Atlantic Voices Vol. 5, No. 05 (May 2015)

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 5 1

- Flora Pidoux

Throughout time, wars and conflicts

have been conducted in various ways,

depending on the scope, the capabilities,

and more importantly based on the

technologies available. The Cold War and

the nuclear bomb drastically impacted

warfare as direct confrontation had to be

avoided because of the risk of total and

mutual destruction.

Today, although the nuclear risk is still

present, economic restrictions have

forced countries, and more specifically

greats powers, to develop new ways to

attack their opponents. These methods

are referred to as hybrid warfare, as

opposed to conventional warfare. This

new category regroups all the attacks that

violate the Geneva Convention and/or

use asymmetric methods. Examples of

hybrid warfare include terrorism, cyber

attacks and the recourse to non-identified

military personnel such as the “little green

men” who appeared in Crimea.

The appearance of these new methods

thus questions centuries of military

practices, forcing states to develop new

defense mechanisms to face these new

challenges.

70 Years After The End Of World War II:

The Military Strategy Evolvement

Volume 5 - Issue 5 May 2015

Contents:

NATO And The Challenge Of “Hybrid Warfare”

Mr. Philip Chr. Ulrich analyzes the evolution of warfare through time, be-

ginning with from traditional warfare, moving to Total War, then the Nuclear

Age and finally the more recent threats that have arisen with the development

of Hybrid Warfare.

Mercenaries And Internal Conflict

Dr. Andreas Stradis’s article focuses on the use of mercenaries to conduct

war. World War I and II changed the pattern of warfare and involved all aspects

of society, thus limiting the use of mercenaries. Since then, however, they have

regained importance with the emergence of Hybrid Warfare.

NATO Troops in Afghanistan (Photo: GlobalResearch.ca)


By Philip Chr. Ulrich

F or more than two decades, NATO has

operated in a post-Cold War security

environment, and changed the nature of

their missions since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In this period, NATO had to refocus on peacekeep-

ing operations in the Balkans and the civil wars which

had erupted following the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Following the terrorist attacks against the United

States on September 11th 2001, the Alliance adapted

once again to conduct their first operation using Ar-

ticle 5 in Afghanistan. The International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) mission became the main

focus the Alliance for the next decade. Russia’s an-

nexation of Crimea in 2014 once again placed Russia

as the primary challenger, and the Alliance has to

adapt to the new challenge of “hybrid warfare”. Rus-

sia in Ukraine. Since its founding in 1949 NATO has

had to adapt to a number of changes in warfare and

to the consequent threats to its member nations.

Hybrid warfare is a way for Russia to impact

countries in what they consider their “sphere of in-

fluence”. This is done by presenting a more diverse

set of capabilities for which those nations will have

more difficulty preparing. For this reason, NATO as

an alliance, has to adapt and support those member

nations that share a border with Russia.

The numerous changes that have been put in

place by NATO show the willingness of the Alliance

to adapt to the new international context. The initia-

tives include the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force,

and increased shows of political solidarity within the

Alliance. The clearest statements came after the Wales

Summit in September 2014, and the decisions made at

this summit. These changes are supported by various

initiatives meant to reassure the Eastern European allies

and prove the commitment of the Alliance to support

all member nations in case of war. Only by adapting can

NATO continue to deter aggression against its member

nations.

Historical Challenges

During World War II the character of war changed;

it became “total war”. This meant not only the complete

mobilization of the population and the production capa-

bilities of a nation, but also the targeting of civilian pop-

ulations. The military developments during World War

II were substantial, both in terms of ground warfare;

where armor became a central feature, and in the criti-

cal importance of airpower. The close cooperation be-

tween armor and airpower defined warfare during the

conflict. The most significant development was, howev-

er, the invention of nuclear weapons.

After World War II ended, the status of the Europe-

an powers changed from being dominant global powers

to secondary actors in a new global superpower compe-

tition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The emergence of super powers as well as the char-

acter of “total war” meant that alliances had become a

central feature of international politics. Individual na-

tion states were unable to mobilize sufficient resources

to wage a modern “total war”. For this reason, coopera-

tion became necessary to win in modern global con-

flicts. The creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact

NATO And The Challenge Of “Hybrid Warfare”


were results of this new dynamic. These alliances were

necessary to meet the requirements of modern warfare

and create a credible deterrence.

The nuclear arms race between the two global super-

powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had great

implications for NATO. It meant that a military confronta-

tion between the two blocs would almost definitely lead to

a nuclear exchange, and the subsequent destruction of

both sides. This certainty of the consequences of nuclear

war became known as “Mutually Assured Destruction” or

MAD.

Throughout the four decades of the Cold War the pri-

mary objective for NATO was to be prepared for a con-

ventional confrontation with the Warsaw Pact.

Following a decade of primarily peacekeeping opera-

tions in the Balkans in the

1990s, the terrorist attacks

on 9/11 marked a new para-

digm shift in NATO’s focus.

It triggered more than a dec-

ade of operations, which be-

came a mix of conventional

combat and counterinsurgen-

cy operations in a major out-of-area mission in Afghani-

stan.

These different missions have shown that NATO as an

alliance has been capable of adapting to changing threat

environments and support varying operations even in out-

of-area missions. Events in early 2014 show that the Alli-

ance once again needed to change in order to secure its

member states in the future. The new threat is known as

“hybrid warfare” . To counter this threat, the Alliance has

to rethink how it uses it capabilities and cooperate across

the full-spectrum of operations.

Emergence Of A New Threat: Events In

Crimea

In the early days of NATO, its first Secretary Gen-

eral, Lord Ismay, is said to have proclaimed that the

purpose of the Alliance was to “keep the Russians out,

the Americans in, and the Germans down.” As the

Cold War ended, the hope was that the focus and

purpose of NATO could change, and initiate a less

bellicose relationship with its former Eastern compet-

itors. NATO opened up towards the former member

states of the Warsaw Pact as well as its former prima-

ry enemy, Russia.

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War,

only one of Lord Ismay’s old purposes is no longer

relevant. Germany has grown to become the most

dominant country in the European Union, and a fully

integrated member of the

Alliance. For that reason, “to

keep the Germans down” no

longer seems relevant.

Events from early 2014

onwards have, however,

once again made Russia

NATO’s center of attention. Thus, it still stands that

the purpose for NATO is to “keep the Russians out”

and “the Americans in”. Events in Ukraine have reaf-

firmed the need for the European Allies to keep the

United States engaged, as they depend on the deter-

rent value of the U.S. military.

Perceiving the threat of a closer relationship be-

tween Ukraine and the European Union, which

looked imminent in early 2014, Russia responded.

The response ended with the signing of an agreement

between the Ukrainian government and Russia, rather

than the European Union.

A Ukrainian serviceman operates a drone during a training session out-side Kiev, November 6, 2014 (Photo: REUTERS)


The Ukrainian people responded by beginning

protests on the Maidan Square in central Kiev. In late

February, events unfolded quickly as Russia respond-

ed quickly to the popular uprising across Ukraine.

On February 27th 2014, unidentified military per-

sonnel appeared in Crimea while a Russian mobiliza-

tion simultaneously started along the Russian-

Ukrainian border. The unidentified military units,

who quickly became known as “little green men”, rap-

idly gained control over major government institu-

tions in Crimea. This control enabled Russian backed

separatists to declare Crimea an independent prov-

ince, and seek acceptance in the Russian Federation.

The mobilization of Russian forces along the joint

border as well as the continuation of unrest due to the

Maidan Revolution meant that the Ukrainian govern-

ment was unable to effectively respond in time to the

situation in Crimea. A referendum was held in Cri-

mea, which was used to give legitimacy to the official

desire of the new separatist government to be incor-

porated into the Russian Federation. The separatists’

“wish” to become part of the Russian Federation was

rapidly accepted by the Russian parliament which al-

lowed Russian forces to enter the province under a

cover of apparent legality.

The Russian annexation of Crimea alarmed the

Eastern European allies, and has meant that NATO

once again has to adapt to new challenges.

Defining Hybrid Warfare

The challenge of “hybrid warfare” is characterized

by not being easily conceptually defined and not easily

detected. The subtleness of hybrid warfare was appar-

ent in the Crimean crisis with sudden appearance of

the “little green men”.

One of the leading scholars on hybrid warfare,

Frank G. Hoffman, gives a broad understanding of

hybrid warfare:

Hybrid threats blend the lethality of state conflict with

the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.

In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-

sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) exploit access to

modern military capabilities including encrypted com

mand systems, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and

other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protract-

ed insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explo-

sive devices, and assassinations. This could include states

blending high-tech capabilities such as antisatellite

weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare directed

against financial targets.

This definition shows that the scope of hybrid war-

fare is not necessarily limited to the military sphere;

targets can also be of a civilian nature

What is special in the challenges that NATO faces,

is that it is a nation-state using hybrid warfare tech-

niques in order to infiltrate and undermine a neigh-

boring country. First, as a nation-state, Russia is able

to dedicate greater resources to such operations,

which allows for a wider range of capabilities to be

used, rather than fighting through a proxy. The tight

control over all government resources means that the

Russian government is able to divert capabilities to-

wards military operations to a higher degree than

Western democratic governments. Second, the new

threat environment presents a challenge as it is not

necessarily clear when hybrid operations are

launched, and therefore it can be difficult to respond.

Once such operations are identified, it might be too

late, as in the case of the appearance of the “little

green men”. This is a clear distinction from other hy-

brid threats which have so far been presented by non-

state actors. These actors do not have the same level


of capabilities as a nation-state. This emphasizes the spe-

cial character of the threat presented by Russia. A chal-

lenge for NATO, therefore, is to develop a clear defini-

tion of what constitutes an attack.

The New Threat: Russian Hybrid Warfare

In their paper on Russian hybrid warfare, Heidi

Reisinger and Aleksandr Golts argued that Russian hybrid

warfare rests on five key aspects:

• Operations must be in “accordance with the law: ac-

tions with an appearance of legality”

• Military show of force and readiness: snap inspections

[mobilization of military forces]

• Incursion of unidentified military personnel

• Taking advantage of local tensions and local militias

• Propaganda – i.e. extensive information operations

All these aspects came into play prior to and during

the annexation of Crimea, as well as the subsequent in-

cursion into Eastern Ukraine.

Russia used the excuse of the Russian-speaking minor-

ity which is oppressed by the Ukrainian government as a

cover for intervening in Ukraine. This narrative of pro-

tecting the Russian speaking population connects the

question of legality with propaganda.

Propaganda and apparent legality were supported by

the incursion of the “little green men” and the deploy-

ment of large conventional forces massed on the Eastern

Ukrainian border. For the Eastern European members of

NATO, this reinvigorated old fears of Russian aggression.

The conduct of Russian aircraft flying close to or trespass-

ing in sovereign airspace added to the frustration and fear

of NATO members who share borders with Russia.

The overt actions of Russian armed forces in Eastern

Ukraine are being supported by covert operations, such as

operations via the cyberspace. Cyber operations are seen

as an integral part of hybrid warfare, as operations in this

dimension have the potential to cripple a modern soci-

ety while simultaneously having an increased deniabil-

ity for the perpetrator. This again means that NATO

members will have difficulties identifying the perpetra-

tors of cyber attacks.

An example of this is in Poland, which experienced

an increase in the number of cyber attacks from 5,670

in 2013 to 7,498 in 2014. The most disturbing trend

for Polish authorities was an increase in the

“dissemination of foreign ‘propaganda-disinformation’

by bloggers and contributors to online discussion fo-

rums or website comment sections.”

It does seem like cyber operations are a more viable

way for Russia to conduct warfare. The operations

conducted against Ukraine are the result of major mili-

tary reforms which were initiated after the invasion of

Georgia in 2008. The invasion was not as successful as

intended, and the Russian political and military leader-

ship began reforming the military in order to improve

performance in future conflicts. These reforms focused

on being able to quickly mobilize military forces, de-

ploy them near a potential conflict zone, and conduct

covert incursions of Special Forces.

As to the capabilities of Russia, “it is clear that these

rapid deployment units are not sufficient to carry out

large-scale military operations like the occupation of

two Ukrainian regions.” This indicates that although

Russia has shown great developments in hybrid warfare

capabilities, they prove unable to conduct larger con-

ventional operations. The reforms conducted since

2008 have not yet reached a point where large-scale

deployments of units are possible. The fact that Russia

is unable to conduct large enough operations to defeat

opposition in Eastern Ukraine, is not, however, a sign

that NATO can take its time adapting to Russia’s hy-

brid threats.


In a report from spring 2015, Dave Johnson as-

serted that the commitment of military forces by Rus-

sia into Ukraine should in fact not be seen as “an early

indicator but could mark the end of a non-military

phase and beginning of rapid escalation.” This means

that Russian planning is much more wide-ranging and

long-term than otherwise might be the impression.

Johnson asserts that military might is actually a very

late stage in operations. The implication of this is that

Russia could be conducting information operations in,

for example the cyberspace, combined with political

pressure in order to destabilize or influence a neigh-

boring country. This could be happening for pro-

longed periods before it is noticed by the threatened

party. In the case of Ukraine, military forces were

only committed when such cov-

ert operations proved inade-

quate. Therefore NATO must

prepare to counter Russian hy-

brid warfare. Although Russia is

unlikely to directly invade a

NATO country, it may be able

to foster discontent and thereby

weaken the governments of East-

ern European states leading to a destabilization of

those countries.

NATO’s Response

Because the actions of Russia in the spring of 2014

were greatly disturbing for NATO, the Alliance

agreed on some initiatives at the Wales Summit in

September 2014.

Politically, the most important point was the reas-

sertion of solidarity within the Alliance. These politi-

cal messages of assurance were followed up by con-

crete agreements.

One of the most important and concrete initiatives

was the creation of a “Very High Readiness Joint Task

Force”. This force is meant to be of brigade size and

deployable within 48 hours. Such a fast responding

force aims to reassure the Eastern European allies that

in case of events such as the emergence of “little green

men”, NATO will be able to respond.

Another concrete initiative to reassure Eastern

European allies and show the commitment of the

United States to the Alliance has been Operation At-

lantic Resolve. This operation ensured the participa-

tion of U.S. units in exercises in Europe, as well as

the redeployment of previously withdrawn military

forces to Europe. These actions aim to deter aggres-

sion by showing the willingness and capabilities of

NATO as an alliance to respond

to any type of threats.

As Johnson asserted, if forces

such as the Russian “little green

men” begin to appear, it is likely

that Russian operations are al-

ready at a very late stage of oper-

ations towards destabilizing and

influencing a neighboring coun-

try. For this reason, NATO needs to cooperate with

other international organizations such as the European

Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co

-operation in Europe (OSCE). This is necessary be-

cause, as noted earlier, multiple aspects of hybrid

warfare focus on non-military capabilities. These

could be economic, political and general information

operations, which stand outside of the Alliance’s re-

sponsibilities. To counteract those threats NATO is

unequipped to respond to, it needs to cooperate with

organizations such as the EU and OSCE. Only in this

way can the civilians and militaries issues be properly

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with the President of the European Council, Donald

Tusk on 3 Dec. 2014 (Photo: NATO)


http://www.nato.int/cv/secgen/ismay.htm

Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Confl ict, (Strategic Forum, No.204, April 2009)

Reisinger, H. and A. Golts: Russia’s Hybrid Warfare. Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective De-fence (Rome, NATO Defence College, November 2014)

Matthew Czekaj, Russia’s Hybrid War Against Poland, The Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43851&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=513dea6e2da23e276d6cc8d3f1d08451#.VUSo-I7tlBc

Johnson, Dave, Russia’s Approach to Conflict – Implica-tions for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence (Rome, NATO Defence College, April 2015)

Operation Atlantic Resolve http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/

addressed, as both a military as well as civilian issue.

As long as the members of the Alliance assert their

solidarity with one other, it is highly unlikely that Russia

will invade a NATO member state. This deterrence,

however, only functions as long as the member states

present a credible deterrence through military capabili-

ties and cooperation within the Alliance. If the military

capabilities of the member states are seen to decline, and

cooperation and solidarity weaken, it will remove the

deterrence, which has been the foundation of NATO’s

success for the past seven decades. The challenge re-

mains, both for the Alliance and the individual member

states, to balance domestic needs with security concerns.

Philip Chr. Ulrich holds an M.A. in American Studies

from the University of Southern Denmark. He analyzes

American foreign and defense policy for the Danish web-

site Kongressen.com. He has previously worked as head

of section at the Royal Danish Defence College, where

he published several briefs on U.S. defense and foreign

policy. He has also completed an internship at the Les-

sons Learned / Development Section at the Civil-

Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence.

About the author

Bibliography


By Andreas Stradis

W ith Russian recidivism threatening

in Ukraine whilst the sting of the

Crimean take-over still rankles the

international community, there is much grasping for new

concepts to explain the situation. And in a sense, ascribing

novelty or peculiarity to an event such as this masks its

true nature: relatively new terms such as ‘hybrid’,

‘asymmetric’ or ‘sub-state’ belie the more enduring as-

pects of what has taken place. Less generously, one could

even say that neologisms in international affairs such as

these often hide profound strategic oversight. It is safer to

appear momentarily wrong-footed by a new aspect of the

character of war than to be seen to have overlooked an

aspect of its enduring nature, to borrow two Clausewitzi-

an terms. Not predicting a truly new development in

warfare is one thing; being surprised by a form of warfare

previously consigned to the historical scrapheap is quite

another, and more difficult to accept.

This article therefore seeks to use Russia’s recent ac-

tivities in Eastern Europe as a test-case, not only for how

far military strategy with respect to mercenaries has

evolved since the end of World War II, but also to ques-

tion this evolution in the wider context of the whole his-

tory of warfare. In a sense, the apparently drastic emer-

gence of recent events should highlight to us not their

anomalousness, but the all-too-hasty willingness to be-

lieve that warfare had evolved. Since the so-called ‘end of

history’ proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama in 1989, the

West has been subject to a whole series of strategic rude

awakenings, each showing that no aspect of warfare can

truly be ruled out in an anarchic international environ-

ment. Whether fighting a fourth Afghan War or contem-

plating the emergence of new and unpredictable nuclear

powers, ‘never again’ scenarios are trumped as reliably as

they are proclaimed. So too with the reawakening Russian

bear in Eastern Europe; the strategy might be different to

what the West had expected, but it is certainly not novel.

Rather, it stands as the latest iteration in the long history

of the employment of mercenaries; carefully chosen and

cleverly executed so as to be almost impossible to deal

with.

Whilst there may be little political appetite for expedi-

tionary operations, mercenaries allow the home nation to

retain a stake in a conflict whilst publicly appearing to be

detached from it. Furthermore, when these forces are

raised or recruited indigenously, the conflict retains the

semblance of being internal and, crucially, the moral and

political high-ground is up for grabs. In a globalised world

where the glare of media scrutiny – both individual and

corporate – is more intense than ever, it may simply be

that the de facto way for governments to achieve strategic

results will be through the use of hired hands.

The Mercenary: An Ancient Profession

The history of war is not, in fact, a history of profes-

sional military forces or permanent establishments.

Whilst this has certainly been the case since World War

II, it is worth pausing to reflect on just how small a sliver

of military tradition the standing army really is. To begin

with, the great European militaries only started their tra-

ditions in the 17th century, prior to which Europe relied

on many hundreds of years of feudal tradition, where lo-

cal aristocrats would raise armies as part of their duty to

their monarch. And even with the establishment of these

standing armies, it was not until the very start of the 19th

Mercenaries And Internal Conflict


century that the world’s militaries truly began to

‘professionalise’, with the founding of the great institu-

tions that exist today: the École Militaire in France, Sand-

hurst in England, and West Point in the United States.

Even the ancient Greeks, whose system of warring

city-states or poleis is often held up as the prototype of

the modern international landscape, relied heavily on

mercenary forces. The truly professional fighting force –

in the sense of a paid, permanent and discrete body of

soldiers loyal to only one authority – was something of a

rarity, and a far cry from the popular imagination of ser-

ried ranks of hoplites all loyal to their city. This is because

permanent forces of this kind were notoriously costly

and difficult to maintain in a whole variety of ways. Even

the fearsome Spartans, often dubbed one of the earliest

and most effective professional fighting forces, only con-

stituted 10% of their city’s population, with the other

90% being helot slaves more often than not roped in to

boost numbers in conflicts. The Spartan system was an

anomaly, and severely limited its strategic reach because

of this military structure. As history would prove, it was

not until the proud Spartans were willing to dilute them-

selves with the assistance of Persia that they could coun-

tenance being a truly strategic force, and extend their

influence beyond the Peloponnese. Indeed, there were

certainly Greeks among the ‘barbarian’ armies of the

Persian King Xerxes when he famously invaded in 484

B.C., contravening the neat distinction of forces that

often persists in modern culture: even the heroic Greeks

had their price, and could be Persians for a fee.

The era of large standing armies was also no stranger

to the employment of mercenaries, most notably

through the infamous East India Companies: these were

joint-stock corporations formed to further trade in the

region, but which had de facto authority over large

swathes of India and employed large, professional private

armies. Though the most famous of these, the British

East India Company, was eventually absorbed by the

Crown, for over a quarter of a millennium from 1600

it operated as one of the most influential non-

governmental powers in the world. Nor was this the

only model in widespread use: ‘Foreign Legions’ of

various denominations were formed throughout this

period, in some cases becoming very significant com-

ponents of national power, but crucially, falling into

the category of mercenary force, with all the ad-

vantages that this entailed. From the King’s Foreign

Legion, to the Gurkha forces of Nepal and the French

Foreign Legion, governments continued to place great

reliance on the mercenary not simply as a temporary

supplement but as an integral component of the way

in which power was projected and employed in the

international sphere.

Total War: An Aberration Of History

In order to explain the fate of the mercenary in the

Second World War, its uniqueness must be under-

stood. The demands of the conflict suffused every

nation involved to such an extent that there was no

need for the softer, more politically detached touch of

a mercenary force – every man and woman was part

of the war effort, to the extent that countries faced-

off not only militarily, but economically as well. In

this scenario of ‘total war’, the need for nuanced in-

tervention options quite simply evaporated. Each na-

tion state was singularly directed towards the war

effort because it was politically united around the ex-

istential threat posed by the enemy, so the war took

on the attributes of an industrial confrontation, with

every aspect of each nation’s productivity – human,

monetary, agricultural, or otherwise – directed to-

wards increasing fighting power.

But this begs the question of why the mercenary

returned as such an important component of state


power in the post-war environment, given that the Cold

War still shared the characteristics of a fundamental op-

position of states that had characterised World War II. In

short, the so-called ‘nuclear umbrella’ ruled-out total war

because of the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction

(MAD) that both the Allies and Soviets operated under.

In a sense, the nuclear capability restored a level of anar-

chy to the international system, but crucially precluded

the standing armies of the major powers becoming en-

gaged for fear of total war with an unconscionable nuclear

dimension. Thus the mercenary was catapulted into a po-

sition of even greater prominence during the Cold War,

particularly in the two Superpowers’ peripheral spheres

of influence. From the Bay of Pigs in Cuba to Charlie

Wilson’s War in Afghanistan, mercenary forces were re-

lied upon – successfully or not – for significant strategic

effect that regular forces simply could not have had. More

than this, they were no longer the ‘disunited, ambitious

and ill-disciplined’ forces that Machiavelli so deplored in

his infamous treatise The Prince, but highly professional

and disciplined.

The Modern Mercenary Profession

The 21st century is in many ways continuous with the

Cold War, against Francis Fukuyama’s prediction and that

of many others when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Still

bound by the ‘nuclear umbrella’, major powers also have

to operate within the context of increasing public scrutiny

for their foreign interventions, whether military or non-

military, from the post-ISAF training mission in Afghani-

stan to the role of international development activity in

the MENA region. Dubbed Private Military Companies

(PMCs) rather than mercenaries, these 21st century forces

take the hired-hand to a new level of professionalism.

Often recruited from Special Forces units, they have

many years of regular service to draw upon. In a sense,

they embody the shift of national power from the

‘official’ space of the regular force to a deliberately less

transparent, less accountable business model. But

should this be viewed as an entirely sinister develop-

ment?

One could argue that PMCs are simply the logical

response of governments hamstrung by the unprece-

dented levels of public scrutiny of the internet age.

This cuts both ways: not only are governments wary of

being perceived as ‘meddling’, but even in the most

publicly supported wars, the political cost of casualties

can be strategically debilitating, as the loss of US Rang-

ers in Somalia in the early 1990s proved. Furthermore,

not only are these forces more discrete, but they are

scalable, highly efficient businesses, reflecting in many

ways the migration of many previously national ser-

vices to the private sector, from energy supply to

transport. Companies like MPRI are now deliberately

worked into US foreign policy by the State Depart-

ment, and its management structure consists of former

high ranking military officers that have quite literally

been outsourced in order to provide not only the eco-

nomic but political efficiencies that a tentative 21st cen-

tury government requires when engaging in foreign

affairs.

And the pattern of NATO engagement post-1989

points to PMCs as a logical solution. Sustaining politi-

cal will has become the biggest strategic problem for

the Alliance, whether in Somalia as previously men-

tioned or in Afghanistan for the 14 years since 2001.

Even the air campaign in Kosovo is illustrative of the

fact that the Alliance is struggling to convince its re-

spective publics of the need for involving its troops:

the air campaign was fêted as the solution to risking the

lives of ground forces, one which ultimately proved

ineffective. The unwillingness to commit forces to

Eastern Europe persists, and the way in which NATO

is engaging neatly mirrors the Russian approach: the

new Rapid Reaction Force is symbolic rather than


overly-threatening, being based on a British brigade and

designed to be small, highly mobile and scalable. It is not

an act of war. The real fight in Ukraine has only smatter-

ings of incidental evidence, such as NATO 5.56 maga-

zines, Blackwater deployment, and Russian-made weap-

ons. Yet with the public acknowledgement of pro-

Russian separatists as well as NATO ‘advisers’ in the

region, it is clear that subliminal military activity is rife,

and being kept deliberately out of view.

But what makes Ukraine worthy of singling out? For

the first time, a major power is taking the proxy war

model to the very borders of its political competitor’s

central sphere of influence. Quite understandably, this

has created profound concern. What is remarkable is

that major Western powers such as the US and UK are

responding in kind, investing heavily in the softer ele-

ments of their own military power. In the UK, a new

‘Chindit’ formation has been raised, so-called because it

shares the same designation of ‘77 Brigade’ as its infa-

mous World War II antecedent founded by Orde Win-

gate. Similarly, the US has boosted the budget for SO-

COM (its Special Operations Command) by $30 mil-

lion, in official recognition of the resurgence of the

murky, non-state dimension to modern warfare.

We may be witnessing not only the resurgence of the

mercenary, but a new demand made of modern military

forces: that the hired-hand forms a fundamental part of

the political and strategic calculus in the future. This is

every bit as unnerving as it sounds, since it opens up the

possibility of a foreign policy entirely divorced from the

public it is meant to serve.

Andreas Stradis is a Voluntary Senior Research Fellow

and Member of the Executive Board for the Atlantic

Council UK. He completed a PhD in International Rela-

tions at the University of Bristol in 2014. Prior to this,

Andreas completed an MSc in IR at LSE, and MA in

English Literature at Oxford. He is currently also a

Higher Executive Officer in the British Civil Service

Fast Stream, and a serving officer in the British Army

Reserve.

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