Assignment Aniesh Explosion Venting CPE206001 2[1]

8/2/2019 Assignment Aniesh Explosion Venting CPE206001 2[1]

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1)

Brief System Description

The thermoplastics manufacturer proposed to use a Silo(10mX30m) to store the produced

plastic powder which has been separated through a cyclone.

Design Intention

To design an Explosion Vent for the proposed silo with a scenario of dust explosion inside the

vessel and subsequently duct the contents to safe area(>15m).

Schematic Diagram

Design Approach with Calculations and Justified AssumptionsAssumption: The venting of single enclosure is only considered and linked cyclone is treated as a

separate entity as the unit is separated by appropriate isolation devices (rapid action valve) &

“designed” rotary valve to mitigate eventualities.

Material of Construction: Stainless Steel

Dust specific Deflagration Index Kst, which denotes explosibility characteristic, is calculated using cube

root law as:



Vent Sizing using VDI 3673 Approach

Effect of Vent Duct on Pred

It is presumed that vent products are of toxic nature and need to vented to >15m.

With a consideration of Factor of Safety,Length of vent duct,l = 16m.

Kst- Nomograph method cannot be used as vessel volume>1000m3

With consideration elongated vessel (H/D>1),

Design Pressure Alteration-Proposals with Justification

As calculated above PIred,max has distinct disproportion with envisaged design pressure Pred i.e.

0.25barg,and the enclosure will not be capable to withstand the pressure surge. As vessel is located in a

congested area,the toxic vent products need to be vented to >15m, for that reason, P Ired,max cannot be

altered.

Incisive proposal is to alter the design pressure of silo which is at design stage to 1.90 barg which is greater than PIred,max(1.66barg).

New Design Pressure, Pred,max = 1.90 barg

Validity Check for using VDI 3673 Equation

Assumption& Justification: The dust cloud is assumed to be homogeneous nature so as to design an

effective vent area considering worst case scenario.Inhomogeneous dust distribution was not

considered since equation should adhere to strict boundary conditions and for this case under

study,reliable confirmation was not available.

Uniform distribution of dust cloud in the vessel.(Voldustcloud= Volvessel).

Unimpeded progress of flame front from point of ignition to vent (i.e.no internal obstructions).

Pred depends on cross section of vent and not on any internal obstructions.

Pmax =9 bar for a St2 dust(Perry,2008)



Thus applying VDI equation for homogenous dust distribution,

Vent Duct Design

The duct selected is of circular type with straight horizontal venting due to better air tightness,

higher strength for material of same gauge and for limiting overhead dust accumulation.

Considering Vent Area=Duct Area;Vent Area, Av=17.78m2

The diameter of the circular duct,A=(4XAv/π)1/2 = 4.76m

Length of the duct=16m



2)

The entire storage and filling process need to be systematically analyzed and appraised to

augment process safety and reliability of the entire unit.The multiplicity of activities carried out in the

unit inherently possess substantial risks which should be countered in a methodical manner.

Overall Safety Management-Silo and Filling System

Elimination Elimination is a prudent technique to evade needless risks of the activity.The system should be

thoroughly analyzed from onset to make it inherently safer to avoid a dust explosion.The scale up team

can consider measures such as:

● Hazardous materials inventory reduction to suit the necessity.The design decision to build a

big(V=~2500m3) silo for an inter-mediatory storage should be reevaluated to assimilate the

tangible process requirement, and subsequently optimize the storage size.

Removal of unwanted interconnections(to prevent flame propagation in case of a mishap).

Reduction of pipe length to as low as reasonably required.

Judicious Plant Layout and hazardous activity segregation(minimize congestion). Installation of state-of-the-art instrumentation systems which could accommodate error

tolerances and avoid human intervention.eg:online monitoring electrical field inside silo.

Consideration of particle size and its influence on F&E characteristics.

Optimize process parameters like temperature,mass flow rate,pressure etc.

Moisture control in silos and powder handling sections

Substitution

Measures to be configured to substitute the activities/processes to reduce imminent

risks of the unit as a whole like.

Use of less hazardous materials in the process line.The use of a powder with Kst=252barms-1 and

St2 could be reevaluated and if possible substituted.

Use of circular dust instead of rectangular one to minimize dust accumulation. Substituting N2 gas instead on air for pneumatic conveying.

Alternative safe process route avoiding dust handling in slurry form rather than fine dust form.

Substituting carcinogenic MDA from the process stream.

Administrative& Procedural Controls:Formulation of SOPs,Fool proof PTW system,robust maintenance

procedures,Selection of competent personnel,On-Job-Training,Work-Rest Regime,Procedural

Controls,Specialist competency skills,Implementation of 5S principles of housekeeping,workplace

exposure assessment,inspection system for checking dust deposits inside pipelines.

Personal protective Equipments: PPEs should not be considered as primary BoS.All appropriate PPEs to

be adequately donned by the concerned operatives.

Housekeeping Strategy

A well structured housekeeping stratagem needs to be promulgated to control the dust layerdeposits in the plant.All plant and equipment area including beams,rafters,conduits,light fixtures,ceiling

etc must be rigorously cleaned and periodically inspected to prevent dust accumulation.Use vacuuming

devices to suitably clean the dust in all areas(visible as well as conceivable).

Engineering Controls and Hazard Isolation Techniques



The main hazard associated with this particular unit is that of a probability of dust fire and

explosion emanated out of powder handling systems of the unit.

The knowledge of elements of a dust explosion lead us to the required explosion prevention and

protection measures.

Dust Explosion Prevention StratagemAvoidance of Ignition Sources

Complete avoidance of ignition sources (esp. unconcealed) is not practically feasible, but good

design&judicious practices could certainly reduce probability of an ignition.Zoning studies should be

carried out to classify hazardous areas(Zone20,21,22) and accordingly,suitable electrical equipments to

be selected.To summarize, the ignition sources usually encountered in a powder processing plant and its

precautionary measures are:



Inerting

Inerting could be a valid BoS especially in a typical process stream containing pneumatic

conveyors,cyclones and silos.The inerting method could be a)Addition of inert dust b)Purging with inertgases to reduce vapour concentration below LOC,latter the appropriate method in this particular case.

The inert gas selected could be N2,flue gas,steam,argon,helium or CO2,preferably the former

one. The inert gas in the stream would tangibly lower the LOC(6-13% with N2,but advised to carry out a

specific test) and prevent development of flammable dust-oxidant formation(Barton,2002).Various

purging techniques like pressure,vaccum or flow through purging should be judiciously selected and

employed.An oxygen sensor with alarm in the stream is also recommended.The flammability diagram



could be employed when the inert gas is introduced into the process stream and is considered to be

BoS.

Ventilation

In the powder handling plant, Local Exhaust Ventilation with apposite rate of air changes

capable of preventing formation of flammable dust-oxidant concentration in the processing area should

be installed.Bag filling station is a potential area where dust clouds could be developed.

Dust Explosion Protection StratagemExplosion Containment

The vessels could be built to withstand pressure surge of a dust explosion causing inside

vessels and thereby avert catastrophic structural failure.Since the project is in design stage and vent

products is envisaged to be of toxic nature,it would be much easier to assimilate these ideals into

equipment design.The constructional measures should be correlated with Pmax value.The two modes of

explosion containment options are:

Explosion Suppression

Explosion Suppression could be also used in this case as the products to be vented out is of toxic nature.It is proposed to couple an explosion suppression system(which effectively reduces

fireball diameter),isolation system together with the venting system,thereby minimizing the impact

on long discharge vent duct(16m).The principle is to detect the explosion at incipient stage and to

suppress the fire ball with rapid injection(within milliseconds) of suitable suppressants and thereby

reduce Pred,max.The proposed suppressant system specifications for the project is:

Explosion Isolation

Explosion Isolation techniques are required to separate propagating flame front from

reaching other “safe” process streams.Explosion Isolations techniques are to be coupled with various

explosion prevention systems.The various options recommended are: Rapid Action Valve(RAV):- RAV could be installed in pipelines to prevent explosion progression

to downstream.RAV(with response time<25ms) is proposed to be provided every 5m over the entire

stretch of pneumatic convey stream to timely isolate the flame front from “safe” areas.The combination

of pressure&optical detectors to be used.

Extinguishing Barriers:- Suppressant barriers activated by coupled optical flame detector should

be installed every 5m in pneumatic convey stream, which inject an inert suppressant and thereby

impede flame progression.

Rotary Valves:-Rotary Valves are used to prevent flame propagation by the principle of

quenching the flame by making its progression route through “small” gaps.Depending upon the

explosibility characteristics of the specific dust, “gap length” could be decided.In case of an explosion

inside silo,the rotary valve installed will prevent flame progression to the cyclone.

Explosion Relief Venting

All enclosures are treated as separate entities and adequately designed explosion vents are

provided in all linked vessels in the process stream like cyclone,pipelines,dust collectors etc in addition

to well engineered vent in silo



3)

ASSESSMENT NO: COSHH/ASST/01 AMENDENMENT: 0

NAME OF THE ASSESSOR : ANIESH PARAMADAM DATE OF ASSESSMENT:19 NOV 2010

RISK RATING : HIGH

X*Y*Z THERMOPLASTICS PLC

COSHH ASSESSMENT

TITLE: HANDLING OF DUST POWDERS CONTAINING METHYLENEDIANILINE (MDA)

SCOPE : The scope of COSHH Assessment covers operatives who are exposed to

dust particles containing MDA during bag filling operation.

WORK DESCRIPTION : The following operations are performed in the bag filling station by

designated operatives.

Clip on the plastic bags (FIBC) in the filling arm. Bag rests on the

weighing scale.

Shudder the loading arm for flawless powder conveyance.

Open the downstream valve to discharge powder into bags.

Close the valve when stipulated weight is reached.

Transit the filled bag to conveyor line which takes it into palletising

machine.

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

COMPOSITION :

Name of Product: Powder Containing MDA.

Hazardous Material Composition

Chemical Name CAS No Percentage

4,4’-Methylenedianiline

(MDA)

Physical State: Powder

101-77-9 N/A

Structure:

TOXIC

IARC Type 2B Carcinogen

Liver Toxin

CH2

NH2

NH2



EXPOSED POPULATION : Direct

40 hours a week - 12 operatives - 4 operatives/shift - 3 shifts

Indirect

Maintenance Crew-Preventive as well as Breakdown

Production Support Staff

Management Staff

Visitors,Vendors

Sampling Technicians

Quality Control Technicians

Transportation staff

Indirect persons have only shot exposure time.

CHEMICAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT OF POWDER CONTAINING MDA

HEALTH HAZARDS : The powder containing MDA could result in Acute and Chronic health

problems.

Exposure Routes & Acute Health Effects:

Eye Contact : Irritation,corneal burns

Dermal Contact : Rapid absorption through skin causing acutedermatitis.

Skin Irriatation,Yellow staining in skin/hair/nails .

Could cause irreversible damage if exposure is in

significant quantities.

Ingestion : Fevers,Loss of appetite,chills,vomiting,jaundice,upper

abdominal pain,dark urine,anorexia

Inhalation : Respiratory trace irritation and show similar effects

due to ingestion route.

Chronic Health

Effects : Prolonged exposure could result in CANCER.

Potential mutagen.

Cardiac ischemia(deficiency of blood supply).

Damage to Liver,Kidney,Blood and Spleen

The extent of impact depends upon individual susceptibility of

exposed population.

HAZARD SYMBOLS :

RISK PHRASE :

SAFETY PHRASE :

Risk Phrase : R 45, R 39/23/24/25, R 43, R 48/20/21/22, R 51/53

R 68

Safety Phrase : S 53, S 45 , S 61

EXPOSURE LIMITS : WEL-TWA(8 hour) : 0.08 mg/m3(0.01ppm) (Reference:EH40)Short Term Exposure : 4 mg/m

3(10 min reference period)

Action Level(8 hour TWA) : 5ppb

At Action Level concentration,the employer must instigate:

Exposure monitoring.

Medical Surveillance.



FIRST AID : Eyes : Flush with water for 15 min.Get Medical help.

Skin : Remove contaminated clothing.Wash with copious

amount of soap and water.

Inhalation : Remove to fresh air.Get Medical help.

Ingestion : Do not induce vomiting.Get Medical help immediately.

STORAGE : Powder should be stored in sealed plastic bags preventing the unwanted

dust dispersion into surroundings.

Store in well ventilated area.Check compatibility matrix and store way from incompatible materials. Keep away from strong oxidant, strong acids and their anhydrides.

Display hazard symbols on the storage container.

ISOLATION : Only authorized personnel to be permitted in the bag filling station.

Entry to be regulated by swiping “Access Cards”.

Fast Action Isolation Valves to be provided.

Two valves in series to be provided and “both” should be opened to

discharge powder.

Adequate warning signs posted at conspicuous places to warn others

of the impending danger.

SPECIAL CASE

CONSIDERATION :

Personnel having increased susceptibility for harmful effects carcinogen

eg:Pregnant women should not allowed to work in powder handling area

containing MDA.

VENTILATION : Adequately engineered Local Exhaust Ventilation with HEPA filtered dust

collector and air flow indicator to be provided at bag filling station along

with natural ventilation at worksite.

The air change rate to be modulated such that dust concentration is below

WEL.

Periodical inspection of LEV by competent person.

FIRE HAZARDS &

MITIGATION MEASURES :

Plastic powder is combustible.

Use water spray,dry chemical powder.(Use only if you are trained to

do so).

Beware of hazardous decomposition products(CO,CO2,NOX).Use SCBA.PERSONAL PROTECTION

MEASURES :

Respiratory Protection : Use Half face piece filter (P100/Organic

Vapor filter) cartridge mask while handling

powder.

In the powder unloading area, use

compressed airline (externally supplied) full

face mask breathing apparatus(APF-2000).

Training should be provided to the intended

users to ensure fit efficiency.

Skin Protection : Use rubber gloves(uncontaminated area)

Use copolymer laminated gloves(type 4H)

(contaminated area)

Eye protection : Use goggles(with resistance to dust/airborne particles).

General PPEs : Flame retardant overalls,disposable

overalls,safety helmet,safety boots ,head

covers,foot covers.



MAINTENANCE : Engineering System

LEV should be thoroughly tested by competent person at least

once in 14 months.Maintain records of inspection.

Isolation devices should be appropriately tested.

Personal Protective Equipments

A PPE Maintenance program should be implemented for

methodical PPE Management.

Respiratory Protective equipments should be monthly inspectedby competent person and daily inspected by user.

Qualitative fit testing should be carried out prior to respiratory

usage.

Breathing Air Quality standards should comply with BS

requirements.

Periodic penetration test for gloves.

PERSONAL HYGIENE : Adequate welfare facility and sanitary convenience to be provided

in work area.

Eating,smoking and drinking not allowed in undesignated area.

Wash hands before intake of food.

Separate the contaminated clothing and launder them separately.HOUSEKEEPING : Work area to be kept clean and tidy.

Implementation of 5S housekeeping program.

Plastic powder should be always contained in leak-proof bags.

SPILLAGE AND DISPOSAL

MEASURES :

Contain the spill and collect the material from the floor and pack them into

designated skips.

Waste materials should be handled by authorized waste disposal

contractor who disposes the materials in an accepted

way.(eg:incineration).

Disposal measures should comply with UK Environmental regulations.

Wear appropriate PPEs while handling waste materials.

TRAINING : Operatives handling plastic powder containing MDA should be apposite

instruction and training on:

Safe handling of hazardous chemicals.

Premature recognition of health hazards.

Use of PPE and its importance.

Respiratory Fit Testing.

Personal Hygiene measures.

Fire Fighting.

Spill management.

Housekeeping Strategy

MANAGEMENT

CONTROLS :

Adequate supervisory-operatives ratio to be maintained.

Ensure competent supervision at all times while at work.

Periodic site audits to check safety compliance.Housekeeping checklist to be maintained.



EMERGENCY

PROCEDURES

An effective emergency mitigation plan should be in place.

Effective means of communicating the emergency should be in

place.eg:An alarm/siren to warn of lurking danger.

Escape routes to be identified,demarcated and to be kept clear.

Operatives to be trained for emergency mitigation procedures.

A fully fledged Occupational Health Centre to be provided.

HEALTH SURVEILLANCE : Required for operatives:

≥30 days exposure above Action level.

≥15 days dermal exposure.

Showing symptoms of exposure.

Prior to assignment in a probable exposure zone.

Judgment based on air sampling results.

Emergency exposure.

Medical examination record to be maintained for 30 years.

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

MONITORING :

Air Sampling

Regulating and periodic monitoring of dust concentration in bag filling

station by use of:

High Volume Sampler.

Personal dust samplerPreliminary Monitoring

All operatives who will be exposed to powders containing MDA should

undergo initial health monitoring to have a baseline data.Operators

previous disease history to be documented mainly previous exposure of

MDA,liver problems,skin diseases,dermatitis etc.

Laboratory test should include Urinalysis and Liver Function Test.

Periodic Monitoring

Monitoring Frequency:

Every 3 months if Exposure Limit is above WEL

Every 6 months if Exposure Limit is in between Action Level and WEL.

As per HSE,UK-Guidance to Biological Guidance Monitoring Values:

Substance Biological Monitoring

Guidance Value

Sampling Time

4,4’ Methylene

dianiline

50 µmol total

MDA/mol creatinine

in urine

Inhalation : Post shift

Dermal : Pre Shift

next day

Additional Monitoring:

Additional monitoring is required if there is change in the workplace

conditions,concentration,exposure time, change in RPEs,change in work

practices etc.

Visual Monitoring

Periodic visual monitoring of dermal exposure by in-house competentstaff.

Employee Training

Operatives handling plastic powder containing MDA should be trained to

recognize symptoms of hazardous chemical exposure at an initial stage

itself and to effectively communicate the same to the concerned.



4)

Introduction

The innate environmental hazards associated with thermoplastics manufacturing and

ancillary activities of this manufacturing unit would cause detrimental or irrevocable effects to the

environment,if not,approached,managed and controlled in a scrupulous way.To construct an effectual

environmental management system,it is imperative to run in parallel with current regulatory

requirements which helps to structure out environmental sustainability.

Drawing Parallels- (Environmental Impact) vs.(Legislations&Best Practices)

The law clearly elucidates that it is manufacturers’ responsibility to work out the pollution

control stratagem. The cumulative impact of the thermoplastic industry on surrounding environment

could be broadly delineated as to the detrimental effects on air,water&land.The extent of damage could

span from superficial damage to surroundings to far-reaching damage to flora and fauna in a distinctive

measurable scale.The thermoplastics industry uses 4,4’Methylenedianiline as an additive en-route of the

process which is identified as a polluting agent of aquatic environment(R51/53).The innate

environmental risks, characteristic to complex process and operations of a chemical manufacturing unit,

could also extend their wings of damage to surrounding ecological stratum.

The industrial activity should be well analyzed in perspective of harmful effects it can induceto our vicinity.The initial step is to analyze whether it falls into an MAH site as per COMAH 1999

Regulations.COMAH 2005 Amendments Schedule 1-Part3 necessitates stringent environmental

regulatory controls for the use of R51/53 chemicals like MDA. If the quantity exceeds threshold quantity,

the unit should be appropriately classified (Lower Tier or Top Tier) and associated regulatory obligations

should be promptly demonstrated.The detail analysis of harmful properties of individual chemicals need

to carried out and compared with table and, if applicable use the aggregate rules in threshold quantity

summation. An Environmental Policy needs to be formulated in line with COMAH addressing specifically

the ideals and methodology for major environmental accident prevention.The environmental risks could

be elucidated by The Source-Pathway-Receptor model promulgated in COMAH.

The “siting” of the facility to be critically analyzed in perspective of damage it induces to

neighboring ecological distribution.Proactive corrective actions should be undertaken to limit the

environmental disturbance.eg:Since a R51/53 chemical is stored,it is highly advisable to locate the

industry well away from a potential receptive aquatic environment(eg:river,pond etc).

In line with COMAH Regulations,a Safety Report should be addressed to concerned authority

elucidating the site location,topography,chemicals,compostions&quantities,different modes of

release,pathway of hazard propagation,potential receptive environments,potential receptors like red

data book species etc.A Qualitative and Quantitative modeling including EHI should be undertaken to

reveal all foreseeable hazards.The hazard should be further scrutinized to classify whether it is potential

MATTE.eg:If potential MDA release to the river stream could cause the death to red book data species, it

should be considered as a MATTE.

Environmental Permit should be applied appropriately in accordance with Environmental

Permitting(England&Wales) Regulations2010 and a valid permit(standard/bespoke) shall be obtained

prior to start up of the unit.Environmental Permit covers mandatory regulatory requisites and bestpractices that need to be integrated into the“regulated” facility.The appropriate regulator to be decided

as per installation categorization(PartA1/PartA2/PartB).

Noise pollution could also be caused due to equipment functioning,if sound level > 85dBA.

In consensus with ISO14001 system(EMS),the development of an environment register

covering Aspects-Impacts is the next vital rung in the impact assessment.It would help to systematically

classify and record impact of various activities of the process.

A more “generalized”Aspect-Impact-Legal resister of the manufacturing process is developed.



Applicable Environment Regulations and Best Practi

Air Water Land Noise High Medium Low

1 Storage of process materials YES YES YES If the containment is lost the material

could be dispersed to surroundings

YES REACH1907/2006,COMAH 1999,COSHH 2002,AQSR200

CHIP 2009 EP(E&W)(A)2010, PPG11,WRA 1991

2 Handling of process material in

Storage area

YES YES YES Mishandling could release in loss of

containment

YES REACH1907/2006,COSHH 2002,AQSR2007,CHIP 2009,

PPG11,WRA 1991

3 Transportation of material to thecharging zone.

YES YES YES Transport Accident would releasematerial to environment.

YES COSHH 2002,CHIP 2009 ,REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007,WRA 1991

4 Charging of materials into the

respective equipments

YES Mishandling could release in loss of

containment

YES COSHH 2002,REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007

5 Charging of MDA as an additive YES YES Loss of containment could result in

toxic dust release.MDA being a R51/53

chemical, it harms the aquatic

environment.

YES COSHH 2002,REACH1907/2006.PPG11,WRA 1991

6 Material processing inside

equipments in production floors.

YES YES YES YES Fire,Explosion or loss of containment

could release large quantities of toxic

dust.

YES REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007,WRA 1991,NAW20

7 Material transport through the

pneumatic conveying system.

YES YES YES Fire,Explosion or loss of containment


dust.

YES COSHH 2002,REACH1907/2006, PPG11,AQSR2007,

WRA 1991

8 Material processing inside cyclone. YES YES YES Fire,Explosion or loss of containmentcould release large quantities of toxic

dust.

YES REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007,WRA 1991

9 Feeding the residual air to bag filters. YES Loss of containment could release

trace amount of toxic dust to

atmosphere.

YES REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007

10 Material storage inside silo. YES YES YES Fire,Explosion or loss of containment


dust.

YES REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007,WRA 1991

11 Material Transport through vibrating

arm

YES Loss of containment could release toxic

dust to atmosphere.

YES REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007

Material Storage

Material Transit

Material Charging

Material Processing-Powder Production Area

Impact

X*Y*Z Thermoplastics PLC

Environment Aspect-Impact Register

Rudimentary Risk

CategorizationAspectsSl No Brief Description of Impact

Material Transport-Pneumatic Conveyer

Material Processing-Cyclone Section

Temporary Material Storage-Silo Section

Powder Processing-Bag Filling Station

Table 15



12 Attaching bag to filling arm. YES YES Loss of containment(due to damaged

bag etc) could result in release of toxic

dust.

YES COSHH 2002 ,REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007

13 Opening Valves to allow powder

discharge

YES YES Failure of process valve could release

toxic dust to atmosphere.

YES COSHH 2002,REACH1907/2006,PPG11,AQSR2007

14 Transferring "filled" bag to conveyor

line

YES YES Loss of containment(due to damaged

bag etc) could result in release of toxic

dust.

YES COSHH 2002,REACH1907/2006,PPG11,CHIP 2009,

AQSR2007

15 Construction activities-Thermoplastic

plant construction(Estimated Project

Cost = >£300,000).

Usage of water resources(>20cm3)

YES YES YES YES Wide range of constructions activities

causes widespread damage to

environment.

YES SWMPR2008,WR(EIA)(E&W)R

2003,PPG11,AQSR2007,NAW2005

16 Storage and handling of oil.(for

lubrication,fuel oil) >200L

YES YES Loss of containment(leak,spill) causes

significant damage to surroundings.

YES COP(OS)(E)R2001,EP(E&W)(A)2010

17 Use of batteries YES Unattended Batteries(waste) contains

hazardous ingredients harmful to the

environment.

YES WBAR2009

18 Use of vehicles inside site. YES YES Vehicle exhaust emissions and noise to

atmosphere.

YES VOSA Testing, DoT Best Practies,AQSR2007

19 Waste Management&Disposal YES YES YES Improper waste handling/management

imposes irrevocable effects of

environment.

YES EPA1990,EP(DoC)R1991,CoP(A) A1989.c.14

EP(E&W)(A)2010,RRR Best Practices,PPG11

20 Ha zardous Waste Management YES YES YES Improper waste handling/management

imposes irrevocable effects of

environment.

YES HW(E&W)R 2005,EPA1990,EP(DoC)R1991

EP(E&W)(A)2010,PPG 11

21 Working of Equipments YES YES Excessive noise,Exhaust emissions to

atmosphere(eg:generators)

YES CoPA-1974-PartIII , AQSR2007 ,NAW2005

22 Effluent Discharge to Sewer YES Untreated effluent discharge causes

severe impact to environment.

YES WIA 1991 ,TE(PP&S)R 1989,WRA 1991

EPA1990

23 Waste Management-Electrical &

Electronic Components

YES Mishandling of waste containing

electrical and electronic

components(eg:careless dumping)

YES WEEER2006 HW(E&W)R 2005,EPA1990

EP(DoC)R1991

24 Transportation of bulk process

materials to the plant by road.

YES YES YES Transport Accident would release

material to environment.

YES CDGRR1996

25 YES CCA2008

26 YES CF, REA Best Practices, EST Best Practices

27 YES ED(P&R)R2009,CHSR2010Impact on Flora,Fauna &Wildlife

Climate Impact

Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Depletion

Miscellaneous-General Aspects



Conclusion

The recognition of foreseeable environmental risks and its proactive mitigation is a pivotal

step for sustainable development.The dynamic balance between industrial progression and

environmental sustainability should be ensured during all phases of the plant life.Comprehensive

quantitative modeling and EIA studies should be carried out for this plant as it will help us to

methodically capture all potential hazards, and to subsequently instigate relevant control measures.Thecorrective measures should be drawn on lines of rigorous regulatory requisites as well as global best

environmental practices.

It is much easier to conceive and adopt changes at the design phase and modulate process &

manufacturing trajectories to tune up with sustainable objectives. This ensures the fulfillment of

company’s long terms objectives and propels the smooth sail towards various target pinnacles.

Assignment Aniesh Explosion Venting CPE206001 2[1]

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