Atlantic Voices Vol 3. no. 3

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 3 1

Volume 3 - Issue 3, March 2013

Contents:

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Stabilizing and Sustaining the

Arab Spring

Paul Price examines the role of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperative Initiative as a force for ensur-

ing security and upholding progress in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. He concludes that in

the absence of a concrete policy platform for democratization, the ICI is the best mechanism

available to prevent violence from overwhelming the region.

The Impact of Syria’s Conflict on NATO’s Security

Branko Lazic explores the threat of the Syrian conflict to Turkey and NATO’s wider strategic

interests. He concludes that NATO must leave a military option on the table in order to re-

solve the ongoing crisis by arguing that if an operation is launched against the Assad regime or

rebel groups, it will simultaneously strengthen NATO’s dialogue with Assad’s allies in Mos-

cow, Beijing and Tehran.

Adapting NATO Partnerships Coping With The Effects of the Arab Spring

As the Arab Spring reaches its two year

anniversary, the region remains in a volatile

state. Having brought the demise of four

regimes and severely weakened the legitima-

cy of others, the Middle East has been mired

in political turmoil.

Having already intervened in Libya and

with a major stake in the continuing civil war

in Syria, NATO finds itself in an increasingly

insecure environment where hostile forces

are gaining ground throughout the region.

With the risk of NATO members and Part-

ners being directly threatened by these un-

folding events, NATO’s role in addressing

the security deficit in the region is critical.

As the second year of the Arab Spring has

shown, the instability is far from being con-

tained and the possibility of counter-

revolutions and state failure cannot be ruled

out.

As NATO’s Partnerships illustrate, there

exists a framework between states in the re-

gion for collectively addressing these ongoing

challenges to protect the wider transatlantic

community, however their potential remains

to be realized.- Jason Wiseman

Signing of Agreement on the Security of Information Between NATO and the UAE (Photo: NATO)


By Paul Pryce

I n a phenomenon as diverse and tumultuous as the

Arab Spring, it is difficult to pinpoint a single event

that precipitated the process of reform and counter-

reform which continues to sweep the region to this day.

Many observers agree that the self-immolation in January

2011 of a Tunisian protester, Mohamed Bouazizi, was the

point at which the coming revolution began to take shape.

Regardless of when the

Arab Spring began, it

has confronted Arab

societies in particular,

as well as global society

in general, with a num-

ber of urgent ques-

tions. To what extent

can the power of the

executive be con-

strained? How can Is-

lamic (or even Islamist)

values be expressed in democratic society? And what role

should the military play when the executive and the people

part ways?

These are difficult questions to face, especially in socie-

ties where democratic traditions are lacking and civil socie-

ty is at a nascent state of development. Yet the degree to

which the countries caught up in the Arab Spring can an-

swer these questions successfully while balancing a vibrant

array of views and values will determine whether stability

and prosperity predominate throughout North Africa and

the Middle East in the coming years. But must these coun-

tries do it alone? Or can the Euro-Atlantic community,

through tools such as NATO, be of assistance in ensuring

that the gains of the Arab Spring are entrenched and ex-

panded upon?

NATO possesses two structures of relevance to those

countries caught up in the currents of the Arab Spring: the

Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Ini-

tiative (ICI). The former currently encompasses Algeria,

Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO member

states extended an invitation to Libya to take part in the

Mediterranean Dialogue

as well. As of this writing,

the new National Con-

gress in Libya has yet to

officially respond to the

invitation.1 Still, the Med-

iterranean Dialogue en-

joys broad membership

among Arab countries,

with the partnership in-

tended “…to create good

relations and better mutu-

al understanding and confidence throughout the region,

promoting regional security and stability, and explaining

NATO’s policies and goals.”2

As such, the principal focus of

the Mediterranean Dialogue is on inter-state security, inter

-state relations, and public diplomacy efforts intended to

put forward a positive image of NATO and its efforts. But,

as the Arab Spring has demonstrated, at times the state

itself can become a threat to the security of its own citi-

zens. The Mediterranean Dialogue presents few opportu-

nities to address issues such as civilian oversight of the mili-

tary; structuring civil-military relations; and fostering the

rule of law in states across North Africa and the Middle

East.

In this sense, the ICI may hold greater potential, offer-

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Stabilizing and Sustaining the Arab Spring

Bilateral meeting between Secretary General Rasmussen and Sheikh Mohammed

bin Rashid al-Maktoum (Photo: NATO)


ing NATO opportunities to share its best practices and

institutional knowledge with states struggling to reconcile

competing values. The ICI, originally launched at the 2004

NATO Summit in Istanbul, is intended to foster practical

security cooperation with a select number of countries in

the Middle East. Initially, only the member states of the

Gulf Cooperation Council were invited to take part: Bah-

rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United

Arab Emirates (UAE). The governments of Bahrain, Ku-

wait, Qatar, and the UAE accepted

the invitation and actively participate

in the ICI, while Saudi Arabia and

Oman have yet to do so as of this

writing, but have still expressed an

interest in the ICI’s activities. Lack-

ing the broad membership of the Mediterranean Dialogue,

the ICI is nonetheless more integrated and its efforts decid-

edly more intensive.

It must be noted, however, that the ICI lacks the ex-

plicit democratization agenda of NATO’s more widely

known Partnership for Peace.3 Similarly, the Mediterrane-

an Dialogue merely calls on its members to ‘promote’ the

democratic control of armed forces, rather than setting out

any terms that would apply pressure on Mediterranean

Dialogue members to adopt comprehensive reforms.4 This

reflects the political realities of the region at the time of

the ICI’s establishment, at which point the inclusion of an

explicit democratization agenda in the ICI would have very

likely hindered, if not halted, cooperation on the part of

the Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

Given that significant changes have occurred in the

region since the 2004 NATO Summit, the ICI could be-

come an excellent vehicle for fostering necessary reforms

in its member states and other countries across the region.

This is not, however, to say that NATO should look to

impose an explicit democratization agenda upon the ICI

partners. Instead, NATO could seek to build upon the

aspects of the ICI relating to practical security cooperation

by inviting ICI member states to become ‘Sponsoring Na-

tions’ of the NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of

Excellence (CIMIC COE) in Enschede, the Netherlands.

According to NATO, “Centres of Excellence (COEs)

are nationally or multi-nationally funded institutions that

train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO

member and partner countries…” and assist in expanding

the Alliance’s capacity to operate in varying environments

under diverse conditions.5 Currently, NATO has a total of

19 accredited Centres of Excellence tackling topics that

range from cold weather operations to

naval mine clearance. The CIMIC COE

itself is concerned with assisting

NATO, Sponsoring Nations, and other

institutions “…in the field of civil-

military interaction by providing inno-

vative and timely advice and subject matter expertise in the

development of existing and new concepts, policy and

doctrine….”6 By becoming Sponsoring Nations of the

CIMIC COE as an expansion of the activities of the ICI,

civilian and military officials from Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,

and the UAE would engage closely with civilian and mili-

tary officials from Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia,

the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia on topics relating

specifically to civil-military interaction.

A necessary aspect of civil-military cooperation as un-

derstood by the NATO member states is civilian oversight

of the military. Simultaneously, it must be understood that

military personnel are expected to disobey unlawful or-

ders. Over the course of the Arab Spring, military and

police personnel have opened fire upon unarmed protest-

ers on numerous occasions. The carnage wrought in Syria

is a firm indication that that country has failed to apply

adequate constraints to executive power and that the mili-

tary is not at all beholden to democratic control. As such,

it is doubtful that Syria under the current regime would

apply to take part in the activities of the ICI and even more

inconceivable that NATO would facilitate the engagement

of the current regime in such a valued NATO partnership.

The current ICI members have also experienced some

The ICI lacks the explicit democrati-zation agenda of NATO’s more wide-

ly known Partnership for Peace


difficulties in striking the right balance of values, though

none have reached the total failure with which the rule of

Bashar al-Assad can be characterized. In the UAE, five

political activists were charged in 2011 with insulting the

royal family, endangering national security, and inciting

the people to protest by signing an online petition that

called for free and open elections to the country’s largely

advisory parliament. The day after the five were convicted

and sentenced to several years in prison, they received

pardons and were promptly released.7 Widespread arrests

also took place in Kuwait as protests began to intensify

there in October 2012.

Of particular concern for

NATO and the ICI, however,

has been the response of mili-

tary and police forces to pro-

tests in Bahrain. While worri-

some, the actions of Kuwaiti

and Emirati authorities in re-

sponse to the Arab Spring falls

beyond the intended scope of

the CIMIC COE and certainly

beyond the ICI’s interest in

practical security cooperation.

Addressing the imprisonment

of the five Emirati political

activists, for example, would

require adopting an explicit

and politically untenable de-

mocratization agenda within the

ICI. The Bahraini reaction to its

national off-shoot of the Arab Spring protests, however,

suggests a severe lack of the Bahraini authorities’ ability to

engage constructively in civil-military relations, as well as

an opportunity for NATO to render practical security as-

sistance through ICI and the work of the CIMIC COE.

Protests began in Bahrain on 14 February 2011 and

continued peacefully until 17 February, when police

launched a pre-dawn raid to clear protestors from the

Pearl Roundabout, a central location in the capital of Ma-

nama. The raid resulted in the deaths of four protesters.8

The next day, military forces opened fire on protesters

attempting to return to the Pearl Roundabout, fatally

wounding one civilian. After thousands of protesters

peacefully reclaimed the Pearl Roundabout days later, Bah-

raini military forces once again opened fire on the crowds

on 22 February, killing 20 people and injuring over 100

others. Though repression in Bahrain has certainly not

reached the level of severity witnessed in Syria, the police

response in 2011 and 2012 has been characterized as a

‘brutal crackdown’, resulting in the arrests of dissident

bloggers and even doctors who

provided medical treatment to

protesters injured in the military

response in February 2011.9

Such a heavy-handed re-

sponse by the Bahraini authorities’

carries the risk of radicalizing ci-

vilians and exacerbating tensions

within society. As has been noted

by some observers, “radicalizing

agents such as al-Qaeda have me-

dia systems that commission, pro-

duce, and distribute content that

legitimates their worldview and

actions.…”10 The gruesome acts

of repression carried out against

the protesters at the Pearl Round-

about in Manama provide radical-

izing agents in the region with

plenty of ammunition for propa-

ganda campaigns, demonstrating to audiences the apparent

need for armed resistance and justifying acts of terror

committed by these radicalizing agents. Thus, if the Bahrai-

ni authorities had feared that the 2011 protests could allow

radicalism to fester within society, the crackdown on the

protesters achieved that end far more effectively than any

peaceful alternative might have.

As evidenced by this brief review of events in Manama,

the Bahraini authorities lack civil-military competencies.

Protesters in Manama, Bahrain, at the height of the Arab

Spring (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)


Through engagement with the CIMIC COE, Bahraini offi-

cials, both civilian and military, can develop an understand-

ing of how to engage civilian populations constructively

when tensions are running high. By understanding the

broader consequences of a crackdown, these officials might

then help to shift the behaviour of Bahraini government

institutions, avoiding the use of vio-

lence against peaceful protesters, up-

holding the rule of law, and fostering

intra-state dialogue. If the authorities

of states engaged in the work of the

ICI are greatly concerned about the prospect of terrorist

groups waging campaigns to undermine local governance,

then the partnerships formed within the context of the ICI

could be expanded to include not only the activities and

expertise of the CIMIC COE but also the NATO Centre of

Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in

Ankara, Turkey. In this way, best practices in the fight

against terrorism can be readily exchanged between

NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council, while these

partners in the Middle East region can be appropriately

encouraged to refrain from potentially radicalizing activi-

ties.

While the potential benefits of expanding and enabling

the security partnership envisioned in the ICI are clearly

significant, the question of political will remains an im-

portant one. Demonstrating the benefits of engaging with

the CIMIC COE and potentially the COE-DAT will re-

quire intensive public diplomacy efforts on the part of

NATO and its member states. At the same time, NATO

member states will need to strive to adopt a common posi-

tion on the role of the ICI in fostering regional coopera-

tion. Since its establishment in 2004, NATO member

states have lacked consensus as to whether the hopes of the

Alliance should be placed on the Mediterranean Dialogue

to the exclusion of the ICI, the ICI to the exclusion of the

Mediterranean Dialogue, or on both evenly. The ICI was

originally envisioned as a more ambitious project when

first proposed but was later reined in by some NATO

member states – namely France and Spain – which were

concerned that the ICI would undermine the important

work of the Mediterranean Dialogue.11

At its inception, the ICI could have understandably

been perceived as a competitor to the Mediterranean Dia-

logue. While, as has been noted here previously, the initial

phase of the ICI was to be directed at

the membership of the Gulf Coopera-

tion Council, the ICI is open to any

interested states in the broader Middle

East region. Similarly, the Mediterra-

nean Dialogue is open to any potential partners in the

broader Middle East, and this institution has undergone

expansion since it was first established in December 1994.

Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania joined first, while

Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Algeria joined later in a phase of

expansion that ended in March 2000.12 It is therefore en-

tirely possible that the membership of these two partner-

ships may overlap at some point in the future, with an ICI

member also joining the Mediterranean Dialogue or vice

versa.

But these two institutions have clearly diverged in function

even if they may share similar purposes and may eventually

share similar memberships. The Mediterranean Dialogue has

evolved primarily as a means of facilitating high-level contacts,

holding regular talks to foster inter-state and cross-regional

understanding, and even taking on a parliamentary dimension

as representatives of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meet

with parliamentarians from the Mediterranean Dialogue coun-

tries.13 This differs greatly from how the ICI has developed,

since its focus is almost exclusively on practical security coop-

eration and the ICI member states continue to express interest

in holding joint military exercises with NATO member states.

In 2013, it would be more accurate to say that the ICI and the

Mediterranean Dialogue are complementary rather than con-

flicting due to the differing premises upon which they were

founded and the different expectations of the countries en-

gaged in these partnerships.

Nonetheless, it may be challenging to develop a con-

sensus within NATO regarding the potentially comple-

mentary roles of the ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The Mediterranean Dialogue calls on its members to ‘promote’ the

democratic control of armed forces


Soon, though, the case must be made for this consensus. In

order to capitalize on the historic opportunity afforded by

the Arab Spring, NATO must be decisive and coherent as

to its manner in fostering democratic values even when a

formal democratization agenda is absent. The ICI, enhanced

by the work of relevant NATO Centres of Excellence, is

the best vehicle for pursuing this on the practical level.

This does not diminish the vital contribution of the Medi-

terranean Dialogue on the level of political partnership; on

the contrary, the high-

level contacts fostered

by the Mediterranean

Dialogue can only

serve to enhance re-

gional security and

ensure that the intel-

lectual movements

triggered by the Arab

Spring favour modera-

tion and liberal demo-

cratic values. Still, pre-

venting the kind of violence witnessed at the Pearl Round-

about requires the utmost effort on the part of NATO

member states to intensify the practical security coopera-

tion in the region for which the ICI is so uniquely suited.

Paul Pryce is a researcher at the European Geopolitical Forum.

Holding a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the Univer-

sity of Calgary (Canada) and a Master of Social Sciences in Inter-

national Relations from Tallinn University (Estonia), he has pre-

viously worked in conflict resolution as a Research Fellow with

the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Bibliography

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3Rebecca R. Moore, NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 2007), p.138

4Chris Zambelis and Eva Svobodova, “NATO and the Middle East: The Road to Greater Engagement,” in Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition

or Support for US Foreign Policy, ed. Jack Covarrubias and Tom Lansford, 197-216. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007), p.204

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7Al-Jazeera. UAE Pardons Jailed Activists. (2011, November 28). Available from: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/20111128135953601809.html>

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10Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p.147 11Ana Echague, “The Gulf Coop-eration Council: The Challenges of Security,” in The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment, ed. Richard Youngs, 135-153. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), p.149 12Sarah Wolff, The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union’s Internal Security, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.117 13Graeme P. Herd, “NATO Partnerships: For Peace, Com-bat, and Soft Balancing?” in Understanding NATO in the 21st

Century: Alliance Strategies, Security, and Global Governance, eds. Graeme P. Herd and John Kriendler, 67-84. (New York: Routledge, 2013), p.72

About the author

Leaders Meet For the Istanbul Summit in 2004 (Photo: NATO)


those allied with al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. If that

happens in the near future, neither Assad’s regime nor the rebels

and their Western allies will feel secure in what will become an

increasingly unpredictable environment. This uncertainty has led

Israel to carefully monitor the civil war in Syria, as it anticipates

a serious threat on its northern border from militant Islamist

insurgents from Syria if these groups prevail in the conflict. At

the moment, less extreme groups still hold power in the bloody

Syrian war; as such, the conflict is primarily based on demands

for political reforms, particularly for Sunni rule versus Alawi

Shia rule (represented by the Assad family since 1970).

Unfortunately, since the uprising began in March 2011,

these ‘less extreme’ forces of regime and rebel troops have

caused the deaths of more than 70,000 people within Syria,

mostly civilians. At the same time, there

are several hundred thousand refugees lo-

cated mainly in camps in Turkey, Jordan

and Lebanon. Additionally, an estimated

four million people inside Syria are in need

of humanitarian aid.

Syria’s Threat to Turkey

The Syrian conflict is extraordinarily complex and has major

implications for regional security. As a consequence, Turkey’s

security as a NATO member country is a critical issue. This ob-

viously impacts NATO’s stance on Syria directly since Turkey

has suffered numerous attacks against its border areas as part of

the ongoing crisis. Moreover, since missiles coming from Syria

have already caused deaths on Turkish soil, NATO’s decision in

December 2012 to send Patriot missiles to the southern Turkish

border has increased its stake in the ongoing crisis.

Between the end of 2012 and mid-February 2013, the Unit-

ed States, Germany, and the Netherlands deployed Patriot mis-

siles to Turkey amid fears of a chemical weapons attack from

Syria, a notion repudiated by Damascus. Regardless, if Islamist

groups in Syria gain control of these weapons, Turkey and Israel

will be seriously threatened. Following these developments,

by Branko Lazic

T wo years after the beginning of the Syrian revolu-

tion and its transformation into a civil war, there

are no signs that officials in Damascus are going to

reach any kind of compromise with rebel leaders to end the

violence. The negative implications of the conflict for Middle

Eastern and global security have the potential to cause serious

instability within the North Atlantic Community. Turkey, a

NATO member state, borders Syria to the north. Therefore,

the Syrian war poses a direct threat to NATO as a whole, espe-

cially since Turkey could potentially invoke Article 5 as the

crisis continues to escalate.

The Syrian crisis, as the longest-lasting phase of the Arab

Awakening, is not only a Syrian issue, but

it is also an issue for the broader Middle

East since it is already causing instability

throughout the region. Bordering Turkey,

Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, Syria’s

sectarian conflict has already caused serious internal security

difficulties in countries like Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq.

It must not be forgotten that the regime in Damascus relies

heavily on support from the Islamic Republic of Iran and its

Hezbollah allies in Lebanon in order to stay in power and fend

off the threat of state collapse. In addition to the turmoil it

has caused inside Syria, the Arab Awakening has led to some

kind of closure within the Ba’ath party and was followed by a

cessation of Syrian cooperation with Turkey. Now, the Turk-

ish government strongly supports Syrian rebels organized in

the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposi-

tion Forces under the leadership of Moaz al-Khatib. The re-

gional issue of Kurdish sovereignty is also prevalent, as the

Kurdish population dominates large swaths of territory cover-

ing areas of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, many

of the parties involved in the Syrian conflict fear a possible rise

of Islamic extremism in the country. In such a case, Syria could

become a long-term battlefield of various groups, including

NATO’s decision...to send Patriot missiles to the southern Turkish bor-

der has increased its stake in the ongoing crisis

The Impact of Syria’s Conflict on NATO’s Security


NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that there

is a need for effective defense and protection for Turkey. The

United States, Germany, and the Netherlands agreed to deploy

two batteries of Patriot mis-

siles each. Their main objec-

tive is to detect new launches

of ’Scud-type missiles’ against

rebel fighters. The United

States approved the deploy-

ment of 400 troops to Incirlik

Air Base, while Dutch and

German troops number 300

each. The German, Dutch and

Turkish defense ministers paid

a joint visit to NATO Patriot

batteries in Turkey on 23

February, showing the Alliance’s solidarity. The Syrian crisis

marks the first time Patriot missiles have been located in Turkey

since the 2003 campaign in Iraq.

Officials in Damascus have denied the use of ballistic missiles

in military activities. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) controls the

northern parts of the country (the cities of Idlib and Hama and

the area around the city of Aleppo), in addition to smaller areas in

other parts of Syria. They are currently launching attacks on the

capital of Damascus and Aleppo. Even though some analysts be-

lieve that Assad’s regime is in retreat from the north, these areas

bordering Turkey remain extremely fragile and still could poten-

tially provoke Ankara to act against Assad’s forces.

Considering that it currently houses 150,000 Syrian refugees

and has been susceptible to insurgent attacks from the south, it is

not surprising that Turkey insists on concrete actions to secure

the fragile 900 km border next to Syria’s ‘bloody conflict’. In

October 2012 Turkey shelled Syrian targets after a series of cross

-border attacks. Turkey has claimed that the Syrian army and its

martyrs might use chemical warheads against Turkish border

communities, alarming its NATO allies. Therefore, the Turks

demanded the installment of Patriot batteries in order to inter-

rupt possible warhead attacks on Turkish soil. The Turks believe

that Assad’s regime possesses Soviet-era Scuds and North Korean

SS-21 missiles. Along with other observers, they also believe that

the Syrian regime holds stocks of mustard gas, sarin nerve gas,

and probably VX nerve agents. Officials in Ankara, aware of

Iran’s importance in controlling Assad, have already organized

a series of trilateral meetings with Iran and Egypt, Iran and

Russia, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Many analysts believe that

Russia’s role is vital for

reaching a peaceful solu-

tion in the Syrian crisis,

since Moscow has strong

ties to the Assad regime.

Turkey also moved 250

tanks to the Syrian border

as an additional security

measure, while at the same

time the U.S. deployed

150 Special Forces in Jor-

dan.

Regional Implications

The issue of Kurdish sovereignty remains important and

relevant. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s (PKK) presence in

Turkey and its tumultuous past must be included in the overall

analysis, especially because it is a vital factor in understanding

Turkish economic and security interests in the Middle East.

Turkish companies like Genel Energy are very interested in

exploiting natural gas reserves located in the Kurdish parts of

Iraq. In August 2012 Genel Energy acquired interest in two oil

blocks in Iraq: Bina Bawi and Miran. Genel Energy is the larg-

est stakeholder in Bina Bawi, owning 44% of the shares, which

leaves 20% to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and

36% to Austrian OMV. Turkey made a direct deal with the

KRG without Baghdad’s official approval in May 2012, leading

to the current deadlock between the KRG and the Baghdad

government over Iraqi oil sales.

Genel Energy has interests in six oil production contracts

with the KRG, specifically related to the Taq Taq, Ber Bahrm,

Miran, Tawke, Dohuk, and Chia Surkh fields. They are plan-

ning a vast drilling campaign with the aim of developing a pro-

duction sharing contract in the next 12 months. Large oil

companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Total also have

interests in northern Iraq. At the same time, Genel Energy is

reviewing its plans to deploy its oil export pipeline system in

Kurdistan. The first pipeline in the northern Kirkuk field is

already under construction, and any lack of security and stabil-

U.S. troops with Patriot missile systems in Gaziantep, Turkey

(Photo: United States European Command – EUCOM)


causing various obstacles to NATO initiatives in the region as

well as promoting serious instability on a global level due to

Iran’s flouting of international law.

Is NATO Ready To Intervene?

One of the most important topics regarding current devel-

opments in the Syrian crisis is the issue of whether NATO or

its member states are unilaterally ready and adequately

equipped to militarily intervene in the ongoing conflict.

Some security analysts believe that small stockpiles of pre-

cision guided munitions (PGMs) can serve as NATO’s crucial

weapon in an air strike campaign, especially in densely popu-

lated areas. Since Syria has a substantial air defense network

supported by Russia and Iran, any operation would likely re-

quire significantly more PGMs than the Libyan campaign in

2011. The NATO-led and UN Security Council-backed Libyan

intervention, known as Operation Unified Protector, depleted

energy and resources within NATO and its Gulf allies. Nine-

teen countries participated in the

Operation, fourteen of whom were

NATO member states. There are

some estimates that many of the

European member states involved in

the Libyan campaign have relatively light reserves of PGMs.

These missiles are quite expensive and there are only a

few production lines of PGMs in the world. Many European

NATO member states are reducing military expenditures in

the equipment sector. Therefore, for most of them, a uni-

lateral approach is not an option. A multilateral approach

could provide sufficient PGM stockpiles for a possible inter-

vention against Assad’s regime. However, a NATO military

intervention in Syria is not a likely approach at the moment.

NATO can consider several military options but it is very

difficult to say whether these options can be implemented

on the field in the near future. It is unlikely that the UN will

allow any kind of military campaign against the Syrian gov-

ernment at the moment. Therefore, the only possible op-

tion is a unilateral intervention, probably led by the US and

its NATO partners. In this case, NATO has three viable

strategies: declare no fly zones; prompt an air invasion

without ground support or deploy a full scale military inter-

ity in that area, which borders Syrian Kurdish lands, poses an

obstacle for the free distribution of oil and gas toward Turkish

and Western markets. Projects such as Nabucco with links to

Iraq are very important for a diversified energy supply in Turkey

and its NATO partner countries. One of the most important gas

supplying initiatives is the Arab Gas Pipeline Project connecting

Egypt’s El Arish with Turkish Kilis through Syrian territory.

Ongoing conflict stopped that project with 230 km of pipeline

left to complete from Homs in Syria to Turkey. Before the Arab

Awakening Turkey had a very pragmatic approach, trying to

build friendly relations with all of its neighbors. Now, it is very

difficult to keep that kind of foreign policy balance given the

regional upheaval. The decades-long strategy of ‘Zero Problems

with Our Neighbors‘ must be reconsidered after new develop-

ments in the region. Turkey is heavily engaged in efforts to over-

throw Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; at the same time, rela-

tions with Syria’s only regional ally, Iran, are declining. Finally,

oil pipelines can cause problems in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Parts

of the PKK are located in the

northeastern areas of Syria, bor-

dering Turkey and Iraq. The

Syrian government forces with-

drew from Kurdish majority

areas last July. Since then, these areas are under Kurdish control

near the oil pipeline routes. It is important for Turkey to prevent

these groups from threatening Turkish interests. If Assad’s re-

gime regains control over the Kurds in Syria and decides to block

Turkish economic interests in that area, it could cause serious

economic problems for Turkey and the wider EU-NATO area

which are very dependent on the Middle East’s oil and gas sup-

plies.

The Turkish government is obviously cautious about the pos-

sible renewal of Syria’s links with the PKK, and as such is pri-

marily concerned with diversifying its energy supplies which, for

now, are mainly related to doing business with Iran.

This energy issue could cause serious economic problems in

Turkey since Turkey is one of the largest importers of Iranian

crude oil, accounting for 7% of Iranian exports. After China, the

European Union is the largest importer of Iranian crude oil. At

the same time, NATO member states and the Iranian regime

strongly disagree on the nature of the Iranian nuclear program,

The decades-long strategy of ‘Zero Problems with Our Neighbors’ must be reconsidered

after new developments in the region


vention including air power and ground troops. If NATO

chooses to avoid direct intervention but still seeks to influ-

ence the outcome, it can choose to provide training and logis-

tical support to the rebels. In that case, NATO must tactically

consider to whom they deliver military assistance if they do

not want to provoke wider and more violent conflict within

Middle East. NATO’s need for restraint can be described in

the Secretary General’s words: ‘Syria is ethnically, politically,

religiously much more complicated than Libya.’ Keeping postwar

Libya in mind, NATO’s caution has strong justification.

The ‘Afghanization’ scenario of Syria becoming deeply

embroiled in sectarian war poses risks not only to Turkey but

also to Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and the wider region. If

it continues to develop into an unstoppable sectarian war

without any chance for compromise between Assad and the

rebels, Western democracies might be pressed to intervene in

order to stop the humanitarian disaster. At this moment Rus-

sia and China are strongly opposed to any UN-mandated in-

tervention against the Syrian Government. Moscow and Bei-

jing have vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions aimed

at isolating Assad’s regime, as they disagree with the view

that the Syrian government is solely responsible for the cur-

rent conflict. Even still, these developments within the UN

are some kind of explanation and ‘excuse’ for why NATO has

not organized

some kind of

military action

against Assad’s

troops. NATO

states might be

willing to deliv-

er military assis-

tance to the re-

bels, but there

are justifiable

fears that these

weapons might

end up in the hands of extremists who would cause further

instability within Syria. For example, some groups like Hez-

bollah could potentially obtain advanced weaponry currently

controlled by Assad’s troops, including chemical weapons.

NATO must be careful in preventing other groups such as

Jabhat al-Nusra from gaining possession of such weaponry.

The newly created umbrella organization of the Syrian op-

position, known as the National Coalition under the lead-

ership of Sheikh Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, is still insufficient-

ly interconnected, posing another problem for Western

states.

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) led by Brigadier General

Selim Idris is already under strong control of Islamist struc-

tures and NATO needs to be careful when engaging the

numerous factions of rebels. There are some signals that

the FSA has some ties with Salafists and the Muslim Broth-

erhood. At the same time, there are heavy sanctions against

the Damascus regime, which was previously selling 98% of

its oil to the EU states. Already, Syria has lost around $4

billion of revenue in terms of oil trade on the annual level.

Even though there were signals after 2000 that Syria might

build some friendly relations with Western democracies,

chances of such a development are out of the question since

the start of the conflict. Demands for Assad’s departure are

very strong and there are no signals that the U.S. or EU are

willing to cooperate with his regime.

As of February 2013, U.S. policy is still focused on

d i p l o m a t i c

and economic

pressures as

the main

mechanisms

for resolving

the Syrian

conflict. The

US also sup-

plies deliver-

ies of humani-

tarian aid to

the opposi-

tion forces. Some in the media speculate that certain West-

ern intelligence services are involved in coordinating arms

deliveries to the rebels in concert with Saudi Arabia and

Former Leader of the Syrian National Coalition Sheikh Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib (Photo: Reuters)


About the author

dialogue with Damascus, Moscow, and if possible, Tehran.

At the same time, if NATO decides to begin a military in-

tervention, it needs to reconsider its strategy in dealing with

rebel groups. Regardless of the chosen strategy, all require

action not only on the part of NATO, but also Russia and

China in order for diplomacy to be an active player in end-

ing the ‘blood games’ in Syria.

Branko Lazic holds a M.A. degree in Regional Studies of

Asia from the University of Belgrade. He has graduated at

the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Acade-

my. Currently he is engaged in the Serbian Government as a

national security analyst. Lazic is an active member of the

Atlantic Council of Serbia’s Youth Organization.

Bibliography

BBC, Kurdistan Pipeline Deal: Iraq warns Turkey over Kurdistan Pipeline deal, Inter-net, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18163248 May 2012, 22 May 2012 (accessed 14 Feb. 2013)

BBC,NATO Deploying Patriot Missiles to Turkey – Syria Border, Internet, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20911919, 4 January 2013 (accessed 15 Feb. 2013)

Chatam House, Scenarios for Syria, Internet, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%

20East/1211mtgsummary.pdf, December 2011 (accessed 12 Feb. 2013)

Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria – Bashar’s Trial by Fire (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2005)

Jonathan Masters, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response, Council on Foreign Relations, Internet, http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisis-global-response/p28402, 5 February 2013 (accessed 15 Feb. 2013)

Jubin Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatc Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London – New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006)

Julian Borger, Turkey requested NATO Missile Defenses over Syria chemical weapons fears, The Guardian, Internet, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/02/turkey-syria-chemical-weapons-fears, 2 Decem-ber 2012 (accessed 12 Feb. 2013)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Defense Ministers Visit Patriot De-ployment, Internet, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_98819.htm, 23 February 2013 (accessed 25 Feb. 2013)

Ozturk Selvitop, Turkish Gas Network Pipelines Recent Developments, Internet, http://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/406203.PDF, 10 September 2009 (accessed 12 Feb. 2013)

Radwan Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011)

Ray Duprey, U.S. NATO Driven to Wage War on Syria, workers.org, Internet, http://www.workers.org/2012/10/20/u-s-nato-driven-to-wage-war-on-syria/, 20 October 2012 (accessed 10 Feb. 2013)

U.S. Energy Administration, Iran – Country Analysis Brief, Internet, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ir, (accessed 5 Mar. 2013)

Zachary Fryer-Biggs, NATO Allies Might Be Unprepared for Syria, Internet, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121217/DEFREG01/312170002/NATO-Allies-Might-Unprepared-Syria, 17 December 2012 (accessed 12 Feb. 2013)

Qatar, but there are no signs that there is a systematic ap-

proach regarding this issue.

What Can NATO Do To Stop The Syrian War?

It is obvious that there are several scenarios that could lead

to the resolution of the Syrian civil war. Some of them, how-

ever, are unrealistic, such as reconciliation. The collapse of

the regime could be a realistic outcome, but it depends on the

cessation of Iranian and Russian support to Assad. The option

of a negotiated exit appears to be an acceptable solution for

rebels and Western states, but it seems that Assad does not

consider this an option. As such, the conflict risks developing

into a long civil war with elements of sectarian conflict. It

could become ‘Multileveled Syrian Chaos’ consisting of small-

er disputes on religious, ethnic, cultural, political, and eco-

nomic levels within the bloody conflict. The most dangerous

effect of such an outcome might be the rise of Islamist groups,

which would cause great political instability within the region.

Any spillover effect

would drastically change the

security of any neighboring

country in addition to putting

added strain on Turkey. In that

case, conflict could spill over into not only Lebanon and Iraq,

but also to Jordan and Israel. It could also be a source of daily

unrest in Turkey. Few, if any, participants in the Syrian war

are interested in the bloodiest scenario. Therefore, NATO

must carefully consider all options, including the military

campaign against insurgent elements, no matter if they belong

to the official regime or to rebel factions in Syria. Any action

will be very expensive in terms of human resources and

equipment, but a passive approach could cost the global com-

munity much more. The U.S. and NATO-led ‘Friends of Syr-

ia Group’ must cooperate with the Assad regime’s protectors

from Moscow and Tehran if they don’t want to create a new

al-Qaeda headquarters in the heart of the Middle East.

NATO, therefore, needs to reconsider its current approach to

the Syrian conflict. It is not enough to focus solely on the hu-

manitarian dimension; it is necessary to consider a diplomatic

and military approach too. The Alliance must strengthen its

Regardless of the chosen strategy, all require action not only on the part of NATO, but

also Russia and China

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

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governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

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academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37

countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

include to the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

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◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

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Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

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Editor: Jason Wiseman

ATA Programs

From 4-6 April, the Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association

(EATA) will host a NATO-EU Roundtable in Tallinn to discuss

various topics related to the work and cooperation of NATO and

the EU. This event will bring together 60 students in order to in-

crease the knowledge of young people in foreign and security poli-

cy to discuss the working principles of NATO.

From 4-6 February,

the ATA organized its

58th annual General As-

sembly in Rome. The

Assembly was held at the

Sala della Regina of the

Italian Parliament and

the NATO Defense College. Full reports are available online.

Visit www.globsec.org/globsec2013/ to learn more about the

Slovak Atlantic Commission’s upcoming Globsec Conference on

18-20 April. Don’t miss the opportunity to apply for the Young

Leaders Forum and join one of the leading security and foreign

policy forums in the world.

Atlantic Voices Vol 3. no. 3

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Transcript of Atlantic Voices Vol 3. no. 3