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Transcript of Atlantic voices, vol. 4, no. 5
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 5 1
Edited by: Genaro Aguilera-Reza
The nature of threats and the challenges
that NATO is faced with in the present day are
ever changing and have added difficulties. The
alliance has been posed with an aggression by
Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the reaction
has been reluctant.
In addition, a world financial crisis has
worsened the contributions to the defense in-
dustry. More and more nations are cutting
back on defense spending at a time when in-
vestment are mostly needed. The need for
military spending is of great importance espe-
cially for European nations, as its Eastern
neighbour grows increasingly hostile.
In that sense, how can prior experiences
pave NATO’s road towards a stable and secure
Euro-Atlantic region?
This edition of Atlantic Voices will exam-
ine two different views to NATO’s defense
capabilities. This issue will first explore how
past lessons can be applied to the present situa-
tion of NATO, followed by an analysis of de-
fense spending and its need for reform.
The Airborne Early Warning and Control Force one of the military assets that is owned and operated by NATO. (Photo: NATO)
Challenges and Future of
NATO’s Defense Capabilities
Volume 4 - Issue 5 May 2014
Contents:
Operation Enduring Freedom And The Weakness Of The
Revolution In Military Affairs: A Lesson To Learn For The
NATO Allies
Francesco Di Massa offers historical background behind the Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs and explains why it has not fulfilled its potential. He argues that
there is a need for investment in military technology in order to avoid face-to-
face combat and to reduce casualties.
NATO Capabilities And Threats Since The Global Financial
Crisis
Quint Hoekstra examines the capability cutbacks that have taken place since the
Global Financial Crisis. Additionally, he explores the challenges and difficulties
that NATO has endured during the crisis.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 2
Operation Enduring Freedom & The Weakness Of The Revolution In Military Affairs: A Lesson To
Learn For The NATO Allies
By Francesco Di Massa
A fter the defeat in the Vietnam War, an
asymmetric conflict in which around 58,000
American soldiers lost their lives, the US
Department of Defense decided to modernize its se-
curity apparatus by engaging in a process of military
application of technology, best known as the Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs (RMA). The direct applica-
tions of this process were reconnaissance, based on
the employment of drones and satellites, as well as
accuracy of ranged weapons. The final aim was to di-
minish human casualties in conflict, by reducing the
need of engaging troops in face-to-face combat, and
make the idea of waging new wars more appealing to
the American public opinion.
This military revolution
turned out to be a successful
choice during the First Gulf
War. However, the 2001 Op-
eration Enduring Freedom
(OEF), the US led military
engagement aimed at eradicat-
ing Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
dismantled this new certainty, as the RMA develop-
ments resulted to be a partially effective means in the
fight against the September 11 perpetrators. In princi-
ple, RMA should have allowed the US and its allies to
win the military campaign by only employing drones,
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and laser
guided bombs, without risking the loss of human
lives. In practice, ground combat played a fundamen-
tal role in defeating the enemy.
In future military operations, reconnaissance
devices and long distance fire power should be inde-
pendent means for winning wars and Special Opera-
tion Forces (SOFs) should stand away from frontal
combats. The US, as well as the other NATO allies,
which do not contribute as much as the former to the
development of RMA, should bridge their gaps and
conduct new R&D joint efforts, by adopting a strate-
gy of commercialization of the defence industry. As a
result of the development of the RMA technologies,
soldiers could avoid engaging in face to face mortal
combat and the loss of human lives among NATO
troops would remarkably diminish. Ultimately, the
anti-war sentiment in the countries joining the mili-
tary alliance would decrease.
From Vietnam to the First Gulf War: the Illu-
sionary Revolution in Military Affairs’ At the
beginning, OEF was thought to be a short conflict
conducted mostly through the use of new technolo-
gies, offered by the previous RMA. This military rev-
olution has its roots in WWI and saw its first develop-
ment after the Vietnam War.
America lost the conflict in
South East Asia for several rea-
sons. First, the US army, which
was used to fighting conven-
tional wars, found itself unpre-
pared in the asymmetric con-
flict against the Vietcong, communist guerrillas who
used to engage the enemy by employing ambushes
and “hit and run” tactics. They knew very well how to
move into the jungle and they exploited the
knowledge of the territory to their advantage. Sec-
ond, during that long and troubled conflict, which
lasted from 1964 to 1973, around 58,000 American
soldiers lost their lives and the public opinion became
very restless about the war. Third, the Vietnam War
was televised and people who saw the slaughtering
from home expressed dissent about the military oper-
ation forcing the government to withdraw from the
war.
After such a demise, which stained the American
military reputation abroad, showing that the first
world superpower could be defeated on the battle-
The impact of such a revolution has been to reduce human casualties in conflict
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 3
ground, the US Department of Defense decided to en-
gage in a process of military application of technology,
best known as RMA. Its aim was to improve military ca-
pabilities and its direct applications were twofold: recon-
naissance, based on collecting information about enemy
positions and weaknesses through the use of drones and
satellites, and accuracy of weapons, enhanced by the use
of sophisticate lasers, able to target objectives at a dis-
tance of 8 km. The impact of such revolution has been to
reduce human casualties in conflict, considering the fact
machines and not just human power have been employed
since then, and enhance the effectiveness of military capa-
bilities.
This new revolution proved to be highly productive
during the First Gulf War. Indeed, US satellites quickly
identified Saddam Hussein’s positions in Iraq and the new
enhanced long range precision fire weapons destroyed
them during a conventional war conducted mostly on the
open field. After this success,
America thought to have de-
feated its strategic weaknesses,
which caused the demise of the
Vietnam War, and restored its
military image worldwide.
However, the 2001 Afghan-
istan War would have resulted
in a doubtful symmetric con-
flict, which quickly changed its
identity in asymmetric warfare,
revealing to the US and its al-
lies the ineffectiveness of the RMA
developments.
Operation Enduring Freedom: fighting an asym-
metric war with traditional tactics
On the 7th of October 2001, OEF began with a
bombing campaign against the Taliban’s air force and
communication systems. In the first stage, which recalled
a typical symmetric warfare theatre, enemy targets were
exposed and easy to acquire for the Precision Guided Mu-
nitions (PGMs) technology. The Taliban made no effort
in hiding themselves and their positions, openly standing
on mountain peaks. Even their armoured vehicles were
deployed without revetment shields. Those positions
were quickly targeted by the RMA precision fire pow-
er from 8 km and bombed.
This propitious situation changed after some weeks,
especially when Al Qaeda combatants started replacing
Taliban forces. Weeks of bombardment failed to de-
stroy all the Al Qaeda garrisons and the innovative pre-
cision guided fire power could not kill all the insur-
gents. This happened because PGMs could do only a
part of the job in Afghanistan, a country with a particu-
larly dense mountainous environment, where enemy
targets could disperse, cover and conceal themselves.
Another major problem for PGMs, was that Al Qaeda
combatants used to hide themselves in civilian villages,
making it difficult for aerial warfare computer models
to distinguish between the insurgents and the local
population.
The situation changed only when terrain SOFs
reached the battlefield. At the same time, CIA teams
were operating, tasked with
making connections with the
Northern Alliance commanders
and asking them for assistance
on the battlefield. The intelli-
gence campaign worked suc-
cessfully and the US led coali-
tion had on its side a combina-
tion of PGMs, SOFs and indige-
nous allies. One of the first bat-
tles, fought close to Mazar-i-
Sharif, saw SOFs fighting side
by side with Northern Alliance
troops against the Taliban. During this battle enemies
hid in small underground chambers to escape allied
firepower. Coalition troops eventually had to flood the
chambers with cold water in order to kill the insur-
gents.
During the following stage of the military opera-
tion, advanced US terrain vehicles found it impossible
to move over rocky mountain trails and troops had to
proceed with ponies, bearing the weight of their equip-
ment on their shoulders. Another important battle saw
coalition troops fighting against Taliban hidden in old
Soviet bunkers at the small village of Bai Beche. Here,
again, the Taliban fell easily but Al Qaeda troops de-
fended themselves from target acquisitions. Coalition
Geographic Map of Afghanistan (photo: Talking Proud)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 4
forces showed resolve and Kabul fell to its feet on
the 13th of November 2001. 5,000 Taliban and Al
Qaeda troops organized a resistance in Konduz,
but after 12 days they surrendered. After Kabul
and Konduz were taken, SOFs moved with Kar-
zai’s troops toward the Taliban’s fortress in Kan-
dahar. On the 6th of December, before coalition
troops reached the area, Mullah Omar and some
other Taliban rulers had escaped. The Taliban re-
gime was finished.
The last great battle of the military cam-
paign, namely Operation Anaconda, started with
an intensive reconnaissance operation during
which less than 50% of the Al Qaeda positions
were identified before SOFs and Northern Alli-
ance troops engaged in direct fighting. This hap-
pened because drones could not identify all tar-
gets, covered by the complex Afghan natural envi-
ronment. The battle saw coalition troops fighting
face to face against Al Qaeda combatants in the
Shah-I-Kot valley. During this fight, soldiers got
surprised by Al Qaeda’s
insidious fire attacks, which
came from previously un-
seen positions, and conse-
quently had to engage in
close combat operations
conducted by traditional
infantry. The remaining enemy positions, which
drones had not been able to identify, were discov-
ered by ground forces observing through the
source of fire.
This unforeseen situation should not have
taken place. Drones and long distance fire power
should have been able to defeat the enemy with-
out the need to expose the US led forces to
frontal mortal attacks. This is the reason why,
although coalition troops won the battle, a group
of Al Qaeda survivors probably including Osama
Bin Laden escaped to Pakistan through the White
Mountains near Tora Bora. From a strategic point
of view, this episode caused tactical and diplomat-
ic challenges, considering the fact that the Taliban
obtained a new refuge outside of Afghanistan.
Here they could reorganize their forces and plan fu-
ture counterattacks against NATO’s International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Learning from the past: NATO’s need for a re-
newed RMA engagement
OEF revealed the weakness of RMA as the mil-
itary campaign was conducted as an orthodox exam-
ple of modern face to face warfare, despite the pres-
ence of drones and heavy fire support. Precision air
power played a fundamental role in making the differ-
ence between stalemate situations and victory, even if
it could not have ensured the final result by itself. In-
deed, ground combat revealed to be a necessary strat-
egy against Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants, who
engaged in asymmetric operations by exploiting their
knowledge of the Afghan territory and hiding on the
mountains. Precision fire power, based on the use of
JDAMs as well as laser-guided bombs, and land troop
manoeuvers demonstrated the interdependent means
necessary to win the war. However, RMA should
have allowed the US led coalition
to employ only fire power, ob-
taining success on the battlefield
without risking the loss of human
lives. Then, OEF represents an
element of continuity with WWI
and WWII, where joint air-land
tactics were employed, instead of a turning point in
the history of military strategy.
The US and NATO military apparatus must be
redesigned in order to give major power to the long
range precision engagement and leave ground frontal
combat behind. In future operations, reconnaissance
devices and ranged weapons should be independent
means for gaining victory and SOFs should only play a
backing role by standing apart from face to face com-
bats and enemy fire.
However, a major obstacle for a renewed RMA
engagement within NATO is represented by the mili-
tary capability gap between the US and its European
allies, partially due to reduced defence budgets in
Western European countries. Indeed, since the end of
the Cold War, these members have cut military
spending by 25% in real terms. The US spends
NATO members should embrace the so called “globalization and commercialization of the
defence industry”.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 5
around two and a half times as much on R&D as all
the other NATO allies combined. With regard to this
point, Bill Lynn, chief executive officer of both
Finmeccanica North America and DRS Technologies,
argues that NATO member states should embrace the
so called “globalization and commercialization of the
defence industry” and
bridge their differ-
ences in military capa-
bilities, since not all
innovations in such
field will come from
the US.
M o s t i m -
portantly, giving ma-
jor power to long
range precision en-
gagement and leaving
ground face to face
combat behind could reduce the loss of human lives
among NATO troops and thus defeat a major point of
weakness for the US and the whole military alliance:
namely, the ability to achieve strategic objectives fast-
er while avoiding high casualty rates which would
simultaneously lower the anti-war sentiment at home.
Francesco Di Massa holds a Master of Arts in Inter-
national Politics and Security Studies, completed at
the Roberto Ruffilli Faculty of the University of Bolo-
gna and the University of California Santa Barbara.
After having completed an internship at the Italian
Embassy in Oslo, during which he attended several
conferences at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, he
is currently contributing through the organization
Automated Mapping – Facilities Management GIS
Italia to some EU funded projects, including the Up-
sidedown Project for the protection of underground
critical infrastructures.
Bibliography
Biddle S. (2002), Afghanistan and the Future of
Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense
Policy, Carlisle, US Army War College.
Biddle S. (2003),
Afghanistan and the
Future of W a r -
fare, in Foreign Af-
fairs, vol. 82, no. 2,
pp. 31-46.
Lynn B. (2013), Interview with Bill Lynn on 2013
Global Security Forum, in The International
Relations and Security Network, URL: http://
isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Video/Detail/?
lng=en&id=172492
Sloan E. (2000), DCI: Responding to the US Led
Revolution in Military Affairs, in NATO
Review, URL: http://www.nato.int/docu/
review/2000/More-capable-balanced-alliance/
DCI-Responding-US-led-Revolution- Military
-Affairs/EN/index.htm
Watts B.D. (2011), The Maturing Revolution in
Military Affairs, Washington DC, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
About the author
Predator UAV. Widely used for reconnaissance missions throughout OEF (photo:
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 6
ing. His successor Chuck Hagel echoed these words
more recently by saying European states must renew
their investment in military capacity. Ironically, the US
has also been cutting its own defence spending. Last
February, Hagel even announced he is planning to
shrink the US army to pre-World War Two levels.
Capabilities, therefore, are a central concern to
both the US and NATO. But capabilities on their own
do not say much. It is their relation to the threats
NATO faces that is important. So, does there exist
something like a threat-capability gap? Is there really
something to worry about? This article first investigates
what capability reductions there have been since the
outbreak of the global financial crisis. It then examines
trends in threats and issues NATO faces over the same
period.
Capabilities
The assess-
ment of NATO
capacity levels first
requires a way to
measure military
capabilities. This is
not as easy as it
may seem. The
s imp le s t way
would be to count
and compare troop
numbers. The
more soldiers a
state has, the high-
er its capabilities
are. A core prob-
lem with this
method is that it does not account for differences in
equipment. One thousand poorly equipped Turkish
soldiers would arguably be no match for a hundred
NATO Capabilities And Threats Since The Global
Financial Crisis
By Quint Hoekstra
N ext September, NATO member states
will gather in Wales to discuss collective
NATO capability levels. In some member
states, the Global Financial Crisis has led to reduced
military spending. Yet the recent crisis in Ukraine
shows threats continue unabated. So by how much
have budgets exactly been cut? How have NATO
threats evolved since the outbreak of the financial cri-
sis? And what does that mean for the alliance?
After years of economic woes dominating
Western newspapers, Russia’s advance in the Ukraine
has reminded NATO member states that money is not
everything. The global financial crisis and the corre-
sponding government budget deficits have sparked a
string of cuts on military spending, leaving military
analysts worried about the collective level of NATO
capabilities.
The Obama
administration
has repeatedly
urged Europe
to spend more
on defence,
insisting that
peace does not
come free of
c h a r g e . I n
2011, US Sec-
retary of De-
fence Robert
Gates warned
that NATO
would have a
“dim if not dis-
mal future” if it does not increase its military spend-
Table 1. Percentage change in military budgets from 2007 to 2013. (Source: SIPRI
Military Expenditure Database 2012)
1 Turkey 17,3 15 Estonia -13,2
2 Norway 9,5 16 Albania -15,2
3 Germany 7,3 17 Italy -17,8
4 USA 2,4 18 Netherlands -18,2
5 Portugal 2,1 19 Slovenia -30,1
6 Poland 1,3 20 Spain -30,8
7 Denmark -1,1 21 Slovak Rep. -31,4
8 Luxembourg -4,1 22 Iceland -31,9
9 Romania -4,4 23 Czech Rep. -34,5
10 France -5,2 24 Bulgaria -35,0
11 UK -6,9 25 Lithuania -35,1
12 Canada -8,0 26 Hungary -36,3
13 Belgium -8,8 27 Greece -37,5
14 Croatia -13,1 28 Latvia -49,6
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 7
highly specialized British troops using the latest technolo-
gy. This problem could be solved by measuring material
capacity instead. Yet this too runs into problems. An old
former Soviet tank is not equivalent to Germany’s best.
Academics at the SIPRI institute offer a solution for this
problem. They track all official national government mili-
tary spending in their Military Expenditure Database,
allowing for cross-national comparisons. Simply put,
higher budgets are assumed to lead to higher capabilities.
One downside is that this mechanism does not pick up on
differences in purchase power. A thousand dollars spent
on military personnel wages arguably goes a lot further in
India than in the United States. But as the goal here is on-
ly to compare Western military budgets, this poses less of
a problem. This paper therefore uses SIPRI’s 2014 dataset
to compare military figures between 2007, which is the
year before the global financial crisis started, and the lat-
est figures from
2013.
The f irst
question to ask is
whether NATO
military spending
has indeed de-
creased in this time
period. In 2007,
combined NATO
s p e n d i n g wa s
$939,407 million.
Six years later this
had dropped to
$928,348 million, a
decline of just over 1%. From these figures, it would be
tempting to say the global financial crisis has almost no
effect on NATO’s military spending. However, as table 1
illustrates, a closer look reveals great differences between
member states.
With a rise of 17.3%, Turkey has by far increased
its military budget most. Other risers are Norway, Portu-
gal and Poland. Perhaps surprisingly, Germany displays
an impressive increase of 7.3%. The only other riser is
the United States, with 2.4%. Out of all 28 member
states, 22 (79%) show negative figures. Latvia ranks last;
it nearly halved its military spending. Worryingly, over a
third of member states (10 out of 28) have decreased
their budgets by more than 30%. Admittedly, these are
the small member states and this explains why the total
has remained so stable. Figure 1 shows differences be-
tween Europe’s great powers: the United Kingdom,
France and Germany. France remains the top spender
out of these three but Germany is steadily closing the
gap.
Figure 2 shows differences between the US and
the EU. The earlier 2007-2013 comparison hid the
true dynamic of US spending. During the first three
years of the crisis the US budget increased, but it noted
a sharp decline afterwards. The EU, by comparison is
much more stable. It first slowly increases and then
decreases a year prior to the US. The figure’s scaling
somewhat hides the fact that between 2007 and 2013,
total EU military spending decreased by 9.3%. The
graph does clearly
show the differ-
ence between the
US and EU: de-
spite its much
larger population
and economy the
EU only spends
just under half
(45%) of what
the US does.
The con-
clusion on NATO
capabilities since
the global finan-
cial crisis is that while total NATO capacity has re-
mained stable, differences between major EU powers
have shrunk and differences between US and EU mili-
tary spending have increased. Gates and Hagel’s com-
ments therefore do appear to be justified. But how
does this compare to the threats NATO faces? After
all, defence spending primarily serves to protect the
Alliance. If the threats have reduced proportionally,
the reduced spending can be seen as a positive sign as it
keeps NATO safe while freeing up resources for other
policy areas.
Figure 1. Military spending figures from France, Germany and the United
Kingdom, expressed in millions of constant 2011 US dollar. (Source: SIPRI Mili-
tary Expenditure Database 2012)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 8
Threats versus Issues
In order to fully understand the context in
which NATO operates, it is important to distin-
guish between threats and issues. Threats are de-
fined as any external actor (state or non-state) that
jeopardizes the territorial integrity of NATO
member states. A historical example is the Soviet
Union during the Cold War and a more contem-
porary example is Al-Qaeda. Issues, on the other
hand, are external problems that NATO faces but
which do not directly challenge NATO member
states’ sover-
eignty. Exam-
ples are, for
instance, inter-
national crime
(such as drug
trafficking) and
environmental
change. Even
though these
issues can have
a great impact
on the long
term, on their
own they do not warrant large military expendi-
tures.
Contrary to the previous section, threats
and issues cannot be easily quantified. A more ho-
listic approach is therefore needed to map these
out. The 2007 Dutch National Security Strategy
provides a good starting point in classifying their
impact. It states five vital interests of the state.
First, there is the aforementioned territorial secu-
rity. Second, is economic security, which refers to
the free and independent functioning of the econo-
my, such as international trade. Third is ecological
security. This concerns the capacity to be resilient
to the environment, something challenged by cli-
mate change. Fourth is human security, which is
used to indicate the functionality of individual citi-
zens. Epidemics, for example, can inhibit citizens
from carrying out their daily life. The last vital
interest for the state is social and political stability.
Social cohesiveness and stability may be undermined
by friction between different generations, such as
youth unemployment or elderly care. Another issue
can be friction between a host population and migrant
communities.
Some of these interests are in general only chal-
lenged by outside actors, such as a states’ territorial
integrity. Others, such as forced migration issues, are
more often caused by internal actors. But as recent
events in the Ukraine show, minority groups can also
cleavages and attract (military) attention from outside
states. If NATO
aims to protect
member states
from all these
threats and issues,
it must pay atten-
tion to each of the
five levels out-
lined in the Dutch
National Security
Strategy. Now
that it is clear
what threats and
issues can consist
of, it is time to analyze security trends in the 2007 to
2013 period.
Trends
Staying with the Dutch analysis in 2010 the
Dutch government released a report called Verken-
ningen [Explorations]. In the midst of the global finan-
cial crisis the authors of the report attempted to antic-
ipate future developments in the world of security
politics, in order to help policy makers to make stra-
tegic decisions.
One of the main conclusions is that the interna-
tional environment can go one of four ways, illustrat-
ed in Table 2. The crucial factor is whether the domi-
nant actors in international politics are state or non-
state actors and whether cooperating is high or low. A
multipolar world would see states cooperate with
each other, while a multilateral world would see
states struggling to do so. Fragmentation occurs when
Figure 2. Military spending figures from the US and the EU (combined total of member
states), expressed in millions of constant 2011 US dollar. (Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database 2012)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 9
non-cooperative non-state actors dominate global pol-
itics. Lastly, the world can be classed as a ‘network’
environment when non-state actors dominate and
cooperate with each other. Using this model to ana-
lyze the trend in international politics will help assess
NATO’s threat levels.
Before the global financial crisis NATO mem-
bers were fully embroiled in the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Back then,
Islamic extremist terror-
ism arguably posed the
largest threat to NATO
member states. Analysts
spoke of the rise of non-
state actors such as Al-
Qaeda and of the general
decline of the threat em-
anating from militarily
strong states. Contrary
to the Cold War era, it was now weak states that
NATO worried about. In 2002, the US National Se-
curity Strategy stated that “America is now threatened
less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”.
The idea was that these failing states, such as Somalia,
Sudan and Yemen, could be used as safe havens for
terrorists. Yet more recent thinking suggests non-
state actors do not tend to operate from failed states.
Just like citizens, terrorists require some degree of
order to carry out their business. They rely on stable
communication methods and they need access to
banking and international transport. Weak states can-
not provide these, making terrorists turn to middle-
tier states instead. These are weak enough not to dis-
turb their business but do have the facilities terrorists
require. This means weak states no longer appear to
be a grave danger to NATO security as analysts
thought they were a decade ago. In addition, the glob-
al financial crisis marked a general decline in the im-
portance of non-state actors in international security.
Al-Qaeda, for example, did expand throughout the
Middle East and North Africa but the organization
failed to repeat its attacks on Western targets of the
late 90s and early 2000s.
Non-state actors also made a retreat in the do-
mestic politics of the developed world. At the turn of
the century, globalization was seen to lead to a ‘race
to the bottom’ whereby states deregulated business
and dressed down social welfare provisions in order
to stay internationally competitive. This was especial-
ly the case in Europe, where the European Union
passed liberalization laws to be implemented in mem-
ber states. But as the markets (and especially the fi-
nancial sector) failed
to deliver, states saw
no option but to in-
tervene in the econo-
my. For a short peri-
od, Keynesianism
was back. Once
some North Europe-
an economies recov-
ered, member states
pressed the European
Union to call for austerity measures. This put states
firmly back in the driving seat of international politics
at the expense of businesses and other non-state ac-
tors.
While the global north struggled with its econ-
omy, the south (especially Asia and Latin America)
continued to grow. The global financial crisis marked
China’s rise to superpower status, overtaking Japan as
the world’s second biggest economy. India grew in-
creasingly confident while high gas prices led to a re-
assertive Russia.
Some of NATO’s pre-global financial crisis se-
curity threats moved to the background. NATO ef-
forts in Iraq were rounded off with the training of
over 15,000 Iraqi security forces. NATO involvement
in Afghanistan is winding down later this year, even
though continued support to the new Kabul admin-
istration is expected. Yet these old issues have been
replaced by new ones, such as the aftermath of the
Arab Spring. NATO showed its continued relevance
by exercising an effective air campaign to oust Libya’s
Colonel Gaddafi in 2011.
In contrast to 2007, current NATO member
state threats are predominantly state based, but they
also highly differ. The US keeps a tab on develop-
ments in China, with Obama calling even himself the
Cooperative Non-cooperative
State-based Multipolar Multilateral
Non-state based Fragmentation Network
Table 2. The Scenario Framework. Source: (Ministerie van Defensie.
2010)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 10
first ‘Pacific President’. Turkey, on the other hand, is
more focused on preventing the civil war in neigh-
bouring Syria from spilling over to its territory.
Western European NATO member states are worried
about instability in North-African states, such as
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, while East-European states
perceive Russia as the biggest threat to their security.
Turning to the smaller issues, global state co-
operation has repeatedly proven difficult. Progress on
climate change is obstructed by seemingly irreconcila-
ble differences between the developed and developing
world. The permanent members of the United Na-
tions Security Council also clashed over how to han-
dle the Arab Spring and its
aftershocks. Superpower co-
operation has been successful
in some cases. There has
been strong action on piracy
off the Somali coast and the
US and Russia have cooperat-
ed with regards to the issue of Syria’s chemical weap-
ons supply. Yet recent events in Ukraine re-ignited
tensions between the two former rivals, marking an
end to the brief period of détente.
To summarize, the trend during the global fi-
nancial crisis is one towards a state-based multilateral
world in which the specifics of security threats have
changed but the level of threats and issues have re-
mained the same. US political, economic and military
hegemony in much of the world continues, but it is
increasingly questioned by other rising powers, prob-
lematizing global cooperation.
Conclusion
Military spending figures suggest total NATO
military capabilities have not significantly decreased
since the global financial crisis. Differences between
major European powers have shrunk while the Atlan-
tic divide (between the US and EU) has widened. The
total level of threats NATO faces remained un-
changed. That means on a NATO-wide level there is
no need to speak of a threat-capability gap. Yet the
type of threats have significantly changed.
In 2007 threats predominantly came from non-
state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, but in 2013 they ap-
pear to originate from stronger states instead, such as
Russia and China. There is also greater diversity be-
tween the threats the various NATO member states
face. This potentially undermines NATO solidarity.
Not helping matters is the fact that NATO’s role in
the world is still debated. The global financial crisis
has not brought NATO any closer to the question
whether it should be a regional or global actor. The
more diverse threats also make it more difficult for
states to anticipate on future military needs. This adds
an extra challenge to those states wishing to further
reduce military budgets. In
an increasingly uncertain
world, states have no option
but to maintain a versatile
military force. State differ-
ences between the level of
military budget cuts and the
difference in threats mean individual NATO member
states can end up facing threat-capability issues in the
near future.
Smart defence, the idea of doing more with
less, can be part of the solution. The increase of
NATO interoperability could for example help main-
tain collective capabilities. Yet military might is not
everything. Recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq
have shown that high capabilities do not always trans-
late into desired outcomes. The lesson may very well
be to try and use what capabilities NATO has got in a
more intelligent way. After all, military capacity is
constrained by the capacity of political leaders to use
it effectively and efficiently. Russia’s swift invasion of
the Crimea shows that NATO military might does
little to protect its interests if it is not utilized proper-
ly. If military capacity goes unused (in the sense of
ineffective deterrence or non-deployment), these re-
sources may be better redirected to other policy are-
as, such as education or health care. If NATO-
member states really seek to make the most out of
their capabilities they must think better about how
they deploy their forces. Both too much (Afghanistan)
From this perspective, a hundred thousand extra dollars for NATO’s War College in Rome may very well be bet-ter spent than millions for a few extra Joint Strike Fight-
ers.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 11
and too little (Crimea) can be detrimental to its inter-
ests. From this perspective, a hundred thousand extra
dollars for NATO’s War College in Rome may very
well be better spent than millions for a few extra Joint
Strike Fighters.
Quint Hoekstra currently studies Political Science
with a Specialization in International Relations and Or-
ganizations at Leiden University, the Netherlands.
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Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 5 13
Edited by: Genaro Aguilera-Reza
The nature of threats and the challenges
that NATO is faced with in the present day are
ever changing and have added difficulties. The
alliance has been posed with an aggression by
Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the reaction
has been reluctant.
In addition, a world financial crisis has
worsened the contributions to the defense in-
dustry. More and more nations are cutting
back on defense spending at a time when in-
vestment are mostly needed. The need for
military spending is of great importance espe-
cially for European nations, as its Eastern
neighbour grows increasingly hostile.
In that sense, how can prior experiences
pave NATO’s road towards a stable and secure
Euro-Atlantic region?
This edition of Atlantic Voices will exam-
ine two different views to NATO’s defense
capabilities. This issue will first explore how
past lessons can be applied to the present situa-
tion of NATO, followed by an analysis of de-
fense spending and its need for reform.
kommwww.kommersant.md hwww.kommersant.md