St. Thomas Aquinas and the Individuation of Persons

by Montague Brown

In a world in which scientific materialism dominates the commonperson's view of the universe and in which millions of people live undervarious kinds of socialism and statism, we who have a heritage of respectfor individuals might weIl ask on what this respect is based. Just what is itthat makes us individuals? And is there a reason why individuals ought notto be treated merely as chance configurations of atoms or as members of asocial order that transcends them? I believe that a study ofthe thought ofThomas Aquinas can help us in answering these questions.

The answer will involve two stages. First of all, it is necessary todetermine what it is which is the basis for our individuality. The standardThomistic answer is to say that it is our particularized matter. This,however, I think is insufficient, for it fails to show why people have adimension ofindividuality not attributed to granite boulders, or maple trees,or sheep. Another option is esse or existence. Although this can be applieduniversally to all dimensions ofreality in a way that matter cannot, it, too,fails to specify why it is that personal individuality differs from that ofotherthings. A third answer, one which can be found in the texts ofAquinas andwhich I think is the correct answer, is the rational soul. This first stage ofthe discussion will itselfinvolve two parts: one will look at these possibilitiesin the light of the intrinsic principles of the human being; the other willconsider the human being in the light of extrinsic ends, particularly theperfection of the universe.

The second stage of the essay will involve a consideration of how thedignity of persons depends on their individuality and why it is wrong torefuse to recognize and honor individuals. This done, we should have somejustification for the respect we give to individuals, and renewed strength towithstand materialism in its metaphysical and social n1anifestations.

I

The first consideration is to discover what is the intrinsic principle ofindividuation in persons. The standard answer Aquinas gives to the issueof human individuality is to say that human beings are individuated by

29

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matter. However, it is not our materiality in general that individuates us,for Aquinas insists that the essence of the human being includes bothrational soul and body.l To have a rational soul as the form of the body iswhat it means to be a human being; we all have such a composition. Webelong to the genus animal because of our living and sensing materiality;we are placed in a species of animals by our form, the rational soul. We areunique members ofthe species because of our particular matter, that is, ourindividual bodies. According to the doctrine as stated, differences betweenpersons depend on quantitative and materials factors. One person differsfrom another because ofthis flesh and these bones. We are of one species byour soul and its information of sorne body; we are unique by having quanti­tatively different bodies.2 As Aquinas sums up this thesis on individuation:"Matter is the principle ofindividuation for all inherent forms.,,3 But whatabout persons? Surely we are unique in a way that is not merely dependenton having different bodies. There is not just a quantitative differencebetween uso Human beings are unique in a way that cabbages and crocodilesare not. Matter, as the principle ofindividuation, does not account for this.

One cannot deny that matter figures in our individuality. Certainly;individuation is tied up with the presence ofmatter in our essence. It is onlybecause there is matter (and not just intellectuality) in our essence that wecan be members of a species. Matter when signed by quantity indicatesindividual instantiations of rational animal. But to say that matter cancarry the whole load of explaining human individuality is to say too n1ucl1.Examining the things ofthe universe in themselves and not, for the moment,in their relation to others, one finds that the only time matter comes closeto explaining individuality is in the case of inanimate things, like differentpieces of quartz or different hydrogen atoms. In them quantity pretty muchdoes sufficiently explain differences ofidentity, why one is one and anotheris another.

But this kind of explanation will not work even for plants and animals,never mind human beings. Individuation, it is true, is only possible withinliving species because matter is part ofthe essence. Ifthere were no matter,each individual would be its own species, like the angels. But the individu­ation is actual beGause the continuing existence ofthe kind is only throughpropagation. This is why there are individuals within the species: the

1 For an extensive treatment of this point, see Armand Maurer, "Form andEssence in the Philosophy ofSt. Thomas," Medieval Studies, 13 (1951): 165-76.2 Aquinas calls this principle of individuation, which is quantitatively uniquematter, signate matter (materia signata), De Ente et Essentia 11, 6.3 " ••• materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus."ST 111, 77, 2. There are innumerable other texts in which Aquinas calls matterthe principle of individuation. Among them are: De Ente I, 6; ST I, 3, 3; SCGI, 21, [4]; Comp. Theol., 154.

AQUINAS MD INDIVIDUATION 31

survival ofthe species requires it. The form ofthe thing is such as to demandthe continuing production ofindividuals for its own continued existence.

In the case of human beings matter appears even less sufficient as theexplanation of individuation. Individual human beings do not continue tolive on'only, or even most importantly, by propagating the species (althoughthis is one way that we do so). Each human being is, in a way, forever; forthe rational soul, at least, cannot be destroyed.4 Thus the explanation ofhuman individuality lies more in the soul than in the sequential existenceofmaterial instantiations. And so our bodies, as important as they are, arenot the sole or even the most striking element in our individualit~ We aremore individualized by our souls than by our bodies.

A second option for individuation which can be discovered in the writingsof Aquinas is that central metaphysical principle esse, that is, existence.5

Without existence nothing would be at all: and if there were nothing, thereobviously would be no principle ofmatter which might serve in one way oranother as the principle of individuation. This fact that there is a world atall is what we call creation; and God creates a world ofdiversity and relation.At the core of every created thing is esse which is its most fundamental act,its own existence in its dependence on the Creator. Each thing, as directlydependent on God for its existence, is thus radically individual. "Accordingas things have existence, so they have unity and plurality.,,6 Each thing hasits own unique relation of dependency on God and possession, as gift, of aunique existence. However, granted that all things are radically individualinsofar as each is related in a unique way to God, the giver of all existence,the question we began with still remains unanswered: are human beingsindividuated in exactly the same way as all the other things of our experi­ence, or is there something in human persons which accounts for the dignity

4 How rationality implies immortality will be explained below.5 Addressing this issue in his article, "'Alteritas' and Numerical Diversity in St.Thomas Aquinas," Dialogue (Canada) 16: 693-707, David Winiewicz concludes:"Matter is, indeed, a principle of individuation but, more properly, it is only aco-principle. Being (esse) is a prior cause of diversity than matter" (pp. 704-05).James B. Reichmann, in an article entitled "St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan,and the Created Person," New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 1-31, notes that "esseis the reality which renders a created being absolutely incommunicable" (p.30).6"Adhuc, secundum quod res habent esse, ita habent unitatem et pluritatem."Comp. Theol., 71. Ed. Leonine Commission (Rome: 1979) Opera Omnia, 42:104. All references to this work below are from this edition. EIsewhere, St.Thomas says explicitly: "It [the distinction of things] is not on account of thediversity ofmatter as a primary cause; ... non sit propter materiae diversitatemsicut propter primam causam." SCG 11,40 [2]. Ed. Leonine Commission (Rome:Desclee & C. - Herder, 1934) p. 130. All references to this work below are fromthis one volume edition. Later, in chapter 45, we read that is God who is thefirst cause of everything, and that his primary effect is esse. See also ST I, 47,1, and De Potentia 111, 16.

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ofwhich each is possessed and which we immediately respect? Aquinas saysthat in human beings, sensation is specifically different than in the otheranimals, for it derives from the rational soul.7 Our intellectuality colors allour activities. So, too, does it color the issue ofour individuality. And whileit is correct to say that esse individuates us (as it does all tI1ings), this doesnot tell us much about individuation of persons as distinguished fromindividuation of other animals, plants, and inanimate things.

There is a third option for what individuates human beings, one for whichSt. Thomas himselflays the ground by compelling arguments: the rationalsoul.8 Aquinas says in many places that the human soul is a substance; thatis, it exists, in some wa~ on its own.9 It is not merely the form ofthe bodythe way, for instance, the soul of a pine tree informs its cellulose. It has anactivity of its own in which the body does not share, and therefore it canexist without the bod~

The activity in question is, of course, knowing. Knowing is always oftheuniversal and the timeless. One knows, for example, that a mountain is nota valley, or that a goldfish is not apond; and one knows this will be truewhenever and wherever mountains and valleys or goldfisl1 and ponds exist.Now one could only know the timeless and universal by an operation thatis itselftimeless and universal, and so by reflection we understand that theintellect's operation is unbounded by space and time. It is immaterial andnontemporal. But only an immaterial thing can have an immaterial oper­ation. Therefore, the rational soul is immaterial and thus not limited to abodilyexistence. It is a substance in its own right, able to exist on its own.The soul does not require another substance in which to exist the way anaccident does. Nor is it bound inextricably to matter as a material form (saythe form of a mushroom or a mouse) is; for if it were, it could not haveintellectual knowledge.10 To know something is to be that other thing

7 De Pot. V, 10, ad 4.8 Henry Veatch makes an allusion to this point about angels and human soulsbeing self-individuating, but passes it off as unimportant for his study, which isof "such substances as there are in the natural world," for which matter is theprinciple of individuation. "Essentialism and the Problem of Individuation,"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 46 (1974):54-73, p. 65.9 ST I, 75, 2. See also SCG 11, 51, 55, 65; De Pot. 111, 9, 11; De Anima I, 14; DeSpiritualibus Creaturis I, 2.10 St. Thomas makes a crucial distinction in ST I, 75, 2, ad 1. When he says thatthe human soul is subsistent, he means that its being is not being in another asan accident or as a material form. However, it is not complete in its own specificnature, for it is not a thing, but the fonn of a thing-the complete human being.Aquinas is ever careful to redress the balance between these two surprisingconcurrent features of the human being: knowing and materialit~ Knowingimplies an immaterial activity which requires an immaterial agent; but thehuman being is not an angel. To be human is to be a profound and mysterious

AQUINAS MD INDIVIDUATION 33

intentionally, to have its form while retaining one's own form and existence.Material things can receive another form only by losing theirs in substantialchange, that is, only by ceasing to be.

It is in retaining our own form and existence while having other formsintentionally that we are self-conscious. The soul can reflect on itself; weknow that we know. 11 But a material thing cannot bend back on itself insuch a wa~ Extended in space with its act always one ofincomplete motion,it cannot return upon itself completely: one part would be covering anotherand therefore not at the same time covering itself. That the soul can anddoes do this indicates that it is not material. We are simultaneouslythinking and aware of the full activity of this operation. I am presentlythinking about one ofAquinas's arguments for the subsistence ofthe rationalsoul, and at one and the same time am aware that I am doing so. Althoughone might want to say that things limited by space and time provide theground for my thinking in the sense that they provide the raw materialsfrom which I abstract universals, nevertheless, the very fact that I am awareof space and time indicates that I transcend them. We measure space andtime, and the measure is never one of the things measured.

Granted that the human soul is immaterial and subsistent, what followsfor the issue of individuation? Aquinas says whenever speaking of theangels (who, like the soul, are intellectual substances) that they are individ­uated by themselves;12 they are, in fact, different species.13 They cannot bemembers ofa species, different from each other because ofparticular matter,because they have no matter. But neither does the human soul have anymatter. Immateriality and intellectuality go hand in hand. 14 It wouldappear, then, that every intellectual being, as intellectual, is individuatedby itself. This has been shown to be true for angels and is certainly true forGod;15 and, to the extent that they are intellectual, it is true of humanbeings, as weIl. In one place where Aquinas discusses intellectual sub­stances prior to differentiating between angels and human souls, he says ingeneral that "they are not able to differ from one another by a materialdifference since they lack matter; hence if there is plurality in them, it isnecessary that it be caused by a formal distinction, which constitutesdiversity of species.,,16 Matter may be an indication ofour individuality, butit is not the cause of it.

However, there is some rough ground here, for we are not angels.Aquinas insists that the rational soul is the form of the body, and thereforeis tied up with particular matter. What is more, if one speaks of human

unity ofthe nlaterial and the immaterial.11 De Veritate I, 9.12ST 1,3,3.13ST I, 50, 4, c; De Ente. VI; SCG 11, 93; De Spirit. Creat., 8; De Anima I, 3.14"Immunity from matter brings with it intelligible being; immunitas enimmateriae confert esse intelligible." SCG 11, 91, [5], p. 214.15ST 1,3,3.

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souls as individuated by themselves, what is to happen to the commonalityofhumanity? Is there no human species?

Let me first address the issue of the relation between the rational souland the body with which it forms the human composite. Aquinas does saythat the soul is tied intimately to the body, that each human being isindividuated by the relation of soul to body. However, the body is not thecause ofthe individuation. Rather, the soul is individuated according to thebody; that is, each human soul is unique in that it is a subsisting form whichdemands a particular body to inform. "Souls are multiplied in accordancewith the multiplicity ofbodies; nevertheless, the multiplicity ofbodies willnot be the cause of the multiplication of souls.,,17

Let us look at one of Thomas's arguments on this point in more detail.In the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, he makes the generalstatement that "whatever must be co-adapted and proportioned to anothersimultaneously receives, with that other, multiplicity or unity, each from itsown cause.,,18 Now body and soul must be adapted to one another simulta­neously because together they make up one human being. If the being ofthe form depends on the matter (as in material composites) then its multi­plicity or unity does too. However, the human soul does not depend onmatter, for it has an act transcending matter and therefore subsists in itself.Therefore, although souls are multiplied together with matter and in pro­portion to the matter, their multiplicity and unity do not depend on thematter. Each soul subsists in such a way as to require some particularformation offlesh and bones for its perfeetion. The rational soul is in no wayfor the sake ofthe body; rather, the body is for the sake ofthe soul, as matteris for form, or more generally, potency for act. 19

And this saves the specific community of human persons. The fact thateach human being is, through his or her soul, individuated by itself does notspeIl the destruction ofall commonality among human beings. Each humansoul agrees with every other human soul in the fact that it needs a particularkind ofbody for its very intellectuality to flourish. "Just as it belongs to thehuman soul, according to its species, that it be unified with such a body, so

16"Non enim ad invicem possunt differre materiale differentia, cum materiacareant: unde si in eis est pluritas, necesse est eam per distinctionem fonnalemcausari, que diversitatem speciei constituit." Comp. Theol., 77, vol. 42, p. 106.17" ... multiplicantur quidem animae secundum quod multiplicantur corpora,non tarnen multiplicatio corporum erit causa multiplicationis animarum." BCG11, 80-81, [7]; see also BCG 11, 75 & 83, and BT I, 76, 2 ad 1.18" ... quaecumque oportet esse invicem coaptata et proportionata, simulrecipiunt multitudinem vel unitatern, unumquodque ex sua causa." BCG 11,80-81, [7].19This is not to say that the soul is prior in time to the body. There is no doctrineofreincarnation or transmigration ofsouls in Aquinas. Each human soul comesinto being with a body: more properly, the human person comes into being-thecomposite of soul and body. See BCG 11, 83, espe [11 & 26].

AQIJINAS AND INDIVIDUATION 35

this soul differs from that soul numerically only because it has a relation toa numerically other body. And thus human souls are individuated . . .according to bodies, not as if the individuation were caused by the bodies"(my emphasis).20 The human soul is intellectual potentially, and requires abody to allow it to come to perfection.21 We are not possessed of innateknowledge but must abstract what we understand from the sensible world.Through the senses we have direct access to this world. Through abstractionofwhat is essential in the things we experience, we come to know. There isan element of the world acting upon us in our knowing. To receive thiselement, we require a body. And so each subsisting human soul, informingand individuating each person, is signed with the requirement for a partic­ular body.22

If the soul is a subsisting form, the11 what can be said ofother subsistingforms (the angels) can be said ofit as weIl. And since the soul is the form ofthe body, its characteristics characterize the composite. The intellect (asform) is the principle from which the sensation derives; the intellect (asform) is also the primary principle ofindividuation in the human composite.Aquinas is clear in stating that each angel is its own species. Although heis careful to deny this in the same identical sense to human beings (otherwisethe soul would be united to the body only accidentally, and the human beingwould not be one substance),23 the implications ofAquinas's thought cannotbe simply ignored. To deny that each person is unique notjust quantitativelybut also, and more importantly, intellectually is to reject obvious evidence.Thus, one could say that we are individuals by form as weIl as matter. And,in a real sense, we are individuated by matter because our souls demand it.The higher (actual) is never for the sake ofthe lower (potential). Therefore,the soul, which is the act ofthe body, is not for the sake ofthe body, but vice

2°"Sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem competit quod talicorpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita haec anima differt ab aliud numero soloex hoc quod ad aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet. Et sic individuanturanimae humanae ... secundum corpora, non quasi individuatione a corporibuscausata." BCG 11, 75, [6].21Comp. Theol., 80; see also BCG 11, 83, [26].22Robert O'Donnell, in a helpful article on this subject, comments that "It ispossible to have many individuals within the same human species preciselybecause each human soul is by nature the substantial form of an individualmaterial body." "Individuation: An Example ofthe Development in the ThoughtofSt. ThomasAquinas," New Bcholasticism 33 (1959): 49-67, p. 67.23"Souls are, according to their substances, the forms ofbodies: otherwise, theywould be united with bodies accidentally; and thus, out ofbody and soul therewould not come something essentially one, but only one by accident; Sunt enimanimae secundum substantias suas formae corporum: alias accidentalitercorpori unirentur, et sic ex anima et corpore non fieret unum per se, sed unumper accidens." BCG 11, 80-81, [8]. See also, BT I, 76, 1; 89, 1; BCG 11, 57, [3];83.

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versa. Ultimatel~both are for the sake ofthe human being, but within theessence, body is for the sake of soul.

The conclusions of philosophical explorations provide us with two doc­trines seemingly incompatible: (1) the human soul is subsistent, and thusis, in some sense, individual of itself; (2) the soul is the form of the body,forming together a composite merrLber ofthe human species. The very wordshe chooses to introduce his treatise on man in the Summa Theologiae clearlystate this puzzle: "On Man Who Is Composed of aSpiritual and a CorporealSubstance.,,24 Thomas spends a good deal of time proving that the humansoul is subsistent.25 He spends perhaps even more time insisting on the unityofthe human~erson. Properly speaking, it is the person who understands,not the soul. Thomas says most explicitly: "1 am not my soul.,,27 Twosubstances are one: that is truly mysterious. St. Thomas's effort is to try toshow how and why each of these doctrines must be true, and neither nlustbe subsumed under the other.

One might object that it seems absurd for an immortal soul to beconnected to a corruptible body, and opt for one side of the equation or theother: either we really are our souls, in which case the fact that the body iscorruptible does not matter; or we really are just material composite beingswho, like animals, cease to exist when our bodies cease to function. ButAquinas will not accept any option, no matter how simple or clever, whichdenies obvious natural evidence.28 By examining the nature ofthings, one

24"De homine qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur." ST I, 75.Thomas says again most explicitly: "It is necessary that some substance be theform ofthe human body; ... necesse est aliquam substantiam formam humanicorporis esse." De Spirit. Creat. I, 2, Questiones Disputatae (Rome: Marrietti,1953) 11: 375. All references below are to this two volume edition.25See above, note 9.26"It can be said that the soul understands as the eye sees, but it would be moreappropriate to say that the man understands through the soul; Potest igitur diciquod anima intelligit sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homointelligat per animarn.: ST I, 75, 2 ad 2. For other texts, see In 111 Sent., 5, 3,2; De Ente. 11; SCG 11, 57; 59; 69; 76; 83; ST I, 75, 4; 76, 1; In 111 de Anima, Lect.VII, no. 690; In VII Meta., Lect. 9.27" ... anima mea non est ego." I ad Corinthias 15, L. 2, In Omnes S. PauliApostoli Epistolas Commentaria (Taurini: Marietti, 1929) 1:392.28In answer tojust such an objection, Aquinas replies that we must not ask whatGod could have done or should have done (How could we reach behind the veryfirst principle for something prior by which to judge it?); but rather, we mustexpress what truth we glean from our experience. "But if anyone should saythat God could have avoided this necessity, it must be said that, on theconstitution of natural things, we are not to consider what God can do but whatbelongs to the nature of things. Si quis vero dicat quod Deus potuit hancnecessitatem vitare, dicendum est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium nonconsideratur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat." STI, 76, 5 ad 1, vol. 1, p. 458a.

AQUINAS MD INDIVIDUATION 37

finds, on the one hand, that the use of reason implies that the soul, whichhas this activity that transcends space and time, must itselfbe above spaceand time, and, on the other, that one experiences knowing as one's ownknowing, intimately associated with this thinking animal, with this body;withme.

Aquinas is ever careful to balance one affirmation with the other, neverallowing our intellectuality or our physicality to completely dominate thepicture. On this issue he follows Aristotle in claiming that the highestnatural form (tl~e human soul) is also separate; that is, the rational soul isnon-material yet in-mattered.29 Thomas stresses that it is the individualhuman composite who understands, not the soul using the body nor aparticipation in universal soul. However, having made this point he goes onto insist that although the soul is the form ofthe body, it yet has an act thattranscends the body, which establishes it as a subsisting thing. Unlike anyother natural form, the human soul is not completely bound by matter.While the acts of all other material things involve matter, human beingshave an act which does not-thought. "And so, although the soul accordingto its essence is the form of a body, nothing forbids some power of the soulfrom not being the act ofthe body.,,30 If some part is not the act ofthe body;then it is not dependent on the body for its existence. Although it mayrequire the body for its completion, its act ofthinking is not limited by thebody. The soul does not depend on the body for its existence (first perfection);but it does require the body for its operation oflearning by abstracting fromsensible things (second perfection). Thus the soul at once exists apart fromthe body, and yet is naturally united to the body for its perfection, or moreprecisely, for the perfection of the human being.31

One finds Aquinas striking this same balance concerning the state ofthesoul after death. Since the rational soul has an operation that is immaterial,it likewise must be immaterial. What is immaterial is incorruptible. Butwhat happens to the other side of the issue, Le., the insistence on the soulas the form ofthe body and naturally needing the body for its perfection? Itwould seem that the soul sloughs offthe body at death and continues to existwithout it as if it really did not need it in the first place. To handle thisproblem, Aquinas says that the soul has one mode of existence in this life,and another after its separation from the body, but that its nature remainsthe same. To be separated from the body is unnatural for the soul, and thesoul then exists in an imperfect state: still it can exist without the bod~

29ST 1,76,1 ad 1. The reference to Aristotle is to Physics 11, 2(194b12).30"Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam eius virtutem non esse corporis actum,quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis forma." ST I, 76, 1 ad4, vol. 1, p. 450a.31SCG 11, 68, [12]. Concerning first and second perfections, see ST I, 6, 3 andDe ver. 112.

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"Therefore, it is clear that it is on account ofit being better for the soul thatit be united to the body ... ; nevertheless, it is able to exist separated.,,32

Still, it does seem odd for a thing that is everlasting like the soul to betied up with something like the body which must decay. Since the soul iseverlasting and the body is not, while in composites form and matter are inall ways interdependent, it would seem impossible for the soul and body tomake up one thing. Aquinas answers by stressing the character of thehuman soul as requiring a body. Even when it will exist in aseparated state,it will always naturally desire to be reunited with its bod~ and in thatseparated state remain incomplete. "The human soul remains in its exis­tence when it has been separated from the body, having an aptitude andnatural inclination to union with the body.,,33

St. Thomas's solution to this enigma of what he calls two substances inone is to say that the being (esse) ofthe soul as subsistent is the being (esse)of the composite.34 "It is necessary that some substance be the form of thehuman body.,,35 A substance exists on its own. And a composite existsthrough its form, which in the case ofthe human being is also a substance.Thus, although the doctrine might seem to suggest two substances in one,there is only one act ofbeing, specifying one substance. "The soul commu­nicates that existence in which itself subsists to corporeal matter; and fromthis the intellectual soul makes one thing, so that existence, which is ofthewhole composite, is also ofthe soul itself ... and on account ofthis the humansoul remains in its existence when the body has been destroyed.,,36 The soulshares its act of being with the body because it is the kind of intellectualsubstance which requires a body for its perfection.

This is, indeed, a way of expressing a solution which takes into accountboth evidences, but it hardly completely dispels the tension; nor, I think, isit meant to. What Aquinas is doing is simply affirming that both evidencesare significant, neither to be ignored. He does this by saying that subsisting

32"Sic ergo patet quod propter melius animae est ut corpori uniatur, et intelligatper conversionem ad phantasmata; et tamen esse potest separata." ST I, 89, 1,vol. 1, p. 551a.33" ... anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habensaptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem." ST I, 76, 1, ad6, vol. 1, p. 450b. Whether or not Aquinas has a philosophical doctrine of theresurrection of the body requires textual analysis which is beyond the scope ofthis present paper. While it seems to this writer that he does, the issue is toolarge to be treated in passing here.34ST I, 76, 1 ad 5.35" ... necesse est quod aliquam substantiam formam humani corporis esse."De Spirit. Creat. I, 2, vol. 2, p. 375.36" ... anima illud esse in quod subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex quaet anima intellectiva fit unum; ita illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiamipsius animae ... et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructocorpore." ST I, 76, 1 ad 5, vol. 1, p. 450ab. See also SCG, 11, 68, [3]; 87, [3].

AQUINAS MD INDIVIDUATION 39

form and subsisting composite is one being. This is indeed mysterious:however, it is not whim but the fruit of careful philosophical considerationof what it is to be human.

11

In addition to arguments for the rational soul as the primary principleofhuman individuation from an examination ofintrinsic principles, we mayalso consider the place form has, and the rational soul in particular, in theextrinsic order of the perfection of the universe. As a matter of fact, theexplanation of what form is and why things have such and such a formrequires an explanation in ternlS ofcreation, providence, and the perfectionofthe universe. The species ofplant or animal, which is determined by theform, has apart to play in the perfection of the universe, if not, as Aristotleseems to have thought, as permanently instantiated species through time,then at least as part ofthe process of evolution and the intelligible structureof the universe. As species are more important to the perfection of theuniverse than just individuals of a species, the perfection of the universerequires individuation within the species and the continued existence ofthespecies through propagation that this guarantees. Thus plants and animalshave forms which become more intelligible when seen in the light of theirpart in the order of the universe.

As for human beings, since our forms are immaterial rational souls, theycome into being by a direct act of creation on the part of God, without anymediating causality, and take their permanent places as parts ofthe struc­ture of the universe. Each soul is an integral and everlasting part of theuniverse, and its existence depends by way offinal causality, on the perfec­tion ofthe universe, and by way ofefficient causality on God's creative act.37

The individuality of human beings is thus proclaimed by the divine fiat ofevery new human life. To be sure, we are unities of body and soul, thematerial and immaterial, the temporal and the eternal. Nevertheless, thecause of our individuality is not the potential principle of matter, but theactive principle of soul, created and embodied for the perfection of theuniverse.

In a question from the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles38

where he is discussing the perfection of the universe, Aquinas builds thefollowing argument. The reason why there exist many individuals of thesame kind among corruptible things is that the species may be preserved.What cannot be perpetuated by one individual is carried on by propagation.(But at least in a way this is not true for human beings, for we are, insofaras we are intellectual, immortal.) Aquinas proceeds to say that it is by themultiplication of species, that is, the diversity of things, that the universe

37 See De Pot. V, 5; SCG 11, 46; ST I, 47, 1 & 2.38SCG 11, 93.

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is most ennobled, and that it is in the separate substances, more thananything else, that the perfection of the universe C011sists. Therefore,Thomas concludes, "it agrees better with the perfection ofthe universe thatthey should be a pluralit~ diverse according to species, than that they shouldbe many according to number in the same species.,,39

Now in another place St. Tl10mas speaks about the perfection of thematerial universe as consisting in the production of individual humansouls.4o The purpose ofthe material universe is to provide a place ofnurturefor a body capable of receiving a rational soul. The end of the universe liesnot in the coritinuation ofthe human species, but ultimately in the produc­tion ofindividual persons, who, to the extent that they are intellectual, areindividuated by themselves, who are, in a way, multiple species. Like theseparate substances, human beings, through their souls, are integral, per­manent pieces ofthe universe, figuring in its order and perfection.

The place the human being holds within the universe is dramaticallycentral. Aquinas says that the human being is the matrix between thematerial world and the intellectual world. On the one hand, we can thinkand therefore are not merely material beings; on the other, we are not, inthe end, angels, for our souls require bodies to be what they are. Only weof all creatures can, in a way, pull all created reality together; and thisbecause only we are, in a way, all things. Of all material things, only we canthink; of all intellectual substances, only we are material. "And in this wayit is possible that the perfection of the whole universe may exist in onethi11g.,,41 This fact, rather than being the great stumbling stone in ourexplanation ofwhat it is to be human, is a clear and wonderfullight shiningon the order of all creation.42 We are the highest material thing, and thelowest intellectual thing, and the only thing that is both. "And hence it isthat the intellectual soul is said to be as ifit were the horizon and boundaryof corporeal and incorporeal things inasmuch as it is an incorporeal sub­stance, yet nevertheless the form of the body.,,43 And this union of the poles

39"Magis igitur competit ad perfectionem universi quod sint plures secundumspeciem diversae, quam quod sint multae secundum numerum in eademspecie." SCG 11,93, [5], pp. 216-17.4°De Pot. V, 5. See also Comp. Theol., 148, and De Spirit. Creat. I, 2, whereThomas says that the soul is "the end of all natural forms; finis omniumformarum naturalium" (vol. 2, p. 376).41"Et secundum hoc modum possibile est ut in una re totius universi perfectioexistat.: De Thr. 11, 2, Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. 1, p. 27.42"In this way we can consider the marvelous connection among things; Hocautem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest." SCG 11, 68 [6], p.167.43"Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam horizon etconfinium corporeorum et incorporeorum inquantum est substantia incorporea,corporis tarnen forma." Ibid. In another place Thomas adds that the humansoul exists "as if on the horizon of eternity and time; quasi in horizonte . . .

AQUINAS AND INDIVIDUATION 41of reality is not an unstable, uncertain, and temporary liaison betweenincompatibles. No, Aquinas insists that it is not in spite of but preciselybecause the soul transcends the body that its unity with the body is so strong.The human being is not less one than other composites, due to this myste­rious two-in-one substantial unity, but more one. "The more the formconquers the matter, the more a unity is made from it and the matter.,,44

In a passage from his treatise De Substantiis Separatis45 Aquinas speaksof n1aterial things as finite from above and below. They receive the act ofexisting in a limited way, and their forms are limited by the matter in whichthey are received. By contrast, the angels are limited from above but notfrom below. Like material things, they receive existence from God, butunlike material things, they are not limited to a particular material instan­tiation. But neither are human beings. Although we exist in a particularbody, we are not limited by that body. We are able to be other thingsintentionally. We transcend the limitations ofmatter by knowing, and therange of our knowing is intrinsically infinite, as it is for an intellectualbeings. As the matrix between the material and the immaterial, we areindividuated in the ways appropriate to both. Like material things, we areindividuated by matter. Like immaterial things, we are individuated by ourintellectuality. And like an created things, we are individuated by ourexistence (esse).

So far in this essay, I have stressed an aspect of St. Thomas's philosophywhich I think has not been sufficiently emphasized. The human being isindividuated by the soul as weIl as the body: In fact, the body is not the causeof individuation; rather it is because the soul is the kind of soul it is that itrequires a body. Apparently, then, the soul is prior to the body as a principleofindividuation. Thus our uniqueness as individuals rests in the first placeon our souls. However, this must not be taken to mean that the body isundignified or in any sense demeaning. The human soul alone is onlypotentially intellectual: it is through the body that it comes to know, that itbecomes actual.

From an that we can gather, the human being is in a unique, and onemight say privileged, position within the universe; only human beings areintellectual and material, existing at the horizon of mind and matter. Thesoul without the body is incomplete, existing in an unnatural state. Ourperfeetion, and hence the perfeetion of the material universe, depends onthe unity of the soul and the body. We are all things insofar as potentianywe can know them, by sense and intellect.46 And we are all material things

aeternitatis et temporis," adding that our mode ofaction covers all things, thosewhich change and those which know. SCG 11, 80-81, [12], p. 193.44" .•• quanta forma magis vincit materia, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum."SCG 11, 68, [6], p. 167.45De Sub. Sep., 45.46In 111 de Anima, Lect. 13, no. 787. For more on Aquinas's notion of man as all

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in the additional sense that we are the final cause ofthe physical universe.Gur bodies are the most complex of all material unities, the end product ofbillions of years of evolution which has produced a body that can, incooperation with an intellect created directly by God, know that universeand that very process of evolution-almost a kind of self-justification ofmatter, for our unity is such that one might say that we are thinking matter.The diversity of the material world is focused in the human being throughevolution and rationality. As Aquinas says: "Therefore, in a certain way thewhole ofnature seems to be on account ofman, inasmuch as he is a rationalanimal.,,47 The human being is the final cause and, in a way, the perfectionofthe material world. But the perfection ofthe entire universe is the finalcause for the individual knowing world which each person iso Each humanindividual is a permanent integral part of this larger perfection due to hisor her rational soul.

III

Granted that the human being (in general) is the matrix of all things,and the individual person an integral and permanent part of the universe,why should this command our respect? St. Thomas says, following Scrip­ture, that each person is the image ofGod because ofhis or her intellect.48

God creates a world. Each one of us, in a way, recreates the world, for thehuman beingis potentially all things. And each one ofus recreates the worldin a unique way. We are n10re than just members of a species: each one ofus is, due to his or her intellectuality, a new creation both in the sense thateach one of us must be created (as to the rational soul) directly by God 49and, more to the point I am making now, in the sense that each ofus, throughknowing, recreates the world. Therefore, to denigrate the individual is todenigrate, in a way, all things. It is to deny our very life and intellectualit~

Thus, although it might appear that a political ideology which programs andeffaces the individual in the name of the good of all is inculcating anunselfish attitude, the attitude that is really spawned is one ofindifferenceto other individuals and, in this, a kind of indifference to oneself and the

things, see James H. Robb's excellent short work Man as Infinite Spirit(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1974). In it he writes: "There is,therefore, in us, according to St. Thomas a principle ofbeing that is the likeness,actually and virtually, although not determinately, ofall that is or can be knownby us" (p. 11).47" ... igitur quodam modo propter hominem, inquantem est rationale animal,tota natura corporalis esse videtur." Comp. Theol., 148, vol. 42, p. 138.48"Neither is the image of God found in the rational creature itself unlessaccording to mind; ... nec in ipsa rationali creaturi invenitur Dei imago nisisecundum mentem.: ST 1,93,6, vol. 1, p. 577b.49ST I, 90, 2.

AQUINAS MD INDIVIDUATION 43

good one is trying to foster. Thus, by an apparently paradoxical backlash,this kind of unselfishness leads to the impossibility of being genuinelyunselfish. Agenuinely unselfish act requires the conscious free choice to putthe self second, based on an awareness ofwhat one authentically values. Toclaim to care for the whole while preventing the flourishing of individualswho are, through their intellectuality, potential instantiations ofthat whole,is to be in contradiction. It is to be in the absurd position of simultaneouslycaring and not caring about the same thing.

Let us clarify this argument by spelling out its implicit premises and howthese lead to its conclusion. As in all arguments concerning value andobligation, the first premises must be drawn from the realm of practicalreason, for there is no getting value from fact or obligation from theoreticalreasoning. The simple fact that we are individuated by our rational soulsand therefore are permanent features of the universe does not oblige us torespect each individual. Why should a feature of the universe or theuniverse itself, for that matter, be respected? The key element in showingmoral obligation is to show that one involves oneself in practical contradic­tion if one acts against that obligation, if one values something as good butthen acts in a way that rejects that recognized good. Now there are somefundamental goods which we all recognize immediately inasmuch as we arehumans, such as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, and friend­ship.50 Ifwe recognize these to be basic goods yet act against them, that is,treat them as not worthwhile, then we have abandoned all reason in ouractions, and these actions become arbitrary and unjustifiable. Thus, wehave an obligation not to act directly against a basic good.

Now life is a basic human good. It makes no sense to promote any courseofaction that has as its direct end the destruction oflife, for the destructionoflife is the destruction of all courses of actions and makes all possible endsunattainable. Insofar as we want to attain human goods, we want to live.Even the move to denigrate the individual in the name ofthe common goodhas the preservation and enrichment of life as its goal. But this vision ofhuman life is unjustifiably truncated, for human life is not merely biologicalor sentient: it is also and preeminently intellectual. This means thathuman life has individual significance and is notjust a matter ofthe survivalof the species. Because of our intellectuality, we are potentially all things.We naturally desire to know and this desire is unrestricted. (Here we findanother basic good, knowledge, entering the picture.) To impose a party lineor group policy which prevents this potential from flourishing is to deny thegood of knowing. This is also to deny the good of specifically human life. Todeny these fundamental goods is to be in practical contradiction, to be

50The central text for Thomas's presentation ofthese fundamental human goodsis ST 1-11, 94, 2. This basic position has been advanced in recent years byGermaine Grisez and John Finnis. To their works I owe much ofmy thinkingon the subject.

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unjustified in our actions. The denial or restriction of the individual'spotential to think and to choose is the denial of what we all fundamentallyvalue-life and knowledge. Justification for an action which goes againstthe first principles of justification is in1possible to come b~ Hence such apolicy of intentionally denying the importance of the individual could neverbe unjustified.

IV

From Aquinas we learn that life and knowing are fundamental humangoods, or rather he reminds us of what we already implicitly know. It isimmediately evident as soon as we know what "life" and "knowledge" meanthat we value them as essential elements in our well-being. From Aquinaswe also learn, or again are reminded ofwhat we already know, that humanlife is saturated by intellectualit~ All that is human is informed by therational soul, by knowing. Since knowing is an activity in which the bodydoes not share, the seat of thought must be immaterial and a substance initself. And since the soul is subsistent, it is immortal and an integral partofthe order ofthe universe. Every intellectual substance is individuated byitself, for it has no other essential distinguishing feature. Thus intellectu­ality and individuality go together. To value intellectuality and the pursuitofknowledge which is central to human life is to value the individual. Thusthe respect we pay, or ought to pay, the individual is justified. To an age inwhich materialism in its metaphysical and political forms tends to demotethe individual before the whole, the wisdom ofSt. Thomas offers wholesomemedicine.

Saint Anselm College,Manchester, New Hampshire