Antitrust for Business Lawyers · Business Lawyers December 8, 2010 Douglas Ross. Davis Wright...
Transcript of Antitrust for Business Lawyers · Business Lawyers December 8, 2010 Douglas Ross. Davis Wright...
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
But first: antitrust law in five minutes
Four areas
Joint conduct
Unilateral conduct
Mergers
Price discrimination
Joint conduct
Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade is unlawful
Two elements
Agreement
Harm to competition
Unilateral conduct
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Prohibits:
Attempts to monopolize
Conspiracies to monopolize
Actual monopolization
Elements:
Monopoly power
Anticompetitive conduct
Possession of monopoly power is not unlawful
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
Non-solicitation agreements
Antitrust Division: complaint and consent decree against 6 tech firms (September)
Claim: bilateral agreements prevented cold calling
Non-solicitation agreementsExample: Apple-Google
All employees
No geographical limits
Apple complained when believed breached
Google investigated and reported back
Non-solicitation agreements
“Ancillary”
Necessary or intrinsic part of a pro-competitive activity
Rule of reason applies, not per se rule
Non-solicitation agreements
Examples of ancillary agreements
Employment or severance agreements
Mergers, acquisitions, investments
Contracts with
Consultants, providers of temp employees
Resellers, OEMs, providers of services
Settlement of legal disputes
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
Interlocking directorsInterlocking Directorate Act
No person shall at the same time serve as an officer or director of two corporations that are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws”
If each of the corporations has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $25,841,000 (2010)
15 U.S.C. §19 (Clayton Act §8)
Interlocking directorsQuestions
What does “capital, surplus, and undivided profits” mean?
Does the Act apply only to corporations?
Does this apply to subsidiaries of a common parent? Parent-subsidiary?
Can the Act be avoided by appointing non-officer to an interlocking board?
Interlocking directorsMore questions
Does the Act apply to potential competitors?
Does it apply to interlocks between suppliers and customers?
Does it apply to interlocks where individuals from competing corporations sit on a board of a noncompeting company?
Are there exceptions?
Interlocking directorsThe Act does not apply where the competitive
sales …
… of either corporation are less than $2,584,100
… of either corporation are less than 2% of that corporation’s total sales
… of each corporation are less than 4% of that corporation’s total sales
Interlocking directorsIs this a real issue?
One-fifth of the 1,000 largest U.S. companies share at least one board member with another top 1,000 company
Interlocking directorsIs this a real issue?
More than 1,000 board members from the top U.S. companies sit on four or more corporate boards
Interlocking directorsIs this a real issue?
235 of these board members sit on seven or more corporate boards
USA Today (2002)
Interlocking directorsWould the government
ever enforce this?
Shared two directors
Eric Schmidt
Arthur Levinson
Take-aways
Has exceptions but…whether or not Act applies, Section 1 always applies …… and, Commissioner Rosch has suggested Section 5 of the FTC Act could be applied to “loopholes”
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
JVs and partial acquisitions
Parent and wholly-owned subsidiary cannot conspire
Copperweld (1984)
What if the subsidiary is less than wholly owned?
JVs and partial acquisitionsWhat’s the issue when there is less than complete
ownership?
Unity of interest/control
Ownership interest
Representation on the board
Right to select or remove board members
Reserved powers
Right to hire and fire CEO
JVs and partial acquisitions
What if X owns 50% of Y (and X and Y sell the same product in the same market)?
Can X set Y’s prices?
Does X control Y?
Probably not
What should the JV do?
Antitrust guidelines
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
Mergers without an HSR filing
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
Must file if:
Value of the transaction is > $252.7 million
Value of transaction between $63.4 million and $252.7 million, and size of companies test is met:
A = $126.9 million total assets or annual sales
B = $12.7 million total assets or annual sales
So: No filing if < $63.4 million
Mergers without an HSR filing
If a company doesn’t have to file is it home free?
Has the FTC ever filed suit against a non- reportable merger?
FTC vs. LabCorp – last week
Laboratory Corp. of America $57.5 million acquisition of Westcliff Medical Labs
Mergers without an HSR filing
So what should a company do to avoid a challenge if its merger is non-reportable?
Visit the agencies?
Which?
No safe harbor: filing an HSR report does not stop the FTC from suing a company later
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
Bad words
“When you see the competition drowning … stick a water hose down their throats”
The “antitrust laws do not condemn, without more, such colorful, vigorous hyperbole”
Advo v. Philadelphia Newspapers, (3d Cir. 1995)
Bad words
“These turkeys . . . ought to be flushed”
This “provided little insight into intent to monopolize”Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union (7th Cir. 1986)
Bad words
“One memo, for example, discusses ways to ‘shut down’ and ‘kill’ Cigarettes Cheaper! ‘on the beach’”
“As we remark frequently in antitrust litigation, ‘cutthroat competition’ is a term of praise rather than condemnation”
“Consumers gain when firms try to ‘kill’ the competition and take as much business as they can”
R.J. Reynolds v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, (7th Cir. 2006)
Bad words
Oracle’s President: “The back office applications market for global companies is dominated by an oligopoly comprised of SAP, PeopleSoft, and Oracle”
Mere “spice”
United States v. Oracle (N.D. Cal. 2004)
Overview
Non-solicitation agreements
Interlocking directors
Joint ventures and partial acquisitions
Mergers without an HSR filing
Bad words
Corporate leniency
Corporate leniency
Benefits
No prosecution of corporation or board, executives or employees
For offenses prior to the date of the letter
In connection with the anticompetitive activity reported
Corporate leniency
If the Division is not aware of the conspiracy:
First in the door
Prompt and effective action to withdraw on discovery
Reports with candor and completeness
Confession is corporate act
Restitution
No coercion of others; not the leader
Corporate leniency
If the Division is aware of the conspiracy
Same as before and:
Division does not have evidence against corporation
Would not be unfair to others
Corporate leniency
Process
Must be first
Obtain a “marker”
Given time to investigate
Must admit guilt
Must cooperate
Corporate leniency
Only one company per conspiracy
Huge consequences – air cargo investigation
21 airlines, 19 executives charged (through last week)
$1.7 billion in criminal fines imposed
Four executives sentenced to prison
Charges pending against the remaining 15 executives
Can be revoked