparation for consumption, and problems/suggestions)

r. When hiding, what type of sites did you select?

(a) Describe as many as you can.

(b) Did you use them as found or were modifications required?




(c) Describe the modifications.(d) Did you have to make a shelter for protection? Explain?(e) How long did you stay at the various sites?(f) What precautions did you take for security?(g) Describe your use of camouflage in the site.(h) Did you observe potential hide-sites that you did not use?

s. Did you camouflage yourself throughout the episode?

(a) Describe how you camouflaged yourself.(b) What problems did you note?(c) Describe how you maintained the camouflage.

t. Did you travel or not? Why? If you traveled:

(a) What were your initial goals/intentions/objectives?(b) Did you plan to go to a predetermined recovery site?

i. Were you able to follow that plan?ii. Where was your planned recovery site?

iii. How far away was it?iv. What was your direction of travel?v. Describe your travel plans to get there.

vi. What was your rate of travel?vii. How long did it take you to reach your objective?

viii. Was there any evidence that the enemy was conducting a search for you?How was the search conducted: what type of troops, their weapons andvehicles, tactics, use of NVD or other illumination devices, dogs, and levelof proficiency (disciplined and organized, or an unorganized gaggle)?

ix. How long did you wait at the recovery location prior to contact?x. When did you travel (day, night, dusk, dawn, etc.)?

A. Why?B. What was the best?C. Were there any particular problems?

xi. Did you have an alternate plan? Briefly what?xii. Did you select your own recovery site? Why?

(c) Did you travel a straight line or travel a planned erratic pattern using theterrain/vegetation, etc?

(d) What obstacles were encountered? Describe obstacles in detail. How did theyeffect your plans?

i. Natural. (mountains, valleys, broad open areas, rivers, vegetation, etc.).ii. Man-made. (enemy presence, borders, border obstacles, electronic de-

vices, dogs, population controls, roads, power lines, pipe lines, etc.)

(e) Did you use a map and/or compass / GPS during this time?(f) If you had evasion charts, describe how you used them.

i. Did you use the marginal information on navigation techniques?ii. Was the evasion chart useful for other things, (i.e. medical, personal pro-

tection, shelter or clothing, camouflage, plants, etc.)?



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u. Did you have any specific problems with navigation or any survival problems as-sociated with travel?

v. How could you have been better prepared to cope with combat survival?

(a) Briefings.

(b) Formal training.

(c) Clothing.

(d) Equipment.

S.10 Contacts with local populace

a. Describe your initial contact.

b. What do you believe led to your contact?

c. Do you believe you were under surveillance before contact?

(a) If so, how long did it last?

(b) How many people did you observe?

d. What actions were observed before contact with local populace?

e. What actions did you take to prepare yourself for contact?

f. How did the local people contact you/your group?

(a) How many were there?

(b) Were they armed?

i. If so, what kind of firearms? Provide make, model, and country of fabri-cation if known.

(c) Did the local people come across as being friendly or hostile?

(d) How did they introduce themselves and whom did they say they represented?

(e) What language did they speak?

(f) Could they speak English?

(g) Did you use a pointee-talkee or blood chit to communicate?

g. Cultural aspects

(a) Were you at all familiar with the cultural characteristics of country/people?

(b) Would it have helped if you had been more familiar?

(c) Were there any specific events that occurred where your lack of knowledge oftheir culture created an additional hardship on you? Describe.

(d) Were there any specific events that occurred where knowledge of their culturemay have helped? Explain



S.11 Preparations for recovery

S.11 Preparations for recovery

a. Describe your recovery location.

(a) Why did you select the site?

(b) Was it a site that was pre-briefed?

(c) Were there any problems finding a recovery site?

(d) How long did you wait there?

b. Communications with Recovery Forces

(a) When and where did you first attempt to make contact with friendly forces?

(b) Were you able to pass your location, authentication, physical condition, andenemy situation to friendly forces?

(c) How (visual signals, radio, etc.)?

i. Describe your signals in detail, (i.e. materials, configuration, size, loca-tion, radio type, mirror, flare, type, etc.)?

(d) Any problems with signals and/or communications?

(e) Were there any failed attempts to contact friendly forces?

(f) If HOOK-112 equipped, explain and describe the location and process usedduring each data burst.

c. Authentication

(a) Did friendly forces authenticate you upon initial contact at your recovery lo-cation?

(b) Was ISOPREP data used? If so;

i. What parts were used?

(c) Explain any problems with authentication.

(d) Were you authenticated more than once?

(e) Were you aware of when your identity was verified? How?

(f) Were you authenticated by means other than ISOPREP data? Explain.

(g) If you were not authenticated, describe the situation and reasons.

d. Enemy situation

(a) Did you observe enemy forces/civilians in the recovery area? Explain.

e. Physical Condition - What survival difficulties were encountered while waiting forrecovery?

(a) Physical/Medical Condition.

(b) Environmental Conditions.

(c) Food/Water Availability.



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S.12 Recovery phase - how were you recovered / rescued?

Note to interviewer: You will have to determine, based upon the returnee’s response,which category of recovery applies to this situation, then refer to the proper line ofquestioning.

a. Conventional assisted recovery (planned) - refer to paragraph S.13.

b. Non-conventional assisted recovery - refer to paragraph S.141.

c. Unplanned contacts - refer to paragraph S.15.

d. Unassisted recovery - refer to paragraph S.16.

S.13 Conventional assisted recovery (planned)

a. Describe initial contact with the recovery force

(a) How was contact established?i. Were there any problems?

(b) Did you use any signals, loads, link-up procedures not mentioned previously.i. Where?

ii. How?iii. When?iv. Were you pre-briefed instructions? By whom?v. Describe any problems with the signal/loads/radios.

b. Describe the recovery force.

(a) Who: US Military, Allied, other?(b) What:

i. Aircraft (helicopter or fixed wing aircraft).A. What type?B. Were there any problems with recovery devices or the landing?

ii. Advancing troops or armor / long range patrol / scouts.A. Unit designator and type?B. Initial contact precautions?C. Any problems?

iii. Ship, sub, small watercraft.A. Type/name of ship/unit?B. Describe initial contact?C. Any problems?

(c) Describe the authentication procedures used by the recovery force to verifyyour identity.

(d) Describe your treatment once recovered?i. Was medical treatment rendered, if required?

(e) Any suggestions regarding recovery operations?1If the returnee was recovered via NAR methods, then the debriefing team MUST include a represen-

tative from J-3-N. If J-3-N is not present, and the returnee indicates that his recovery may have beenthrough non-conventional means, do not ask any questions regarding non-conventional recovery until theJ-3-N representative is present. Debriefings containing information pertaining to NAR methods must ini-tially be protected at the TS/NF/OC/SAR level until evaluated by J-3-N.



S.14 Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned)

S.14 Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned)

The sequence of events during NAR occurs in four phases. These are contact, move, hideand support, and return or crossover. these four phases may be repeated several timesbefore successful return to friendly control takes place. The questions in the followingsections have been grouped by phases and will be repeated as many times as necessaryto cover all aspects of the NAR.

a. Describe in your own words the sequence of events from the time you were directedor decided to seek assistance in return to friendly control until you were finallyreturned.

(a) What guided you to the contact area?

b. How were you made aware of the contact area?

(a) Technical communications? When, where and from whom?(b) Pre-briefed with a contact plan and location? When, where, and from whom?

c. What route did you use to get to the contact area?

(a) Describe in detail. Movement actions, hold-up/hide sites, contact with otherevaders, contact with indigenous personnel, actions/activities observed en-route.

(b) How did you locate the signal site and/or contact point upon arrival?(c) What where your actions at the signal site and/or contact point? Describe in

detail.

i. Security procedures at signal site and/or contact point.ii. Describe all activities in the vicinity of the signal site and/or contact point.

d. Contact Phase

(a) Describe actions at the contact point.

i. Who made contact? (Describe the group who made contact).A. Military or civilian? Numbers and names if known. General appear-

ance? Uniforms?B. Nationality if known. How many English speaking?C. Armed or unarmed? If armed, what type?

ii. Describe the assister’s initial security measures during the contact phase.(I.E., search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and speed to the rear.)A. Did they communicate with you on other than ISOPREP data? What

subjects? How?B. Was there an obvious chain of command? Describe the leader(s)?

iii. What was said? (What instructions were you given?) Was a re-contactplan established?

iv. When was contact made? (Approximate time). How much time elapsedbetween of the activation signal and initiation of contact?

v. Where did contact take place?vi. Why did you make contact with that individual(s)?

vii. How was contact initiated?



155

(b) Did you see any people in the area before contact? What were their actions?(c) Describe any signals, loads, link-up procedures not mentioned previously.

i. Where?ii. How?

iii. When?iv. Describe any problems with the signal/loads.

(d) How was your identity authenticated? When and where?(e) Did all actions happen as planned?(f) Explain any problem areas.

e. Movement phase.

(a) Describe the sequence of events immediately following contact.(b) How much time passed between contact and initial movement?(c) Describe any known security measures used in the movement phase to protect

the assister’s and evader. Examples could include blindfolding the evader,mask’s, limited contact, disguises, guards, lookouts, cutouts, dead drops, re-authorization, etc.

(d) Travel times, distances, routes, and methods of travel.(e) Stops, hiding places, safe houses, with approximate time spent at each. Pre-

cise locations if known.(f) Times you were handed over to the control of other groups or individuals and

how it was done.(g) Were you aware of any radio, cellular phone, or other external communica-

tions?(h) Did the assister(s) provide you with emergency procedures and/or re-contact

instructions?

f. Hide and support phase

(a) Medical aide.(b) Water.(c) Food.(d) Clothing and bedding.(e) Shelter.(f) Sanitation and hygiene.(g) Mental and physical occupation.(h) Security measures employed at the hide site.(i) Briefing on evader actions at the hide site.(j) Emergency procedures and re-contact instructions.

(k) Were re-authentication procedures used any time you were passed betweenindividuals/groups?

(l) Explain your evader/assister(s) interaction and relationship.

i. Attitude toward you? NATO? Why? Did you get the feeling that anyonedisliked or mistreated you?

ii. What conversation subjects did they appear to like?



S.15 Unplanned contacts - describe/explain any unplanned contact(s)

iii. Did anything irritate them? What?iv. Did you make any mistakes that irritated, worried, or alienated your as-

sister(s)?v. Did the assister(s) do anything to irritate, worry or alienate you? What?

vi. How did you cope with your problems?vii. Did you feel threatened? If so, explain.

viii. Did you help your assister(s) in any way?

(m) Prior to your mission had you received enough training to deal with non-conventional assisted recovery? What would you change or add?

g. Return or crossover

(a) How were you returned to friendly control or crossed over between elementsduring your evasion?

(b) Travel times, distances, routes, and methods of travel.

(c) Stops, hiding places, safe houses, with approximate time spent at each. Pre-cise locations if known.

(d) How many times were you handed over to the control of other groups or in-dividuals and how was it done? Were you re-authenticated each time? Whatprocedures were used for re-authentication?

(e) Other evaders encountered and observed?

(f) Were you aware of any radio, cellular phone, or other external communica-tions during this phase?

(g) How did the assister(s) get you to friendly forces?

(h) Could you have survived and evaded on your own?

(i) After the assister(s) delivered you to the control of a definitive recovery force(under friendly control), did you discuss any details about the assistance youhad received to that point? What details did you discuss? With whom?

(j) Is there anything else you think may be important to tell us at this time?

S.15 Unplanned contacts - describe/explain any unplannedcontact(s)

a. Those contacts not resulting in assistance:

(a) Who? Personal description/perception?

(b) Where? Be as precise as possible.

(c) Time of contact?

(d) How did you break contact and what were your actions immediately after?

S.16 On-scene military forces

In case recovery was assisted by military forces that happened to be in your area.

a. On scene forces:



157

(a) Who were they?

(b) How many?

(c) What were they doing in the area?

(d) What contact procedures were used?

(e) How were you treated?

(f) How were you transported back (to your unit)?

b. Local Populace Assistance

(a) Describe initial contact.

i. How contact occurred; (i.e., accidental, selective, capture, etc.).A. Where? Be as precise as possible.B. Time of day?

(b) Describe your assister’s:

i. Who were they? Provide detailed description of individual(s).A. Name(s).B. Features.C. Age, height, weight.

ii. What was their motivation for providing assistance?A. Opportunistic?

• Sympathetic individual or group motivated by political goals, reli-gious conviction, and/or hatred of a common enemy.

• Reward motivation (i.e. greedy individuals, criminals, smugglers,kidnappers, and mercenaries).

• Independent resistance movement.B. Accidental contact with evader in which aid was rendered. Describe

in detail.C. Acts of mercy - sought by evader/isolated person?D. Attitude - cautious, bold, meek, fearless, fearful, pro-NATO., anti-NATO,

but hates enemy worse?E. Likelihood of helping other Americans.F. Capability of helping other Americans?G. Security measures to prevent detection?H. Attitude toward you personally?

iii. What form of aid did you receive?iv. Did you use your blood chit? How many times? If so, explain in detail.

Describe how the assister reacted to the blood chit.v. Did you make any promises? If so, explain in detail. Did the assister’s

demand or request anything?vi. How did this group/individual help get you to friendly forces? Give details.

A. How long did it take?B. Could you have survived without this help?C. Could you have returned without help?



S.17 Unassisted recovery

S.17 Unassisted recovery

In the case the evader/isolated person reached friendly forces/neutral territory on his/herown.

a. Describe in detail.

b. Where and how contact was made.

c. Precautions used.

S.18 Any problems?

a. Lessons Learned

b. Was anything classified, to your knowledge, compromised?

(a) What information/equipment was compromised?

(b) When was the information/equipment compromised?

(c) Where was the information/equipment compromised?

(d) Could the compromise have been prevented?

(e) How could future missions prevent the occurrence from repeating?

c. How well did your prior SERE training prepare you for this incident? Discuss

d. Was there any particular SERE course or Theater specific SERE/PR preparation pro-vided which proved to be more helpful? Discuss

e. Do you feel that the time interval between training and the actual incident: ac-ceptable, unacceptable, too long, etc.? Discuss

f. Had you done any outside readings in subject areas associated with SERE? If so,what?

g. Had you done any research prior to the incident? If so, what type?

h. Had you adequately prepared yourself for such an incident? Discuss

i. Had you adequately prepared your family/loved-ones for such an eventuality? Dis-cuss

j. Was there anything left undone or unsaid prior to this mission, which caused youconcern? Discuss

k. Did you adequately sanitize yourself and your equipment prior to the mission?Discuss

l. With this experience behind you, what, if anything, will you do to better prepareyourself for another such incident? Explain


Continuity PR training task listNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

159

Annex T

Continuity PR training task list

In theatre training of personnel is an essential part of PR SOP and includes Briefings,Command Post Exercise (CPX) and Live Exercise (LIVEX). JPRC / PRCC is responsiblefor distributing and keep updated PR-brief to be given personnel divided in levels inorder to make sure individuals and organisation levels understand their responsibilityin fulfilling the different PR task in order to affect the recovery of personnel in the AO:

The training could as a minimum include following.

a. All personnel - Common PR brief in order to understand own responsibility aspotential isolated person objective:

(a) Basic knowledge concerning PR

(b) Understand own responsibility in order to affect own recovery and minimisethe risk for others

(c) Inform about PR system/assets in place

b. HRIE personnel - Procedures briefing for Personnel who will have access to SPINSand write ISOPREP and EPA

(a) Understand PR system(b) Understand how to support own recovery(c) Ability to use different methods for authentication(d) Understand and have ability to act i.a.v. SPINS

c. Extraction forces - Procedures briefing and training including training with as-signed Rotary Wing (RW).

(a) Understand PR system(b) Ability to use different methods for authentication(c) Understand and have ability extract personnel i.a.w. SPINS

d. C2 and Staff Briefing and training including CPX.

(a) Staff responsibility in a PR operation.(b) Make individual staff member understand their responsibility in order to af-

fect recovery of personnel within the AO.

The training should be validated through CPX and LIVEX in order to make sure that boththe human and the technical systems work the way they are supposed to.



Volume II

HELICOPTER BORNERECOVERY FORCE OPERATOR

GUIDE


GENERALNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 1

GENERAL

1.1 Introduction

0101. The purpose of Volume II is to standardise all Tactics, Techniques and Procedures(TTPs) used in a Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF) from the recovery force’s point ofview. It contains those planning elements relevant to the preparation and execution ofthe Personnel Recovery (PR) mission. Since the recovery force operates in the same envi-ronment as the isolated personnel, it is essential that they are familiar with all aspectsof this publication. Operators PR planning is conducted along the five essential PR tasks.

1.2 Command and control

0102. The baseline for Command and Control (C2) is given in the Communication Plan(COMPLAN) as part of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Special Instructions (SPINS).

1.3 PR SOP and SPINS

0103. Operations are conducted in accordance with the PR Concept of Operation (CONOPS)produced by the Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC). Further details on execution ofair centric PR missions will be found in the PR SPINS.

1.4 Mission abort

0104. All levels of command can recommend mission abort. The authority to abortrests with Joint Force Commander (JFC) / Component Commander (CC), On Scene Commander(OSC) and Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).

1.5 Liaison authority

0105. All participating units are granted direct liaison authority with the JPRC / Per-sonnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC).



1.6 Risk mitigation

1.6 Risk mitigation

0106. Efforts should be made to mitigate the risk associated with the execution ofrecovery operations. These risks can be mitigated through;

a. Proper route planning to avoid threat areas and utilise terrain cover whereverpossible.

b. Proper (task) force composition.

c. Operational Security (OPSEC) measures.



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Chapter 2

PR OPERATION


0201. Pre-emptive planning is preparatory work, conducted before an incident occurs,which facilitates the recovery of potential isolated personnel. Every PR unit will set upits own operations room upon arrival in the Area of Operations (AO). In combined opera-tions nations may only provide elements of a PRTF and a multi-national operations roomwill be required. To facilitate proper C2 with the JPRC / PRCC, a checklist of the minimumrequirements of a PR unit ops-room in given in Annex A. Every PR unit should providethe JPRC / PRCC with the appropriate information regarding their assets (numbers, ca-pabilities, disposition etc.) as requested. The units should also have prepared maps anddocumentation in accordance with the SPINS for the operation. Finally the operatorsshould be as familiarised with the terrain, weather and general threat conditions in theAO as possible.

0202. Once a PRTF is designated, an internal PRTF Standard Operating Procedure(SOP) should be developed to facilitate planning and execution of a PR mission. A tem-plate of such an SOP is given in Annex M on page 221.

2.1.1 Preparation and planning

0203. Successful PR operations depend on diligent preparation and planning by allmembers of the recovery force: command and control, recovery forces, and the potentialisolated personnel. Potential isolated personnel should be familiar with the currentSPINS for their AO to increase their chance for being successfully recovered. The PRSOP are a primary source of information from which isolated personnel can derive theirpreparation and planning. They are developed and coordinated by the JPRC and issuedin order to provide potential isolated personnel and recovery forces with instructionsto successfully prosecute PR missions. The overall PR SOP is detailed in the SPINS andwill provide the isolated personnel with critical information regarding available typesof recovery forces and procedures. Although SPINS are normally issued in support ofaviation operations, they are equally applicable to all participants in a NATO operationwho have the potential to become isolated and are eligible to receive PR.

0204. Figure 2.1 depicts a generic overview of the RMC’s planning process. Once taskedby the JPRC / PRCC the RMC will start his planning. In this process he will determinewhether he has suitable assets and suitable conditions to execute the mission. If not, heneeds to immediately inform the JPRC / PRCC to coordinate how to mitigate the encoun-tered problems. At the end of his planning process, the RMC will brief the JPRC / PRCC



2.2 Report

and receives launch approval. He will then brief the PRTF and execute the mission afterreceiving the execute order from the execute authority.

2.2 Report

0205. Initial notification of a PR requirement is likely to come from the JPRC / PRCCthrough a Search And Rescue Incident Report (SARIR). It is imperative that the SPINSauthentication data current at the time of the incident is “frozen” for all PR efforts as-sociated with that incident (authentication data, codewords, Search And Rescue Dot(SARDOT), Search And Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid (SARNEG), etc.). This informa-tion must be annotated on the SARIR that will be distributed in turn to the PR units. Anyasset that becomes aware of isolated personnel must notify the JPRC / PRCC as soon aspossible.

2.3 Locate

0206. Time, effort and lives can be lost if the isolated personnel’s exact location is notaccurately verified in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore the critical task is tolocate or confirm the location of the isolated personnel. Normally the location of theisolated personnel will be conducted by stand-off electronic means. Dependent on therisk / threat in the area the search may be conducted by the PRTF itself if other meansthat have more stand-off and / or covert ways to locate the isolated personnel are notavailable.

a. Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver derived and reported coordinates (nor-mally the most accurate).

b. Isolated personnel reported position.

c. Friendly forces visual observation.

2.4 Support

0207. A PRTF will typically not play a role in the support of isolated personnel. As soonas the isolated personnel is/are located an OSC may be appointed to provide communi-cation support to the isolated personnel. If the isolated personnel needs to be supplied(e.g. food or survival equipment) this will typically be executed by transport aircraft notpart of the PRTF.

2.5 Recover

0208. The JPRC / PRCC will start the risk analysis while the search is ongoing, butformal mission planning will only start after this phase is completed. This analysis isimplicit in the mission planning cycle and the results will determine both the composi-tion of the PR package and the conduct of the PR mission. The JPRC / PRCC is howeverlikely to issue a warning order in the form of a partial (not complete) PRTF-messagedocument, which can be found in Annex E.4 on page 79.



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Figure 2.1: RMC decision cycle

0209. The PRTF may thus start its planning process simultaneously as depicted in fig-ure 2.1, based on the information available, but formal tasking will be part of the nextphase. Should the RMC conclude that the available assets or conditions are not suitablefor the mission he should inform the JPRC / PRCC through the PRTF-message immediatelyto let them re-plan / re-assess the mission. As soon as the RMC has finished his planninghe should inform the JPRC / PRCC through a completed PRTF-message. Subsequently theRMC may receive launch approval from the JPRC / PRCC if applicable. All exchange ofinformation between the JPRC / PRCC and the possible PRTF will be done through theJPRC / PRCC-message document. When the mission is cleared for execution, most itemsmust be known and clear to both the JPRC and PRTF. The actual execution may only beconducted after receiving the execute order from the execute authority. This should bedone not later then leaving the rendez-vous point.

0210. When PRTF recovery is not suitable because of threat, recovery vehicle limita-tions etc, ground recovery can be taken into account. In this situations, extraction for-ces may be tasked for ground recovery. Extraction force starts its planning process astasked by JPRC / PRCC. Extraction force mission planning guide (Annex O to volume II)should be used during mission planning.

2.5.1 Assets / PRTF composition

0211. PR options may include single or multiple recovery aircraft, additional fixedand/or rotary wing air assets, conventional and/or unconventional ground elements,surface or subsurface naval assets, or any combination thereof. If the PRTF is a com-plex formation of dissimilar type aircraft and / or multi-national composition, the RMCshould be experienced in leading such formations.



2.5 Recover

Recovery vehicles The recovery vehicles will eventually pick up the isolated person-nel. Recovery vehicles will be transport helicopters with the capacity to transportthe extraction forces and the isolated personnel to be rescued. The decision touse one or more recovery vehicles is dependent on the tactical situation and thenumber and physical condition of the isolated personnel. Multi-ship operationsmay enhance combat effectiveness by providing mutual support and a back-up re-covery capability. Depending on the threat, recovery vehicles should be equippedwith the appropriate passive and active defensive aids. A checklist for the recoveryvehicles is at Annex H.

Extraction forces The Extraction Force (EF) is the integral part of the recovery vehicleteam that will deplane the recovery vehicle in the Pick-Up Zone (PUZ) to identifyand a authenticate the isolated personnel, provide initial medical care and bringthe isolated personnel to the recovery vehicle. The EF may also be required to infil-trate, exfiltrate and engage in combat to ensure the safety of the isolated personneland the whole PRTF.

RESCORT will neutralise any threat enroute and at the objective area. It may in-clude fixed and/or rotary wing attached and detached options. A checklist for Res-cue Escort (RESCORT) crews is at Annex G. Tactics and procedures for use by theRESCORT assets are included at Annex 3.

RESCAP will neutralise any enemy aircraft and will ensure a local air superiority. Therelative position of Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) assets is determined by theneeds of the forces along the intended ingress/egress route or at the objective area.The Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC) should ensure de-confliction between theRESCAP and other Task Force aircraft.

SEAD will neutralise any enemy ground to air radar systems on a certain pre-determinedroute. This route should be carefully co-ordinated through the JPRC / PRCC.

Fire support / Suppression assets will be used as necessary to create a threat en-vironment that enables recovery. The OSC/RMC will plan these strikes and then,through the AMC, coordinate their execution. The OSC/RMC must decide how closeto the objective strikes may occur, based on weapon types and effects. If the loca-tion of the isolated personnel is not known exactly, any suppressive strikes mustbe executed with extreme caution to prevent hitting the isolated personnel by ac-cident. If able, the isolated personnel should assist in directing strikes in his closeproximity.

Mission support Supporting assets such as tankers, jammers, Forward Arming andRefuelling Point (FARP) etc. may be also added to a PRTF dependent on the circum-stances under which a PR mission is to be conducted.

2.5.2 Mission planning and briefing

0212. The mission planning process for the PRTF is conducted in a number of steps.The RMC should delegate several tasks to other members of the PRTF. A task delegationsheet that contains all general planning points is given in Annex L. In some cases theremay not have been the opportunity to have the recovery vehicle and RESCORT crews planand brief together. In such cases the lead of the recovery vehicle(s) may need to briefthe RESCORT while airbourne joining up. Then the recovery vehicle lead may use thebriefing format as given in Annex Q. Risk mitigation considerations should be part ofplanning to prevent unduly risk to the PRTF, the isolated personnel and others.



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2.6 Execution

0213. As soon as the PRTF is set-up and briefed, execution should commence as follows.

2.6.1 Enroute procedures

0214. Enroute recovery and RESCORT formation procedures and patterns for both Ro-tary Wing (RW) and Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft are described in Annex 3. Whenever nec-essary, a FARP could be planned either before or after the recovery as described in AnnexR.

0215. Formation flight procedures can also be found in ATP-49 Vol II chapter 6.

2.6.2 Rendezvous point

0216. When the PRTF assets are not co-located, different elements or sections will ren-dezvous at the Rendezvous Point (RV). Unless otherwise stated in the mission scenarioor situation dictates, take-off time should be adjusted to coordinate rendezvous timewith RESCORT aircraft and / or arrival at RV. Authentication of the isolated personneland the 15-line brief by the appropriate OSC or detached RESCORT has to be finishedbefore the PRTF leaves the RV unless special conditions exist. If execute authority hasnot yet been granted by the PRCC, the PRTF should not proceed beyond the RV.

2.6.3 RV to IP

0217. The route from RV to Initial Point (IP) can be planned and executed using spiderpoints that are defined in the SPINS. When the RMC decides to perform a route changeduring this phase, he can do this using other spider points.

0218. From RV to IP, a sweep can be executed by the detached RESCORT, so that therecovery vehicles and attached RESCORT can be cleared to progress using the pre plannedspider points.

0219. Upon arrival at the Objective Area (OA), the RESCORT can assume all responsi-bilities as OSC. When the recovery vehicles arrive at the IP, they should hold outsidethe OA until cleared to proceed by the OSC. RMC will then order the recovery vehicles toexecute the pickup. If no RESCORT is available, the recovery vehicles will assume OSCresponsibilities on arrival at the OA.

2.6.4 Communication procedures

0220. Prior to execution, the RMC will ensure all required PRTF sections are on thecorrect isolated personnel recovery frequency. As a minimum, RESCORT and recoveryvehicles will monitor the primary recovery frequency. The RMC will announce “execute”on the primary frequency.

2.6.5 Objective area procedures

0221. The OA flow, de-confliction and communications procedures will be dictated bythe tactical situation, terrain and PRTF assets. The following examples provide a guide-line for possible objective area procedures, but should not be regarded as the only solu-tion. These procedures should be modified as required by the situation at the time. For



2.6 Execution

readability purposes, in this document the recovery vehicles are described as Rescue 11and 12, the RESCORT as Gun 1 and 2.

0222. Dependent on the situation and the time required for the EF to locate, authen-ticate and prepare the isolated personnel for the flight to safety, the recovery vehiclesmay leave the Landing Zone (LZ) and move to a nearby holding area for safety reasons.Once the EF is ready they will subsequently call the recovery vehicles to pick them up.

OA procedures without RESCORT

0223. If no RESCORT is available, the recovery vehicle lead will become the RMC. TheRMC should carry out the final authentication of the isolated personnel and ask for anappropriate signal when approaching the Pick-Up Point (PUP).

0224. Having located the isolated personnel, the recovery vehicles can determine asuitable Landing Site (LS) or pickup procedure and will provide their own mutual sup-port. Rescue 11 could conduct a low pass over the PUP, in order to confirm the locationof the isolated personnel and may attempt to draw Opposing Forces (OPFOR) fire. Res-cue 11 can then relay the location and relative position to Rescue 12. After confirmingthe PUP and the isolated personnel’s location, Rescue 11 will proceed into an overheadpattern. Rescue 12 can continue inbound and land at the site of the isolated personneland proceed with recovery. Alternatively, Rescue 11 may land immediately, followed byRescue 12.

0225. If Rescue 11 has not positively located the isolated personnel by the time Res-cue 12 is at PUP, Rescue 12 may join Rescue 11 in the overhead pattern until a positivelocation is acquired. Once a positive location has been acquired, Rescue 12 may proceedto land in the PUP. Once on the ground, the EF may disembark Rescue 12 and move tothe isolated personnel. The EF may perform final authentication of the isolated person-nel and will move back to Rescue 12. Rescue 11 may remain in the overhead patternproviding situational awareness, security and overwatch (ready to fire).

0226. In the event the EF are not immediately enroute back to Rescue 12 with theisolated personnel within a pre briefed time of wheels down on the PUP, Rescue 12 canjoin Rescue 11 in the overhead Combat Air Patrol (CAP) until Rescue 12 is called back infor pick up at the PUP. At that time Rescue 12 may land immediately and begin recoveryof the EF and isolated personnel.

0227. If deemed necessary, and if the situation allows, both recovery vehicles may landat the PUP. Take off may be in the same order as landing. If both recovery vehicles haveto land in the PUP due to the situation, but the PUP allows only one helicopter to land,Rescue 11 may land first, drop off the EF and take off again. Rescue 12 may land andstay in the PUP until it has picked up the EF again. Afterwards Rescue 11 may landagain and may pick up all remaining EF.

0228. If radio contact is lost, the EF on the ground may signal for extraction withappropriate pre briefed signalling devices. When the EF are forced to use a differentPUP for extraction, the extraction point may be marked with smoke (preferred) or witha panel marker for day operations and a swirling IR chemlight, Buzzsaw (preferred) orInfraRed (IR) strobe.

0229. Before takeoff, a signal should be made (radio call, light signal etc.) to warnthe other assets that the aircraft is lifting. If necessary, a departure heading or sectorshould also be passed for de-confliction. Once airborne, the recovery vehicles shouldrejoin in formation for the egress.

OA procedures with RW RESCORT



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0230. Upon reaching the IP, Rescue 11 and Rescue 12 should hold in order to allow theRESCORT to push forward to the OA. GUN 1 should proceed into the OA to authenticateof the isolated personnel and assume OSC responsibilities.

0231. Gun 1 can proceed across the PUP and attempt to positively locate the isolatedpersonnel by both visual or thermal means and determine if the objective is cold or hot.

0232. At IP inbound, Gun 2 can continue to provide RESCORT until the recovery vehiclesare in the OA.

0233. After the RESCORT has neutralised any OPFOR threat and determined the OA tobe cold, Gun 1 can clear Rescue 11 and 12 into the OA. The recovery procedures maytake place as outlined in the paragraph above.

0234. The RESCORT may take up positions to provide over watch and security or main-tain a mobile patrol.

OA procedures with FW detached RESCORT

0235. Detached RESCORT may have Tactical Control (TACON) over the PRTF, if ap-pointed as RMC.

0236. If the fixed wing detached RESCORT lead is not trained to execute RMC duties,the attached RESCORT or recovery vehicles lead may take the RMC role.

0237. After the fixed wing detached RESCORT has determined the objective to be cold,or after it has neutralised any OPFOR threat, the PRTF may be called in.

0238. The recovery procedures may take place again as outlined in paragraph 2.6.5.

OPFOR threat and reaction in the OA

a. Reactions should always be according to the Rules of Engagement (ROE). No firearea’s, free fire area’s and coordination area’s will be defined for every possiblescenario within a radius of 1000 meters. Specific sectors can be assigned to re-covery, RESCORT or EF. Outside this radius of 1000 meters, the detached RESCORTis responsible. The OSC can at any moment amend these procedures, consideringthe specific condition or situation. Call For Fire (CFF) can be done by distance andheading from a certain position, or by the use of laser pointers. Procedures will bebriefed by the RMC and EF. Asset armament limitations as well as the fragmenta-tion envelope of specific weaponry must always be taken into account. Regardlessthe RESCORT available, if Rescue 12, while in the PUP, receives OPFOR fire that cannot be suppressed by the EF nor Rescue 11’s or 12’s door gunners, Rescue 11 and 12will depart while the RMC organises suppression and neutralisation of the OPFORthreat, based on calls from the recovery vehicles or the EF. Once the PUP is secure,Rescue 12 will land for extraction of the EF and isolated personnel. If the OPFORthreat can not be suppressed, the RESCORT will assist with a break in contact andprovide covering fire for the EF and isolated personnel as they move to an alternatePUP.

b. If artillery fire begins to impact the PUP while EF are still in the OA, they mustimmediately collapse back to Rescue 12 for extraction and departure.

c. If Rescue 12 goes down in the PUP, RESCORT will assist in suppression of the OPFOR.Rescue 11 will provide covering fire for Rescue 12 and friendly forces to egressaway from the OPFOR. Rescue 11 may land and extract Rescue 12’s crew and allfriendly forces on the ground. Rescue 11 will then egress and return to base.



2.6 Execution

d. Asset armament limitations as well as the fragmentation envelope of specific weaponryhave always to be taken into account.

EF employment

a. Timing calls: EF will be given time calls as required (e.g. cross Forward Line OwnTroops (FLOT), etc.).

b. If chemlights are used to indicate a PUP, deploy one per side per aircraft to min-imise the confusion of where each aircraft will land. If landing as a formation, thelead aircraft will land as indicated and others will land as briefed.

c. The type and sequence of aerial insertion and extraction needed, will be coordi-nated between the flight engineer/aerial gunner and the pilots. Use of hoist, ropeor rappel and the desired altitude will be briefed.

d. Signalling methods and No Radio (NORDO) procedures between EF members andthe recovery vehicles Commander will coordinated and briefed for each mission.

2.6.6 ISOPREP authentication procedures

0239. Normally isolated personnel in a hostile environment will not receive assistanceuntil their identity has been authenticated. To facilitate isolated personnel authentica-tion, unit intelligence personnel will assist Personnel member in preparing an IsolatedPersonnel Report (ISOPREP) form. This assistance will be completed thoroughly becauseof the importance of a correct ISOPREP. A copy of deployed personnel ISOPREPs will becontrolled in accordance with the PR SOP.

0240. Personnel review their ISOPREP form prior to every mission. The JPRC / PRCCmust maintain a copy of any unit’s ISOPREP file that does not have the capability totransmit secure data within 30 minutes of an incident.

0241. Otherwise, ISOPREP information should be passed to JPRC / PRCC by the fastestelectronic secure means. ISOPREP information must be available to all players involvedin a PR mission within 30 minutes after initial notification of a PR incident.

Authentication procedures

0242. An effective authentication system is essential for protection of PR forces fromOPFOR entrapment and successful recovery of isolated personnel. To achieve this objec-tive, authentication information must be used in a manner that maintains security anddurability over a long period of time.

Authentication procedures and techniques

0243. Immediate authentication of isolated personnel may be accomplished by an OSCusing the PR authentication code PR word / letter / number / colour, published in theSPINS. The SPINS may give directions on who is to use which authentication method.These directions are to be adhered to closely to prevent duplicate use of authenticationcodes and thus become compromised. To maintain security, personnel should only carrythe PR authentication codes for their on station time, as written in the ATO. These codesremain valid for the duration of evasion until recovered. Since recoveries may involve



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multiple isolated personnel, it may be necessary to use the same PR authentication codesmany times. To increase durability, the OSC should avoid asking isolated personnel forthe complete PR word or number. Simple creative questions may allow same PR wordand number to be used many times.

0244. Usage of SARNEG will be described in detail in the PR SPINS.

2.6.7 Egress routing

0245. Egress via briefed egress route which is different from the ingress route. In caseof emergency, reverse routing can be used. All applicable enroute contingencies apply.

2.7 Reintegrate

0246. On completion of the “Execution” phase of the PR operation, the isolated person-nel should be taken to a pre-assigned medical facility for reintegration. Plans should beflexible enough to allow for changing medical and operational requirements. It is im-perative that recovery forces are debriefed at the earliest opportunity. The JPRC / PRCCshould be informed as soon as possible by the RMC about the outcome of the operationwith a PRTF report. The format of this report should be found in the SPINS. Lessonsidentified / learned from the recovery forces should be forwarded to the JPRC and dis-seminated to all appropriate force levels.



2.7 Reintegrate



Formation flights and RESCORT patternsNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 3

Formation flights and RESCORTpatterns

3.1 RW RESCORT types of formations

0301. All distances and angles mentioned in this Annex are indicative. Actual detailsare dependent on the situation and are to be briefed by the formation leader1.

3.1.1 Combat cruise

0302. The sections will fly staggered left (approx. 45) with a separation of 200m withinthe section. The separation between the sections is 300m. For Night Vision Goggles(NVG) operations, it is mandatory that all helicopters within an element are visual witheach other. The lead of the second element has to maintain visual contact with thewingman of the first element. If visual contact can not be maintained between theelements, separation between elements will be effected by a fixed distance, which canbe checked by fixed calls on prepared points (e.g. spider points). Speed changes have tobe reported to all helicopters within the section. This procedure can also be applied tokeep separation between recovery vehicles and attached RESCORT.

3.1.2 Free cruise

0303. The basic formation is staggered left with a separation of 200m within the sec-tion. Helicopters within an section, as well as the sections themselves are free to ma-noeuvre approx. 30o right and left of each other. The distance between the sections willbe 400m.

0304. For NVG operations, it is mandatory that all helicopters within an section arevisual with each other. The lead of the second element has to maintain visual contactwith the wingman of the first element. If visual contact can not be maintained betweenthe elements, or if deemed necessary, separation between elements will be effected by afixed distance and fixed speed, which can be checked by fixed calls on prepared points(e.g. spider points). Speed changes have to be reported to all helicopters within thesection. This procedure can also be applied to keep separation between recovery vehiclesand attached RESCORT.

1These formation procedures should be copied from ATP-49 Helicopters in Land Operations. Given thecurrently ongoing revision of ATP-49 the current text will be kept for the time being. Upon release of a newversion of ATP-49 these procedures are to be replaced by a reference to ATP-49.



3.2 Enroute contingencies

(a) Combat cruise (b) Free cruise

Figure 3.1: RW (RESCORT) formations


3.2.1 Blind

0305. When an a/c within an element or section calls “blind2”, all a/c of this elementor section will go “Flashlight” (landing lights for day and IR searchlight for night, bothstraight down) and go “Yardstick” (Air to Air Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)) whenequipped with a TACAN. After calling “blind”, the other aircraft will:

a. If it has the “blind” aircraft in sight, call “visual” and clock position from blindaircraft with a distance.

b. If the second aircraft is also blind, and the lead has full situational awareness(yardstick, terrain, funnelling or maintaining lateral separation via heading orrange/bearing from a common point), lead will call “Continue” and include a head-ing.

c. If the lead has limited situational awareness or blind was unexpected, the lead willcall “Execute Blind” and execute altitude de-confliction blind procedures. If visualis regained on another formation member, visual aircraft can be cleared to rejoin.

3.2.2 Altitude de-confliction procedures

0306. In case of a two ship, Lead (regardless of position) remains below a referencealtitude. Wingman climbs to at least 200’ above that reference altitude. Lead can call

2Brevity words used in this paragraph are the “standard” brevity words that can be found in APP-7.



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barometric altitude if necessary. (Exception: during PUP operations if unable to remainin the PUP the pick-up aircraft will remain 300’ AGL and below. Supporting aircraft willclimb to 500’ AGL.)

Figure 3.2: Rejoin

0307. If rejoin cannot be accomplished prior to next way point, aircraft will remain inaltitude blocks, proceed to the next way point and make left turns at 60 KIAS until visualis regained. See figure 3.2. Use overt lighting as required to assist in reacquisition.

0308. These de-confliction procedures are local procedures only. Real world missionsmay dictate different procedures based on tactical situation.

0309. Rejoins: Unless otherwise pre-briefed, perform all rejoins at 60 KIAS and if turn-ing 20o angle of bank.

3.2.3 Inadvertent IMC

NOTE:

0310. If national procedures don’t allow crews to apply the procedures underneath, itis not possible to fly a multinational formation. In this case a physical separation willbe applied between the different national formations.

0311. If a crew goes inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) their firstconcern is a/c control and warning of the rest of the formation: “1 IMC - break” For eachmission, an emergency recovery will be planned to an airfield, the operating base, or arecovery spot. For the operating base or recovery spot, a GPS approach will be developedin case of an Instrument Flying Rules (IFR) emergency recovery and if no other meansare available.

IMC in OPFOR territory

0312. When a flight encounters inadvertent IMC and a/c go IMC in OPFOR territorywhere no climb out is possible, the following procedure will apply:

a. A/C climb to Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) and initiate inadvertent IMC procedure.

b. The last a/c decreases speed by 30 Knots (KTS), a/c 3 -20 KTS, a/c 2 -10 KTS fromthe cruise speed. A/C 1 maintains its cruise speed.




c. On command of first a/c, all a/c reverse track via procedure turn and fly an airspeedof 80 KTS.

d. Procedure turn consists of flying a track for one minute with a 30o offset followedby a standard rate turn to get back on reversed track.

e. When reaching Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) conditions a/c proceed tolast Spider Point (SP) and continue the mission.

f. The rest of the formation, which is still under VMC will come to a stop or reverseand proceed as ordered by the RMC. Options are to continue, split in smaller pack-ages, or return to a holding area near the last SP for formation join up.

IMC in friendly territory

0313. When an a/c encounters inadvertent IMC in friendly territory when a climb outis possible, the following procedure will apply:

a. All a/c in inadvertent IMC will start a climb and squawk emergency.

b. The lead a/c will call out his heading and altitude he will climb to the base altitude.This altitude depends on the MSA and freezing level.

c. The second a/c will climb to lead’s altitude plus 500’ and turns 20o away from lead,

d. The third a/c will climb to lead’s altitude plus 1000’ and turns 40o away from lead.

e. The fourth a/c will climb to lead’s altitude plus 1500’ and turns to 60o away fromlead.

f. On command of first a/c all a/c reverse track via procedure turn and fly an airspeedof 80 KTS.

g. Procedure turn consists of flying a track for one minute with a 30o offset followedby a standard rate turn to get back on reversed track.

h. When reaching VMC conditions a/c proceed to last SP and continue the mission.

i. The rest of the formation, which is still under VMC will come to a stop or reverseand proceed as ordered by the RMC. Options are to continue, split in smaller pack-ages, or return to a holding area near the last SP for formation join up.

j. If a/c can not regain VMC, they will rejoin the operating base for an emergencyrecovery.

Lost wingman

0314. Lost Wingman procedures must be taken into account during the mission plan-ning. Factors determining a continuation or cancellation of the mission are among oth-ers: the availability of a “Hot Spare”; mission priority; threat level; lost wingman before-or after execute, etc.



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3.3 RW RESCORT

0315. The task of the armed helicopters is to protect the recovery vehicles by provid-ing firepower or showing presence to suppress or intimidate the OPFOR, so the recoveryvehicles can have a safe passage to the AO. The RESCORT can be detached or attachedRESCORT. The detached RESCORT will fly 1 to 5 minute in front of the recovery vehiclesand fly the same speed and same altitude or higher as the recovery vehicles. It needs tobe considered that using forward detached RESCORT can alert possible OPFOR. In orderto prevent this, the detached RESCORT can take an alternative route in the direct prox-imity of the recovery vehicles’s route. The position of the attached RESCORT will dependon the number of used Attack Helicopters (AHs), threat situation, terrain, environmen-tal conditions and size of the whole Task Force (TF). The preferred tactic for attachedRESCORT will be rear RESCORT. In this case the AHs will fly behind the recovery vehi-cles. See figure 3.3. When the recovery vehicles are being engaged, the AHs manoeuvretowards the threat to suppress the OPFOR.

Figure 3.3: Rear RESCORT

3.4 FW RESCORT patterns and procedures

Detached FW RESCORT. The following patterns and procedures are only conceivablewith fast movers. Detached FW RESCORT patterns include:

a. Medium altitude parallel. The medium altitude parallel is flown alongingress and egress routes in front of the recovery vehicle(s). The primarypurpose of this pattern is to clear the recovery vehicle(s)’ flight path. TheRESCORT aircraft will most likely not maintain sight of the recovery vehicle(s).The pattern can be flown at different altitudes and airspeeds.

b. Racetrack. Racetrack is a large oval pattern flown with the recovery vehi-cle(s) within the pattern. The pattern is flown along the recovery vehicle(s)route with RESCORT aircraft maintaining sight of the recovery vehicles. Thepattern may be flown at different altitudes and airspeeds. (see Fig. 3.4)

c. Box pattern. Box pattern is similar to racetrack but with extended cross-wind legs. This pattern may be flown at different altitudes and airspeeds.

Attached FW RESCORT patterns include:



3.5 RW RESCORT tactics and procedures

Figure 3.4: Racetrack

a. Low Altitude chain pattern. Low altitude chain pattern is used for closecover of a singleton or formation of recovery helicopters (see Fig 3.5a). TheRESCORT assets fly essentially an oval shaped pattern around (a) moving re-covery vehicle(s). Such a pattern is normally flown between 500’ and 2000’AGL but is not easily flown by aircraft manoeuvring at speeds above 350 KIAS.

b. Race track. The race track pattern for attached RESCORT is the same basicoval pattern as flown for detached RESCORT (see Fig 3.4). The pattern may beflown with either the objective area or recovery vehicles in the centre, or beoffset to aid in visual look-out. This pattern is useful regardless of RESCORTairspeed.

c. S-weave. The weave pattern involves FW RESCORT flying an “S” pattern inrelation to the recovery vehicle(s)’ flight path (fig 3.5b). This pattern may beflown at varying altitudes and airspeeds.

3.5 RW RESCORT tactics and procedures

0316. The task of the AH is to protect the recovery vehicles by providing firepower orshowing presence to suppress or intimidate the OPFOR, so the recovery vehicles can havea safe passage to the OA. The RW RESCORT can be detached or attached RESCORT.

Detached RW RESCORT. The detached RW RESCORT is to clear the ingress route andmonitor OPFOR avenues of approach into the OA. The detached RW RESCORT willfly 1 to 5 minute in front of the recovery vehicles and fly the same speed and samealtitude or higher as the recovery vehicles. It needs to be considered that usingforward detached RW RESCORT can alert possible OPFOR. In order to prevent this,the detached RESCORT can take an alternative route in the direct proximity of therecovery vehicles’s route.

Attached RW RESCORT. The attached RW RESCORT is to provide close-in protection tothe recovery vehicles. The position of the attached RW RESCORT will depend on thenumber of used AHs, threat situation, terrain, environmental conditions and sizeof the whole PRTF. For Night Vision Device (NVD) operations, it is mandatory thatall helicopters within an element are visual with each other. The lead of the second



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(a) Daisy chain

(b) S-weave

Figure 3.5: Attached FW RESCORT patterns

element has to maintain visual contact with the wingman of the first element. Ifvisual contact can not be maintained between the elements, or if deemed necessary,separation between elements will be effected by a fixed distance and fixed speed,which can be checked by fixed calls on prepared points (e.g. spider points). Speedchanges have to be reported to all helicopters within the section. This procedurecan also be applied to keep separation between recovery vehicles and attached RWRESCORT.

0317. The preferred tactic for attached RESCORT will be rear RESCORT as ex-plained above.

3.6 RESCORT patterns in the objective area

0318. As detailed in 3.3, at least one AH will keep rear RESCORT in order to providesecurity for the recovery vehicles at all time. Also in the objective area, this AH willstay in rear cover, hovering behind the recovery vehicles to provide constant cover. Ifhowever, more AH are available as RESCORT, the following RESCORT patterns may beused in the OA as “hover cover”

Wheel. Wheel is a circular pattern flown with the objective area or recovery vehiclesnormally at the centre. The wheel may be flown at varying altitudes and airspeeds.

Figure 8. RW RESCORT figure 8 pattern is the same as the fixed wing except that thepattern may cover less area around the objective area or recovery vehicles. He-licopters with forward firing ordnance may require higher altitudes during thepattern.



3.6 RESCORT patterns in the objective area

(a) Wheel

(b) Figure-8

Figure 3.6: Attached FW RESCORT patterns


COMMUNICATIONSNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 4

COMMUNICATIONS

4.1 General

0401. The JFC or a designated CC will publish a COMPLAN capable of supporting PR op-erations. This COMPLAN will provide callsigns, frequencies, codewords, communicationformats etc. All deviations from this COMPLAN require coordination with the PRCC priorstart of the mission.

4.2 Radio communications

0402. Brevity communications will be used to the maximum extent possible. When-ever appropriate, secure communications have to be applied all the time. When usingnon secure communications, codewords and procedures will be used, such as NumericalEncryption Grid (RAMROD), SARNEG, SARDOT, bulls eye, duress.

0403. The recovery force, as well as the survivor should authenticate as much as pos-sible all new calls made to them, using word of day where possible.

0404. Diagrams of the communication structure both prior and after passing IP aregiven in figures 4.1 on page 185 and 4.2 on page 185 respectively.

4.3 Necessary amount of frequencies

PUSH 1 (MHZ) 2 (MHZ) V (MHZ) PURPOSE CALLSIGNX JPRC / PRCC OPS DESK ....X X PR OPS DESK ....X X X PRTF ....X AMC-PR ....X FARP ....X X ISOL. PERS. ....

4.4 Communications checks

0405. Since communications are of vital importance in a PR operation, a possible wayto check the communications is described below:

TBD



4.5 Brevity words

4.4.1 Element/section lead initiates comm checks

0406. Obtain ATIS (if applicable) prior to the comm check. The flow for comm checks is:UHF - VHF - PLS - HF - FM - Have Quick -Secure respond by position to inform the lead ofany communication or aircraft limitations not previously briefed after the comm check.The EF commander needs to be included in the Comm Check.

0407. The lead then calls “comm check complete” For example:

• “Formation, check Uniform”

• “2” - “3”

• “Formation, check Victor”

• “2” - “3”

• “Formation, Comm check complete”

4.4.2 Communications check continuation procedures

0408. Go through the complete communications check and do not trouble-shoot radiosuntil the lead calls “comm check complete” and directs trouble-shooting. Following thecommunications check, push conform the Communications Card (COMCARD). A possibleCOMCARD to use can be found in Annex P in paragraph P.2.

a. Call signs: The element/section will use the lead’s call sign for all communica-tions concerning the flight. Intra-flight communications will use the individualcall signs, for example “Brussels”, which consists out of 1, 2 and 3 will proceed asfollows; “Brussels, hook right 270” – “2” – “3”

b. Push and Roll will be used for frequency changes and check-in. If flight lead pushesthe package on a certain frequency, aircraft will respond during first check-in. Ifflight lead rolls the package, an initial response from all aircraft is not required.

4.4.3 PLS check procedures

0409. Recovery vehicles need to check their Personal Locator System (PLS) prior todeparture.

4.5 Brevity words

Brevity words are short words to communicate procedures or information in a fast man-ner. These brevity words can be used in planning or executing a PR mission. NATObrevity words can be found in APP-7. An excerpt of most frequently used brevity wordscan be found in Annex P.


COMMUNICATIONSNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

185

Figure 4.1: Comms prior passing IP

Figure 4.2: Comms after passing IP



4.5 Brevity words



TRAININGNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Chapter 5

TRAINING

5.1 General

0501. Training is key to the effective execution of any mission. Appropriate basic PRtraining should therefore be conducted at the peacetime home base of the unit. Thisbasic training is to be supplemented with AO specific training prior deployment andupon arrival in the AO.

5.2 Pre-emptive training

0502. Units and operators should be trained for their respective missions in accor-dance with relevant NATO procedures.

5.2.1 PRTF and extraction force training

PRTF training. PRTFs require appropriate training to ensure that they are familiarwith NATO PR TTPs and are familiar with NATO PR SOP / SOP / SPINS.

Extraction force training. The extraction team must be trained in the specific tasksof PR as outlined in Annex S. It must be capable of providing security on theground, and have medical qualifications appropriate to the potential nature ofmedical conditions they may encounter. The team must train regularly as partof full spectrum PR exercises.

5.2.2 Types of competencies

National participants, VMC conditions. This level of training allows the crew of aPRTF to execute a PR missions under good weather, day-only conditions with onlynational participants in the PR mission. Details are given in Annex S.

National participants, adverse conditions. This level of training allows the crewof a PRTF to execute a PR missions under day and/or night adverse weather andterrain conditions with only national participants in the PR mission. Details aregiven in Annex S.

Multi-national participants, VMC conditions. This level of training allows the crewof a PRTF to execute a PR missions under good weather, day-only conditions withparticipants from different nations in the PR mission. Details are given in AnnexS.



5.3 Pre-deployment training

Multi-national participants, adverse conditions. This level of training allows thecrew of a PRTF to execute a PR missions under day and/or night adverse weatherand terrain conditions with participants from different nations in the PR mission.Details are given in Annex S.


0503. Prior to deployment units should be fully prepared for their role in the upcomingoperation. Pre-deployment training should pay special attention to unfamiliar environ-mental operating conditions (e.g. mountain flying).

5.4 In-the AO training

0504. This part of training includes terrain and weather familiarisation and familiari-sation with the current SPINS and other units that could comprise a PRTF.

a. Validate the PR SOP.


c. Validate the calculated capabilities.

d. Adapt procedures to the AO. Continuation training in order to maintain opera-tional readiness must be conducted by all elements of the PR organisation.


Helo ops set-up checklistNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex A

Helo ops set-up checklist

a. Make inventory of available national assets and characteristics

b. Review location and back-up procedures for communications with JPRC / PRCC

c. Make inventory of available national assets and characteristics

d. Review location and back-up procedures for communications with JPRC / PRCC

e. Brief supporting personnel on their duties

f. Develop quick reference list of key personnel and phone numbers (i.e. JPRC / PRCC;DetCo’s; Wing Ops Centre (WOC); Multinational Logistics Centre (MNLC), mainte-nance chiefs etc.)

g. Establish procedures for after duty hour notification.

h. Collect all ISOPREP and Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) data1 of the crews participat-ing in the operation / exercise and centralize their storage.

i. Check radio equipment:

(a) Conduct familiarisation training for ops personnel(b) Set-up secondary / mobility radios as required(c) Develop and review frequency list and sweep(d) Coordinate communication procedures with available facilities

j. Develop and display two wall charts:

(a) Assets board & maintenance status(b) Incident / mission table

k. Draw and post the planning map with:

(a) Universal Transversal Mercator (UTM) designator letters(b) Low level routes(c) Spider points(d) Tactical / Designated Area of Recoverys (DARs) / FARP areas(e) Orbits / refueling tracks(f) Reference points (SARDOT)

1This may need to be re-accomplished one a month.



(g) Recovery resource locations (with type and numbers)

(h) FLOT and Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) when applicable

(i) Known OPFOR threats (received from intel)

(j) Transload locations

(k) HCP /waypoints

(l) Fire support coordination line

(m) Field hospitals

(n) OPFOR / friendly forces

(o) Airspace Control Measures (ACM)

(p) Current as of Date / Time Group (DTG)

l. Analyze the ATO for active operations areas (this analysis will be a major factor indetermining if follow-on activity is needed)

m. Separate the ATO package into general SPINS, PR SPINS and PR tasked missions

n. Set-up mission folders and miscellaneous worksheets

o. Set-up two message folders (incoming and outgoing). Divide the folders into clas-sified and unclassified sections, with log sheets

p. Start, set-up procedures for maintaining a 24hr events log

q. Develop a work schedule

r. As needed, review:

(a) Authentication / encryption / decryption procedures

(b) Plotting of UTM / Geographical Reference (GEOREF) coordinates

(c) Plotting of TACAN radials and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) (SARDOT/Bullseye)

(d) ATO / SPINS format and procedures

s. Start a mission log


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Annex B

Capabilities & equipment

See also asset sheet in Annex ??1

B.1 General

All PR platforms should have compatible communications. Recovery vehicles should becapable of:

a. Deploying recovery personnel and equipment.

b. Communicating with isolated personnel and PRTF.

c. Locating and transporting recovered isolated personnel.

B.2 Recovery helicopters

The recovery helicopters and their crews should be capable of operating as part of a PRTFin any given threat environment. In addition, an EF may be required in each recoveryvehicles to extract the isolated personnel. The recovery helicopter and crew should becapable of:

a. Carrying personnel and related equipment capable of extracting isolated person-nel.

b. Locating and authenticating the isolated personnel (e.g. operating a PLS, conform-ing to Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) 7007).

c. Executing a isolated personnel pick-up (potentially with a hoist) and transportinga litter-borne patient. Self protection (e.g. operating with chaff and flare equip-ment, armour plating, component redundancy and self-defence weaponry).

d. Operating avionics, to include: precision navigation equipment, secure communi-cations, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) and a data-link system.

e. Operating in poor weather / low light level night conditions with equipment suchas: NVD and compatible lighting; IR devices and Terrain Avoidance System (TAS)with Obstacle Warning Capability (OWC).

1this information should be put into a table that links the type of equipment to the type or threat levelof the operation as depicted in Volume I Annex C on page 74.



B.3 Extraction force

In addition, it is highly desirable for recovery vehicles to have:

a. An Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) / Helicopter Aerial Refuelling (HAR) capability.

b. An Altitude Hover Hold System (AHHS) and a Hover InfraRed Suppression System(HIRSS).

B.3 Extraction force

a. The EF must be trained and equipped to suit the mission, threat and environmentof the AO. The only essential equipment is self-protection and communication be-tween the EF and the recovery vehicle. The skills and equipment presented hererepresent samples – not exhaustive lists – of the possible skills and equipmentthat MAY be required:

(a) Small unit (infantry) tactics and procedures.(b) Insertion / extraction methods.(c) Landing techniques such as:(d) Fast-roping.(e) Rappelling.(f) Rope ladder.(g) Hoist operations.(h) Deploying into the water.(i) Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE).(j) Rescue swimming.

(k) Authentication procedures.(l) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

(m) Fire support request.(n) Contact with the special or subsurface forces.(o) Contact with isolated person.(p) Interfacing with other special teams such as Army and Navy Special Forces

for quick integration.(q) OSC procedures (EF leader is the OSC for ground operations).(r) Combat engineer(s) Mine clearing(t) Combat medic

b. The EF equipment to perform this mission MAY could include (but is not limitedto):

(a) Light weight infantry rifle.(b) Pistol.(c) Grenade launcher.(d) Sub-machinegun (if required).(e) Small calibre machine gun.(f) Combat optical gun sight (both day and night).


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(g) Combat optical gun sight reflex.

(h) Binoculars.

(i) NVD.

(j) IR pointer.

(k) GPS receiver.

(l) Signalling devices.

(m) Communication systems.

B.4 RESCORT

Ideally, aircraft tasked for RESCORT role should:

a. Be equipped with multiple (redundant) and secure radios.

b. Be equipped with stand off sensors (IR / optical pods) to locate the isolated person-nel and to track the recovery vehicles.

c. Be equipped with interoperable data-link.

d. Have A / A self defence capability.

e. Be able to carry A / G weapons, mixed load capable.



B.4 RESCORT




195

Annex C

PR report formats

C.1 Personnel Recovery Incident Report

1 Obtain the following information and pass it to JPRC / PRCC as it becomes available:

1 Time of report

2 Callsign. Who’s reporting M

3 Authentication

4 Time of incident.

5 Exact location E

6 Type of vehicle

7 Way to identify vehicle (colour, ID)

8 Type (cause) of incident T

9 Hazards (fire, mines, enemies) H

10 Access to the spot A

11 Number and status of isolated personnel N

12 Nationality

13 Emergency service required type of injuries E

14 Qualifier / source.

15 Authentication of isolated personnel (Y / N and by what means).

16 Point of contact and means of communication.

1This report is to replace the SARIR as still shown on the next page



C.2 SARIR

C.2 SARIR

1 DTG of report: Z

2 Callsign: Last contact frequency:

3 Aircraft type:

4 Nationality / unit:

5 Persons on board:

6 Location:

7 Location qualifiers (circle as appropriate): Actual / last known / estimated positionland / water ejection / bailout altitude feet

8 Ejection / bailout winds at knots

9 DTG of incident Z

10 Cause of loss (circle as appropriate):

11 Interceptors, Surface to Air Missile (SAM), Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA), collision,malfunction, other:

12 Isolated personnel condition:

(a) Mobile?

(b) Injured?

(c) Concealed?

(d) Survival equipment?

(e) Signalling devices?

(f) Intentions?

13 Last voice contact at DTG.

(a) Freq / push with

(b) (Callsign)

14 Threat situation:

15 Friendly units on-scene:

16 Source of information:

17 Reported by:

18 RMC call sign:



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C.3 PR 11-line report

The following checklist is used to communicate basic information about a PR situation.As a minimum, the designated AMC uses this checklist to gather information and relayit to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), JPRC /PRCC, and the PRTF. All aircraftshould have this checklist available and use it as appropriate during a PR incident.






5 Injuries/Conditions6 OSC / Bingo / Loadout / Point

Of Contact (POC) (Who is re-porting and means of com-munication)



b) .....

*CAUTION: Line 2 must include all three elements; location / source / time.

NOTE: For brevity, information should be given by reference to each checklist linenumber (e.g.: Line 1: Sixpack 01; Line 2: 30 45N, 046 00E / Wingman / 1000Z; etc.). It iscrucial that line #2 always includes all three elements: Location, Source, and Time. TheJPRC / PRCC uses this information to discern the most accurate location. All players canthen reference the location of the survivor by the associated time and source to avoidconfusion.

C.4 PR mission message

a. Unit/POC

b. Isolated personnel

(a) Callsign

(b) Location

(c) Number of isolated personnel



C.4 PR mission message

c. Routing

d. Threat assessment

(a) Ingress route

(b) Isolated personnel location (area description)

(c) Egress route

e. PRTF mission package

f. Additional support requirements

g. Launch location

h. Launch weather

i. Estimate Time En-route (ETE) to isolated personnel

j. Ingress weather

k. AAR / HAR track / FARP location

l. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) isolated personnel location (DTG)

m. Weather at isolated personnel location

n. Estimate time on station

o. Isolated personnel transload/recovery base

p. Re-entry location friendly territory

(a) Re-entry time (DTG)

(b) Re-entry altitude (ft amsl/agl)

(c) Re-entry heading (degrees)

q. ETA transload/recovery base (DTG)

r. Recovery base weather

s. Estimated mission complete time (DTG)

t. Commander assessment

u. ROEs

v. Go / no go


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Annex D

AMC responsibilities andchecklist

D.1 AMC responsibilities

a. Update JPRC / PRCC as frequent as possible.

b. Ensure isolated personnel is located and authenticated.

c. Coordinate rendezvous of the PRTF.

d. Request additional assets as required.

e. Coordinate PRTF communications connectivity.

f. Coordinate flow of PRTF assets to and from the objective area.

g. Coordinate asset re-fuelling including AAR / HAR, surface locations including mar-itime, land vehicle refuel points and FARPs.

h. Monitor PR effort; provide coordination and assistance as required.

i. Update mission progress, threats and weather conditions to the PRTF and the JPRC.

j. Obtain launch approval.

k. Obtain execute approval.

l. Monitor PR code usage.



D.2 AMC checklist

D.2 AMC checklist

• Notified by

• Callsign

• Accompanying A/C / vehicle callsign

• Aircraft / vehicle type

• Persons On Board (POB)

• Location

• Actual/last known/estimated

• Time

• Cause of crash (if known)

• Bailout location (if applicable)

• # of chutes seen (if applicable) seen by

• Bailout altitude/winds (if applicable) ft. kts.

• # of isolated personnel reported by

• Crew position

• Location

• Condition

• Last voice contact

• Frequency

• Situation (threat in area)

Authenticate survivor (and means used):

• PR colour

• PR word

• PR letter

• PR number

Pass authentication info to JPRC / PRCC.


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Annex E

OSC checklist

a. Authentication:

(a) Authenticate isolated personnel (SPINS authenticators, etc.).

(b) Confirm number of isolated personnel.

(c) Establish order of communications (multiple isolated personnel).

(d) Determine physical / psychological condition of isolated personnel.

(e) Determine / confirm OPFOR threat and local activity.

b. Location:

(a) Locate through electronic and / or visual means.

(b) Develop isolated personnel visual signal plan.

(c) Note PUP terrain description, elevation.

c. Threat suppression:

(a) Suppress immediate threats to the isolated person.

(b) Suppress threats that may affect recovery operations.

(c) Locate OPFOR positions.

(d) Pass all threat data to AMC.

d. Monitor PR code usage.


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Annex F

RMC responsibilities checklist

a. Achieve OSC handover / approval.

b. Receive PRTF status brief from AMC.

c. Authentication:

(a) Authenticate isolated personnel (ISOPREP, etc.).

(b) Confirm number of isolated personnel.

(c) Establish order of communications (multiple isolated personnel).

(d) Determine physical / psychological condition of isolated personnel.

(e) Determine / confirm OPFOR threat and local activity.

d. Location:

(a) Locate through electronic and / or visual means.

(b) Develop isolated personnel visual signal plan.

(c) Note PUP terrain description, elevation.

e. Threat suppression:

(a) Suppress immediate threats to the isolated person.

(b) Suppress threats that may affect recovery operations.

(c) Locate OPFOR positions.

(d) Pass all threat data to AMC.

f. Pre-recovery:

(a) Pass 15-line brief to recovery vehicles, RESCORT (see Annex J).

(b) Direct isolated personnel to:

i. Prepare signalling devices but to use them only as briefed or when di-rected by authenticated PR forces.

ii. Report threats.iii. Vector recovery vehicles.iv. Approach recovery vehicles when directed and follow their instructions.

g. Actions at PUP:



(a) Direct recovery vehicles as required to proceed from the IP to PUP.

(b) Direct isolated personnel signalling, or delegate isolated personnel control tothe recovery vehicles.

(c) If required, act as Airborne Forward Air Controllers (ABFACs) for RESCORToverhead.

(d) Be prepared to vector recovery vehicles to safe area if immediate threat oc-curs.

h. Egress i.a.w. plan once isolated personnel are on board the recovery vehicles.

i. Pass in flight report to AMC.

j. Monitor PR code usage.


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Annex G

RESCORT responsibilitieschecklist

a. Route:

(a) Fly detached or attached RESCORT pattern as dictated by RMC or as requiredby threat.

(b) Use sensors for threat assessment and to update recovery vehicles position.

b. En-route suppression:

(a) Call all threats by type using bearing and range from recovery vehicles orspider point until suppression of threat.

(b) No threat to recovery vehicles: hold or vector recovery vehicles to last knownsafe spider point.

(c) Threat to recovery vehicles: immediately vector recovery vehicles to avoidthreat and then suppress when recovery vehicles is clear.

(d) If threat cannot be suppressed, determine if route can be changed.

c. Pick up point:

(a) Attached and detached RESCORT secure the OA.

(b) When secure, continue to provide overwatch and security.

d. Monitor PR code usage.


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Annex H

Recovery vehicle checklist

a. Rendezvous at RV with RESCORT, receive brief from RMC when unable to plan andbrief together and hold at RV until reception of execute order.

b. Route:

(a) Transit as appropriate for terrain masking and threat avoidance along thebriefed spider points.

(b) Make checkpoint calls to RESCORT as applicable.

(c) Use bearing and range calls to or from checkpoints to assist RESCORT in main-taining contact if applicable. Use aircraft lighting as last resort.

(d) Complete 15-line brief before leaving RV.

c. En-route threat suppression

(a) Call threats by type with bearing and range from aircraft, checkpoint or ge-ographical reference. PRTF members should use typical “avoid-suppress-kill”threat prioritisation procedures. Return to last safe checkpoint and hold.

(b) Make checkpoint calls to RESCORT.

(c) RMC will make decision to continue, change route or abort.

d. IP

(a) Update gunners on threat avenues of approach and isolated personnel loca-tion in objective area.

(b) Update authentication data with recovery team.

(c) Switch frequency to isolated personnel when directed.

e. PUP

(a) Provide threat suppression.

(b) Make threat calls as bearing and range from aircraft, or geographical refer-ence.

(c) Ask for appropriate signalling from isolated personnel.

(d) Call landing, 30 seconds codeword and heading for take-off.

(e) Egress tactics similar to ingress tactics.


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Annex I

Recovery vehicle to RESCORTbrief

a. Recovery vehicle callsign.

b. Number and type.

c. Ingress routes.

d. ETA to holding point.

e. Egress routes.

f. Endurance.

g. Pick-up capabilities.

h. Pararescuemen (PJs).

i. Guns.

j. Speed.

k. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) protection.

l. Pick up technique.

m. Recovery vehicle wingman plan.


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Annex J

15-line pick-up brief

J.1 15-line pick-up brief

1 Callsign.

2 # of isolated personnel.

3 Isolated personnel’s location (secure), source and date/time stamp.

4 Isolated personnel’s condition.

(a) Ambulatory.

(b) Not ambulatory/not critical.

(c) Critical.

(d) Dead.

5 Equipment (comm/signal).

6 Authentication complete? Y/N, method.

7 Threats.

8 Elevation of object location.

9 Description of object location.

10 IP.

(a) Ingress routing.

(b) Egress routing.

11 Ordnance.

12 RESCORT tactics.

13 Recovery tactics.

14 Comm/signal procedures.

15 Questions?

* Line 1 to 9 are minimum information.



J.2 Explanation

J.2 Explanation

1 Callsign(s): Give the complete Callsign(s) of the concerned crewmember.

2 Number of isolated personnel: Ideally, this number will correspond to the numberof call signs. However, if call signs are unknown or are incomplete, knowing thenumber of isolated personnel will help recovery forces better than the pickup.

3 Location(s): The location of each isolated personnel in Lat / Long, UTM / MGRSgrid, or range and bearing to a known point (SARDOT, waypoint, etc.). Providethe coordinates / range and bearing in the original format as received from thesource (HOOK 112 GPS coordinates, accompanying aircraft over flight, etc.). Alsoprovide the source of the location by circling the appropriate descriptor (GPS, Map,Flyover, Other) and the date / time stamp or code of that location. For example,if an aircraft flew over the isolated personnel and recorded the position, circleflyover and include the Zulu date / time of this location or code (e.g. 281403Z orLocation B). If given GPS coordinates from the isolated person, circle GPS. Thesource of information can be critical when loading into navigation systems due tothe different datum and navigation system defaults. Having the information in itsoriginal format will limit errors induced by various conversions that are handeddown from one controlling agency to another.

4 Isolated personnel condition: Most important is can they walk or not? Answer YESor NO. This will assist the recovery vehicle in determining the amount of time theground team will need. If time permits, provide additional information concerningthe type and extent of injuries.

5 Equipment (Comm / signal): Coordinate the following for the isolated personnelarea: the passing of specific OSC duties from RESCORT to the recovery vehicle andback, who has control of the isolated person frequency, and who is responsible forcoordinating isolated personnel signalling and when. Provide the recovery vehiclewith the signalling devices available to the isolated person.

6 Authentication completed? YES or NO and how the authentication was accom-plished (ISOPREP data, letter of the day, etc.). Inform recovery forces of authenti-cation information previously used and compromised, to include ISOPREP data, PRword, letter, or number of the day.

7 Threats: Isolated personnel are threats that will affect the recovery vehicle orRESCORT. Include OPFOR foot soldiers, tanks / armoured vehicles, known or sus-pected chemical / radiation hazards, AAA, SAMs, etc. Include enroute threats dur-ing ingress and egress if known.

8 Elevation: Provide the MSL altitude (or nearest 1000 ft) of the isolated personnellocation if known. Elevation is critical above 4000 ft AMSL and / or surface air tem-perature is 25 degrees Celsius or greater. These factors are used for calculating therecovery vehicle’s power available and power required for various hover heights.

9 Description of isolated personnel area: Some possible descriptors: flat, rocky, hilly,sloped, 80-foot trees, valley, and ridgeline. For example, “ZORBA 01B is on thesouth slope of an east / west running ridgeline halfway up in rocky terrain.”

10 (a) Ingress Route: Provide the ingress route for the recovery vehicle to the actualisolated personnel location from the IP.


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(b) Egress route: Provide an egress route from the isolated person location to aplanned exit point, FEBA / FLOT crossing, etc. Ingress / egress routes shouldavoid threat exposure to the recovery vehicles. Use spider points / routes ifavailable.

11 Sandy ordnance available: List and describe all available ordnance and quantityper RESCORT aircraft type.

12 RESCORT tactics: Describe patterns of both attached and detached RESCORT. Alsodescribe pre-planned reaction against encountered threats, type and location, alongthe Rescue track.

13 Rescue tactics: Describe the recovery vehicles type of progression (speed, height,etc.) related to the position on the track. Announce the type of recovery to beperformed (landing, hoist, etc.). Also describe the final options for all the recoveryvehicles (landing, hover for protection, split to recover a distant isolated person,etc.).

14 Comm / Signal procedures: Remind the main Codewords, frequencies, check andisolated personnel recovery procedures to be used.

15 Additional Items / Questions: Any other business if deemed necessary.



J.2 Explanation



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Annex K

Joint formation face-to-facebriefing guide

a. Call signs

b. Parking

c. Max Actual Combat Load (ACL)

d. Determine package requirements (navlogs, frags, maps)

(a) Discuss numbering differences etc.(b) Discuss planning airspeeds and altitudes(c) Maps and datums

e. Communications

(a) Check ini. Time

ii. Procedures(b) Inter-plane frequency

f. Lighting

(a) Discuss lighting configurations

g. Signals and codewords

(a) Light signals (on the objective and off)(b) Required calls (i.e. turkey, fubar, etc.)(c) Expected calls (i.e. swapping sides of formation)(d) Lead change procedures

h. Taxi, take-off, join-up

(a) Spacing(b) Hover check procedures(c) Take-off procedures (ground or hover)

i. Formation type

(a) Define formations (terms may differ)



j. Air refuelling

(a) Formation sequencing (critical fuel concerns)

(b) Light signals

(c) Re-constituting the formation

k. Inadvertent IMC procedures

(a) Heading (true vs. magnetic)

l. Weather requirements (per airframe)

m. Discuss overall performance factors

(a) Quick stops

(b) Acceleration


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Annex L

RMC task delegation sheet

L.1 Mission preparation:

L.1.1 Aim

a. High or complicated threat level

b. Numerous different assets from different countries with different point of view.That’s why it is necessary to have a common mission planning method, in order to:

(a) prepare the mission as far as possible

(b) be sure that nothing will be forgotten

(c) be sure that everybody knows who do what

L.1.2 Principles

a. delegation of the different tasks to cells

b. coherence of the tasks of each cell

c. coordination and control by the RMC

d. use of briefing at different points of the mission planning

L.1.3 Crew tasks

Tasks for all crew members when they arrive at the operational deployment base:

a. Take and read the documentation (Airspace Control Order (ACO), COMPLAN, SOP,SPINS)

b. Prepare maps (draw Spider Points, FLOT, gates, etc.)

c. Upload data to the “crew mission planning computer”

d. Update ISOPREP




L.1.4 Chronology

Under the command of the RMC who is responsible for the time management:

a. Initial briefing: presentation of the general situation, the documentation and defi-nition of the different cells.

b. Intermediate briefing(s): presentation of the conclusions of the cells and if neces-sary correction by the RMC.

c. Mission briefing, using the RMC mission briefing format.

d. Debriefing, using the mission debriefing format.

L.1.5 Cells

Planning activities will be subdivided over cells as depicted in the table below with theirrespective responsibilities.

a. Command cell

(a) Assign deputy commander

(b) Lead brainstorm

(c) Coordination between the cells

(d) Coordination recovery - rescort

(e) Authentication (initial and at PUP)

(f) Go / No go criteria

(g) Establish time line

(h) Acknowledge to JPRC / PRCC

b. Intel and electronic warfare cell

(a) Bring Weather to brainstorm

(b) ISOPREP and EPA Isolated Personnel

(c) Prepare tactical situation display

(d) Analyse INTREP

(e) Analyse SARIR / EPA Isolated Personnel

(f) Analyse imagery and LZ

(g) Prepare EW database

(h) Collect documentation (authentication codes, etc.) and distribute

(i) Prepare Intell brief

c. Route cell

(a) Prepare the NOTAMs/ Birdtam

(b) Taxi and take off

(c) Plan route

(d) Prepare the flightplan

(e) Push point split point


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(f) Air to air TACAN plan(g) Time On Target (TOT)(h) RV

(i) Recovery time (if neccessary)(j) Maximum Rolex

d. OA cell

(a) Develop ingress – OA– egress plan(b) OA tactics Deconflict:

i. Weapons employement and ROE

ii. Threats call/reaction (techniques)(c) Identify LZs

(d) Ready to leave target(e) Contingencies(f) TOTs

(g) Bad weather plan(h) Coordinate extraction plan with ground tactics cell

e. Ground tactics cell

(a) Prepare PRTF EPA

(b) Check PRTF ISOPREPs

(c) Ground extraction plan and tactics (see also Annex O)(d) Co-ordinate with RESCORT, and recovery vehicles(e) Plan contingencies

f. COMCARD cell

(a) Manage planning timeline(b) Coordinate with Airborne Early Warning (AEW)(c) Develop PRTF COMPLAN

(d) Get info on to the COMCARD (data, freqs, timeline and codewords)

g. Holding cell

(a) Location(b) Altitudes / Heading / Speed / Turns(c) Weather backup(d) Latecomer(e) Push Flow(f) Bring info and plan to comm card

h. FARP cell

(a) Location(b) Joining / leaving procedures(c) Refueling sequence(d) Holding point / altitude




(e) Fuel required vs. available

(f) Information to COMCARD

(g) Contingecies

(h) Emergencies

L.1.6 Check before walk:

a. Updated maps (spiders, FLOT, ingress, egress)

b. Updated COMCARD (frequencies, time line, data, code words) (see Annex P)

c. Updated GPS/nav aid (ingress, egress, survivor(s) position)

d. OA tactics (position and sectors of RESCORT, approach heading of the recovery)

e. What ifs (mechanical, radio, etc.)

f. Documentation (authentication codes, etc.)

g. Time and frequency of the check-in


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Annex M

Suggested PRTF SOP format

A PRTF will have to develop an SOP for iternal use. This SOP should be used as a guidelinefor mission planning and execution. Specific mission needs may require to deviate fromthis SOP; the SOP is merely a collection of default actions in general, rather than anykind of “rule of law”.

As there are significant differences between operating by day and at night that affectalmost every aspect of this SOP, it is strongly recommended to develop two separate SOP;one for day and one for night operations.

M.1 Timeline

After receiving the ATO, a timeline shall be given As Soon As Possible (ASAP) by theperson responsible for the time table (together with the RMC) and strictly adhered to byall participants when the PRTF is tasked to plan (and conduct) a recovery mission.

Activity TimeMET/NOTAM/INTEL/ATOCommence brainstormComplete brainstormStart planningPrepare mappingMass briefingIndividual flight briefingStepTaxiTake offTOT

M.2 Joblist

See Annex L on page 217.

M.3 Flow

a. Assign tasks



M.4 Brainstorm checklist

b. Analyse mission

c. Brainstorm

d. Plan mission

e. Plan contingencies

f. Identify showstoppers

g. Brief mission

h. Brief sections/elements

i. Step

j. Execute mission

k. Debrief mission

M.4 Brainstorm checklist

Consider the participants to the brainstorm and the duration.

M.5 Planning checklist

M.5.1 Planning parameters

a. PRTF composition

b. Aircraft speed

c. Weapon load

d. Load capacity (# of isolated personnel)

e. National caveats

f. Weather minima

M.5.2 Planning standards

a. Map markings

b. Communications

M.6 Briefing

a. Format (Vol II Annex N)

b. Timeline


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M.7 Start-up and taxi standard

a. Start-up sequence

b. Taxi sequence

c. Communications

d. Lighting

M.8 Enroute flying standard

a. Enroute formation

b. Enroute tactics

c. Speed

d. Altitude

e. Communications

f. Lighting

g. Air to air TACAN

M.9 Holding standard

This section may be more applicable to FW aircraft, but a plan for the RW assets close tothe PUP may be necessary for timing and final mission adjustment purposes.

M.10 FARP standard

See also ATP-3.7.1 Vol II Annex R.

M.11 Objective area standard

a. Authentication (refer to the PR SOP for the operation as that will guidance to theauthentication methods to be used by specific entities

b. FW RESCORT protection

c. RW RESCORT protection

d. Recovery vehicle landing

e. EF standard

f. Recovery vehicle take-off



M.12 Contingencies

M.12 Contingencies

a. Threat avoidance

b. Bad weather

c. Aircraft fall out prior take-off

d. Bump plan

e. Comms failure

M.13 Emergencies

a. Inadvertent IMC

b. Blind

c. Downed aircraft

d. NVD malfunction

e. Other


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Annex N

RMC mission briefing format

All elements to be taken from standing orders (SPINS, COMPLAN, ACO, ATO, etc.) whereapplicable.

N.1 General

The Personnel Recovery Mission Brief (PMB) is the PRTF core elements’ briefing con-ducted by the RMC, in which supporting staff and all involved mission elements brieftheir part of the PR mission. The PMB contains the plan of the recovery vehicles com-mander, RESCORT commander and EF commander. After the PMB all details regardingthe tasked mission should be clear to all mission elements.

N.2 Mission elements

a. AMC

b. OSC

c. RMC

d. RESCORT commander

e. Recovery vehicles commander

f. Extraction forces commander

g. Intel

N.3 Preparation

Supporting Staff and all involved mission elements must have their part of the PMBready, including overlays and sketches. There must be a map 1:100.000 of the operationarea and a map 1:50.000 of the objective area. The PUZ, when known, will be briefed byusing a large-scale sketch and/or photo of the area.



N.4 Briefing format

N.4 Briefing format

Slide 1: PRTF mission (RMC)

• Roll call• Time hack• References (versions of):

– ATO

– Map– COMCARD

– EPA

• Time zone used

Slide 2: General overview (RMC)

• Higher commander’s intent• Mission• Risk level• Political Planning Indicator (PPI)• Objective• TOT

Slide 3: ROE

• ROEIMPL version• National caveats• Special considerations

Slide 4: Intel update

• Intel update:– General– Enroute– In / around the OA

• PRTF PR codes– RAMROD

– SARDOT

– SARNEG

– Duress– PR word– PR letter– PR number– DAR

Slide 5: Weather / Notice to Airmens (NOTAMs) / birdtam

• Weather update:– General

∗ Visibility / cloud base / precipitation∗ Wind



227

∗ Temperatures / freezing level∗ Ephemerides∗ Illumination by night in Lux / thermal x-over IR

∗ Sea-state– Homebase– Enroute– In / around the OA

– Diversion• NOTAM update• Birdtam update

Slide 6: Domestics

• Flightplans• Base status• Local Operating Procedures (LOPs)

Slide 7: Route

• Detailed route description– ACO

– Ingress, IP, OA, egress– Hazards (obstacles & powerlines) / MSA

– Speeds– Altitude deconfliction plan– Splits

Slide 8: Route contingencies

• Threat reaction• Timing (lose / add)• Divert airfields• Latest take-off to stay within TOT window• Adverse weather

Slide 9: Holding plan

• Location• Altitude(s) / heading / speed / turns• Rejoin plan• Adverse weather backup• Push flow

Slide 10: FARP plan

• Location / frequencies• Joining / leaving procedures• Holding point / altitude• Fuel required vs. available• Information on COMCARD



N.4 Briefing format

• Contingencies• Emergencies

Slide 11: FW RESCORT

• Tasks• Tactics

– Ingress– OA

∗ Sanitise∗ Authentication of isolated personnel∗ Request Execute approval through AMC

∗ Frequency management– Egress– Contingencies

Slide 12: Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)

• Tasks• SEAD plan overview

– Flow– Orbit– Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)– pet! (pet!) times / coverage– Vul time– Communications / codewords

• Threat reactions• Contingencies

Slide 13: FW RESCAP

• Tasks• ROE / ID criteria• Tactics overview

– Sweep plan– Detached / embedded escort plan– CAP position

• Contingencies

Slide 14: OSC

• Authentication• Isolated personnel information update (9 / 15 liner)• Frequency usage• Risk / threat level

Slide 15: OA; ingress

• Flow• Formation



229

• Route

• Tactics

• Contingencies

Slide 16: OA; Fire zones / areas of responsibility (Picture vertical cut through of who iswithin which cylinder)

Slide 17: OA; overall

• OA description

– Elevation– Isolated personnel location– Obstacles– Landing zone

• Operations (FW / RW RESCORT / recovery vehicles)

– Flow– Formation– Tactics– Contingencies

Slide 18: OA; extraction force

• Terrain

• Threat

• EF tactics

• Authentication

• Contingencies

Slide 19: OA; egress

• Flow

• Formation

• Route

• Tactics

• Contingencies

Slide 20: OA contingencies

• Threat handling

– ROEs

– Techniques

• Weapons employment

– Fratricide– Collateral damage

Slide 21: COMPLAN

• COMCARD

• Codewords

• Bullseye



N.4 Briefing format

• IFF procedures

• Emission Control (EMCON) procedures

• Communications flow

– Priorities– Jamming – chattermark procedures / authority– Spoofing – Gingerbread procedures– EOB update– AEW agreements

∗ Service provided∗ Radio coverage∗ Radar coverage∗ AMC manager

– Controlling agency fallout

Slide 22: Snapshots

• Taxi and take-off

• En-route

• Holding

• At IP

• Ingress

• On the ground

• Egress

• En-route

• FARP

• Landing and taxi

Slide 23: Contingencies

• Go / no-go

– Threat vs. risk level– FARP fallout– No AMC

– Minimum self protection– Minimum RESCAP

– Minimum SEAD

– Minimum RESCORT

– Minimum recovery vehicles– Minimum EF

Slide 24: Emergencies

• Inadvertent IMC

• Blind

• Others as required

Slide 25: Questions (ALL)


Extraction force mission planning guideNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex O

Extraction force mission planningguide

O.1 Extraction force planning

The extraction of the isolated personnel is the core of the recovery mission. This partof the mission should therefore be thoroughly planned. The planning should take as aminimum the following steps into account:

a. Study the mission

b. Plan use of time

c. Study terrain and situation

d. Study intelligence, prepare IPB

e. Organise the team

f. Select men, weapons, and equipment

g. Issue warning order

h. Coordination (continuous throughout)

i. Request reconnaissance

j. Complete detailed plans

k. Issue operation order

l. Brief-back (to the tasking authority)

m. Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse

n. Execute the mission



O.2 Extraction force briefing guide


O.2.1 Time hack

O.2.2 Team mission overview (given by team leader)

O.2.3 Marshaling area procedures

a. Manifest

(a) Number of pax

(b) Equipment

(c) Estimated average weight

(d) Weapons carrying procedures (muzzle down, on “safe”)

b. Loading

(a) Location (restrictions)

(b) Aircraft markings (chalk #)

(c) Restraining devices

(d) Bump plan (diagram)

(e) Team leader location (headset?)

c. Effects of delays

d. Static load training

(a) Time

(b) Location

(c) Players involved

(d) Aircraft familiarisation briefing

• aircraft capabilities• emergency exits (location and operation)• emergency shutdown (fuel shutoff, rotor brake)• destruction procedures (sensitive equipment)

O.2.4 Infiltration plan

a. Primary LZ

(a) Name

(b) Location (lat/long or MGRS)

(c) Datum used (check GPS)

(d) TOT

b. Alternate LZ

(a) Name





233

(d) TOT

c. Actions on objective

(a) Landing sequence(b) Landing direction(c) Weapons status / firing fans(d) Emergency procedures(e) Go around procedures(f) Actions in the event of hot LZ

d. Communications

(a) Aircraft callsigns(b) Team callsigns(c) Primary frequency(d) Secondary frequency(e) Comm check (time and format)(f) Time warnings (20, 10, 5, 1 min)(g) No comm plan

e. Signals

(a) Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) markings(b) Friendly identification / team markings(c) Aircraft signals

f. Fire support

(a) Other aviation assets availablei. Fixed wing fire support

ii. Rotary wing fire supportiii. Other

(b) Location and altitude of fire support aviation assets(c) Indirect fire support assets (ground) available

i. Mortarsii. Artillery

(d) Location and trajectory of rounds(e) Friendly and threat markings(f) Comm out fire support request signal

g. Contingencies

(a) Lame duck(b) Shoot down(c) Weather

i. Takeoffii. Enroute

iii. Objective




iv. Effects on fire support assets

h. PR plan

(a) Responding assets

(b) Notification procedures

(c) ISOPREP / EPA

(d) Medical facilities

O.2.5 Exfiltration plan

a. Primary LZ

(a) Name



(d) TOT

b. Alternate LZ

(a) Name



(d) TOT

c. Actions on objective

(a) Landing sequence

(b) Landing direction

(c) Weapons status / firing fans

(d) Emergency procedures

(e) Go around procedures

(f) Actions in the event of hot LZ

d. Communications

(a) Aircraft callsigns

(b) Team callsigns

(c) Primary frequency

(d) Secondary frequency

(e) Comm check (time and format)

(f) Time warnings (20, 10, 5, 1 min)

(g) No comm plan

e. Signals

(a) HLS markings

(b) Friendly identification / team markings

(c) Aircraft signals



235

f. Fire support

(a) Other aviation assets available

i. Fixed wing fire supportii. Rotary wing fire support

iii. Other

(b) Location and altitude of fire support aviation assets

(c) Indirect fire support assets (ground) available

i. Mortarsii. Artillery

(d) Location and trajectory of rounds

(e) friendly and threat markings

(f) Comm out fire support request signal

g. Contingencies

(a) Lame duck

(b) Shoot down

(c) Weather

(d) Abort criteria

i. Takeoffii. Enroute

iii. Objectiveiv. Effects on fire support assets

h. PR plan

(a) Responding assets

(b) Notification procedures

(c) Medical facilities



237

Annex P

Communications

P.1 Brevity words

Brevity words are short words to communicate procedures or information in a fast man-ner. The words selected below are NATO standard and commonly used in especially NATOair operations1. These brevity words can be used in planning or executing a PR mission.Additional and/or different brevity words may be used. All brevity words to be used inan operation should be inserted in the SPINS.

REMARKSABORT Cease action / attack event / mission /emer-

gency egressAJAX LZ /PZ clear of threatsANCHOR(ED) Orbit at a specific pointBANDIT Enemy Aircraft(system) BENT System indicated inoperativeBINGO Fuel state reached needed for recovery (imme-

diate BUGOUT)BITTERSWEET Blue on Blue / Neutral engagementBLIND No visual contact with friendlies (opposite of

VISUAL)BOGEY Unidentified aircraftBREAK RIGHT or LEFT Turn 90 degrees Left or Right immediatelyBUGOUT Separation of operation with no intent to re-

engageBUSTER PLUS XX orMINUS XX

In- or decrease speed plus or minus XX knots

BUZZER Electronic communications jammingCEASE FIRE Stop firing, missile in flight can continue to

targetCHATTERMARK Switch to the alternate frequency due to MIJI

(Meaconing - Intrusion - Jamming - Interfer-ence)

CLEARED HOT Ordnance release authorisedCLOSING Decrease separation (opposite of FLOAT)COMMIT Intercept / engage specified targetCONTACT Sensor contact at stated positionDATA IDM message. Send / received / not receivedDEADEYE Laser / IR pointer inoperativeDIVERT Proceed to the alternate base / mission

1A complete list of all standard brevity words can be found in APP-7 Joint brevity words publication.



P.1 Brevity words

EXTEND Manoeuvre for separation / position to re-attack

FEET WET / DRY Continue ops over water / landFENCE (IN / OUT) Set switches entering / leaving the combat

areaFLASH Turn on specified system for identificationFLOAT Increase separation (opposite of CLOSING)GO (DE)ACTIVE De- or activate frequency hopping on specified

radioGO CLEAR Deactivate encryption on specified radioGO SECURE Activate encryption on specified radioHOLD FIRE Stop firing, missile in flight should be aimed

elsewhere if possibleINDIA IFF Mode 4LEAN (DIRECTION) Manoeuvre to avoid threatMARSHALLING Establish at a specific pointMUD (type and direc-tion)

Ground RWR indications

NAKED No RWR indicationsNO JOY No visual contact with the non-friendlies (op-

posite of TALLY)PLAYTIME Time left for missionPOPEYE Flying in reduced visibility (e.g. fog, smoke,

dust)PRESS Continue attackRESUME Resume last formation / route / missionRIFLE Friendly air to ground missile launchedROLEX Time adjustment from original plan in min-

utesROPE Circling IR pointer around aircraft to identify

troops on the groundSADDLED Return to briefed formation positionSAUNTER (RANGE) Fly max endurance (range)SCRAMBLE Take off as soon as possibleSHOTGUN Briefed weapon status at which BUGOUT

should beginSNAKE Oscillate IR pointer about a targetSPARKLE Oscillate IR pointer on target / Mark target

with tracersSPIKE(D) Direction RWR indications of a radar track or launchSPLIT Leave formation to pursue separate attackSPOOFING Voice deception is being usedSTATUS Request for information regarding aircraft sta-

tusSTEADY Stop oscillation of IR pointerTALLY Sighting of non-friendlies (opposite of NO

JOY)TEN SECONDS Stand-by for Laser ON in ten secondsTERMINATE Stop laser illumination of targetTUMBLEWEED Loss of situational awareness, request infor-

mationVISUAL Visual contact with friendlies (opposite of

BLIND)WHAT LUCK BDA / results of the missionWHAT STATE Number of fuel / ammo / rockets / missiles of

aircraftWINCHESTER Out of ammunition



239

YARDSTICK Directive to use air to air TACAN for rangeand bearing

P.2 COMCARD

Here are four generic examples of a COMCARD to be used2.

DATE: PACKAGE: AMC: RMC: DATE: PACKAGE: AMC: RMC:

CALL SIGN MSN ACFT M1 M 3 M3 2# TAXI T/0 VHF TAC CALL SIGN ROLL CALL HOLD VFR IFR PUSH TIME INGRESS ALT IP ALT

X (GPS) TIME WILL DECLARED BY CAOC TO START PR MISSION

PACKAGE INFORMATION SARNEG HQ FREQUENCIESINITIAL CHECK-IN :

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 DAYCALL SIGN RV ROUTE IP AREA ERP

CLEARANCE

TOT WINDOW WOD

REATTACK WINDOW WORD OF THE DAYLAST OUT TIME

NETSARDOT PR NUMBER / LETTER

LOCATION OF ISOLATED PERSONNEL

SURVIVOR CALL SIGN U-Y U-X AUXILIARY U-XSTP LAT LONG ELEV POINT SPİDER POINTS

1 A1 B5

2 A2 C1

3 A3 C2

4 A4 C3 BIG PICTURE5 A5 .

6 A6 .

7 B1 .8 B2 .9 B3 .10 B4 .

CODE WORDS IFFMOD I MOD III

………….. COORDINATION CARD ………………. COORDINATION CARD

USE …………….LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING /

IP

RV POINT

SURVIVOR

SANDY 1-2

SANDY 3-4

JOLLY

Figure P.1: A COMCARD example

2We should attempt to come up with one single COMCARD example that should be good enough toreplace all existing national comcards.



P.2 COMCARD



Helo lead to RESCORT BriefingNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex Q

Helo lead to RESCORT Briefing

This checklist is to be used in case of an airborne join-up of the PRTF.

a. Helo callsign

b. Number and type

c. Ingress routes

d. ETA to holding point

e. Egress routes

f. Endurance.

g. Pick-up capabilities

h. PJs

i. Hoist

j. Special Insertion and Extraction (SPIE)

k. Litter

l. Forest penetrator

m. Guns

n. Speed

o. NBC protection

p. Pick up technique

q. Helo wingman plan


Tactical arming and refuellingNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex R

Tactical arming and refuelling

1

R.1 Tasks and responsibilities

The JPRC / PRCC will coordinate the establishment of a FARP as appropriate. The FARPcommander will have Operational Control (OPCON) over all personnel in the FARP. AFARP will consist of personnel of the same nationality, as far as possible. For this annex,refuelling will be considered to be “hot” unless otherwise stated.

R.1.1 RMC

The RMC will have responsibility, in full coordination with the JPRC / PRCC, over theplanning of the FARP, in time, as well as in location. He will plan a reconnaissance asfar as possible.

R.1.2 FARP commander

The FARP commander is fully responsible for the execution of the FARP. He will haveOPCON over all personnel that are required to operate the refuelling point.

R.1.3 Recommended personnel available on a FARP

Depending on the size of the FARP and helicopters, the following list of personnel can beused as a guideline to establish the composition of a FARP.

a. Command element: 1 FARP commander and 1 deputy FARP commander

b. Pad management: 1 pad chief per helicopter pad

c. Fuel supply element: 1 operator for every available fuel nozzle

d. Fire fighting element: according to national regulations

e. Comms element: 1 operator1This annex is inserted in the absence of an annex on refuelling procedures in ATP-49. This annex will

therefore be deleted upon promulgation of an new edition of ATP-49.



R.2 FARP and FARP area

f. Medical element: according to national regulations

g. Ground and air defence element

R.2 FARP and FARP area

Figure R.1: Generic FARP area layout

The FARP should be large enough to accommodate the number of aircraft requiring fuelat one time, along with the refuelling equipment involved. It may also include an areafor the fuel trucks, the fire and medical crew and the communication devices. A FARParea will consist of a point “in”, a holding area, the FARP and a point “out” The points“in” and “out” will be big enough to allow all helicopters to land. The holding area is 100meters away from the refuelling points where the helicopters will hover before beingcalled in. The holding area can be equipped with a landing “T” See also Figure R.1

R.2.1 Criteria for landing / refuelling points

The size of a landing site for helicopters to be refuelled will depend on the amount andsize of helicopters using the landing site. The minimum recommended distance (d) be-tween landing points can be found in ATP 49, Chapter 4, Section 1. For Gazelle, A109,Apache, Cougar, HH 3 F, Puma, Super Puma and UH-1D, the minimum recommendeddistance between landing points is 50 meters. If possible, the fuel trucks will stay sta-tionary during the whole refuelling process. If this is not possible, the fuel trucks willmake a U turn and return to their original position to allow other helicopters enteringthe FARP. At no time, helicopters will over fly the fuel trucks. During night operations,all vehicles will only use tactical exterior lighting. See also Figure R.2

Figure R.2: Standard FARP layout



245

R.2.2 Lighting

All night operations will be done with NVG, so all white light has to be avoided. Alllighting will be as follows:

a. All refuelling pads will be indicated by orange coloured chem lights.

b. The pad chief will wear a blue chem light and will use white chem light for handsignals.

c. Red chem lights will indicate safe zone behind tail rotor for ground crew.

d. The landing T will be outlined with white coloured chem lights.

e. All vehicles will use tactical exterior lighting.

R.2.3 Fire fighting equipment

National regulations will be complied with. The following guidelines can be taken inconsideration in case of doubt;

a. Lightweight water extinguisher

b. One 10 kg CO2

c. Extinguisher 2.5 kg dry powder next to pump

d. 2.5 kg dry powder extinguisher next to each refuel point

R.2.4 Medical crew

Medical crew and their equipment should be available to give immediate aide in case ofa mishap.

R.2.5 Fuel trucks

Depending on the size of the FARP, fuel trucks and their operators will be on a fixedposition, or will move between the different refuelling pads. All fuel truck operators willemploy all standard grounding and bonding regulations.

R.2.6 Communications device

There will always be a VHF and/or UHF radio and operator available. Even in case of aprocedural FARP execution, there will always be a radio frequency available in case ofan emergency.



R.3 Refuelling procedures

R.3 Refuelling procedures

R.3.1 Radio controlled

a. 5 minutes prior the FARP area, the first element/section lead of a PRTF will contactthe FARP. After this initial contact the element/section will be cleared to approachthe FARP, or to stand by at point “in”

b. When cleared to enter the FARP area, helicopters will go to the point “in” or proceedimmediately to the holding point, as briefed by the RMC, and will be summoned toenter the FARP. A pad chief will give further visual instructions

c. Helicopters will only enter the FARP if instructed so by radio and pad chief.

d. Cold refuelling only: After landing in the FARP, helicopters will shut down theirengines, and pilots will assist the fuel truck operators if necessary. Start-up willbe initialised after instructed by the pad chief.

e. After having refuelled and after being cleared to leave the FARP, helicopters jointhe point “out” The FARP commander is responsible for the refuelling procedure inthe FARP and the summoning of the helicopters on the FARP frequency. The RMC isresponsible for the refuelling procedure out of the FARP, which includes the choiceof the points “in” and “out”, the procedures at those points and at the holding point.

f. Example Radio calls:

(a) “TEXACO”, this is “C/S”, request entering the FARP

(b) “C/S”, this is “TEXACO”, you are clear to enter the FARP at point “in”

(c) Next helicopter is clear to enter for pad A, B, C, D

(d) Helicopter at A is clear to leave for point “out” when ready

R.3.2 Procedural

a. The first element/section lead of a PRTF will send a scout to reconnoitre whetherthe FARP is clear. If that is not the case, helicopters will hold at point “in”

b. When the FARP is clear, helicopters will proceed immediately to the holding point,as briefed by the RMC, and will be summoned by a pad chief to enter the FARP. Thepad chief will give further visual instructions.

c. Helicopters will only enter the FARP if instructed so by a pad chief.

d. Cold refuelling only: After landing in the FARP, helicopters will shut down theirengines, and pilots will assist the fuel truck operators if necessary.

e. Start-up will be initialised after instructed by the pad chief.

f. After being cleared to leave the FARP by the pad chief, helicopters join the point“out”

The FARP commander remains responsible for the refuelling procedure in the FARP andthe summoning of the helicopters. The RMC is responsible for the refuelling procedureout of the FARP, which includes the choice of the points “in” and “out”, the procedures atthose points and at the holding point.



247

R.4 Safety

R.4.1 Responsibilities

a. FARP Commander: Must ensure that all FARP personnel are briefed and aware ofall normal and emergency procedures.

b. Pad chief: Is responsible for all personnel and actions associated with the normaland emergency operations of his pad. He is responsible for determining the crewintentions and all other personnel will remain clear of the pad until directed bythe pad chief.

R.4.2 Fire at the FARP

In case of an A/C that gets on fire on the FARP, it is important that all aircrew and groundcrew act according these guidelines. Hand signals are according ATP 49. Personnel willreact as follows:

a. Aircrew.

(a) Signal from / to pad chief: FIRE

(b) Emergency shut down

(c) Egress

(d) Move to RV

b. Pad chief.

(a) Signal : FIRE to fuel operator and air crew

(b) Operate fire extinguisher, concentrate on crew

(c) When relieved from fire crew, move to RV

c. Fuel truck operator.

(a) Stop fuel flow

(b) Signal FIRE

(c) If nozzle is removed:

i. Insert hose and grounding cablesii. Move fuel truck to safe location

iii. Report at RV

iv. If nozzle is not removed: move to RV

d. Fire crew.

(a) On FIRE signal, activate siren and emergency lighting

(b) Engage the fire / recovery crew

e. Other pads.

(a) Pad chief notify aircrew

(b) Stop refuelling activities

(c) If rotor is not running: emergency shutdown, move to RV



R.5 Helicopter landing sites

(d) If rotor is running (and refuelling activities have not started yet, or are totallyfinished): take off after clearance from pad chief and move to the point “out”

(e) Make a MAYDAY call on frequency of controlling agency or guard, passing on:

i. Location of mishapii. Source of mishap

(f) Element/section leader will call TEXACO and exchange info.

R.4.3 Fuel spill

A fuel spill must be considered as a potential fire hazard and must be acted on accord-ingly:

a. Pad chief.

(a) Hand signal “stop refuel” to operator

(b) Call fuel spill, fuel spill, fuel spill

(c) After nozzle has been disconnected perform shutdown procedure

(d) Assist air crew in egress A/C

b. Fuel truck operator.

(a) Stop refuelling

(b) Insert fuel hose and grounding cables in fuel truck

(c) Drive fuel truck to start position

c. Fire crew.

(a) Move to spill location

(b) Clean up fuel spill

(c) When safe give all clear to pad chief

d. Pad chief.

(a) Resume FARP procedures on “all clear” call from fire crew

R.5 Helicopter landing sites

All procedures and standards of ATP-49, Use of helicopters in land operations, Volume2, Chapter 4, Helicopter Tactical or Non-permanent Landing Sites will be valid duringoperations.

R.6 Procedures for marshalling helicopters

All procedures and standards of ATP 49 -Use of helicopters in land operations, Volume2, Chapter 15; Procedures for marshalling helicopters in land operations- will be validduring PRTF operations.



249

R.7 Air refuelling briefing checklist

CALL SIGNS: Tanker Receiver

A/R TRACK

ARCT ARIP

ARCP AREP

ALTITUDE: JOINUP REFUEL MSituational Awareness (SA)

AIRSPEED

RADIO: VHF UHF FM HF

PRIMARY RADIO

TANKER: HI LOW

TYPE RENDEZVOUS

COMM OUT: YES NO

NVG LIGHTING: YES NO

STANDBY TANKER

SQUAWK : MODE I MODE II MODE III

TACAN A/A: Tanker Receiver

ALTIMETER

WEATHER

FUEL ONLOAD

ABORT POINT

EMERGENCY BASES

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

BACKUP PLAN



R.7 Air refuelling briefing checklist



TrainingNATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex S

Training

T.B.D.



Volume III

ISOLATED PERSONNEL GUIDE



f



257

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aim

This volume is intended to be used by tactical commanders and if required, by individ-uals. It prescribes generic Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) basic Survival,Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) principles concerning potential isolated per-sonnel during operations. The level of detail is not intended to replace national trainingpolicy.

1.2 Introduction

0101. NATO Nations are responsible for providing their personnel with specific SEREtraining and equipment to ensure their survivability. It is also the individual’s responsi-bility to prepare for possible isolation. This responsibility also reflects on the personnelwho might endanger themselves during recovery. Thorough preparation will increasethe probability of mission success and decrease the amount of time that recovery forcesmust operate in a hostile or uncertain operational environment. The well trained andeducated isolated personnel will be capable of adapting to the various isolation situa-tions and methods of extraction. Based upon the definition of the term isolated person-nel, SERE training is needed in order to provide personnel at risk of isolation the skills toreact appropriately and legally, as an isolated person, resistor, or escapee. Evaders haveto survive in order to evade. Attention to personal needs can be postponed temporarily,but eventually these survival needs must be met, or evaders won’t be physically or men-tally fit to continue. Dehydration, heat and cold, lack of sleep, sickness and starvationcontribute to physical weakness and poor decision making. Extraction is the end stageof the SERE process.

1.3 Mission abort

0102. All levels of command, including the isolated person, can recommend missionabort. The isolated personnel may be the person with the best situational awareness ofthe tactical situation in the recovery area. The isolated person should be aware that he/she is part of the decision process for aborting the mission and therefore, should alwaysconsider the threat to the recovery force and provide information whenever possible.



1.4 PIERIE vs MRIE and HRIE

1.4 PIERIE vs MRIE and HRIE

0103. Personnel Identified as at an Elevated Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation(PIERIE) is the general term to indicate that personnel that is at some risk if isolationand / or exploitation should be trained, equipped and prepared appropriately. Furtherdistinction can be made between personnel that is identified as Medium Risk of Iso-lation and / or Exploitation (MRIE) those who are identified as High Risk of Isolationand / or Exploitation (HRIE). HRIE may require higher levels of training, equipment andpreparation or more extensive risk mitigation measures to prevent them form becomingisolated.

0104. the level of risk personnel is anticipated to be at does not necesarily equal thelevel of effort that will be taken to recover and reintegrate them once they have becomeisolated.


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Chapter 2

PREPARATION AND PLANNING

2.1 General

0201. The following paragraphs are intended as an aide memoire to tactical comman-ders and trained personnel in the Area of Operations (AO) and as a guide to the relevantskills and training required of personnel deemed likely to become isolated.

2.2 Preparatory work

2.2.1 Personnel

0202. The successful recovery of isolated personnel in an AO can only be achieved ifthe personnel requiring recovery are sufficiently trained, equipped, mentally preparedand properly documented prior to the start of their mission, taking into account the dif-ference between personnel that is identified as MRIE and HRIE. Pre-emptive operational/ tactical planning and training is the preparatory work, conducted before an incidentoccurs, which facilitates extraction.

2.2.2 Next of kin

0203. The behavior and statements made by next of kin may seriously endanger per-sonnel that has become isolated or captured. It is a national responsibility to preparepersonnel and next of kin alike for do’s and don’t’s in particular towards the media inan isolating event.

2.3 Levels of training

0204. Isolation may occur following a wide variety of causes, from hostile activity, me-chanical failure or navigational error. All personnel in the AO are to be trained andequipped to evade and be recovered in the event of becoming isolated in enemy territory.The degree of training and the level of equipment will depend on national standardsand the likelihood of isolation applicable to each individual’s role. Definitions of levelsof SERE training are given in Chapter 6 and are contained in STANAG 7196. Minimumstandards of training and equipment to be carried will be identified in the OperationPlan (OPLAN) Annex V / Personnel Recovery (PR) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)/ Special Instructions (SPINS) for the relevant AO.



2.4 Operational planning

2.4 Operational planning

2.4.1 Annex V, PR SOP(s) and SPINS

0205. The Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC) and/or Personnel Recovery Coordina-tion Cell (PRCC) should provide detailed instructions to coordinate all PR measures andactivities in the AO. Operations should conform to the Concept of Operation (CONOPS)produced by JPRC. Details on the execution of PR missions should be disseminated viathe PR SOPs / SPINS. Personnel should study the the PR SOPs / SPINS prior to any opera-tion in the AO and follow their guidance. Units arriving in theatre should ensure thatthe JPRC and/or their PRCC are aware of their presence.

2.4.2 ISOPREP

0206. The Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) is a form designed to enable positiveidentification and authentication of an isolated person by recovery forces. It is highlyrecommended that all personnel prone to isolation, capture and exploitation are to com-plete ISOPREP forms, however this is mandatory for level B and C trained personnel.The PR SOP for the operation will define who is to have an ISOPREP. Annex A providesa format of an ISOPREP. The JPRC may disseminate a different format for an ISOPREPfor the specific AO. Directions for its completion and an example can be found at AnnexA. Personnel should seek assistance in completion of the ISOPREP form. The ISOPREPshould be completed and collected prior to deployment, or at least prior to entering theAO. It is vital that personnel are aware of the content of their ISOPREP and that thecontents are not known by any other individual other than those in the PR chain ofcommand. Once the ISOPREP is completed, it’s classification is “CONFIDENTIAL”. Anelectronic copy of the front page of the ISOPREP is to be forwarded to the component’sPRCC prior to the start of operations.

2.4.3 EPA

0207. The Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) is developed by individuals or groups before ex-ecuting missions in a hostile environment. By providing recovery forces with an insightinto the isolated personnel’s intentions, the EPA can greatly improve isolated personnel’schances of successful recovery. The EPA should be written as directed by the PR SOPs /SPINS. The PR SOP for the operation will define who is to have an EPA. An outline of thecontent and format of an EPA is shown at Annex B. In consultation with the unit SEREspecialist, intelligence officer and ops support staff, an EPA is to be completed for eachaircraft mission, or for each mission for ground forces if appropriate. A copy of the EPAis to be lodged according to SPINS / SOPs.

2.4.4 Recovery methods

0208. There are a number of ways that isolated personnel may be recovered. The recov-ery methods are not only military in origin, but may also be through political pressure,diplomatic negotiations or intervention by civil organisations which will not be furtherdescribed in this document.



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0209. Military recovery interactions are to be described in this ATP and further de-tailed in the PR SOPs / SPINS. Following assets can be utilized separately or combined ina task force:

a. Land forces.

b. Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft.

c. Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft.

d. Maritime surface vessels.

e. Submarines.

f. Special Operations Forces (SOF).

2.5 Tactical preparation and planning

2.5.1 Pre-deployment training

0210. The most suitable preparation consists of the appropriate pre-deployment train-ing, continuation training and (SERE) equipment to be in place at all times. As part ofpreparation personnel should sanitize, if possible, their personal equipment which maycompromise them in captivity. Special attention is to be given to remnants of badgesand insignia on uniforms. Additionally, they should carry items that could assist themin their survival, evasion and extraction (e.g. money, pointie-talkies, etc.) specific totheatre as appropriate.

SERE guide / country handbook

0211. SERE guide or a country handbook gives the individuals a good view of the coun-try and the environmental hazards. It can also describe the different parties in the areaand what to avoid during evasion.

2.5.2 Equipment

0212. The the PR SOPs / SPINS will direct the minimum levels of equipment to be carriedby personnel in the AO taking into account the difference between personnel that isidentified as MRIE and HRIE. Prior to deployment units are to contact the JPRC or PRCCto establish the correct scale of equipment. It is the responsibility of units to arrive intheatre fully equipped and trained to conduct their operations. Personnel should, wherepossible, be equipped and trained to ensure survivability for up to 72 hours in order tobe subsequently extracted.

Promissory Notes (Blood Chit) Promissory notes give an undertaking by the indi-viduals’ government to provide anyone who helps the bearer of the note with a reward ofmoney, goods or services. No specific value is attached and the bearer is not to promiseany specific reward. To avoid the potential for fraudulent use, it is essential that thereis strict control and accounting of promissory notes. Each note is to be numbered in-dividually and a record of the custodian established. There should be no signatures orfeatures that would identify the originating unit. The promissory note should not be left




with the individual providing the aid, as there is a risk of punishment by the enemy ifit is discovered that help was given, the promissory note number is to be given to thehelper.

Evasion charts. The PR SOPs / SPINS will detail guidance on whether and how toevade once one has become isolated. During movement there is a greatly increased riskof capture and less likelihood that the isolated personnel will be ready to be extracted.The isolated personnel should only move if environmental conditions allow and/or whennecessary. Consequently most survival moves are likely to be over a short distance.Land forces will typically have their staff charts to assist them in navigating their eva-sion. Aircrew will typically be issued evasion charts for this purpose. Evasion chartsare usually available in 1:250,000 or 1:500,000 scale depending on the size of the area ofoperations. These scales are not suitable for navigation over short distances. It is likelythat an evasion chart will only be of use for long-term evasion when all other means ofextraction have been exhausted.

Carriage of currency and gold. In some theatres the carriage of currency or gold bypersonnel to assist in evasion may be authorised by the individuals’ government. Theuse of currency or gold in order to gain aid or favour(s) should only be contemplated asa last resort.

Pointie-talkies. A pointie-talkie is a sheet of paper with symbols, pictures and wordsin the isolated personnel’s own language and a variety of other languages that may en-able some basic communications with the indigenous population. Pointie-talkies shouldbe used only if contact with the local population is unavoidable.

2.5.3 Mission preparation

General

0213. Prior to missions all personnel must prepare themselves for possible isolation.This must be standard procedure and should be reflected in the PR SOPs / SPINS. Certainpersonnel could utilize one EPA for more than one mission.

Sanitisation

0214. Equipment should be reviewed prior to the mission to ensure that personnel donot carry items that could compromise them in captivity.

Equipment

0215. Prior to going on a mission, personnel should ensure that their equipment andweapons are properly functioning.

Review ISOPREP

0216. Personnel should review their ISOPREP before they go on a mission to ensurethat they are familiar with the authentication information contained in their ISOPREP.



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Create or review EPA

0217. Personnel should also create an EPA before going on mission to assist them inchoosing their evasive actions should they become isolated. It also helps the recoveryeffort to easier locate the isolated personnel and thus facilitates an expedient recovery.


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Chapter 3

SURVIVAL AND EVASIONDURING ISOLATION

3.1 Introduction

0301. During ones isolation the isolated personnel can, in different ways, support thefive tasks of PR (report – locate – support – recover – reintegrate). This chapter willfocus on four of these tasks but also reflects survival and evasion issues. Reintegrationwill be covered in Chapter 4.

3.2 Report and immediate actions

0302. Personnel that have become isolated should attempt as soon as possible to notifyany friendly force via methods described in the PR SOPs / SPINS or any other methodavailable, depending on the situation.

3.2.1 Ground personnel

0303. Ground personnel will act in accordance with the operation’s PR SOP.

Immediate actions.

a. Report through the Command and Control (C2) chain in accordance with SOPs.

b. If able, move away from threat or hazard.

c. If possible stay by your vehicle.

d. Check for any significant injury and carry out essential first aid.

e. If unable to move due to injury consider use of the radio to inform C2.

f. Seek cover, camouflage yourself and your equipment.

g. If possible attempt to conceal unnecessary equipment.

h. Sanitize yourself but retain any items necessary for survival and evasion.



3.2 Report and immediate actions

i. If applicable and possible Rendezvous Point (RV) with any other team membersand assess the situation.

j. If appropriate consider moving to a better location.

k. Assess the benefits of another location with the increased chance of detectionwhilst moving.

l. Once isolated personnel have a place to hide, they should only move to evade theenemy, prevent environmental injury or establish communications. However, theyshould also be ready to move immediately with their equipment after sanitizingtheir hiding place.

m. Act according to EPA and/or SOPs.

Communication. In most circumstances ground personnel are likely to have commu-nications with their normal chain of command for their initial report. Most ground unitswill not have a capability to talk direct with specialized recovery units and will be relianton the passage of information through their chain of command. However, there may be atheatre wide (non-secure) air frequency designated for Close Combat Attack (CCA) / CallFor Fire (CFF) support. This frequency may also be used for reporting in an isolatingevent.

3.2.2 Aircrew

Aircrew that becomes isolated will act in accordance with the operation’s PR SOP. How-ever, due to the nature of the way they become isolated, they should perform certainadditional actions or may be required to deviate from the PR SOP. Such deviations maybe stated in the PR SOP, but will as a minimum be listed in the PR SPINS.

Immediate actions on the ground

0304. Entry by parachute or forced landing1:

a. If able, steer away from habitation and Lines Of Communication (LOC).

b. Upon landing, isolated personnel should check for any significant injury and carryout essential first aid. If unable to move due to injury consider use of the radio toinform C2.

c. If able, move, gather up parachute and Personal Survival Pack (PSP) and seekcover.

d. Camouflage yourself and your equipment.

e. Establish ones exact location (e.g. through the use of a Global Positioning System(GPS) receiver).

f. Discard the parachute harness and switch on the survival radio.

g. Make an initial call as required by the detailed instructions in the PR SOPs / SPINS.

1These procedures are dependent on the theatre



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h. If possible attempt to conceal unnecessary equipment and destroy sensitive equip-ment if appropriate.

i. Sanitize yourself but retain any items necessary for survival and evasion.

j. If applicable and possible RV with any other crewmembers and assess the situa-tion.

k. If appropriate consider moving to a better location.

l. Assess the benefits of another location with the increased chance of detectionwhilst moving.

m. Once isolated personnel have a place to hide, they should only move to evade theenemy, prevent environmental injury or establish communications. However, theyshould also be ready to move immediately with their equipment after sanitizingtheir hiding place.

n. Act according to SPINS and EPA.

3.2.3 Radios / beacons

0305. Radios and beacons that comply with STANAG 7007, are the key to early recovery.Without them, the search for the isolated person, the authentication and the recoverywill be a slower process.

Radio / beacon procedures

0306. The initial call (on ground) should be made as soon as possible / practicable.The PR SOPs / SPINS will contain specific instructions on the sequence and content ofthe initial call. The sequence and content of the initial call are a part of the overallauthentication process. It is desirable that they are completed as expected.

3.2.4 General report

0307. Personnel in communications with the isolated personnel should attempt togain as much information to satisfy the requirements of the standard “METHANE”or (preferably) the 11-Line report (see volume II Annex J (with explanations). TheJPRC / PRCC need this information to (start to) fill in the Personnel Recovery IncidentReport (PRIR).

3.2.5 Survival

0308. In order to survive, the survivor must identify, understand and cope with theenvironmental hazards. As a guideline:

Protection against environment or hostile activity. This can be achieved by theuse of equipment and the environment.

Location. Use all possible means in order to establish own position.

Water. Essential for survival.

Food. Survival without food is possible for at least 30 days. Therefore this is the lowestpriority.



3.3 Locate

0309. The order of priority will be dependent upon environmental conditions.

3.2.6 Evasion

Urban environments

0310. Urban environments place a significantly different and potentially far greaterdemand upon the isolated personnel. The likelihood of becoming isolated in close prox-imity to the local population and hostile elements, perhaps even those responsible forthe hostile activity, is extremely high. Time is critical; the initial actions of any iso-lated personnel in an urban environment should therefore be focused on allowing theirlocation and status to be established as quickly as possible by the extraction forces. Thecivilian population may be aware of the initial location of the isolated personnel, particu-larly if the hostile activity has occurred in daylight. The vast majority of such personnelwill move towards the incident. The isolated person cannot be expected to predict thecivilian population’s actions.

a. The isolated personnel’s main effort should be to ensure extraction whilst avoidingcontact with the local population.

b. Furthermore, it is essential that all personnel not positively identified as friendlyforces are assumed to be hostile, and are treated in accordance with Rules ofEngagement (ROE).

c. If possible the isolated person should seek to break away from any crowd.

Non-urban environments

0311. To reduce the chances of being seen by an enemy or by the civilian population,the isolated person should remove any high-visibility marking from clothing and equip-ment, apply camouflage cream or natural materials to any exposed flesh and/or clothing.

Action on imminent capture.

0312. In the event of imminent capture, purge information from radio and GPS re-ceivers and destroy all compromising information.

3.3 Locate

0313. Location of the isolated person is a critical task for PR operations. Isolated per-sonnel must be prepared to assist this process by using signalling devices and authen-tication procedures if requested. Special attention is to be given to the fact that mostpersonnel has only limited possibilities to signal and / or communicate with with thosewho are searching for them or are attempting to recover them. As a part of the initialcall on the radio or other communications device, the isolated personnel should attemptto pass their location to their chain of command / extraction agencies in such a way thattheir location is not revealed to hostile forces.



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3.3.1 Authentication

0314. Isolated persons will be required to authenticate themselves at any time duringthe recovery process. In case of severe doubt, the isolated personnel can seek authen-tication from the recovery forces. Methods of authentication will be detailed in theCommunication Plan (COMPLAN) / SOPs / SPINS. The method of identification may varydue to the level of training of the isolated personnel.

3.3.2 Location if no radio available

0315. If no communications can be established, the isolated person should set out avisual marker. This would be as directed by the COMPLAN / SOPs / SPINS. and may be inmany forms; a letter or symbol, a piece of material or other object set out in a pattern,or by using an InfraRed (IR) light source.

3.3.3 Evasion

Navigation. In a non-permissive environment, isolated personnel should move withextreme caution, in principle during the night. The isolated personnel should regularlychange direction and stop to maintain situational awareness. While on the move, RVhave to be identified where evaders should go to in case the group gets spread out.

GPS jamming. Personnel utilizing mobile GPS receivers are to be aware of its limita-tions. GPS receivers performance can be affected by jamming or environmental restric-tions. If the GPS receiver does not acquire the appropriate amount of satellite connec-tions, it may be due to a poor view of the sky or GPS jamming. To counter GPS jamming,use terrain shielding to remove line- of-sight between the GPS receiver and the sourcesof possible jamming. If necessary the GPS receiver may be placed in a shallow depressionto counter ground-based jamming.

3.4 Support

0316. A well equipped and trained isolated personnel can minimise the need of supportto survive. However occasions may arise where support is required

3.4.1 Fire support

0317. Fire support and suppression assets could be used as necessary to create anenvironment that permits an immediate extraction. The On Scene Commander (OSC)/ Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) will coordinate and direct all supporting strike /suppression sorties and / or ground based fire support.

3.4.2 Additional equipment/resupply

0318. Terrain and distance may make it difficult to extract the isolated personnel im-mediately therefore resupply has to be taken in to consideration.



3.5 Extraction

3.4.3 SERE psychology

0319. The chain of command should consider the mental state of the isolated personneland where possible offer support and assurance.

3.4.4 Support to family

0320. The chain of command is to ensure that a process is initiated, on a national levelto inform / support isolated personnel’s next of kin.

3.5 Extraction

0321. Once isolated, personnel should evaluate their situation, equipment, physicaland mental condition to formulate a plan to assist in their extraction. It should, asmuch as is practical, follow the intentions that were stated in the EPA.

3.5.1 Actions during extraction procedures

0322. Once an extraction becomes imminent, the isolated personnel should, where pos-sible, assist in the extraction process by carrying out the following:

a. Prepare to carry out final authentication procedures with the extraction vehicle(s)/ force(s).

b. Prepare signalling devices as directed by the RMC. Be prepared to move to theextraction point.

c. Assist identification as required.

d. Follow all orders given by the extraction force.

e. Position as detailed in EPA or as directed by extraction force.

f. Take actions in accordance with the PR SOPs / SPINS.

Communications with recovery force. Isolated personnel should ensure that theycan get communications from the selected RV. They should remain in cover, listeningon the assigned frequency. Signalling equipment should be prepared as detailed in thePR SOPs / SPINS, making sure primary, secondary and tertiary devices are ready forimmediate use. All kit should be secured, and weapons made safe and holstered/slung.

Helicopter and land forces extraction/ RV selection of extraction site/ RV. Ifpossible choose an RV site that gives you good overview of the surrounding area. Makesure that you can see the RV as early as possible in order to challenge their identity.



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3.5.2 Helicopter recovery

Selection of helicopter landing site

0323. The isolated personnel should always try to be aware of suitable areas for a heli-copter to land. Opportunities for a recovery may occur at any time, even when personnelare on the move. If a suitable Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) cannot be identified, theisolated personnel should inform the recovery force who may adjust tactics to enable arecovery to be completed.

Vectoring helicopters

0324. The isolated personnel may be able to see or hear the recovery vehicle before itsees their signal. If heard they can give general vectors to their location i.e. ‘I hear ahelicopter to my south’. If the helicopter is visible to the isolated personnel, they canuse an orientated compass to give the aircraft a heading to their location, (i.e. Steer 270,steer 245, continue on heading) or use the clock method (i.e. steer to your 10 o’ clock).

3.5.3 Authentication

0325. In the last stages of an extraction, the isolated personnel should expect to beauthenticated again. When advised that an extraction is imminent, they should keepmonitoring the radio and prepare for the recovery vehicle according to the PR / SOPs /SPINS.

3.5.4 Extraction tactics

0326. Members from the extraction force will move to the isolated personnel and au-thenticate them. The isolated personnel must comply with their instructions. The iso-lated personnel should never move towards the extraction force unless told to do so.Depending on the situation, personnel may be restrained and carried to the recoveryvehicle.



3.5 Extraction



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Chapter 4

Reintegration

0401. On completion of the recovery phase of the operation, the isolated personnelshould be taken to a pre-assigned medical facility for the first phase of reintegration.Plans should be flexible enough to allow for changing medical and operational require-ments. It is imperative that the recovered isolated personnel are debriefed at the ear-liest opportunity. Lessons learned from the recovered isolated personnel should be for-warded to the JPRC and disseminated to all appropriate force levels.

0402. The isolated personnel must be prepared to provide tactical intelligence andSERE information immediately upon return to a secure area (medical condition depen-dent).

0403. Where appropriate data in the memory of communications and navigationalequipment used in the recovery phase should be downloaded for subsequent analysis.The isolated personnel’s radio and other equipment should be segregated for testing toprovide information for detailed investigation. The lessons learned from one recoverymay aid future missions. Each nation should consider the appropriate reintegrationpackage for their personnel and next of kin.


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Chapter 5

Conduct after capture

0501. The overall aim of the Conduct After Capture (CAC) policy is to protect life andinformation. Each member nation’s CAC policy may differ therefore isolated personnelare to conduct themselves in accordance with their own national policy. However, as itis not uncommon to operate in joint and combined teams, even at low levels, personnelhas to be aware of the fact that their actions during captivity may pose a threat to theircomrades. The JPRC may therefore provide CAC guidance in the PR SOP.


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Chapter 6

Isolated personnel training


0601. The total training package an individual receives should be in balance with therisk of isolation and exploitation that person has.

6.1.1 Levels of training

0602. NATO has identified three levels of SERE training

Level A: This is the minimum basic level of SERE training, conducted as initial entrytraining and prior to the first operational deployment.

Level B: This is an intermediate level of SERE training, specifically for those personnelidentified by nations as at MRIE.

Level C: This is an advanced level of SERE training, specifically for those personnelidentified by nations as at HRIE.

Details of the SERE training levels can be found in Annex F


Prior to departure nations should provide individuals deploying to a NATO AO with ap-propriate environmental survival training (i.e. specific to that region). Operational areaspecific captivity training should also be provided. This training should cover the fol-lowing topics and will be provided/tailored i.a.w. national specifics.

6.2.1 Theatre specific training

0603. Following areas should be reflected during theatre specific training:

a. Theatre recovery procedures.

b. Threat from captivity.

c. Legal status of individual and specific legal aspects.



6.3 In-theatre training

d. Rules of engagement (ROE).

e. Equipment.

f. Procedures: radio, extraction, etc..

g. PR principles.

h. Intel.

i. Theatre specific Protection, Location, Water, Food (PLWF).

j. Overview concerning the data’s1 of the country to be deployed.

k. History2.

l. Religion(s).

m. Language(s).

n. Vaccination program.

o. Practical use of personal weapons.

p. First aid training.

To achieve operational readiness, training exercises must be conducted to:

a. Validate the PR SOP.


c. Adapt procedures to the AO. Continuation training in order to maintain opera-tional readiness must be conducted by individual persons as required to assurethe best chances of success in the event of a recovery operation.

d. Identify optimum TTPs to facilitate recovery.

6.3 In-theatre training

6.3.1 Prior to conducting operation

0604. Upon arrival in the AO, the primary focus of SERE training is on acclimatisationand becoming accustomed to the AO. If personnel are not familiar with in theatre PRprocedures, they are to receive appropriate briefings as soon as possible. This is also thetime for finalising any preparation that has not been conducted prior entering the AO.

6.3.2 Refresher training

0605. Personnel should receive refresher or continuation training while in the AO. Con-tinuation training should encompass academics (review PR SOP, SPINS, etc.) as well aspractical exercises (e.g. conducting an actual recovery during a field exercise).

1Position, size, borders, climate, currency, population figure, etc..2Major historical events, beginning of the conflict, political & economical situation, manners & practise,

United Nations (UN) CoC, situation of refugees (if any), etc.


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Annex A

ISOPREP

A.0.3 ISOPREP form (electronic)

Personal Details. An authentication number and 4 personal statements are to beentered into the boxes (1 – 15 and 20 – 24) on the front part of the form. The boxes num-bered 16 – 19 are for use by the JPRC in the event of the individual becoming isolated.Theatre specific items may be required to be added to the additional comments box. Ablank ISOPREP is shown in figures A.1 and A.2.

Authentication Number. The individual’s personal authentication number must be4 digits. Zeros are not to be used as the isolated person may need to signal his personalauthentication number using a series of torch flashes. The number should not containduplicated numbers, a sequence of more than 2 digits and should not be from the in-dividual’s service number, date of birth. It must be a number that the isolated personcan recall even at times of great stress. It may be used for authentication by a recoveryhelicopter crew or ground recovery team, as it is quick and unique to the individual. Anexample of authentication using the personal authentication number would be askinga question requiring the isolated person to provide the sum of 2 or more digits of thepersonal authentication number.

Personal Authentication Statements. Personnel are to use declarative statements,not a set of questions and answers. The statements should include personal details thatare easy to remember, and that are not subject to change. Details of friends, relatives(not immediate family) pets, vehicles and holidays are also an option. The 4 statementsmust be in simple English so that it may be understood by foreign-speaking recoveryteams, who are unlikely to understand jargon, slang or colloquial English. Avoid refer-ences to dates, ages (or other information from your military records or public informa-tion) religious, political or otherwise contentious subjects. Any references to current in-formation, such as my current car is a Ford, should be avoided as the facts may changebefore personnel can update their ISOPREP. Ensure that 4 questions and answers maybe derived from each statement. The recovery forces are usually passed only 2 of the 4statements. This is to ensure that some statements are still available for further rescueattempts.

Photograph and Fingerprints. The photograph is to be a current likeness of theface. No headdress is to be worn. Digital copies are to be forwarded to the JPRC / PRCCby e-mail when requested. Faxed copied are not to be sent as they are not sufficiently



A.1 ISOPREP form

clear for purposes of identification. The photograph and fingerprints are available asfinal proofs of identity for recovery teams, but it is more likely to be used to identifythe deceased or insensible, or for use by Unconventional Assisted Recovery. Other thanwhen required after an isolating event, the ISOPREPs sent to the JPRC are not to containphotographs or fingerprint data.

A.0.4 Procedures for completion of ISOPREPs

0266. ISOPREPs are to be completed at unit level initially and reviewed by individualsevery six months. ISOPREPs should be filled in by all deployed forces. As a minimum,ISOPREPs are required for all PIERIE.

A.0.5 Sending of ISOPREPs and EPAs to the PRCC

To enable rapid handling and sorting of the many ISOPREPs and EPA held by units andthe JPRC / PRCC, it is important that all electronic documents arrive with the sameformat of labelling.

a. E-Mails Containing EPA. EPA, Callsign, Aircraft Type, Base Name, Air TaskingOrder (ATO) Day (e.g., EPA, ZIPPY 43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).

b. EPA Documents. Callsign, Aircraft Type, Base Name, ATO Day (e.g., ZIPPY 43,GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).

c. E-Mail Containing ISOPREPs. ISOPREP, Aircraft Type, Sqn, Base (e.g.,ISOPREP,E3D, 8-23 Sqn, PSAB).

d. ISOPREP Documents. Surname, First name, Middle Initial (e.g., Bigglesworth,John, W).

A.1 ISOPREP form


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Section 9: CONFIDENTIAL (When blocks 50-55 are filled)Reason: Declassify On: Previous Edition Obsolete (Replace through attrition)

SECTION 1 - PERSONAL INFORMATIONAUTHORITY: PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): To protect recovery forces from enemy entrapment and facilitate the recovery of isolated persons.ROUTINE USE(S): To be completed by designated personnel subject to isolation due to hostile activity. Contains personal information that may be used to ensure positive identification. The form will be unclassified/official use only. Blocks 50,51,52, 53, 54, and 55 are optional blocks and are only utilized when directed by unit SOP or Service doctrine. When blocks 50,51,52, 53, 54, and 55 are completed this form becomes classified CONFIDENTIAL and must be handled appropriately. This form may only be transmitted via official email accounts.DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY: The information is necessary since it affects the entire personnel recovery process. Exceptions on disclosure are made for government contractors.

1a. LAST NAME *

1b. FIRST NAME *

1c. MI

2. GO BY NAME

3. GENDER * 4. GRADE * 5.SSN

6. COALITION ID

7. DOB (YYYYMMDD) *

8. BRANCH OF SERVICE / AGENCY / DEPT * 9. CURRENT UNIT *

10. BLOOD TYPE *

11. HEIGHT * inches

12. WEIGHT lb.

13. HAIR COLOR * 14. EYE COLOR * 15. ETHNIC GROUP

16. CITIZENSHIP *: a. b. OTHER:

17. ACCENT

18. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE

19. BLOOD CHIT NUMBER

20. IDENTIFYING SCARS/MARKS/TATTOOS *

21. KNOWN MEDICAL CONDITIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

SECTION 2 - UNIFORM DATA22. SHIRT SIZE: 23. PANT SIZE: 24. HAT SIZE: 25. BOOT TYPE: 26. BOOT SIZE: 27. BOOT WIDTH:

SECTION 3 - TRAINING / CAPABILITY DATASERE TRNG a. TYPE b. YEAR (YYYY) c. MONTH d. LOCATION / OTHER e. COMMENTS

28. TRNG-1 /

29. TRNG-2 /

30. TRNG-3 /

31. PRIMARY LANGUAGE CAPABILITY

a. LANGUAGE: OTHER: b. READING: c. WRITING: d. SPEAKING: e. COMMENTS:

32. OTHER LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES:

SECTION 4 - REINTEGRATION INFORMATION33. PRIMARY NEXT OF KIN 34. PARENT NO. 1 (Contractors Optional) 35. PARENT NO. 2 (Contractors Optional)

a. NAME: a. NAME: a. NAME:

b. ADDRESS: b. ADDRESS: b. ADDRESS:

c. CITY: c. CITY: c. CITY:

d. STATE: e. ZIP: d. STATE: e. ZIP: d. STATE: e. ZIP:

f. TELEPHONE: f. TELEPHONE: f. TELEPHONE:

g. SAME AS: PARENT NO. 1 PARENT NO. 2 37. HOME OF RECORD (Contractors Optional) 38. SPECIAL FAMILY SITUATIONS

36. CHILDREN AT HOME (Contractors Optional) b. ADDRESS:

a. NAME(S): c. CITY:

c. DOB(S) d. STATE: e. ZIP:

SECTION 5 - JPRC / PRCC USE ONLY39. DATE MISSING (YYYYMMDD)

40. DATE RECOVERED (YYYYMMDD)

41. DATE ENTERED REINTEGRATION (YYYYMMDD)

42. DATE RELEASED TO UNIT CONTROL (YYYYMMDD)

43. NOTES:

SECTION 6 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION44a. LEFT FINGERPRINTS: 44b. RIGHT FINGERPRINTS:

THUMB: THUMB:

Page 1CONFIDENTIAL (When blocks 50-55 are filled in)

Figure A.1: ISOPREP page 1

44c. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

44d. CONTRACTOR INFORMATION: COMPANY NAME: COMPANY POC:

SECTION 7 – PHOTOS45. FRONT FULL DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH 46.RIGHT PROFILE DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH

SECTION 8 - REVIEW INFORMATION47. DATE COMPLETED (YYYYMMDD) 48. DATE REVIEWED * (YYYYMMDD) 49. SIGNATURE:

SECTION 9 - PERSONAL AUTHENTICATION INFORMATION(Note: For the Personal Authentication Statements, items 50-53, please input 4 unique statements from which 4 questions can be derived from each.)

50. (C) PERSONAL AUTHENTICATION STATEMENT #1




54. (C) AUTHENTICATION #

55. (C) PERSONAL DURESS WORD

56. (C) ADDITIONAL AUTHENTICATION INFORMATION

Figure A.2: ISOPREP page 2



A.1 ISOPREP form



EPANATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

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Annex B

EPA

B.0.1 EPA

The EPA is a course of action developed by individuals or groups of individuals beforeexecuting a mission in a hostile area. By providing recovery forces with an insight intothe intentions of the isolated personnel, the EPA can greatly improve the chances of asuccessful recovery. The EPA should include information on the agreed plan from imme-diate actions through to recovery procedures. The individual or individuals compilingthe EPA should consult the following information sources:

a. PR SPINS.

b. PR SOP.

c. Intelligence personnel.

d. Survival equipment personnel.

e. Unit SERE staff.

B.0.2 EPA form (electronic)

Examples of blank and completed EPA and examples are paragraph B.

B.0.3 Completion and handling EPAs

EPAs are to be completed at unit level initially and briefed to all aircrew on a mission.EPA are required for all aircraft flying or at risk of flying over hostile or uncertain terri-tory. Aircraft on airtest or route flying into the AO but not entering hostile or uncertainoperating environments are not required to complete EPA. One EPA per aircraft missionis required, multi-crew aircraft aircrew are not required to complete individual EPAs.SPINS may require that the EPA are held by the unit or are lodged with the PRCC beforemission launch.

Non-aircrew are also to fill in an EPA. However, certain information in the standard EPAform is not available or applicable to non-aicrew. That information may be left blank.Special attenton is to be give to the survival equipment section as that information maybe critical to the successful execution of a recovery mission if personnel has becomeisolated.



B.1 EPA form

B.1 EPA form

Page 1 of 21

CONFIDENTIAL (When Completed)

EVASION PLAN OF ACTION (EPA)

MISSION IDENTIFICATION

DATE

PREPARED MISSION DATE /

DAY MISSION NUMBER CALLSIGN AIRCRAFT DEPARTURE BASE

/ LOCATION

UNIT AC INITIAL REVIEW BY CSRO / INTO EPA POC

CREW IDENTIFICATION

CALL SIGN IDENTIFIER RANK NAME

CREW POSITION

RADIO TYPE PLS # BLOOD

CHIT # ALLERGIES

AUTHENTICATION

CSAR NUMBER CSAR LETTER CSAR WORD CSAR DURESS WORD

LOCATION

SARNEG SARDOT 01

BASE 02

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

CSAR FREQUENCIES / SIGNALS

CSAR A SIGNALS : PRIMARY ALTERNATE MHz DAY :

CSAR B NIGHT :

MHz RECOVERY ACTIVATION SIGNAL (RAS) :

SIGNAL PROCEDURES (NON RADIO)

COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES

Figure B.1: EPA page 1


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Page 2 of 21

SURVIVAL – LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ( ITEMIZED LIST )

SURVIVAL VEST:

SURVIVAL KIT:

INDIVIDUAL KIT:

DAR & SAFE INFORMATION

LEGAL GUIDANCE

EVASION INTENTIONS ( NONPERMISSIVE )

IMMEDIATE EVASION INTENTIONS: EXTENDED EVASION INTENTIONS:

ADDITIONAL DATA

CONFIDENTIAL (When Completed

Figure B.2: EPA page 2



B.1 EPA form



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Annex C

Notification checklist

C.1 Aircrew

While in the air

a. Turn toward friendly forces, Designated Area of Recovery (DAR) or minimum threatarea.

When on the ground

a. Establish radio contact according to SPINS. When radio communications are estab-lished the following information should be transmitted:

(a) Callsign.(b) Position.(c) Course.(d) Speed.(e) Altitude.(f) Problems and intentions.(g) Alter Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment according to SPINS.

C.2 Non-aircrew

As soon as personnel is aware of the fact that he has become isolated, he should attemptto notify the JPRC / PRCC through the means and ways as described by the SPINS orthrough the chain of command. The isolated personnel should attempt to give as aminimum the following information1:

a. Identity.

b. Current or last known position.

c. Condition.

d. Intentions.

1This is a short and simple checklist, but it does not contain a lot of information. Non-aircrew can alsouse the standard 11-liner and leave out any unknown information. Proposals are welcome.



C.2 Non-aircrew



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Annex D

Isolated personnel initial actionchecklist

a. Administering first aid (for life threatening injuries).

b. Destroying classified material and sensitive equipment or weapons.

c. Concealing unnecessary equipment and move to cover.

d. Determining location.

e. Establishing initial communications with friendly forces. All future communica-tions should be in accordance with appropriate procedures (e.g. EPA, SPINS, etc.)using the reporting formats given in AnnexE.


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Annex E

Report formats

new annexE.1 PR 11-line report

The following checklist is used to communicate basic information about a PR situation.As a minimum, the designated Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC) uses this checklistto gather information and relay it to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), JPRC/PRCC, and the Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF). All aircraft should have thischecklist available and use it as appropriate during a PR incident.






5 Injuries/Conditions6 OSC / Bingo / Loadout / Point

Of Contact (POC) (Who is re-porting and means of com-munication)



b) .....

E.2 METHANE report

The “METHANE” report is the basic, minimum, report that all personnel in theatreshould be able to pass through whatever channel is available to their unit and / or theJPRC / PRCC:



E.2 METHANE report

a. Callsign (Who’s reporting) M

b. Exact location E

c. Type (cause) of incident T

d. Hazards (fire, mines, enemies) H

e. Access to the spot A

f. Number and status of isolated personnel N

g. Emergency service required type of injuries E


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Annex F

The NATO SERE trainingstandard

F.1 General

Both practical and theoretical training to an agreed standard is paramount to the suc-cess of any North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation. In order to achieve thesame training standard amongst the membership nations this document will describethe minimum requirements of NATO SERE training. This training complements normalForce Protection measures, which are not mandated by this document.

The NATO SERE training is based on the intention to deliver as efficient informationand/or training as possible. The main difference between the different training levelsis the amount of training and information which will be provided. The diagram of thisconcept has been displayed in the figure below.

Figure F.1: The NATO SERE training concept

SERE is part of the NATO PR / Joint Personnel Recovery (PR) as described in the basicdocument AJP-3.3.9. This Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) focuses on the “IsolatedPersonnel” part as laid out in figure F.2.

F.2 Responsibilities

Experience has shown that personnel may become isolated and potentially face capture,captivity and exploitation by governmental and non-governmental organizations which



F.3 Scope

ignore Geneva Conventions or other Human Rights Conventions. Therefore personnelneed to be able to survive the environment and theatre of operation whilst evadingcapture and preparing for extraction. They should be able to resist exploitation andescape if captured.

Consequently NATO Nations are to provide a basic level of SERE training to all deploy-able forces. Additionally they are to identify selected personnel who are considered to bePIERIE. These personnel require a higher level of training because of their moderate orhigh risk of isolation, capture and exploitation, and should be provided with the appro-priate level of training as defined in this document (para F.4). These PIERIE personnelmay include, but are not limited to, units or personnel operating in small numbers or atrange from own forces (e.g., Special Operations Forces, long-range reconnaissance patrolmembers, aircrew).

Figure F.2: The NATO SERE structure

Before entering the Joint Operations Area (JOA), acnato and participating forces are tobe trained and prepared for their appropriate level of PR operations. Hence, the ForceCommander or Component Commander shall be aware of the levels of SERE training ofthe Units under their Command.

F.3 Scope

This training provides the SERE skills required from the point at which personnel be-come isolated, (typically for aircrew this is from the point of man/seat separation orforced landing and in the case of non-aircrew, when they become separated from theirunit or upon exiting their vehicle). To standardise operational procedures within NATO,personnel receive doctrine, theoretical and practical training in the following areas:

a. Survive the Environment in a permissive and non-permissive environment.

• Conduct Land Survival training.• Conduct Maritime Survival training.• Conduct environmental training.• Safety and Survival Equipment Training.

b. Survive the Threat in a non-permissive environment.

• Evade a hostile force or element.• Survive in captivity as a POW or hostage following capture.• Resist exploitation, including interrogation.• Escape captivity.• Prepare for extraction by PR assets or non-conventional recovery.

c. Survive the Theatre.



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• Conduct theatre specific training• Understand the geography, including cultural aspects, topography and cli-

mate.• Understand theatre PR / JPRC procedures.• Understand potential motives and modus operandi of military, governmental

and criminal elements that may enforce captivity on individuals.

SERE is individual training that is complementary to the 5 tasks of PR (Report, Locate,Support, Recover and Reintegrate).

F.4 SERE training levels

To allow isolated personnel to be extracted by Joint Personnel Recovery (PR) forces andincrease the likelihood of success, SERE training is conducted at the following levels:

SERE level A: This is the minimum basic level of SERE academic training, conducted asinitial entry training and prior to the first operational deployment, which intro-duces potential isolated personnel to the concepts of SERE operations, policy anddoctrine.

SERE level B: This is an intermediate level of SERE academic and application training,specifically for those personnel identified by nations at moderate risk of captureand exploitation.

SERE level C: This is an advanced level of SERE academic and application training,specifically for those personnel identified by nations at high risk of capture andexploitation. This level must include practical resistance training.

These levels of training are to be supplemented by theatre-specific, pre-deployment andcontinuation SERE training.

F.5 Student training objectives

Within SERE training a student must be taught, understand and practise techniquesand procedures to:

a. Survival

• Ensure immediate survival.• Maintain psychological and physiological well-being.• Maintain normal body temperature.• Maintain adequate hydration.• Maintain sufficient calorific intake.

b. Evasion

• Use location aids.• Avoid detection whilst static and mobile.• Conduct evasion plan of action.



F.6 Instructor requirements

c. Resistance

• Assess conditions of capture.

• Protect sensitive information.

• Mitigate physical and mental stress.

• Maintain self and others (survive with dignity).

• Limit the degree to which you are exploited.

• Attempt to escape.

d. Extraction

• Aid rescue.

• Establish communications with friendly forces.

• Carry out RV Procedures.

• Carry out extraction procedures.

The preceding paragraphs define the SERE operational standard and skills requiredby NATO personnel to Survive, Evade, Resist and Extract in a permissive and non-permissive environment. The methods of training delivery will be determined by in-dividual nations, however, the minimum amount of training required for Level A, B andC training qualifications are defined at Annex A. All training should be conducted us-ing the same personal equipment that an individual would be issued during operations.TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT.

F.6 Instructor requirements

F.6.1 SERE instructor

Deliver Theory and Practical SERE Training

a. Deliver theoretical instruction on National SERE+PR organisation.

b. Deliver theoretical and practical survival training

(a) Land survival training

(b) Maritime survival training, including pool and sea drills if applicable (notHelicopter Underwater Egress Trainer (HUET)/STASS).

c. Teach permissive and non-permissive survival, combat recovery operations tech-niques.

d. Deliver theory and practical training on survival equipment.

e. Deliver theory and practical training on evasion and extraction.

f. Deliver theoretical resistance and escape training (if applicable to nations).

g. Deliver aircrew emergency drills training if applicable, from man/seat or man/vehicleseparation or in conjunction with a forced landing.

h. Organise, administer and supervise SERE training, including production of train-ing documentation.



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Provide Operational Support

Produce and deliver theatre specific basic survival theory, environmental and resis-tances briefings.

Pre-training

Complete national instructional techniques training courses. Instructors are to havereceived SERE level C training.

F.6.2 Advanced SERE instructor

In addition to the competencies identified in Para F.6.1, an advanced SERE instructormust be qualified in at least one of the following:

a. Deliver training in at least one of the following areas in addition to their ownnational environment.

(a) Desert(b) Jungle(c) Arctic + winter(d) Mountain

b. Or deliver practical resistance and exploitation exercises.

c. Or complete PR training course (US PR301) or equivalent.

F.7 Level A

Applicability. This level of SERE training is the initial-entry PR training for all per-sonnel involved in military operations who are trained but not equipped and thereforewill employ Combat Recovery (CR) techniques.

Purpose. To give each participant the basic theoretical knowledge;

a. about the NATO PR concept,

b. to optimise their survival using personal equipment and the natural environment,

c. to increase ones readiness for a captivity situation,

d. to increase their chances of a successful recovery / extraction.

a. Survival

• Knowledge about Basic survival - PLWF.• Awareness of physiological factors that limit the human body in a survival

situation.• Awareness of how “temporary factors”1 affect personal capabilities.

1e.g. first aid, environment, water, food, hygiene, etc.



F.8 Level B

• Ability to use personal equipment to optimise chances of survival.

b. Evasion

• Understanding of the principles of evasion.

c. Resistance

• Understanding of the Geneva Convention concerning ”treatment of prison-ers”.

• Rudimentary knowledge of Governmental and non Governmental captivityand understand the difference between POW and Hostage.

• Awareness of the stages of capture and the concepts of:– Protection of information,– Protection of life,– Escape

in order to return with dignity.

d. Extraction

• Ability to report location.• Awareness of the techniques for signalling position using improvised methods• Knowledge of Search And Rescue (SAR) and CR concepts.

Training method Level A SERE can be taught on a distributed basis at unit level. Itneed not be taught by a SERE instructor and may be delivered using some or all of thefollowing methods: Video, DVD, Computer Based Training (CBT) or other instructionalmedia.

F.8 Level B

Applicability. This level of SERE training is the intermediate level for specifically se-lected personnel who are prone to isolation, capture and exploitation and at moderaterisk. These personnel are to be trained to fully comply with either PR or Combat Recov-ery Procedures dependant upon their level of personal equipment.

Purpose. To give each participant the theoretical and limited practical knowledge,through demonstrations, to conduct the following PR skills and techniques:

a. Show a full understanding of the NATO PR concept.

b. Survive and move against a hunter force.

c. Resist exploitation in a Governmental and non Governmental captivity situation.

d. Use operational personal equipment and the natural environment in order to affectExtraction.

a. Survival

• Performing immediate actions required after bail-out, ditching, forced land-ing, or other distress situations.



299

• Understanding of the principals of PLWF and take account effects of:– human factors (physiological and psychological).– temporary factors (e.g. first aid, environment, water, food, hygiene, etc.).


b. Evasion

• Ability to complete an EPA.• Understanding of evasion techniques, camouflage/concealment, navigation and

specialist survival equipment (e.g. blood chit, pointee talkee).• Theoretical understanding of the GPS system and individual GPS equipment.

c. Resistance


• Understanding of the psychological and legal aspects of captivity.• Understanding how to resist exploitation in both a Governmental and non

Governmental captivity exercise.• Understanding of the stages of capture and the concepts of:

– Protection of information,– Protection of life,– Escape


d. Extraction

• Ability to complete their own ISOPREP.• Knowledge of PR / CR procedures as appropriate.• Understanding of SPINS.• Ability to operate Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) and comply with commu-

nication / authentication procedures in a field exercise.• Knowledge of recovery procedures (air, land or sea).

Training method Level B academic training and demonstrations are delivered bySERE instructors. Although this training is mainly conducted in a classroom setting,students must be afforded the opportunity to participate using demonstrations and syn-dicates to practice techniques and the use of operational equipment. Resistance trainingat this level is not conducted through a practical captivity exercise. However, it shouldallow students to practice resistance techniques by means of experiential role plays inan academic setting. This level may be divided into Level B Combat Recovery and LevelB PR, recognizing that the IP is trained but may or may not be equipped i.e. they maynot posses a PLB.

F.9 Level C

Applicability. This level of SERE training is the advanced level for specifically selectedpersonnel who are prone to isolation, capture and exploitation and at highest risk. Thesepersonnel are to be trained and equipped to fully comply with PR Recovery Procedures.



F.9 Level C

Purpose. To give each participant the theoretical and practical knowledge, through apractical field exercise, to conduct the following PR skills and techniques:

a. Show a full understanding of the NATO PR concept.

b. Survive and move against a hunter force.

c. Resist exploitation in a Governmental and non Governmental captivity situation.

d. Use operational personal equipment and the natural environment in order to affectExtraction.

a. Survival

• Performing immediate actions required after bail-out, ditching, forced land-ing, or other distress situations.

• Ability to apply the principals of PLWF and take account effects of:

– human factors (physiological and psychological).– temporary factors (e.g. first aid, environment, water, food, hygiene, etc.).


b. Evasion

• Ability to complete an EPA.

• Ability to conduct evasion techniques, camouflage/concealment, navigationand specialist survival equipment (e.g. blood chit, pointee talkee).

• Thorough understanding of the GPS system and individual GPS equipment.

c. Resistance


• Application of the psychological and legal aspects of captivity.

• Understanding and demonstrating the ability to resist exploitation in both aGovernmental and non Governmental captivity exercise.

• Thorough understanding of the stages of capture and the concepts of:

– Protection of information,– Protection of life,– Escape


d. Extraction

• Ability to complete their own ISOPREP.

• Working knowledge of PR procedures as appropriate.

• Understanding of SPINS.

• Demonstrating the ability to operate PLBs and comply with communication /authentication procedures in a field exercise.

• Ability to perform recovery procedures (air, land or sea).



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Training Method This academic and practical training is delivered by SERE in-structors within specialist schools as part of a theoretical package and a realisticfield exercise using operational equipment and involving a hunter force that lastsapproximately 72 hours including a simulated captive environment of no less than12 hours in order for students to develop robust coping mechanisms and demon-strate resistance techniques in a realistic environment. Furthermore, studentsneed to be “combat conditioned” prior to entering the simulated captivity environ-ment. This conditioning provides the student with battle fatigue and should belinked to the realistic combat environment they are likely to be in. The simulatedcaptivity environment should provide the stages of capture they are likely to expe-rience.

F.10 Pre-deployment training

Generic levels (i.e. A, B, C) do not necessarily prepare individuals for operations inspecific areas. Therefore having completed the appropriate level of SERE trainingan individual must conduct a theatre specific pre-deployment training. This train-ing should cover the following topics and will be provided/tailored i.a.w. nationalspecifics:

(a) Theatre Recovery Procedures;

(b) Threat from captivity;

(c) Legal status of individual and specific legal aspects;

(d) ROE;

(e) Equipment;

(f) Procedures: radio, extraction, etc.;

(g) Personal recovery/ PR principles.;

(h) Intel;

(i) Theatre specific PLWF

i. Overview concerning the data’s2 of the country to be deployed;ii. History3;

iii. Religions;iv. Language(s);

(j) Vaccination program;

(k) Practical use of personal weapons;

(l) First aid training

The pre-deployment briefing provides the minimum level of continuation train-ing. It’s in the nature of modern conflicts and asymmetric warfare that lethalactions can hardly be predicted. Hence it’s paramount that every personnel whichis planned to be deployed has received a pre-deployment training – regardless howlong the person will stay in theatre.

2Position, size, borders, climate, currency, population figure, etc.3Major historical events, beginning of the conflict, political & economical situation, manners & practise,

UN CoC, situation of refugees (if any), etc.;



F.11 Continuation training

F.11 Continuation training

To maintain a proper proficiency level of SERE skills, personnel rated Level B orLevel C will undergo continuation training in accordance with their national policy.It is recommended to refresh SERE skills at a minimum every four years. Thistraining is to focus on skills, equipment and procedures.


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Acronyms

AAA Anti Aircraft Artillery

AAR Air to Air Refuelling

ABCCC Airborne Command, Control and Communications

AC Aircraft

ABFAC Airborne Forward Air Controller

ACC Air Component Commander

ACCS Air Command and Control System

ACL Actual Combat Load

ACO Airspace Control Order

ACM Airspace Control Measures

ACP Air Control Plan

ADF Automatic Direction Finder

AEW Airborne Early Warning

AGL Above Ground Level

AH Attack Helicopter

AHHS Altitude Hover Hold System

AJP Allied Joint Publication

AKA Also Known As

AMC Airborne Mission Coordinator

AMSL Above Mean Sea Level

AO Area of Operations

AOC Air Operation Centre

AOD Air Operations Directive

AOR Area Of Responsibility

ASAP As Soon As Possible

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATD Actual Time of Departure

ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service

ATM Air Task Message

ATO Air Tasking Order

ATP Allied Tactical Publication

AWACS Airbourne Early Warning and Control System

BCE Battlefield Coordination Element



BI-SC Bi Strategic Commands

C2 Command and Control

C2W Command and Control Warfare

CAC Conduct After Capture

CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CAS Close Air Support

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

CBT Computer Based Training

CC Component Commander

CCA Close Combat Attack

CFF Call For Fire

CHOPS Chief of Operations

CIMIC Civil – Military Cooperation

CIS Communication and Information System

CJSOR Combined Joint Status Of Requirements

COA Course of Action

COM Commander

COMCARD Communications Card

COMPLAN Communication Plan

COMSEC Communication Security

CONOPS Concept of Operation

CONPLAN Contingency Plan

COSPAS Cosmicheskaya Systemya Poiska Avariynich Sudov

CPX Command Post Exercise

CR Combat Recovery

CRONOS Crisis Response in NATO Open Systems

CSAR Combat Search And Rescue

CTAPS Contingency Theatre Automated Planning System

CW Continuous Wave

DAR Designated Area of Recovery

DART Downed Aircraft Recovery Team

DF Direction Finder

DME Distance Measuring Equipment

DOB Deployed Operating Base

DOTAH Daily Operations Task Air / Helicopters

DSAR Deployed Search And Rescue

DTG Date / Time Group

EEI Essential Elements of Information

EF Extraction Force

ELT Emergency Location Transmitter



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EMCON Emission ControlEOB Electronic Order of BattleEPA Evasion Plan of ActionETA Estimated Time of ArrivalETD Estimated Time of DepartureETE Estimate Time En-routeEVC Evasion ChartEW Electronic WarfareFARP Forward Arming and Refuelling PointFEBA Forward Edge of the Battle AreaFLIR Forward Looking InfraRedFLOT Forward Line Own TroopsFM Frequency ModulationFOB Forward Operating BaseFOL Forward Operating LocationFRAGO Fragmentation OrderFW Fixed WingGBR United Kingdom (The acronym obviously stands for Great Brittain,

but it actually refers to the United Kingdom)GCCS Global Command and and Control SystemGEOREF Geographical ReferenceGPS Global Positioning SystemGTAS Ground-To-Air SignalsHAR Helicopter Aerial RefuellingHCP Helicopter Contact PointHF High FrequencyHIRSS Hover InfraRed Suppression SystemHLS Helicopter Landing SiteHQ HeadquartersHRIE High Risk of Isolation and / or ExploitationHRO Hostage Release OperationsHUET Helicopter Underwater Egress TrainerHUMINT Human IntelligenceIAD Integrated Air DefenceICAO International Civil Aviation OrganisationICC Integrated Command and Control systemID IdentificationIER Information Exchange RequirementIFF Identification Friend or FoeIFR Instrument Flying RulesIMC Instrument Meteorological ConditionsIMINT Image Intelligence



IMO International Maritime Organisation

INS Inertia Navigation System

INTREP Intelligence Report

IP Initial Point

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IR InfraRed

IRCM InfraRed Counter Measures

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISOPREP Isolated Personnel Report

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

JOA Joint Operations Area

JCO Joint Coordination Order

JFC Joint Force Commander

JIC Joint Intelligence Centre

JISE Joint Intelligence Support Element

JOC Joint Operation Centre

JOG Joint Operational Guidelines

JOPG Joint Operations Planning Group

JPR Joint Personnel Recovery

JPRC Joint Personnel Recovery Cell

JSTP Joint Service Training Programme

KFOR Kosovo Force

KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed

KTS Knots

LCC Land Component Commander

LEGAD Legal Adviser

LIVEX Live Exercise

LKP Last Known Point

LNO Liaison Officer

LOC Lines Of Communication

LOP Local Operating Procedure

LS Landing Site

LZ Landing Zone

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MC Mission Coordinator

MCC Maritime Component Command

MCCIS Maritime Command, Control and Information System

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

MGRS Military Grid Reference System

MISREP Mission Report



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MNLC Multinational Logistics CentreMOPP Mission Oriented Protective PostureMOU Memorandum Of UnderstandingMRIE Medium Risk of Isolation and / or ExploitationMSA Minimum Safe AltitudeMWS Missile Warning SystemNAR Non-conventional Assisted RecoveryNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNBC Nuclear, Biological, ChemicalNCO Non-Commissioned officerNEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation(N)GO (Non) Governmental OrganisationNORDO No RadioNOTAM Notice to AirmenNPSO NATO Peace Support OperationNVD Night Vision DeviceNVG Night Vision GogglesOA Objective AreaOC Operations CentreOPCON Operational ControlOPFOR Opposing ForcesOPLAN Operation PlanOPORD Operations OrderOPP Operational Planning ProcessOps OperationsOPSEC Operational SecurityOPTASK Operational TaskORBAT Order of BattleOSC On Scene CommanderOWC Obstacle Warning CapabilityPDSS Person(s) with Designated Special StatusPIERIE Personnel Identified as at an Elevated Risk of Isolation and / or

ExploitationPIO Press and Information OfficePJs PararescuemenPLB Personal Locator BeaconPLS Personal Locator SystemPLWF Protection, Location, Water, FoodPMB Personnel Recovery Mission BriefPOB Persons On BoardPOC Point Of ContactPOLAD Political Adviser



POW Prisoner Of War

PPI Political Planning Indicator

PR Personnel Recovery

PRCC Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell

PRDO Personnel Recovery Duty Officer

PRIR Personnel Recovery Incident Report

PRTF Personnel Recovery Task Force

PSP Personal Survival Pack

PSYOPS Psychologal Operations

PUP Pick-Up Point

PUZ Pick-Up Zone

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RAMROD Numerical Encryption Grid

RAS Recovery Activation Signals

RESCAP Rescue Combat Air Patrol

RESCORT Rescue Escort

RFI Request For Information

RMC Rescue Mission Commander

ROE Rules of Engagement

ROEIMPL ROE Implementation

ROZ Restricted Operation Zone

RV Rendezvous Point

RW Rotary Wing

SA Situational Awareness

SAM Surface to Air Missile

SAR Search And Rescue

SARDOT Search And Rescue Dot

SARIR Search And Rescue Incident Report

SARNEG Search And Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid

SARSAT Search and Rescue Satellite

SARSIT Search And Rescue Situation Report

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence

SERE Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction

SH Support Helicopter

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SME Subject Matter Expert

SNR Senior National Representative

SOCC Special Operations Component Commander

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOM Scheme Of Manoeuvre



309

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SOF Special Operations Forces

SNR Senior National Representative

SP Spider Point

SPINS Special Instructions

SPIE Special Insertion and Extraction

SRR Search and Rescue Region

STANAG Standard NATO Agreement

TACAN Tactical Air Navigation

TACON Tactical Control

TAS Terrain Avoidance System

TMRR Temporary Minimum Risk Route

TOA Transfer Of Authority

TOT Time On Target

TRAP Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel

TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

TF Task Force

UHF Ultra High Frequency

UN United Nations

UTM Universal Transversal Mercator

VHF Very High Frequency

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions

VOR VHF Omni-directional Range

WOC Wing Ops Centre


BI-SC JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY JOINT OPERATIONAL...

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