Benevolent Empire

8/6/2019 Benevolent Empire

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The BenevolentEmpireb y R o b e r t K a g a n

No t so l o n g a go , w h e n t h e M o n i ca L e w i n s k ys c a n d a l fi rs t b r o k e i n t h e g l o b a l m e d i a , a ni n v o l u n t a r y a n d t h e r e f o r e u n u s u a l l y

r e v e a l i n g g a s p o f c o n c e r n c o u l d b e h e a r d i n t h ecapitals o f ma ny of the world's most p rom inen t nations. E ver so briefly,prime ministers and pundits wa tche d to see if the drivewh eel of the inter-

na tion al e con om ic, security, an d political systems was abou t to misalignor lose its power, with all tha t this breakdow n would imply for the rest o fthe wo rM . W ould the M iddle East peace process stall? W ould A sia'sfinancial crisis spiral out of control? W ould the K orean peninsula bec om eunsettled? W ou ld pressing issues of Euro pea n security go unresolved?" I nall the world's trouble spo ts," the Times of Lo ndo n noted , leaders w ere"calculating w ha t will ha pp en w he n W ashington's gaze is distracted."

Temporarily interru pting their steady grumbling about A m er ica n arro-

gance an d heg em onic pretensions, Asian, European, and M iddle Easterneditorial pages paused to contemplate the consequences of a crippledA m eric an presidency. T he liberal Ge rm an newspaperF r a n k f u r t e r R u n &schau, w hic h a few m onth s earlier had be en accusing A me ricans of arro-gan t zealotry and a "camouflaged neoco lonialism ," suddenly fretted th atthe "problems in th e M iddle East, in the Balkans or in Asia" w ill no t besolved "w ithou t U .S. assistance and a president wh o enjoys respect" a nddemanded that, in the interests of the entire world, the president'saccusers quickly produc e the goods or shut up. I n H ong Kong, the South

R o B E R T K A o A N is a senior associate a t the Carnegie E nd ow m ent for Internat ionalPeace an d is director of i tsU.S.Leadership Project, which exam ines Am erica's role in thepo st-C old W ar world an d the challenge of providing effective global leadership.

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Ch/na Morn/ng Post warned th at the "humb ling" of an A m erican presi-

d en t ha d "implications of great gravity" for intern atio na l affairs; in Sau diArabia , the Arab News declared that this was "no t the t ime th at A m eri-ca or the wo rld needs an inward-looking or w oun ded president. I t needson e u nenc um bered by pr ivate concerns wh o can m ake tough decis ions."

T he i rony of these pleas for vigorous A m erica n leadership did n otescape notice, e ve n in Paris, the intellectu al an d spiri tual c apital of anti-heg em on y and "multipolarity." A s on e pu nd it (Jacques A m alr ic) notedw ickedly in th e lef t- leaning L/berat/on, "Th ose w ho accused the U nite d

States of being overbearing are today praying for a quick end to thes torm." Indeed , they were and wi th good reason. As Aldo Rizzoobserved, part in la m en t and p art in tribute, in Italy 's pow erful La Stam-pa: "It is in t imes l ike these th at w e feel the absen ce of a power, certainlyno t [an] a l tem ative, but a t least complem entary, to Am erica, som ethingw hich E urope could be . Cou ld be , but is not . Therefore , good luck toC l in ton and , m ost of all, to A mer ica ."

Th is br ief m om en t of interna t ional co nc ern passed, of course, as did

the f lash of can do r abou t th e t rue s tate o f wo rld affairs an d Am erica 'sessential role in p reserving a sem blanc e of global order. T h e presiden tappeared to rega in h is ba lance , the dr ivewheel kept sp inning , and in th eworld 's great capitals ta lk resum ed of Am eric an arrogance and bul lyingan d the ne ed for a m ore genu inely m ult ipolar system to m anag e inter-na tio na l affairs. Bu t the alm ost universally expressed fear of a w eak en edU .S. presidency provides a useful an tido te to th e pervasive han dw ringin g,in W ashin gton as w ell as in foreign capitals, ove r the "problem" of Am er-ican hegemony. Th ere is m uc h less to this problem tha n meets the eye.

T he com ming led feel ings o f re l iance on and r e sen tmen t towardAm erica ' s in te rna t ional do m inan ce these days a re ne i ther s trange nornew. T he r e sen tmen t o f power, even w hen i t is i n the hands o f one 'sf riends , is a no rmal , indeed , timeless hu m an em ot io n- -n o less so tha nthe ar rogance of power. A nd perhaps only Am er icans , w i th the i r ra thershor t memory, could imagine tha t the cur rent resentm ent is the uniqueproduc t o f the expans ion o f Amer ican dominance in the pos t -Co ldWar e ra . Dur ing the conf ron ta t ion wi th the Sov ie t Un ion , nowreca l led in the U ni t ed S tat es a s a t ime o f Eden ic ha rmo ny am ong theW estern allies, no t iust Fren ch bu t a lso B rit ish leaders cha fed und er th eleadership of a som etimes overbea ring A m erica. A s po l i tical scient is tA.W . DeP or te noted some 20 years ago , the schemes of European uni tyadvanced by F rench f inanc ia l p l anne r Jean M on ne t and F rench fo re ign

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min i s t e r Robe r t Schuman in 1950 a imed "no t on ly to s t r eng thenW es te rn Europe in t he f ace o f t he Russ ian th rea t b u t a l s o - - th ou gh th i swas less ta lked a b o u t- - t o s t re ng the n i t v is-a-vis its indispensable bu tove rpow ering A m eri ca n al ly." Today 's cal l for "m ult ipolar i ty" in inter-nat ional affa i rs , in short , has a his tory, as do European yearnings forun i ty a s a coun te rwe igh t t o A m er i can power. N e i the r o f these p ro -

In truth, the benevolenthegemony exercised by theUnited States is good fo r avast po rtion o f the world'spopulation.

fessed desires is a new response tot h e p a rt ic u la r A m e r i c a n h e g e m o n yof the last n in e years .

And ne i the r o f t hem, one sus -pects, is very seriously inte nd ed . Forthe tn l th abou t Amer ica 's domina n tro le in the wor ld i s kno w n to m os tclear-eyed international observers.A nd the t ru th is t ha t t he benevo len theg em on y exercised by the U nite d

States is go od for a vas t po rtio n of the world 's popu lation. I t is certainly a

better in terna tiona l arrang em ent tha n all realist ic al ternatives. To und er-m ine i t would cost many o thers a round the wor ld fa r more tha n i t wouldcos t A m er ica ns- -a nd fa r sooner. A s Sam uel Hu nt ing ton wrote f ive yearsago, before he join ed th e pleth ora o f scholars disturbed by th e "arrogance"of A m er ican hegem ony: "A wor ld wi thou t U.S . p r imacy wi ll be a w or ldwi th mo re v io lence and d isorder and less democracy and econo m icgrowth than a wor ld where the Uni ted S ta tes cont inues to have moreinf luence tha n any oth er coun try shaping global affai rs ."

T he un ique qua li ti es o f Am er i can g loba l dom inance have neve r beena mystery, but these days they are m ore a nd m ore forgot ten or, for con-ven ienc e ' sake, ignored. Th ere was a t ime w he n th e world clear ly sawho w different the A m eric an superpower was from al l the previous aspir-ing hegemo ns . T he d i ffe rencela yin th e exercise of power. T h e s t rengthacquired by the U ni te d S ta tes in the a f te rmath of W or ld War II was fargreater than any s ingle nat ion had ever possessed, a t least s ince theR om an Empire. Am er ica 's share of the wor ld economy, the overwhelm-ing super ior i ty of i ts mil i tary capaci ty--augmented for a t ime by amo nopo ly o f nuc l ear weapons and the capac ity to de liver t hem - -ga ve i tthe choice of pursu ing any nu m ber of globa l ambi t ions. T ha t the A m er-ican people "migh t have se t the c rown of world empire on the i r b rows,"as on e Bri t ish s ta tesma n pu t i t in 1951, but chose n ot to , was a decis ionof s ingular im portan ce in world his tory and recognized as such. A m eri-

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Kag~n

ca's se l f-abnegat ion was unusual , and i ts uniquene ss was no t los t o n peo -p les w ho had jus t suffered the hor rors of wars brou ght o n by pow erfu lna t ions w i th ove rw een ing ambi t ions t o empi re o f t he mo s t coe rc ive type .N o r w a s i t l os t o n t h o se w h o s aw w h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n p l a n n e d t o d owi th its new foun d pow er a f te r Wor ld W ar I I.

T he un iqueness pe rs is ted . Dur ing the Co ld War, Am er ica 's s ty le o fh e g e m o n y r ef le c te d its d e m o c r a ti c f o rm o f g o v e r n m e n t as m u c h asSov ie t heg em on y r e fl ect ed S ta lin 's app roach to go vem ance . T he"hab it s o f democracy," as Co ld W ar h i s to r i an Joh n Lewis Gadd i s hasn o t e d , m a d e c o m p r o m i se a n d m u t u a l a c c o m m o d a t i o n t h e n o r m i nU.S . -AUied re la t ions . This approach to in te rna t iona l a ffa i r s was no tan example o f s e l f l e s s behav io r. The Amer i cans had an in s t i nc t ivesense, based on the i r ow n expe r i ence g rowing up in a un ique ly opensys tem o f democra t i c cap it a li sm, t ha t t he i r pow er and in f luence wou ldbe en ha nc ed by a l lowing subord ina te a l li es a g rea t mea sure of in te rna land eve n ex te rna l f r eedom o f maneuve r. Bu t i n p rac t ice , a s Gadd i spoin ts ou t , "A m er ican s so of ten defer red to th e wishes of a ll ies dur ingthe ea rly C o ld W ar th a t som e h i s to r i ans have seen the Europeansespec ia l ly the Br i t i sh - -as hav ing m ana ged them."

Beyond the s ty le o f Am er i can hegem ony, wh ich , ev en i f unev en lyapp li ed , undo ub ted ly d id mo re to a t t rac t t ha n r epe l o the r peop le s andna t ions , A m er i can g rand s tr at egy in t h e Co ld W ar cons i s t en tly en t a i l edprovid ing fa r more to f r iends and a llies th an was expec ted from t he m inre turn . Thus , i t was A m er ic an stra tegy to ra ise up f rom th e r u im power-fu l eco no m ic com pet i to rs in E urope an d Asia , a s tra tegy so successfu ltha t by the 1980s the U ni t ed S ta tes was tho ug ht to be in a s ta te of irre -

versib le " re la tive" econ om ic dec l ine- - re la t iv e , tha t is , to those veryna t ions w hose econom ies it had r e s to red a f te r Wor ld W ar I I.

A n d i t was A m er ic an stra tegy to r isk nuc lear ann ih i la t ion o n i ts o th-e rwise un th rea t en ed hom elan d in o rde r t o de t e r a t tack , e i t he r nuc l ea ror co nve nt iona l , on a Eu ropean or A s ian a lly. Th is s t ra tegy a lso cameto be take n for g ran ted . But w he n on e cons iders the absence of s imi la r.ly re liab le guaran tees am on g the var ious European powers in th e pas t(be tween , say, G rea t Br i ta in and France in the 1920s and 1930s), the

wi l lingness of the U ni t ed S ta tes , s tanding in re la t ive sa fe ty be hin d twooceans , to l in k i t s surv iva l to tha t o f o ther n a t ions was ex traord inary.

Even m ore r emarkab le may be tha t t he U n i t ed S ta t e s has a t t emp tednot on ly to preserve these guaran tees bu t to expand them in thepo s t -C old W ar e ra . M uch is m ade these days , no t l east in W ashington , o f

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t h e A m e r i c a n d e f e n s e b u d g e t n o w b e i n g se v er al t im e s h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o f

e v e ry o t h e r m a j o r p o w er. B u t o n w h a t is th a t d e f e n se b u d g e t s p e n t? Ver yl it tl e f un d in g g o e s t o p ro t ec t n a t i on a l t er rit ory. Mo s t o f i t is dev o t ed t om a k i n g g o o d o n w h a t A m e r i c a n s c a ll th e i r i n te r n a t i o n a l " c o m m i t m e n t s . "

E v e n i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e S o v i e t th r e a t, A m e r i c a c o n t in u e s , m u c ht o t h e c h a g r in o f som e o f it s po l i t ic i an s , t o de f i ne i ts "na t i on a l s ecu r i ty "b road ly, as e nc o m pas s ing t he s ecu r i ty o f f r i ends an d a ll ie s, and ev en o fa b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s , f a r f r o m A m e r i c a n s h o r e s . I n t h e G u l f Wa r, m o r et h a n 9 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e m i l i ta r y f o rc e s s e n t t o e x p e l I ra q's a r m y f r o m

K u w a it w e r e A m e r i c a n . W e r e 9 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e i nt er es ts t h r e a t e n e dA m e r i c a n ? I n a l m o s t a n y i m a g i n a b l e s c e n a r i o i n w h i c h t h e U n i t e dS t a t e s m i g h t d e p l o y t r o o p s a b r o a d , t h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e w o u l d b e t h ed e f e n s e o f i n te r e st s o f m o r e i m m e d i a t e c o n c e r n t o A m e r i c a 's a l li es -- -a si t h a s b e e n i n B o s n ia . T h i s c a n b e s a i d a b o u t n o o t h e r p o w e r.

Ev e r s in c e t he U n i t e d S t a t e s em erged a s a g r ea t power, t he i den ti fi c a -t i o n o f the i n te r e s ts o f o t he r s w i th i t s ow n has be en t he m os t s t ri k ing qua l-it y o f A m e r i c a n f o re i g n a n d d e f e n sep o l i c y.A m e r i c a n s s e e m t o h a v e

i n te r n al iz e d a n d m a d e s e c o n d n a t u r e a c o n v i c t i o n h e l d o n l y s in c e Wo r l dW a r II: N a m e l y, t h a t t h e i r o w n w e l l -b e i n g d e p e n d s f u n d a m e n t a l ly o n t h ew e l l- b e in g o f o t h er s ; t h a t A m e r i c a n p r o s p er it y c a n n o t o c c u r i n t h ea b s e n c e o f g lo b a l p r os p er it y; t h a t A m e r i c a n f r e e d o m d e p e n d s o n t h e s ur -v iva l a nd sp r ead o f f r e edom e l s ewhe re ; t ha t agg re s sion anyw he re t h r ea t-e n s t h e d a n g e r o f a gg r es si on e v e ry w h e r e ; a n d t h a t A m e r i c a n n a t i o n a lsecur i ty is im poss ib le w i th ou t a b road m easure o f in te rn a t ion a l securi ty.

Le t us no t ca l l th i s co nv ic t io n self less : A m er ic an s a re as se l f -in te resteda s a n y o t h e r p e o p l e . Bu t f o r a t le a s t 50 yea rs t hey ha ve bee n g u ided by t hek in d o f e n l i gh t ene d s e l f- in t e re s t tha t , i n p r ac t ic e , com es dange rous ly c lo seto r e s em b l ing gen erosi ty. I f t ha t gene ros i ty s eems t o be f ad ing t oday ( an dth i s is s ti ll a p r e m a tu re j udg m en t ) , i t is no t because A m er i ca h a s g row nt o o f o n d o f p o w e r. Q u i t e t h e o p p o s i te . It is b e c a m e s o m e A m e r i c a n s h a v egro w n t i red o f power, t i r ed o f leadersh ip , and , conse quen t ly, le ss inc l ine dto de m ons t r a t e t he so r t o f gene ros i ty t ha t ha s l ong cha rac te r iz ed t he i rna t i on ' s f o re ign po li cy. W ha t m an y i n Eu rop e and e l sewhe re s ee as a rro -gance a n d bu l l y ing may be j u s t i rr it ab i li ty bo rn o f wea r ine s s.

I f f a ti gue is s e t ti ng i n , t h e n t hose na t i ons an d peo p l e s w ho hav e l ongbenef i t ed , and s t i l l benef i t , f rom the in te rna t iona l o rder c rea ted andu p h e l d b y A m e r i c a n p o w e r h a v e a s t a k e i n b o ls te r in g ra t h e r t h a n d e n i -g r a t in g Am e r i ca n heg em ony . A f t e r a ll, wha t , i n t r u th , a r e t he a l te rna ti ve s?

W ha tev e r Am er i c a 's fa il ings , we re any o the r na t i on t o t ake i ts p l ace,

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I U . S . F o r c e sO v e r s e a sC o u n t r ie s i n w h i c h m o r e t h a n S O a c t iv e d u t yU . S . m i l i ta r y p e r s o n n e l w e r e " h o m e - s t a t i o n e d "( To t a l: 3 3 ) . O n D e c e m b e r3 1 , 1 9 9 7 , U . S .m i l i ta r y s e r v i c e s h a d ) , 4 1 8 , 7 7 3 m i li t a ryp e r s o n n e l c u l le d u p f o r a c t i v e d u t y. O f T h o s e ,2 2 4 , 1 6 4 p e r s o n n e l w e r e s t a l i o n e d a b r o a d .

ITo p l O U . S . D e p l o y m e n t s( b y c o u n t r y, o n D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 1 9 9 7 )

Ge rma ny . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 62 ,55 |Ja pe n . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 41 ,669So uth Ko rea . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 36 ,285Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .11 , 8 0 7Un ited Kingd om .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .1 0 , 9 0 0Bos e ia and He rzego vina .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . 7 ,651Pa na m a . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 4,99 2So ud i Ara bia . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3,37 5Sp ain . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,64 6Ku wo it . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 1,8 95

To p 5 U . S . O v e r s e a s O p e r a t io n s( in M a r c h 1 9 9 8 )

M I L I T A R YR E G I O N A N D O P E R AT IO N N A M E p E R S O N N E L

Form er Yug os lav ia , Op era t ion Jo in t Gua rd . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . 12 ,50 0S a u d i A r a b i a a n d K u w a i t : O p e r u t i o n D e s e r l F a k a n , O p a r u t i o n D e s e r t

Focu s , Op ara l i ea I r i s Go ld , Exe rc i se n l r ins ic Adion . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . 9 ,400I raq , Ope ra t ion Nor the rn Wa tch , No -Fly Zon e . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. 9 ,000The S ina i , Mu l t ina t iona l Farce and Ob serve rs . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . 92SHo ndu ras , Op era t ion New Hor izon s 199 8 . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. 48 5R o l e :Personne l umbers a r U.$ counte rdrug pera t ions e reno t ava i lab le .

"The Sun Ne ver Sets. . ."G l o b a l D e p l o y m e n t o f U . S . F o r ce s

~ _ - ' % - - ~ ~ - - . . . . . _

- ~

f /

S o L ~ . - c e : D e p o r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e .z ' ~ o t e : T h i s m o p e x c l u d e s p e r s o n n e l w h o w e r e o n U . S . s h i p s in t h e P a c i f ic O c e a n

o f f t h e E u r o p e a n c o a s t ( 4 , 4 6 6 ) , a J o n g t h e N e a r E a s t a n d S o u t h A s i u n c o a s t s ( 8o f f th e A m e r i c a s ( 1 3 4 ) , a n d " u n d i s tr i b u te d " a n d c l a s s i fi e d a s s i g n m e n t s ( 2 ,


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t he r e s t o f t he wor ld wou ld f ind the s i tua t ion le ss congen ia l. Am er i ca may

be a r rogant; A m er ican s m ay a t t im es be se lf ish; they m ay occas iona l ly beham -ha nd ed in t he i r exe rc ise o f power. Bu t,excusez-moi,c o m p a r e d w i t hwh om ? C an anyo ne be l ieve tha t w ere F rance to possess t he pow er theU ni te d S ta tes no w has , the Fre nch w ould be less a rrogant, l ess self ish, a ndless pro ne to m ak ing m istakes? Li t t le in France 's his tory as a great power,or ev en as a m ediu m power, justif ies su ch opt imism. N or can on e eas i lyimag ine pow er on a n A m er i ca n scale be ing em ployed in a m ore en l igh t -ene d f a sh ion by Ch ina , Germ any, J apan , o r Russ ia . An d eve n the l eade rs

of tha t l east ben ighte d of empires , the Br i ti sh , were m ore a r rogant , m orebloody -mind ed , and , in th e end , less capable m anagers of wo r ld affa ir stha n the i nep t Am er i cans have so fa r p roved to be . I f t he re is t o be a so l esuperpower, the wo r ld is be t te r o ff if tha t pow er i s the U ni t ed S ta tes .

W h a t , t h e n , o f a m u l t ip o l a r w o rl d? T h e r e a r e th o s e, e v e n i n t h eU ni t e d S ta te s , wh o be l i eve a s em blance o f i n t e rna t iona l i u s t ice can beach ieved on ly in a wor ld cha rac t e r i zed by a ba l ance among r e l a t i veequal s. I n such c i r cums tances , na t iona l a r rogance m us t t heo re t i ca l ly be

t empered , na t iona l a sp i r a t i ons l imi t ed , and a t t empt s a t hegemony,e i t h e r b e n e v o l e n t o r m a l e v o l e n t, c h e c k e d . A m o r e e v e n l y b a l a n c e dwor ld , t hey a s sume , w i th t he U n i t ed S ta t e s cu t dow n a peg (o r two , o rthr ee ) w ou ld be f reer, fai rer, an d safer.

A dis tant , thou gh un ack now ledg ed cou sin of this realis t, balance-of-power theory is the global par l iamentar ianism, or world federal ism, thatanimates so many Europeans today, par t icular ly the French apost les ofEuro pean un ion . ( I t is l it tl e reca lled , especial ly by m od em proponen ts offoreign pol icy "real ism," that Hans Morgenthau 's seminal work, Po/ / t /csAm ong Nat/ons, bu ilds s lowly an d m ethodica l ly to th e conc lus ion tha tw hat is nee ded to m ain ta in in te rna t iona l peace i s a "w or ld s tate ." ) In fact ,m an y of today 's cal ls for mu kipolar i ty seem to spr ing from th e view, popu-la r in som e W ashin gton c irc les bu t d ow nr ight pervas ive in Eu ropean cap-it al s, t ha t t r ad i t i ona l m easu res o f na t ion a l pow er, an d e ve n thena tion -state i tself , are passe. If Eu rop e is erasing borders, w ha t ne ed is the refor an overbear ing A m er ica to ke ep th e peace? Am er ica 's m i li ta ry pow er isa rcha ic in a wor ld w here f inance i s t ransna t iona l a nd the m od em is k ing .

W e need no t en t e r he re i n to t he end les s and so f ar unproduc t ive deba team ong in te rna tiona l - re la t ions theori s ts o ver the re la tive mer i t s o f mul t i-polar, b ipolar, a nd unip olar in terna t ional "systems" for kee ping th e p eace.I t i s suffic ien t to no te tha t dur ing the supposed heyday of m ul t ipo la r i ty - -the e igh teen th cen tu ry, w he n the firs t ' ~ on ce r t o f Europe" ope ra t ed - -w ar

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The w orld 's crossing guard?

am on g the great powers was a regular feature, with major a nd minor, andglobal and local, confl icts erupting t hro ug ho ut alm ost every decade.

W e should a lso no t forget that u top ian fancies about the obsolescenceof mil i tary power and nat ional governments in a t ransnat ional , "eco-nom ic" era have blossomed before , only to be crushed by the nex t "war toen d all wars." T h e success of the Eu ropean U ni on , such as i t is , and, more-over, the wh ole drea m o f erasing boundaries, has been m ade possible onlybecause the mo re fun dam ental and endu r ing issues of Europ ean securi tyhav e b een addressed by the U ni ted States th rou gh i ts leadership of NA'ro,that mo st archaic and least u topian of inst i tu t ions . W ere A m erica n hege-

m on y really to disappear, the old Europe an quest ions chiefly, w hat to doabout Ge rm any - -w ou ld qu ick ly rea r thei r hoary heads .

But le t's re turn to the real world . For al l the bleat ing abo ut he gem o-ny, no na t io n rea lly wants genu ine mul t ipo lar ity. N o na t io n has show na wil l ingness to take on equal responsibil i t ies for m an ag in g global crises.N o na t io n has been wi l ling to m ake the same k inds o f shor t - t e rm sacr i-fices tha t the U ni te d S ta tes has been wi l l ing to m ake in the long- te rmin teres t o f p reserv ing the g loba l o rder. N o na t ion , excep t C hina , hasbeen wi l ling to spend the m on ey to acqui re the mi l it a ry power neces


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mili tary bui ldup has no t exact ly been viewed by its neighbors as creat-ing a m ore harmo nious envi ronm ent .

If Europeans gen uinely sought multipolarity, the y w ould increase theirdefense budgets considerably, instead of slashing them . T he y w ould takethe lead in the Balkans, instead of insisting that their participationdepends o n Am erica 's par t ic ipation. But ne i ther the French, oth er Euro-peans, n or e ve n the Russians are prepared to pay th e price for a genu inely

mu ltipolar world. N ot only do theyabout shy away from th e expense of creat-

For all the ing and preserving such a world;hegemony, no na t ion rea l lythey rightly fear the geopoliticalw an ts genuine m ul tipolari ty,conse quen ces of destroying A m eri-

can hegemony. Genuine mul t ipo-la r i ty would inevi tab ly mean a

return to the com plex of strategic issues th at plagued the wo rld beforeW orld W ar II: in Asia , the co m peti t ion for regional preem inenc e am ongC hina , Japan, and R ussia; in Europe, the com peti t ion am ong France,

G ermany , Great Bri tain, and Russia .K en ne th Wal tz once m ade the seemingly obvious poin t th a t " in

intern at iona l poli tics, overw helm ing pow er repels and leads othe rstates to bala nce against i t" a ban al truism, an d yet, as i t hap pen s, sount rue in th is e ra of A m er ican hegemon y. W ha t France, Russ ia , andsome others real ly seek today is no t gen uine m ult ipolar i ty but a falsemult ipolar i ty, an honorary mult ipolar i ty. They want the pretense ofequal par tnership in a m ult ipolar w orld w ithou t the pr ice or responsi-

bi l i ty that equal par tnership requires . They want equal say on them ajor decis ions in global crises (as w ith Iraq and Kosovo) w ithou t hav-ing to po ssess or w ield any thing l ike equal power. Th ey w ant toincrease the i r own pres t ige a t the expense of Amer ican power butw ithou t the s t rain of hav ing to f ill the gap lef t by a dim inu t ion of theA m er ican ro le . A nd a t t he same t ime , they w an t to m ake short -t erm,most ly f inancial , gains , by taking advantage of the cont inuing U.S.focus on long-term support of the interna t ional order.

The problem is not merely that some of these nat ions are givingthemselves a "free r ide" on the back of Am erica n power, benefit ing fromthe internat ional order that American hegemony undergirds , while a tthe same time pu nctu ring l i tt le holes in i t for short-term adva ntage. T h em ore serious danger is that this beh avio r will gradually, or perhaps no t sogradually, erode th e sum total o f pow er th at ca n be applied to pro tecting

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the international order altogether. The false multipolarity sought by

France, Russia, and o thers w ould reduce Am erica's abil ity to defend co m -m on interests w itho ut increasing any one else's abil ity to do so.

In fact , th is erosion m ay already be happe ning. In th e re cen t case ofIraq, A m erica 's abi li ty to pursue the long-term goal of defending thein te rna t iona l order aga ins t Pres ident Saddam Husse in was unde rm inedby the effor ts of France and Russia to a t ta in short- term eco no m ic gainsand enhanced prest ige. Both these powers achieved their goal of a"mul t ipo lar" so lut ion : Th ey took a s lice out of Am er ican hegem ony.But they d id so a t th e pr ice of leav ing in p lace a long- te rm threa t to anin t e rna t iona l sys tem f rom w hich they con t inue to d raw imm ense ben-eflts bu t w hich th ey by themselves have no ab il ity to defend . Th ey d idno t possess the m eans to solve the Iraq problem, only the m eans to pre-ven t th e U ni ted S ta tes f rom so lv ing i t.

Th is insufficiency is th e fatal flaw of multilateralism, as the C lin to nadm inistration learned in the case of Bosnia. In a world that is no t gen-uinely m ultipolar w here there is instead a widely recognized hierarc hyof power--multilateralism, if rigorously pursued, guarantees failure inm eet ing internat ional crises. Tho se nat ions th at lack the p ower to solvean internat ional problem cannot be expected to take the lead indem anding the problem be solved. The y m ay even eschew the exerciseof power al together, both because they do no t h ave i t and because theeffective exercise o f it by so m eo ne else, suc h as the U ni te d States, on lyserves to w iden the gap betw een the h egem on and the rest. Th e lessonPresident Bill C lin to n w as supposed to hav e lea rned in th e case of Bosniais tha t to be effective, m ulti lateralism m ust be precede d by unilateralism .

In th e toug hest situations, th e m ost effective mu ltilateral response com esw he n the s trongest p ower decides to act , wi th or w ithou t the others , andthe n asks its partners w heth er they wil l join. Giv ing equal say over inter-nat ional decisions to na t ions w ith vast ly unequal pow er of ten m eans th atthe ful l measure of pow er that can be deployed in defense of the inter-natio nal co m m unity's interests will , in fact, n ot be deployed.

Those cont r ibu t ing to the growing chorus of an t ihegemony andmul t ipo lar i ty may k now they are p lay ing a dangerous game, one tha t

needs to be con ducted w i th the u tmost care , as French leaders d id dur-ing the Co ld W ar, l es t the en t i re in tem at iona l sys tem com e crash ingdow n a round them. W ha t t hey m ay no t have adequa te ly ca lcu la ted ,how ever, is the possibil ity tha t A m erican s wil l no t respond as wisely asthey genera l ly d id dur ing the Co ld W ar.

SUMMER 19 98 33


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Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated

w hining abou t U .S. hege m ony too seriously. Th ey certainly should no ttake it m ore seriously tha n th e wh iners themselves do. But, o f course,A m ericans are taking it seriously. In the U ni ted States these days, thelugubrious guilt trip of post-V ietnam liberalism is ec ho ed ev en by con -servatives, with W illiam Bu ckley, Sam uel H untin gton , an d JamesSch lesinger all decrying A m eri ca n "hubris," "arrogance," an d "imperial-ism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exaltingA m eric a as the "indispensable" na tion , increasingly be hav e as if w hat is

truly indispensable is th e prior approval o f C hi na , France, a nd R ussia forevery military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring ofneo-isolationism n A m erica today, a m ood th at nicely com plemen ts theview am ong man y Europeans that Am erica is meddling too m uch ineveryo ne else's business and taking too li tt le t ime to m ind its own. T heexistence of the Soviet Un io n disciplined A mericans and m ade the m seeth at the ir e nlig hte ne d self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreignpolicy. Today , th at discipline is no lon ger present.

In othe r words, foreign grumbling about A m erican heg em ony wouldbe m erely amusing, w ere it no t for th e very real possibili ty tha t too m anyAm ericans wi ll forg et - -ev en ff most of the res t of the wor ld does n o t - -just how impor tant cont inued A m erican dominan ce is to the preserva-tio n of a reasonable level of inter nation al security and prosperity. W orldleaders may want to keep th is in m ind w hen they pop the champagnecorks in ce lebrat ion of the n ext Am erican humbl ing.

W A N T T O K N O W M O R E ?

Th e Spring 1993 i ssue o fInternational Securityinvi ted a number ofau thors to com m ent on A mer ican hegemon y in a forum en t i t led "Pr i -macy and i t s Discontents ." In h is a r t ic le "The Unipolar I l lus ion:Why New Grea t Powers Wi l l R i se , " wcI~ p ro fessor Chr i s topherLayne ci tes K en ne th Waltz and employs neoreal is t theory to argue tha tm ult ipolar i ty will blossom again som etime betw een 2000 and 2010;

Columbia University professor Robert Jervis, in his article "Interna-t ional Pr imacy : Is th e G am e W orth the Cand le? ," a rgues tha t pr ima-cy is no longer a worthy goal, s ince "with the dev elop m ent of nuclearweapons, th e spread of liberal democracy, and th e d im inu tion ofnationa lism, war am on g th e m ost powerful actors is unlikely"; and Har-

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vard Unive rs ity 's Sam ue l H un t ing ton , i n "W h y In te rna t iona l P r im a-

cy M at t e r s ," advances an a rgum ent fo r A m er ican p rimacy tha t he mayno longer be l ieve in . Char l e s Krau thamm er, i n "T he U nipo la rM o m e n t " (ForeignAffa/rs: Am erica and the W or/d, Vol. 70, N o. 1,1990-91) , a lso makes a case for A m er ica n hegemony, an opin ion heno w seems la rge ly to hav e aband oned.

A good source o n A m eric an policy, already cited in this art icle, is Jo hnLewis G addis 'We N o w K n ow :RethinkingCold W arHistory(Ne w York:Ox ford U niversity Press, 1997). D rawing on archival material from for-

m er com m un ist countries, Gad dis argues tha t W estern scholars hav e tra-dit ionally underemphasized the role of ideology during th e C old W ar.T he U ni te d Sta tes Informat ion A genc y (USlA) on a da i ly bas is com-

pi les summaries of edi tor ial commentary from around the world.Searchab le archives of the D a/ /y D /gest are available on l ine at the USIAW eb site . For l inks to o the r relevan t W eb sites, as wel l as a com preh en-sive index o f related articles, access w w w .foreignp olicy.co m .

http://www.foreignpolicy.comS e l e c t e d f u l l - t e x t a r t i c l e s f r o m t h e c u r r e n t i s s u e o f

F O R E I G N P O L I C Y A c c e s s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l d a ta a n d

r e s o u r c e s O v e r 1 5 0 r e l a te d W e b s i t e l in k s I n t e r a c t iv e

L e t t e r s t o t h e E d i t o r D e b a t e s l 0 y e a r s o f a r c h i v a ls u m m a r i e s a n d m o r e t o c o m e . . .

A c c e s s t h e i s su e s !

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Benevolent Empire

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