Back to the Future: The Return of U.S. Sanctions, …parhami/pres_folder/bava19...2010 --CISADA 2011...

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Back to the Future: The Return of U.S. Sanctions, their Economic Impact, and Iran’s Response

Transcript of Back to the Future: The Return of U.S. Sanctions, …parhami/pres_folder/bava19...2010 --CISADA 2011...

Page 1: Back to the Future: The Return of U.S. Sanctions, …parhami/pres_folder/bava19...2010 --CISADA 2011 –IRGC for interfering in Syria 2012 –Obama’s Executive Orders • Leveraged

Back to the Future:The Return of U.S. Sanctions, their Economic Impact,

and Iran’s Response

Page 2: Back to the Future: The Return of U.S. Sanctions, …parhami/pres_folder/bava19...2010 --CISADA 2011 –IRGC for interfering in Syria 2012 –Obama’s Executive Orders • Leveraged

Contents

1. What are economic sanctions?

Success / failure factors

2. History of economic sanctions against Iran / JCPOA

3. US reinstatement of sanctions in Nov 2018

4. Impact of Sanctions

5. Iran’s potential response

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What are economic sanctions?

“Economic sanctions are the deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.”*

U.S. Sanctions apply to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.

US Person

US citizen or permanent resident wherever located

Anyone physically present in the US

US corporations, partnerships, associations, including their non-US branches

Also covers activities of non-US persons

*Hufbauer

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Key message of economic sanctions

To target country:

We do not approve of your actions

To allies:

We mean what we say

To domestic audiences:

We are protecting our nation’s interests and our values

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Economic Sanctions

Types of Sanctions:

Export Import Financial Loans, Banking

Asset Freeze

Primary sanctions Secondary sanctions

Goals of Sanctions:

Deterrence

Asserting leadership

Regime change

Compensation for nationalized property

Domestic political support

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Primary Sanctions

Prohibits “US persons” from conducting any business transactions with Iran

U.S. IRAN

Example: US oil and banking sanctions against Iran

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Secondary Sanctions

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Warns “third parties” to stop commercial dealings with Iran or lose the commercial relationship with US entities.

U.S. IRAN

Third Parties

Example: Secondary Sanctions warned financial institutions in other countries: either stop transactions with Iran or lose access to the US financial system.

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Economic sanctions: Success Factors

Economic size and trade size

Type and combination of sanctions used“Carrot and Stick”

International support

Duration of sanctions

Target country’s:• Government--democracy or autocracy• Economic health and political stability

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Economic Sanctions: Failure Factors

Sanctions:

may unify the target country behind their leadership

May prompt adversaries to assume the role of “savior” and support the target country

May alienate allies and certain domestic businesses

may not be adequate

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History of Iran Sanctions: A SummaryUS Sanctions: 1979 –Hostage crisis

1984 –Support for Hezbollah

1992 –Weapons development

1995 –Trade

2001 –Asset freezes/travel bans

2007 –IRGC for destabiizing Iraq

2009 –IRGC for human rights violations

2010 --CISADA

2011 –IRGC for interfering in Syria

2012 –Obama’s Executive Orders • Leveraged CISADA* and expanded

sanctions

• Oil and petrochemicals

• Technology

• Blocked Iran’s access to international financial system

* CISADA: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010

UN Sanctions:

2006-2008 --Noncompliant with IAEA nuclear safeguards; embargo on nuclear-related materials; blocked financial assistance

2010 – UN Security Council Resolution 1929 supported by all allies, Russia and China

--Oil restrictions; banking (CBI) and financial sector

EU Sanctions:

2007 –Asset Freeze for Nuclear and missiles production

2010 –financial/banking; trade

2012 –Oil/petrochemical imports; shipping insurance; CBI asset freeze

CBI: Central Bank of Iran

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Economic sanctions will be more effective if target country is dependent on industrial imports and has no strategic exports

STRATEGIC EXPORTS

DEPENDENCEon IMPORTS

Little Effective

Highly Effective

Little Effective

?High

Low

Low High

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Effectiveness of economic sanctions: a few examples

STRATEGIC EXPORTS

DEPENDENCEon IMPORTS

China

Liberia IRAN

NorthKorea

Little Effective

Highly Effective

Little Effective

High

Low

Low High

1979-2010 Somewhat effective 2012-2015 Highly effective

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Advancement of science and technology, self sufficiency, and production of strategic goods create more immunity to economic sanctions

STRATEGIC EXPORTS

DEPENDENCEon IMPORTS

China

Liberia IRAN

NorthKorea

Little Effective

Highly Effective

Little Effective

High

Low

Low High

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Iran Nuclear Deal

Also known as Joint comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

A product of sanctions and intense diplomacy

Made Iran compliant in nuclear area

Group of 5 + 1 allowed Iran to once again trade oil internationally

Made sanctions subject to snapback for 10 years

Sanctions remaining:

Ballistic missiles

Support for US-designated terrorist groups

Human rights

Financial transactions restrictions

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Factors that made 2012-2015 Iran Sanctions very effective

Trade

Oil Petrochemicals

Dual Purpose Exports

Secondary Sanctions

ShippingInsurance

International Financial Transactions

Multilateral: US, UN, Group of 5+1Effective

Somewhat Effective

Little Effective

Legend:

One other key factor that, in conjunction with sanctions, led to JCPOA Agreement was intensive diplomacy between Iran and the other parties, especially the United States.

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President Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA has somewhat reduced effectiveness of US sanctions against Iran

Trade

Oil/Petrochemicals Dual Purpose Exports

Secondary SanctionsShipping Insurance

International Financial Transactions

Effective

Somewhat Effective

Little Effective

Legend:

Unlike JCPOA, what seems to be absent from the 2018 reinstatement of sanctions is lack of ongoing dialogue between the United States and Iran.

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2012 vs. 2018: Is Iran in a better position to weather sanctions?

2012

• Popular policies/Subsidy

• Unemployment 14%

• Inflation 30%

• Foreign exchange Reserves $110B

2018 • Reformist policies

• Subsidized food prices

• Unemployment 11%

• Inflation 10% - 30%

• Foreign exchange Reserves $130B

• More Support for domestic products

• Increased non-oil exports

• Willingness to implement banking reforms

• Refine oil products domestically

• Greater unity

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Despite a weaker impact, reinstatement of US sanctions will still take a heavy toll on Iran’s economy

OPPORTUNITIES

CHALLENGES

Exporters Loss of Market

Share

Lower Gov

Spending

InflationNegative GrowthUnemployment

Uncertainty/Lower

Investment

Technologiyknowledge Exchange

Poverty Inequality

Increased Innovation

Import Substitution

Black Market/High

Costs

Intern’lPayments

Indirect Impacts:

Direct Impacts:

Depreciated Currency

High Interest

Rates

Other Impacts:Negative Impact

Positive Impact

Legend:

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2012-2015 Economic Sanctions

2012-2015 economic experience may provide insights into what Iran should expect under Trump’s sanctions

Source: World Bank, Fall 2018

2012-2015 economic sanctions contributed to increased poverty rate and more inequality

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2012-2015 Economic Sanctions

Poverty rates varied across provinces, with Sistan-Baluchestan, Kerman and Golestan experiencing the highest poverty rates (32%)

Source: World Bank, Fall 2018

Tehran, Qom and Alborz experienced the lowest poverty rates (2%)

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F012-2016 Economic Sanctions

Groups most affected by poverty

Households:• with more children• headed by younger adults• With head of household unemployed

Provinces with less urban population• Impact more severe for rural households • 18% of rural population with an employed head of

household below poverty line

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Rouhani’s strategy to counter US economic sanctions

Resistance Economy

Oil export to eight exempted countries

Accelerate bank reforms and FATF compliance

Austerity measures

Leverage EU’s Special Purpose Vehicle

Subsidize basic food prices

Use foreign exchange reserves wisely

Support science and technology R&D

Increase non-oil exports by:

• providing support for technology-oriented exports

• leveraging Iran Expo to promote Iranian products

• Use small- and medium-sized firms for trade

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January 5, 2019

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Are the benefits of economic sanctions worth the cost?

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References (1)

Economic sanctions reconsidered, Hufbauer, Gary Clyde.; Schott, Jeffrey J., 1949-; Elliott, Kimberly Ann, 1960-; Institute for International Economics (U.S.), Washington, D.C. : Institute for International Economics; 1990

Economic sanctions reconsidered, Hufbauer, Gary Clyde.Washington, DC : Peterson Institute for International Economics; 2007

Biased Sanctions? Methodological Change in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered and Its Implications, Van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. ; Siddiquee, Muhammad S. H., Routledge, International Interactions, 03 September 2017, Vol.43(5), p.879-893

Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data, Bapat, NavinA. (University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill); Morgan, T. Clifton (Rice University), Harvard Dataverse; 2018

Busted Sanctions Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail, Early, Bryan.Palo Alto : Stanford University Press; 2015

IMF Country Report No. 18/94, Islamic Republic of Iran, Selected Issues, March 2018

Iran Economic Monitor, Weathering Economic Challenges, world Bank Group, Fall 2018,

The Long-term Impact of Economic Sanctions on the Technological Development of Iran, Hussein Fakhari in the Book “Development of Science and Technology in Iran”, edited by Abdol soofi and Mehdi, Goodarzi, 2017

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References(2)

Valizadeh, A. (2012). Sanctions performance theories in international political economy, Journal of Policy, 41(1), 349-365.

economy. Journal of Policy, 41(1), 349–365. AzizNejad, S. (2011). Effects of sanctions on the Iranian economy with an emphasis on foreign trade. Journal of House and Research, 16(61), 165–210

Emomjomehzadeh, S., & Moradi, S. (2007). International sanctions and the formation, of subversive movements: Case Study Of Iran. Journal of Political and, International Approaches, 25, 37–62.

Miremadi, T. (2012). A framework for evaluation of strategies to counter sanc- tions from the perspective of the national system of innovation. Journal of Science and Technology Policy, 3, 83–98.

Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, For Immediate Release, July 31, 2012

Post-withdrawal Iran, Clément Therme, (2018) Post-withdrawal Iran, Survival, 60:6, 231-240,

CISADA, COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010

Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), US department of State, 07/14/15

Various periodical Articles