..-.

( “-

b .,●

\

Afwutk,

“e $&.4Y -..:,b

(

i.

PREFACE

tg “

Our job ~n Task Group ?.4 was to pr~vide air support to Joint Task

Force SEVU31. The propose of this report is to brfcf what we did in carryi-

ng mt this job, Anyone interested in more dctail”than contained in this

report is referr~.dt.~the histories of the Task Group and of its units. “

Althou&h Headquarters Task Group 7.L was not formally established for

Operation HARDTACK until October 1957,

participation in the opration started

Joint Task Force S13VlW,and within the

h9~Wh Test Group (Nuclear) of the Air

this report covers activities starting

plans and preparation for its

long before that within Headquarters,

headquarters and squadrona of the

Force Special Weapons Center. ThuS,

as early as the Spring and Summer of

1957. The last shot of the HARDTACK series took place at the Eniwetok

Provine Grounds on18 August 1958. Roll-up activities, deactivation of

provisional units, and reassignment of ~rsomel will take place for several

weeks to come.

report has been

publication.

The report

Part

Part

Part

Part

Part

These matters arc routine, however, and therefore this

cut off as of18 August 19S8 in order to permit ear3y

is or~anized into five parts as followst

I summary

II Command

III Personnel & Administration

IV Operations

v Materiel

‘ I take this opportunity to express appreciation to all the officers

and alrmn who have served in Task Group 7.4 so faithfully and well. All

SWS 8SRD 28532//3 -

2

9--

f“’of US ~e happy to have b.en able to contribute to tbe success of Joint

Task Foroe SE~ in the conduct of Operation H.A.RDTMX~

Ctmmmder

AFwulio

3

3

fi

.“ COPYI’lumm

(—1-3456

;9101112-131&18

192021-22

25262728

%’g

333435-36373839Lo&

43-4445464?

48-53n55-70

DISTRIBUTION LIST—

A~ENCIiiS ATTENTION

CJTF-SEVENCTG 7.1 Col Lverycm 7.2 Col Sawi,ckicm 7.3 Cd.r DodsonCTG 7.5 Mr. James E ReevesComdr AFSWPCondr F’c/AFswP Col K. D. ColemanChief Of Staff USAl (AFOAT) Col BomotComdr AFOAT-1 Lt Col SeifertCO* ARDc Maj MarkhamComdr AFswc Swo (Cys 14-15)

~ (Cy 16)WP (Cy 17)SWC (CJf 18)

Comdr L925th Test Group (w-~ ~ement CO1 N-ncoti 492Gth Test Squa&on (S) (TAu)Codr 4951st Support Squadron (T) (TBUCO* &9%d Support Squadron (T)Com&WADC (Effects Element)Comdr AFCRC (IonosphereElement)CO* MCComir SMMACO* MATSComdr Test Services Unit

Lt Col Steinhausslhj B H. COChranOLt Col R. Wi Yundt

Mr. Douglas(sMSIL)Lt Col G. F. WientyesCOIW. H. Neal

Comdr Search and Rescue Elemmt (6MMRS) Lt Col M. C. FrazeeCoti Weather Reporting Element Lt Coz pu~inComdr Weather Reconnaissance Element Lt Col ConradLookout Mountain LaboratoryCINCSAC Maj WellerCINCPACAFPACAF Helicopter Element Capt S. W. HebertComdr MsComdr Mcs Maj GikasCO* APcsBUAERComdr NAswF Cmdr BushnerComdr @80th Strat Reconnaissance Wing Col AdamsCO* MC MCFOComir WESTAF DCS/PlansMr. Ted Johnson, CM, 6th Region, HonoluluLife Bldg$ Honolulu$ T. H.TO 7.L (4950th TG (N) Staff AgenciesHunter MB, Ga. Col KiefferFile

AFwMo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Participattig Organizations

Preface

Distribution List

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

Part

Part

I - Summag

II” command

Chapter 1 - General

Chapter 2 - Mission

Chapter 3 - organization

Chapter h - Planning &Build-Up

Chapter 5 -Operatioml Phase

Chapter 6 - ~ying Safety

Chapter 7 -Medicd

Part III - Personnel & Administration

chapter 1 - Introduction & Swry

Chapter 2 -Personnel

Chapter 3 - Administrative Services

Chapter 4 -secufitY

Chapter 5 -Comptro~er

Part

Chapter 6 - Ground SafetY

Chapter 7 - Legal & Discipline

Chapter 8 -Protocol

IV - Operations

Chapter 1 - Introduction

PAGE NR

1

2

4

5

7

10

13

14

16

17

21

23

27

3-

3

33

38

k5

46

L8

52

36

- 59

60

62

5

AFuIJHO

-1Part

Part

Part

Part

.

I - None

TABIE OF FIGURES

11 - Command

Figure l- Organization Chart - TO 7.h

Figure 2 - Accident Rate

III - Personnel & Administration

Figure 1 - Monthly Strength Chart

Figure 2 - Peak Monthly Strength Report

figure 3 - Monthly Island Strength

Figure 4- Number of Secur5@ Badges Issued

lHgure5u - Comptroller Charts

Figure 7- &nerd. Order of Attachmnt of GeneralCourt-Martial Jurisdiction

IV - Operations

Figure l-

Figure 2 -

Figur83-

Figure 4 -

Figure 5-

Figure 6 -

Figure 7 -

Figure 8-

Figure 9 -

Figure 10 -

Figure 11 -

Figure 12 -

Figure 13 -

;alendar of Events

m-50 s~

Urcraft Participation

?loud Sampling Accomplishment Chart

Iadiation Eqosure - SampI-ingCrms

3-57B & B-57D FI.yi.ngSUDRIEUY

?J)$&@-s~

3-52 Fl@ng Summwy

P2V Flying summary

B-36 Fl@g Summmy

C-97 Fl@ng Suxmuary

RC-~ Flying Sunm@ry

R%* Fl@g Summary

7

Page No.

18

30

39

40

u

47

.$-%- 6-Q

Sa

,.-.61

7’5

,78-79

80.85

87

89

90

94

94

.97

97

101

102

Mwlm

**

dTa e of Figures

Part

Figure 4 -

Figure 15-

Figure 16 -

Figure 17 -

figure 18 -

Figure 19 -

Figure 20 -

Figure 21 -

Figure 22 -

Figure 23 -

Figure 2k -

Figure 25-

Figure 26 -

Mgure 27 -

mgure 28 -

(Cent’d)

v - Materiel

c-%Flying Sunmxy

L-20 Fl@ng Sunmwry

H-19 Flying summary

H-21 Flying summary

G19 Flying s~

sA-16 Fl@ng Sunm=y

MATS Afil.ift

Air Control Area

Ionizing Radiation Exposures

Positioning Infmmation (ROSS)

Positioning Information (Rose)

K-HOUr Array (Rose)

Progr-d ~SSiOll EXeCUtiOn tit (RON)

Mssion Contiol B- (Rose-Mcks)

Mission Execution Board (Rose)

Figure 1 -

Figure 2 -

Figure 3 -

Figure 4-

Figure S -

figure 6 -

Figure 7-

Figure 8 -

Aircraft Engine Consumption

line

We

AOCP

Pipe

Items on Hand

IteIUSRequested and Issued

Rate

Id.neTime AWE AOCP EMER.

Roll-up

Fuel Consumption

MO-gas and Diesel Consumption

8

Page No.

108

IJO

U-3

lls

117

120

123

w-I-38

ti7

ti8

I-49

150

153

1%

164

166

167

168

169

172

174

175

yA$WHO

(

#

T~le of Figures (Conttd)

Figure 9 - Aircraft On Hsnd

Figure 10 -

Ngure U -

Figure I-2-

Figure I-3-

Figme4-

Figure 15-

Figure 16 -

Figure 17 -

Figure 18 -

Figure 19 -

Figure 20 -

Figure 21 -

-craft In-Commission Rate

Mdntenance W Hours ExpndedTim

Maintenance lb Hours ~nded

General Purpose Vehicle Used

Specisl Purpose Vehicle Used

Air Cargo West Bound

Mge No.

178

la

Indirect 186

Direct The 187

190

192

194

- passenger Movement lfestBound 196

Water Cargo West Bound

Passenger Air East Bound

Mr Cargo East Bound

Water Cargo East Bound

Construct&on Program Thru

197

2a)

201

203

m 62 208-209

(

“ PART I

SUMMARY

.

10

(

fThe mission,of Task ~OUF 704> pro~isionalj was to

..prwide and operate

certain aircraft and to p-otide we,a,therand other sarvices in support of

Joint Task Force SEVEN during Operation HARDTACK in the spring and summer

of 19S8. The Group reached a peak strength of 2262. Althcmghthe Grw

manned some sixteen different operating sites, the bulk of the people

served on FRED Island at Eniwetok Atoll. Some thirty-seven (37) N=y

~crsonnel served i.nTask Group 7.4, Provisional. All of the remaining

p-ople were members of the United States Air Force.

Plann5.ngfor the participation of Task Group 7.4, provisional, in

@-ration HARDTACK began tithin the Air Fbrce Special Weapons Center at

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mefico early in 1957. In @tober Of that ye=

the Task Group and its operating Elements were formally established. Task

Group personnel began moving into the Forward Area in December and con-

tinued at an ever increasing rate until 15 March 1958 when the Task Qroup

Headquarters and all its Units and Elements became operational in the

Eniwetok Proving Grounds (EPG).

lluringthe five months that the Task Group participated in sustained

support of HARDTACK, its flying and technical elements participated in 35

nuclear tsst events. Of these, 11 took place at E5kini, 22 at Eniwctok$

and 2 at Johnston Island. - On four occasions it was necessary for the

Group to partici~ate in two cvsnts on the same d~. In all, the test

effects and sampler aircraft of the Test Aircraft Unit flew 2n sorties

and 1982hours in direct support of nuclear test operations.

The Group protided weather reporting, weather reconnaissance, and

weather forecasting services to Joint Task Force SEVEN. Weather reporting

stations were set up on eight islands ranging in distance from one hundred

to ci~ht h~mdred miles distance from Eniwetok. Weather reconn~ssancen

(

1

was accomplished with a unit of ten l/E-~0aircraft which flew daily out

to distances of twelve hundred miles from Eniwcto]cand returned- The

-wrnatherforecasting or~anization, of course, played”an important part in

providhy the Task Force Conmandcr with that weather information which

he needed to determine whether or not to shoot.

Air .suTportactivities included the opr=kion of C-54, SA-16, liaison

and helicopter aircraft carryin~ passengers and CarCO in the Forward Area.

At p??k strc?n@h, Task hOUF 7.4 was assimed a total of 78 fircraft

of 16 different t~es. Between 1~ March and 16 August a total of~83°7 :1~~

hollrsw-r? accom~l.ish”d. Four major ?ccid’;ntsw:re suffered involting

on-:Iisison P.ircraft?n(lthreeh[*l.ic3ptcrS.One life was lost as a result

of these

All

to their

accid{~nts.

Units a~d Elements of Task @OUP 7.4s ~o~si~n~~ were r~deFloYcd

home stations as soon as they could be spared from the Forward

Area. On 15 AuQmst the main Headquarters of the Task Group transferred

back to Kirtland Air Force Ilassleafig only a small cchclon to finish

th roll-up of supplies and equipment.

12

Alw.tlul

(

PART II

COMHAND

.

(.

13

Awuno

(

Cha~er 1 - Generalr

Zate in 1956 the 4950th Test &oup (Nuclear)..

Headquarters ~r Research and Development Command

was established by

as part of the Air

Force Special Weapons Center at ltirtlandAir Force B~se. It is a perma-

nent orEanlzation whose mission is to plm for and to protide direction

of air support for full-scale nuclear test programs both in Nevada and

the Pacific. The members of the Headquarters of this group, while

~artici~ating in the PLUMBBOB exercise in Nevada in the Spring and Summer

of 19$7, concurrently initiated pl~ms for Task Group ?.4 participation in

HARDTACK. Upon activation of Task Group 7.4, ~ovisional, by Headquarters

Air Research and Development Command on 1 October 1957, the Commander

and other personnel assi=med to the Headquarters of the ~950th, mere~

assumed similar titles within the newly fomed Task Group ?.~ and continued

doing the job at hand. Thus there was no tjme lost in organizing a new

group of people to do the Headquarters Task

During the period from 1 October until

phase of HARDTACK in the forward area on 15

elements of Task Group 7.4 were established

GrOUp 7.4 job.

the owning of the operational

March, the provisional units and

and organized at their various

21 home bases. Commanders were assigned and planning

~idance of the Commander, Joint Task ~rce SEVEN and

Group 7.4.

Although advance detachments were in the forward

proceeded under the

the Commander, Task

area as early as

February, operational control of these units was not assumed by Task Group

?.h and Joint Task Force SEV_ENuntil their commanders arrived on 12 and

Umrch r~spectlvely; this assumption of command was accomplished smoothly

and without misunderstanding.

Connand arrangements during shots varied depending upon the shot

situation. At no time was t~ere a~ serious cliff”lculty in maintaining

ntwulio

*

iadequate communication between the various operating locations. Thus, it

was possible for the Commander of Task Group 7.4 to comnand all the air

operations while at the

SEVEN fully informed of

same time keeping the Commander Joint Task Force

the situation and responding to his orders.

Flying Safety was a special subject at all levels within the Task

Group. The accident rate achieved was 21-3 per one hundred thousand

fl@g hours. This compares with an Air Force-wide rate during Calendar

year 1957 of 13*6 per

six months of calendar

hours.

one hundred thousand fl@mg hours.and?or the first

yea.r1958 of 10.8 per one hundred thousand flying

(

AFWLJI+(J

15

?chapter 2 - Mission

The mission of Task Gr~up 7.4 durin~ Opration HARDTACK was two-

fold: to operate aircraft for the purpose of collecting data and samples

and to provide certain of the air support sex=dces required by Joint

Task Force SEVEN. This latter function included the operation of air

base facilities at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls, an inter-island and hter-

atol.1eirlift syste~, weather reporting and forecasting setices~ air

terminal, search and r-scue and communication’services.

3-6

AFWL/HO

.*-

Cha~ter 3 - Organization

Headquarters Task Group i’.bwas organized into three directorates

(Personnel and Administration, Operations, and*teriel) anda s~ll

special staff reporting directly to the Commander and consisting of

the Flying Safety Officer and the Flight Surgeon. The operating personnel

were organized into three units: the Test Aircraft Unit, Test Services

Unit, and Test Base Unit. The organization structure and the general functional

areas of responsibility of each of the three operating units are indicated in

Figure 1.

The Commander of the Task Group was formerly assigned as Deputy Commander

of the Air Force Special Weapons Center and, thus, has been associated for some

time with the atomic weapons research and development program. On 15 July 1957

he was reassigned to the post of Deputy Commander for Overseas Tests in pre-

paration for his subsequent assumption of command of the Task Group. This

arrangement made it possible for him to participate in the field phase of

Operation PLUHBBUB, the 1957 atomic test series conduct~ in Neva** He as-

suned comrand of the

The former commander

served to insure the

k95Gth Test Grow and Task Group ?.h on 1 Otto* 1957.

of the @SOth Test Group became his deputy, a move which

continuity of that unit’s operations.

With the activation of Task Group 7.4 on 1 0ctober19S7, the various staff

officers of the h9SOth Test Group assumed like staff positions uithin Task

Group 7.4, an arrangement which proved particularly effective In the case

of two officers naking up the Commander’s

request manning from resources other than

Weapons Center. The services of a Flight

logical effects of radiation was obtained

Joint Force SEVEN and Headquarters United

17

special

that of

Surgeon

staff it was necessazy

the Air Force Special

with experience in the

to

bio-

by arrangement with Headquarters

States Air Force.

AFWL/HO

(\

—

FIGUIW 1 la

(

_~During the period when Task Group 7.4-was operating at Kirtla~ Ur Force

fBase, assistance was protided by the Staff Judge Advocate of the Ati Force

Special Weapons Center. Arrangements were mde with the Commander Pacific

Air Forces to provide legal assistance when needed at Eniwetok by placing a

qualified officer of his staff on TDY with the Task Group. It proved necessary

to request such assistance on three occasions during the on-site phase of the

operation.

The Test

Its commander

Therefore, he

Aircraft Unit included the data and sample collection aircraft.

was formerly the Deputy Commander of the 49SOth ‘TestGroup.

well understood the problems comected with flying aircraft in

the vicinity of nuclear detonations and through nuclear clouds. His deputy

was the Commander of the h926th Test Squadron (Sampling), one of the units

assigned to,the h9SOth Test Group. This latter officer and his

experienced, through participation in previous operations, with

nuclear cloud sampling. The remaining Elements assigned to t%e

unit were

all aspects of

Test JUrcraft

Unit were provided by various Air Force and Navy commands and came under our

operational control when they arrived at the Eniwetok Proving Ground.

The Test Services Unit was manned and orgsmized by the Xilita.ryAir

Transport Service to protide normal MATS services to the Joint Task Force.

Its commander was an officer with experience in many phases of MATS operations.

Coincident with the arrival of the Commander Test Services Unit in the forward

area he assumed command responsibility for all MATS units based in the Proving

Ground.

The Test Base Unit$ whose task was to provide air base facilities and

local airlift, had as its nucleus the 49~lst SUppOrt squadron (Test)~ and a

detachment of the 24th Helicopter Squadron, PACAF, whose permanent homes are

at Eniwetok. These units were augmented as needed to meet the test require-

ments by their parent comrnandsjthe @33th Test Group and PAW respectively=

19

f(Ammo

.. .

In ad#ition it wa~ necessary to request al% participating units to make a pro-

ra4 contribution of additional personnel needed to augment the field main-

tenance shops.

I

20

MWUHO

(

Chapter ~ - ?lannin~ and .uildup

/Plannin~for~ask ~roup 7eL participation in OFeration ~TAcK

comnwnced in late

test at Eniwetok,

continental test,

1956coincident with the roll-up of that year~s nuclear

Operation

Operation

REDWING, and with the planning for the 1957

PLUMBBOB. The first efforts were directed

at the FreFaration of aircraft} ‘upplyJ construction} transportation> @

budget requirements. These studies led to the development of the data

which was presented at the Joint Task Force SEVEN planning conference

in February 1957 as being.

By mid-1957 a Schedule of

rublished and our officer

our needs for the conduct of our test mission.

Events and a Communications Plan had been

and airmen personnel requisitions had been

forwarded to hither headquarters for action. AS has been mentioned

previously, the activation of the various Task Group 7.4 agencies occurred

early in the month of October 1957. Immediately thereafter the Task

Group held its Logistics Planning Conference which brought the test

participants together with representatives of the various Air Materiel

Areas and the Task Group Materiel stqff for the purpose of outlining

requirements and the steps necessary toward meeting those needs. Mean-

while, the Task Group staff published its first planning directive out-

lining the general operational concepts, undertook rehabilitation of the

air control equi~ent, the AN/USQ 12, arranged for the modification

of additional sampling aircraft, and prepared supplemental budgets

necessa~ to reflect the changing requirements. By the end of the year

the Operations Plan and a draft of the Movement Directive had been com-

pleted and the Commander and his tie~utyhad completed staff visits,to

the forward area. One of the principl. purposes of these tisits was

to make mutually satisfactory arran~ments with the Army Task Group, 7*2S

for the support the; would pro-tideduring the operational period.

21

WHO

tIn early 1%8, the Task Group staff directed its efforts to the

preparation of detailed plans necessary for carrying out each facet of

the ndssion. An advance echelon led by the Deputy Commander arrived at

Eniwctok during the first week

completion of the construction

stations and off-island sites,

incoming units.

in Febru~ to mmitor and expedite .

program, establishment of weather island

and preparation of base facilities for

AFwlml

22

Cha@%r S - Operational Phase

Operation HARDTACK inv~lved the detonation of some 35 nuclear devices.

Of these, 11 were detonated at Eniwetok~ 22 at Bikini Atoll, and two at

Johnston Island. On four occasions two detonations occurred the same day

and 17 occurred on successive days. &total of 257 so~ies were fl~

in connection with the operation. The organizational structure and the

resources made available to Task Group ‘?.hproved adequate to meet its

mission commitments.< FYve of the events: the two underrater shots, WAHOO

and UMBRELLA, and the three high altitude shots, YUCCA, TEAK and ORANGE,

gave rise to some new operational problems but in each instance we were

able to resolve these problems and perform the required missions.

The command arrangements in the forward area were vagied depending

on location of events and operational requirements. The first event was

YUCCA, the high altitude balloon shot conducted at Bikini Atoll. This

event imposed some unusually stringent command and operational problems.

The Task Group Commander exercised command of the air operation from the

Air Operations Center (AOC) in the USS BOXER. His deputy was responsible

for the dispatch and recovery of test aircraft from Eniwetok. He USed the

Air Operations Center at FRED Island, Eniwetok Atoll, as his comnd post-

on subsequent Bikini events, the Bikifi ar @erations Center -s under the

direct on-the spot supervision of either the Task Group Commnder or one of

his senior officers, and the Task Group Commander exercised overa~ control

from the FRED AOO. The Commander of the Test Aircraft Unit was responsible

for the pre and post-mission operation of aircraft on the ah base. He ex-

ercised this control from a radio-equipped vehicle on the ramp itself. ‘he

Fl@ng safety Officer or a senior operations officer mnned the tower during

missions to assist in expediting landings and takeoffs.

23

On-WAHOO and UMBRELLA, when there were especially stringent loCal aircraft

requirements, a

dispatch office

Throughout

Air Force Base.

senior staff officer was also stationed at the central

controlling the helicopter and liaison aircraft.

the operation a rear echelon was maintained at H.rtJ.and

Its function was to monitor and to assist the actions

being taken at that B~se in the support of the operation. In additions

it provided an agency through which the dependents could obtain information

and assistance~ a function which contributed =teriaTly to the morale and

welfare of the families of the men participatfig in the operation.

When it was decided to conduct the high altitude shots, TEAK and ORANGE

at Johnston Island rather than at Bikini, we placed one of our

staff officers on detached service with Joint Task Force SEVEM

operations

to serve as

Base Operations Officer at Johnston Island and later estib~shed commnd

posts at both Johnston Island and Hickam U Force Ease, Honolulu. I~ediate

control of the air operations in comection with the two events was exer-

cised by the Task Group Commander from the AOC in the USS BO~ (a destroyer

was used to provide AOC facilities when they were required at Bikini during

the absence or the BOXIR). &craft participating in NB?SRXKL operated from

Hickam Air Force Base and

control of these aircraft

missions was exercised by

Barbers Point Naval Air Station in Hawaii. Operational

during the takeoff, enroute and landing phase of the

the Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, from a command

post located in the Honolulu fir Traffic Center. The Commander of the Test

Services Unit served as the acting commander at the Eniwetok Proving Ground

while the Task Group Commander and his deputy were away participating in NEWSREEL.

Task Group was required to provide planning assistance and aircraft for Operation

LITTLE DAVID, a nuclear rocket test to be conducted at Eglin Mr Force Base

during August.

Afwum

PlaR%ing for this SUppOrt was done by the rear echelon with the assistance

fof several officers of the b926th Test Squadron (Sampling) who were returned

early for that purpose.

Many command functions in connection with Task Group ?.h operations were

norml to those experienced by any

a few problems which merit special

In addition to those stations

commander at Wing level, but there were

comment.

in the Eniwetok Proving Ground itself,

Task Group 7.h manned several other locations for the purpose of making and

reporting weather observations. In several cases personnel of other task

groups were also resident on these islands. The Task Group Commander having

the senior individual permanently assigned was instmcted to appoint that in-

dividual as the personal representative of the CJTF SEVEN to be responsible

for maintaining discipline among JTF-7 personnel and establishing correct re-

lations between the JTF-7 personnel and the local inhabitants. Task Group 7.4

manned eight weather islands and was responsible for the administration on

four of these. Frequent visits were made to the camps. There were nc untoward

incidents during the operation; but in two cases personnel who had indicated

some lack of stabil$ty were replaced to forestall any possible breach of dis-

cipline.

A new arrangement for the dispatch and control

evolved for operation HARDTACK. In the past it had

of liaison aircraft was

been the practice to provide

a preciously agreed upon number of aircraft to the Task Group 7.5 dispatcher

at ELMER (Parry) Island each day. In turn, he re+iispatched these airplanes

as they were needed to meet the requirements of the scientific and construction

personnel of Task Groups 7.1 and 7.5 respectively. Amother group of aircraft

was retained on the strip at FRED to meet all other JTF SEVEN requirements

and to serve as spare aircraft. During HARDTACK the two dispatch functions

were consolidated into a single office known as the Eniwetok Airlift Operations25

AFWIJHO

-d ~

!Of ice, located at FRED. This office controlled the movement of aircraft

through the use of two-way radio with the aircraft andblephone and radio

circuitswith each of the passenger and cargo agents on all the up-atoll

airstrips. The EAOO knew the precise location and status of each aircraft at

all.times and was in a position to

tomers.

During the operation the long

give the best feasible service to all cus-

range construction program at Eniwetok

was reviewed and amended to reflect the projected needs of Task Group 7*k

for future test operations in the EPG. A

the unit manning documents of each of the

Test Group (Nuclear) in order tha-tfuture

the experience gained during HARDTACK.

similar review was conducted of

units assigned to

mnning documents

the 49@th

would reflect

The support rendered to Task Group 7.4by other task groups waa out-

standing. Although the construction program lagged behind schedule prior

to the operation, most of the delays were beyond the control of Task GrOUP

7.5 and all of the essential facilities were c~mpleted prior to the beginning

of the operational phase itself. The housekeeping’suppoti required of the

Armyts Task Group 7.2 was entirely adequate in every respect.

26

AFWHO

Chapt%;r6 - Flying SafetyiThroughout the exercise the Task Group

personnel devoted much attention to fl@ng

Commander and other supervisory

safety. During the period when

accidents in the Eniwetok Proving Grounds were chargeable to the Task Group

(21 February to 18 August 1958) a total of 18307 fifing hours were achieved

and four major accidents were experienced for a rate of 21.3. It is worthy

of note that three of the four accidents involved helicopters. Exclusive of

helicopters, the accident rate was only 6.8 per 100,000 hours of flying time.

The attached chart shows our accident rate on a cumulative basis.

Our four accidents involved an L-20 and three helicopters as follows:

a. On the morning of 7 April the pilot of a L-20 took off with a near

empty fuel tank. The engine died soon after takeoff and the pilot stalled

the aircraft onto the reef. Major damage to the aircraft resulted, but t%ere

was no injuqy to personnel,

b. On

to maintain

and crashed

the evening of 7 April the pilot of aH-19T3 aircraft, in an attempt

VFR flight during a heavy rain shower, lost control of his aircraft

in the lagoon. A civilian passenger was drowned in this accident;

the other four people aboard sufived without major injury.

C. on IO July 19~8 an H-21B aircraft crashed into the ocean when the

pilot experienced some Hnd of materiel failure in the control system. The

failure could not be determined precisely as the aircraft sank in very deep

water and could not be recovered. All people aboard the aircraft escaped with-

out injury.

d. on 14 August1958an H-21B aircraft crashed near Yvonne in 35 feet of

water approxl.mately1500 feet short of the runway. No passengers were aboard.

No one was injured. The cause of the accident was the blow out of the master

cylinder which severed the ignition harness of the engine.

27

AFwuna

~Our Group Flying Safety Council was established as soon asf

was started; It met weekly throughout the exercise. Under its

vigorous flying safety programs were conducted by all Units and

the operation

supervision,

Elements. The

program began with flying safety survey of all Units and Elements with con-

tinuous follow-up action throughout the operational period.

Many unusual features of the flying operation in the Eniwetok Proving

Grounds made flying safety a particular important subject. Some of these

were:

a. Mrfield construction at FRED was not completed before we started

to operate. Consequently we had to operate while painting and,grading,

installation of lights, etc, took place.

b.

c.

d.

required

e.

There were roads across the runway at two points.

The parking and taxi areas were cramped.

The tiny diverse type of aircraft operating off the single runway

the coordination of several different-types of traffic patterns.

SA-16ts landed at lagoons where in some cases the markings and

buoys were marginal.

f* There were many flights in the area of

In addition to the four accidents which we

nuclear”detonations.

experienced, many incidents

occurred which could have

a. AB-~ aircraft

actuator. The runway was

led to accidents. Two examples are:

experienced failure of the nose gear hydraulic

foamd and the aircraft landed in the foam.

The nose gear collapsed with only s~ight da~ge to the aircraft. It was later

discovered that many of the nose gear actuators on our aircraft were defective,

The aircraft were grounded until the actuators couldbe tested ard all the

defective ones replaced.

b. A life raft inflated and ejected from AWB-SO in flight. It struck the

left horizontal stablizer and did such damage as to reduce the normal control28

.,/~CJWuw .M

avai}able to the pilot. The aircraft landed safety at Wake.

# ~thO~gh the Task Gro~P7.b, pro~~iOnal, accident rate of ~.3WaS in—

fact higher than the ~ ~orce tide accident rate in 1957 of 13.60 We feel

that our great efforts in the flying safety area were not in vain.

A.wJno

.. -

1;-

0 0m N

9NlAld OOCfOOl M3d

o wsF

SAN30133V

.

30

(

Chapter 7 - Medical...

-J

/ Task Group 7.2 was responsible for providing medical attention to

Task Group 7./1personnel and WaS manned fith sufficient doctors to do this

job well. By and large the command remained extremely healthful through-

out the exercise. ‘dehad no epidemics. The majority of the cases treated

fell.into one of three groups, i. e.

a, Superficial skin infections.

b, Upper respiratory infections.

c. Minor injuries.

Medical.services to Task

provided by the.assignment to

Group 7.b personnel on outlying islands were

each of a medical technician, plus occasional

visits by Task Group 7.2 doctors and the Task GTOUI?7.4 ~ght Surgeon*

Becausr we had a large number of ~~ng personnel engaged in diversified

flying activities, Task @oup 7.4 had assigned to it a Flight Surgeon

from 4 March 1958

with an office in

in taking care of

to the corn~letionof the exercise. He was provided

one of our operations buildings and was very effective

medical problems for our fifing personnel. His activities

were somewhat handicapped by lack of medical technicians; we recommend

that medical technicians be provided for future operations of ttis nature.

From time to time during the exercise medical semi.ces were provided

in emergency situatims on outlying islands where we maintained detachments.

These ssr~ces were Fro~dcd to both tilitary and indigenous personnel arid

included diagnosis, treatment and/or evacuation. Outstanding among these

events were:

a. Evacuation of two cases of acute appendicitis.

b. Evacuation of a

c. Evacuation of a

fallen from a tree.

do Evacuation of a

Wunc

suspected case of sm~lpox.

case of multiple fractures in a boy who had

case “th a huw abscess in his right flank.*

;\

PART III

PFRWNNEL AND ADMN_IS~TION

32

.

Chapter 1 - Introduction and Sumk’y ‘--”

t

To describe the personnel and administrative activities of Task ~roup

7.4, it is necessary to devote some preliminary remarks to the organization

Of the k95Gth Test Group (Nucl=r) which isthe nucleus for Task Group 70b0

Unlike many components of Task Group ?.h, the h950th is not a transitory

organization established only for participation in Operation HARDTACK.

It is a permanent

and directing Adx

organization that is in being for the purpose of planning

Force participation in nuclear test operations both in

Nevada and the Eniuetok Proving Grounds.

In addition to Headquarters, h95Gth Test GrOUP (Nucle=) tiich beco~s

Headquarters Task Group 7.4 for overseas tests, there are four squadron in

the 495Gth. The h93%h Alr Base Squadron at Indian

Nevada, is the

has no role in

primary support organization for all

the overseas operations. The h9~lst

1

Springs Air Force Base,

continental tests and

Support Squadron at

Eniwetok provides h Ease Support in the Eniwetok Provhg Grounds.

The b926th Test Squadron (Saxpling) is permantly stationedat Kirtlandti

Force Base but spends a gocd part of each year TDY either at Nevada or

the Eniwetok Proving Grounds, depending on where the tests are

Ammo

33

be{ng conducted. The mission of the b926th is that of collecting parti-tcu].ateand gaseous SamPl@3 by f~ing S~Cially equip~d J-S? SircrSft

through nuclear clouds. This squadron becomes the nucleus of the Test

Aircraft Unit that is formed at

the 4952nd SupPrt Squadron, is

technicians who are sent TDY to

these sup~rt activities during

each site. The remaining squadron,

made up of military specialists and

either Nevada or Zniwetok to augment

test operations. The h9~2nd has a

normal strength of about 250 ahnen and 12 officers. Its strength and

composition has to be changed after each test; however, because the

auu~entation required at Eniwetok where some items of base support are

the responsibility of the ArrIw(Task Group 7.2) is much different than

that required at Indian Springs Air Force Base where the entire base -

support is a b9SOth responsibility.

During the Summer and Fall of 1957 when the h950th and its subor-

dinate organizations were participattig ~ operation pL~OB ~ Nevada~

the Directorate of Personnel

in revising the Unit Manning

and requisitioning personnel

and Administration was additionally engaged

Document of the h952hd Support Squadron

necessary to au~ent and support the Test

Base Unit (h9~lst Support Sqpadron) in the Eniwetok pz’ovingGrounds

during operation HARDTACK. It was necessary to compute the overall

strength of the Task GrOup and to predict the personnel suFport require-

ments that were not at the time firmly established. Conferences and

meetings were held with individuals who were later to form the Test

Services Unit, Test Aircraft Unit and the Test Base Unit. Strength and

billeti~m fi.~e~ of their respective organizations were discussed.

Emphasis was placed on attempting to get the job done with a mim

of persomel. Estimates were obtained as to length of time that various

3b

AwuHll

..

4

T s would require to move to, set up, and become operational in the

l!kriwetokProvin; Grmmds. Based on these figures, it was possible to

determine movement dates for the various organizations.

With the establishment of firm personnel figures and movement

dates it was possible to retise and make more accurate the prelhninary

budget estimates that were submitted early in 1957.

then possible for the Test Base Unit to predict with

when they could require the movement of augmentation

l%rther, it w-

greater accuracy

personnel from

the b952nd Support Squadron to the EPG. An attempt was made to predict

with the most accuracy possible the exact dates that personnel would

be required in the EPG. This was particularly necess~ because of

an indication in the Sumner of 1957 of a decision by the-Comptroller

General.that TDY in excess of 180 days in future cases might be

regarded by his office as unwarranted. By mutual agreement with the

various services, it came about later that Headquarters Joint Task

Force SEVEN was granted authority to approve extensions of TDY beyond

180 days for those persons for whom replacements were not available

and extension of TDY was essential. Although we were not at the time

able to foresee all the complications the 180 .dsylimitation was to

cause during the operation, it was lmown that our biggest persomel

problem area was going to be in the manning of the Supply area. Not

only were supply personnel required in December, seven (7) months

before the expected termination of the operation; they would also be

required throughout the operation and for two months thereafter during

the roll-up phase. Anticipating this prOblemj arrangements were made

to replace the earliest augmentation personnel sent to the EPG, and to

stagger the movement of the remainder so that a sizable force would be35

AWUHO

. . .

( !’

“., ....

f

‘=availab~e fron December throu@ most of Au=~3t* The many compM-

cations centering around the-180 day TX restriction were intrr.~ified

in June when the decision was made to extend the operation thraugh

Augllsto

The organization of the Directorate of Personnel and Administration

for Task Group 7.4 was as follows:

I CommanderI

‘-I

Director of Persomeland AdministrationLt Col 7016

II

1

I Dep Dir of Personneland AdministrationMajor 7016

Personnel Technician

Msgt 73270

I

r——————— r I I I

Corres Ii@Forms&PubsNsg Center

~ Airmen

-%This function was performed by an officer from Hq PACAF on a TDY basis

as required.

36

-.

‘ fdIt will be noted that no personnel record-keeping function was

estab~shed at Group Headquarters..

The records keeping and basic per-

sonnel function was established in ‘KU for all M4TS organizations and

in TBU, which performed a consolidated function for TAU andTBU elem+m%g~

This type of organization left the small Group Personnel and Administra-

tion staff free to do necessary planning, to promulgate policy andto

publish regulations as well as to supervise the Group Message Center, the

security program, protocol actititie~s the preparation of the ~storYs

and ground safety and comptroller activities. In general, the organization

was satisfactory and no major problems were encomtered.

AFWUHO

3’

(

-.. .

Ch$ter 2 - PersonnelI

Task Grmp 7.~ had the responsil,ilityfor the planning and estab

Iishment of personnel activities to support 3U Officers md 1915

airmen durin~ Operation HmTACK. The attached charts (Figures 1 thru

3) reflect the flow of personnel to the EPG during the Luild-up FhXe

and their Thasing out as the operation neared completion. This move-

ment of personnel to and from the dPG was accomplished in accordance

with pre-determined schedules based on known mission requirements

during the planning and operational phases of HARDTACK.,

In addition to determination of the total numbers and types of

personnel that would be required to execute the Task Group mission,.

it was necessary to provide the best possible-personnel Setices while -

keepin~ numbers of ~rsonnel specialists to a minimum. Consolidated

Personnel Sections were established in Test Services Unit(for all their

attached personnel) and in Test Base Unit (for TBU, TAU and Headquarters

pcrsomel), providing records maintenance, classification and assign-

ment and

the Base

Services

pay and personal affairs services. Also, Test Base UnitJ as

SUppOrt organization, was responsible fOr conduct Of a perSOnnel

(Recreation) program and operation of a Personnel Classtiication

Bo~rd for all Task Group 7.4 personnel.

The Personnel Services Section coordinated with Task Group 7.2 on

schedu~ng of Inter-Task

Special Services Supply,

type of recreational and

Group sports competitions, and maintained a

from which individuals could draw almost every

athletic equipment. In alll more than $2,000

in recreational and athletic gear was purchased for

personnel.

The personnel Classification Board convened by

use by Task &oup

Test Base Unit met

AW1 /Ufl

on four (~) occasions, considering 18 cases involving Task Group personnel.

38

‘-@

f1

Aiwl Inn

-

N

—

10

W

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

(.

m

.

■

m

.

.

)

I

ti

:

.

.

.

.

:I

i

II

■

-

—

0

—

N

—

.

.

.

.

n.

t

.

II

I

■

I

—

—

—

—

[

zwii

4xa\

if

(

—

nN

m MMa

ax

*N

wIn

1Nm

wIA

0

—

u

—

0z4

ii —

FIGURE 3

MWUI19

(

{’

,-< As stated in the preceding Chapterj the 49SOth Test Group (Nuclear)

fhad a dual responsibility for o~ration as a Group under the Air Force

Special Weapons Center and as Task ~roup 7s4 under Joint Task Force sm.

During the initial planning stages of Operation HARDTACK, the 49jOth was

participatin~ in a continental test series at the Nevada Test Site. Deter-

mination of personnel requirements and procurement of personnel for duty

in the EPG had to be accomplished in addition to the normal workload incident

tc a continental test operation.

Personnel requirements within the

by Headquarters, MATS, on the basis of

Test Services Unit were established

planning information made available to

them relative to the scope of their participation in Operation HAJ2DTACK.

Headquarters MATS assumed full responsibility for the manning of all Test -

Services Unit elements from within MATS resources. Those Test Aircraft

Unit and Test Base Unit elements composed of personnel from other than

Air Fei~ceS~cial ?~eaponsCenter resources were also manned by the appro-.

priate Major Air Conrnand.

In order to determine and better estimate the requirements fcr the

augmentation force during Operation HARDTACK~ it was necessary to study

the stren~h figures that applied to Operation WWNG in 19S6. This waa

scmewhat coroplicatedby the changes that had taken place in the organization

o.fthe permanent Eniwetok Air Base Squadron. In I-956jduring Operation

RED?iTNGjit was a large organization with a permanent strength of over ~00

men. Duri~ Operation HARDTACK it was a much smaller organization that had

to be augmented by TDY personnel from the 49S2nd Support Squadron to meet

its increased requirements durin~ the test operation

On 1~~Msrch 19s7, the officer manning requirements for

est.abYishedand a requisition was submitted to Air Research

HARDTi~CKwere

and Development

Comanci, This requisition was based on nrissionrequirements only. BY I!ay

42

, ~wA

AFWHO

(

[

4

1whe the Unit k?mning Documents mm written, insufficient officer space

allocations were available, but requisitions remained valid as originally

approved. This resulted in assignment of some officers on an overage

basis but no major problems arose as a result of such assignments.

Concurrent with finalization of airmen manning requirements in WY195?,

a requisition was submitted, listin~ skills required and desired in-place

dates. This included those b950th positions which are @nned OfiY d~~g

an overseas test period (i.e. MCU, Liaison Supply, etc.). For the most part,

personnel requested were in place per established schedule.

During the course of the Task Group 7.h Logistics Conference in

october 1957, bfief mention was made of the probable futWO need for p~aci~

levies upon units participating h Operation HARDTACK for personnel to aug-

ment

Such

Task

the field maintenance activities, and to support supply rollup operations.

leties would onlybe for people who could notbe provided ~rom within

Group 7.h resources.

In December 1%7, a review of maintenance manhour requirements, as

submitted by each element in Task Group 7.4 rev=led that aPPro*telY

162 specialists in various maintenance areas would be needed in the EGP

over and above those which could be provided from within the 49Smh. On

the basis of these requirements~ levies were placed on Headquarters HATS,

CINCSAC, AFSWC and other agencies, for personnel to report to the Eniwetok

Proving Grounds 1 March 1958. Some difficulty was encountered in @lamen-

tation of this program, and it is believed that earlier identification of

maintenance personnel requirements would be destiable in future test plaming.

were

Personnel for the supply roll-up were procured in the same manner as

the maintenance specialists, reporting 1 July 1.958.

U

43

AFWMO

.-

#$..Movementof Task Group personnel to the Eniwetok Proving Grounds was

effected in an orderly manner, following a pre-set schedule for movement

of each element. The Air Force Movement Directive, published In January,

19s8, contained a detailed breakd~n Of the Task Groups listing assigned

shipment numbers and readiness dates for each increment of personnel depart-

ing the ‘U for the Eniwetok Proving Grounds. Each Major Air Command,

followed by issuing Movement Orders directing movement of their personnel.

In mid-June$ when it became apparent that the operation would extend

over a longer

to review the

for extension

period of time

reaming status

or replacement

placement of 31 augmentation

than had been anticipated, it became necessary

of the ent&e Task Group to determine the need

of persomel in the KPG. We had planned for qe-

personnel whose TDY tours would of mission

necessity & in excess of the 179 day limitation. Extension of the opera-

tional period necessitated estalilishrnentof a programto insure that a much “

larger nusiberof people now required for conduct of the operation either (1)

be returned to the 21 and replacedby parent organization or (2) extended

beyond 179 days under authority granted Joint Task Force SXVEH in the USAF

Movement

The

NWSREEL

Directive.

Task Group 7.4 complement established at Johnston Island for operation

amounted to only six officers and one airman. The bulk of Task

Group 7.4 personnel engaged in NEWSREEL were based at Hickam ~ Force Base

and Barbers Point Naval Air Station. Personnel at these two locations

totalled appro~ately 82 officers and 302 enlisted personnel.

44

AFwl/1’lo

/’

-. ...u

#f&Chapter 3 - Administrative Services

The Task Group 7.4 Administrative Services Activity included a Hessage

Center and Courier Service, a Correspondence Management acitivity, an orders

issuing agency, a publications distribution point, and a muster and safety

reporting activity. During Operation HARDTA~, 79 Task Group directives

were published, and SO Special Orders and/or endorsements thereto were issued,

the latter authorizing”emergency and morale leaves and TDY from EPG.

Durtig the operation, a problem area was encountered involving the

inadequacy of reproduction facilities which were established in the Test

Base Unit. Necessary equipment was on hand,”but trained operators were not

available, causing some difficulty in getting reproduction sertice as quickiy

as desired. Future planning will include a complete reproduction facility,

with trained operators as a part of the Task Group Headquarters.

45

+’Acnl/bu3

.

f<

Chapter h - SecuAty

During Operation HARDTACK, only two security violations were reported

by Task Group 7.4 elements. These involved inadequate safe security ti

which no compromise of classified matter was concerned. This record was

achieved primmily through the cooperation of all Task Group 7.4 agencies

j,lrequiring all personnel to familiarize themselves thoroughly with Air

Force, Joint Task Force SEVEH and Task Group directives regarding proper

security discipline.

During the planning stages of the Operation$ necessary Task Group

Security Regulations were publishedand distributed for the purpose of

providing guidance to all participants prior to their departure for the KPG.

Additional guidance in the foraro~ WPfs, letters and supplements to

directives was designedti insure that necessary security infer-tionwas

available to each echelon. The security criteria were forwarded to the Ta’sk

Group elements sixty days prior to the commence-t of the operational

period.

The Air Police

badging of all Task

permanent Operation

Section of the Test Base

Group personnel. During

Unituas responsible for the

the operational period, lCJ17

HARDTACK badges were issued to Task Group personnel.

1137 temporary badges were also issued for those personnel requiring in-

frequent access to controlled areas. (Reference figure h)

46

. . ... ..._

{\

Awl Iun

J“”~ During the operation it was necessary to hire native labor at the

camps on the vwious weather islands. Arrangements were made to pay the

natives at Kusaie with

the only other”islands

made in cash.

broken lots of food. At Tarawa

where indigenous personnel were

and Kapingamarangi$

hired, payment was

To expedite payment of these laborers, it was necessary to estab~sh

definite methods of payment in each case.

To effect payment in broken lots of food, the island Magistrate

certified to the hours worked and signed for appropriate amounts of food,

which was paid on the basis of the current retail value of simiiliaritems

in the local store.

In the case of payments made in cash, the

authorized the appointmemt”of a Class ‘tAltagent

trip to each canrpsite to make payments.

An additional expense was incurred on the

Finance Officer at Eniwetok

who would make a monthly

island of Naqru, where

the Australian authorities asked payment of guard fees to natives who

guarded aircraft landing at the Nauru airport. Prompt payment was essential

in order to maintain good relations with the Nauru administration; there-

fore

such

payment was effected expeditiously upon receipt of each bi~ for

charges.

Two other minor charges were handled in the same manner as the

ward fees.

The above procedures were considered satisfactory and it is recommended

that similiar procedures be adopted for subsequent tests.

The attached charts indicate funds utilization during Operation

HARDTACK.

L9

)im410

.

#

>a

&

mQ

Eli

I

t

1 * c 9 s

0 0 0 0 00 0 e 0 0 00 0 0- 0 0 00

; o- ~“ m-o- 0

0 0 00to ●

d

Qmo-0wm

N0m

i

mlQN●

NWUHO

, .=-=

f-

— =Ua

Lwu)

~ 0. *.....”*. .::;. ~“...“” **.. * ...*...*. ●**.”...*,,. . ...*...* Q *.**””...● O-O.....: . . ...*.... ::

**.,..”*”.”*”’*”,”” ‘L

z~

.. .. ...**.● ......”” . ...*”● O..***.. . . . ...* ~

., .*.....* . ..””..**..*.* ● *.. ..:::::”.. .**.. . ...*. . ..*..*.. ,. ..**

.: ...0. . ...***... ● **....., . ..*. ...*..... . . . . . . . .. . . . ...*”.*””:: .,.,.

.OO O,.... . **......* ● *” *~.**””. . . . . . . c

4z

. ..9.... ● ..””””..... ....●...””*”” “.= .....**...,...●*..*.***.* ●

......... ...........:::::”.;::::::::: . ...●.......*” ● *~.*@.*... ....*** . .......... ...**. ..0

kc

.............*.*...............*.**.... ........*.......“. ”. ., ***.... . ..**.

. . *..**..*. ● ..*.*.“ .

tI

~4

,“● (. “. I.:... .

,

. .

II I I I I I

og o 0 0

3

0&~ g g : ~

o0- 0 #3g$~;:cg

al Q r- 0

En......,0

● .*.*.

00000- 0

d*m**

dca#<P

iI((

.

hfwmo

2

FIGURE 6

.... .=...

-s”f

Ch~ptcr 6 - Ground Safety “

Task Group 7.4 Accident expe~ience during Operation HARDTACK was.

as fOllCMs:

1. Pcrsor:alInjuries:

HEADQUARTFI~ 3 1 $171.00

TESTAIRCRAFT UNIT 8 0 S6.00

T’FSTBASE (~T 36 1 552:00

TESTSERVICES uNIT 30 6 -1800*00

T~AJJ 77 8 $2S79.00

J

2. Property Damage:

ORGANIZATION VEHICLES AIRCRAFT EQPMl! DOLLAR

DAMAGED DAMAGED DAMAGED C~T

HEADQuARTERs 2 0 0 $ 16.00

TESTAIRCRAFT UNIT o 1 1 ~.oo

TEST BASE UNIT 4 3 2 3882.00

——

TFSTSERVICES UNIT 2 1 0 80.00

TOTAL 8 5 2 $3994.00

L

52

-,”, 1-

. .. .~...“.-

@--”

crossing the runw~= Signs were placed at the entrance to

areas, indicating the trees of vehicles authorized and the

A directive was Fublished by the ~9~lst~ outlinine vehicle

the airfield.

flight line

speed limits.

operations on

Sports injuries accounted for 60% of the minor injuries reported

during the operation most of which occurred while participating in

.swimminC,softball or volleyball.

as a direct result of falls caused

exertion and inexperience. Due to

The majority of these injuries were

by over-exuberance of players, over-

the physical t~.rrainin the swimming

and recresti.onalareas, lacerations and abrasions were predominant. The -

seemingly hiCh percentage of minor sports injuries does not reflect a

deficiency in the program, because a great amount of off-duty time is

spent in some type of sport. The percentage actually reflects an excep-

tional record of treatment of minor injuries, preventing them from becoming

Illostt~elf cases.

55

Afwm

.

Ch %er ? -F

Legal and Discipline

Durjn::the operational pried

a~ainst Task Group 7.I!Jpersonnel:

25 disciplinary actions were taken

HQ TAU TBU TSU TOTAL

Article 1$ 0 1 7 12 20

Most

Summary Courts-krtials o 0 3 2 5

Special Courts-Martials o 0 0 0 0

of the above actions were n~cessa~ as a direct result of intemperate

consu.mptjonof alcoholic bev=rages:..

?)runkand”~isordwly 17

Dri~ng while under the influence 1

Fighting (Drunk) 4_

Theft 1

Miscellaneous 2

Fifty cases were invcsti~ated during the operational period:

Theft and Pilferage 28

Misconduct 22

To insure that a legal capability was readily available, a judge”-

advocate from the 61.t86thAir Base Wing, Hickam Air Force Base, T. H. was

furnished when requested to advise and provide legal assistance to Task

Group 7.4. The jud~e advccate was present at the EPG during two weeks in

M~ch} one W~pk in M=Y~ and ten days jn July. Dwing the organizational

~riod in March a regulation prtainin~ to disciplinary matters was published.

The l.rEa.lofficer held briefings for officers appointed to try summary cou%s-

mart~al, p-rs~n~el officers and clerks designated to prepare charge sheets

~nd ;Uic3 paper~.

G-I22 May 195C Pacific Air Forces, by ~neral Order 31j attached ~

Fcrce p-rsomnel assio~.edto Joint T sk Force s~~ to the 6b86th Air Base58

(

f

Wing for courts-surti~

Article 1s, and certain

to a request from Joint

jurisdiction, administration of punishment under

board actions. This attac~ent was made pursuant

Task Force SEVEN to Pacific M.r Forces. On 10 June

19s8 the Commander 6b86th tiBase Wingby General Order 12 redelegate

authority to Commander Task Group 7.~ to convene S-v Courts-*rti~

administer punishment under Article 1s, UCIZl(Figure 7). Prior to the

and

attachment by Pacific h Forces the Commarder Task Group 7.4 was authorized

to exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction and to administer i

punishment under Article 1S, UCMJ over personnel assigned or attached to Task

Group 7.4 pursuant to the authority contained in ~~ Bood Message ~~~$-~1

October 19~7 as amended, Task Group 7.4 Operations Orde~ 1-58 md hticle 24s

Ucw ●

57

.1

10June1956

sectionDISCIPLIKARYCONJ!RDL- Recimion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IDISCIPLIMRYCOIWROL.............................................. II

1. DISCIP’KRARXC~O~ ~mere.1Order-no.15,th~theedqtierc,16A-t 1957,partaln~astoa@lmll~ COmtrO1O18re~cloded”

11. DIllCIP~ CONI’ROL.1. Theorgaolcatlowlletedbelow,in-cludlwtheir●bordioatouniteuhicharephysicdlybested10the&vaiiM Id.ande, JohnstonIdland,IOmJeleia,or2aivetokAtoH,areaee~ed orattachedtothe@86thAirSaSoVlaS(PAC.AF),fordieeipli~controlandedmia~stration of military ~uat Ice, iuclwlingthaimpoeitlonot~t~bmeatunderArticle15,sadth.processingof=tterere@rlogaction by en of flcar erercieinggeneralcourts-imrtlelJuriedictloain●ccordeacevitb~omnto betveeatheCommandersconcerned.

2. Oowmal,special,nod•~ cotie-- inlJuriadiationwillb. exercised by the C~der, 6&66thA* EaseWing(PACAF),farallunitelistedbelov, ead theireuhordinateunitetiicbera“~eice.llyloc~tedlatheHaniianlelande,Johantomlel~, KwaJslelm,or2nivetokAtti,Woesotberwieoindicatedbelou.

WE2qPaoiflc~~oreesEq@+6&hAim’ma l?ins@hO-lAircraftDellveryOrou?Det*chaeat12q1X6 AirTranePortWinS(E)c-1.24-2 Mobile TrainingDetachmentEq60@dAirIntelligenceServiceOroupXq&X15th.Air’Pomta.1GroupTam 103,l-h 8pecialUeaponeSQuaAroa6g28tbsecurlt~FliatDe$acbmcnt~,1358thAeronauticalChartandxnfox-matio~squulroll

6001stt?pecie.1Inveetig~tioaeSquadron(Xa)76th.A* Rescue @kadXVJU

~ Weather Reoonnnieeanoe8~uadroa5thCnawauaicationaCoontructioaDat~cbment~ Air~terlelYorcee,PacificAreaBqPacificUCS Area~ lfltWeatharVinglfq326th—A-tiDiYioiOUNq2ndAirRcccucOroupAirFarce-CivilAir I%trolLiaimonOffice30iutTackForce-7~g51stSupportSquadson(Teet)1253rd AAcs t3quXlronOffice of theFieldRepresentative,Far-at19t@thAACSSquadron

L4XATIOl!liickemxirForceBase,T. &?IickamAirForce2-ese,T. FLHickamAirForceBeee,T. Ii.KiC- AirFOrCU~~et~.g.HickamAirForce2aee,T. E.HickamAirForceBase,T. 11.Hick= AirForceSese,T. ILEickamAirForceBaee,T.E.KickeaAirrOrCO8e.esjT.E.EickamAir~orceBaxe,T.H.

Hit- Alx~orcoSaae,T.R.EloknmAtiForce-Se,T.ILHickamAir~orceX-e,T.E.ElckamAirForce=*e,T.H.ticelcrAirForcetie.T.H.UhuelorAirForceSaee,T.H.VbeetlerAlrForceBaee,T.E.~ni&~Air ForceBane,T. H.UheelerAir Force Base) T. E.Camp@tlin,Ronolulu,T. E.Enfwctok AtollEnivetokAtollEnlvetokAtollElckamAirForceBase,T. S.Kwajaleim,~

3* Underthe●upewiaoryauthorityoftheCommander,6kf!6thAirBaneViog(PACAF),thecozzmdersof theunitsindicatedbelowareauthorizedtoconvenewmmerycourte-~ld forthetrialof Air Force personnelintheareaindicated.InaccordancewithAir?’orCeRegulationn-h,AirForcepereonnolinsuchareaaarealeoattkchedfordieclplinarycontrol,includingthe lmpoaitionofpunir+hmantunder Article15.

a. EoivetokArea--Commander,TackOroup 7.4Com.ander, ~951etSupportSquadron(Teet)

b. KWajalelnArea -- Commander,l$@2thAAC9Squadron

c. JohnstonIeland--Conmnder,JohnstonIalnodSam

FOR TSE COM4ANOER:

!1●

DI=RXEVX’IONJS

58

LtColonel,USAFDirector,AdminServicco

J%’

.-

.-

PART IV

OPERATIONS

60

MWUHO

,1)

I‘1’h‘1,, ii; l\,.1’,;111,

11I ‘1I

I I 1 1 I

.11(11

I‘1’

1’1

31

AFWUHO

t ~i??. r“d~~c=eci Part,IV ;f this repcrt ~!illbe tc pcrtray the

opera-....alaspects of the participation of Task GroJp 7.4 in Operation

(HARDTACK. This foreword will trace the scope of Task Group 7.4 opera-

t~ong. Chapter 2 till deal with the organization ok Task Group 7.k’~d

the operational reasons for this type of organization. Part IV will

tkez be broken down intc other chapters which will relate ifiseinede-

taii the ~jor facets of the Task Group operation as follOws: Weather

reportir.gand forecasting, cp9ration of test aircraft, aerial support

fcr the ~peration$ contrcl of air traffic within the Eniwetok Control

Are&~ comrur.icaticnsand radiological responsibilities concerned with

the gaikering and l’xwdli.ngof radiological samples.

Although information was meager at,the time, some ;ery preliminary

plmr.ing on cmrrzications arid-aircraftrequirements for Operatior

HMWTACK was s+~rted as early as October 1956. By tha the Mat Joint

‘TaskFcrcs SEVEN held the first planning meeting fcr Operation HARDTACK

e~ 2@ February l%7j Task Group ‘7.4kad fairly solid requirements .OC

cormnwisations systems and on the numbers and type cf aircraft required

tcr supp3rt.roies. Additions of project aircraft were later made after

Armed Forces Special Weapcns Praject approved the projects

in Operation HARDTACK.

March? & preliminary ‘mxk message was drafted and sezt tG

WSAl?fcr them to publish”directing the major commands cf

t: suppcrt ARDCP wh~ would be dasi~atec? as ths Air Fcrce

Agmcy. This directive wher.published cn 29 April ty Head-

6/))

Awl Inn

(

i@th Test Group (Nuclear) to work directly with major commands in

formulating definite plans for the operation.

In the months following the receipt of this prelhd.nary book mes-

sage9 Headquarters~ Task Group 7.4 was active in the Pla~ing s~ges.

outlining specific requirements and policies for the participating

organizations. Many documents were is=ed d~ing this P~nning P~ses

the following being the most important: Task Group 7.4 Planning

Directive published on

on 6 January 1958; and

9 January 19s8.

The Task Group 7.4

tions Order on 15 March

document for activities

17 October 1957; Task Group 7.4 Operations Plan

Headquarters, USAF Movement Directive on

Operations Plan, Mde effective aS an OPera-

19s8, was to be the directing and guiding

throughout the entire operation. This started

the second phase of Operation Hl@DTACK, that of build-up in the forward

area. At this time, all units came under the control of Task Group 7.4

and the majority of the ttie~

ticing and rehearsing for the

I%e nuclear testing for

of the first event, YUGCA, on

cl’uded35 nuclear detonations

up to the first shot, was spent on prac-

first event.

Operation HARDTACK conuaencedwith the firing

28 April. The test

at Bniwetok, Bikini

(See Figure 1). This is the largest nuclear test

series itself ti-

SXXIJokstin Islands.

series yet conducted

by the United States. Aircraft operated by or under the operational con-

trol of Task Group 7.4 participated in every shot fired during HARDTACK.

In support of the operations the aerial support elements carried 60,901

passengers and 2,626,26S pounds of cargo. These aircraft flew a total of

10,8U flybg-hours from the beginning of the operational phase of

63

AFwlllw

(

@DTACK in March 1958 until its conclusion cm 18 ALWSt 1958.

The sampling aircraft flew2b0 sampling missions and logged

1,635 fifing houm. The effects aircraft flew ~7 successful missions

on 18 shots and logged 3h7 flylng hours. The Asrial Photography Ele-

ment flew 32 missions on certain specified shots and logged 199 fly.

ing hours in support of both documentary and technical photography

requirements. The Weather Reconnaissance Element flew 334 flights

and logged 3,696 fl@ng hours obtaining weather information over =

area that stretched fr~ the Territory of Hawaii to a point west of

Guam and covered well over 10,000~000 square miles, in the Central

Pacific. In addition to the flying activities listed above~ during this

operational phase the Task Group operated weather repor-tingand communications

stations at eight (8) island sites remote from the testing location..

While the operational phase was still in progress~ some elements

completed their projects and rolled up their personnel and equipent and

returned to their home station. First of these was the Navy Effects

Element which completed its scheduled participation on the ELDER shot OB .

28 June. They were followed shortly by the Air Force Effects Element

which completed their mission on the POPLAR Event on 12 July.

When on

shct for the

celled there

Eniwetok and

27 July it was officially announced that PINON, the open

United Nation Observers and news personnel~ had been can-.

were only two (2) very small shots left to be fired at

the two (2) high altitude missile shots tc be fired at

Johnston Island. At this time$ weather reporting requirements were

decreased in the Eniwetok Proving Ground and immediate rcll-up of Weather.

6b

AFWHO

(’

.

Ch %er 2 -Y’s

Organization and Man~wer

The general responsibility

Task Group 7.4 can be separated

1. That of providing test

which Joint Task Force - delegated to

into five (5) general sreass

aircraft to obtain scientific information

from the individti detonations

2. That of providing ah transportation for militsry and civilian per-

sonnel connected with the test series.

3. That of providing supply and maintenance support for all air-

craft asaigned to Task Group 7.4.

and

4. That of providing services such as weather Informatlonp Search

Rescue (sAR) and airport termlnd facilities.

5. That of control-l- all aircraft movement within the Eniwetok

Control Area.

To perform these responsibilities, Task Group 7.4was organized into a

headquarters and three (3) su~rd~ate @ts_ The three (3) s“~rdtiw ‘

units were further subdivided into elements to carry out theb vsrlous

duties.

Headquarters~ Task Group 7.4was organized with a Command Section

and three (3) Dlrectirates; nrsonnel ~ tiistration~ ~ra~ons? ~-+

Materiel. These three (3) Directorates guided the tits fi the~ PI-

for the accomplishment of their mission. m addition to nor~ st~f

activities~ the Operations and Materiel Directorates also carried out

operational duties. The Materiel Directorate operated a Maintenance Control

Unit for coordtiating and expediting the accomplishment of all aircraft

mahtenance.

craft within

headquazzters

The Directorate of Operations actively controlled all air-

the Eniwetok Control Area. Manpower spaces for the entire “

came Nom +&e resources of the 495Mh Test ~OUP (Nuc~e=)

of the Mr Force Specisl lJeapon3Center.

mum

.-=.* 4.X%.

-he Test Aticre.ftUnit was res-@n~ible for providing test aircraftf

to obtain scientific Information from the tidividual detonations. All

atrcraft provided

assigned to TAU.

B-5’7DIsfrOIll SAC)

for the purpose of collection of scientific data were

These included 16 B-5’7~s(ten B-57BIs froxnARDO, six

provided to obtain perticulati and gaseous samples

from the nuclear clouds, two (2) B-36~s$ one (1) ~V and one (1) C-97

provided to obtain technlcsl data from the high altitude detonations, and

one (1) B-52 and four (4) Navy jet fighters provided to obtain effects

Information. Suitable mannl.ngtables for these u.nitswere developed in

cooperation with the commands which furnished the alrcrsft and the personnel

to fill the spaces were provided by these co-s.

Test Base Unit was responsible for providing inter-island and l.nter- -

atoll transpmtatione To perform this mission they were furnished with

five (5) C-54CSS eight (8) L-20fss sti (6) H-19’s and nine (9) H-21~s.

Two (2) of the C-54ts and the eight (8) L-20ts were provided by ARDC.

Three (3) of the C-54ts end all of the helicopters were provided by PACX’.

Augmentation personnel uere assigned to the Test Base Unit fiomthe 4952nd

Support Squadron to cover the increased load of operating the additiond

L-20~s. Flight crews and mahten-ce perso~el for the Wee (3) C-54tS

and the helicopters were provided by PACAF.

Additionslly~ the Test Base Unit was responsible for providing

supply and maintenance support for

Augmentation manning to carry this

the 4952nd Support Squadron of the

all aircraft assigned to Task ~OUP 7.4.

extra load was provided by ass-

4950th Test Group to the Test Base Utit.

The

services

included

Test Services Unit had the responsibility of providing those

normally provided by the Mllitsry JUr Transport Service. These

weather imformation~ search and rescues communicatlonst photigraphy~

.

and airprt termlnsl facilities. The aircraft assigned to this unit

67

NW/tic

veregtin (10) UB-5Q1S for weaih=-=%bnnaiss poses? seven (7) SA-161S.

f~ Se=ch and fiSCUS and weather island resupply mlsslons, thee (3) C-54~s

@ LiJO (2) RE-50~s for photographic missions. Personnel to operate these

aircraft d to carry out the fictions of operattig eight (8) weather

islands, a weather central, W Force cormnunicatlons,allilitary Mr

Transport Service Termlnd and documentary photograph were supplied by MATS.

This was the orgtiization which Task Group 7.4 set up to plan for and

to conduct Operation HARDTACK, See Figure 19 Chapter 3 - Command Section

for a presentation of the organization.

68

Wunc

(

---- -_J-....

Ch&er 3 - Weather Operations

fWeather cmditionsj putic~uly wind dkectlons and velocitles$

are of considerable sign~ic~ce f.nconductiw a nucle= *st series*

Since the possibility of hazard to life and property fiomradloactive

fallout exists in neaz-lyall nuclear detonations the commander

responsible for authoriz~g ~e.deto~tion Of a ~cle~ device must

be completely bformed on the fdl out pattern to k eXpected@ Her

weather factors~ such as cloud cover$ precipitation, and visibility

which might have an adverse effect on the gathering of scientific data,

or which might intensify the local effects of shock and blast must te

considered. To provide Joint Task Force SEVEN with a weather reporting

and fQrecasthg capability to meet these requlrements$ _Commander~Joint -

Task Force SEVEN requ!red Task Group 7.4 to provide and train”the

personnel for a Weather Central Element$ a Weather Reporting Element,

with widely dispersed reporting stations throughout the Centrsl Pacific

area adjacent to the Enlwetok fiovlng Grounds and a Weather Reconnaissance

Element oprating ten (10) WB-50 aircraft and having a capability of

gathering synoptic data over a tremendous area.

As stated above, Task Group 7.4 was responsible to furnish the

personnel to man the Joint Task Force Weather Central Element. The

Weather Centrals however~ was under the operational

Task Force SEVEN. Its mission was to collect, plot

information concerning the Pacific Wean srea~ with

Central Pacific and the Eniwetok Roving Groundj to

control of Joint

and analyze weather

emphasis on the

issue severe weather

advisories and typhoon Warningsj and to ma3ntain technical control of

and to coordinate the land station weather observing and aircraft weather

reconnaissance Progru.

69

MwlJt+o

&e Weather Central Element gath~red its weather data from many

fsOurcesc In addition to the weather reporting stations operated by

the Task Group 7.4 Weather ~port~g ~e~lent~ ~ the ~-50 equlPPed

Weather Reconnaissance Element9 the Weather Central gathered data from

weather units afloat on Task ~OUP 7.3 *1Ps9 weather observations from

Task tioup 7.3 Secuity Patrol a~cr~g U= S. weather ~eau observ@?

stations at MAJURO~ PONAPE, WAKE, and TRUK~ Naval Station at Kwajaleins

“and routine intercept of the Pacific Ocean area weather broadcast network.

The officers assigned to the Weather Central reported to the Joint

Task Force SEVEN Meteorological Centers Pearl Harbors T. H. on 20 January

1958 for sti (6) weeks trafig in tropical weather

airmen assigned reported on 24 February for two (2)

The Element then moved to the forward area arriving

analysis. me

weeks of training. -

between 6-13 March.

The Weather Central became operational 15 March 1958.

During the entire ~pratlon9 briefings were held for the Commander,

Joint Task Force SEVEN end his staff prior to each test event. Stand~d

tfmes for forecasts were H-Hour minus 18 hours, minus 12 hourss and minus

ak (6) hours. At times? when conditions were ma.rglnslor very critical

special.briefings and forecasts were made as required. The following

statistics indicate

these forecasts

Month

April

wJuneJuly

The missicn of

the high degree of vslidity ma5.ntainedin making

Forecasts Hits Busts

39 37 273 6565 62 ;40 39 1

the Weather Reporting and Forecasting Element was

to provide surface and bslloon sounding meteorological observations as

required by the Weather Central on P-y Island. TO accomplish thiss

b~’”

(“

eight (8) reporting stations wz%%siitablished. These were located at,2

I@TiGAllARANGI, NAURU, KUSAIIZ,RONGELAP, UJELANG, WGTHO, UTERIK and

TAIWA. Operation of camp facilities was the responsibility of this

element at KAPINGAMARANG19 NAURU9 KUSAIE and TAIUWA. Task Group 7.5

operated camp facilities at the remaining locations. Activation of these

locations began on 4 February and was completed on 5 April 1958.

On 11 AwU 1958~ the Weather Oentral Element conducted the first

maximum effort shalmdown of all reporting locations. lluri6gthe period

19.30 April 1958 a continuous maximum schedule was Undertaken with.sll

stations participating. Operational commitments~ both normsl and maximum

effort observations were met during the enttie operation.

During May 1958, five (5) personnel from this element were transferred

to Johnston Island to augment the detachment there in support of the

NEWSREEL Project.

During June 1958, the NAURU Weather Station was closed and moved to

Bikini to replace the facilities of the USS BOXER which was deployed to

Johnston Island to support NEWSREEL.

On 27 July9 CJTF-SEVEN directed the roll-up of SU Weather Island

sites except the Bikini site due to the cancellation of the PIXON Event.

It was decided that the Enlwetok and Bildni stations could provide adequate

coverage of remaining events.

The mission of the Weather Reconnaissance Element was to provide

inflight meteorological data$ perform tracking missions and radiological

safety missions as required by Commmderj Joint Task Force SEVEN.

The first WB-50 aircraft arrived at Eniwetok on Xl March 1958. mfs

was the first of ten (10) WB-50 aircraft that had been decided as necesssry

to perform the weather

WB-50 aircraft for the

mission for HARDTACK. MATS supplied all of the

o~ration. The 57th Weather Reconnaissance Squdron,

ffwuno

71

/

(’

~~ally based at Hicksm AFB formed the nucleus of this element, It was

augmented by afrcraft and crews from the 55th Weather Reconnaissance

strength up to the ten (10) required.

ti March, a transition schedule was set up for incomhg crews so

that all pilots would receive ADF letdo~s~ GCA apwoachest ~ day d

night landlngs at Fhlwetok. Practice missions commenced on18 March 1958,

flying one (1) weather track per day i-npreparation for actual missions

commencing 1 April 1958. The weather tracks required from ten (10) to

twelve (12) hours of fllght and consisted of 1S1OO to lS500fle outbo~

legs which were flown at 10,000 feet and then a reverse of this leg, with

at least fo= (4) hous of the return leg f~o~ at 30~oo0 feet~

During the practice phase$ a deficiency in communications between

the aircraft and the high fkequency radio station operated by the Weather

Central at ELMER Islemd was discovered. The problem was resolved by the

addition of more chamelss ~ hcrease from tm (2) to five (5) au~orized~

which allowed sufficient flexibility to establish communlcations”on the

frequency with the best propagation characteristics for the time and @ace.

h

a point

Weather

Aprll~ of the sixty-tie missions flowns the mission credit point,

at which sufficient data had been collected to be useful to the

Centrals was reached in every case. ‘Xhreeflights aborted> two

(2) prior to reaching the mission credit point and one (1) beyo-xlmlsslon

credit point. The flights aborting prior to reaching mission credit

point returned to Eniwetoks changed gear to the stadby aticraft, and ccm-

pleted the mission successi%lly within the required time limlt. Seven of

the mfssions had late take-offs.

72

Afwmo

—_-,..—

(“

-%uring the month of April the ml.ssionrequirements were acceleratedf

from the one (1) per day planned to two (2) per day. On 20 AprU, the

mission schedule was boosted up to three (3) missions per day, two (2)

esrly morning flights and one (1) afternoon flight$ with take~ff times

at 0430 and 0500 for the mornl.ngflights d 1630 for the evening fllght.

In May, the Weather Reconnaissance Element flew seventy-eight

missions of which seventy-three were weather reconnaissance missions~

four (4) were cloud sampler missions end one (1) was

safe mission combined with a weather reconnaissace-

take+ff occurred during May and six (6) aborts were

of the aborts were

of miseions credit

For the month

beyond mission credit point. Two

>

a three (3) hour rad-

Only one (1) late

experienced. TWO

flights aborted short

but were not requfied to be made up.

of May, mission requtiements for D minus 2 and D minus 1

days were increased to three (3) for each day. Ilzreemissions were flown

on eighteen days I.nlfay$two (2) missions on eleven (Ii) days and one (1)

mission on two (2) days. The element maintafied the capability for three

(3) mbsions per day throughout the month but a lull in

during the middle of the month resulted in several days

missions per day were required.

shooting activity

when only two (2)

During the month of June~ seventy-nine missions were flown, seventy-

one being weather missions, four (4) cloud sampler mbsiom~ thee (3)

cyclone reconnaissance missions and one (1) ferry flight. There was only

one (1) late take-off during this period ud of nine (9) aborts five (5)

occurred prior to mission credit point. Only four (4) of these five (5)

required a make up flight to complete the mission. One ferry mission

was flown as a result of an aticrsft aborting the track and landing at

Wake Island. The aircraft was femied to Hicks.mfor repairs and later flew

a weather mission on the return flight to Eniwetik.

nAWUHO

#“ ~‘For June, tission req~rements for D fius two (2) and Dnrlnw one (1)

*S .ernainedat Three (3) per day. During this period, four (4) missions

were flown on tio (2) ~ys$ three (3) per day on s~teen -s, ~o (2) Pere

day on eleven (n) days and one (1) per day once.

During the month of July mission requirements for D minus two (2) and

D minus one (1) days remained at three (3) per x. During this period-79

weather tracks were flown. Operation NEWSREEL at Johnston Island required

tkto(2) weather tracks per day-beginning 25 July. To meet requirements at

toth Eniwetok and Johnston, it was decided b move the pefiodic maintenance

capabilL@ of the Weather Reconnaissance Element to Hickam AFB and to stage

aircrtit there from Eniwetok. One (1) aircraft was to depart Eniwetok

dtily and give weather reports for that area on its outbo-md track. In.

bound % Hickam, it would give a report on Johnston Island area weather.

A flight on a reverse track wo~d depart Hickam daily for Eniwetok, giving ‘

;hc r.quired dsil.ycoverage. h 26 July, however, it W= decided that

weaz”hs~reconnaissance flights were no longer needed for Eniwetok. Between

That date and 1 August, sl.1the WB-SO aircraft departed for Hickam. u

fu-.l.he~NEWSREEL weather reconnaissance was performed from Hickam AFB.

Daring HARDTACK, the ?Jeather

hau.rsand 33.4missims. Of thgse

Reconnaissance Element flew 3696

32bwere weather reconnaissance missions

~=n (LO) were cloud sampler missions. For a complete resume ofWB-SO fly-

i~ activities, see Figure 2.

A highly trained organization of specialists in the Weather Centeral.

Element collected weather data from a varie~ of sources, analyzed this

data and with a high degree of accuracy furnished to Commanders Jotit T~k

Force SEVEN the tiather forecasts vital to the successful.firing of a

74.

AFwutlo

f

R orting and Weather Reconnaissance Elements was started. At the same-.

ttie requirements for cloud sampling were decreased and most of the

personnel and equipment of this element were returned to the states.

By the the that the FIG detice was fired on 18 August, the Test

Aircraft Unit had been reduced to a sampling and decontamination ele-

ment. The Test Services Unit had been reduced to a Search and Rescue

(SAR), Communications, Heather Central and MATS Terminal Element. These

elements were quickly rolled-up and redeployed to the 2X.

C9z

f-

,.

0m. .0*

i=

10r-

$

/

m. .:

0m. .s

m*. .0*

00

AFwutw

/ -----

\

d’.

{nuc ear test series. Over a sustained period of five (~) months, these

specia3J.stsprodded this

which the Weat&r Central

infomnation. A Iionts share of the data from

made its forecasts was furnished by other Task

Group 7.L Elements concerned tith the gathefi~ of weather information.

The Weather Reporting Element with eight (8) island stations outside the

Eniwetok Proting Groud, as well as two (2) from witldrr,functioned smoothly

in its data gatheting respo~i~iu~. The Weather Reco~ss=ce ~em~nt

with its ten (10) WB-50 aircraft flew 324 weather reconnaissance missions

and 3696 hours over an area reaching from Hawaii b points west of Guam,

covering over 10,000,000 square miles of the Central Pacific h fulfilling

its responsibility to the network weatkr information gat-krlng.

..76

Nwutlb

d-Ch~ier 4- Test Aircraft

(“ part of-the mission ch=ged h Task Group 7 ●h w= ~ Profi~e~ ~n-..

tain and operate aircraft in support of diagnostic and weapons effects.

test nlissions. These aircraft supported a large number of scientific pro-

jects gathering scientific data. Most of these aircraft were operated by

the Test Aircraft Unit. Some of the *craft in this classification were

operated by the Test Services Unit. These were aircraft supporting tech-

nical and documen~ photography projects. ~gure 3 shows the complete

aircraft participation in nuclear test events. This chart shows all sir-.

craft airborne at H-Hour, both test support and test sircraft, as well as

those test sircraft which were airborne after H-Hour. Test sircraft par- -

ticipation may be divided roughly into four (4) categories: Samplers,

effects aircraft, instrument ctiers and photographic drcrtit.

The mission of the Sampling Element was to collect particulate and ,

gaseous samples from within the nuclear cloud. The nucleus of t~s org=-

izati’onwas the 4Y26th Test Squadron (San@ng), a subordinate unit- of the

h950th Test Group (Nucle= ). The 4926th operated ten (10) B-~7B @craft,

especially modified ta perform its primary mission of collecting samples

from nuclear clouds. For Operation HARDTACK, the Sampling Element was

a~mented by six (6) specially modified B-~7D aircraft of the L080th

Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SAC). Aircraft of the Sampling Element

participated in all of the nuclear tests in the Eniwetok Proving Ground.

Only the TEAK and ORANGE shots at Johnston Island did not require the

participation of the sampler aircraft.

On a typical ssmplhg mission the sample

scientific observer took off prior to H-Hour.

a part of the test array and was placed in a

AFWtiHO

controller aircrdt with a

This aircraft was considered

safe position

71 ~CY1’REJ,J?AQADrD m

. .

NwL/t40

.

AIWLIW

/,79

. .

:,

t-Z

.

4a

i

.

‘1

a

. “-80

AFWUHO

1

i

1

I

)

. I

.,, .

I I I

Zt3#I I I I 1 I

m-t-*’m

‘ml

1-

;Ol,‘a

F

@

u)

*

m

: lH=t=l= *

m:l;-*. -r

D

t

a

_LIJrd. N

+

’40 ●,<0

0 -“--+2nOmmm j

n

—

—

Q

IQQ

1-“Zw>w

82

(

--l I+

I

i?

j

t)

—

m—

—

—

F>.Qt

❑

1co*

—

m—

—

—

L

T

I

.1Om

J1-Z:LIJc>3u:

>u d

83

.

d-

84

I I

)r

n 1a, a

.

.

.

I

tkbl

B+

m

.-, fun

g-

al( -&d direction from ground zero varying with the expec_tidyield of the de-

“vice to be detonated. After the detmation, the controller watched the

development of the nuclear cloud and observed its drift and configuration.

The sampler aircraft took off at pre-determined times after H-Hour and

were mctored toward the saxpler controller by the Air Operations Center,

The sampler controller then vectored the sampler aircraft into the cloud

at the points where he eqected b obtain the ,desiredsamples.

recorded radiation readings obtained on the special instruments

them to the scientific controller, who took this information on

written record and on-a tape recorder. The requirements of the

The crews

and read

both a

scientific

laboratories were met in most cases during KARDTACK. At some times

weather conditions prevented -mum results from being obtained. On

other shots, failure of the device to perform as predicted made changes

of altitude necessary b obtain suitable samples. Ftgure 4 illustrates

nuclear test events; the desired fissions to be obtained in the samples

and the results obtained. All bars b the right of the required

line indica+-s a sample as great or greater than required. Bars

left show sample sizes smaller than desired.

fissions

to the

o

In planning for Operation HARDTACK, the aircrew reqtiementi for sam-

pler aircraft were computed on the basis of the number of nuclear clouds

to be sampled and the amount of radiation qosure that the crew members

were to get in obtaining the desired sample. The inclusion of several ad-

ditional shots to the program and the miscalculation of exposures on certain

shots resul+tedin some aircrew members receiting maximum exposures before

the end of.the operation. This necessitated the replacement of some of the

B-S7 pilots and the training of additional observers from volunteers among

Task Group 7.4 rated personnel. Figure ~ shows tie radiation exposure of

PRIVACYACT

.

MPFjRIALREh

III(I(IIIIII4I1II

JIII

— III

=u

S-----

00,. u

31450.0

0,”.0

00n

Y I 1 1 I 1

I I II I

I I I 1I i

m

1 al 01

1 Wr w

II ;03:1 2030

I u

1125851540IA, A

I I I r 1 I I

I

I I

~1 I I I -I 01.’ 0- 1

FIGURE ~

CYACTMATERIALREMOVED

‘%q-

(

AFwut+o

$- allmIcSthe~ampler aircrews during Operation HARDTACK.

See Figure 6 for a summary of

during Operation HARDTACK.

The participation of the Naval

the B-~7B and B-S7D flying activities

Effects Elementw~ planned by the

Naval & Special Weapons Facility located at Kirtland ~. They planned

to participate with two (2) A@~s and two (2) FJ41s. The mission of these

aircraft was to measure the structural response and blast loading of the

sircraft when exposed

Participation by

During April, %y and

to nuclear detonations.

the A4.DIsand the FJ41s W= practic~Y identic~a

June the FJ4~s flew seventy-seven hours and the @’s

flew eighty-four hours. These aircraft participated in eight (8) nuclear

detonations and flew sixty-nine sorties practicing for these events. ‘ITMY

also flew eight (8) sorties for missions which were postponed after the

aircraft had become airborne. The events in which they participated were:

CACTUS, BUTTERNUT, KOA, XEIWM30D, MAGNOLIA, TOEACCO, ROSE and WALNUT.

Some of the earlier shots failed to give the predicted~elds and no

worthwhile data was obtained from some of these events.

ever, the WALNUT Event in particular, exce~ent res~~

These sircraft participated in every event as scheduled

no h aborts or pre-take off cancenations.

The

Honolulu

Navy fighters were loaded on the USS B- for

On others, how-

were obtsined.

and experienced

transportation to

on 24 Junej concluding their participation in Operation HARDTACK.

USAF had

This aircrzft was

The effects test-s

REDdINO. On that

tion were carried

only one (1) effects aircraft in Operation HARDTACK.

a B-S2 furnished by the Wright Air Development Center.

were a continuation of the test series conducted during

operation, effects tests head-on and tail-to the detona- _

out. The HARDTACK tests were designed to give data on

. .— *.e“-

0

0

I

~alal

I I I

m

u

im

I I

00. .

s

I

.00. .mN

I

0

I

,.

,

I I

I I II

0

1

o

Awl#Ho

.-

i“ --~side loading effects on the B-S2, particularly on the fin. The aircraft

arrived in the Eniwetok Proving Ground late in March and became operational

early in April.

The B-S2 flew a total of

HARDTACK. It flew in fturteen

176 hours during its participation in

nuclesr destinationsand in twenty practice

missions for these events. The events in which the B-S2 flew were: FIR,

KOA, YEIJJXWOOD, TOBACCO, SYCAMORE, ROSE, M4PLE, WALNUT, REDWOD, ELDER,

OAK, CEDAR, D~WOOD and POPLAR. The Air Force Effects Element had not

intended to participate in so many events. This larger participation was

made necessary because seversl of the earlier shots failed to produce the

expected yield. On the shots which failed to come up to expectations,

this element did not get sufficient ~able data and had to be programmed

for a larger number of shots. See Figure 8 for a summary of the B-52

flying activities on HARDTACK.

With the POPLAR Event, the ti Force Effects ~e~nt co~~eted its

participation in Operation H!JIDTACK. On 16 July the B-52 and its crew de-

parted Eniwetok. It is noteworthy that during Operation HARDTACK, the

B-S2 had no air aborts and no pre-take off cancellations. In addition,

on,28 June, it participated in the REIX@OD Event at BiM.ni with H-Hour at

0530 and in the ELDER Event at lkiwetok with an H-How of 0630; only one

(1) how later. This is the first time that an effects sircraft has par-

ticipated in two (2) events in one (1) day and within one (1) hour of

each other. The B-S2 then participated in OAK the following day, estab-

lishing the remarkable record of participation in three (3) major nuclear

test events in twenty-six hours.

The instrument carr@ng aircraft have been

.

Q\

so styled to differentiate

g~

,

{dthem from the aircraft whose instrumentation measured

- nuclear detonation on the aircraft structure and those that measured the

fissions present in the detonation. These aircraft carried instruments

for a wide variety of

data with will enable

omens associated with

scientific projects for t~e purpose of gathering

researchers to better understand some of the phen-

certsin types of nucl-eardetonations. All.of these

aircraft were carrying instrumentation for projects interested‘in the very

high and ultra high altitude shots carried out under the aegis of the

Department of Defense. Originally, these sircraft were limited to the B-36

aircraft of the VHA/UHA Element, the P2V sponsored by the IiASWI?and the

C-97 aircraft of the Ionospheric Element. Much later during the operation,

other aircraft supporting other projects became active in the test seties

and participated in the last twu (2) Deparhent of Defense sponsored tests.

The tission of the P2V was to obtain basic data concerning itira-red

radiation for high altitude shots and sea level shots for comelation pur-

poses.

me P2V aircraft arrived in the &riwetmk Proving Ground on 31 March

1958. It flew a total of s- hours in April and May before returning to

the ZI. It participated in three (3) practice tissions and two (2) re-

hearsals for the YUCCA Event and in that event. It also flew eight (8)

practice missions for the BU’ITERNUTand KOA Events and in those events.

The P2V then returned to the ZI in May and returned to BarberIs Point NM

in July for participation in the TEAK and ORANGE Events held at Johnston

Island. On 17 July it participated in a practice for the TEAK Event and

in rehearsals for TEAK on 22 and 26 July and made an emergency landing at

Johnston Island, blowing tires on both main landing gears on landing.

Fast maintenance enabled the aircraft to overcome its difficulties in time

AiWlftU3

..

idto participate.

participation for the OWE shot was similar to that for ~, except

that only one (1) rehearsal was held and it was necessary to change the

H-Hour position of the P2V in order for the project to obtain usable data.

The P2V aircraft was positioned by an air controller in the Air Operations

Center aboard the USS BOXER for the YUCCA Event but positioned itself by

its own sirborne radar

shots, an MSQ-lA radar

H-Hour on the last two

on the TEAK and ORAtWIEshots. On both of these

helped the P2V to positively mark his position after

(2) events. See figure 9 for a summary of the fly-

ing

ing

activities of the P2V during its participation in Operation HARDTACK.

The Air Research and Deve~opment Command was responsible for furnish-

the ticraft comprising the Very High/Ultra High Altitude Element.

This responsibility was passed to AJ?SWCat Kirtland APB. These aircraft

arrived at the Eniwetok Proting Ground in March 1958. These aircraft were

to support projects 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. The respective interests of these

projects were thermal radiation measurements, early fireball.photography

ad thermal radiation spectrum measurements. These projects satisfied

their requirements through special photographic equipment which was in-

stalled on the aircraft. After YUCCA, it was decided that Project 4.1,

which was”interested in retinal burns caused by a high Kltitude nuclear

detonation, would place rabbits aboard the B-361s in such a way as would

expose them to retinal burns from the detonation.

&fter arrival at Eniwetok, the B-36ts beg= t~ practice for the yUCCA,,

ihent-. This event was the detonation of a smsll nuclear device carried

aloft by a free balloon to an sltitude of between 80,000 and 90~000 feet.

AfwA19

+?,-=-----

Oi

0

>Na

u-

1

0

FIGURE 8

W1./no

911

FIGURE 9

4?-qq

9“FJ?, $-~.

The~aircraft had to be positioned within a very C1O

position in sPace relative ~ the de~ce so t~t the f~ed camera ~uted

on the aircraft could photograph the detonation. As the normal airborne

radar would not scan above the aircraft and since the”target was a free

moving bom in the upper tir c~ents, a special instmation of an E-4

radar set with an upward field of scan was made on these aircraft snd a

beacon installed in the equipment carried by the balloon. This eq~pment~

urfcrtunately~ never functioned properly and an alternate method of posi-

tficmng had to be arrived at. Through much practice, a system was devised

wl-~eret!leballoon was tracked by optics and by radar aboard the USS BOXER

and its position passed to the Task Group 7.h contro~erss who plotted ~s

position on their radar scopes. The controllers in turn vectored the

!%36~s to the proper position relati~ to the b~oon and maneuvered the

aircraft into their proper H-How positions. The pilots of th aircraft

also were able ta check the AOC positioning by flying formation on the

balloon visually”while the navigator checked for proper slant range from

the target t~-ough optical instruments. Due to the flash blindness hazard,

tinerlsud. and opticaJ observations had to be abandoned just prior to time

zero and final positioning done by the controller but this ingenious method

of positioning the aircraft against a position in space relative to a mov-

irg ~a-get proved higfly effective and ~1 scientific reqtiements were met.

The positioning problem was not so great on the TEAK and ORANGE shots.

On these events, a large nuclear device was detonated after beirg carried

to heights of 2sO~OO0 and 12s~OO0 feet by a Redstone Missile. The detona.

:,icnwas prcEr-ammnedto occur within a fixed envelope in space. One (1)

aircraft positioned itself lYJusing its own airborne radar while the other

was posit.i~nedby “anliSQ-lAradar on the ground. Air ccmtrollers monitored

AFw@ltJ

.@--S

the fositionin.gof both aircraft and had.the capability to position either

aircraft within specified limits.

The TEAK and ORAN3E Events had

at Bildti and most of

to the possibility of

population within 400

SEVEN decided to move

the necessary

originally been scheduled to be fired

installations had been completed. Due

caudng permanent damage to the eyes of the native

miles of the fireball, Commander, Joint Task Force

these events to Johnston Island and assigned the

codeword WSREEL to the operation there. The NEWSREEL Events were still

a part of Operation HARDTACK and the various Task Groups still retained

their primary responsibilities. As a resfit of these c~es~ the B-36’s

departed Eniwetok in I@, after y~CA, as the ~ =d O-E shots were

rescheduled for 1 August and IS August respectively. These aircraft re-

turned to Hickam Al?Bin mid-hly to resume participation in the NEWSREEL

phase of HARDTACK, staging their mission from that location. Figure 10

gives the pertinent statistics concerning the B-36 participation in

Operation HARDTACK.

The Air Force Cambridge Research Center sponsored the Ionosphere

ment and furnished a C-97 aircraft to support its participation in

Ele-

Operation HARDTACK. Its participation was to be limited to the TEAK and

ORAME shots. This sircraft arrived at Eniwetok shortly before the deci-

sion was made lm move these shots to Johnston Island and returned to the

21 without having participated in the Eniwetok Proving Ground phase of the

operation. It was scheduled to return to Hickam AFB and stage its missions

from there at the same time as the

arrival due to storm damage and an

early practices for TEAK. It did,

B-36 aircraft. It was delayed in its

engine change and missed some of the

however, participate in both events.

96

qb

N

N

I

I

N

I

I

I

I

t

N

N

I

I

N

o

I

I

f-

u)m

I

I

g

0

I

I

I

I

0

0

FIGTJRE10

MWuno

FIGURE 11.

y-

f,

The mission of

tion and associated

this aircraft was to aid in the investigatlon of ioniza-

effects in the high atmosphere caused by a large nuclear

detonation at sltitudes over 100,000 feet. It.took vertical sounding meas-

urements on the ionospheric lqfers after the high altitude detonations

gathering data on radio wave absor@ion and on the physics of the high

atmosphere. See Figure ~ for statistics on the fifing activities of this

aircraft

Quite late in the operations the School of Afia~onMe~cine decided

that its studies

sltitude nuclear

deemed necessary

of retinal damage to the eye caused by exposure to high

detonations needed airborne stations. These stations were

to minixdze cloud cover between shipborne stations and the

de+dnation. MATS was required

abom cloud cover and to place

range frcm the detonation. It

to firnish a C-97 aircraft to carry rabbits

them at a distance of 300 miles horizontal

flew6sorties on practices and rehearsals

and participated in both of the mS- shoti. It flew a total of 39

hours during its participation in HARDTACK.

project 6.13

gtudy the effez%

~q~pmente These

furnished two (2) W2 aircraft to the NIWSWZL Events to

of the high alt~tude detonations on its sir search radar

aircraft staged their missions from Barber)s Pcint NM

and p=ticipated only in the NElt5REZLEvents.

missians at a distance of 200 miles ho@.zontal

positioning themselves with their own acirborne

They simulated btier patrol

range from the detonations,

navigational equipment. They

fle~.’7 practice ,missionsand participated in both NEWREEL Events flying a

total of 103hems.

To aid in their studies of methods of detection of high sltitude

98

Afwl/Ho 4$

----

nuc9= ‘detonations’

APOAT-1 participated in the NEWSREEL phase of HARDTACK—

with one (1) C-sb aircraft staged

( Reseaxch and Development Command.

mately 300 miles horizontal range

from Hickam AFB .-Ldfurnished by the Air

This aircraft positioned itself approxi-

from the detomtion. The crew positioned

the aircraft with airborne navigational equipment. It flew Lpract,ice

missions and in both mLS- Events. It flew a toti~ of90 hours d~~

its participation in Operation HARDTACK.

It ~= decided that ~ perfo~ the aern~ pho+agraphic work for

HARDTACK three (3) C-54 aircraft and two (2) RB-so ~craftw ofid ~ re-

quired. The Aerial Photographic and Charting Sefice of MATS was directed

to furnish

the 3-S01s

Two (2) of

these aircraft and people. Two (2) of the C-s4~s aridboth of

came from P- Beach AI% and one (1) C-sb came%om Clark APB.

these C.~4% arrived during March, as did one (1) of the RB.~Ols.

The other two (2) aircraft arrivedin April.

The Aerial Photo Element was given the mission of providing aircraft

and crews for as~al pho+agraphy during HARDTACK and to supplement the air

transport activities of the Fixed Wing Element.

The C-54 aircraft of this element flew 616 hours during HARDTACK and

the RB-S!3Is flew 2U hours. The C-S4 hours devoted to airli,ft till be

covered in another chapter. During HARDTACK, the aircraft of”the Aerisl

Phatc Element flew many different types of photo missions. Aerial photis “

of the islands of both Eniwatok and Bikini Atolls were made. A complete

aerial survey of populated stills and islands within a @O file radi~ of

Bikini was made prior to the TEAK and ORAIWE Events being moved to Johnston

Island. Photographs for water landing survey were made of many weather is-

lani sites for use of the SAR Element. Aerial photographic coverage was

made of Jotit.on .lslandprior to the decision to use that site for NIMSRF@.

AFWHO

(

Pre~md post shot crater—

clear detonations during

detonations was included

~rap~ was done, such as

-, -survey photography was,made

the test. Aerial photography of many of the

in the program and much miscellaneous aerial photo-

photography of B-57is and the B-52 in flight and

silhouetted ~sinst a nuclear detonation shots of Naval vessels ~d Nav

jet fighters in flight.

The largest shot participation for this element was on the underwater

sho+~ WAHOO and UNBRELM. On these shots all five (S) of the Aerial Photo

Element aircraft participated. With the completion of the UMBRELLA shot,

the participation of the RB-~Ols was completed and on 11.June they departed

the EFG. On 22 June, one (l),C-54was returned to Clark MB. After the

ELDER shot another C-~4was returned to Palm Beach APB on-30 June. One (1)

C-SLwas retained for use in aerial photography and airlift until after the

last shot. Figure 12 gives a swmnary of fifing activities of the C-S4 air-

craft of this element and Figure 13 gives a stilar summary of the fl@ng

activities of its RB-501s.

This chapter has described

aircraft in Operation HARDTACK.

the missions and the participation of test

This operation was the largest nuclear test

series yet held. Mng the Operational phase, 33 nuclear detonations were

heldin the Eniwetok Proving Ground and two (2) at Johnston Island. Test

aircraft, under the operational control of Task Group 7.4, participated in

every test shot in the operation in support of many

The aircraft had many various missions but could be

(4) different @_pes of missions:

scientific projects.

categorized inta four

1. Samplers, whose missions was to collect partic~ate and gaseo~

samples from the nuclear cloud.

2. Effects “aircraft,whose mission was to aid in the study of the

-agWc’wes”~effects of nuclear explosions on

9 @

I I

T

.-i ,.,,.

101%? @

..

1

?3. Instrument carriers, whose mission was to gather scientific data

about many of the phenomenaassociated with nucle~ detonations.

4. PhotograpMc aircraft, whose mission was to furnish a platfom

.from which still and motion picture photography of nuclear de+mnatio~ and

locatiom connected with nucle= testing could be taken.

During

SiOIISand a

. . ... ,,,A

Operation HARDTACK, test aircraft flew 307 sorties on test mis-

total of 3s90 hours during the entire operation.

.

103

g“Ch~ter 5 - Support Aircraft

Task Group 7.4 was charged with many support responsibilities in

connection with Operation HARDTACK. Among these responsibilities were

logistic support of the weather and rad-safe sites at Tarawa, Naw,

Kusale, Kaphgamarangi, Uterik, Rongelap, Wotho, Ujelang, Wake, Midway$

Kwajalein, Majuro, Trek, and Guam. Airlift sefice had-to be supplied

between the principal Eniwetok Proving Ground sites of Eniwetok and

Bikini and among the islands of each atoll. The logistic support fur-

nished by MATS required the services of an air terminal organization

Responsibility for Search and Rescue operations in the Eniwetok Control

Area was delegated to Commander, Task Group 7.4 by Joint Task Force

SEVEN Operation Order 1-58. These support activities will be discussed

in the following paragraphs.

In planning for Operation

transportation requirements in

HARDTACK, it was recognized that air

support of the test series would be varied,

and would require several different types of aircraft to carry them out.

It was established that re-supply of the weather island and rad-safe

sites would have to be accomplished by both four engin~land based aircraft

and amphibious aircraft. It was decided that the transport requirements

between Eniwetok and Bikini would also be met by using four enghed land

based transports. Personnel transport and light cargo transportation

requirements between the islands of Eniwetok Atoll and certain scientific

support requirements such as rad-safe surveys and recovery of scientific

instruments could best be met, it was decided, by Maison and helicopter

aircraft. As a result of this planning, the book message which directed

104

J,{ ,‘-

AAwunn

-z>&. . .. --

the l!!!ganizationof Task Group 7~/’stated the requirement for eight (8){

c-54 aircraft, eight (8) L-20s, three (3) L-199, and fifteen (15) heli-

copters, either H-19s or H-219 or a combination of the two. PACAF was

required to ~sh three (3) of these W49~ A~C W~S to f~ish two (2)s

and MATS three (3). The three (3) C-54S firnished W~.fATS were to ~

primarily aerial photo aircraft, but were to be used to supplement the

airlift requirements. PACAF was to furnish all of the helicopters.

ARDC was to furnish the eight (8) L-20s and was to arrange with the

Army for the loan of the L-19s. Seven (7) SA-16 aircraft were to be

furnished by MATS for Search and Rescue, and for the amphibious weather

island re-supply requirement. All of these aircraft except one aerial

photo c-54 were in place or arrived during~~arch 19580 _

The control of these aircraft was divided according to the pri-

mary mission each was to perform. Those aircraft which vere to te

primarily engaged in transport operations were placed under the cor.trol

of the Test Base Unit. These included five (5) C-54S and eight (8)

L-20s which were formed into the Fixed Wtig Element, and the fifteen

(15) helicopters, nine (9) lL2is aridsix (6) H-19s, -~tilchformed Detach-

ment #4, 24th Helicopter Squadron. The Test Services Urit had ccntrsl of

the SA-16S which formed the Search and Resc~leElement (SAR)Z a~d the

three (3) WITSC-54S which were a part of the Aeriai Photc Element. The

SAR Element was responsible for weather island re-supply where OCIY iJater

landings could be made. The Aerial ph~to Element C-54S supplemented the

heavy transport requirements of the TBU Fixed IlingElement when their

mission requirements permitted. First twos and then three of the L-20 air-

craft of the Fixed Wing Element were detached to Bikini to provide ainlift

between NAN Island and the PETER-OBOE Island complex.

#wulto

105

\

. .

Ta~Group 7.4 helicopters also provided support at Bikini during the

build-up phase until relieved by a Marine helicopter squadron in late

January 195$.

To coordimte all airlift requirements, the Test Base Unit operated

the Enivetok Airlift Operation Office. This element ~’asmanned by civ-

.

ilians furnished by Task Group 7.5 and military personnel of Task Group

7.4. This element coordinated transportation requirements with the Trans-

portation Coordinating Agent of each Task Group-,and allocated space

available on the various scheduled and special airlift flights. They

also operated FRED Control,

and coordination of liaison

of Eniwetok Atoll.

The C-54 aircraft flew

Bikini and between En”wetok

of HARDTACK, and before the

which was responsible for flight following

and helicopter flights among the islands

re=@larly scheduled missions between Eniwetok and

and outlying sites. During the operational phase

cessation of activity at Bikiti at least two sched-

uled flights a day were made between Eniwetok and Bikini, except that at the

hei:ht of the build-up, three (3)flights per day were required. Wee~Y

flights were made to Nauru and Tarawa, while monthly flights were made to

Truk, Guam, Kwajalein, Majuro, Wake, and Midway Islands. Many additional

flights were made to all of these sites and to other places when special

requirements existed. ifhentechnical complications required that the TEAK

and ORANGE shots be moved fron their planned site at Bikini to Johnston

Island, weekly flights betveen Eniwetok and Johnston Island were instituted.

As this operation neared D-Day, the tempo

and a shuttle between Johnston Island and

the beginning of the operational phase of

of these

Eonolulu

EARDTACK

flights were stepped up,

became necessary. From

in lLarch1958 until

10L.

hFwuHo

..

{18~August 1958s the C-54 aircraft of the Ftied Wing Element flew over 100%

their programmed fifing hours. Only with the end of the operation in sight

of

did

this tempo slacken. The C-54ts of the Fixed Wbg Element carried 12~78~ Pas-

sengers and l}882J018 pounds of cargo during the operational phase of HAP31~ACKe

To perform these tasks they generated 2522 flying hours. During the months

April through July, C-54~s of the Fixed Wing Element flew more than 80 hous ‘

per month per assigned aircraft. The C-54~s of the Aerial Photo Element aug-

mented this effort by flying 1101 passengers and160,886 pounds of cargos

which generated 29h flying hours. See F@re U for a eummaryof C-54 Fifing

Activities.

The only problems arising from the operation of the C-54 aircraft

arose from over-fl@ng programmed flying hours, which made it difficult

to schedule the aircraft

be desired, and caused a

During the build-up

schedule. The principal

into maintenance in as orderlya fashion as might

few AOCP’S late in the operation.

phases of HARDTACK, the L-20 aircraft flew a busy

areas of L-20 operation were between EIMER and

FRED Islands in the Eniwetok Atoll and between NAN and PETER-OBOE Islands in

the Bikini Atoll. Through July, a schedule of a flight every 20 minutes between

ELXi and FRED beginning at 0740 in the morning and continuing until 1630

in the afternoon was maintained. As the operational phase progressed the

tempo of light aircraft airlift increased and many calls for special

airlift were received in addition to the regularly scheduled flights.

Early in June, in response to the request of Commander, Task Group 7.1,

another L-20 was assigned to Bikini making the division of aircraft five

(5) at F~ and three (3) at NAN Mstead of the SiX (6) to two (2) ratio

107

fwW@

(

i.

$*’

10.-.$

I

1G8 FIGURE14

(

t@ prevailed earlier. May and June were the peak months for the L-20ts.

In May, the L-20’s flew 571 hours and 1,992 missions. These missions carried

4,128 passengers and 8,575 pounds of cargo. ~i% the entire OPeratiOn

from March through August, these aircraft flew 2622 hours and carried

1s,587 ~ssengers and 4~,210 pounds of cargo. See Figure 15 for a SUXZ-

msry of L-20 fl~ng activities.

/’-Detachment #4 of the 24th Helicopter Squadron was enlarged from its

permanent complement of four (4) aircraft to fifteen (15) aircraft for

Operation HARDTACK. These aircraft performed yeoman servfce during the

operation. The fifteen (15) were divided into a flight of six (6) H-19’s ati

another flight of nine (9) H-21’s. The H-19’s were prefemed for rad-safe eur-

veys because the aircraft affo’idedgreater protection from radiation and tie

H-21ts were preferred for normal airlUX because of their greater carr@ng.

capability. The unique performance characteristics of the helicopter made

it an invaluable tool in the accomplishment of inter-island airlift at Eniwetck

in support of the scientific projects. The helicopters also consistently

overflew their programmed flying hours. In spite of the high maintenance

cost in man-hours to produce a he~copter flying hour, the in-commission

rate of these craft was very high. The average of 69 hours per month for

each of the assigned H-211s for the month of Nay is believed ta be an

Air Force recofi

The flow of

by weather. The

during the first

for helicopter utilization.

normal scheduled traffic was smooth, titerrupted only

special airlift requirements, however, were difficult

half of the

“laterequests for scientific

operation due to Task Group 7.4 recei~

recoveries, and many other special missions~

:(29

\

(A

o04

00..0aQ’

00*a)

;i

ccE

110

PHuno

. .

x’-‘)an ~ue to the fact that many of the persomel of many of the

projects did not understate the proper channels through which

scientific

to request

special airlift support. Also early in April a fatal helicopter accident

at night and under adverse weather conditions caused a re-evaluation of

helicopter procedures which subsequently placed restrictions on night

liaison and helicopter fifing. This policy restricted to some extent

the support many scientific projects had planned for and through nds-

understanding the reasons for these operation limitations, some ad-

verse reaction was experienced. Coordination with scientific project

personnel and with supervisory personnel of Task Group 7.1 ironed out

most of the difficulties and misunderstandings and during the last half

of the operation support airlift activities operated very smoothly.

During HARDTACK, the H-19ts flew x262 hours and carried 671O

passengers and 572300 pounds of cargo. The H-211S flew 24s4 hours and

carried 23,328 passengers and 307~l~o pods of cargos See Figures 16

and 17 for summaries of helicopter operations.

The SA-16 aircraft of the SAR Element flew regular weekly schedules

to the weather island sites of Wotho, Kapingamarangi, Uterik, Kusaie,

Rofigelapand Ujelang. These flight had to ke made in amphibious aircraft

because no airstrips were available at these sites. The sA-16 flew 1119

hours on airlift flights. These flights carried 1390 passengers ati

173,701 Pounds of cargo” cer~~ Problems ‘ere

ation but they will be disctised in ‘theportion

to the SAR Element.

encountered in this oper-

of this section devoted

The three (3) L-19 aircraft were used prbrily as executive trans-

ports. Two (2) were based at Parry Island and reserved for use of Joint

l-u

IbWJno

-...

,/’

(’

00. .0*m

0+. .ea)

D0m--

I

m’a*--

u)awezuu)U)~

I

00

F

cLc

. .iE

-2.-J

112 FIGU’F@16

f$wno

,3

f

(’

1

$r-

00mlNa

113

u)mw@zwVIu)aa

Afwutm

(’

f.-

Task Force SEVEN staff officers, while one (1} was based at Eniwetok and

used by Comiander, Task Group 7.4 and certain senior staff officers. See

Figure 18 for a summary of L-19 flying activities.

Seven (7) SA-16 aircraft were required for the SAR and weather island

re-supply mission. The Air Rescue Service of MATS was required to finish

the aircraft and personnel for this effort. The nucleus of tbfs organi-

zation was the 64th Air Rescue squadrons hsed at Norton ~B~ which fur-

nished five (5) of the aircraft. Two (2) others were furnished by the

2nd Air Rescue Group, operating in the Pacific area, one com~ng from

Clark AB and the other from Naha AFB. Two of these aircraft arrived dur-

ing February and the other five arrived at Eniwetok during March.

The SA-16 aircraft flew SAR cover for all of the nuclear detona-

tions in the HARDTACKtest series held at the Eniwetok Protig Ground.

The operational policy was established that the SAR aircraft would be

airborne prior to the take-off of the first mission aircraft and would

remain airborne until after the last mission aircraft had landed.

The SA-16 aircraft have also filled in with special missions when

other aircraft capability was short. Instances are the airlift of tipor-

tant persons to Bikini and,of special si@ficanceJ a flight to fi~~s

New Britain with a flight surgeon and nuclear research specialists to

look into the alleged radiation contamination of a Japanese vessel.

During HARDTACK the SA-16ts flew2168 hous. ~ese fleg ho~s

have involved 79 orbit missions during nuclear test events, five (5)

escort missions, 17 intercept missions of aircraft in distress, ten (10)

Search and Rescue missions, twelve (L?) medical evacuation missions,

l-lb

WHO

m

In I

m

f0)

II

00..*N

I

004..z

i

LrK

115 FIGURE 18

hwwo

..->,=..-

fan‘5other special missions. The details of the island resupply flights

were discussed in the section devoted to airlift. See Figure 19 for a

summary of SA-16 flying activities.

When the SA-16 aircraft first arrived in the Eniwetok Proving Ground,

the mooring buoys at several of the weather island sites were

in such a state of disrepair as to make their use hazardous.

action was taken to replace or repair these buoys. In future

unusable or

Immediate

operations

care should be taken to see that these buoys are in operable condition

prior to the beginning of operations.

Another problem arose in the availability of the Ponape homing beacon.

This beacon was originally ody treed on on-request and operated ofiYfor

a short time while the aircraft was in transit to Kapingamarangi and not

turned on again until one (1) hour prior to the estimated time of return

of the aircraft from Kapingsmarangi. On one occasion, a flight was

forced to return early to Ponape due to loss of all other navigational

equipment and

communication

this occasion

.

ked weather in the Kapingamarangi area. High frequency

with Ponape radio was lost. The flight bck to Ponape on

was uneventful but had bad weather prevailed at Ponape it

is doubfful that the SA-16 could have made a landing in a sheltered area

and would have been forced to make a dangerous open sea landing due to

fuel exhaustion. This situation was corrected through coordination with

the District Administrator of Ponape. This same

should be effected at the earliest time or

another test program in the EPG.

A limiting factor in SA-16 flights to

the gross weight factor for water landings

116

prior

type of coordination

to the beginning of

resupply weather islands was

and take-offs. It was necessary

MwLjtto

@-●

f-”

f-

.. -.

00. .wm

00..n#

1

0*..64m

117 FIGURE 19

*00.mm

m0u

0

00. .Nn

10Q0N

to~perate the SA-16fS at maximum gross water landings and take-off weights

on most of the flights to these sites. This was necessary to insure sufficient

cfuel for return flights and still carry enough pay load to make the flights

practical. Continued operation under these conditions caused severe msti-

tenance problems and caused two (2) of the aircrtit to be returmed

for depot maintenance prior to completion of the test series.

During the NEWSREEL phase of HARDTACK, SC-54 aircraft and crews of

the 76th Air Rescue Squadron bsed at Hickam AFB assumed SAR responsi-

bility at Johnston Island. one (1) SC-54 aircraft was kept at Jo~ston

Island during the build-up and operational phases of NEWSREEL. UsUSllY,

the aircraft and crews were rotated on a weekly basis. These aircraft

participated h all practices and rehearsals and were ati-krne during

the TEE and ORANGE events.

An additional air support fiction required by the operation was the

movement of personnel and cargo into and out of the Eniwetok Proving Gro~

by MATS. Although not under the operational control of Task Group 7.4,

MATS was supported by the Air Terminal Element, Test Services Unit,

which provided the terminal sezwlces requirements. Their responsi-

bilities included the on-loading and off-loading of passengers and cargo,

maintenance and refueling of aircraft and crew control and flight plan.nizlg.

As the heavy flight schedules resulted in aircraft arrivals and departures

at all hours, this support function was an around the clock operation. At

the peak of the testing series, during a one (1) month period, over 200

inbound and outbound flights were serviced while handling nearly 2,000,000

pounds of cargo and 2,500 passengers.

118

#WIJHO

(

fAnother -importantphase of this elementts responsibilities was the

handling

For each

place at

.

of the sample return aircraft,

nuclear detonation at least three (3) C-97 aircraft were in

Eniwetok to return samples collected by the scientific projects

to locations within the United States. Due to shot postponements, air-

craft at times were detained

imposed upon this element to

These sample return aircraft

used’for personnel and cargo

many as twelve (12) aircraft

at Eniwetok and an additional workload was

keep the aircraft in flyable condition.

were in excess of the normal MATS flights

airlift and occasionally there were as

at one time being maintained by the Air

Terminal Element. Limited working space, overcrowded parking ramps,

additional aircraft maintenance caused by high humidity and salt spray

and a

buted

small number of specialists available for trouble shooting contri-

towards making the Air Terminal Element one of the busiest sections

in the Task Group.

During the period starting lMarch and ending 18 August 1958, the

element serviced L98 inbound and outbound flights while handling

13,181 ~ssengers and 28~097~017 PO~S Of cargo” See Fiwe 20 for a

summary of this elementls activities.

In order for operational units to perform their missions they must

always be supported by auxillary units. Operation HARDTACK was not dif-

ferent h this respect and some of the success of the largest nuclear test

series yet performed is owing to this support. The airlift supplied by

the aircraft and elements discussed above placed men and materiel.in the

proper place at the right time. The airlift elements were called on for

119

\tlAFwlmo

. . .

-. *i##ga

—

120

1-

m0

alu)

I I

FIGURE 20

I

.

Afwtlo

. .. . \

T

a @ater measure of support than they had been programmed. From beginning

to the end of the operational phase of HARDTACK the five (5) C-54 aircraft

of the Fixed Wing Element flew more than 1OO$ of programmed flying hours.

The helicopters, particularly the H-21is, are believed to have set an Air

Force record for monthly utilization per assigned aircraft during this

period. Search and Rescue served well in their dual role of providing

protection for distressed aircrews and amphibious airlift services and were

always the first aircraft airborne and the hst to land

array. The Air Tetinal Element furnished the tezmkal

traffic and maintenance wise that was necessary

function operating on schedule. These elements

tribution to the operation.

to keep

made an

from a nuclear test

service ,’both

the air logistic

essential con-

121

AFWUHO

(’

.,*..

*. = -’2

!!(.-,--

C’pter6- Aircraft Control

In Operation .Order1-S8, dated 1 Octobe: 1957, Cormnander,Joint Task

Force SEVEN delegated to Commander, Task Group 7.4 the responsibility for

control of all aircraft flying in the Eniwetok Air Control hea. Aircraft

flying within this area fell into three (3) categories: Test sircraft

participating in test detonations, Joint Task Force SEVEN aircraft flying

locslly and aircraft entering or departing the =ea. These aircraft

categories posed three (3) different control problems, which will be dis-.

cussed in this chapter,

Task Group 7.4, in conjunction with the AACS and representatives of

CAA

snd

was

set

at Honolulu and Wake, set up an air control

BiMni Atolls. (See Figure 21) Control of

exercised by Task Group 7.4.

area around the Eniwetok

traffic within this area

To handle the three (3) types of control mentioned above, there were

up within the Eniwetok Control Area three (3) different controlling

facilities. These were the Eniwetok Air Operations Center, which was the

master control center; a subsidiary control center aboard the USS BOXER

and precise positioning control facilities using MSQ-IA and M-33 radar

equipment in vans.

The Eniwetmk Mr Operation Center (EAOC) was established on 8 March

1958 and assigned the mission of controlling the movement of sJ2 ticraft

in the Eniwetok Control Area on a 24 hour a day basis throughout the test

period. This center served also as the Command Post for the Task Group

Commander during

cept Controllers

test events. Adrcraft were controlled by Officer Inter-

(AFSC 164.1-164.4)utilizing the AN/USQ-12 positio-

122

MWlno

. . . . m

\

/.

\

b

I I I

\

——

FIGURE 21

=’a=0

0t-

123

. .

...

.

?(e pment. In addition to the normal control fac

Controllers were aided in the AOC by Approach Controllers

the Intercept

and a Search and

Rescue Center.

The Bikini AOC was established aboard

the regularly installed radar and IFF gear

the USS BOXER on 11 March using

aboafi this aircraft carrier

operated by Air Force Controllers. This control center was used for primary

control on test events in the Bikini area and as an adjunct to the Eniwetok

Operations Center to control transient aircraft and aircraft flying locally

in the Bikini Area.

The MSQ-U and the M-33s were used for positioning the effects aircraft

on practice missions and test events. The abilityto position aircraft with-

in a matter of feet or tenths of a second on test events with these radars was

necessary because of the criticality of the position of these aircraft at

H-Hour and the need for very accurate after the fact information in order

to interpret properly the effects data obtained.

While the effects aircraft were controlled and placed in proper position

by the MSQ-lA and the M-33 radars, controllers in the AOC monitored the progress

and positioning of the aircraft visually on their radar scopes and aurally on

the aircraftls individual UHF control channel. To aid h this monitoring

the controller drew the aircraft flight path submitted by the project

personnel on his scope indicating time check points, abort points and track,

and position of last possible abort. By closely monitoring the progress of the

aircraft along this flight path, constantly checking its actual position

versus its planned position at any time check point and knowing its make-up

capability, the

position of the

became apparent

Mwtitto

controller could advise the Commander as

aircraft and suggested course of action.

that the aircraft could not be in proper

124

to the momenta~

If,at any time,

position, the

J,pl,!-

1-

it

-.

concerned requiring aircraft to clear for either Wake or Kwajalein with

possible diversion to Eniwetok frcm a specified point outside the control

areq. This procedure proved satisfactory and allowed unintermpted MATS

semica to Eniwetok during the entire test series.

1.27

AFW140

t

Ch~ter 7- Commun.lcationa

Communications for Operation HAR.DTACYwere phn~d and installed

to provide: essential ah navigational aids for stie ~ efflclent .

both outside and inside the TWt Area; control

of all aticraft partlcipat~ h a test event.

to be evaluated in planning communications ati

and preclslon poaitionlng

Other factors which had

electronics (C &E)

facilities were the heavy atmospheric

the very humid cllmata axxlthe highly

the ER2,

radio noise on high fiequencies$

corrosive atmosphere present h

Ming Operation NEWSREEL aticraft were controlled over a much

. greater range than during previous tests. This CO*O1 situation was

complicated by the complete loss of all sky wave radio propagation which

occurred simultaneously with detonation of the

more complete dlsctwsion of all Task GrOUP 7.4

in the followlng par~aphs.

high altitude devices. A

conmnznicatlonsis presented

The responsibfflty for providing and operating sll ARTC communications

and ah navigational aids for Task Group 7:4was delegated to the A/U

Communications ~ement. ARTC traffic for flights outside tie test srea. .

was transmitted to ?kajalein Center using one (1) voice clrctit on the

high frequency single side band system. Early clifflcultles in maintain-

@ contact on this circuit made it necesssry to establish a back-up

radio ctictit from Eniwetok Approach Control to Xwajaletn Center. M

route traffic for weather islands, such as flight @ans for reSUPPIY

aircraft was transmitted through the Weather Islsnd weather ~ ~d~~ew

net.

. 128

AfwulUJ

f

~~ & navigational aids consistedprtncI’@.l.yof a

homers, supplemented by a GCA end TACAN at Enlvetok.,

system of low frequency

The low frequency-

homers were located at Bikini, Eniwetok, Kapingamsrangi, Uterlk, and

Kusale.

The WA at Enlwetck was an AN/UPN-llB incorprat@ modern radar

developments such as moving target indicator and circular pokrlzation

for improved weather penetration. This facillty provided valuable

assistance particularly when worldmg with

effects aircraft after a test.

The TACAN set located on Sand Island

the AOC in recovering jet

operated without difficulty.

~is aid could only be utilized by the &57B ssmplers and the Navy

effects aircraft.

The Air Operations Center (AOC) at Eniwetok was responsible to tie

Task Group Commander for the safe positioning of all a.trcr~ in the

test array. To accomplish this mlqsion, the ANfiSQ-12.manufactured by.

the Hazeltine Corpra~~on was employed. TMS factii;y was able to see ‘ ‘

and present the relative positions of almraft at all times during a

test operation. Basic components.are eight,(8) UPA/35 SCOPS, 1.2. .

channels of UHF communications ad assoolated hot MM telephone sYs@IU.

Seven ah controllers may operate the equlpent simultsneouly. (The

UHF transmitters and receivers sre located in separate vans and oprated

through telephone tie lines). The AN/USQ-12 vas not considered adequate “’

for some of the precise positioning necessary for the effects progTaM.

Rimsry positioning of effects aircraft was in most instances conduc%ed

by the MsQ-1 or M-33 radsrs monitored by the AOC. Each effects aticrti

required a clear UHF channel to its assigned positioning rader thereby

seriously reducing the number of channels available for MC operation.

X29

AFWUHO

K

TMEinconvenience uas ion of the A02 communicationsz

console so that each controller could monitor any comblnatl.onof all U

uHF channels.

The A1.rOperations Center at Bikini was orlglr+lly established on

board the

Destroyer

available

USS E4XER. Later the BMX function

USS EENNER. UHF communications and

were sufficient but despite maximum

was transferred to the

the number of scopes

cooperation and effort

by

as

to

Navy communications personnel, some tiportent navigational aids such

TACAN and the hom-hg beacon were either out for maintenance or unable

transmit due to interfering with scient~ic Projectsa The Am ~

the BAOO utilized a hot line for coordktx aircraft movements ad

operations. This circuit was backed up by a high fiequegcy circuit which

was not completely satisfactory. The ~imary dlfflcultywlth this circuit

was due to the low power being radiated

transmitter.

The telephone cable-in the outside

by the BOXIZR~shigh frequency

cable plant at Enlwetokwas

S.nstalledh a haphazard nwmer. The efistq fac~itles were

supplemented for each succeed@g operation without a firm e~ansion plan.

Klso most sll cables lnuse had at least l@ bad pairs as a result of

electrolytic action. ‘thisshortsge caused concern as to whether or not

ample pairs would be available for the @hot 1~11 ~lephones in the AOC

and lines for control of the remote UHF transmitters located at building

638. It was necessary to mcd~ 13 UHF transmitters to reduce the number

of telephone lties reqdred prior to their becoming operational. M’ter

modMying the equipment, satisfactory communications were established.

AIL requests for telephone service f’ramunits of Task tiOUP 7Q4

could not be fulfllled due to the ncn-availability of telephone cable

pairs in some sreas. amned to run from Bldg. 90

@

AFwutlo

~.

(“~

to e ~in exchange uas not ‘l-nstdledand id~tidniti -rece$y~-that it

Would ~otilbe~.~~~’d-fi:fitil’some’tim iriAugust....lshor~agenec essitatedted the

implementation of controls over the number of telephones that could

be installed in satuated ~eas. Inmost instances during the crltlcal

period, telephone extensions w?re added rather than installing new services.

Teletype and crypto facilities were provided on a joint basis as

were sXL long distance point to point communications. The AACS

Communications Element operated the Task ~OUP 7c4 wtlon of these C~-

cuits and the tdetyp communlcati.oncenter in Building 90. Tele-

communications with SMAW were conducted on a weekly schedule with very

little difficulty.

Communication and Mr Control Facilities on board the USS BOXER

were used by TG 7.4 for ah communication and alrcra.ftcontrol d~ing

Operation NEWSREEL.

original requirements for Task Group 7.4 Communications Included .“

the use of avoke telephone cixcuit from the CIC on the USS BOXER to

Hi.cksmAFB. This circuit could not be established since the USS BOXER

was moved beyoxxithe range of the AN/TRC UHF equipment for operational

reasons. me loss of the AN/TRC

single side bard (SSB) telephone

Command Post on Johnston Island.

equipnent left only one high frequency

circuit from the USS B- to the

At our request Hickam Mrways joined our HI?net ad satisfactory

communication were maintained, during most of the test periods.

Mxcreft participating inthese testiwere dispersed over a much

wider area than on previous operations- Five of the test aircraft

were more than zOO miles from the USS BO= and three (3) h~h frfWuencY

circtits were necessary to control these aticrsft. At the time of

AFwutio

131

“wdeti~lon of the high altit -6- e~~ce sll high frequency Se wave radio

FPrWWtlon was lost. No contact with Hlokam Mrways was possible and

considerable diffic~ty was encountered in passing lnforntton to and

from al.rcraftwlthti range of groundwave signals due to the high

atmos@eric noise level. The HF equlpent

World War II type equipment snd could only

This low power was not considered adequate

for dependable aircraft contiol.

on the USS BOXER was

radiate 100 watts of ??l?~

for the net control station

Communications facilities in the EPG fall into two (2)

dlstihct categories. They are, first the permanent faciMties that

remafn operational throughout the interti

point to point and the homer at Eniwetok.

Islsnd facilities, Eniwetok GCA$ TACAN.

period such as control tower

In the second.srea are weather

To establhh the facilitles

in the second category the material and manpower of the 1st MCS Ebbile

SW@ron located at Johnson AF’B,Japan were used by the MCS Communications

Element. This organization must mai.ntalna mobile capability and 1s

well suited to establish these facilities on a mission basis●

The AN/USQ-12 alr contiol sys~m -ctioned without w I@Or

difficulty and was able to present and record

graphs of alrcra.ftpositions for all tests at

although lacking in dependable high frequency

by means of scope photo-

=iwetok. The USS BOXER

radio voice communications

maintained UHF and IFF contact with aircraft participating in Biktii Events.

The Eniwetik outside cable plant Is in need of complete fehabflitatlon.

The increasing demands for.

fsr exceeded the number of

adjacent to the airstrip.

telephone and intercommunication service has

operational cable pairs particularly in areas

132

AFWUHC

~ The effects of the radic blackout which occurred siruultaneody—

with detonation of ~ne high altitude device must be considered I.nall

future operations where shilsr conditions may be encountered.

,.

Wuno

(

C#pter 8 - Radsafe and Blast Damage Responsibilities

A rigorous program was conducted tk-oughout HARDTACK to insure maximum

data gathefing support without sacrifice of h~ s~ety. This program

deal-tchiefly with the radiological safety of persomel but also embodied

considerations of possible damage to equipment from blast, heat and water

wave action. The program included the followi.ng:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The

Dosimetry for Task

Pre-shot planning.

Cloud SSJ@i~ .

Sample return.

Group 7.4 personnel.

Post-shot monitoring

most difficult problem in this area was the control of e~osure

h radiation of air and ground crews associated with the nuclesr cloud

sa@ing program. In the end it was necessary to obtain replacement ‘

personnel in order not to exceed maximum pernrissableexposures on large

nunb=rs of people in this program..

Dosimetzy provided for continuous monitoring of the exposure of each

HARD”ACK participant to ionizing radiation through

The:e fiLm-badges were issued to m personnel and

by the person!s duties. Men engaged in activities

the use of . film-badge.

at a frequency dictated

not requiring regulazz

expcsure ‘tcradiation were issued film-badges at six (6) week intervals,

while personnel worting in hazardous environments received film-badges as

often as twice weekly. The badges were collected and read and hi-weekly

r-e-portswere published listing the total radiation exposures. Through

this means, the radiological health of all persomel cculd be monitored and

13b

.>

P

f

c@mander was in position to divert it to a safe position and inform the

Task Force Comnander.

Aircraft uhose positions were not as crttical as the effects

wera directed to a pre-planned H-Hour orbit by the Air Operations

aircraft

Center

Controller and timed around this orbit in order that they might he at

the pre-determined H-Hour position at time of detonation. These air-

craft were positioned by the Air Operations Center Controllers in much

the

the

the

same manner as the Controllers monitored the effects aircraft with

use of a pre-planned orbit and definite time check pofnts. Since

effects of t% detonation on these aircraft was not considered

critical, they had no abort procedures; however~ the positions had tO

be accurately maintained in order for them to receive tliedesired test

re~u~ts. This catego~of aircraft included Search and Resoue (sAR)

aircraft, sampler controller aircraft, photographic aircraft and 5-n-

strument carriers.

During the last six (6) minutes prior to a detonation the Commander

of Task Group 7.4 kept a constant check on the accurate positioning of

all aircraft in the test array. During this period he was in constant

touch by ‘hot linetlwith the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN and the

firing party. The Comnander, Task Group 7.4 kept the Conrander, Joint

Task Force SEVEN and the firing party briefed on the safety of the air-

craft posttions. If necessary, this “hot linen was also his method for

obtaining information about shot delays or cancellations.

Methods of control in the Bikini Air Operations Center aboard the

USS BOXER were the same as those used in the Eniwetok Air Operations

AFwl.ma

125

. &

-.

*.

FCenter, except that for

craft from Eniwetok was

Control of the aircraft

approximately 100 miles

*..

-iiBikini events the launching and recovery of air-

handled by the Eniwetok Air Operations Center.

passed fron one center to the other at a point

east of Eniwetok. Additionally, information was

relayed between the Cmmander, Task Group 7.4 in the Eniwetok Air Operations

Center and his representative aboard the USS BOXER.

The control of Task Group 7.4 aircraft flying locally on non-shot.

days was exercised by the controllers in the Eniwetok Air 6perations

Center, assisted by Air Force Controllers operating in the Bikini Air

Operations Center.

To carry out the responsibilityof controlling aircraft entering

and departing the Eniwetok Control Area it was necessary to make an

agreement wit!~Kwajalein on procedures to te followed in the transfer

of control of aircraft between Kwajalein and the Eniwetok Air Operations

Center. Additionally, the Wake FIR was extended southward to border on

the Eniwetok Control Area and therefore similar arrangements had ta be

made with the CAA authorities at Wake. To hrsure control of all air-

craft entering the area, it was stipulated that aircraft would not

enter it until specific clearance to do so had been received from

~niwetok Am either direct or by re~y through the Kwajalein Area

trol Center or the Wake CAA Center.

To insure safety of crews and passengers from possible flash

ness or other effects of a detonation in case of radio failure on

aircraft, and to allow aircraft to clear to Eniwetok

tions like Hawaii and Guam on a D-1 Day, a NOTAl{was

126

from distant

issued to all

the

Con=

blirxl-

the

sta-

ex@3ures exceeding the -mum permissible precluded.

,.

f>

,,

Pre-shot safety planning was accomplished for each event to insure

that men, materi~ and faci~ties WOuld not be SUbjeCted tO avoidable

haz@ais. Of prime consideration was the threat of radioactive fall-out

resulting from the detonations. Prior tm each Wst event a predicted

fsJ1-out area was established and only when this area was clear of inhab-

ited locations was the destinationexecutid. Of the shot delays encountered

during Operation HARDTACK, more than ninety per cent were due ta undesir-

able fall-out indications. These fall-out areas were posted in the Air

Operations Center so that controllers could keep aircraft clear of the

danger areas. Pre-shot planning also dealt with damage predictions con-

cerning blast, heat and water action. On two (2) events at Eniwetok and

one (1) event at Bikini it was necessary to evacuate liaison type aircraft

to preclude blast damage and on one (1) event it was necessary to require

complete body covering for all personnel to preclude the possibili~ of

burns. A constant program was pursued b insure that no one observed

detonations with his naked eyes. The possibility of retinal burns con-

stituted a continual.threat through the entire operation. Through dainage

predication and the precautionary neasures dictated by these predictions,

no unplanned damage occurred to aircraft and only minor damages were in-

flicted on base facilities. .

The most difficult Task Group 7.L radiological problems of the opera-

tion existed in the support of the cloud sampling program. Prior b the

operation

HARDTACK,

man (rem)

and based on the scheduled number of detonations plamed for

maximum permissible exposures of ten (10) roentgens equivalent

for cloud sampling and effects aircrews and five (~) rem for all

135

.

d

f

%-

ot~r personnel were established by the Comander,

,.,

.

Joint Task Force SEVEN.

As the test series progressed, additional events were introduced and the -

personnel exposwes mounted rapidly toward the established timum. Not

o*- the aircrews but the aircraft maintenance persomel and the crews who

recovered and packaged the collected samples were approachl.ngtheir expos-

ure limits. To alletiate this problem, the commanders Task Grow 7s~

requested and was granted permission to extend the maximum exposure limit

of the msintinance and sample recovery crews from five (s) rem to eight

(8) rem and ten

was authorized;

selected fl@ng

of cloud ssmple

(10) rem respective~. No extension beyond ten (10) rem

so additional cloud sampling aircrews were obtained and

personnel at Eniwetok were trained b perform the duties

observers. ~ careful scheduling of all aloud sampling

sircrews and support personnel it was possible to complete the operation

with no serious cases of over exposure. (See Figure 2Z , Chapter 8,

W2cposure of T.AUNuclear and Maintenance Personnel b Ionizing Radiation”

and Figure 5, Chapter 4, ‘~CloudSampler Aircrew Exposure”.)

In support of tb rapid delivery of radioactive cloud samples to lab-

oratories in tl= Zone of the Intefior$ ** coders were instruc~d

and briefed by the Task Group 7. b Nucle= Research officers who ~so mOn-

itored the loading and securing of the samples aboard the return aircraft.

He also established an isolation area within each of the sample return ti-

craft to insure the safety of the passengers and crew. This isolation area

was established ~ marld.ngthe cargo floor of the aircraft at a location

between the cloud samples and the passengers where the radiation intensi~

was ten (10) milXroentgens per hour. Personnel remaining outside this

line could expect to receive no more than one (1) weeks tolerance dose of

136

#wlJHo

Teat Aircraft

IONIZING RADIATION EXPOSU~

b

Unit Nuclear Applications Personnel: *

1 April - 1 August 195~ .

a—--—-.-—6576 m—— —8293 mr————3776 mr

——-6983 mr—- —4579 m

—--403$ m’—1009mr

——- —3173 m

PRIVACYACTMATERIA1REMOVED

—--2276 m.~,7310—-0058——-2731——337$

~g—-—~- 6645——-2786~7225

7132————7345. __.-0---o556 m

{. ------------3107

mmrm’

mrmrnlr

mrmrmmrml’

-------------- 3888

m’

m’

PRIVACYACTMATERIALREMOVED

* HARDTACK I,laxm Permissible fiposure: 10,000 Ililliroentgens.

FIGURE 22A

137

. ‘%illm-

Test Ahcmft

L

“.

w HARDTACK

unit

~()~~NG RADIATION IDWOSUR=PRIVACYACTMATERIALREMOVED

Aircraft E@neetig Persomels*

I April - 1 August 1958

,.,---...—.5653 mr—.2200 mr.—5476 mr_—z* m

-41 ~..—--1850mr——2379 mr—5410 m—1717 m’—4475 ~.—4832 m-—-2954 =—2294 =——2381 m——2511 mr—3500 m.-2146 mr—1470 m—1930 ~.--6355 =—2218 m—2156 m—5229 mr.—26n mr—2291 m—~ mr—~n =—2509 mrA763 ~—.-2744 =—x98 mr—-5098 mr4649 =—-3851 mr—-1$75 =—--7415 m

—2025 mr

—-— —-3260 IW_—2138 w, ,~-6917 mr—— —3972 m

——5376 m— —-5861mr.- —-—~2910 m—— 2@o=-— —--2774 w_.-3o54 mr~7737 m~1904 =~iino =.—5302 mr

—5491 m___--2586 m,___--297o mr_m---l92l w_—2582 =~3077 =_—-3o2o m—-— —--2264 ~

—4177 ~.—-----2350 mr.~7= ~-— —-3587 mr~24% ~—----3947 =.~3059 m~2774 ~~2678 =-—.5L$1 mr~1996 mr

MaximuIu Perdssable &pos~e: 8,000 Mil.liroentgens.

_—2961 m_—4812~3748

mmr

PIWACYACTMATERIALREMOVED~Gm 22B “

flight.—

Post shot monitifing was accomplished by various activities within

the Task Group to insure the earliest possible detection of radioactiw

fsll%ut or damage produced by the detonations. Rad-safe teams con-

ducted island monitoring on Eniwetok hmediati~ following each event and

continued their checks for forty-eight hours or until the danger of fsJl-

out had passed.

Task Group ?.& provided personnel to man four (4) off-atoll.weather

rad-safe sites. These sites at Kuasie, Kapingamarang3.,Nauru and T-a

maintained a continuous fall-out surveillance program to insure earliest

possible detection of this hazard. The personnel assigned to these sibs

were trsined in the United States and were selected caref~ to insup a

favorable relationship”with the native population. Their equipment in-

cluded a continuous~ recording geiger instrument and they submitted

pefiodic radio reports concerning their observations. There were no cases

of adverse falLout encountered during the test series. Monthly inspection

visits were made to these rad-safe activities to assist with instrument

mai.nte=ce and calibration and tm evsluate the collected data.

AU multi-place sircraft flying in the Eniwetik area dting or within

twenty-four hours following an event were provided with a Rad-Safe Monitor

whose due was to keep the aircraft commander advised concerning radiation

encountered on the flight. Those

were required to radio their safe

wave passage.

aircraft positioned in the test array

condition i.nnnediatilyfoIlowing shock

Approhtely one (1) hour after each detonation a helicopter was

dispatched to transport a rad-ssfe re-entry team to or near ground zero to

.139

‘*-ILes bllsh a safe time for personnel to recover instruments and test data—

near the burst. At shut S~

copter transported a rad-safe

more detailed radiation check

helicopter pads.

(6) hmh after the detonation a second heli-

team around the shot atoll to accomplish a

and to assess the be to airstips and

Following test events$ all aircraft returning to Eniwehk which could

possibly be contaminated were monitored and those requiring decontamination

were isolated. The sircrews were immediately sent h the personnel decon-

tamination center, checked thoroughly and decontaminated when necessary.

Contadnated aircraft were snowed to decontaminate themselves in isolation

by radioactive decay when time permitted. This technique insured a ~

of radiation qosure to the decontamination personnel s-ticethe contamina-,

tion intensities appro-tely halved themselves each seven (7) hours.

After decay tk remainder of the contamination was removed from the airoraft

through normal waslrhg with chemicals, water and high press- hoses.

Maqr activities under Task Group ?.!iparticipated in the accomplishment

of a successful.and a safe nuclear test. Through the planning and adminis-

tering of a conservative yet realistic radiological safety program,

Operation HARDTACK was completed with no radiation injuries occuring within

Task Group 7.h

140

#) .

am m?)

.-

&

f

Ch er9- Photography

T The photographic program during Operation HARDTACK necessititti

support from two (2) different sources. Documentary photography was

accomplished by a provisional unit formed by militsI’Yand civilian-.

personnel from the l-352ndMotfon pic~e squadrons Lookout Moun~in

Air Force Station, Los Angeles, California. The 1370th Photo Mapping

Squadron (APCSWITS) West Palm Beach, Florida, provided and operated

three (3) C-54 and two (2) RE!-50aircraft to support airborne documentary

and technical photography. The three (3) C-54tS, two (2) w50is ~

assigned supporting personnel composed the Aerial Photo Element Provisional.

(Reference Chapter 4.)

The Documentary Photography

documentation of HARDTACK. This

Element was responsible_for continuing

photographic effort protided motion

picture

Project

footage

photography for Field Commmd,

(FC/AFSWP)(Military effects of

for the Department of the Navy

AEC consisted of color transparencies,

Armed Forces Special Weapons

Operation HARDTACK) and stock

@ A~. Coverage for the

black and white still negatives

of all detonations plus-stills on the assembly and instrumentation of

four (4) test devices. For the Air Force, selected sequences of the

operation were photographed in”35 mm color using cine~sco~ lens tec~que.

The most extensive coverage by far, was that given to the KAHOO

and UMBRELLA events. For ‘JAHOOevent, forty motion picture and still

cameras manned and remote, in the air, on the ground and at sea were

used. Documentary Photographic Element cameramen also operated the

technical photographic camera racks on all three (3) C-54 aircraft. All

camera equipment operated satisfactorily with only two (2) camera failures

ltll

AlwL/no

,

IEwh h did not affect the overall documentation. A total of 7,500 feet—

of 35 ~ Easwn Color Negative was e~osed on this event.

The U!{BRELLLAevent was the element~s biggest effort during the

enti%e operation. All available cameramen operated forty-four cameras

of all types in the air and on the

photo cameramen operated technical

ground. For this event} documentary

photo cameras mounted in the C-54~s.

All camera equipment operated satisfactorily, except one set of remote

cameras in place on HENRY Island (MUX). These cameras were equipped

with 17 inch lenses directed on three (3) target destroyers. Failure of

these cameras

time circuit.

factorily but

to operate was due to a malfunction of their own electronic

The EGG signal tripped and operated the relay system aatis-

camera motor relays failed to respond. -

Camera failure on HENRY Island (KUI) did not affect the overall.

documentation. Back up remote cameras on GLENN Island covered a

portion of the test destroyers with excellent results. It was later

determined that the HENRY Island sensitized stock loaded in magazines

atop the remote cameras received sufficient fallout to ruin the film.

A total of 8,359 feet of 35 nunEastin Color Negative was exposed for

this event.

Positioning of aircraft to provide aerial photography of the

UMBRELLA and WAHOO were practically identical. One (1) &50 flew a

race track pattern directly over surface zero at 25,000 feet, positioned

to be 1,000 feet short of surface zero at Time Zero. The second R.B--5O

was positioned ten miles Northeast of surface zero at 2,500 feet and

following detonation, turned into the water spray column. Two (2) photo

C-54~S were positioned Northwest of water zero at 20,000 feet horizontal

1.L2

(

.. .,e

H ‘\..

HA~TACK, each event was photographed from the air. During HARDTACK only

nine (9) events were photographed from the air; seven (7) of which

were of interest to the AEC and two (2) of interest to the DOD. A

toti’1of thirty-five (35) aerial photographic missions were flown.

“ The folhwi~ pages illustrate the preparation and execution of a

@pical nuclear test event from the standpoint of Task Group 7.4 Operations.

The”*ROSEEvent was selected for portr~~. The test will be covered from

the preparation of the operation order to the debriefing and critiqw sfter

the last sircraft had landed.

The test aircraft participation was decided upon prior to the opera-

tional phase of HARDTACK and was outlined in Annex B b Task Group 7. b

Operation Plan 1-58. ITM participating aircraft, the projecti wfich they

supported and the general purposes for theti participation were outlined

in the referenced document. Occasionally, changes to the test array as

outlined in Operation Plan 1-S8 were made. The only c~e for ROSE was

the addition of

barrier partrol

~ D minus

lished for each

a Task Group 7.3 p2vj whose~ssion wasfl@W a rad-s~e

post H-HOW to the array*

three (3) days, a supplement operation order w= Pub-

test event. The order for ROSE, Task Group 7.4 Operation

Order 18-58, was first published six (6) days prior to the actual detona-

tion. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining positioning data and a

safety certificate for these planned positions prior tQ original publicat-

ion date of the supplementary operation order. The positioning data and

safety certifications were the responsibility of Task Group 7.1. The

difficul~ in obtaining this data from Task

most instances due to lIDI1days for shots on

participate being scheduled close together.

Group 7.1 was Unavoidablein

which the projects wanted to

Frequently there was insuffi-

cient time to reduce data

positioning criteria in a

gathered on one (1) shot in time to produce

timely fashion for the next shot. On ROSE, this

145

MWUHO

(

..

g.

4“ ---

r e, one (1) at ls5~ feet; the Other at lotooo feet. The third photi

c-54 was positioned 20,000 feet Southwest of water zero at 9,000 feet.

By this means, complete aerial photo coverage was effected.

, On 22 June 1958,

Island and by 22 July

had been documented.

and still photography

Project NWSREEL documentation began at Johnston

1958, 70 per cent of all participating programs

Remote camera installations for motion picture

were positioned and ready for rehearsal and

functioned satisfactorily on shot events. Element camera teams documented

activities at Waikele Branch, Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu during the

peri~ U, 12, 1.3,and ~ July 1958. participating progr~s at ~c~

Air Force Base, Wheeler Air Force Ease, and Barbers Point Naval Air

Station were documented during the perhd, post TEAK event. Four (4)

K-24 type cameras with a supply of Ektachrome were positioned near

launch pad for technical evaluation purposes as requested by AEllA.

In addition to the required coverage for Operation HARDTACK and ~

Project NEWSREEL events, considerable effort was expended in obtaining,

for the Bureau of Ships, Department of the Navy, realistic action pictures

for their own production, “Nuclear Defense at Sea’t. This effort reqtird

the positioning

various phases,

decontamination

of cameramen on board four (4) destroyers> and covered

such as gun crews manning battle stitions, mmitoring a“zid

teams in operation, wasMown systems in operation, and

operation of a rad-safe center on boafi the USS RENWILLE. In addition

to the realistic action pictures, phpical damage to destroyers, sub-

urines, squaw and liberty ship were

Aerial Documentary Photographic

not as extensive as that required in

documented in detail wherever possible.

coverage of Operation HARDTACK was

previous operations. Prior to

143

,43

-..--...-*

f

-- . . .....

rJ ~dmbulted j.namendments and additions to the operation or er.

23, 24 and 25.)

General requirements for cloud sampling were documented by the labora-

to~ concerned - in this case, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory - and

given to the Sampldmg Element. Prior to the mission, any changes were dis-

cussed in conference between the Sampling Element Commander and the

scientific representative of the laboratory. At this time, final sampling

requirements were established.

The crowded conditions on the runways and

the preparation of a written llissionlhcecution

taxiways at Eniwetok made

Chart necessary. This C&t

was published on D minus two (2) days ~ the Test Aircraft Unit. This

chart established start engines$ M$ ~-uPs take-off and aPPro~~

landing

Mssion

On

times for the participating aircraft. See lHgure26 for the R~

Execution Chart. .

D nd-nusone (1) day, a general bfiefing was given by the Test Air-

craft unit to u aircrew, - controuers$ ti~er officer and other

responsible agencies. Shot location, time hack, H-Hour time and a weather

briefing were given. Also a reviewof the operation order, a IIblacute’f

display of the H-Hour aircraft patterns were shown and special requirements

snd instruction were given. Following the general briefing, each partici-

pating element conductid its own specialized briefing, going into much

greater detsil on their specific mission requirements.

146

i

..

r

.

FIGURE 23

147

AmLilm

(-

. .-

(I3

aj%4

i?

d●

c-

.I-4

u1)

Q

+

1-1’

4

mwo

. .

ANNEX B TO=TASK GROUP

7*’--(R0sEEvz

(‘3

-s.

llOpI~l[&57 Iv

35,000’ - to be abeam

Q!

of GZ heading 090° T

at=

(1) “CLARK” A@-13,0001 alt - heading344.50T - IZ,800’beyond GZ at Toe

(2) “COMTn FJ44,000’ alt - headi~

short of GZ at To

341.50T 11,270’ b9y0GZ at To.

(3) “BARLEY” A@-lll,omheading 34.2050T 7)950J

beyond GZ at TOO

(4) “KI.MONAnFJ413,000t altheading 338.50T 2~465t ~YO~GZ at To.

GZ at To 35 ~ East

WHO

(-tJIfSTABLEn u-16

tl~~R~fi P2V 2,000f -

To be abeam of GZ heading270° T at To 50 NM South.

e’

—ur:

r

{(

1

(\(

—

!

—

—

oNmo

.

[((f

I

i1.

—

—

u

:c

—(I

,,

I I

L

! 1 m

I 1 1

NHHIm-3

T

ArWHo

“- .:%...

*’

{

.~eAt midnight on D-1 day, the Air Operations Center?

* checks. By Hminus four hours, the Center was completely ~~ed, inc~udi43

the Task Group Commander, operations Officer, air controllers, and Communications%

Officer. At approximately H minus three hours, the Tower Officer was In place

serving as an advisor and coordinator for test array aircraft. At 0310,

STABLE ECHO started engines, taxied at 0315 and took off at 0335 hours* Each

H-Hour array aircraft

the until there were

one (1) B-57B Sampler

on the Mission Execution Chart followed at the assigned

two (2) A@, two (2) FJ-4s, one (1) B-52, one (1) SA-162

Controller, one (1) B-57B Sampler, and a P2V airborne.

Each of these aircraft was under control of the Air Operations Center and

their positions were monitored by the air controllers. The effects aircraft

(B-52, A@, and FJ-4s) were prtirily COntrOllQd by MSQ ‘andM-33 precision

radars capable of very accurate positioning. The Air Operations Center provided

tack up positioning capability ti the event of precision equipment malfunction.

The AOC also had the overall responsibility for safe positioning of all

aircraft. At H minus one hour, the voice countdowm was broadcast over

UHF $Itirdn channel from EIMER Island and all aircraft had their radios

positioned in the ‘tGuardReceiven position, insuring that they were

receiving the warnings prior to detonation. By H minus thirty tiutes all

aircraft airborne at H-Hour were in position. At H minus five (5) minutes}

the Coxmnander,Task Group 7.4 reported to the Commander, Joint Task Force

SEVEN that all aircraft were safely positioned. All radio tran~ssions

with the exception of emergencies and the voice countdown on Guard channel~

were silenced from H minus three minutes until H plus tio (2)‘tiutes. At

H plus two (2) minutes, the Air operations Center called all aircraft for

151

Ammo)31

/-

.-.

-. ~afety check and this hformation was once again r. aye o

Following the detonation, the FJ-4s and @s were cleared to return to base and

land, their requirements having been met. The B-52 remained airborne for.-s

approximately another hour and thirty minutes to complete its

ing the detonation. Starting at H plus fifty-five minutes and

fifteen minute intervals, three (3) B-57 sampler aircraft took

testing follow-

following at

off. The

Air Operations Center vectored them to the airborne Sampler Controller .

who then assumed control and directed the aircraft in their penetrations

of the nuclear cloud. As each aircraft collected its required sampb$

the Controller released them to

their retuxm to the airfield to

The tower gave landing priority

the controller in the ACE who expedited

prevent any unnecessary radiation exposure.

to the sampling aircraft and after landing,

cleared them to the sample recovery area. In this area, the aircrew was

quickly evacuated from the aircraft. The filter paper

by sample recovery personnel and placed in lead ~lpigsn

laboratoriesin the ZI. After all the sampler aircraft

had landed, the SA-16 aircraft was cleared to land. A

Task Force Cam-and Post was made by the Air Operations

was then ramoved

for reti.rntc the

aridthe cmtroller

report to the Joi2t

Center when all

aircraft were safely on the ground. After landing, all effects and

sampling aircrews were debriefed by the Test Aircraft Unit Opraticn.e Officer$

and on the following day a critique uas held for all aircrews and responsihh

ground agencies to determine problem areas generated by the event. See

Figures 27and28 for photographs of the ~ssion control boards in the

Air Operations Center.

MWUHO

152

&

1-.+$!$Ea-”- .—.._._——.-.—-------—-------

___— — .— -

?

\

m,●

+

● ☞

● ☛

4

,

4

k●

, ++

+ ...L

+

-#

*

IIIII

I\IIIiI

i

I

i

153

, <?’

Afwulto

R’

GN

%=

““\ II I 1

—.

1 1’

$0—

I

.

iI

—

—.-

FIGURE 28

WHO

PART V

MATERIEL

. .

L%

.

.. . -

rCha ;l - . ‘--*Introduction.

~ The Materiel objective was to provide 100% logistical support for

all Task Group 7.4elements. Materiel agencies at all levels engaged

in planning, programing, movements} distribution and ro~l-up of‘a

exce%ses. The lbterfel activities encompassed

Maintenance Transportation and Construction.

During the nmnths of December 1957 through

supplies and equipment were procured, shipped~

the fields of Supply,

hlay1958, the required

received and broken out

for use by the Task Group

were greatly expedited by

various elemnts, and the

7.4Elements. he break-out of these itims

the arrival of the advance echelons of the

Base Supply augmentation personnel. These,

arrivals9 which began as early as December 1957,were timed to met

the operational readiness dates of the various elemnts. The Task

Group 7.4 Logistics Ltiison Cffice at Headquarters, SMAMA, succe.~ded

in procuring all essential items of supply and equipment and shipping

in time to meet required in-place dates.

A minor delay in the Materiel build-up ts attributable to the

lab designation of Air Force elements to participate in Cperation

HARDTACK as a part of Task Group 7.4. Althugh ow supply ai~~

maintenance support concepts were finalized by the em of J~Y 195’7:

it was not until October 1957 that the majority of the Air Fcrce

elements were designated. During 29-30 October 1957’a Yaterjel plan-

ing conference was held at Kfitland Air Force Base. This conference

was attetied by representatives of all the then-committed elements.

The purpose of this conference was to discuss and finalize the

materiel support concept and to prepare listings of quantitative

sunport requirements. The period immediately following the materiel

conference was one of intense activity which included finalization

155

[,(kAMtJHO

..-

-f

.-.jt3&

of r rements for 9-il@l_enance, aircraft parking, trans-

Po tion, work and office space. wing the months of November 1957

through January 1958S SUPPIY and ~uiPment require~nts lists were

submitted by the elements, reviewed by the Task Group materiel officei

and ~drwarded to the Task Group Logistics Liaison Office at S’MAMA,

for requisitioning and shipment to

office was the Task Group’s single

supply and maintenance system. As

the Eniwetok Roving Grounds. This

point of contact with the AMC

a result of the late assignment of’

some elements to the Task Group, and the resulting delay in submission

of support requirements some parts of the procurement program reached

crash action proportions. A major factor in the timely solution of

this problem was the fact that the key personnel in the ‘lkskGroup

Logistics Office at SMAMA had previous experience on Operation REDWING.

Results in the logistics supprt area were gmd; aircraft incommision

rate was83.3J; AOCP rate wasl.9 %; and e=rgency supply support was

good. The key bo the efficien~ of the logistics support of Operaticn

HARDTAGK was the Maintenance Control Unit which was manned by personnel

of the Task Group plus a number of augmentation personnel from Task

Group elements.

Of continuing concern was the nnnitoring of various aircraft

modification programs. In some cases the late finalization of modifi-

cation requirements resulted in crash programs. In addition consider-

able delay was encountered in negotiating with the nmdification activi-

ties in the firming up of realistic completion dates. By continual

monitoring of the various codification programs, all aircraft were able

to meet

The

Control

required Eniwetok Proving Grounds in-plaoe dates.

establishment and operation of the Thsk Group Maintenance

Unit was”begun during Operation REDWING. Utilizing the

157

AFWHO

---

(

f

..

experience gaind on Operation R~WING plus the guidance contained in

~ 664, Organizational and Field Maintenance, the Task Group Mainten-

ant>.Control Unit functioned, throughout Operation HARDTACK, as a

single control agency by which we were able to put to best use our

limited supply and maintenance capability. The overall efficiency of

the Materiel effort is reflected in the outstanding readiness rate of

aircraft and related equipment maintained throughout the operation.

Further$ during Operation ~WING, the then-organized Task Group,

prepared a long range construction program which consisted of a

number of projects for improvement of facilities in the Eniwetok

Proving Grounds. lhis document was finalized in AW9t i958.

Throughout the period from August 1956 ~ Awfl 195g this program was

given continuous attention. As a result of continuous follow-up

action, most of tie esstiiial projects were completed in ti~ for

Operation HARDTAGK.

158

....

(

f

Cha 2 - supply. “ <,

Section A - Mission

Supplies and equipnmt as projected to be needed for an 120 day oper-

ation were procured and propositioned in the Eniwctok Proving Grounds.*

The requirements were developed by each participating element to provide

100% logistical support during their presence in the EM. Headquarters,

Task Group 7.4

pose vehicles,

ground support

the EPG by the

distributed to

developed the requirements for special and general pur-

petroleum products, spare aircraft engines, and aircraft

equipment. All air and water shipmnts were received at

Air Force Wse Supply. These shipments were expeditiously

advance echelons of the participating elemmts or inte-

grated into base stocks as appropriate. The original spare parts require-

mmts were not adequate to support the extended operation. mus, it was

necessary to procure additional quantities to support the extended HARD-

TACK operational phase and Operation NEWSREEL. The overall supply

effectiveness throughout the entire operation was excellent.

Section B - Supply Organization and hnction

The supply agencies consisted of a staff supply officer in the

Group Headquarters, a materiel control officer working in the Mainten-

ance Control Unit, Supply Liaison Branch at SMAMA, a unit supply in

each element ati an Air Force

of the Test Base Unit.

The ‘Msk Group 7.4 Supply

Base Supply actitity, which was a part

Liaison Branch consisted of seven (7)

personnel at the Sacramento Air Materiel Area, McClellan Air Force

Base, California. This unit works directly with the SMAMA Operation

HARDTACK project monitors at the various AMC depots, and the Head-

quarters, Joint Task Force-SEVEN Liaison Officers at Travis Air Force

AMUH9

Base, California, and Naval Supply Center, Oaklaxxi,California. l%is

159

,

<

(

-

“6” ‘ .’*rovides a centil. u Htrol point on a year around basiS

a~ insme. contlnulti of supply procedures during both interim axd●

operational periods.

The Air Force Base Supply (AFB 2872) was organized and operated.

acc~idance with Air Force Manual 67-1. The Base SUpply manning was

in

augmented to provide the capability to process the 26,000 line items of

incoming supplies and equipment. ‘Iheaugmentation personnel were re-

quired throughout the operation including the roll-up phase.

The Materiel Control Unit closely monitored the issue of supplies,

expedited priori- requirements and furnished supply assistance to the

element supply agencies.

The staff supply officer monitored the overall supply effectiveness,

initialed procedures and polices as needed to improve supply service$

developed new requirements for the extended operational phase and

Operation NEWSREEL, provided guidance and assistance and nmnitored the

materiel roll up program.

Section C - Special Supply Procedures

Materiel requirennts for Operation HARDTACK were developed as

follows: Each participating elemsnt developed materdul requirements

based on 120 days operation in the EPG. These requirements excltied

K)L and spare engines, refueling units, fire trucks, special and

general purpose vehicles which were developed by Task Group ‘7.4. me

elemmt req~e~nts were submitted as ‘A” and ‘BW kits. ~e nAn kits

consisted of enroute and immdiate requirements on arrival in the EPG.

The ‘An kit contained primrily aircraft spares, blank forms, limited

“office supplies plus aircraft ground support equipment not included in

the ‘Bn kit. The ‘Bn kit consisted of 120 days aircraft spares, air-

craft ground support equipment that could not be furnished by the ele-

1(0

AFWHO

(

...- .-s”---

f

nen nd all other CM “’tiyrequired in the EFG. The des-

i, ation of all mission essential items at the time requirements

listings were submitted permitted the Liaison Officer to utilize

effectively the short lead ti~ to insure shipment of these specific.

item”~’.As a result, all essentidl item requirements’were satisfied

and 92% support was provided on all other requirem=ts.

Late identification of som participating elements resulted in

crash development of requirements for these elements. In these cases

there was insufficient time for the Headquarters to screen thoroughly

HBH kit listings for completeness, accuracy and adequacy of quantities.

As a consequence some excesses were procured.

~e format for submission of requirement could be improved as

follows: Prepare the ‘Bn kit in sections: Section 1, a listing of

peculiar aircraft spares, Section 2, cost category 3 and all classes

of expendable supplies except office supplies and common Ar~/Air Force

blank forms; Section 3, all office supplies, furniture, machines and

equipment, ad Section 4, special purpose vehicles, general purpose

vehicles, aircraft ground support equipment, test equipment and special

tools. ‘Ihe‘Bn kit listing should, contain only items not’available

from the element and home station assets.

The provisioning of the 6th Weather Squadron was handled separately

from all other elements. All requirements were obtained at or through

OCAMA, segregated into site kits by the 6th Weather Sqtidron and shipped

to the ER2. ~ese requirewnts include all property necessary to sus-

tain five (5) separate off-island camp sites. Upn conclusion of pre-

vious operations, this property was returned to supply sticks. This

headquarters proposed that upon completion of this Operation, all re-

useable property-be retained axxlshipped to OCAMA for rehabilitation

161

Afw14io

(

.- ‘--

f

and rage pending-f operations. This proposal was

a roved by Hq, M. Project BITTMl PILL has been established to

acco~lish the rehabilitation and storage of the operations property.

16 foot Wherry Boats were obtained from the U.S. Navy to meet‘*

the”krequiremnts of the Weather/F@d-safe sites. ~e”se boats were

used to sweep the lagoon aircraft landing areas$ ferry passengers

ad cargo between xmored aircraft and shore, tow disabled aircraft

to safety and to yet any ercergencyrescue requirements. The Wherry

Boats were not entirely satisfactory for these purposes. They

lacked stability to navigate in moderately rough lagoon waters. In

addition the size and design of these boats precludes installation of

two (2) outboard motors, required to tow an SA-16 aircraft. Features

desired in the boats needed for use at the Weather/Rad-Safe sites are:

1.

2.

3*

4.

5.

6.

Padded gunnels.

A minimum of 50 horsepwer.

Mu&mm stability.

M.inimumdraft.

Simplified maintenance.

Be capable of handling eight (8) passengers ami/or 1200

pounds of cargo.

A spare aircraft engine program was developed during

Total spares were predicated on the expected flying time

November 1957.

planned for a

120 day period. All engines except H-19, H-21 afi portion of the C-54

engines were supplied by AFC in built-up configuration. Approximately

25% of the total spares programmed were propositioned at Eniwetok as the

initial requirements. An additional 25% was positioned at SMAMA as

back-up stocks. SMAMA shipped a replacement engine upon notification

of an issue by APB 2872. The reparable engine was shipped from A.PB2H2

162

,0

,.

MWwo

-..F

f

%=-A.-+- .

to appropriate de~-zmt removed the QEC from the re-

able engine, built-up a new serviceable engine a~- shipped to

SMAMA to replenish the back-up stock. The system worked very well,

however, the orignial quantities proved inadequate due to the ex-‘.

tens%m of the operational phase. Additional SA-16~RB-50 and.-WB-5O

engines were added during the operational @ase. (See figure 1 ).

All enCines were co~ooned by SMAMA prior to shipment. This

provided good protection from the elements and enabled us to use

outside storage.

lhat all engines

ability prior to

Two (2) suggested improvements to the program are:

be inspected by SMAMA for completeness and service-

cocooning and/or shipping, and that all engine forms

and records be attached outside of the cocooning. ‘lhiswould permit

access to these documents without removal or opening of the cocooning.

Section D - Supply Operation in the EFG

Hq, JTF-SEVEN Administrative Ofier l-58, Hq JTF-SEVEN, lettir J-4/

400.3, 15 May 1958, Subject: Delineation of Supply and Service Support

in the EFG, and previous Administrative Orders contained

ology concerning the logistical responsibilities of Task

support.of Task Group 7.4. During tie build-up phase it

vague termin-

Group 7.2 in

became apparent

that Task Group 7.2 interpreted the JTF-SEVEN Administrative Order

differently from Task Group 7.4. The referenced Hq, JTF-SEVEN letter

was published to clarify logistical responsibilities and to eliminata

duplicate stockage objectives and like facilities. T!heprovisions of

this letter are being gradually integrated beginning concurrently vith

the roll-up phase.

The Task Group

satisfactory. OUr

clothing, however,

7.2 Supply support

tatil requirements

for this operation was generally

for hot lockers ard Class ‘X”

were not filled until late in the exercise. Task

163

Atwu!m

I I 1 I 1 1

FTGURE 1

p164

I

. ._* . -a.. I

f

Grou :2 k advlse&. ..gf Class ‘Xn clothing are nearly

e usted, and that it is probable that Class ‘Xn clothing will not ber

available for issue on future test operations.

In several instances common ArWiAir Force vehicle spares and other

co- items were procured by Task Group 7.4 although ~sk Group 7.2

was the designated supply agency. Task Group 7.4 procurement was

necessary in order b satisfy WP$ work stoppge ati other Wgent

reqtiremnts.

The 26,000 line itemsof supplies and equipment received byAFB

2872 to support this operation were integrated into base stocks. The

aircraft maintenance work stands, tugs, generators, and other items

of equipment common to mre than one type if aircraft were retained in

a central pool. The equipment peculiar to a specific type aircraft was

issued to the appropriate element. The nBn kit spares were retained in

AFB 2~ stocks and issued on as required hsis. The storage available

to AFB 2872 becam critical with the input of the 26,000 line items.

This was solved by utilizing outside storage for items suitable for this

typ storage. Approximately 30 conex containers were used to provtde

additional inside sterage space.

The existing

operation. (S&e

The decision

organization as augmented adequately supported the

figures 2, 3, 4, ad 5.)

was made in late March 1958 to use Johnston

a new operating site. This phase of the operation was known

ation NEWSREEL.

Task Group 7.4 was designated the sole agency to arrange

Island as

as Oper-

total

-UHO

JTF-SESTENlogistical requirements at Hickam AFB, TR. ~e bulk of supply

and maintenance requirements at Hickam AFB were available from local

and Em assets. 136 line items of WB-50 spares were procured from the

165 /!5I &

i

:>L.’_* ..4.

( ‘,’~+=-

Idzz

[

w:

m

:ccu

iI 1 I I I I 1 I I I 1

0 0 0 0 t!) 0 0 0 0

: 0 0 00 z 0~

g:gg0 0 0 0- 0- 0. 0.

*- da“ u- m- * 0 9 u ●- o- m-* * m n m u w---

—

—

—

Mw-mo

FTGUR.Eu%

2

(

.=-&-

-..--,.. ___=a a @

T

I 1 ,

1

1 1 ,.-, .-,,

-0

UJL’.-r

I 1 1%1--1-1’

Q

} I I I I I I I I I I

0 0 0 0 0000000

0 Ogg0000000o~od)-o-~-o-

0- q *“ ~- n-n-**mm

0 m a-

FIG~ 3167

0000Uao

AMwl

...... ,.a .,_

I,,

1

I I I

I I {

—

o

— —

8-.N

k

aaa

Y’[L

,.

I L \

Nwfno

.+---- *-

Staf

- -“”Land prepositioh~d. AFB to support the WB-50 aircraft.

TI#resihiiI property Was turned lXI~ MB Z@ as

H~ckam. The roll-up and disposal of this property

Hickam AFB.‘.

~sk Group 7.410gistic responsibilities at Johnston Island itself

it became excess

was accomplished

consistid of furnishing approximately 100 separate items of aticraft

ground handling equipmmt, peculiar weather station equipment and

certain other selected items. Air Force peculiar spares, except those

required from MATS aircraft were furnished from the EFG. The MATS

spares were furnished by the 1502nd Air Transport Wings Hickam AI’B,Ill.

l’heequipment items for Johnston Island were obtained from the EPG and

Hickam AFB except for 22 line items, which were requisitioned from the

States for delivery direct to Johnston Island. The Johnston Islati Base

Command accomplished roll-up at that site. !Mere was no stock record

account at this location and all property furnfshed fromWG (MB 2872)

was on a hand-receipt basis. me shipping documents were prepared for

the disposal of this property byAFB 2872 and forwafied to Johnston

Island. l’hedocuments were married to the items and shipment affected.

Section E - Supply Effectiveness

The mission category andprecedcnce assigned to Task Group 7.4

coupled with the services of the AM special project supply system

provide an adequate foundation for accomplishing the supply support

mission. All local procurement action was handled by the SHAY?

Procurement Directorate, All central proc~wed and General S_UpPlies

Stock Fund items were obtained from the appropriate Ah Force prime

depots, and Task Group 7.2. An Operation HARDTACK supply and

Maintenance Project Monitor was designated at each depot to insure

accelerated processing of all requirements. Hq, N also designated a

1?0

AFwulw

(\

,$ ---- ---s--.

f

co ,+””-d Operation -=, Monitor to assist in all serious

p lem areas. This system provided the necessary management tools to

accomplish the mission of providing complete supply and maintenance

support for all USAF Units participating in nuclear tests in the Em..%The special supply procedures and the

were adequate to support this operation.

provide a basis for future refinement and

Section F -

supply organization employed

The experience

improvement.

Roll-Up

gained will

26,000 lime items of supply and equipment were received byKFB 28?2

in support of the operation. These items were In addition to the ltAm

kit and organizational items that accompanied participating elements.

Limited roll-up was commenced mid-way through the Operation. me (1)

man was employed full time begining late April to identify duplicate

depot shipments and other excesses. b average of 89o tons of excess

and reparable property was disposed of each month from May through

18 August 1958. Disposition of all material was predetermined in order

to accelerate the roll-up program.

Arrangements were

condition to a single

the roll-up program.

made with NW to ship all vehicles in an “as is”

destination. Tnis arrangement greatly accelerated

Local fabrication of three (3) standard size

packing boxes was accomplished during June and July. These boxes PIUS

the conexs and containers saved from ticoming shipments provided the

majority of’container requirements. A total of 98 personnel from par-

ticipat~ elements were retained to assist TBU h the roll-up

A total of 1,961 line items were shipped to the 21 during

operational period (See Figure 6). Since the cut-off date of

program.

the

this

report is the same as the last shot dati (18 August 19s8), final roll-

up figures are not included.

l?l

Afwl./tlo

I

T00cd--

Idu)Is

::

FIGURE 6

172

AiWJno

“f - “’”””””.;$$$kE#-.C ptsr 3 - Supnly of FQL Products.

The Petroleum products were available as required to satisfy Oper-

ation HARDTACK requirements. Limited bulk storage facilities, however,‘.

nec~’ts$tateddaily nxmitoring of stock balances and frequent adjusting

of petroleum tanker schedules to insure the nnintenance of minimum

operational requirements. (See fi~e 7 and 8, fuel c@ J~tion).

l’heexisting bulk storage capacity is 614,500 gallons JP-4; 774,500

gallons AvCas; 78,000 gallons M&as and 158,0~ gallons of diesel. NO

difficulty was experienced In maintaining adequate stocks of MoCas and

diesel; however, during periods of intensified flying stocks of JP-4

and AvCas becam critical. The daily issues, stock balances, projected

daily requirements and petroleum re-supply tanker schedules were re-

viewed daily to identify actions necessary to preclude depletton of

stocks. The storage space did not always permit the isolation of tested

fuel and on occasions it was necessary to contaminate tested fuel with

new fuel in order to accept delivery of nnxi”mumquantities from the

tanker. Arrangermnts were made with the petroleum testfng laboratory

at Pearl Xarbor, !ITl,to test our fuel samples and to report results

expeditiously. The support rendered was ‘excellentwe were able to

avoid using untested fuel, although on occasions fuel was serviced

into aircraft within hours after receipt of the analysis results.

As part of the support of the Weather Islands, (Kusaie, Rongelap,

Kapingamarangi, Tarawa, Nauru, Wotho, Utirik, Ujelang), it was

necessary to preposition drums d MOGas and diesel fuel. Qumtlties

estimated were

requirements.

adequate and were in place in tire to meet our operational

WHO

173

(

(.

*

...---- ---

.,

.-E’IGURE

175/’

hfWtjHO Iq5

>..=.,..e#

a=

f

“-“&Bddition to t-: ... f fuels placed on the Weather Islands,“

i was necessary to preposition a quantity of drumrd AvGas at Ponape.-.

The fuel was used to refuel SA-16 aircraft enrout8 to Kapingamarangi on

island resupply missions. Because of extension of the test operation‘,---

and a number of unanticipated flights, fuel stocks at Ponape were ex-

hausted by June 1958. Through negotiations with the Weather Bureau at

Ponape we were able to secure AvGas at a cost of $.47 per gallon.

Although this cost was high; it was a cheaper solution than shipping

a srnll quantity of drummed AvCas to Ponape.

‘Iheprogramwi modifications to the bulk storage facilities will

aid the fuel management, but during future tests, daily monitoring of

fuel status and expeditious testing by the fuels Iaboratiry will prc-

bably still be required.

Mwwl

176

-- ~~.

f

Cha /+- ?kintenan*-

Section .4- Eis9ion

The maintenance tissicn was to mintain assi~ned aircraft, ground

support equipmnt, special purpose vehicles, and soresgrcund and all‘L“*

air cbynunications equipnent in a =imun state of readiness. There

were a total of seventy-eight (78) aircraft of sixteen (16) different

types and 342 units of aircraft ground support equtpmnt included in

the ‘J’as]:Group 7.4 inventory. An additional wcrk load was created in

providing turn-around maintenance for Farticlpating U.:. Navy aircraft,

based at Kwajalein, NATS and transient traffic. (See f~gure 9 ,).

Section B - Organization and Functicn

The basic structure of organization and functicn closely paralleled

the stmdards contained 5nAir Force Mamal 66-1. There iers, however,

some r~ner deviations instituted in order ta tailor the najnterance

efforts to the untque nissicn. The mhterxince crgur=.zsticmincluded a

s+aff mtir.tenance officer in the Task Grouu Feafiqurtars, a Maintenance.

ControJ Unit md an organizational maintenance section in each element.

‘TheStaff Ylintenance Cfficer formulated requtre=nts for hth

augmentatim personnel and support equipmnt reqi~hxl in the EIY3.

The Cross requ~remnts rlevelcpedby

corre?.atedand reduced to a minimum

anticipated ‘vorkloads.

pmtjcipating elerents were

net quantity co~atible with the

~Je Staff Maintenance Cfficer serwxl as advisor to the ~irectcr of

Kafieriel;standardized mintenmce policies md practices; mint.ained

sta+,isicslCkta, mcmitcred reports and distributed technical publi-

c2ticns.

The ?hirter,anceContrcl Unit assi~ned direct~y tc T:.skCroup }!ead-

cjumters, was actfviated concurrent with the arriv:l of the Advanced

177

Wuna

7

Afwuno

FIGURE 9

178

f\

.

(

‘n 5Fe::+@d!BM-6“rEch unit was established as a focal point to

c elate the overall maintenance effort. This unft maintained current

status of aircraft~ aircraft ground support-equfp~nt$ scheduled ~inten-

ance specialists and controlled flow of work into Field Maintenance shops.‘.

In a?hiition,priority requisitions were validated in”those instances

where the required item was not in local stocks. me ~thods and pro-

cedures employed insured the most effective and efficient utilization

of personnel ati equipment throughout the entire operation.

The Elemnt Maintenance activities performed the specific functions

of directly supervising and prforming maintenance to the aircraft and

other equipment.

Section C

All organizaticmal maintenance

ues accomplished in the open. The

- Aircraft Y?irtenance

and some of the field nmintenance

single existing hangar was used as an

aircraft repair facility to the maximum extent practicable It WaS,

however necessary to provide ten (10) 20X.40portable buildings to

satisfy minimum shop, supply and technical adrinistiative requirements.

The hangar and detached sndler buildings provided minimum

space to accommodate base shops.

Salt water corrosion presented a continuing prObleIIIin

inside

the EPG.

A vigorous corrosion control program, includirg frequent fresh water

washjng, was practiced on all aircraft. This program retarded but did

not eliminate salt water corrosion. There were rany and varied air-

craft malfunctions directly attributable to corrosion, although a

significant effort was expended to minidze corrosion effects.

During the entire operation there were forty-four (44) reciprocating

engires

changes

and seventeen (17) jet er.g~nechanges. The number of eng~ne

were well within proportion to hours flown.

179

WHO

.–..:-.---.A-

t?

re were tvo ou . ~ blems stemming from design or mter~el

fa ure. One such problem was a B-57D aircraft landing gear failure. ne

pilots of two separate B-57D aircraft experienced difficulties inflight,

In extending the nose gear to ‘down and locked’tposition. The nose gearL

of o;~-aircraft collapsed upon landing. Inspection revealed cracks in

the barrel of the nose gear actuator, resulting in a loss of hydraulic

fluid. At this timeall B-57D aircraft were grounded except for actual

cloud sampling missions. An emergency unsatisfactory report was sub-

mitted to !JRAMAand four (4) spre actuators and three (3) actuators

rermved from aircraft were flown to NAMAP, Tachikawa Air Base, Japan

for Depot Inspection. The depot inspection detected cracks in three (3)

of the seven (7) units tested. NAMAP provided depot inspected replacement

actuators for the B-57D aircraft, permitting the lirr~ted‘flying status

to be rescinded. Additional depot tested units were expeditiously pro-

cured from !WIAMAto replace the B-57B actuators. Later, a similar

deficiency was fcwnd to exist in the B-5’7B&Dmain gear actuators. An

energency Unsatisfactory Report was submitted to WRAYJland concurrent

crash action taken to procure depot inspected replace~nt actuators. The

replacements items were received axrlinstalled expeditiously.

The other problem involved SA-16 aircraft of the SAR Element. Two

(2) SA-16 eircraft developed extensive hull damage that was beyond our

capability to repair. These aircraft were evacuated to depot repair

facilities. The damage consisted of hull vrinkling in the bow belov

the pilot compartment. One (1) aircraft was evac~ated +a a depot

repajr facility ~ncl replaced. The other aircraft was evacuated ta SNAP

for repair nnd return to the EFG. The water landings at near maximum

gross landj.rgl~e~~htand the long down wind take off distances, peculiar to

som j:;lz~dsites contributed to the wri~kling of the hulls.

180

AFwlMD

+.-&%-

4=

i?‘-‘“&a result of a r fly weather reconnaissance missions

in. he Johnston Island area_in support of Op=ation NEWSREEL, It was

decided that the Weather Reconnaissance Element (Hovisional) periodic

main,~nance capability would move to Hickam AFB, ‘l’H.

~?kns, which were formulated in June 1958, provided that weather

reconnaissance missions would be launched from Eniwetok and terminated

at Hickam AFB and vice-versa. Missions were so scheduled that an air-

craft due for a periodic inspection would land at Hickam APB and go

into the periodic maintenance facility for necessary inspection and

maintenance.

lle home base of the Weather Reconnaissance Ele=nt (Provisional)

was Hickam AFB where permanent type facilities~ i.e. hangarsj work

space, etc, were available. Two (2) officers, 139 airren and equipment

were nmved from Eniwetok

the periodic maintenance

WB-50 aircr8ft commncd

to Hickam AFB during July 1958 to estiblish

facility. Periodic inspection of the first

on 16 July 1958.

Section D T Special Purpose Vehicle and Aircraft Ground Support

Equipment Maintenance

The total units of Special Purpose Vehicles and Aircraft Ground

Support ~uipment maintained was

These units were ndntained in a

control and maintenance.

three hundred and forty-ho (3@).

common pool to facilitate operational

Salt water corrosion was unavoidableand required the expenditure

of considerable maintenance man hours to minimize the effects. some

equipment failure is attributable to corrosion.

Another continuing problem was the lead tim required to procure

replacement parts and spares from local purchase sources. Many local

purchase items we”re obtainable from a single source and in som cases

181

AFwuuo

(

-. ./ --+-.

r*‘ %facture requ & to fabricate and deliver. Thusj

c trolled cannabillzation was practiced in order to raintajn acceptable

equipment readiness rates. The spare parts support of special purpose

and aircraft ground support equipment could be imwoved by earlier‘&

det~-nation of spares to be pre-positioned and ti~ely initiation of

supply actions.

A small number of units sustained minor damage in shipment, which

was corrected as the units were prepared for operation. The instances

of inj~ to units due to mishandling or carelessness in the ERi were rare.

A vehicle and aircraft ground pwer equipment inspector was dispatched

from Sacrament Air Materiel Depot at the end of the test phase to deter-

mine serviceability and disposition of excess equipmmt. The result of

this inspection was the salvaging of approximately forty (40) units of

special purpose vehicles and aircraft ground powered equipwnt. The

balance of units were retined to SMIMA for repair and return b stock.

A high percentage of this salvaged equipment was a direct result of

corrosion.

Section E - Commmjcations

During the early part of the operation, daily, weekly and monthly

preventative maintenance schedules for the communications and AN/’USQ-l2

radar equipment within the AOC was devised. Fortunately, with but one

exception, enough backup equipment was available so that outages were

held to an absolute minimum. ‘I’hebulk of maintenance was accomplished

on an as required basis, we did, however schedule wiintenance to the

extent that back-up equipment and operational commitments would permit.

The Field Maintenance Communications Shops maintained the airborne

cotununicationsand radar equipment as well as the vehicle radio sets.

In the interest of expediency, malfunctioning units were remved from

182

NWJno

48=”

ft ‘“+’’’””’*ircraft and irmne replaced with serviceable units from pre-

i~sue sticks. The nmlfunctioning unjt was repaired in the

placed in serviceable pre-issue stock. Aircraft affording

to~adar and communicationsunits during flight were issued

‘Ybe installed should a malfunction occur.

bas~shop and

accessibility

a spare set to

The radio and inter-coxnunicationsystems were installed ad serviced

by the Field kjntenance Communication Shops with assistance from Task

Group 7.2 Signal Section. This system consisted of inter-cornboxes in all

the Elemnt Engineering Offices, Field Maintenance Shops and Base Supply

Expediter Section. Radios were installed in the Maintenance Control

Officerst vehicle and five (5) flight line pick-ups.

Section F - Execution

The aircraft readiness rate attained and sustained

Force standard (See figure 10).

exceeded the Air

The personnel skflls and eqtipment provided each activity was

adequate to execute the maintenance mission. lle varying techniques,

personnel skills and organizational structures in each element necessitated

some adjustment to weld together all activities and achieve a coofiinated

and effective maintenance capability. The succession of a D-1 status over

a period of several days precluded performing major maintenance. The

release from a D-1 status was followed with intensa ndntenance activitys

on a 24 hours day basis on occasions.

Frequently, the field maintenance shops personnel worked double shifts

to meet the requirements of the participating elemnts. On D-1 nights,

maintenance specialists maintained an around the clock vi~il to accomplish

last minute correction of malfunctions. Pre-issue stock items were kept at

a maximum level on D-1 and D days, thus affording mirdxum replacement time

~LjH()-1.

103

FIGURJI10

184

AFwl Inn

(- ““--”-*The maintenance personnel of all units worked long hours under adverse

conditions to meet the mission requirements.’ (See figure 11 and 12 Mainten-

ance Man-Hours Expended).

L“T“-\

185

/’r-, %

‘\, .,. ,

t-

—

>>~ul

D

q

33t’n

D0Sn*-

*

00.,m0*-

m

00. .(u00

00. .0aQQ-

x0A

MwLfHo

—

—

—

>4x

-...

—

00. .ar-CQ

—

010. .0Nm

—

Jvwum

(

-~”--~~=~’r--“fCh.,

Section A - Mission—

The mission of the ‘Eansportation Section, Task Group 7.4 on Opera-

tion HMOTAGK was as follows:‘.ax provide General Purpose Vehicle Support.

2. Provide Special Purpose Vehicle Uupwrt.

3* Arrange for movement Task Grcup personnel (approximately (12M),

via NATS from the GCHUS to the EFG.

4. Arrange for movement of

5. Arrange for movement of

heavy items via surface lift to

pricrity ~ir cargo via MATS to the EPG.

Special Rqmse Vehicles and other

the IW2.

6. Arrange for booking of Task Grcup 7.4personnel and cargo on

Inter-Intra and off atoll fli~hts.

7. Arra~e for mo.~etcentof pssen~ers and priorfty cargo to the

~}~s on ~ rolI.uP sched~e aftir completion of Operation HARDTACK.

6. Arrange for rol~-up ncvement of Special Purpose Vehfcles, trailers

and other heavy items to the CCNUS via surface lift.

Section B - General Purpose Vehicle Requirements

General Furpose Vehicle Require~nts for Cperation HARDTAGK were

firmed U“ in Fehruaq 1957 and fo~arded to Hq~ J~-m: for aPPronl*

A tctal of 137 vehicles were requested. Types requested were 1/4 ton

(jeeps), 1/2 tin trucks (pick-up), 3/4 ton weapons carriers 1 1/2 ton

trucks, and 2 1/2 ton trucks. A list of 116 vehicles

approved by JTF-SEVIN in June 1957 vim Substitutes

trucks for 3/4 tin weapons carriers.

The above requirements submitted for Cperation

on the prev~ous operation and allowances were mde

that were ex~ect&d to be added.

1U3

of

were tentatively

1/2 ton pick-up

HARDTACK were based

for new elements

Wtul

cf;t=A;;li- - ‘e8eaddi-

~Weather Squadron requested they be

ocated additional vehicles including two (2) Dukws.

tional requirements were forwarded to JTF-SEVEN and they were approved.

Final approval was received from JTF-SEVEN for 119 General Purpose

Ve;%qles in Janusw 1958. These vehicles were made’available through

Army Supply ch~nnels and were shipped to the EKi in the last qm~t-er of

1957. me Test Wse Unit Installations Officer made arrangements with

the ArxIwto commission these vehicles as they were required.

‘he Transportation Officer was represented by the Assistant Staff

Supply Officer in the Advance Echelon. This officer drew the general

purpose vehicles from the TBU and issued same to the various elements.

This phase of the operation was carried out as planned and the elements

received their allocation of vehicles ve~ shortiy after arriving in

the EPG.

Task Group 7.4 personnel were issued Military Drivers license and

operated its own vehicles. Task Group 7.2 dispatched and provided

maintenance

some of

minute that

believed it

support for these vehicles.

the units that had requested jeeps decided at the last

they would like to have 1/2 ton pick up tmcks. It is

would be to the advantage of the next operation to have

nme pick-up trucks and less jeeps. (A breakdown of general purpose

vehicles by organization is shon in fi~e 13).

Section C - Special Purpose Vehicle Requirements

14.4pieces of special purpose equipment were programmed for the

Operation. These vehicles were requested by letter to ARDC through

AFswc . At the time, these vehicles

Base Squadron had serveral vehicles

Supprt Squadron (Test). 18 of the

were requested the 4935th Air

excess as also did the 4951st

4935th vehicles were marked for

M9

AWUHO

HARDTACK.,

Jlllf--=i’’ti-v’”’’”‘SS’GNMENT,“

1/4 TON 1/2 TON 4 1/2 TON 2 1/2 TONJEEP P/u 6x6 TOTALS

HQ. TG7.4 14= a 22

TAU 14 12 2 2 30

TB~ 12 16 4 S2.

TsU 12 19 2 s 36

wv

HQ. TO. 7.4 14 8 ,22

4926 TH 8 7 1 16

40S0 TH(SAC) I 1 I s

WADC 2 I 1 4

NASWF I I 2

AFCRC(C-97) I 1“

4925 TH(B-36) I I z

AFOAT- I I I z-

4951 ST 9 10 s 22

4952 ND 2 s 5

24TH HELRON 1 2 3

HQ. TSU 3 I 4

64 TH ARS( SAR )

2 3 I 1 7

AIR PHOTO 2 I 3

DOC PHOTO I I

57TH Wx I 3 I ,1 6

6TH WX S0 3 6 9

MATS I 2 sTERMINAL

AACS 3 I 4

PACAF I 1

ToTALS 52 56 e 5 I 20b 4

FIGURE 13

190hfwuno

(_

-4-----’ --~. -ro “-””’*ion HARDTACK ) of the /+951stvehicles were mrked to

main at Eniwetik for the Operation. The net requirement to AR-DCwas

reduced to 126 vehicles. Part of these vehicles came from ARDC ex-

cesses at other stations and the reminder cam from Mallory AFD, which\.

was~he prime dept for vehicles..

A deadline date of 1 Janmq 1958 was set for deljveIY Of all

special purpose vehicles to the Oakland Port. All vehicles mde the

deadline date and were shipped to arrive in the EPG by February 1958,

which was well before the start

Arrangements were made with

bOITOW a 15,000 pound fork lift

aircraft engi~es. This vehicle

of the Operation.

the lTAS,North Island, California to

with special attachment for nnunting

was shipped on the aircraft carrier?

USS BOXER from San Diego, California. A panel truck us~ by the SAC

Unit for denitregenation of high altitude crews and four (4) decon-

tamination trucks were also shipped on the USS l?OXIR.

me special purpose vehicles were kept in common pool and were

issued to the units to fill their day to day requirements. *.intenance

Control Unit controlled the dispatch of these vehicles. (Figure lh

shows the number of vehicles on hand by type).

Section D - Movement of Passengers and Freight to Em

I.fienTask Group 7.4 Logistic Conference was held in October 1957$ the

Task Group Transportation Officer distributed instructions to all units

setting forth requirements for forecasting movements of pssengers and

cargo by both air ad water. The first report was received in November

and then continued up through Mrd and then discontinued since mst of

the Units were in place in the EPG by this time. These reports proved

very helpful in the Transportation Sectiony ~sk GrOUF 7.4 in forecasting

requirements for air and surface lift.

‘.ii1

Awl./luJ

(

/-“ ““--~”.-:..

JAN FED MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUQ

Io 8 6 6 6 5 3

40 S6 S3 30

Il. 16 16 16 16 2,

I

TRACToR, TowlNC AIRCRAFT

TRACTOR, WAREHOUSE (ti6 ) la I It9 40

;Rh OR, ill/2-lo Tom 6

wRECKER, M-246 III I

r 18 a 8 8

\REFUELIN6 UNIT F-6 2 II 12 12 II 10 II

sooo 6ALLa

REFUELINO UNIT F-3 2 4 9 Is 12 12 10

~

I TRAILER , 25’6 40’ I 4I

4I

7

h-u’--JJ

75o t3ALLON I 1 [ 1

i.TL1FoRKLIFT 1-7 I/Z TON

,21. -I A*L=

CRANE, GARWOOD 20 TON o

f

I CRANE, Ro~T~ouT v-lo I 01

Ii I 1

6RANE. tiYSTER 18,000 LB. I 2 sI

3

STREETSWEEPER o 0 0

FIRE TRUCK 530B

TRuCK PUMPER 2V2T M*6I ~ E z E z

o s 3 3 3TRUCK . DECoN MSAS o t

,

..

1

TOTALS I60 ~ 1~$

NWUHO

(==’”* was S1OU during the months August 1957

ugh November 1957 and averaged only ten (10) tons a nmnth. In—

December, the alr tonnage picked up. January, February, March, April

and May were peak months averaging 85 tons per month.

‘~e movement of Task Group 7.4 passengers via MATS was accomplished

in an orderly manner. About 100 airmen of

were shipped in November and December 1957

Support Squadron (Test). In Janua~ 1958,

the 4952nd Support Squadron

to augment the 4951st

the Advance Echelons of the

various elenmnts started to move and peak months were February and

March. Elements were responsible for movement of their personnel from

home station to the Aerial Port at Travis Air Force Base, California.

Some of the elements used aircraft of their own Command in moving

personnel to the port. Others used commercial transporti-tion. Personnel

from Hq, Task Group 7.4, 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling), and 4952nd

Support Squadron were mewed to Travis AFB in groups of 20 by C-47 air-

craft furnished by AFSWC. A total of 1200 ~sk Group 7.4 personnel

were moved to the E= tia MATS.

In the Westbound Air Cargo, it will be noted there is a peak

months of January, February and March, which was the shipping of

in the

IIBII

kits for the elements and other support equipment for the start of the

Operation. Also note another build-up in Westbound Air Cargo shipments

in May and tune. This was due to the shipmnt of replacement aircraft

engines by alr from the depot to the EFG. (See figure 15, Air Cargo

Westbound.)

The Chart on Westbound Air Passenger hbvement shows a peak in

January, February and March which is when the mjority of the 1200

passengers moved by MATS had reached the EFG. Then another build-up is

indicated on the chart in June and July in the Westbound Air Passenger

193

+

4AFwl./tbo

/-

->1

FIGURE 1519&

WUHO

:’~~~””+ to replacements arriving in the EI% for

ntation personnel who were se_nthome at the end of their six (6)

months period. Due to the extension of the operation through July and

August, it was necessary to replace these personnel in June and July.

(sJ&@re16, Air $%ssenger Mvement Westbound). “

The hajor part of the water cargo was the 120

vehicles which arrived at the port in January and

January and February. Water cargo reached a peak

special purpose

were shipped in

in January, February

and March when

shipped. (See

Section E -

A position

the bulk of the heavy items of support equipnmt were

figure17, Water Cargo Westtiund.)

Air Transportation. (Inter, Intra-Atoll and Off Atoll)

was created by JTF-SEVEN called a Senior Transportation

Control Agent (STGA). ‘his position was held bya civilian employed by

Task Group 7.5. This person was placed directly under the J’IT’-SEVlN

Transportation Office and responsible only to that office with no obli-

gation to any Task Group. me duties of the S’ICAwas to receive require-

ments for movemnt from the Task Groups and to make decisfons as to

priorities of movement.

Each Task Group designated an Officer as a Transportation Control

Agent. (TCA). ‘l’hisOfficerls responsibilities was to receive require-

ments for movemnts from the subordinate units and book them with the

SIYA. The STCA consolidated all his bookings from the TCAts and then

made a decision as to what passengers and cargo would go.

No problems were encountered on the scheduled lift to Bikini. ‘I%ere

were sufficient flights scheduled daily to take care of everyone who

had reason to go. Three (3) flights were scheduled daily at first and

after two (2) xmnths, the number of flights was reduced to two (2) due

to lack of patronage.

195/

..

FIGURE 16

196

NWUMO

.

‘i—

—

—

H

FIGURE 17197

MWuna

. .

f“- --.-.

%<..- ““”” .

ghts to the We - . safe Islands were scheduled cnce a veck

u“ a flight departing’daily for a different island. Flights to Nauru

and Tarawa were serviced by C-54 aircraft but were l~mited to the number

of passengers they could take due to a large crew of eight (8) and theL

\numbe of persons who could be billeted at the camp ”site. A total of

seven (7) passengers were permitted on these flights.

On the SA-16 flights to Kapingamarangi (weight limit 1777), Utirik

(weight limit 2107), Kauaie (weight limit 2291), Rongelap (weight

limit 2225), Wotho (weight Iifit 2634) and Ujela% (weight li~t 3~7g)~

the total weights for passengers and cargo was limited as noted above.

This usually meant a total of five (5) seats for passengers and the

aircraft was filled out with freight including such items as rations,

housekeeping supplies, PX supplies, f~lm and mail. -

On 75% of the flights scheduled kth C-54 and SA-16 aircraft> ~

the Weather Rad-Safe Islands there were more official passengers booked

than could be transported. I%iorj.tieswere determined by the STCA and

be decided which passengers would

one week were slipped to the next

On approximately June 1958,

go. Passengers

and as a result

Commander, Task

policy in effect that personnel off duty would be

that could not go

many cancelled out.

Group 7.L placed a ~

permitted to travel

to the Weather Rad-Safe Islands and to Kwajalein and Guam on a “space

available” basis. This was controlled thro~h Task Group 7.4 (~A) and

seats were evenly distributed anxmg the

strength. These spaces were limited to

Section F - Roll-Up Shipment of Cargo

Task Groups according to

deserving airmen and officers.

and Passengers to CCNJS

The majority of the passengers indicated on the figure as moving

Eastbound in January through April were PCS returnees to the CFNUS from

the 4951st Support Squadron (Test). About five (5) personnel were

198

~,’,”

L<>

AWL/no

:F’v ‘s period due to emergency or morale leave.

1) each film couri r was booked each week ta return exposed film

to~Lookout Mountain Laboratory in Hollywood, California. In April and

May, the C-97 and B-36 aircraft sup~rt crews were booked to leave after

the$ aircraft had\

the 4952nd Support

reaching a peak in

departed. In May and June, augmented personnel of

Squadron started to the stabs. Starting in J~yand

August, the main My of the operation was returned

to the states via MATS. On 1 July 1958, the MATS I~ustrial ~ding

System was placed in operation. ‘lhishad very little effect on our

operation. l%is meant that all ~Y personnel afi cargo moved by MATS

in support of Operation HARDTACK was billed to a JTF-SEVEN fund

citation by M4TS. A stamp was provided by JTF-SEWZN to validate all

personnel orders ad shipping documents. (See figure 18; Passengers

Air

and

Eastbound.)

There was very little air cargo moved Eastbound in January, February

March, but

chart reachjng

of the tonnage

engines, being

starting in April, a steady build-up is indicated on the

a peak in July, August and September. The major part

nmved in April.,May and June was reparable aircraft

returned to the depot for overhaul. In July, 20 tons

of cargo was shipped-to Hickam. This cargo consisted of “Bw kits for

B-36, c-97 and WB-50 aircraft. The roll-up of air shipment on high

priority hi-value items started in late July and continued through

August and September. (See figure 19, M-r Cargo Eastbound.)

The

special

pAaJcin

roll-up of heavy surface lift was started in June when several

purpose vehicles were declared excess. Surface lift reached a

August and September when the USS BRCISTRGM, heavy lift vessel

was brought in to return the reminder of special purpose vehicles to

the COMJS. Unfavorable winds nade it necessery to ship six (6)SA-16

199

WUno

“{\

a4

(naId(9zuu)(0g

I

AFWUHO

al

FIGURE 18

200

FIGURE19201

(“f’

<“* -.-.--.=----

air t from Hawa””’”” C[I!7JSvia surface lift. Special arrange--..

s were nude with -SEVEN Surface Transportation Section to ship

~ese aircraft aboard the aircraft carrier USS

face lift.

%i our (4) H-21 helicopters? firee (3) H-19B

BOXIHlas opportune sur-

helicopters, five (5)

F-6 Re’~eling Units and 84 tons of general cargo was shipped to Japm

via surface lift in late August and e=ly September 1958. (See

Figure 2~ Water Cargo Eastbound.)

Section G - sulmllary

A total of 119 general purpose vehicles were issued to Task Group

7.4. They were distributed among the major units and the Task Group

Headquarters, according ~ their requirements as follows:

Hqs, TG 7.4 22-

TAU

TBu

TSU

A few minor adjustments

month of the operation.

30

32

36

in allocations between units were mde the first

.

Special Purpose Vehicle support was provided to the Task Group by

arranging for shipment of 144 pieces of equipment to the EFG in January

1958. 50% of these vehicles were issued on a per~nent basis and the

reminder dispatched on call as required by Maintenance Control Unit.

The movement of approximately 1200 paggengers from their home

station in the 21 to the arrival Port of Embarkation at ‘I!ravisAFJ3was

accomplished by Unit aircraft and commerical transportation. ‘Me

transportation Section Task Group 7.4 arranged for booking Of these

personnel on MATS

Approximately

with JTF-SEVEN Liaison Officer at T?ravis.

350 tons of air cargo was shipped out of Travis AFB

20&

MulJHn

<“--‘;

*--,.-...==...< .-

Ii0

( FIGURE 20

203

AFWUHO

y!f!iii:pJanuary 1958 through 30 Anrfl 1958. ‘l’he

as aircraft support kits and spare aircraft

engines, which was shipped direct from s~~f”

AII Special Purpose Vehicles) van tw trflilersand Ofier heawi

equ*

nt was moved to the Port of Embarkation, Naval Supply Center at,.

Oakland, California via rail? co~-rical truck or drive awW’” ~is

equipment was shipped via MSTS surface lift to the EPG.

Transportation of ‘Msk Croup 7..4personnel a~ cargo to Biki~ and

the Mcather Rad-Snfe Islands was arranged by the ~~sk Group 7.4

Transportation Control Agent who was the Task Group 7.4 Transportation

Officer. The Task Group 7.4 (TVA) received requests for move~nt bY

phone and forwarded them to the JTF-SEVEN (S’l?2A)by

Bikini was twice daily. Service to the !~eather-Rad

weekly.

phone. Service to

Safe Islan:lswas

Movement of passengers to the COFUS from the EPG was accelerated in

July and August. When a total of over 900 persons were shipped via

MATS. ‘Ihcsepersonnel were booked through the ArxqyTransportation

Section. MATS scheduled one to

57 persons per aircraft to move

The shipping section of the

three flights a day with a cap~city of

these pcrsonnelo

4951st Support Squadron (Test) arranged

for receiving high-value cargo to be shipped by air. The Transportation

Officer, Task Group 7.4, and the shipping Officerj Test ~se unit)

sqreened this cargo to restrict it to priority cargo. The majority of

roll-up air cargo was shipped in August and Septemkr 1958.

The majority of the heavy roll-up items such as vehicles, van

trailers and large crates were shipped on t!e USS BROS’IROMwhich de-

parted the EPG in late August 1958. This cargo was turned over to

the shipping section of the Lgjlst Supprt Squadron (Test) who in turn

2o11

it N.7Sstored urtil surface 1ift was 3rranged.

N3VUHU

‘*

\

205

!...

~ burjnl the ofirational phase of 0:.~ati~n’Redwing, Headqw-rters ‘TaA.

Group 7..4prepared and submjtted to c~~’~nder~ J~-S~;E~; as coj~pletea

10

\

range construction proCran as could be foreseen nt +,hattire.

A fi~la’refinement of this cor.structionplan was submitted to Commnder,

JTF-HW7’ by our letter, Subject: T:]skGroup 7.)+Developrcnt Plan

(Revised), 15 Aurust 1956.

Cur construction program was combined with the pro~rars of the

other Task Groups, into a sin~le JTF-SEVTN program, which w,?:;forwar-led

to the (%airrran,United States Atomic EnerN Commission, for further

pr0cess5~~.

Throu@out the period September 1956 to March 1958 continuous fOllOW

up action “instaken to insure the completion of construction projects

prjor to the beginning of Operation HARDTACK. This follow up action

included joint action with Holmes and Narver, the AEC Contractor in the

?PC:and the USAEC, to finalize sxi approve construction dz-awirgs,ar.i

to e::tablishtarCet dates for coqoletior?. The mjor project involved

I.lasthe e~t,ensi~nof the existing runvay, Wid!?~.!~ Of &Xi-w:*:TsQrd

t~r~ ~rcnmd areas, and addition of ramp parking space.

Tn spite of continuous action to effect the timely con:;et~:~? cf (Fe

a~rficlcl cOnmlex, some l.;Ork, i.e. rurmay li~htin~, runway rw?.rt-in~,1

x, J,ISyet to be accomplished at the beginning cf the !-!ARDT’AC?oper-

ational ~riod.

Continued attention to the M% construction requirements is essential

to the ti?ely co?wletion of projects. It is exf.remel;$i~portant th=.t

as mny constructions projects as possible be completed cluri~gthe nff-

.yearbetween test operations.

~(33

MbulJhl)

KZ7Tnmnn(ier,JTF-SWEF advised of a planned con-

struction conference to be held in the EPG during the Spring of 1958.

Accordingly, considerable thou~ht was given to additional construction‘*

kreq “ ements, over and above those listed in letter? Headquarters? Msk,,.,

Group 7.4, Subject:Task Group 7.4 Development Plan (Rev3sed), 15

August 1956. In addition, the Test Base Unit (4953st Sunnort Squadron

(Test) was advised to be~in considering its requirements for additional

construction in the El%.

In March and April 1958 several conferences were held in the EFG,

attendei by representatives of ]Teadquarters,Task Croup 7.4, Test

Base Unit, Test Aircraft Unit and Test Services Unit. From these

meetings was formulated an overall construction plan which included all

construction items not scheduled for completion in FY58, plus a number

of new projects. All of these projects were re-considered as to

validity and were listed in the order of priority for completion.

(See figure 21). This listing was submitted to the Commnder, JTF-

:~lp,r!,by our letter, Subject: Task Group 7.4 Construction Plan for

the Period Ending 1 J1.ily1962, dated 12 .4pril1958.

!)uringthe JTP-S?WN Construction Conference, held in April 1958,

the construction programs of all Task Groups was nresented to and

,j~stifiedbefore representatives of JTF-SZ’.KT. Upon co~letion of this

conference, JTF-SEVEF consolidated all requirements, jn the agreed

order of priority for conyletion, and forwarded them to the Chairman,

US.4TC,by letter, file Comi~600.1, dated 2S June 1958.

207

fl46:8’

1.

\2.

\3...

4.

5.

6.

7.

p.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

1/+.

15.

16.

17.

lE.

519.;

’20.

z].

??!./.

— TITLE

Expand K)L Farm.

Yew Hanrar, With No (2) Lean-To Additions.

Rehabilitate Old FOL Farm and Replace Office Buildings.

Maintenance Run-Up Pads and Blast Fences.

Replace Control Tower.

Replnce !iawinsondeWeather Facility.

Additional Communications and Electronic Shcp Space.

Replace AACS Supply and Maintenance Building.

Repl~ce quarters for Comrnnder, Task

Rehabilitate Field Ykintenance Shop,

Construct Aircraft T~re ‘hrehouse.

Construct Airlift Support Building.

Group 7.1+.

Building #82.

Replace Building #632 with a ~.~dron F1.i~htLine ~X~in- ,tena~ce Building.

Construct a Seaplane Reaching Ramp.

Replace Building #6?l, Carpenter Shop.

Replace Building #90C,Gen~r~torShed.

Repl~ce Building 91A, @ld Crash Fire Station.

Construct Ten (10) 128-F’angarracks.

Construct Unit Supply BuildinE.

Construct Headquarters Building for TW, TAU and TSU.

Pave Area Around Building #679.

Install Additional Ramp Power.

AiwlJHo

... ,

23. Extension to Building x, Ifor Base Yeqther.

21,. Replace Ruilfiinrs//640,633, 606, 607, 6M, 6°9 lnd 611.\?\ Construct a MATS Passenger Termi~al.

.

26. Pave IIATSCargo Area.

27. Construct Fire Watch Tower on !hildjn~ //6T5.

28. Pn.veRunways on JANET and YVC!T~.

29, Construct a Crash Boat Pier.

30. Ccnstruct Pier for l%L Sea Tires.

.

SW 83RD 28532//5-

--w

. . . . .

“.