Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1967

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1967

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION , ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYCOL Edwin L. Powell Jr .

COMMANDANT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMG Delk M. Ode n

ASST COMDT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCOL M. H. Parson

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFFMAJ L J. Herman Jr ., Editor-In-Ch iefRichard K. Tierney, EditorWill iam H. Sm ithDiana G. Will iamsJohn P. Jones

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORTHarold G. LinnHarry A. PickelDorothy L CrowleyAngela A. Akin

DIRECTOR , U. S. ARMY BOARD FOR AV IAT IONACCIDENT RESEARCHCOL Wa rr en R. W i lliams

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIVPierce L Wigg in, ChiefWilliam E. CarterTed KontosCharles MabiusMa ry W. Windham

RMY VI TION

1GESJNOVEMBER 1967 VOLUME 13 NUMBELETTERSNIGHT IS OUR FRIEND, MAJ Wi lliam W. Fraker

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CLEARED TO LAND TO FLASHLIGHTS,CPT William S. GriswoldNIGHT MAINTENANCE- PRO AND CON, CPT Malcolm BamfoTHE NIGHT I JUMPED, MAJ Allen C. BennettNIGHT MEDEVAC, CW2 Terrell R. ClarkCOMBAT NIGHT FLYING, CPT Burton H. Kap lanFIREFLYTURBINE ENGINE FACILITY PROPOSED, CPT Peter R. HarrisDIVARTY NIGHT PARTY, CW3 William R. DayNIGHT EXPEDI ENT LIGHTING, CW2 Dwight G. PalmerNIGH T AR T ILLERY ADJUSTMENT, CPT David L. ForteU-8F LANDING- GEAR UP , CPT Engle W. ScottNAVY TEST PILOT SCHOOL OPEN TO ARMY,MAJ Paul G. StringerEYES IN THE NIGHTHELICOPTERS . TH EIR SPEED LIMITATIONS,H. E. Roland , Jr.DIGEST AUTHORSPEARL S NIGHT VISION Ins ide

The mlsslou of the U. S. ARMY AV IAT ION DIGEST is to provide information of an operationfun ct ional nature concerning safety and a ircraft accident prevention training maintenance operatresea rch and development avia t ion medicine . and other related data.The DIGEST is an official Depar tmen t o f the Army periodical publish ed mon thly und er the supervof th e Commandan t, U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein are not necessari ly thoDepa r tmen t of the Army or the U. S. Army Avia t ion School. Photos are U. S. Army unless othespecifIed. Material may be reprin ted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author uotherwise indi ca ted .Articles photos and items of interest on Ar my Avia t ion are invited . Direct commuflicatiofl i s aui:ed to: Editor .iflChief U .S Army Aviatiofl Digest Fort Rucker AlabamaUse of funds for pr int ing this publication has been approve'd by H eadquarters, Depa rtment oArmy 29 Dece mber 1964.

Active Army units re ce ive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AR 320 March 62, and DA Ci rcula r 31057, 4 March 63. Complete DA Form 124 and se nd directly toAG Publica tions Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore Md. 21220. For any change in distribreq u irements , merely initiate a revised DA Form 124.at iona l ' Guard and Army Reserve units submit requirements through their state adjutants generaU. S. Army Corps commanders respec tiv ely.

For those not eligible for official distribution or who des ire personal copies of th e DIGEST , paidscriptions S4.50 domestic and 5.50 overseas are available from the Superint endent of Documents UGovernment Pr int i ng Office, Washington D. C. 20402 .


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Night Is Our riendA unit ,hat is purely daylight oriented is ask ing fortrouble because it is go ing to be in a tight bind whenforced to operate at night. t will then be too late and alot of emba rrassment can be caused by the chaos re-sulting from inadvertent night operations

N THE DEVELOPMENT ofdoct rin e for the employmentof Army aviation from our combat experiences in Vietnam, it hasbecome increasingly apparent thataviation units must have the capa b ility to conduct tactical operations at n ight under the airmobileconcept. T he successes now beingach ieved in the in ternal defenseoperations against the Viet Conghave forced the enemy to relymore and more, on cover of dark-ness to provide them wi th the tactical advantage required by theirdoctrine.

The ability to conduct internaldefense operations is not completeunless our general tactical unitsare provided with the capabilityto deploy their forces by he li-copter at any hour. Either because of reluctance of the aviation unit commanders or becauseof the successes now enjoyed inconduc t of daylight operations,many of the


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American advisors, or to a hardhit American unit, why it tookyou 6 hours and sunrise to cometo their aid. Army aviation is organized to be immediately responsive to the ground commander.Immediately responsive means justthat and is not restricted to daylight hours.

Night operations c n turn the tables on Charlie

How can the infeasible becomefeasible? Aviation commandersmust realize that this taboo aboutnight operations is a trainingproblem and not a limitation thatmust be lived with or ignoredcompletely. The training requiredcan be accomplished with no additional load placed on the unitif half of the day missions areflown at night. Look for missionsto fly at night and make certainthat these missions are necessaryand in aid of the persons supported.

because of the widespread objections voiced by the majority ofthose who participated? I wonderif the first few daytime helicopterlanded assaults in RVN were assuccessful and well executed asthe majority of them are now? Idoubt itl My point is that hadthese night operations continued,the experience gained as well asthe confidence buil t up by theindividual aviators would have resulted in night helicopter operations that would be just as effective as daylight operations.

Whether we care to admit it ornot, we continually allow ourselves to become so stereotyped inour tactics that Charlie can sit inhis tunnel and predict to the exactminute when the landing zoneprestrike will stop, when the finalrecon is made, and when theslicks will touch down. You saythat I am wrong? Look at thesequence of events on the last 20operations orders you have used.Look a little closer and see howmany times you have used thesame landing zones on consecutiveoperations in the same areas. fI am wrong, then thank yourlucky stars that you were assignedto the -unit you are in because jr4

is exceptional and so are yourcommanders.Now that I have thoroughly in

furiated most of you, I will givemy reasons for doing so and myopinion (like noses, we all haveone) 011 how an aviation unit cangradually become proficient atnight combat operations. My reasons are simply that a unit whichoperates during daylight only ismuch less than 100 percent effective and is not exercising its fullcapacity. A unit that is purelydaylight oriented is asking fortrouble because it is going to bein a tight bind when forced tooperate at night. It will then betoo late and a lot of em barrassment can be caused by the chaosresulting from inadvertent nightoperations.

This type of operation is usually initiated by a telephone callduring the best part of an enjoyable party and is characterized byvery fragmented fragmentary orders. The unit that is well trainedwill function well and the othertype uni t will be embarrassed. Amore serious reason for proficiency in night operations is thedifficulty that one encounters inexplaining to compatriots of dead

Mail runs, resupply, liaison,countermortar patrol, Firefly, beerruns to isolated compounds, orany other missions that your unitperforms in the daytime areideally suited to this transitionfrom day to night operations.Aviators will be cooler and morerelaxed because they have a reason for flying at night and because the missions are old hat tothem. They will benefit by gaining confidence and night flyingproficiency. They will become expert on night navigation. Someamong them will become fanatically in favor of night flying.

f you say, as a unit commanderor operations officer, that your unitdoes not need to do this, thenanswer these questions. How manyof the base camps or compoundsthat your unit supports can besketched from memory? Howmany can be clearly described bytheir appearance at night? Howmany of them have your aviatorslanded in at night without usinglanding lights? Can your aviatorsfly to, locate, and land at theselocations under pressure of low

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ceilings, poor visibility, and hostile fire at night? The trite expression that lives depend uponthese abilities takes on real meaning when it becomes a harshreality.Single ship missions will giveway to section and platoon missions as confidence and abilitygrow. A demand for these missions will be generated by thevery fact that you are flying missions at night. The next problemwill be arranging for a companynight operation, and here is wherethe company commander willusually be stymied. He must eitherwait until a mission of this nature is given to him or he muststir up his own. f the trainingsequence has been successful thusfar, chances are that the aviationbattalion commander has beenfavorably impressed. His wholehearted support is required forcontinued success and for execution of company sized operationsat night.

Now you must beat the bushesand find a ground unit that iswilling to conduct a night helicopter assault. Usually, it is nottoo difficul t to find a commanderof a ground unit who is aggressiveand willing to experiment, eitherfrom boredom or from professional desire to find and des troythe enemy. Once he has beenfound, we now have an integratedteam. Regardless of methods orreasons, the coordination, planning, rehearsal, and executionmust be as thorough as possibleand nothing left to chance.

Here we borrow a page fromCharlie's book. We select an objective that will easily fit our ca-pabilities. We obtain all the intelligence that it is possible to get.We use sand tables and brief andrehearse. We plan for weatherconditions that best suit us and,if necessary, wait for them. Wecontinue to refine our plans andto rehearse over and over again.NOVEMBER 1967

We have everything in our favorbefore we execute our plan, andwe have contingency plans whichwill meet all anticipated enemyreactions to our assault.We shuffle our sequence andhave our prestrike after the landing has been completed. Insteadof using a single landing zone,

we would use a wagon wheel pattern with ou r objectives at thehub. We would then split ourforce into squads and platoonsfor better control in the darknessand land them on each spoke ofthe wheel. They attack down thespokes, which are canals, roads,trails, and dikes leading into thehub. This will disperse our helicopters while landing, make itpossible to have all helicoptersland simultaneously in smallerlanding zones, and confuse theenemy while blocking his escaperoutes.Areas between the spokes are tobe covered by armed helicopterswith a Firefly or helicopter flareship for on-call illumination. sthe assault force nears the hub,they are drawn closer together andreduce the possibility of the

enemy escaping. They are closertogether and can shift more rapid-ly to counter breakthrough attempts. A reserve force will orbitnearby to be committed if the situation requires reinforcing alongany spoke.

At a s.elected point along thespokes. the assault force wi 1 halt~ d the out of sequence prestrike

can now be made on the objective.This will allow time for finalassault preparation while theenemy is being further confusedand reduced. At this point, thereare two courses of action: one, wecan attack; or two, simply consolidate our encirclement of the objective and wait for daylight.Course of action two is for unitsnot quite convinced about nightoperations.Simple? No. Problems? To thebest of my knowledge, the aboveprocedure has not yet been attempted. However, remove thehelicopters from the plan and youhave a Ho Chi Minh specialthat has been presented nightafter night for a number of years.Night is our friend whom we haveyet to meet.

lanning or night operations must be as thorough as possible


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learedTo Land To FlashghtsIDEBOARD 6 this is Playboy22, two miles out. Request

landing instructions. Over.This is Sideboard 6. Enemy

situation negative, wind 270 at 5landing azimuth 225, field elevation 95 feet, land to flashlights ina T. You are cleared to land.

As the pilot of Playboy 22 youare now entering one of the mostdifficult phases of a night landingto a minimum lighted area: liningup your aircraft on the properlanding azimuth. Other aspectsof the landing are hairy enough,but when your landing headingis correct, about half your prob-lems are over.6

aptain William S Griswold

Consider these ailments of animproper landing azimuth. Mostimportant of all, landing areasare set up keeping the wind direction and barriers in mind. If theazimuth is 225, barriers probablyprevented a heading of 270 frombeing used. So when you use anazimuth other than the one given,you are not guaranteed barrierclearance on a normal approachangle.

Another difficulty is that thelighting device used on the groundwill not appear to be correct. AT viewed from as much as 20 offwill not look like a T bu t like anundefined blob of lights. f flash-

lights and/or a glideslope are usedthey will be invisible, unless youare just about on the money, dueto the narrowness of their beams.

Here are some suggestions forarriving on the desired landingazimuth. We'll assume you havea functioning RMI (radio magnetic indicator), which cuts themental gymnastics to zero. f youwant to land 225 and from yourpresent heading it would be easierentering a base leg, roll out on aheading (315 or 135) so that theCaf tain Griswold, an ex Armyavzator, has transferred to theU S. Coast Guard.

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landing azimuth (225) is either atthe 3 o clock or 9 o clock positionon your RMI. The 3 o clock position puts you on a right base; the9 o clock position puts you on aleft base. Then, when the lightsfrom the T wink at you throughthe side window, a 90 tum tfinal will put you within a fewdegrees of your desired 225 0 Aminor correction or two will lineyou up exactly, and you can divert your a ~ t e n t i o n completely tothe approach.

Let s assume that a downwindleg would be easier to enter. Set thelanding azimuth (225) in the 6o clock position. Then roll it tothe 3 o clock spot for a right baseor 9 o clock for a lef t base, givingyou a 90 turn to base, and proceed as before to final.

This leaves the straight-in approach, where I offer the followingtwo suggestions: f the landingarea is visible far enough out toget set up on the proper azimuth,plan your straight-in approach,making alignmen t corrections assoon as possible. However, thecase may not be such and yourfirst sighting of the area may betoo close in to salvage a straight-inapproach. f so, turn to the handiest downwind leg and execute apattern as discussed before. The

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main point is to allow enoughroom t get lined up properly andavoid those last minute headingchanges on short final.

Should you be so unfortunateas t have an inoperative RMI ornone at all, adding or subtracting180 or 90 is one solution. Thisisn t too bad on cardinal headings, but most of us have to takea little time getting most reciprocals. And I assure you, it s worthit when you prevent a loused uplanding to flashlights.I doubt that there is an aviatorin the sky who doesn t face land-

M ANY CASES of smoking bycrewmembers, maintenancepersonnel, and passengers in andaround aircraft on the groundand during takeoffs and landingshave been reported. In one casea pilot and his crew were seencooking their rations over an openflame in the rear of a UH-l.

AR 95-1 prohibits smokingwithin 50 feet of an aircraft on

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ing to a mInImUm lighted areawi th some degree of apprehension.Perhaps using this method of arriving on the proper landing azimuth will simplify things andreduce some of the uneasiness.

As stated before, coming in onthe proper heading will eliminatemany problems and enable thepilot to concentrate on the task ofmaking a smooth approach tthose awfully dim lights. So giveit a try the next time you re outat night. It ll work whether youhave a T of flashlights or a 10,000-foot runway. .......

the ground. t prohibits smokingin an aircraft during all groundoperations; during and immediately after takeoff; during fueltransfer operations; immediatelybefore and during landings; anytime gas fumes are detected; andwhen oxygen is being used. It isthe aircraft commander s responsibility to see that these rules areenforced.

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IKE TO GET quick reactions? Want to be known asa route-step? Enjoy seeing repercussions from both up and downthe chain of command? Proposenight maintenance, step backwait-and quite promptly all thesegood things will come aboutguaranteed After all, there arealways 17 reasons why it won'tworkl

Sure it's done There's absolutely nothing new about it. Nearlyevery commander and maintenance supervisor has done it.Many times it is the only way tokeep operationally solvent. Often8

Captain alcolm amford

night or two-shift maintenance isprofitable immediately after aperiod of heavy or sustained operations, when there are component changes and an accumulationof minor discrepancies to work off.Usually at this point, reduced aircraft availabili ty will be the indicator pointing to night maintenance consideration.

Some factors bearing on thesituation are: mission of the unit;status, training or operational, reserve or committed; facilities;level of maintenance; labor force,military jcivilian; and security.Many more considerations will

make themselves known as youlook into the program.For this discussion, let's makea few reasonable assumptions.

You are a maintenance supervisor in a field maintenance detachment, supporting an airmobile company. The bulk of theoperation is conducted duringdaylight hours. Equipment logbooks contain a good quantity ofwriteups that involve, primarily,manhours. Aircraft availability isslowly approaching the minimumCaptain Bamford recently retiredfrom the Army



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acceptable level. Aborted or delayed missions are beginning toshow up due to pilot squawks onaircraft. Maintenance personnelare putting out on a normaldaily scheuule.

Time to hi tch up the trousersand move out, isn't it? Now backto the old drawing board.Since you can't fly and maintain simultaneously, the bird andthe mechanic must be joined whenthe mission allows i t - in this case,at night. Now I'm not saying thatthe mission should be flown regardless of aircraft condition. I'massuming that maintenance hasn'tslipped th t much f it has, you'realready in trouble (and I'm suresomeone has invited your attention to it ).

Many aspects of life in the unitare affected during night maintenance operations. The administrative load is less during the maintenance working hours. t is surprising how seldom the phonejangles at night. The personneloffice, PX, cleaner, barber shopand others are closed. You havepotentially cleaner, more productive manhours.

On the other side of the ledger,consideration must be given tosafety precautions, increased supervision and morale. Sleep is difficult for many people during daylight hours, especially during theheat of the day. Aside from personal considerations, this can havean adverse effect on workmanshipand safe practices, which in turnpoints up the need for tightersupervision. Available hot coffee,soup, and sandwiches in a cleansheltered area can take the stingout of the morale problem to alarge degree.

How about the daytime maintenance requirements? A small crewcan be kept on a day shift to han-NOVEMBER 1967

dIe minor maintenance, do theadministrative work, requisitionand follow up on parts.

Perhaps now we should alsolook over the modified version ofnight maintenance, the two-shiftsystem. Thought should be givento overlapping the shift for continuity. Supervisors and mechanicshave the opportunity to communicate and coordinate shift activitiesto keep the work moving. Whoknows, they might even discussbusiness?

f after careful evaluation, youhave settled for night work, ashort conference with your sup-

ported unit CO and his organizational maintenance supervisors isin order. A coordinated effort onthe part of all concerned will as-sure the desired results .

In closing, let me add a wordof caution . You may well findyourself running out of workwithin a short period of time. Aircraft availability up, shop equipment up to snuff, and aviatorsflying "solid citizen" aircraft witha little more peace of mind. fyou now may be considering fulltime day maintenance.o what's new? We've been do-ing THAT for years

Available refreshments c n take the sting out of night work


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The Night I JumpedW ELL, WHADAYA knowit did open. For somereason this was my first thoughtwhen my descent was slowed bythe opening of the parachute. Iknow that the possibility that theparachute would not open hadn'tconsciously entered my mind before this moment. f it had, I 'msure I would have hesitated longerbefore jumping, but when thatengine quit on the O-IA my onlythoughts were to get the door offand get out as quickly as possible.It was too dark to see the canopy above me. I felt rather thansaw the most beautiful sight I'dever e x p ~ r i e n c e d The feeling hadbeen with me for about an hourthat this mess I was in was goingto end in my having to bail out.I'd run out of experience, whichwas considerably lacking andwhen the O-IA ran out of fue]the foremost thought in my mindwas to leave the aircraft.

It was a dark miserable night,and the mistakes I had made earlier led to this situation. I hadmade a vow that from now on Iwould doublecheck weather atevery opportunity. I didn't carehow many so-called milk runsI would be assigned in the future,I vowed I'd always refuel at everystop to have that little extra totake care of unusual circumstances.

I remember running my handalong the instrument panel to cutthe switches and rolling in someforward trim. I forgot the magswitch and also felt the headsetpull off as I went out the door.This was the climax to a long listof errors that began accumulatingon takeoff for the return triphome.10

Major llen C ennett

I'm not a qualified jumper. Theonly training I'd had was a briefing in flight school on how theparachute should fit and wherethe D ring was located. Oh yesinclude the quick briefing on howto inspect for first echelon maintenance.I don't mind admitting that alittle apprehension crossed mymind when I first pulled that Dring and nothing happened. Actually this turned out best for mybenefit. I was about two steps outthe door when I pulled the Dring. f the parachute had openedthen, it probably would havewrapped itself around the seat Ihad just vacated.

The second time I pulled theD ring it was all the way to fullarm's length and things startedhappening the right way. Theopening shock was really mild towhat was expected. This can beattributed to little or no propblast from the aircraft and the factI had been tightening up the parachute harness for the past 30minutes. In my anxiety I hadtightened the leg straps until circulation was almost cut off.

Then things started happeningfor the worse again. I startedswinging back and forth in theparachute. I worried about howthis swinging was going to affectme when I hit the ground. Istarted pulling on risers above mebu t the swinging back and forthincreased if anything. In fact theoscillation was so bad I beganworrying about tipping the parachute over. I decided to leave wellenough alone and settled back formy approach. I heard the aircraftcrash and this was the only sound

I heard for some time on thatcold dark night.The first iridication of arriving

near the ground was when treebranches started slapping my legsbody and face. I immediatelystarted groping and scramblingfor something solid to hold. Luckily my descent ended with mehanging in the tree and unscratched. I managed to climbover to the tree trunk and releasethe parachute harness. I decidedit was time for a break beforegoing any further.

Now I'm not admitting I wasnervous but after three attemptsI did get a cigarette i My flashlight and coat were in the aircraft.When I flipped the cigarette tothe ground, I was able to guessmy height in the tree as about 6feet. The tree was an oak withnumerous branches so the processof getting down wasn't difficult.After encounter ing briarpatches; barking, snarling dogsand a barbed wire fence I managed to find a farm house whoseoccupan agreed to take me to atelephone. In just minutes, statepolice were at my location anddelivered me to the nearest military installation. After undergoinga thorough examination by a medical doctor it was determined thatI wasn't physically affected bythis ordeal.I've talked with many experienced paratroopers about the procedures or lack of procedures Iused that night. In addition, manyarticles and manuals have beenresearched and the most concreteconclusion I've reached is that IMajor ennett s now serving inEthiopia



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At night with zero visibility,assume the landing attitude ssoon as the parachute is openAccording to the proposed revision to TM 57-220, to assume theproper landing attitude the jumper must: Check his direction of driftand slip in the opposite direction(into the wind). Lock the risers to his ches tand press his elbows to his sides. Keep his head erect, eyes onthe horizon. Keep his legs straight and hisknees unlocked.

Keep his feet and knees together, and the balls of his feetpointed slightly towards theground. Moderate muscular tension must be maintained in thelegs, as they must absorb a significant portion of the landing impact. The jumper must avoid becoming s iff or tense.

With reference to the first twopoints, it is highly recommendedthat the slip not be executed unless the winds are above 15 knots.f a slip must be taken, the jumper should reach high on a set ofrisers and take a vigorous slip into

the wind by pulling the riserswell down to his chest. This slipshould be taken at approximately100 feet above the ground andheld until contact is made withthe ground. Airborne students receive detailed training in this12

maneuver, but it is not recommended by non-airborne qualifiedaviators unless the winds are high.

The landing is the critical partof any jump. This is where mostinjuries occur. Most experts agreethat night jumps are easier on thebody because you have less tendency to stiffen. On day jumpsyou ll have to force yourself notto look at the ground as t approaches.Protect the face and throat areaif landing in trees All articles andmanuals I ve read state that landing in trees should be avoided i fat all possible. I m sure that Iwould have been injured that

night if I hadn t landed in a tree,especially with the high winds(42 knots) reported in that area.But don t try catching hold ofbranches or stopping your descent.Keep your feet and knees togetherwith hands under opposite armpits, palms facing outward. Holdyour elbows high and rest yourhead on arms. Again, that camefrom TM 57-220, Technical Training of Parachutist.

The last point I d like to stressis know your equipment I m notspeaking of parachute packing.Those boys know their stuff; youcan trust them. I mean know howeach item works. For example, ifI had landed on the ground 1 dhave been dragged by the chutefor sure with those winds. I didn tknow exactly how the quick release worked and t took me a fewminutes to get out of the parachute harness. Know each featureand if necessary operate it onceor twice to make sure you doknow how it works.Again, avoid emergencies by being an expert yourself. f you doencounter an unusual situationknow what and how you re goingto react and know your equip-ment



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MI TM DEV C

CW2 Terrell R. Clark

W E HAD TWO UH.IBs stationed at QuangNgai for support of the 2d ARVN Divi-siDn and surrounding outPO sts.At 2200 hours on March 20, 1966 a call was

received at the tactical operations center (TOe)from the American advisors at Minh LO ng out.post. A gasoline stove had exploded, and a mem-ber of the team suffered secDnd and third degreeburns from the waist up. t was feared theadvisDr might die from shock before mDrning,sO TOe requested us to make an immediatemedevac.

I was one of the standby pilots for the nightilo my cop ot and I quickly planned our missiDn

to outpost. Minh Long sits in a small valley25 miles SSW Df Quang Ngai. We estimated theweather to be 2,000 broken with about 4miles visibility with haze and grGund fog. TheGutpGst was estimating 1,800 Gvercast with hazeand nO fog.I had flGwn to Minh LGng a hundred times inthe past few mGnths and knew it was nGt an easyGutpGst to get to during good weather, let alGneat night with low ceilings and reduced visibility.The real prGblem was that there was Gnly Gneway intO and out Gf the valley that we CGuld evenconsider using at night. This was alGng a riverthat flGwed Gut of the valley through a narrGWpass about 3 miles lGng. The sides of the passwere about 2,800 feet MSL, SO gGing Gver themwas Gut Gf the questiGn. However, abGut halfwayup the pass was a hilltGP that went to only1,500 MSLBefO re we left, we talked with the people atthe outpost and arranged for them to start fir-ing flares fO r us when given the word.

By flying at 400 feet we located the rivershGrtly after takeoff and followed it up to the,mGuth Gf the pass. When we reached the pass,we climbed as high as possible, which was 1,800feet MSL due to the Gvercast. At the same timeNOVEMBER 1967

we told the GutPO st to start the flares coming.As the pass was almGst a straight line, we hadnO difficulty in seeing the flares.As we continued intO the pass, the ceilingstarted drGpping, so we approached the hill atabout 1,650 feet MSL. t appeared as thGugh weWGuld clear the hill by abGut 100 feet when thelights went out The outpost said they had runGut Gf flares at the mO'rtar tubes, but they weregetting more right away. It prO bably wasn'tdark fGr mGre than 20 secGnds, but it seemedlike years As the next flare ignited, we werepassing Gver the hill with about 100 feet tospare. We all heaved a sigh of relief and prO -ceeded intO the O utpost where the patient waswaiting fGr us Gn the pad.Rather than attempt a return through thepass, elected to make a spiraling climb Gut ofthe valley. I entered the Gvercast at 1,700 feetwith 40 knots of airspeed and sustaining 1,500fpm rate Gf climb. After we passed through3,000 feet MSL, rolled Gut Gn a heading of090 to take us Gut of the mGuntains and plannedto climb until we brGke out on tGp, or reached6,000 feet. This WGuld put us well above anymountains in the area. At 4,500 feet we brokeGut on tO P and turned on CGurse fGr the MarineHGspital, lGcated abGut 20 miles north GfChu Lai.

After unloading our patient, we to ok off andreturned to Quang Ngai by using the NDBIGcated at the airfield. The doctO r accO'mpanyingus on this missiO n reported that had the evacua .tion been postponed until morning, the patientwould not have survived.CW2 Clark s with Tactical Instrument Flight 3Dept of Rotary Wing Training Ft Rucker Ala.

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HE JUNGLE and roads ap-pear to be a pool of blackness;the lights from the ammunitiondump glare from below. All isquiet and you are bored with themonotonous 2-hour night missionin your Bird Dog. To pass thetime away, you slowly climb from2,500 to 12,000 feet, smoke a packof cigarettes, and then return toyour original altitude. You noticehow many more radio stations youare able to pick up at altitude andthat the Philippine music is com-ing in loud and clear and is sorelaxing.

After all, you had a very fullday at the beach under that glar-ing sun-and you wish you hadn'tbroken your sunglasses a weekago. The coffee you had with theMohawk crews tasted good, andthe two packs of cigarettes haven'tphased you in the least. The mealsare the same day after day andthe tropical climate isn't verystimulating to your appetite, soyou have been skipping yourmeals this past week.

At the end of the mission youreport All quiet in war zone Dand crawl into your bed unwashed, exhausted, cursing theplumbing system. You toss and14

turn the rest of the night andwake up drenched, averaging onlya couple of hours of sound sleep,to start your day again and placean X on the calendar remindingyou that you have only 180 daysto go in Vietnam. Two nightslater you are missing in action,having gone down in war zone D.A careful analysis of this avia-tor's past missions revealed nu-merous negative reports from hiscombat missions. The activity ofthe Viet Cong was well known inthis area; yet he failed to noticeany.

The main reason for so manynegative reports is that this avia-tor was actually blind; that is, hehad developed night blindness.He could not have seen the enemyeven if he flew his aircraft 200feet from them.

The Army aviator has a generalunderstanding and appreciates hisdaytime visual capabilities. Afterall, he wouldn't be an aviator ifhe didn't pass those stringen t eyeexaminations. His visual acuity is20/20. This means that he cansee at 20 feet what most peoplesee at 20 feet. However, at night,visual acuity is reduced to lessthan 20/400. This means that at

night he can see at 20 feet whatmost individuals in daylight cansee at 400 feet.

Often the night aviator does notprepare himself properly for nightflight. He may take off, fly andland without incident, but visu-ally is blind outside his cockpit.Not being dark adapted, he wouldsee a lighted match at 3 miles in-stead of the 26 miles distance hecould see if he were perfectlydark adapted.

An explanation of the bio-chemical changes that take placein the eye at night would not pro-vide any practical knowledge. In-stead, I will l ist some prerequisitesone should follow before attempting a night reconnaissance mis-sion. Know your territory. Fly overyour section during the day. Identify all manmade objects.

Sleep soundly for 6-8 hours.Fatigue decreases your visual acu-ity at night. Eat four light meals duringthe day and some chocolate barsbefore your flight. Low bloodCPT Kaplan is a resident in aero-space medicine Drexel Instituteof Technology Philadelphia Pa.



17/68

sugar: decreases night VISIOn. Asupplemental supply of vitamin Amay be necessary because of poordietary habits. However, see yourflight surgeon before attemptingany self-medication, including as-pirin and APes.

No alcoholic beverage of anykind 24 hours before flight. Alcohol acts on the nervous system asa depressant (as little as two beersor two ounces of whiskey). Smoking should be cu t to aminimum. Tobacco in any formcontains carbon monoxide andnicotine which interfere with theoxygenation and nervous tissuesin your body, decreasing visualacuity at night by as much as 20percent. Dark adapt your eyes by staying in a dark area for a least 30minutes before takeoff. Wear your avia tor sunglassesconstantly during the day. Avoid,especially in tropical climates,glare, bright sunshine. Subjectstested have a higher threshold toillumination than those who arenot exposed to glare, reducingtheir night visual capability. Do not go above 5,000 feetsea level in altitude. Low oxygentension lowers night vision. MostArmy aircraft do not have oxygensystems. Once in flight, scan and pausethe area with your eyes (fig. 1 .Remember your day visual systemis blind (fig. 2 and you have nocentral vision, so if you want torecognize anything pause andsight with your peripheral visionand not your central. You will notbe able to see any color, so youmust recognize unusual movements, silhouettes, shades of grey,or contrast. f exposed to white light,close one eye to keep it darkadapted.

f you will follow these 10 simple rules you will not be blind atnight-and might see the enemybefore he sees youNOVEMBER 1967

0 ~ ~ I: 4

@@ ~ ~ ~ ~

ROUTINE METHOD OF SCANNI NG. THE EYESMUST BE KEPT MOVING FROM POINT TO POINT.TEXT AV. PHYSIOLOGY J A.GILLEY 1965)

Figure t Figure 2~ P E R I P H E R A L FIELD

~ - - - - - - - - - C E N T R A L BLIND FIELD

CENTRAL BLIND SPOT AT NIGHT. YOU MUSTSIGHT WITH YOUR PERIPHERAL VISION INORDER TO SEE AND IDENTIFY AN OBJECT.

15


18/68

FIR FLYWhen Firefly began pinpointing V sampans inbright beams of light, enemy loss reports beganI t read like this: 30 blasted out of the water, twofleets destroyed, 68 sampans sunk, large fleetof 30 and 40 footers smashed

searchlight built at Ft Rucker with the center lenscovered with a yellow fog filter

I N THE BEGINNING of theVietnam conflict, the domina-tion of ground areas was a seesawaffair. During the day the landwas largely controlled by friendlyforces, but at night the Viet Congtook over. Under cover of dark-ness, they could move their troopsaround and resupply t ~ m at will.

Then the Lightning Bug

(now called Firefly) appeared,and the VC's tremendous advan-tage of being able to resupplythemselves at night was takenaway. This nickname for a newcluster searchlight device for heli-copters came from American ser-vicemen who were reminded offireflies as the helicopter's search-light blinked on and off.

t Ft Rucker viation School instructors discuss the merits of a locally built Firefly . . .

With the Firefly pinpointingthe enemy sampans in a brightbeam of light, reports of nighthelicopter operations to clear VCtraffic on the waterways began toread like this: 30 blasted out ofthe water, two fleets destroyed,68 sampans sunk, large fleetof 30 and 40 footers smashed.

One report stated that more


19/68

than 65 enemy sampans loadedwith enough s u p p ~ i s to supporta battalion-sized operation wassunk. Another reported that whilesinking 38 sampans several secondary explosions occurred, indicating that the boats were carryingammunition or other explosives.The next day the river was strewnfor two miles wi th wood shreds,oil slicks, blasted cloth, and alongthe bank were twisted motorparts.

Losing supplies this way is adoubled-edged blow to the VietCong. The equipment and supplies have traveled hundreds ofmiles only to be lost just as theyare being delivered. The efforts ofmany people supporting the VCare cancelled out at the most effective time and place.

Development of the Firefly began in May 1965 when the ArmyConcept Team in Vietnam received from an international engineering firm plans for a cluster oflights that could be mounted ona helicopter for use in night operations. The light was built withlocal material and turned over tothe 197th Aviation Company, theonly armed helicopter company

in Vietnam at that time. (SeeSearchlight for Helicopters in

the U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST, January 1966.) The 197th,now the 334th, immediatelystarted developing tactics for using the new light.

An accurate evaluation of theeffectiveness of the Firefly cannotbe made at this time because onlythe Viet Cong know what it hasreally done to them. However, an. indication of its effectiveness isshown by the fact that after July1965, Viet Cong operations in theARVN III Corps area fell to anew low. The 25th ARVN Infantry Division enjoyed its calmestperiod of the year and the numberof Viet Cong deserters who turnedthemselves in more than doubled.

These deserters stated that lackof ammunition, weapons, food,and medical supplies, coupledwi th the unacceptable risk of concentrating or moving any significant sized unit was a direct resultof the sinking of many sampansand the loss of men, equipment,and supplies.

The light developed in Vietnamhas seven C-123 aircraft landinglights on a metal frame. The

frame can be mounted on anyUH-l helicopter and operates onthe aircraft power supply. It hasapproximately 1 2 million candlepower, can be swiveled in almostany position, and the light beamcan be adjusted from pinpointto floodlight beam width. It isnormally mounted on a UH-larmed with the M-16 arma-ment system consisting of four7.62 mm machineguns and fourteen 2.75 folding fin aerialrockets.When the Firefly went out on ahunt it was accompanied by a

Frog armed ship. It is armedwith a combination M-5 jXM 3armament system, consisting ofthe nose turret mounted 40 mmgrenade launcher carrying 150rounds of ammunition and 242.75 aerial rockets. This armament system has proved to be amost effective sampan destroyer.

The last member of the groupis the Big Stick, an unarmedhelicopter with a door-mounted.50 caliber machinegun. It carries1,400 rounds of ammunition andseveral spare barrels for the machinegun. This has proved to bea most effective sampan perforator

In Vietnam a battalion commander briefs General Harold K Johnson and his st ff on the Firefly


20/68


21/68

Besides the hunt and seek func-tion, the light also can be used asa rescue light or a work light. Forinstance, the helicopter can hoverover a wrecked aircraft while res-cuers remove injured victims oras mechanics make emergency re-pairs.

45' ; '

Soldiers who have worked un-der the Fort Rucker light say it isno brighter than i f they wereworking under the sun, and theglare is no worse. At 800 to 1,000feet, the light on the ground isabout like that of a lighted foot-ball field. When closed tight thelight's beam will extend a quarterof a mile in diameter on theground. Or when opened up, itwill cover a wider area, depend-ing upon the height of the heli-copter. f fog is present, amberfog light lenses are installed by aspring hook attachment to eachlamp, reducing glare and cuttingthrough the fog.

A drawing of the Firefly built t the U S Army Aviation School

All the materials used in theFort Rucker light are available toaviation units. Units interested inobtaining more information orblueprints needed to build such alight should contact the Depart-ment of Tactics, or the U. S.ARMY AVIATION DIGEST,U. S. Army Aviation School, FortRucker, Ala. 36360.

Pop Cutchen says that once an

idea like this gets started it's hardto stop. He says all sorts of modifi-cations and new ideas crop up.Reaching into his private filingcabinet (his inside coat pocket)he pulled out two small photo-graphs of another light under de-velopment. This one had a stockand a handle like a gun.

This light, he said, can beused just like a gun, either in anaircraft or separately using a bat-tery pack for power. It has 1 mil-lion candle power and uses 3,150

A light th t can be used like a gun below) is under development t the Aviation School

watts. It weighs only 19 poundsand will operate on the batterypack for 33 minutes.

A sentry could use one to in-vestigate suspicious noises. Or hecould use it in connection with a'snooper scope' which can bemounted on top. When he located 'something of interest with the'scope' he could then turn on thelight for a better view.

We are still testing this onebut indications are that it will, ork satisfactorily.

19


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23/68

sions that lecture-type instructionis no substitute for practical instruction, and that a military construction project should be developed to provide a facility forconducting practical instructionon operational turbine engines.DOMT has started action for a19-cell turbine engine runup facility to be constructed at GuthrieArmy Airfield close to other maintenance facilities.

The 9 engine cells, wi th control rooms, will be comprised oftwo T53-L-3j7 OVal engines, fiveT53-L-ll/13 UH-I engines, andtwelve T63 OH-6 engines. Theengine cell will house the engineand a loading device mounted ona portable stand and be connectedto a control panel located in theadjoining control room.

Noise levels will be maintainedat a low level, internally below92 decibels in the frequency rangeof 150-300 hertz. This is necessaryto prevent instruction withoutundue interference and to locatethe facility conveniently with respect to other classroom facilities.This will require sound attenuation and loading devices that operate at a low noise level. Thecontrol rooms and classroom willbe air-conditioned and the enginerooms ventilated to provide goodfree air circulation. Safety considerations dictate that the exhaust be routed out of the celland up to a level above roofheight.

Turbine engine simulators(2A27 trainer) as presently usedby Fort Rucker are available;however, they are expensive. Asimulator comparable to the facility proposed would cost approximately 3,300,000, and would notprovide the realistic and practicalstudent training available withthe proposed engine runup facil-Captain Harris is with MasterPlans and Facilities upport Divi-

s o n ~ Director of School S u p p o r t ~Ft u c k e r ~ AlaNOVEMBER 1967

ity. Partial aircraft fuselages couldalso be used for this training;however, they would require rotors or propellers for engine loading and would require extensivepaved parking areas with securetiedowns. Safety problems, availability of the aircraft fuselages,climatic weather conditions, andlighting problems for nighttimeuse have ruled against this typeof training device.

Operating turbine engines areessential for training turbine engine mechanics. The engine runupfacility as proposed is preferredin lieu of an actual aircraft forinstructional purposes because ofsafety no rotors or propellers),economy builtin safety deviceswill protect the installed equipment), prolonged equipment life(foreign particle ingestion will beminimized and the equipmentwill be protected from the naturalelements), better use of studenttraining time double shifting,nighttime operation, and operations under adverse weather conditions will be possible), andbetter trained students (smallclasses with individualized instruction in a controlled environment).

The proposed facility will beused by 800 in-resident studentsbeing trained in the 67AIO BasicMaintenance Course, and 568 inresident students in the highermaintenance skill levels (67H20,67N20, 67V20). All maintenancestudents will be given instructionin the correct procedures for starting and stopping the turbine engine and preservation of the engine for shipment.

Basic maintenance students(67AIO) will be initially familiarized with an operating turbineengine and given practical instruction in normal and abnormaloperating temperature and pressure ranges, vibration analysisand related equipment, minortroubleshooting, and use of theJet-Cal Analyzer.

Higher maintenance skill levelcourses (67H20, 67N20, 67V20)will train mechanics on an operating turbine engine in hot-end disassembly, inspection, repair, reassembly, and operational adjustments- location, removal, inspection, replacement, and operationaladjustment of accessories and components. These advanced maintenance students will also be givenpractical instruction in fuel flowadjustments, bleed band adjustments, engine trim, and troubleshooting.

Troubleshooting inst ruct ionwill be accomplished by introducing faults most likely to be encountered in normal operation.Students will be required to sys-tematically analyze an operatingengine, locate the fault, and eithermake necessary adjustments or re-place the discrepant item.t is difficult to assess the impact that this facility will have onstudent morale and motivation,but it will be significant. With therapid turnover of enlisted maintenance instructors and, in somecases, relatively inexperienced instructors, this facility will make asignificant contribution to thetraining level of Army aviationaircraft mechanics.he small building below is the onlystructure available for classroom work

2


24/68

Night P a r t y ~A decision was made to move a battery of artillery within range of the embattledtroops to provide support throughout the night This required a night move

A LTHOUGH WE will speakin some generalities this ar

ticle is intended to cover one mission: tactical movement of a fieldartillery battery in a combat situation under the cover of darkness.

For many of you this will beold hat but some may benefitfrom reading of this experienceif and when they find themselvesfaced with a similar situation. Although we are to deal with a single mission I feel we should review some of our previous training and circumstances whichbrought us to this mission.

The CH-47A helicopter hasbeen used for managemen t andresupply of the artillery organicto an airmobile division. It doesperform many other tasks; yetthis is still its primary mission inthe airmobile division today.

With testing of the airmobileconcepts completed in the fall of1964 and the airmobile division areality it was decided that theChinook was sound maintenancewise and reliable enough to perform its mission. Also it was feltaircrews and artillery personnelhad achieved a degree of proficiency in their training that theyalong with the Chinook could becommitted to a combat zone insupport of the airmobile division.

Upon arrival in Vietnam the22

CW William R Day

mission of the Chinook in the 1stCavalry Division remained tmove and resupply the artilleryas required. We continued oursupport to them and maintainedconstant liaison always strivingto improve our support. As combat experience was gained weemployed new and improved techniques to better accomplish ourmission. In the next few monthswe flew all types of missions inthe division. We flew in daylightand darkness whenever there wasa requirement and with a greatdeal of success.

After six months in combat westill had not had a requirement tomove a major element of the artillery from one firing position toanother during the hours of darkness. During these months we hadmoved them many times and hadresupplied around the clock butmovement of the firing battery hadalways been during daylight hours.

This mission in its entirety hadto be planned and executed during the night. To set the stage forthis I would like to give you someof the events that led to the decision t re-deploy this artillerybattery.

The 1st Cavalry Division had ascout company out in search ofthe enemy and during the afternoon light enemy contact was

made on several occasions. Justbefore darkness they encounteredheavy enemy contact. As thingshad developed during the afternoon they were in contact withthe enemy out of range of supporting artillery and other friend-1y forces and night was approaching.

The size of the enemy force wasstill unknown and with darknessfalling it would be difficult toreposition the supporting artilleryand bring them within range fora fire mission. Also if a reserveground force had to be committed it would be even moredifficult t airlift them into a position where they could give thescout company some relief. So adecision was made to extract thescout company. They were tobreak contact with the enemymove to a selected clearing in thetrees near their present positionand stand by for an airlift out.

One of our lift UH-1 battalionsassembled a flight of Hueys andrequested one Chinook from ourbattalion for the extraction. Whenthey arrived at the pickup zonethe scout company was to moveto the clearing in the trees forCW Day s with Advanced In-strument Flight i v i s i o n ~ Dept ofRotary Wing T r a i n i n g ~ F t R u c k e r ~Ala



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27/68

the west and that small amountof light that we needed so badlyhad disappeared. Although theskies were clear we had a considerable amount of smoke and hazemaking navigation and flyingVFR almost impossible. We hadrequested flares be dropped overthe landing zone causing constant illumination. After takeoffand reaching our en route altitude we could see the flares forabout 15 to 20 miles thus solvingour problem of navigation to thelanding zone.

As we approached the landingzone radio contact was made withthe pathfinders and we were informed that a C-47 was droppingflares directly over the intendedlanding zone. Enemy situation atpresent was negative landingwould be to the west and sometrees were still standing in thelanding zone. The operator alsoinformed us they had a light gunthat would be flashed on requestand could be seen about 5 milesout in the direction of landing.

From the time we could see thelight gun being flashed we couldalso see a clearing in the treesfrom the flare illumination. Noweverything iooked good and wedid not foresee any difficulty completing the approach and land-ing. We were loaded to maximutngross weight and particular atten-tion had t be given t aircrafthandling during this time.

As we continued our approachagain the pathfinder reminded usof the scattered trees still standingin the landing zone. When wewere within a few feet of the treetops we switched on a landinglight and saw some of the treesthat were still in the landing zonestanding about 100 to 150 feethigh. Some were directly in ourflight path but we were able toturn and slip and descend between the trees to complete thelanding.

Because of the approach angleNOVEMBER 1967

in the darkness and the deceptiveness of the trees in the landingarea a great effort was requiredof both pilots. Even so we lostone ship from the mission due toan overboost on the engines ontlie first landing.Our first six sorties were completed now and we returned tthe forward supply point for refueling. Back at the refuelingpoint we had requested and gotten a searchlight erected andbeamed straight up in the sky.For our return flight this lightserved as a navigational aid andalso gave us a reference so wecould maintain VFR flight.

During our return flight to therefueling point we decided toproceed with the mission with alldeliberate speed. As two aircraftwere serviced and refueiing completed they would continue withthe mission. As it turned out weonly had four flyable aircraft afterthe first flight. One was down foran overboost and another hadother mechanical troubles.

After refueling we returned tothe pickup zone and got our loadsfor the second flight. Consideringall the conditions that we wereoperating in we felt the missionwas progressing well. We approached the landing zone thesecond time to find it in a dark-ened condition. Radio contactwas established with the path-finders and we were informedlanding instructions were. thesame but without the aid offlares. The C-47 had e x p e n ~ hisload and was gone for resupply.

With the benefit of the previouslanding we made a successful approach to the darkened landingzone and returned to the forwardsupply point for refueling. Therewe found we had only two Chinooks flyable due to mechanicaltroubles. We had two sorties remaining and they were picked upand delivered to the landing zoneby those two left flyable.

As we departed the landingzone having completed the mission and on the radio informingthe artillery battalion commanderof this we could see light break-ing over the horizon in the east.Having worked the past fewhours in complete darkness dustsmoke and haze this was a sightto behold and some relief for theaircraft crews that were still in theaIr.

The success of this mission asany other rested with the aircrews of this flight and the artillery personnel. Just what actionshould be taken when you receivea difficult mission cannot be determined bu t we can do somethings to better prepare ourselves.To mention a few we can workhard to perfect our own flyingskills learn the capabilities of ouraircraft and other crewmembers.We can increase our knowledgeof the operation of the groundelements that We support and besure they know and fully under-stand their mission as pertains tothe air movement. Also we shouldincrease their knowledge of capabilities of the aircraft they areworking with.

t goes without saying experience does help; and on this mission every pilot had from 7 to 1years in Army aviation and a lotof that in cargo type aircraft.Even so back at our forward command post over a cup of coffeewe all agreed we had possibly justcompleted the most difficult mission of our aviation career.

When the crew from thedowned Chinook came in a whilela ter and men tioned they hadbeen receiving artillery supportsince about 0230 hours althoughneither they nor the infantry hadseen or heard a Chinook flyingthey all knew we were ou t thererendering any support we could.This certainly added to the feeling that we had accomplished ourmission with a job well done.

25


28/68

Night xpedient Lightingtheir bird mushes uncerem.oniously into the landing zone theengine rpm going down down and their skids coming up up

R EDHAT 6 this is Viper 23,3 miles north of your stationfor landing.""Roger 23, we'll put out a light

for you."Lieutenant Nighthawk leans

into his shoulder harness as hescans the darkness ahead of him."Where is that confounded LZ?

DIRECTION OF LANDING

i0 9 P A ~ E S o

26

III PACESIII6IIIIIII

1 PACESIIIIIIIIIII6Figure 1

CW2 Dwight G Palmer

I know it's out there somewhereamong all those trees ""Viper 23, this is Redhat. You

just passed over us. See the light?"Lieutenant Nighthawk puts his

Huey into a 180 0 turn and retraces his flight path. "There it is,lieutenant," calls the copilot, WIJoe Newcomer.

"Rog Joe, I got it," answersLieutenant Nighthawk as hecatches sight of the pinpoint oflight on the ground.Simultaneously a radio callcrackles in his earphones, "You'reright over us 23."

Lieutenant Nighthawk makesanother turn and begins his approach down the long corridor ofdarkness toward the feeble pointof light. "Hey Joe, am I cockeyedor is that light moving downthere?"

"Looks like that Yo-yo with thelight is running around the LZ."

"Man, I wish you'd hold stilldown there.""Holy mahogany trees, lieuten

ant, pull up ""Pitch, pitch "There is a long moment as theheavily loaded Huey strains for

altitude. Lieutenant Nighthawkand Mr. Newcomer si t transfixedas their bird mushes unceremoniously into the landing zone, the

engine rpm going down, down,down and their skids coming up,up, up - right around their earsCrunch

The next morning, by thedawn's early light, LieutenantNighthawk and Mr. Newcomerstand sheepishly by the wreckageof their bird. With downcast eyesthey watch the "Redhat" messsergeant valiantly attempting topour the cargo of fresh eggs intoa bucket The only choice now isto scramble them.

This accident was caused by thesimple fact of using minimumlighting that was just plain toominimum It all boils down to anoptical phenomenon called "autokinetic illusion."

f you si t in a darkened roomand look at a small point of lighton the wall, you will find that,even though the light remainsphysically stationary, your eyessee the light as a moving point.However, if you place two lightsside by side in the same situation,they will remain steady to yourvision. This same phenomenoncan occur in dark LZs; thereforea single light for night landingsis out. PeriodCW2 Palmer s with the Employ-ment i v i s i o n ~ Dept of TacticsFort Rucker Ala.



29/68

Personnel at the U. S. ArmyAviation School use a system ofminimum lighting that is very ef-fective and can accommodate single ship or formation landings.The secret is simply that of arranging lights or light reflectingmaterials in a geometric patternat the intended touchdown point.

For single ship night operations, the basic lighting patternis the T. The T is formed byplacing 5 lights in the figure ofthe letter T, wi th the crossbar ofthe T indicating the landingheading see fig. 1 .Lights for the T can be smudgepots like the highway department uses), tin cans filled withsand and fuel, or flashlights tapedto sticks. These expedient lightsshould be anchored to the ground,and i fire pots are used, a fireguard should be on hand. Firepots will burn quite vigorouslywhen subjected to a dose of rotorwashl

When placing a T of flashlights especially the hooded Itype), bear in mind the approachangle of the aircraft. Don't placethe beams horizon tal to theground or shining straight upward. An angle of 10 to 20 isbest, keeping in mind that anormal stagefield approach is onan angle of 8 to 10. Sit ting onan angle of 10 to 20, the lightsare visible much farther out onthe approach path.

Another effective method oflighting taught by the U. S. ArmyAviation School is use of a panelilluminated by vehicle headlights.The panel is placed at the touchdown point and secured to theground. It should be pitchedlike a pup tent, so it will reflectlight from the headlight beam.The vehicle is placed at a 45angle to the panel with the headlight beams focused on the panelsee fig. 2).Vehicle-panel marking can beNOVEMBER 1967

IRECTION OF L NDING

DIRECTIONO

L NDING

27


30/68

ight xpedient Lightingexpanded to accommodate a nightformation landing by adding asecond vehicle and two additionalpanels. To land a V of 3 thevehicles are placed on a 45angleto each side of the point panel,and the two additional panels areplaced, one in each headlightbeam, a distance of two or threerotor diameters from the pointpanel (see fig. 3 .

Remember that cloth panelsmust be pegged down to the

ground. Piling rocks on the corners will not hold them downwhen a Huey hovers nearbyl Apoint for the aviator to keep inmind: approach the panel at anangle of 45 to the headlightbeam. It is very disconcerting forpersonnel in the truck when ahelicopter attempts to fly downthe headlight beam and snips offthe vehicle's radio antennas

Flare pots or flashlights areplaced in the inverted Y con-

figuration for night formationlandings (see fig. 4). In this configuration the stem of the Ypoints out the direction of landing. The lead ship of the formation lands to the center of the Yand his wingmen land to theirindividual lights placed 45 toeither side.

It is wise for the aviator to landhis aircraft 10 meters or so backof the fire pots. Landing directlybehind the fire pots will causethem to burn very brightly, possibly blinding the pilot, or it willblow them out completely, resulting in loss of ground reference ata rather critical momentl

On all minimum lighted landings it is important that theground personnel determine thesafest axis of approach, takinginto consideration the longestaxis of the LZ, the wind and obstacles in the flight path. Fromthis information a landing azimuth is determined and passedon to the pilot. f for some reason the pilot does not follow theprescribed landing azimuth andvaries it a few degrees either way,he will find that the relativelysimple pattern of lights will become an almost unrecognizablehodge-podge.According to the book, themost common errors associatedwith minimum lighted approachesare misunderstanding the lightingconfiguration on the ground andfailure of the aviator to correctlyalign the aircraft on the desiredapproach heading. Therefore, theaviator and the ground crewshould be thoroughly familiarwith the lighting configurationtha t is to be used.

The best watchword for nightminimum lighted approaches isprobably caution. Please don'tconfuse it with complacency.f things don't look just right on

approach, remember you have twodefensive weapons: the landinglight and the go-around.

28 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST .


31/68

NIGHT RTILLERY DJUSTMENT

THE HOURS OF darkness belong to the guerrilla.

This is one of the teachingspounded into the head of thecommunist terrorists. They aretold that the night affords theshroud of concealmen t they needto stage sneak attacks resupplytheir units and generally operatewith complete freedom.

Lately this situation s changing, although not drastically atNOVEMBER 1967

aptain David L Forte

present. The OV-I Mohawk provides the combat commander withinfrared and radar surveillanceas well as night photography capabilities. Various USAF Navyand Marine aircraft provide similar capabilities. Night illumina-tion to outposts under seige afterdark rescue missions and othernight operations is furnished bya variety of Army Air Force andNavy fixed and rotary wing air-

craft. Some helicopters now carrylarge light clusters that illuminatean area on the ground the size ofa football field. Gradually thesituation is changing. Graduallythe night s being taken awayfrom the insurgen

One of the old tried, true, butCaptain Forte is with the Employ-ment DivisionJ ept of TacticsJFt Rucker Ala

9


32/68

A 105 howitzer lights up the night when fired during recent exer ises

still popular methods of denyingthe guerrilla freedom of movement during the night involvesthe cooperation between aviationand artillery. In this method an0 1 Bird Dog is usually used because of its endurance, but anyaircraft that can fly slowly can dothe job as well, including theHuey and the new Cayuse.

Let s follow a typical surveillance and artillery adjustmentmission using this method andsee how it s done. In this particu-lar case, the S 2 of a Vietnamesesector was visited one night by alittle Vietnamese man who livedin a VC infested area. He was oneof the many loyal South Vietnamese forced to live among theViet Congo And like many ofthem, he reported what he heardand saw whenever he could.

He told the Vietnamese intelligence officer that he had overheard two VC talking and theyhad said that on the followingnight their company would moveto a new assembly area. The movewould be made at night to take

advantage of the darkness.The Vietnamese S 2 passed the

information t his counterpart,the S 2 advisor. The advisorchecked to ensure the accuracy ofthe information and passed it tothe S 3 advisor to be acted upon.

After a careful map reconnaissance it was decided that theproper spot to hit the VC was ata crossing of two trails. The terrain was such that the VC wouldhave to use this crossing. It wasan ideal crossing because at thispoint there was a sort of clearingand the trails could be seen fromthe air.

t was decided to use an 0 1 tokeep the crossing under surveillance and to direct artillery fire.Consequently, the commander ofthe nearest 0 1 flight section wascalled in for conference.

The pilot assigned to the mission was already familiar with thearea. He was also experienced indirecting artillery fire. Even so hestill had to reconnoiter the areaaround the cross trails and, ofcourse, register the artillery. This

is a ticklish job; the pilot mustdo both in such a way that theVC won t suspect what s up.Before he left on this chore hehad himself briefed on the location of the 105 mm howitzers thatwould do the firing, the registration points, concentrations, knownpoints, reference lines to be usedin making corrections, and thelocation of the cross trails thatwere to be fired on.

He also had himself thorough-ly briefed on the tactical situation, paying particular attentionto the location of friendly troops,local friendly villages, and otherno-fire areas.Lastly, he checked into the communication details to be surethere would be no trouble gettingthrough to the Fire DirectionCen ter (FDC).In making his recon he tried togive anyone on the ground theimpression that he was just another aircraft flying back andforth looking for movement below. He did pass over the area ofthe cross trails but seemingly gave

30 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


33/68

it no special attention. In registering the artillery, he had them fireon registration points some distance from the cross trails. Thesewere so located that it would be asimple matter to shift onto thetarget.Satisfied that he would have notrouble locating the cross trails inthe dark and directing the artillery on the target, he now turnedhis attention to preparing his aircraft for the night mission. Hetook extra pains to see that hislittle Bird Dog was in good shape,giving special attention to thelanding lights and other nightflying aids that are sometimesoverlooked on daylight flights.Lastly, he removed the 2.75rocket tubes from the shackles andreplaced them with MK-24 flares.

Fortunately the weather wasgood and the pilot was able tforget this aspect of flying whilemaneuvering his aircraft into theair. At 4,000 feet, he leveled offand about five minutes away hereduced power and started hisdescent. He contacted the FDCand found that they were readyto fire on his command. When hewas sure he was over the targetarea and at an altitude of approximately 2,500 feet, he releasedhis first flare. Having blacked outthe aircraft as soon as he left thefield, now the harsh light almostblinded him. But below he couldsee the target.

About 30 people were runningdown the trail and jumping intothe bushes by the side of the trail.The pilot immediately called forfire on the target and heard theFDC say, Shot.In seconds there was a burst ofartillery below. Previously it hadbeen agreed that, unless otherwiseinstructed by the pilot, the firstround would be a white phosperous for rapid identification of itspoint of impact, and that HEVTwould be used in effect. Theround was a little to the left cfNOVEMBER 1967

t.he cross trails but the range wasalmost perfect.The pilot asked for right 50,repeat range and fire for effect.He was rewarded with an immediate Shot.

In the meantime, the flare hadburned out. The pilot climbedslightly and dropped another. Thelight revealed that a number ofVC had tried to take advantage ofthe temporary darkness to runpast the cross trails and into anarea where there was better cover.Suddenly the trail and trail junction became engulfed in fire andsmoke that just seemed to comerolling in from nowhere. Thepilot saw several bodies fly up inthe air and drop back down intothe fire. The artillery fire was [ ointense that the little Bird Dogshook from the concussion of theincoming rounds.

The pilot ended the missionafter four volleys had been fired.He dropped a third flare butcouldn't see much. A thick blanketof smoke and dust covered the target area. He thought he couldsee two bodies lying in a smallclearing, but again they mighthave been logs. But the artillery

ForeignON 24 September, the 145thCombat Aviation Battalion,sometimes referred to as America's Foreign Legion, marked itsfourth birthday as the oldest combat aviation battalion in the Vietnamese war zone. Its battalioncolors were unfurled at Tan SonNhut Air Base in 1963.

The 145th, originally composedof the 118th and 120th AssaultHelicopter Companies, lays claimto the Foreign Legion titlesince from its inception it hasnever served in the continentalUnited States nor in any of its

was dead on center and covereda wide area.This is only one example of

how the night is being taken awayfrom the guerrilla. Others are using different aircraft and equip-ment. Sometimes the illuminationof the targets is by searchlight,illuminating shells or clusterlights. More sophisticated meth-ods allow the observer to see without visible light.Even the old method describedabove using a Bird Dog aircraftcan be varied to make it moreeffective. f two aircraft are available, one can be used to drop theflare while the other is used bythe observer. This allows him tosee the target from the side instead of directly overhead. Sometimes it is possible to have thetarget fired upon before the flareis dropped. This keeps the guerrilla from being forewarned.Even better methods are beingdeveloped. Some are on the drawing board while others are beingtested. At the present time theMohawk is being updated withnew and better intelligence gathering equipment. Other improvements are sure to follow.

Legionoverseas possessions. The 118th isstill a part of the 145th, but the120th has been reassigned to another unit.

To round out the current organization, the 68th, 190th, and335th Assault Helicopter Companies have been assigned. Alsothe 334th Armed Helicopter Company, the U. S. Army's only gun-ship company, is a member of the145th. A fixed wing reconnaissance capability is supplied by the74th Reconnaissance AirplaneCompany.

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F \N 23 FEBRUARY, 1967, I\:...J was conducting a transitiontraining: tJjght in a U-8F 'at FortR i c h a r d s ) n , A l a s k a .

We took off from BryantAAFat about 2330Z and proceeded toAnchorage International Airportto make touch-and-go landings.The student completed one landing and then I demonstrated one.Then several approaches weremade, with waveoffs from the. tower because of other traffic.

On the last approach, when thegear was lowered we noticed that

the nose gear indicator was "intransit and the light in the gearhandle was on. The gear was thenraised an 4e nose gear t i ~ l i n d i -cated I l s i t . A go-aroundwas i n i t i ~ t e a a n d we proceeded toBryant AAF. En route to Bryantwe recycled the gear then ex-tended the gear manually, bothwith negative results.Several passes were made pastthe tower at Bryant with the gearfirst raised then extended, and onepass was made while porpoisingthe aircraft. Personnel on the

ground and in the tower reportedthat the nose gear was in-transitand swinging slightly.

e later learned the landinggear components work on the jackscrew principle (similar to a scissors jack for automobiles) andtherefore bouncing and porpoising was useless. f the gear itselfis extended but the position indicator switch on the gear is stuck,bouncing may unstick the switchso a down-and-Iocked conditionwill show on the indicator. Thiseffects ,the indicator switch only,


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GE R UPcott

and in no way will alter the position of the gear.

After a radio conversation withthe USARAL U 8 standardizationpilot, we removed the panel between the copilot s seat andrudder pedals and found the drivechain intact and working properly. During this work, we changedseats. Bryant then notified Elmendorf AFB of a gear-up landingand requested they commenceblowing snow on the runway.Upon radio contact with Elmendorf tower, we advised them that

we would like the snow started at1,000 feet past the approach endof rUI .way 05 and .continued fot4,000 feet.Several more maneuvers wereattempted: abrupt pullups anddives, dives with sudden appIicacation of full flaps and gear, sudden stalls, slips, and hard yawspumping the rudder pedals. A.s alast effort, we made a gear-downapproach to runway 33 at Elmendorf and attempted to jar the nosegear down by bouncing the maingear on the runway. After all at-

tempts the nose gear still indicated in-transit and we decidedthat we would have to land gearup.

We then began to prepare theaircraft for the gear-up landing.Loose gear Was secured, the doorsafety chain unhooked, navigationradios were turned off, and weran through the g e r ~ u p landingprocedure several times. DuringCaptain Scott s with 12thviation Company FW)., 19thviation Battalion, PO Seattle98731.


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Navy Test Pilot School pen To rmyHE NAVAL TEST PilotSchool is one of four schoolsof its type in the free world.

Graduates of the school are members of the astronaut team andare involved in major aircraftdevelopment programs. Armygraduates are currently conducting evaluations of the CH-47B,the V-21, the XC-142, the X-22,and the HueyCobra.Graduation marks the completion of 8 months of intensivetraining in aircraft testing, whichhas included approximately 455hours of academic instruction plusllO hours of flight testing. Evaluations of many types of jet andreciprocating engine airplanes aswell as helicopters have gone intotheir training. Army students completed a 6-week jet transition program in the Navy T-IA airplanebefore starting the academic program.

The academic program providesthe test pilot with the technicalbackground of flight testing. Withthis knowledge, the test pilotcombines test data with experience to evaluate the aircraft sa t ility to perform its intendedmission under operational conditions.Classroom work fills half ofeach day, while the other half isdevoted to the test flight program.Technical courses include basicmathematics, calculus, mechanics,technical report wri ting, and aerothermodynamics. Aircraft performance is discussed in courses covering jet engines, instrumentation,and flight performance. The flyNOVEMBER 1967

aior Paul G Stringer

ing qualities of the aircraft arediscussed in classes in longitudinaland lateral direction stability andcontrol and dynamic stability forboth helicopters and fixed wingairplanes.

An interesting facet of the stability and control phase is a seriesof flights in a variable stabilityB-26 airplane which is providedby Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories. This airplane has beenmodified by installation of a computer which manipulates the control surfaces of the airplane inresponse to control movements bythe pilot to simulate many different aircraft.

The manner in which the airplane responds to the pilot s control movements is dictated by theinstructpr through a control panelconnected to the computer. TheB-26 with its computer respondssimilarly to any airplane from alight attack aircraft to a massivetransport such as the C-5. In thisway a pilot has an opportunityto observe and evaluate the effectsof different characteristics on hisability t control the aircraft.Future plans of the school lookforward to a variable-stabilityhelicopter to perform this function in the VTOL realm.

The final test of knowledgegained during the course is provided by the Navy preliminaryevaluation which each student accomplishes during final weeks ofthe school. In this evaluation thestudent flies an aircraft which hehas never flown before and writesa report covering the flying qualities and performance of the air-

craft. He is allowed a maximum of6 hours or four flights to gatherdata for the report. The completeness of these reports is a tributeto the long hours of preparationand analysis performed by thestudent and thorough instructionprovided by the school.

Nine Army aviators are selectedeach year to attend the Navy TestPilot School. Army aviators in thegrade of lieutenant colonel andbelow are eligible for consideration. Those selected for andentered into the program incur afour year service obligationwhether or not they successfullycomplete the course.Aviators selected to attend thecourse normally have completeda tour in Vietnam. To meet prerequisites of the school, an applicant must have completed collegealgebra, physics, and calculus, bedual rated, on active duty with acurrent instrument rating, andhave been a rated Army aviatorfor a minimum of three years. Although a college degree in engineering is not required, it isdesirable.TC 350-53 covers complete information concerning the NavyTest Pilot School. Applicationsare made to the aviator s careerbranch and must include a transcript of college credit s and a copyof the aviator s DA Form 759.Those selected to attend are notified by their career b r a n c h ~Major Stringer completed NavyTest Course Class 45. He s nowattending the Command and Gen-eral Staff College Ft LeavenworthKansas.

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H UMAN EYES HAVE many qualities on a parwith mini skirts and windy corners. Intelligentand robust males, including emperors and linebackers, have been drawn to the altar by the magnetism of flirting and promising eyes. Through aningenious arrangement of rods and cones, the sameeyes are equipped to recognize colors, shapes, anddistances under the right lighting conditions

Our nocturnal friend, the owl, on the other hand,comes equipped only with rods and lives in a colorless, near-sighted world, but his eyes register lightwhen the average human sees only the darkestshade of jet blackOwls have two seeing advantages over humansthat put them far out in front after dark. First,they re more used to night operations. While apprentice owls probably have to be shoved into nightflying (who doesn t?) to start, they think nothing ofit after they ve completed their checkouts. Darknessbecomes their natural habitat.

36

The second advantage s in the structure of their

the following 8 pagesprepared by the

United States rmy Board forviation A ccident Research


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EYES N THE NI HT

eyes, pretty much like your own from outwardappearances. They have a pupil-lens arrangementto focus on an object and let light through to forman image on the back of the retina. This retina hasa mass of very small brain nerves which transmitthe image for information and action to whateverportion of gray matter that ought to know about it.The difference between you and the owl is in thekind of nerves in the retina. Yours has two varieties - CONES and RODS. The cones do most ofyour daylight and illuminated seeing. They registerdepth and color, but are generally insensitive todim lighting and see little or nothing in the dark.Your rods, when properly adapted to darkness andnot subjected to white lights, do most of your nightseeing. They are very sensitive to low intensitylight, but tell very little about color and depth.Owls, who go about their pm activities with onlyone type of seeing nerve, the rods, can't help beingnocturnal hot rocks. Long habit and speciallyadapted vision make night flying second nature tothem.

Not so the human being-

Half LightTo ark

Two OH-13 pilots were assigned a flight to movetheir helicopters from landing zone to a safe areaat dusk. The flight was in mountainous terrain andthe route selected required flying through a mountain pass.Pilot of lead OH-13: As we approached thepass, I main tained the lead and he fell back intrail to allow me to check the route and pass beforegoing through. I told him I was going to fly overthe road. The pass was open and I flew through it.The ceiling was about 100 feet, with 3 5 miles visi-38

bility I told the other pilot that i he had anydoubts about making it through the pass to abortand not try it.

After flying down the road for about 1,000 meters,started a left orbit to wait for him. He started

transmitting, saying, 'I don't know, I don't know-'or words to that effect. Before I could advise himto abort, I saw an explosion . . . .

What had the weather been like from the LZto the pass?There was a heavy haze, lifting to form a cloud.

The ceiling was too low at the north pass, so wedecided to follow the highway to the other pass.Were you flying in formation?N0 we were not in any type of formation. I hadfinished refueling first and was the first to take off.

He followed soon after . . .Did you have any trouble seeing the ground?There was no problem with ground contact. Iwas flying about 50 feet above the trees and follow

ing the road.';What happened when you got to the pass?When we reached the pass, I saw that it wasopen, called the other pilot, and told him I wasgoing through.What was the weather like then?The ceiling was not well defined, maybe 100feet. It was still that haze lifting to form a cloud

bank. The peaks on both sides of the pass were inthe cloud bank, but the pass itself was clear. I continued to follow the road right through the pass.

What did you do after you saw the explosion?I flew back to the pass and landed in a clear

spot just off the road. My passenger jumped outand ran toward the pass. There was a convoy coming through the pass, so I got out and flagged themdown and used their radio to report the accident.

How much light was there when you wentthrough the pass?When I reached the p ss} it was half light} butwhen I came back and landed it was dark.

What time was it?About 1930.Did you have any lights on?I had turned on my navigation lights early,



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but turned them off because of the reflection onthe haze and bubble of the aircraft.

The helicopter was destroyed and the pilotkilled. The investigation board found that the at-t ~ p t to ly through marginal flight conditions ina helicopter not equipped for instrument flying wasthe cause of the accident, stating: The loss ofground reference due to darkness, haze, and mistresul ted in the crash.

oorizonFlight surgeon: Two days prior to this accident,we had a tail rotor failure on one of our helicopters

aboard the ship. The aviation safety officer went tothe ship to obtain statements from the crew aboutthe tail rotor failure. For some reason, the investi-gation proceeded beyond statements to the pointthat the aircraft commander felt he must demon-strate the hazards inherent in flying off and on acarrier at night. Takeoff time was 2245 TheyNOVEMBER 1967

o

wls have two seeingadvantages over humans thatput them f r out infront after darkthe difference is in thekind of nerves in the retina

came onto the deck from a lighted area, went tothe aircraft, and got in their seats.

The crewchief asked if he should go alorig. Theaircraft commander replied, 'No, I'm only going toly around the ship and take off and land threetimes to show him what it s like to ly off a ship atnight.' The aviation safety officer flew as pilot.

The pilot had some difficulty in getting his seatbelt buckied. The crewchief used a flashlight to

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Y S IN TH NIGHT

assist him. His inertia reel was faulty in that itremained in the locked position. He remarked thathis seat belt and shoulder harness were very tight.

The aircraft commander ran the engine up to6600 rpm. There were no lights on the ship, exceptfor small bow and stern markers. The red panellights were on. The pilot set his altimeter at zeroand his artificial horizon at level. We do not knowwhat the aircraft commander did. The artificialhorizon on the pilot's side was defective. The aircraft commander told the pilot to walk through thetakeoff with him. The . pilot lightly grasped thecyclic and collective, and had his feet resting on thepedals. The aircraft commander brought the aircraft to a 5-foot hover and the deck officer signaledclear to take off.

The aircraft moved forward and the pilot wentimmediately to his instruments. About 10 secondsafter takeoff, he felt a slight shudder which hethought was translational lift. Then he experienceda mental flash and felt as if he was tumblingthrough water. He did not feel that he was unconscious.

He released his seat belt and surfaced, panickedmomentarily, but soon came to his senses. He thentried to automatically inflate his life vest, but waseither too confused or the wire was too strong. He

40

the pilot never felt th tanything was wrong

How much did thefl shlight affect his

dark adaptation?

was too confused to manually inflate his vest. Hethought he had pen flares in his pocket, but laterlearned he had left them on the ship. He

Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1967

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1967