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Annual Security Assessment Report 2014

Pak Institute for Conflict and Security Studies/ Conflict Monitoring Centre © All Rights Reserved


Actions, Reactions and Transformations

Change at the Changing Rate

2014 Revisited

Compiled by

The Conflict Monitoring Center is statistical division of Pak Institute for Conflict and Security

Studies. It is member of Casualty Recorders Network (CRN) established by Oxford Research

Group and signatory of International Charter for Casualty Recording.

Research & Analysis by:

Abdullah Khan, Gul Dad, Zahoor Elahi

Assisted by:

Ahsan Naveed, Reema Asim, Azmat Khan, Watan Yar

Reviewed by:

Akram Zaki, Former Secretary General Foreign Office, Chairman Advisory Board PICSS

Lt. General (r). Asad Durrani, former DG ISI, member Advisory Board PICSS

Brig. (r). Saad Muhammad, Member Advisory Board PICSS

House No. 423-A, St# 01, F-11/1, Islamabad. Phone: 051-8443444 Fax: 051-8442444

Websites: www.picss.net, www.cmcpk.net Email: [email protected] [email protected]



Acknowledgement

The credit for conducting research and preparing this Annual Security Assessment

Report 2014 goes to tireless efforts of the entire Research and Publication team of Pak

Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) including Mr. Abdullah Khan (Managing

Director/ Security Analyst), Mr. Zahoor Elahi (Analyst), Ms. Reema Asim (PRO & Research

Assistant) Mr Naveed Ahsan (Research Assistant), Ms. Zosheen Khan (Research Assistant),

Ms. Sidra Khan (Research Assistant), Mr. Hashim Aziz (Graphic Designer), Ms. Ramsha

Shaukat (Internee), Ms. Iqra Batool (Internee), Ms. Sidra Ijaz (Internee), Mr. Jannat Gul

(Internee), and Mr. Mehtab Shah (Internee).

Special thanks and acknowledgment to Mr. Akram Zaki (Chairman PICSS) and

members of Advisory Board including Lt Gen (R) Asad Durrani, Brig. (R) Saad, and Brig. (R)

Asif Alvi for their review of report and providing necessary guidance to PICSS research team.

Gul Dad

(Senior Analyst/ Director Research & HR)



Table of Contents

1 Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 1

2 Overall Security Situation in the Country ............................................................................................... 3

3 Significant Security/Political Developments .......................................................................................... 5

3.1 Government-TTP Peace Talks ........................................................................................................ 5

3.2 Defections in TTP .......................................................................................................................... 8

3.3 Emergence of ISIS ....................................................................................................................... 10

3.4 Announcement of Al-Qaeda in Sub Continent ............................................................................. 12

3.5 Military Operations in FATA ........................................................................................................ 12

4 Developments in relations with India and Afghanistan ........................................................................ 15

4.1 Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: Despair and Hopes ................................................................... 15

4.2 Pakistan-India Relations and their impact on security situation .................................................. 16

5 Year 2015: Trends and Challenges ........................................................................................................ 18

6 Recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 22

Annexure-A: National Security Profile ................................................................................................. 26

Annexure-B: Provincial Security Profile ............................................................................................... 47

List of Tables

Table 1: Overall violent incidents of the year 2014 ...................................................................................... 26

Table 2: provincial distribution of militant attacks in 2014 .......................................................................... 30

Table 3: Type of Attacks and their impact..................................................................................................... 31

Table 4: Geographical break up of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan (2014) ........................................................ 34

Table 5: Region/ Province wise break up of security forces actions (2014) ................................................. 41

Table 6: Monthly break up of militant activities in Balochistan ................................................................... 49

Table 7: Monthly break-up of militant activities in FATA ............................................................................ 51

Table 8: Monthly break up of militant activities in KP and their human impact .......................................... 57

Table 9: Monthly break up of security forces actions in KP ......................................................................... 58

Table 10: Monthly break up of security forces actions in Sindh ................................................................... 60

Table 11: Monthly break up of militant activities in Sindh and their human impact .................................... 62

Table 12: Monthly break up of security forces actions in Punjab ................................................................. 64

Table 13: Monthly break up of militant activities in Punjab and their human impact .................................. 65



List of Figures

Figure 1: Overall violent incidents and resultant deaths ............................................................................... 27

Figure 2: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks and resultant deaths ........................................................ 27

Figure 3: Monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2014 ........................................................................... 28

Figure 4: Attacks versus Death Comparison (2014) ..................................................................................... 29

Figure 5: Categories of deaths in Militant Activities .................................................................................... 29

Figure 6: Geographical distribution of Mas .................................................................................................. 30

Figure 7: Comparison of Suicide Attacks since 2011 ................................................................................... 32

Figure 8: Categories of those killed in Suicide Attacks (2014) .................................................................... 32

Figure 9: Categories of injuries inflicted from Suicide Attacks .................................................................... 33

Figure 10: Geographical spread of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan since 2002 (%) .......................................... 35

Figure 11: IED based Attacks – Yearly Comparison ..................................................................................... 36

Figure 12: Monthly Comparison of IED based Attacks (2014) .................................................................... 37

Figure 13: Physical assault by the militants – monthly comparison (2014) ................................................. 38

Figure 14: Physical assault by the militants – Yearly comparison ................................................................ 38

Figure 15: Target Killing – Yearly Comparison ............................................................................................ 39

Figure 16: Target killing – Monthly Comparison (2014) .............................................................................. 39

Figure 17: Security forces actions versus militants’ activities ...................................................................... 40

Figure 18: Deaths resulting from SFAs and MAs ......................................................................................... 41

Figure 19: Impact of Operation Zarb-e-Azb on Militancy ............................................................................ 43

Figure 20: BDS Successful bids in 2014 ...................................................................................................... 46

Figure 21: Monthly Comparison of Militant Activities in Balochistan and their impact .............................. 49

Figure 22: Monthly Comparison of Militant Activities in FATA and their impact ....................................... 51

Figure 23: Monthly comparison of security forces actions in FATA ............................................................ 52

Figure 24: Monthly break of Security forces actions in FATA ..................................................................... 52

Figure 25: Monthly Comparison of militant activities in KP ....................................................................... 55

Figure 26: Category of Death comparison in KP .......................................................................................... 56

Figure 27: Monthly Comparison of militant activities in KP ....................................................................... 56

Figure 28: Monthly Comparison of security forces actions in KP ................................................................ 58

Figure 29: Monthly comparison of security forces actions in Sindh ............................................................ 60

Figure 30: Militant Activities in Sindh – Yearly Comparison ....................................................................... 61

Figure 31: Monthly comparison of militant activities in Sindh .................................................................... 62

Figure 32: Monthly comparison of security forces actions in Punjab........................................................... 63

Figure 33: Monthly comparison of militant activities in Punjab .................................................................. 64

Figure 34: District Map of Pakistan .............................................................................................................. 66



List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AJK Azad Jammu & Kashmir

Arst Arrested by Security Forces

C Civilian

CBA Cross Border Attack

FATA Federally Administrated Tribal Areas

FC Frontier Corps

GB Gilgit-Baltistan

GrA Grenade Attack

IED Improvised Explosive Device or Handmade bombs

ICT Islamabad Capital Territory

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations

JuD Jamat-ud-Dawa

KP, KPK Khyber Pakhtoonkha

K Kidnapping

KK Kidnapping and Killing

Kdnp Kidnappings by militants

LeJ Lashker-e-Jhangvi

LOC Line of Control

M Militant

MA Militant Assault/ Militant’s Physical Assault

MAs Militant Attacks

MC Militant Clash

MrS Mortar Shelling

NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority

NAP National Action Plan

Nos Number of incidents

PAF Pakistan Air Force

PGR, RZ Razakar (Pro government tribal militias)

RA Rocket Attack

SFAs Security Forces Actions

SFP Security Forces Personnel

SA Suicide Attack

TK Targeted Killing

TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban

Annual Assessment Report 2014 P a g e | 1


1 Executive summary

2014 witnessed many variations in security situation. Overall violence increased so

were the number of deaths. There were 2821 overall incidents of anti-state violence and

counter-insurgency operations by the security forces in which at least 5388 people were

killed, 3954 others injured, and 158 people were kidnapped while 6615 suspected militants

were arrested during country wide intelligence based operations. The year started with

reaction from militants in the form of increased violence due to killing of then TTP Chief

Hakeemullah Mehsud in November 2013 while the year ended with reaction from the state

in the wake of Peshawar Army Public School Attack. In between, efforts were made to

resolve the issue through peace-talks with the TTP and violence substantially decreased

during this period. However, talks could not progress and militants returned to violence and

launched strategically important Karachi Airport attack that compelled security forces to

launch Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and country wide intelligence based

operations. These measures put militants on the defensive and thus violence in the country

reduced once again. However, militants manage to recover from the immediate shock and

dispersed into other areas including Khyber Agency, stimulating launch of another operation

named Khyber-1. These measures further dropped violence by the end of year but militants,

out of frustration, launched deadly Peshawar School Attack that completely changed the

dynamics of militancy and counter-insurgency approach in the country.

Balochistan was worst affected region followed by KP and FATA. Violence in

Balochistan was multifaceted with involvement of sub-nationalist elements, sectarian outfits

and TTP/Al-Qaeda. Violence in FATA was due to presence of various brands of militants

including local and foreigners that kept fighting with the state as well as among themselves.

Violence in KP, which reduced after operations, was due to close proximity of the area with

FATA and fertile ground for ideological drive by the militants. Violence in Punjab increased

manifold as compared to previous years while Karachi, the financial capital of Pakistan, faced

brunt of criminals, sectarian outfits, TTP/Al-Qaeda affiliated militants as well as from armed

groups backed by political parties. Violence was also witnessed in Federal Capital Islamabad

where militants launched at least two major attacks. Despite some minor incidents, security

situation in Gilgit-Baltistan remained quite stable while no militant activity was observed in

Azad Jammu & Kashmir.

Due to variety of reasons, TTP witnessed a serious decay in the year. While

appointment of a non-Mehsud Fazlullah as head of the outfit acted as stimulus for tussles

between various TTP groups, cleavages increased when TTP entered into peace talks as

some elements were against the move while others were favouring peace talks. Fazlullah

could neither hold a decentralized TTP together nor could lead it by living in Pakistan as he

kept hiding in Afghanistan. Following failure of peace talks, pro-talks faction of Khan Said

Sajna parted ways from the main TTP while anti-talk faction also deflected in the form of TTP

Jamatul Ahrar. Al-Qaeda/ TTP suffered another blow when Punjabi Taliban announced

cessation of violence in Pakistan. TTP suffered yet another jolt when some of its prominent

leaders parted ways and owed their allegiance to Islamic State.



Amidst weakening of TTP, there are signs that Islamic State (IS) sympathizers are

making hectic efforts to establish outfit in the region though IS seems to be little interested

in opening another venue at this point in time. Al-Qaeda under pressure due to success of IS

and other regional dynamics has also announced its Sub-Continental chapter with the aim of

targeting India, Myanmar and Bangladesh but presently there is no immediate threat that

Al-Qaeda would gain ingress into these countries. On the other hand, IS could emerge a

security challenge for Pakistan as well as for the entire region in future.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were never cordial under previous

regime of Hamid Karzai and Afghan military and security establishment was more inclined to

improving relations with India. However, change of government in Kabul and elevation of

Ashraf Ghani as Afghan president, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have

improved considerably. On the other hand, relations between Pakistan and India

deteriorated after cancellation of foreign secretary level talks resulting in ceasefire violations

on Line of Control and Working Boundary. Pakistan believes that India, through her presence

in Afghanistan in the form of consulates, intends to create a two-front scenario for Pakistan

by supporting and financing anti-Pakistan elements to create unrest in the country while

engaging Pakistan in a low conflict on eastern border in the form of ceasefire violations.

Deadly Peshawar school attack brought about a national consensus to take action

against militants and militancy. Political and military leadership devised National Action Plan

to root out militancy. The plan included, inter alia, establishment of military courts for

speedy trial of militants in addition to other measures for stopping the spread of their

ideology. In essence, Pakistan adopted measures that could be termed as hard measures but

these efforts could only suppress militancy in short term but could have negative

implications for the long term as no effort was made to fight this war on ideological front.

Without developing a counter-narrative to militant ideology, success of National Action Plan

is quite questionable.



2 Overall Security Situation in the Country

The year 2014 witnessed many variations in security situation across the country as it

swung between good to worst with developments taking place on political front. As

compared to previous years, it was worst in terms of total number of violent incidents and

resultant deaths. There were 2821 overall incidents of anti-state violence and

counter-insurgency operations by the security forces in which at least 5388 people were

killed including 646 security forces personnel, 80 pro-government razakars (armed militias),

3415 militants and 1241 civilians while at least 3954 people were injured including 885

security forces personnel, 61 pro-government razakars, 512 militants and 2496 civilians.

More than 6615 suspected militants were arrested during country wide intelligence based

operations while 158 people were kidnapped by the militants.

The year started with increase in violence as reaction to the death of TTP chief

Hakeemullah Mehsud in US drone strike in November 2013 and the trend continued for until

February when peace efforts between the government and TTP picked momentum. Violence

in the country reduced during March when TTP announced one-month long ceasefire and

trend continued till April but violence again started to creep up when these talks failed.

Violence in the country increased in May with fears that it will further increase in coming

months. Militants planned and executed strategically important Karachi Airport Attack in

second week of June that dented Pakistani image and compelled security forces to launch a

major offensive against them. In mid-June, Pakistani military launched a full-fledged

operation in North Waziristan code named Operation Zarb-e-Azb while simultaneously

starting a crackdown against militants with input from intelligence agencies.

Due to operation in North Waziristan and country wide intelligence operation,

violence in the country substantially decreased but gradually tended to increase as militants

were able to re-group by dispersing into various other regions including various agencies of

FATA, settled areas (in KP and Punjab) and into Afghanistan. When security forces realized

that militants have taken shelter in Khyber Agency and re-grouping, another military

operation was initiated in October in Khyber Agency code named Khyber-1. These military

operations and country wide intelligence based operations inflicted heavy losses to the



militants but they could not be completely neutralized. At the end of the year, violence

tended to increase. Detailed national and provincial security profiles are given in Annexure A

and B, respectively.

Severely under pressure from heavy men and material losses, militants got frustrated

and launched an unprecedented attack on Army Public School in Peshawar killing more than

145 people including 134 innocent school children and injuring more than 150 others. The

attack completely changed the matrix and brought the whole nation on one point to end

militancy from the country. As reaction to the attacks, political and military leadership came

up with National Action Plan, which included, inter alia, establishment of military courts for

speedy trial of militants for which Constitution and Army Act were amended.

In terms of geographical spread of violence, Balochistan was worst affected region

followed by KP and FATA. Violence in Balochistan was multifaceted as not only

sub-nationalist elements were active there but also sectarian and TTP/Al-Qaeda elements

had their activities in this troubled province. Violent incidents in FATA was quite natural as

the area was hub of various local and foreign militants who not only kept fighting with

themselves but also put a resistance to security forces who launched two major offensives

one in North Waziristan and the other in Khyber Agency. Violence in KP was due to

province’s proximity with troubled FATA region. Violence in Punjab increased manifold as

compared to previous years while Karachi, the financial capital of Pakistan, faced brunt of

criminals, TTP/Al-Qaeda affiliated militants as well as from armed groups belonging to

political parties. Violence was also witnessed in Federal Capital Islamabad where militants

launched at least two major attacks. Despite some minor incidents, security situation in

Gilgit-Baltistan remained quite stable while no militant activity was observed in Azad Jammu

& Kashmir.



3 Significant Security/Political Developments

3.1 Government-TTP Peace Talks

After the formation of pro-dialogue governments at the federal level (PML-N

government) and at the provincial level (PTI-JI coalition government in violence hit KP) as a

result of May 2013 General Elections in Pakistan, the idea of holding talks with various

militant outfits as a means to end violence in the country was gained credence. Resultantly,

in an All Parties Conference (APC) held on 9 September 2013, political and military

leadership reiterated their resolve to give “peace a chance” signaling yet another consensus

to initiate talks with militant organizations across the country. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP) welcomed decision of the APC and showed its willingness to hold dialogue with the

government. Resultantly, background efforts were made to start negotiation process.

However, before the talks could start, Tehreek-e-Taliban Chief Hakeemullah Mehsud

was killed in a US drone strike on 1 November 2013. On killing of TTP chief in US drone strike,

Interior Minister Ch Nisar Ali Khan said “This is not just the killing of one person, it's the

death of all peace efforts"i conveying anger of the government over untimely US drone

strike. Interior Minister also blamed the US for scuttling peace efforts. After the death of

Hakeemullah Mehsud, TTP Shura elected Maulana Fazlullah (who previously headed

TTP-Swat chapter) as new TTP chief on 7 November 2013 who declared that no talks will be

held with the government after killing of Hakeemullah and that TTP will take revenge of his

killing. The government took up the issue of drone strikes with the US asking her to stop

such attacks in its territory. The US assured Pakistan that no drone strikes will be carried out

in Pakistani territory during peace talks.ii Eventually a long break in drone strikes was

observed from December 25, 2013 to June 11, 2014.

After continued background efforts and Pakistan’s repeated request to the US to

curtail its US drone strikes, TTP showed its willingness to hold dialogue with the government

in January 2014. During his address in the National Assembly on 29 January 2014, Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif announced formation of a four-member committee for peace talks

with TTP. Members of the committee included journalists Irfan Siddiqui and Rahimullah



Yusufzai‚ former ambassador Rustam Shah Mehmand and former ISI official Major (retired)

Amir.iii Similarly, on 1 February 2014, TTP also announced a five-member committee to hold

the dialogue with the governmental committee. TTP nominated PTI chief Imran Khan, Lal

Masjid cleric Abdul Aziz, Maulana Samiul Haq, Mufti Kifayatullah of JUI-F and Prof

Muhammad Ibrahim of Jamaat-e-Islami in its mediation committee.iv However, PTI Chief

Imran Khan did not accept this role while JUI-F leadership also stopped Mufti Kifayatullah to

act as mediator. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also announced a 10-member political

committee to monitor the dialogue process with the government to convey TTP’s demands

to their mediation committee. This committee was to be headed by TTP commander Qari

Shakil with other prominent leaders of TTP including Sheikh Khalid Haqqani, Azam Tariq,

Umar Khalid Khurasani, Qari Bashir, Shahidullah Shahid, Asmatullah Muawiya, etc. as

members were also included in this committee. v (Some later left TTP and formed

TTP-Jamat-ul-Ahrar (See the Defection in TTP).

Peace talks between government nominated committee and TTP mediation

committee started first such meeting on 6 February 2014 where both the sides discussed the

road map of the dialogue and mandate of both the committees to strike deals. Both the

sides persuaded each other for halting actions so that peace talks could progress.vi Amid

peace efforts, Mohmand Agency Taliban chief Umar Khalid Khurrasani claimed to have

killed 23 FC soldiers who were kidnapped in 2010 from Shongari check-post in Mohmand

Agency to avenge “custodial killing of Taliban fighters” in various parts of Pakistan.vii The

action of TTP compelled the government to respond with force and killed many of its

fighters during airstrikes in FATA as well as suspending dialogue process. Some observers

viewed killing of FC soldiers as a deliberate effort of anti-dialogue elements within TTP to

scuttle the dialogue process with the government.

In a bid to break the deadlock, TTP on 1 March 2014 announced a month-long

unilateral ceasefire and directed all its factions and affiliated groups to honour this ceasefire

while suspending all militant activities in the country during one month period.viii The

decision of one month ceasefire was widely hailed and created hopes that stalled dialogue

process will resume. The government also reciprocated and halted the attacks on militants

However, merely two days after announcement of ceasefire by the TTP, a deadly



gun-and-suicide attack occurred in districts courts in Islamabad’s F-8 sector killing 11 people

including additional session judge while injuring 25 others. The attack was claimed by a little

known group Ahrar-ul-Hind, claiming to be a splinter group of TTP working independently,

saying that they are against the peace talks between TTP and the government. While

distancing itself from the said group, TTP condemned the attack.ix Similarly, attacks in

Quetta and Peshawar on 14 March 2014, in which more than 22 people were killed (at least

11 people in each blast) and 87 others injured (including 42 in Quetta and 45 in Peshawar),

were also claimed by Ahrar-ul-Hind. (The Conflict Monitoring Centre came to know through

its sources that Ahrar-ul-Hind was headed by commander Dost Muhammad and was a

faction of Tehreek-e-Taliban Muhmand Agency generally known as TTM.) The attacks during

ceasefire from TTP not only highlighted lose control of TTP leadership and the Shura on the

umbrella organizations but also indicated that pursuing peace talks under the shadow of

violence would be difficult for the government. However, once TTP assured to disassociate

itself form Ahrar-ul-Hind, the government continued to pursue peace talks.

In the meanwhile, government formed a new committee to hold direct talks with TTP

under the leadership of Secretary Ports and Shipping Habibullah Khattak while other

members included Rustam Shah Mohmand, Additional Secretary FATA Arbab Arif and PM’s

additional secretary Fawad Hassan Fawad.x On 26 March 2014, direct talks were held

between TTP and government’s committee. While TTP gave 10-day extension till 10 April

2014 to one-month ceasefire but no further meetings between the TTP and government

committee could be held. TTP decided not to extend ceasefire citing government’s failure to

respond positively to TTP’s demands of establishing a peace zone, release of

non-combatants and suspension of security forces operation in tribal areas.xi

Deadlock between the government and TTP continued to persist despite background

efforts to salvage the peace talks until high profile and strategic Karachi Airport Attack was

carried out on 8 June 2014 in which 28 people were killed including 10 attacking militants

while 24 others were injured in more than five-hour gun-battle that completely paralyzed

the airport denting Pakistan’s image internationally. TTP claimed responsibility of the attack

saying that it was the revenge of the killing of TTP chief Hakeemullah Mehsud and hinted at

carrying out more such attacks in future.xii Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan separately



claimed responsibility of the attack and issued photos of the attackers as well. The attacks in

addition to triggering strong reaction from security forces also acted as last nail in the coffin

of peace talks. The government decided to launch a full-fledged military operation code

named “Zarb-e-Azb” in North Waziristan on 15 June 2014.

3.2 Defections in TTP

The TTP was formed in December 2007 and Baitullah Mehsud was elected its Emir

(chief) who continued this role till 5 August 2009 when he was killed in a US drone strike.

After his death, Hakeemullah Mehsud was appointed as Emir of TTP on 22 August 2009 and

headed the fearsome organization till his death on 1 November 2013 in yet another US

drone strike. After his death, TTP Shura elected Maulana Fazlullah as its new chief who was

previously heading TTP Swat Chapter. The appointment of Maulana Fazlullah, who was the

first non-Mehsud, to head the TTP had created rifts among the TTP ranks as Mehsud tribe

formed major bulk of TTP and thus some of Mehsud commanders did not favour Fazlullah’s

selection.

Among those who opposed nomination of Maulana Fazlullah as TTP chief included

Khalid Mehsud alias Khan Said Sajna, a powerful commander belonging to Mehsud tribe

who was contending for the top post of the outfit after killing of Hakeemullah Mehsud.

However, Shehryar Mehsud, another commander of Mehsud tribe was favouring Fazlullah

but Sajna group was more powerful than the Sheryar Mehsud group. Due to the efforts of

various TTP Shura members, Khan Said Sajna was pacified and was appointed by TTP chief as

head of TTP South Waziristan Agency. Since start of his leadership of TTP, Fazlullah gave

more prominence and preference to Sheryar Mehsud group. Tussle between Sheryar group

and Sanja group started as both groups were eying on the control of men and material in

South Waziristan. Fierce battle between these two groups in April 2014 inflicted heavy losses

to both the groups particularly those of Sheryar Mehsud group. On 19 May 2014, TTP chief

sacked Sajna as chief of TTP South Waziristan.

The main bone of contention between TTP chief and Sajna group was that the latter

did not like any non-Mehsud to head an organization that was started and commanded

previously by none other than the Mehsud tribe. After the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud,



Sajna was the powerful contender for the top slot but TTP shura elected a non-Mehsud

Fazlullah. Though Sajna unwillingly accepted this decision but he was not satisfied. When

TTP entered into peace talks with the government, Sajna was among those TTP commanders

who were pro-peace talks but his rival Sheryar Mehsud was against peace talks.

On 27 May 2014, Khan Said Sajna group parted ways with the TTP citing “ideological

differences” with the TTP Chief in addition to accusing TTP leadership of deviating from real

struggle of the TTP (establishment of Sharia) while criticizing TTP of its involvement in

criminal activities and targeting public places using bogus names (this could be a reference

to Ahrar-ul-Hind who carried out attacks during ceasefire announced by the TTP).xiii In

August 2014, TTP suffered another blow when another defection occurred when Maulana

Qasim Omar Khorasani, blaming TTP leadership of victim of personal and narrow objectives,

announced formation of a new group, TTP Jamatul Ahrar.xiv Decay process in the TTP did not

stop here. In September, another key and fearful faction, the Punjabi Taliban headed by

Asmatullah Muaweya announced cessation of violent attacks in Pakistan “in the best interest

of Islam and the nation” appealing other groups to stop violent activities in Pakistan.xv

At the time when TTP was facing internal rifts, another development on global Jihadi

horizon was taking place and that was emergence and dominance of Islamic State in Middle

East with Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi declaring himself as Amir al-Mu'minin or Caliph. The

dominance of IS in Middle East also affected the militant enterprise in this part of the world.

In October, TTP first announced allegiance to the IS but then backtracked. However, the

development clearly hinted at internal thinking process in the TTP. Within a couple of days,

on 14 October 2014, six key commanders of TTP announced their allegiance to the Islamic

State and its leader Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi Al Qureshi Al-Hussaini. These six TTP

commanders including TTP’s then spokesman Shahidullah Shahid along with TTP chief for

Orakzai Agency Saeed Khan, TTP’s Kurram Agency chief Daulat Khan and Fateh Gul Zaman

who heads TTP in Khyber Agency, TTP’s Peshawar chief Mufti Hassan and TTP’s Hangu chief

Khalid Mansoor.xvi On the same lines, another TTP group Jandullah, which was mostly

involved in sectarian violence, defected from TTP and owed its allegiance to the Islamic

State.xvii

Although defections of various groups weakened TTP as an umbrella organization



but this did not mean any qualitative change in security situation of the country as TTP was a

decentralized amalgamation of various groups and separation of few does not means that

security situation will improve (neither it happened). Instead, these groups become more

autonomous in their decisions to carryout militant activities. For example, Jamat-ul-Ahrar

which was a major defection from TTP carried out deadly attacks including that of Wagha

Border Attacks in Lahore in November 2014. On the other hand, left over TTP also did not

stop its violent activities despite losses in men and material during ongoing operations in

FATA. Although TTP has been weakened due to military operations and internal rifts yet it

has managed to plan and execute one of the most dreadful militant attacks in the history of

Pakistan in the form of attack on Army Public School in Peshawar killing more than 142

people including 132 school children and injuring 145 others in December.

3.3 Emergence of ISIS

Islamic State has inspired Jihadi militants across the world including South Asia.

Though not on a bigger scale but its wall-chalking has been reported from all provinces of

Pakistan in the year 2014. PICSS has learnt from the credible sources that IS has appointed

Abur Raheem Muslim Dost, an Afghan national and former detainee of Guantanamo prison,

as its representative in Pakistan. Interestingly, Dost was not involved in practical fighting

before. He wrote a book against ISI in Pashto which is widely circulated in pro Al-Qaeda

militant community in Pakistan.

Appeal of Islamic State is very strong. The revival of Khilafah is considered a moral

obligation for all the Muslims of the world. Struggle for Khilafah inspires more than the

concept of Jihad because Khilafah is considered ultimate outcome of Jihad.

Despite this religious attraction, there is less room for IS in Pakistan. Currently, only

those are shifting towards IS who were once supporters and sympathizers of Al-Qaeda.

However, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi can play a major role in supporting and promoting IS in Pakistan.

The Islamic State is basically an anti-Shia and anti-Iran militant group which used the

concept of Jihad and Khilafah to inspire its fighters. LeJ has already played a pivotal role in

connecting Al-Qaeda, TTP and Baloch nationalists in Balochistan. Jundullah group fighting in

Iran in Sunni dominated areas can also play a role in promoting IS in Balochistan.



Addition of IS in Pakistan's militancy theater will be like one more name in the list of

militant groups but it is less likely that militants will join this group the way they did in

Syria and Iraq. There is already an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. Most of the militants

fighting in FATA and mainland Pakistan against Pakistani state declare Mullah Omar as their

Ameer ul Momineen (Supreme Head of Believers). Al-Qaeda itself has not accepted IS as a

legitimate contender for Khilafah and reiterated its allegiance with Mullah Omar. Mullah

Omar and Afghan Taliban do not want to associate themselves with any extra regional

activity. Their focus is on Afghanistan and they are in a process to distance from Al-Qaeda.

Courtesy to Arab spring and emergence of Islamic State majority of Arab fighters have

shifted to Middle East. Afghan Taliban are open to dialogue and seriously believe that they

cannot re-establish their rule in Afghanistan by opening military front with whole world.

In mainland Pakistan, Jamat-e-Islmai and Jamat-ud-Dawah (JuD) are two major

players and they will not give space to IS for a number of reasons. In Pakistan anti-India

sentiment remains higher than anti-US sentiment. There is no vacuum for IS to fill in this

regard as JuD is already flourishing on anti-India sentiment.

As far as threat to India from IS is concerned, there are reports that some fighters

from India have joined IS to fight in Iraq and Syria. It will be premature to conclude that

these fighters will help IS in India. Islamic militancy in India has two roots:-

a) Unresolved issue of Kashmir

b) Alienation of Indian Muslims at the hands of Hindu majority

As far as Kashmir is concerned there are 18 Jihadi groups fighting against Indian rule

in Jammu and Kashmir but none of them ever extended any support to any extra regional

militant group outside Pakistan or Kashmir. The logic behind this approach is that the

Kashmiri militants believe that they have a political cause recognized by UN and

international community. They kept distance from Al-Qaeda successfully during the last 13

years. Influence of Pakistan over these militants also played a role in this regard. They are

unlikely to provide any space to IS or Al-Qaeda in Kashmir in the future as well. Other way

around, Kashmir was never a priority for Al-Qaeda too. Al-Qaeda and TTP blame Kashmiri

militant groups for their alleged ties with Pakistan's security establishment and call them

agents of ISI.



However, Alienation of Indian Muslims can pave way for IS provided that it remains

intact and successful in its current fight for survival in Iraq and Syria. Indian Mujahideen (IM)

and Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) are struggling to get support from wherever

possible. Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) reportedly helped IM and SIMI

and their operations against Indian state besides conducting their own activities. Indian

authorities have successfully busted network of IM and currently the group is on the

ventilator. IS can play a role in India in the long run as there is some space available but a

final word on this equation needs more brainstorming.

3.4 Announcement of Al-Qaeda in Sub Continent

Al-Qaeda has announced “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian sub-continent” meaning

Al-Qaeda in sub-continent to focus on India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Historically, India or

Kashmir was never a priority for Al-Qaeda despite posing to be advocate of Muslim causes

around the globe. Except some verbal statements, it never practically got involved in

Kashmiri Theatre. The announcement of Al-Qaeda in Sub-continent seems to be driven by

the advances of Islamic State in the Middle East as Al-Qaeda does not want to be seen

threatened by it. Although there is no immediate threat that Al-Qaeda would be able to

make ingress in aforementioned countries yet the threat cannot be ignored altogether.

3.5 Military Operations in FATA

When Government-TTP talks failed, militants resorted to resume their violent

activities and launched a well-coordinated and planned attack on strategically important

Karachi Airport on 8 June 2014 killing 36 people including 10 attackers in almost 24 hours

gun-battle, which paralyzed air-traffic for at least three days. The attack was joint operation

of TTP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) with possible support of Al-Qaeda. The

attack infuriated the government and the military resulting in initiation of operation in North

Waziristan code named “Zarb-e-Azb” with active support from majority of political parties

except some politico-religious parties who still believed that talks were the better option.

Once operation was started, the loss of innocent civilians was feared compelling

government to evacuate people from operational area. Resultantly, almost 0.7 million



people were evacuated from different parts of North Waziristan. At the start of operation,

Pakistan Army declared that this operation will be indiscriminate and all sorts of militants

will be targeted. Before start of operation, internal rifts between various groups of TTP were

quite visible which had weakened TTP in North Waziristan but still the area was hub of all

sorts of Pakistani and foreign militants including TTP, Al-Qaida, Haqqani Network, Arabs,

Uzbek, Chechens, etc. Once operation was started in mid-June, all these militant groups

were targeted and military resorted to airstrikes using gunship helicopters and PAF fighter

jets. Operation created a serious panic among the militants who either tried to escape from

the area in the garb of displaced persons (TDPs), or moved to Afghanistan, or dispersed into

various other neighbouring agencies of FATA including Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency.

Sensing their movement into various tribal agencies, military intensified its vigilance

in various agencies and started operation Khyber-1 in October in Khyber Agency. Pakistan

also sought help from Afghan as well as international/ NATO forces to enhance border

management so that movement of militants across the border could be stopped. However,

this help from across the border was less than desirable.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb had positive impact on overall security situation of the country.

Militant attacks in Pakistan declined except in FATA. Average militant attacks declined in all

parts of the country after the operation but the number gone up in FATA due to desperate

efforts of the militants to regain some territory. Average militant attacks in reset of the

country were 29 prior to Zarb-e-Azb which dropped to 20 attacks per month at the end of

the year 2014. Most significant decline in militant attacks was observed in KPK followed by

Balochistan. In KPK, the average dropped from 50 to 28 while in Balochistan the average

dropped from 50 to 34. Sindh also observed reduction in militant attacks after Zarb-e-Azb.

Average of militant attacks in Sindh was 24 before the operation which dropped to 16

attacks per month from July to December 2015. Average militant attacks in Punjab dropped

from 4.5 to 2.8 attacks per month. Average militant attacks per month in FATA prior to

operation Zarb-e-Azb was 28 which increased up to 32 attacks per month from July to

December 2014. This was direct outcome of military operations in FATA and country-wide

intelligence based operations (2274 such operations in total arresting 3091 suspects), which

were started simultaneously along with military operations in FATA.



As per claims of the military and local sources so far 90% of the area in NWA

including major towns of Miran Shah, Mir Ali, Boya, Degan and Datta Khel are cleared and

secured. 80 km long road of Khajouri to Mir Ali to Miran Shah to Datta Khel road and

Ghariom-Jhallar road have been cleared. 27 IED factories, 1 Rocket and ammunition

manufacturing factory was recovered and destroyed. Huge amount of communication

equipment, ammunition, and other logistics recovered and destroyed. Pak military lost 226

personnel while 811 were injured in whole country (64 in NWA, 42 in rest of FATA, 121 in

rest of the country including Karachi and Balochistan). Command and Control Center of not

only TTP but militants from central Asia, China, and Middle East have also lost their long

established sanctuaries in the area. Despite the success, none of the top tier militants could

be eliminated in the operation.



4 Developments in relations with India and Afghanistan

Year 2014 was an important year in political as well as security context of the region.

While change of government had occurred in Pakistan following May 2013 elections, such

change was due in 2014 both in Afghanistan and India, which are two important eastern and

western neighboring countries of Pakistan. Due to their direct impact on peace and security

in Pakistan, developments related to these countries are being discussed below.

4.1 Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: Despair and Hopes

Historically, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had hardly been smooth

despite having commonalities like religion, culture, ethnicity, and history. Currently, there

are number of issues where differences between both the countries exist including cross

border infiltration, refugees, drug trafficking, border issues (i.e. Durrand Line), etc.

2014 was important year for Afghanistan mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the US/

international forces were to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of the year after

completing their combat operations. Secondly, President Hamid Karzai was to relinquish

office of Afghan President on 29 September 2014 after completing his two consecutive

terms. During Karzai era, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were never cordial and

Afghan president preferred improving relations with India at the cost of relations with

Pakistan. Despite efforts of international community to bring these two countries closer for

security and economic needs, no worthwhile progress could be made. However, after

change of government in Afghanistan and Ashraf Ghani taking over as new president,

relations between the countries started improving as new president was convinced that in

addition to enhancing bilateral relations with India, cordial relations between Pakistan and

Afghanistan are crucial for bringing stability in Afghanistan as well as to tread on the path of

economic growth. Therefore, new Afghan president from the outset, has shown his

willingness to work collectively for regional peace and economic development.

However, security and military establishment in Afghanistan still have tilt towards

India and it is yet to be seen how much new president will be able to exert his influence to

mend the fences between security establishments of Afghanistan with that of Pakistan. After



tragic Peshawar School Attack, Pakistan’s Army Chief visited Afghanistan and sought active

cooperation from Afghanistan for decisive action against militants. Afghan president and

other top security officials gave assurances to Army Chief of their complete cooperation in

Pakistan’s efforts for countering militancy. Recent high level visits between the two countries

gave hope that both countries will come closer to each other to work out a mutually

beneficial working relationship particularly in the field of counter-terrorism manifestly

through better border management and coordination. Without such cooperation and

improvement in relations, both the countries can neither achieve their security/

counter-terrorism goals nor could move on the path of economic development.

4.2 Pakistan-India Relations and their impact on security situation

After half a century of ill-will both the countries had worked out a sound framework

to manage their relation, with a good chance that overtime the improved environment

would help gradually resolve contentious issues. Popularly called "Composite Dialogue", it

was conceived in 1997 and after some initial setbacks and hiccups, it was formally launched

in January 2004 when the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpai attended the SAARC

Summit in Islamabad.

However, when the new arrangement failed to make progress even on minor issues

like the visa regime and trade relations, one had to rethink the whole equation. Indian

reluctance to move away from the status quo was now better understood: it might lead to

an environment in which the Kashmiris would feel encouraged to take certain initiatives that

could acquire a dynamics of its own.

In any case, India as of now is comfortably placed and improved relations with

Pakistan would not substantially add to its geopolitical or geo-economic clout. India

therefore has no major incentive to do so and that too at the risk of a change that could

upset its present advantage.

Pakistan may suffer relatively more in a conflictual relationship but knows that it can

only be changed on the Indian terms and at a greater political cost to Pakistan: acceptance

of the LOC as the permanent borders, for example. Since Pakistan too can live with the

present situation, even when more uncomfortably than India, it has adjusted to the fait



accompli. Of course there are reasons that a major war between the two countries would

not breakout but then we can also rule out a major breakthrough in their relations.

Skirmishes on the borders and sporadically war of words would however continue.

Since General Elections and formation of Narindra Modi led nationalist government

of the BJP in India, relations between Pakistan and India deteriorated. The invitation to PM

Nawaz Sharif to attend oath taking ceremony of Indian Prime Minister raised hopes that

both the countries will be able to make qualitative moves in improving bilateral relations to

enhance cooperation in the economic field in addition to removing trust deficit that is

pivotal for resolving outstanding issues including the issue of Kashmir. However, these hopes

were short lived. While India hardened its stance on the issue of Kashmir, it also resorted to

ceasefire violations on Line of Control and Working Boundary in addition to issuing

provoking statements from various high ups including PM Modi himself. While taking plea of

an age-old practice of meeting between Pakistan High Commissioner with Kashmiri

leadership, India cancelled Foreign Secretary level talks, which further dented the hopes of

any meaningful engagement between the two countries. India also engaged in ceasefire

violations with Pakistan on latter’s eastern border. According to a written statement in

National Assembly by PM’s Advisor on Foreign Affairs, Indian forces committed 243

unprovoked ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and Working Boundary in 2014.xviii

While India upped its ante against Pakistan on eastern borders, Pakistan believes that

India is supporting anti-Pakistan elements using its consulates in Afghanistan in collaboration

with Afghan intelligence and security agencies with the view to put Pakistan in a two-front

war scenario to destabilize it internally to restrict its foreign policy options including that of

Kashmir. Notably, Pakistan has already taken up the issue of Kashmir at the UN on the plea

that bilateral efforts of finding a solution of the problem did not yield any result especially

when India and Pakistan are not talking to each other. Uneasy relations between Pakistan

and India and border skirmishes are seriously hampering Pakistan’s efforts to fight militancy

internally as well as on western border.



5 Year 2015: Trends and Challenges

The year witnessed weakening of TTP as an umbrella organization as many splits and

defections were monitored. However, these splits and defections did not bring about any

qualitative change in security dynamics of the country as splinter groups emerged to be

more autonomous in their decisions and carrying out militant activities. Another related

development is emergence of Islamic State in Af-Pak region. Although this emergence of

Islamic State is at the early stage it could go viral and thus posing serious security challenges

for the country.

If IS emerges to be a serious challenge for Pakistan and Afghanistan in days to come,

it would not remain confined to this region alone as it could develop a snowball effect to

pose serious challenge for the entire region including India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, China,

etc.

Peshawar School Attack was a watershed incident that totally moulded public

opinion and galvanized the whole nation demanding stern action against TTP. While the

tempers were high and the demand for an immediate punitive action was natural yet in the

long term this could only prove to be a temporary measure. The need of the hour is to take a

wholesome view of the issue and develop a comprehensive counter narrative that should hit

at the Takfeeri Ideology successfully persuaded by the miscreants belonging to TTP/Al-Qaeda.

Reacting to the situation, political and military leadership of the country have come up with

a plan called National Action Plan (NAP), containing measures which mostly fall in the

category of ‘hard responses’ – either in the form of executive taking judicial functions

operationalized through amending the Constitution and army act or the regulatory regime of

managing something identified as facilitation of militancy. The question is whether these

measures will solve the problem or in other words will the strategy or plan be effective?

Effectiveness of any plan is measured through the degree of success it achieves. . If

the objective is to teach lesson to those who have done this barbaric act, the plan might

work as intended but if the objective is to eradicate militants and militancy, plan will not

suffice or may become counter-productive in the longer run. As stated earlier, the answer

lies in developing a National Counter Narrative that is vigorously implemented leading to the



eradication of the menace from the roots of our society.

Despite losing public support, TTP/Al-Qaeda are likely to continue with their policy of

violence in 2015 with fears that militant outfits might not hesitate to go after soft targets

and public places. Moreover, reaction to hanging of convicted militants could also come. If

political and military leadership managed to fully tighten the noose around their neck using

intended measures through better implementation, militants will go further on the

defensive. However, no immediate end to militancy at least in 2015 is expected.

Splinter group TTP Jamatul Ahrar has already shown its intent and capability by

launching a devastating attack in the form of Wagha border attack. Among the militant

outfits, this group embodies more hardliners who are against education and even polio

vaccination. Since the group is believed to have ingress into FATA, KP, Punjab and Sindh

(Karachi), it could carry out more lethal attacks in days to come.

If Pakistan continues with the measures being adopted, militancy in the country is

likely to be suppressed for the time being with immediate and positive impact on overall

security situation of the country, albeit amidst threat of periodic incidents of barbarism.

However, situation could get complicated if IS also comes into play. Currently, IS

sympathizers exist in certain parts of Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan while hard core

militants who have lately pledged their allegiance to the IS are apparently quite motivated

thus posing a potential threat particularly when IS has also been making ingress in southern

Afghanistan.

If political instability returns to the country, either due to PML-N and PTI clash on the

issue of electoral rigging or due to any other issue, it has the potential to severely affect

security situation in the country. Conversely, Pakistan will be able to reduce violence to a

greater extent but total elimination of violence in the short term is naïve to believe.

Serious challenge for the country in fight against militancy is institutional set up.

Although a counter-terrorism institution in the form of NACTA has been established it yet to

be made fully functional. In addition to various issues like HR, finances, etc., the biggest

problem lies in cooperation and coordination between various civil and military setups

including intelligence agencies, which will dictate success or failure on the part of NACTA to

act as leading counter-terrorism authority.



In non-traditional wars like that of war against militancy where militants engage in

guerrilla activities, success depends upon effective and efficient intelligence, which Pakistan

is seriously lacking at the moment. The intelligence setups in the country are not particularly

designed and structured to fully comprehend and respond to this challenge. Pakistan will

have to revamp its intelligence infrastructure to achieve success, however, structural

changes in intelligence apparatus would not be an easy task.

Notwithstanding the importance of intelligence in war against militancy, the role of

policing cannot be overstated. Presently, police force is embroiled with many challenges

including inefficiency, political interference, corruption, and capacity issues. Although

improving standards of police and policing is crucial in success against war on militancy, it

presents a serious challenge for the state to develop this institution on the modern lines. In

addition, there exists a trust deficit between general public and the police, bridging this trust

deficit would require efforts and energies on the part of the government.

In National Action Plan, the government has decided to set up rapid response forces.

Setting up such response forces is a gigantic task while making them efficient and effective

through capacity building and training would also emerge to be an issue worth considering.

At present, Pakistan is facing serious issues of governance, unemployment, illiteracy,

economic degradation, social injustice, etc., which provide space for militants and militant

organizations to operate and recruit people. The success of the government’s policy to

countering militancy will also depend on how much government is able to eradicate these

socio-economic issues.

Insurgency in Balochistan is the result of negligence of decades. The government will

have to make a distinction between violence unleashed in the name of religion and violence

having ethnic roots. Issue in Balochistan mainly falls in the second category. Currently,

provincial and central governments are pursuing a developmental model to end insurgency

in the province as they feel that economic growth of the area will create economic/ job

opportunities for the masses, which will ultimately help in improving security situation. The

provincial and central governments will have to realize that economic development is largely

dependent on improving security situation in the province for which political engagement

and dialogue with all angry Baloch is a pre-requisite. Unless and until such efforts are made,



there seems to be no end to militancy in Balochistan. Importantly, insurgency in Balochistan

has non-religious roots but in 2014 we have witnessed that a tactical/ operational

coordination between religious and liberal militants, which could pose a serious challenge

for the province in days to come.

Over a period of time, Karachi has become hub of violence by criminals,

TTP/Al-Qaeda, and armed groups backed by various political parties. Despite launching of

operation in Karachi, there is no end to violence in the city though situation has

comparatively improved. Due to political expediency and patronage by the political parties

to various armed groups, criminal elements, and presence of TTP/Al-Qaeda, security and law

& order situation in financial capital of the country will continue to act as constant headache

though some improvement is likely to be seen due to fear of military courts, etc.



6 Recommendations

Following is recommended:

a. Pakistan needs to develop a counter-narrative against violent extremism and

militancy to effectively fight terrorism. In this regard, all segments of society,

including political parties, religious groups, civil society organizations, media,

academic, scholars, etc., need to be engaged to develop such a narrative. We

should not shy away from developing a national debate on the issue. However,

Politicians being the elected members and rightful people should lead and

moderate this national debate so that a national narrative could be

developed in a specific timeframe.

b. Establishment of military courts is a temporary solution. Pakistan needs to

develop an effective legal framework that could help to fight violent militants

and to bring them to book. The existing judicial, investigation and prosecution

system has many bottlenecks and create more problems instead of solving

them. Investigation system is not only facing serious challenges of corruption

but also fall short of using modern means of investigation. On the other hand,

legal system is so lethargic and time consuming that seeking justice is almost

impossible thus creating more spaces for people to turn to violence and fall

prey to extremist groups. Pakistan needs to develop an efficient legal system

which provides speedy justice to society in general and provide sound basis

for taking legal actions against those who are involved in militancy. Law

making process should be evolutionary in nature where civil society is actively

engaged so that the laws prepared are reflection of society’s aspirations in

addition to being more relevant and up-to-date as per the modern

requirements. Law making process should never be by-passed and no law

should be imposed. Law making should not be done in haste rather laws

should be made after thorough deliberation and debate at national level so

that such laws could be more responsive. In addition, laws are not static



entity but they need to be more dynamic and should be upgraded as and

when situation warrants.

c. Although Pakistan’s external threat has not subsided but the internal threat

has developed monstrously. While keeping minimum deterrence to

effectively fight any foreign aggression, Pakistan needs to develop relevant

institutions, enhance capacity of the existing institutions as well as to develop

understanding and perception to fight internal threat. No threat could be

fought effectively unless and until it is correctly gauged and comprehended.

Shying away from such internal threats of militancy and extremism will only

compound our problems.

d. On paper as well as constitutionally, National Counter-Terrorism Authority

(NACTA) has been raised as main counter-terrorism body but it is yet to

develop as an efficient institution to shoulder this national responsibility.

Currently NACTA is facing serious HR and financial challenges. Sitting

government has come up with first National Internal Security Policy wherein

NACTA has been given the lead role, however, a lot of ground is yet to be

covered to make NACTA more effective. At present coordination, cooperation

and sharing of intelligence between various civilians and military institutions

(including armed forces and intelligence agencies) is fraught with many

challenges. As envisaged, NACTA should be developed on war footings. As

the main counter terrorism effort is executed by the Armed Forces it is

suggested to have a serving Two Star General responsible for the operational

side of the setup. This arrangement besides enhancing the operational

efficiency of the entity will also ensure better coordination and smooth

working relation between the civil and military effort.

e. Pakistan should not outsource the fight against terrorism to military alone. All

relevant institutions need to take this responsibility with patronage and

supervision from civilians.

f. Various militant outfits are involved in criminal activities to collect revenue/

funds from various sources. With the view to weaken militant organizations,



all sources of funding needs to be stopped. A better policing system is a

solution. Institutional development and state’s ability to control the areas

needs improvement. There is a need for making distinction between

political form of violence, ethnic conflicts and sectarian hatred. Once such

distinction is made, it will provide a fair chance to fight them effectively while

applying relevant strategies. For example, for fighting sectarianism,

developing sectarian harmony is quite mandatory for which religious

leadership of the country could be engaged, madrasah reforms could be

enforced as madrasahs and their intolerance teachings at present are the

main source of sectarian hatred in the country. Similarly, ethnic conflict could

be addressed through empowering masses and giving more autonomy to the

provinces and devolving power at the grass-root level.

g. Various national issues need to be understood through conducting

professional and academic research. For example, no counter-terrorism policy

could be effective until and unless relevant violent groups, their motivations,

their patronage, their structure, etc. are objectively analysed, which could be

done both at academic as well as at professional levels. Having a better

understanding of such group will provide required understanding for fighting

them both at strategic as well as tactical/ operational level. Our policies

should be tailored with ground realities which could best be ascertained

through research. In this regard, provision of relevant data and access to

government record for researcher would be a step in the right direction.

h. The structure of the entire Intelligence apparatus at national as well as

institutional levels need to be revamped and overhauled. This is extremely

essential to make these entities efficiently responsive to the challenges at

hand as done by almost all countries of the world after 9/11.

i. Linkages between general public and police force need to be enhanced.

Capacity building of police and merit based selection/ promotions are

required to make police force an efficient institution. In addition, political

interference is also required to be checked. Moreover, culture of police



station needs to be changed so that people feel more comfortable to access

police and thus providing opportunity to the police force to fully penetrate

into militant organizations.

j. There is a dire need to improve governance on war footings. It is only through

efficient governance that the benefits can reach to the grass root level. This

will help in isolating the militant entities and deny them the recruitment base

that is now available to them with in the society.

k. Developments related to emergence of Islamic State in this part of the world

are mostly driven by local elements with hardly signs of patronage of IS but

this threat could increase manifold if special attention is not paid to it.

Regional countries need to improve their bilateral relations to bridge the trust

deficit so that joint efforts could be initiated to curb this emerging threat.



Annexure-A: National Security Profile

Overall Violence in 2014

Despite operation Zarb-e-Azb, peace talks and the ceasefire, the year 2014 remained

the most violent one during the last five years. Militant attacks increased by almost 25pc as

compared to 2013. The year started with an unprecedented surge in militant attacks in first

two months. Apparently it was retaliation of killing of TTP Chief, Hakeemullah Mehsud, who

was eliminated by a drone strike in November 2013. Then a nosedive was observed in next

two months due to peace talk efforts. In May, militant attacks once again escalated as peace

efforts failed to materialize. The trend continued in June but in mid of June Pakistani military

started operation Zarb-e-Azb against the militants in North Waziristan Agency and July saw a

remarkable reduction in militant attacks. A slightly upward trend was observed in August

and September which was temporary as consistent downward trend was observed which

dropped the number of militant attacks to two digits in December 2014.

During the year, 5388 people were killed including 3420 militants, 1243 civilians, 645

security forces personnel and 80 pro-government armed Razakars (volunteers) while 6621

people were injured including 2492 civilians, 885 security forces' personnel, 512 militants

and 61 pro-government armed Razakars. 2821 violent incidents were recorded including

militant attacks and actions by security forces which include 1609 militant attacks and 1212

security forces actions. In militant attacks, highest number of deaths and injuries were those

of the civilians while in security forces' actions militant deaths and injuries were highest

among the different categories. Table-1 shows the overall number of incidents and resultant

deaths during the year 2014.

Table 1: Overall violent incidents of the year 2014

Category Nos Deaths Injuries

Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

MAs 1609 593 80 688 1191 2552 775 61 193 2458 3487 6 158

SFAs 1212 52 0 2732 52 2836 110 0 319 34 463 6615 0

Total 2821 645 80 3420 1243 5388 885 61 512 2492 3950 6621 158



If compared with previous years, an increase in overall violent incidents has been

observed in 2014 as depicted in Figure-1. Increase in deaths was unprecedented after 2010

which was due to more number of killings of militants than any other year.

Figure 1: Overall violent incidents and resultant deaths

Militant Attacks Nation-wide

The year 2014 witnessed the highest number and magnitude of the militant activities

in the last five years. Throughout Pakistan, a total of 1618 cases of violent militant activities

were recorded from January 01 to December 31, 2014 which caused 2498 fatalities and left

3374 injured. The quantity of the militant attacks in 2014 topped the chart of the last five

years. Although the number of violent militant activities have increased during 2014 but

resultant deaths slightly decreased as compared to 2013. Figure-2 shows a comparison of

militant activates and resultant deaths since 2010.

Figure 2: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks and resultant deaths

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

Year-2010 Year-2011 Year-2012 Year-2013 Year-2014

Overall violence - Yearly Comparison

Incidents Deaths

0

1000

2000

3000

4000


Year Comparison of deaths - MAs

Incidents Deaths



A fluctuation was observed in militant attacks during the year due to some factors

which made direct impact on trend of violence in the country. Figure-3 shows month-wise

comparison of militant attacks during the year 2014. Sudden surge in militant attacks at the

start of the year was mainly due to increase in militant attacks in Balochistan and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa. Militants had also intensified their attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to avenge

the killing of Hakeemullah Mehsud. However, a peace process brought the violence down in

FATA and KP. Violence in each province is discussed in Provincial Security Profile section. The

trend graph shows consistent downward trend in last quarter of the year.

Figure 3: Monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2014

Analysis of attacks versus deaths shows consistent pattern except in February, June

and last two months (see Figure-4). Fatalities in militant attacks increased and decreased in

other eight months with the rise and fall in militant attacks. In February, militant attacks

were slightly increased but total deaths decreased. In June militant attacks decreased but

fatalities increased. In November and December a steep upward trend is visible. Highest

number of militant activities was recorded in the first month and the lowest in the last

month of the year. Both January and December 2014 remained worst for the civilians as well

as security forces in which nearly 400 civilians and 129 personnel of the security forces were

killed in the militant attacks. Civilian Fatalities in militant attacks saw a steep downward

trend at the start of the year but a steep upward trend at the end of the year. Highest

number of security forces personnel was killed in January followed by June and December.

0

50

100

150

200

250

Trend Graph of Militant Attacks in 2014



Security forces saw lowest fatalities in April when there was a ceasefire announced by the

TTP. October also saw second lowest deaths of security forces' personnel. Figure-5 shows

comparison between number of attacks and resultant deaths of each category.

Figure 4: Attacks versus Death Comparison (2014)

Figure 5: Categories of deaths in Militant Activities

Similarly, most of the militant activities were recorded in Baluchistan, KPK and FATA

which remained 477, 464 and 380 militant attacks respectively. However in Punjab, Federal

Capital and Sindh provinces, a sharp increase have been witnessed in the militant attacks as

compared to the past five years. Highest number of militant attacks was recorded in

Balochistan followed by KPK but highest number of deaths in militant attacks was reported

from FATA. Provincial/ geographical distribution of militant attacks is given in Table-2.

Civilians 49%

[CATEGORY NAME]

[PERCENTAGE]

Militants 27%

Comparison of deaths in Militant Attacks

Civilians Security Forces Personnels Militants

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Attacks vs Deaths Comparison

Attacks

Deaths



Table 2: provincial distribution of militant attacks in 2014

Province Nos Killed Injured


Balochistan 475 89 10 76 354 529 162 6 26 758 952 3 45

FATA 376 192 44 495 179 910 219 52 131 172 574 0 71

GB 3 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ICT 7 3 0 1 39 43 0 0 0 188 188 0 0

KP 459 154 26 73 392 645 242 3 30 697 972 0 40

Punjab 41 23 0 3 86 112 17 0 2 237 256 2 2

Sindh 248 132 0 40 138 310 135 0 4 406 545 1 0

Total 1609 593 80 688 1191 2552 775 61 193 2458 3487 6 158

Figure 6: Geographical distribution of Mas

Types of Militant Attacks and their impact

A detailed break-up of various types of attacks and their impact is given in Table-3.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) based attacks were highest in number with a tally of 614

making almost 38pc of total attacks of different kinds followed by militants’ physical assaults

which remained almost 25pcof the total with 377 such incidents in 2014.. Incidents of Target

Killing were the third most preferred choice for militants with 277 such incidents killing 395

people and injuring 109 others. In terms of deaths, militant’s physical assault (MA) was more

lethal as 994 out of total 2552 deaths occurred due to physical assault by the militants in

addition to 709 injuries. IED based attacks were comparatively less lethal in terms of deaths

as compared to physical assaults but IEDs were more devastating in terms of number of

injuries as 614 IED based attacks caused injuries to more than 1690 people in addition to

killing 477 people. Thus in terms of deaths, physical assaults inflicted more losses, followed

Balochistan 29%

FATA 24% GLBT

0%

ICT 1%

KPK 29%

Punjab 2%

Sindh 15%

Province-wise Comparison of MAs

Balochistan FATA GLBT ICT KPK Punjab Sindh



by IED based attacks, target killings as 3rd option and suicide attacks on the fourth. In terms

of injuries, IED based attacks inflicted more injuries followed by physical assault while

suicide attacks inflicted 3rd most injuries. Hence, four types of attacks emerged to be

prominent i.e. IED based attacks, physical assaults, target killing and suicide blasts which are

being discussed in this section one by one.

Table 3: Type of Attacks and their impact



Cracker 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0

GrA 119 9 0 4 49 62 41 0 5 269 315 0 0

IED 614 164 18 50 245 477 405 26 22 1237 1690 0 0

K 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 147

KK 45 32 2 10 77 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

MA 377 208 35 410 341 994 256 22 129 302 709 4 8

MC 33 0 1 170 1 172 2 4 33 6 45 0 3

MrA 6 0 0 1 17 18 0 0 0 8 8 0 0

RA 67 8 1 0 22 31 21 0 0 36 57 0 0

SA 30 48 7 38 189 282 39 5 0 518 562 2 0

TK 277 125 16 4 250 395 18 4 4 83 109 0 0

Total 1609 594 80 687 1191 2552 782 61 193 2461 3497 6 158

Suicide Attacks

During year 2014, a remarkable reduction in suicide attacks has been observed.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb has dented the capacity and capability of militants to carry out suicide

attacks frequently as suicide attacks in this year were less than those witnessed in previous

year (see Figure-7 for yearly comparison) During 2014, 30 suicide attacks were recorded in

which 282 people including 189 civilians, 48 security forces personnel, seven

pro-government armed Razakars and 38 militants were killed while 562 people including 518

civilians, 39 security forces personnel and five pro-government Razakars were wounded.



Figure 7: Comparison of Suicide Attacks since 2011

The Figure-8 & 9 below show that over whelming majority of the victims of suicide

attacks were civilians which is a consistent pattern of suicide attacks for over the years in

Pakistan.

Figure 8: Categories of those killed in Suicide Attacks (2014)

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Year-2011 Year-2012 Year-2013 Year-2014

Comparisoin of Suicide Attacks since 2011

Incidents Deaths Injuries

SFPs 7%

RZ 1% Militants

0%

Civilians 92%

Killings in Suicide Attacks

SFPs RZ Militants Civilians



Figure 9: Categories of injuries inflicted from Suicide Attacks

A 36pc decline in suicide attacks was recorded in 2014 as 47 suicide attacks were

carried out in 2013. Impact of Operation Zarb-e-Azb was visible from the fact that 77pc of

the suicide attacks during the year 2014 were carried out before the operation. Eight

suicide attacks were carried out against civilian targets including public places, pilgrims, and

schools. Government and security forces installations were targeted in 10 suicide attacks,

while three attacks were reported against peace committee members. Army was targeted

in at least four suicide attacks during the year 2014, two attacks against police and one each

against Rangers and FC were reported.

During the year, KPK remained the most affected province where 10 suicide attacks

were witnessed in which 48 people were killed and 151 injured. Peshawar (the provincial

capital of KPK) remained the most affected district of the country as out of ten suicide

attacks in KPK, Peshawar alone faced seven such attacks during the year. Operation

Zarb-e-Azb played a major role in reduction of suicide attacks in KP as militants could carry

out only one suicide attack since start of operation Zarb-e-Azb. Average death in the

province also dropped from 15 to five per deaths per attack.

KPK was followed by Balochistan and Sindh where seven and six suicide attacks were

recorded, respectively. In Balochistan 71 people were killed and 164 were injured in seven

suicide attacks. Number of suicide attacks in Balochistan dropped from ten to seven. In 2013,

SFPs 7%

RZ 1%

Militants 0%

Civilians 92%

Killings in Suicide Attacks

SFPs RZ Militants Civilians



the province had witnessed 10 suicide attacks in which 192 people had been killed and 526

injured. Six suicide attacks in Sindh, all reported from Karachi, killed 50 people and injured

64 others. Suicide attacks not only slightly increased in Sindh but they were also deadlier

than previous year. Only 16 people were killed in four suicide attacks in 2013. Security

situation in Karachi could not improve much despite a targeted operation by Rangers.

Reports indicate increased number of TTP and Al-Qaeda related activities in Karachi.

Table 4: Geographical break up of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan (2014)

Province No. Deaths Injure

SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

Balochistan 7 5 0 9 57 71 9 0 0 155 164

FATA 2 3 7 1 1 12 0 5 0 12 17

ICT 1 2 0 0 12 14 0 0 0 25 25

KPK 10 5 0 10 33 48 14 0 0 137 151

Punjab 4 16 0 3 66 85 4 0 0 133 137

Sindh 6 17 0 15 20 52 12 0 0 56 68

Total 30 48 7 38 189 282 39 5 0 518 562

Most significant and alarming increase in suicide attacks was observed in Punjab

during 2014 as the year saw four times increase in such attacks. During previous two years

only one suicide attack was observed in each year while in 2014 the number increased to

four which is the highest number of suicide attacks during last four years. Prior to 2010,

Punjab was second most affected province by suicide attacks after KPK however security

situation in the province gradually improved after Pakistan Muslim League N came into

power in the province. Deadliest suicide attack of 2014 was also carried out in Punjab when

a bomber exploded him in crowd at Wagha border near Lahore in November. Federal capital

Islamabad witnessed a suicide-cum gun attack at district courts complex in March. Since

2002, Pakistan has witnessed 435 suicide attacks in different parts of the country as

reflected in Figure- 10.



Figure 10: Geographical spread of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan since 2002 (%)

At least 10 banned militant outfits were involved in carrying out suicide attacks

during the year 2014. Out of 30 suicide attacks, at least 10 were carried out by

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), three each by Jamat-ul-Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, two

by Jundullah and one each by Jaish-ul-Islam, Ansar-ul-Mujahidin, and Mast Gul group. Some

lethal suicide bombings of the year included TTP bomber’s attack on security forces vehicle

at RA Bazaar in Rawalpindi which killed 13 and injured 18 people on 20th January. Earlier on

9th January, TTP suicide attacker had killed a Senior Superintendent of Police (Crime

Investigation Department) Chaudhry Aslam in Karachi. LeJ attacker exploded himself up in a

bus carrying pilgrims, killed 30 and wounded 32 people in Mastung district of Baluchistan on

21st January. A Jundullah suicide bomber blew himself up in Kocha Risaldar area of

Peshawar killing nine and wounding 25 people on 4th February. A little known militant group,

Fedayeen-e-Islam bomber killed 11 police officers and wounded 36 others in Razzaqabad

Police Training Center in Shah Latif Town area of Karachi on 13th Feb. On 3rd March,

Ahrar-ul-Hind (apparently a fake name used by TTP to divert attention) carried out deadliest

twin suicide attacks at the district court in Islamabad’s sector F-8, killed 11 and wounded 35

others. Islamabad Additional Session Judge Rafaqat Ahmad Khan Awan and a female lawyer

were among the dead. On 14th March, Ahrar-ul-Hind bomber targeted armoured

personnel vehicle (APV), killed 8 and wounded 45 others. Jaish-ul-Islam, mainly operating in

Syria against Shia government, claimed to have carried out suicide attack on Shia pilgrims in

KPK 51%

Punjab 15%

Sindh 6%

Baluchistan 8%

FATA 18%

Azad Kashmir

1%

ICT 1%

Geographical spread of SAs since 2002



Taftan area of Chaghi district in Balochistan province, killing 30 and injuring 16 people on 8

June. On 2nd of November, Jamat-ul-Ahrar militants carried out suicide attack on Wagah

border which killed 55 people and wounded 120 others.

IED Based Attacks

As reflected in Figure-11, IED based attacks were lowest in 2010 but witnessed a

sudden jump in 2011 ad further increased in 2012, however, in 2013 these attacks witnessed

some decline but again jumped up in 2014 with the highest number as compared to

previous years. Monthly comparison of IED based attacks during the year 2014 is more

revealing (See Figure-12) as these attacks remained consistent during first two months of the

year but saw a reduction in March as TTP announced one-month ceasefire in the wake of

TTP-government peace talks. IED based attacks started to increase in April when a deadlock

persisted and Al-Qaeda/ TTP affiliates resumed their activities in May. But from June onward,

a marked downward trend in IED based attacks was observed as Military had started

operation Zarb-e-Azb in June. The operation not only inflicted human losses on Talibans but

also material losses including destroying militants’ IED factories in North Waziristan. Towards

the end of the year, though IED based attacks were comparatively lower but it did not stop

suggesting that despite material losses in North Waziristan, they still have necessary

material support and capability to prepare and plant IEDs.

Figure 11: IED based Attacks – Yearly Comparison

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30

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January February March April May

IED attacks and thier impact - Yearly Comparison

No SFP RZ



Figure 12: Monthly Comparison of IED based Attacks (2014)

Militants (Physical) Assaults (MA)

In 2014, as many as 377 incidents were recorded in which militants carried out

physical assault on security forces check-posts/ installations killing 994 people while injuring

709 others. Monthly comparison is given in Figure-13 while yearly comparison of physical

assault is given in Figure-14. As shown in monthly comparison, number of physical assaults

witnessed a consistent pattern throughout the year with varying degree of human losses.

Since start of operation, deaths resulting from these assaults witnessed a constant decrease

till October 2014 but these witnessed a sharp increase during November with an

unprecedented increase in December. Notably, out of total 994 deaths resulting from these

physical assaults, 410 were militants themselves and 208 were security forces those were

killed in these attacks in addition to 35 pro-government Razakars and 341 civilians. In other

words, these physical assaults by the militants also inflicted losses to militants themselves. A

staggering 410 deaths of the militants clearly suggest that they opted for this type of attack

under severe frustration as such attacks run the risk of retaliation from security forces.

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300

IED based attacks - Monthly Comparison (2014)

No Deaths Injuries



Figure 13: Physical assault by the militants – monthly comparison (2014)

Figure 14: Physical assault by the militants – Yearly comparison

Target Killings

In 2014, a total of 277 incidents of target killings were reported in which 395 people

were killed and 109 others injured. As reflected in Figure-15, the incidents of target killing,

resultant deaths and injuries were the highest as compared to the previous years. This

suggest that law and order situation in the country sharply deteriorated providing militants a

chance to opt for this type of attacks. In terms of their own security, target killings are

considered to be more beneficial for militants as only four militants were killed in these

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200

250

300

Physical Assaults by Militants - Monthly Comparison

No Deaths Injuries

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300

400


Physical Assaults - Yearly Comparison

Incidents Deaths



incidents against 250 civilians, 125 security forces personnel and 16 pro-government

razakars. Out of those injured, 83 were civilians, 18 security forces personnel, four PGRs and

only four were militants.

Figure 15: Target Killing – Yearly Comparison

When compared on monthly basis (Figure-16), a declining trend in target killing was

observed from January to March, increased in April, followed an almost consistent pattern

from April to June with further decrease in July but went sharply up in August with even

bigger jump in September. However, the trend is constantly on decrease since its peak in

September.

Figure 16: Target killing – Monthly Comparison (2014)

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Targeted Killlings - Yearly Comparison

Incidents Deaths



Security forces Response - Nation-wide

Discussing security forces actions in isolation might not give a clear picture until they

are studied with reference to militant activities as the former were somehow in reaction to

the latter. Therefore, an attempt has been made to read them together to find whether a

correlation existed before discussing them at their own. As reflected in Figure-17, both

militant activities and security forces actions can be plotted on a line suggesting closeness in

their variations. Except a few variations among various months of the year, the trend shows

a correlation between the two. Deaths’ resulting from MAs and SFAs is plotted in Figure-18,

which again shows an almost similar trend when militant activities increased, an intensity in

security forces actions is also monitored. By the end of the year (i.e. from November to

December) overall militant activities decreased but the month witnessed one of the

deadliest militant activity in the shape of Peshawar School Attack that triggered action from

security forces pushing the trend upward.

Figure 17: Security forces actions versus militants’ activities

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MAs Vs SFAs

Forces Actions Militants' Actvities



Figure 18: Deaths resulting from SFAs and MAs

Highest numbers of security forces actions (323) were monitored in KP followed by

318 SFAs in FATA. While security forces actions in KP, as suggested by 2182 numbers of

arrests, were intelligence driven operations, the actions in FATA were more force based

including ground operations and airstrikes quite visible from number of deaths which stands

2376 including 2297 militants. Security forces also arrested 996 suspected militants from

FATA which suggest that security forces not only focused on use of force but also relied

heavily on intelligence based operations. Security forces actions in Balochistan were not

consistent with that of militant activities in the province. The year 2014 was one of the

deadliest years for militants fighting against the state. The year was heavy on sleeper cells

and urban networks of the militants too as 6615 suspected militants, their financiers and

supporters were arrested from different parts of the country. Among these actions, there

were two full-fledged military operations Zarbe-e-Azb and Khyber-1.

Table 5: Region/ Province wise break up of security forces actions (2014)


Arst SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

Balochistan 185 4 0 187 6 197 36 0 5 6 47 908

FATA 318 39 0 2297 40 2376 47 0 293 23 363 996

GB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

ICT 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 628

KP 323 5 0 73 4 82 15 0 21 4 40 2182

Punjab 126 2 0 24 1 27 7 0 0 0 7 520

Sindh 226 2 0 151 1 154 5 0 0 1 6 1379

Total 1212 52 0 2732 52 2836 110 0 319 34 463 6615

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Deaths' Comparison

SFAs Deaths MAs Deaths



Impact of Military and Intelligence-based Operations

Militant attacks in Pakistan declined except in FATA after operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Average militant attacks declined in all parts of the country after the operation but the

number gone up in FATA due to desperate efforts of the militants to regain some territory.

Average number of militant attacks in rest of the country was 29 prior to Zarb-e-Azb which

dropped to 20 attacks per month at the end of the year 2014. Most significant decline in

militant attacks after start of Zarb-e-Azb was observed in KPK followed by Balochistan. In

KPK, the average dropped from 50 to 28 while in Balochistan it dropped from 50 to 34. Sindh

also observed reduction in militant attacks after Zarb-e-Azb. Average militant attacks in

Sindh were 24 before the operation which has dropped to 16 attacks per month from July to

December 2015. Average militant attacks in Punjab dropped from 4.5 to 2.8 attacks per

month. Average militant attacks per month in FATA prior to operation Zarb-e-Azb was 28

which increased up to 32 attacks per month from July to December 2014 (see Figure-19 for

comparison between militant attacks before and after operation).

Prior to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, North Waziristan had become headquarter of

anti-Pakistan militant groups. Pakistan had a peace deal with Hafiz Gul Bahadur group since

2006 which demanded that no militant group will be allowed in North Waziristan to operate

against Pakistan. Situation remained in control until TTP, which was expelled from South

Waziristan in 2009, found sanctuaries in North Waziristan. Moreover, various other militants

including foreigners who were flushed out of South Waziristan started to re-group in North

Waziristan. A Shoora of different groups was formed in NWA which was led by Gul Bahadur

but he gradually conceded control to TTP led by Hakeemullah Mehsud. Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan and Al-Qaeda's remaining elements were also active in the area along with

Haqqani Network. Major hard core fighting force of TTP was also from Mehsud fighters who

were located in NWA. Although TTP's head Fazlullah was operating from across the border in

Afghanistan but group's Shoora and senior militant commanders were active in NWA.

Punjabi Taliban (Non-Pashtun fighters, not necessarily from Punjab) group was also active in

NWA under Asmatullah Muawaia's command.

Few weeks prior to operation Zarb-e-Azab, two rival groups of TTP started to attack



each other. Ismatullah Shaheen group and Shehryar Mehsud group killed dozens of each

other’s fighters. Shehryar Mehsud was backed by Fazlullah while Shaheen was backed by

Khan Saeed Sajna who was contender for the leadership of TTP after the death of

Hakeemullah Mehsud but Shoora elected Fuzlullah. Sajna wanted peace deal with the

government as he was under pressure from Mehsud tribe because Mehsud are the most

sufferer of the ongoing militancy but Fazlullah was against peace deal. Sajna defected from

the main group which was a major blow to TTP. Pakistani security forces met with least

resistance at the start of the military operation because of infighting and defection in TTP.

Figure 19: Impact of Operation Zarb-e-Azb on Militancy

As per claims of the military and local sources so far 90pc of the area in NWA

including major towns of Miran Shah, Mir Ali, Boya, Degan and Datta Khel are cleared and

secured. 80 km long road from Khajouri to Mir Ali to Miran Shah to Datta Khel and

Ghariom-Jhallar road have been cleared. The area was once a stronghold of militants who

were governing these areas with their policing and administration. So far, 27 IED factories,

one Rocket and ammunition manufacturing factory were recovered and destroyed. Huge

amount of communication equipment, ammunition, and other logistics recovered and

destroyed. Command and Control Center of TTP has been completely destroyed and

militants from Central Asia, China, Middle East, etc. have also lost their long established

sanctuaries in the area. Despite the success, none of the top tier militants could be

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1600

Militant Attacks Deaths

Impact of Operation Zarb-e-Azb

Before Operation After Operation



eliminated in the operation.

Sensing the mood of forces, militants dispersed into different directions as a result of

the Operation Zarb-e-Azab. Mainly relocation took place in three directions. They moved

within NWA, within FATA and into Afghanistan. Majority of the leadership and fighters

moved into Afghanistan in the garb of IDPs. Some militants moved into Shawal Valley and

areas along Ghulam Khan Road near Pak Afghan border (This is relocation within NWA).

Orakzai and Khyber Agencies are other places where dislocated militants have been trying to

regroup (relocation within FATA). Operation Khyber-1 was launched to deny them space in

these areas. Lashkar-e-Islam, the most influential militant group in Khyber agency headed by

Mangal Bagh Afridi, provided support to TTP in Khyber Agency which is a deviation from its

past policy as this group was once anti-TTP but operation Zarb-e-Azab and operation

Khyber-1 helped both the groups to cooperate with each other in their difficult times.

Lashkar-e-Islam is also sending its fighters to take shelter in Afghanistan as this group has

established strong connections across the border with the people who matter. As a result of

Operation Zarb-e-Azb and subsequent Operation Khyber-1, overall security situation in

adjoining KP had improved substantially though did manage to launch a deadliest attack in

the form of Peshawar School Attack under sheer frustration.

What happened to so called 'Good Taliban'?

There were some groups in NWA and SWA generally called good Taliban. They

include Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Haqqani Network and Mullah Nazir Group. This distinction

between good and bad Taliban was previously made on the pretext of taking arms against

the state or otherwise.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group

Hafiz Gul Bahadur was like governor of NWA as he was also head of the Shura Ithad

ul Mujahideen. Now he is homeless. His undue favor to Central Asian militants and Arabs has

annoyed Pakistani security forces who had a peace deal with him since 2006. He himself

announced operation Zarb-e-Momin to resist Operation Zarb-e-Azb but practically he could

not put any fight. He lost grip over the group. Practically, Gul Bahadur group is divided into



five sub groups though none of them announced any defection but virtually all the sub

groups act independently with almost no influence from Gul Bahdur. These sub groups

include Aleem Khan group, Abdur Rehman Group, Sadiq Noor Group, Sadiqullah Group and

Gul Bahadur Group.

Haqqani Network

This is the most complex militant group in war on terror. It is accused of have strong

ties with Pakistan's security establishment but interestingly the group has strong influence

over almost all militant groups in FATA whether they are good Taliban or Bad Taliban. It has

strong ties with Pakistan's declared enemy Al-Qaeda as well. The group had moved out of

NWA well before the operation. Group's main fighting force was already in Afghanistan and

NWA was used as a logistic base camp before operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Molvee Nazir Group

The group is active in South Waziristan. After death of Mullah Nazir in a drone attack

last year the group has weakened. Although no operation has been conducted in SWA or

against the group but it is increasingly becoming weaker due to a number of reasons. This

group is also divided into five sub groups though none of them formed or announced

defection from the main group. These sub groups are Ainullah Group, Taj Group, Shoaib

Group, Malang Group, and Tehseel Khan Group.

Foreign Militants

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkistan Islamic Movement and Al-Qaeda had

their fighters in the area. Most of the losses during Zarb-e-Azb were faced by foreign

militants in NWA. Now majority of them are hiding and fighting guerilla war from forests and

mountains of Shawal and other remote areas.



Role and Performance of Bomb Disposal Squads

Bomb Disposal Squads (BDS) and Bomb Disposal Units (BDU) work under police and

civil defense departments and composed of specially trained personnel to defuse any

explosive device before it goes off and they have saved many lives over the years in this

militancy-hit country. Figure-20 shows the work of these squads and units in 2014, as these

defused 191 explosive devices. Almost half of their actions were reported in KPK where 96

explosive devices were defused while 29 in Balochistan, 32 in FATA, 26 in Sindh, six in Punjab

and two explosive devices were defused in ICT. One BDS Sindh official namely Saleem Vistro

died of the explosion when he was busy dismantling the cracker device in Tando Allayar area

of Sindh in October 2014. The need to train and equip BDS grew with the growing ferocity of

the anti-state activities in the country. Police and Civil Defense departments cater the

training needs of these units. However, a handful of them got the overseas training as well.

Pakistan’s first Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) Training School in Nowshera KPK is near

completion and will soon be made functional. After the start of this school the capacity of

the security forces in this field will be greatly enhanced.

Figure 20: BDS Successful bids in 2014

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Balochistan FATA ICT KP Punjab Sindh

Bomb Defused by BDS/ BDU



Annexure-B: Provincial Security Profile

Balochistan

Overall security situation in Balochistan remained volatile with some variations

throughout 2014. A total of 475 militant activities were recorded, highest among the all

regions/ provinces, killing 529 people including 89 SFPs, 10 PGRs, 76 militants and 354

civilians while 952 others were injured including 162 SFPs, six PGRs, 26 militants and 758

civilians. 45 people were kidnapped by the militants. Monthly break-up of militant activities

and resultant deaths/ injuries is given in Table-6 while monthly comparison is given in

Figure-21. Interestingly, when violence in rest of the country decreased during March due to

ceasefire by the TTP, militant activities in Balochistan also decreased and picked momentum

when violence in other parts of the country increased. This trend reveals some significant

aspect of violence in Balochistan: One, anti-state militancy in the province is not only

attributed to sub-nationalists but other players like TTP and LeJ are also active here. Two,

violence in the province is positively co-related to violence in other parts of the country (i.e.

a positive change in rest of the country has positive change on the security situation in

Balochistan while a negative change has negative effect).

Among the major incidents, two suicide attacks targeting Shia Pilgrims were reported

in January with one in Mastung killing 30 and injuring 32 others while the other in Quetta

with three killings and 31 injuries claimed by sectarian outfit Lashker-e-Jhangvi who is

closely associated with Al-Qaeda/ TTP. In addition, mass graves of 25 persons were

recovered in Khuzdar district. The provincial home minister claimed that Indian intelligence

agency RAW was involved in this action. In March, an IED blast at Jinnah Road killed 11

people and injured 42 others. The attack was claimed by lessor known Ahrar ul Hind (which

was considered to be TTP’s offshoot). This incident occurred at the time when TTP had

announced ceasefire while Ahrar ul Hind was opposing such talks. April witnessed an IED

blast targeting Jaffar Express at Sibi Railway station killing 17 people and injuring 40 others.

United Baloch Army had claimed responsibility of the attack. A suicide blast in Taftan near

Pakistan-Iran border was recorded in June targeting Shia pilgrims returning from Iran, killing



more than 27 and injuring 30 others. A lessor known outfit Jaish-ul-Islam had claimed

responsibility of the attack. The incident occurred on the same day when an attack was

carried out on Karachi Airport.

In July, a suicide attack was reported from Khuzdar killing five people and injuring 27

others. In August, at least 13 suspected Uzbek militants attacked Smungli and Quetta

airbases which was repulsed by the forces killing 12 militants. Ghalib Mehsud faction of TTP

claimed responsibility for the attacks. In October, Hazara Shia community was targeted once

again in a suicide blast in Hazara town killing five people and injuring at least 12 others.

October also witnessed attack on Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman

in Quetta killing two people and injuring at least 32 others. Militant outfit Jandullah claimed

responsibility of the attack. The same day, security forces vehicle was also targeted in Quetta

using IED killing two people and injuring 12 others. Laskher-e-Balochistan had claimed

responsibility of the attack. In November, two people were killed and 25 others injured in an

IED blast in Quetta when a judge of Anti-Terrorism Court and police DSP were targeted but

both remained safe. November recorded attack on Bugti Express (train) damaging four

bogeys and injuring 12 people in Mastung district. In December, one major incident was

reported from Sibi in which 10 people were injured while an incident in Quetta injured 27

people.

The province witnessed militancy not only from Baloch sub-nationalist insurgents but

also from sectarian as well as militant outfits (read Al-Qaeda/ TTP affiliates). Baloch

sub-nationalists targeted government strategic installations (especially rails, bridges,

electricity and gas infrastructure) civilians, settlers, and government officials. In terms of

sectarian killings, Shia community was mostly targeted including Hazara Shia Community

and Shia pilgrims moving between Pakistan and Iran. Al-Qaeda/TTP, while under pressure in

FATA/KP expanded their focus in the province while taking benefit of the fragile security

situation of the province. Al-Qaeda/TTP mostly remained focused on Pashtun belt and areas

which are close to Afghanistan border. Provincial capital Quetta was one of the main targets

of all the three aforementioned types of militants presenting serious security challenge for

the government and security forces.

It was hoped that provincial coalition government in Balochistan led by National



Party will make political efforts to resolve the issue but no substantial effort was witnessed

during 2014. In October 2014, CM Balochistan Dr Abdul Malik Baloch hinted at convening an

All Parties Conference to initiate formal dialogue with the militant groups in the province. He

had told that a jirga comprising tribal elders and key political leaders would be sent to all

Baloch separatist groups and sectarian militant organizations to hold a dialogue but no

progress on this front was visible so far. Prima facie, Federal and provincial governments are

aiming to resolve a political issue through economic means as efforts are being made to

develop Gwadar port to link it with China through a rail and road network.

Table 6: Monthly break up of militant activities in Balochistan

Month Nos Killed Injured

M Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

January 72 17 2 6 93 118 20 0 0 110 130 0 6

February 72 7 1 10 30 48 31 0 0 31 62 0 17

March 47 7 0 6 32 45 19 0 0 78 97 0 5

April 38 2 0 7 41 50 5 0 1 72 78 0 0

May 20 11 0 0 11 22 2 0 0 27 29 0 5

June 22 6 0 4 31 41 3 0 0 39 42 0 1

July 21 11 0 0 11 22 15 0 0 70 85 0 0

August 42 9 7 19 21 56 24 6 20 62 112 3 0

September 48 7 0 12 19 38 8 0 0 67 75 0 1

October 28 1 0 2 24 27 11 0 4 84 99 0 7

November 24 3 0 1 23 27 11 0 0 58 69 0 0

December 41 8 0 9 18 35 13 0 1 60 74 0 3

Total 475 89 10 76 354 529 162 6 26 758 952 3 45

Figure 21: Monthly Comparison of Militant Activities in Balochistan and their impact

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Monthly comparison of MAs in Balochistan

Nos Deaths Injuries



Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)

FATA has been the epicenter in the war on terror in Pakistan since its very start.

Security forces have been hunting down the militant outfits active there for so many years

now. At the start of the year violence in FATA was quite high but with background and

foreground efforts for peace talks, violence in FATA started to come down with a sudden

drop in March (during ceasefire announced by the TTP) but tended to increase in April

suggesting that militants lost hopes in peace talks. An important development post peace

talks efforts was emergence of clear differences between various militant outfits. The surge

was not just because of the attacks against state but the militants had also started to target

each other in North Waziristan where two rival groups of Shaheen Bitani and Shehryar

Mehsud indulged in turf war. Severe infighting started in April and ended only when Pakistan

started Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan in mid of June. During these three months

of infighting, 126 militants from both sides were killed including Asmatullah Shaheen himself

who was backed by Kahlid Mehsud a.k.a. Khan Saeed Sajna. Shehryar was backed by

Fazlullah who wanted to limit influence of Sajna whom Fazlullah had fears that he was going

to strike a deal with the security forces. Militants’ activities in FATA increased manifold in

May with trend continuing till mid-June as well but once Operation Zarb-e-Azb was started

in mid-June, militants’ activities witnessed a constant decrease but started to increase when

militants were able to somehow recover and shifted to other parts of FATA including Khyber

Agency that compelled security forces to launch an operation in Khyber Agency too. As a

result of this operation, militant activities in FATA continued to decrease towards the end of

the year (see Figure-22)

2014 also saw a remarkable shift in militant alliances and defection in FATA. If on one

hand TTP's infighting led to defection on a bigger scale while on the other hand TTP's rival

group Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) became an ally of TTP in Khyber Agency which was an alarming

signal for security forces as Lashkar-e-Islam was very influential group in vital areas of

Khyber Agency particularly Bara Tehsil and Tirah Valley. LI had strong influence inside

Peshawar as well but the group was tolerated because it did not let TTP to encircle Peshawar,

the provincial capital of KPK.



Figure 22: Monthly Comparison of Militant Activities in FATA and their impact

Table 7: Monthly break-up of militant activities in FATA


Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

January 23 5 0 10 24 39 3 0 0 26 29 0

February 28 24 1 21 18 64 23 4 8 4 39 1

March 19 15 0 4 13 32 6 3 0 21 30 4

April 25 3 4 48 3 58 6 5 11 11 33 50

May 49 32 6 87 14 139 38 3 1 16 58 2

June 43 30 2 41 26 99 36 2 21 29 88 2

July 23 22 1 5 3 31 8 0 0 3 11 1

August 29 5 2 20 13 40 5 0 7 15 27 5

September 23 10 4 29 2 45 6 2 13 10 31 3

October 48 11 8 15 22 56 45 8 4 19 76 1

November 39 25 13 107 10 155 18 21 33 17 89 2

December 27 10 3 108 31 152 25 4 33 1 63 0

Total 376 192 44 495 179 910 219 52 131 172 574 71

Militant attacks in FATA increased as compared to 2013 but remained in same range

as in 2011 and 2012 but could not match 2010 which had seen the highest number of

militant attacks and resultant deaths in in five years.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Monthly comparison of MAs in FATA

Nos Deaths Injuries



Security forces actions in FATA

The security forces successfully conducted 318 actions against the militants in FATA in

2014, in which 2376 people were killed including 2297 militants, 39 SFPs, and 40 civilians

while 363 others were injured including 47 SFPs, 293 militants and 23 civilians. 996 got

arrested. Security forces not only conducted military operations in FATA successfully but also

increased their intelligence based arrests which is quite visible from number of arrests.

Figure 23: Monthly comparison of security forces actions in FATA

Figure 24: Monthly break of Security forces actions in FATA



January 14 0 0 74 20 94 0 0 8 10 18 10

February 21 0 0 111 0 111 0 0 19 0 19 44

March 9 0 0 6 0 6 0 0 6 1 7 25

April 15 0 0 39 1 40 2 0 20 4 26 28

May 38 4 0 148 0 152 14 0 113 0 127 141

June 41 7 0 434 6 447 0 0 8 1 9 133

July 36 7 0 186 1 194 2 0 6 1 9 130

August 18 2 0 129 0 131 0 0 0 0 0 71

September 25 3 0 260 0 263 0 0 0 3 3 16

October 34 12 0 277 2 291 7 0 18 1 26 172

November 30 3 0 217 2 222 16 0 65 2 83 40

December 37 1 0 416 8 425 6 0 30 0 36 186

Total 318 39 0 2297 40 2376 47 0 293 23 363 996

050

100150200250300350400450500

Monthly comparison of SFAs and their impact

Nos Deaths Injuries



Khyber Pakhtoonkha (KP)

Security situation in the province remained quite volatile but some major

developments at national/ subnational level impacted security situation in the province.

During the year, 464 militant activities were recorded in KP in which 650 people were killed

including 154 SFPs, 26 PGRs, 73 militants and 379 civilians while 977 others were injured

including 243 SFPs, four PGRs, 30 militants and 700 civilians. Militants also kidnapped 40

people during the year. In terms of percentage share in deaths, almost 61pc were civilians,

24pc SFPs, 11pc militants, and 4pcPGRs.

Balochistan topped the list where 477 militant activities were recorded, KP witnessed

464 such incidents but lethality of such attacks in KP was comparatively higher than

Balochistan both in terms of deaths as well as injuries. In terms of categories of deaths

(Figure-27), civilians were worst target while security forces were also on the receiving end

though a declining trend is being observed in both the categories as compared to previous

year. Contrary to other trends, killing of pro-government razakars (PGRs or RZ) witnessed an

increasing trend suggesting that those pro-government civilian combatants were specifically

targeted.

Attacking educational institutions witnessed 40 such incidents across the country out

of which 23 alone were reported from KPK followed by 13 in FATA and four in Balochistan.

Out of these 23 attacks on schools in KPK, 20 were carried out using IEDs, two through

physical assault by the militants (including the Peshawar Army Public School Attack on

December 16, 2014) while one was grenade attack. Out of these 40 attacks on schools, the

highest 13 were reported from Charsadda district alone while four were in Bannu district.

Militants destroyed only government schools with majority of them were meant for girls.

One of the saddest parts of the militancy in this region was negative effect on education as

educational infrastructure was specifically targeted with its immediate as well as long term

implications. The attack on Army Public School Peshawar, the deadliest of all the attacks on

schools, significantly impacted and dented the security situation in the country and raised

unprecedented security concerns for the masses and more importantly among school going

kids in the educational institutions in KPK as well as across Pakistan in addition to creating



fear and severe psychological implications.

In yearly comparison, though the year witnessed highest militant activities, division

of such activities on monthly basis present an asymmetry (Figure-26) While militant

activities as well as resultant deaths were higher during first two months of the year but

witnessed a sharp decline when TTP announced one-month ceasefire in March and the

trend continued in April despite the fact that TTP only extended ceasefire by 10 more days

beyond one month. In May, militant activities picked up momentum and continued till

mid-June when security forces launched operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan on 15

June. The operation right from the start put so much pressure on the militants that they

were more focused on their own security. Therefore, number of attacks gone down during

June, July and August. But immediate impact of the operation was seen reversing in

September. However, after start of military operation in Khyber Agency, which lies adjacent

to provincial capital Peshawar, security situation in the province continued to improve and a

negative trend in militant activities was quite visible, however, towards the end of the year,

militants managed to plan and execute the deadliest Peshawar School Attack which pulled

the total number of deaths and injuries up.

Provincial capital Peshawar has always remained on the top of the affected areas in

the province and the violence was largely originating from the adjoining Khyber Agency.

Operation in Khyber Agency, code named Khyber-1, again compelled (or pacified) militants

to scale down their attacks in adjacent areas during last two months of the year. But this

does not mean that military operation has managed to affect all sorts of outfits. For example,

newly defected group Jamat ul Ahrar of the TTP was found quite active and evolving.

Reports of developing IS sympathizers is another example. TTP under pressure from

continuous military offenses got frustrated to an extent that they launched the most

nefarious activity in the shape of Peshawar Army Pubic School Attack killing as many as 132

school children and injuring more than 150.

Notwithstanding given frustration and impatience lately, Al-Qaeda/ TTP affiliated

militants earlier made attempts to expand to northern part of KP when such northward

movement was also witnessed in FATA. This northward movement in KP and FATA was linked

to presence of TTP chief in adjacent Kunar province of Afghanistan where he wanted to



reinvigorate his receding position within TTP due to splits in the outfit particularly that of

Khan Said Sajna group and parting of ways of Jamatul Ahrar, announcement of allegiance

with the IS of some prominent TTP commanders, etc. The areas in the north where militants

tried to re-group included Bajaur, Malakand, Swat, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Buner, Shangla,

Batagram, Tor Garh and Chitral. However, they remained less effective and could not gain

any foot-hold in those areas as security forces were quite vigilant and responded with swift

and timely actions. Militants’ initial visibility in otherwise peaceful Chitral area was quite

alarming and fearful for the people especially when a warning was purportedly issued by the

TTP against Kalash tribe of the area. TTP’s exploration of Tor Ghar, Batagram and Kohistan

areas of the otherwise peaceful Hazara Division was purposeful as the terrain (thick forests

and insurmountable mountains) was quite favourable for militants to develop sanctuaries

elsewhere to avoid human losses. Notably, population in these areas is predominately the

following of Deobandi school of thought with most of them of Pashtun origin.

Figure 25: Monthly Comparison of militant activities in KP

0

50

100

150

200

250

Monthly Comparison of MAs in KP

Nos Deaths Injuries



Figure 26: Category of Death comparison in KP

Figure 27: Monthly Comparison of militant activities in KP

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Nos SFP RZ M C

Category of deaths - Yearly Comparison

Y-2010 Y-2011 Y-2012 Y-2013 Y-2014

0

50

100

150

200

250

Monthly Comparison of MAs - KP

Nos Deaths Injuries



Table 8: Monthly break up of militant activities in KP and their human impact



January 57 47 5 2 42 96 108 1 0 93 202 0

February 60 14 7 10 61 92 11 0 8 154 173 6

March 36 10 0 5 17 32 13 0 2 74 89 10

April 35 10 0 8 15 33 25 0 1 62 88 4

May 59 10 1 5 13 29 23 0 1 36 60 4

June 44 12 0 6 21 39 10 0 5 27 42 7

July 28 9 1 10 15 35 13 2 10 9 34 3

August 27 4 4 7 10 25 6 0 0 14 20 4

September 49 15 3 5 25 48 18 0 1 55 74 2

October 20 5 3 1 18 27 1 0 2 28 31 0

November 26 8 2 5 10 25 4 0 0 22 26 0

December 18 10 0 9 145 164 10 0 0 123 133 0

Total 459 154 26 73 392 645 242 3 30 697 972 40

Security Forces Actions in KP

Security forces mostly conducted intelligence based operations in the province

during the year. These operations were higher during February when central government

was making efforts for peace talks with the TTP and witnessed a nose dive in March (during

ceasefire period), witnessed a further decline in April as a gesture to persuade TTP to

announce a permanent and long-lasting ceasefire. However, operations picked momentum

in May but declined in June and continued to rise until September. In October when

operation Khyber-1 was launched in adjoining Khyber Agency, security forces intensified

their intelligence based operations to thwart militants endeavor to move into settled areas

of KP. Due to deadly Peshawar School Attack, security forces further intensified intelligence

based operations across the province including areas like Abbottabad and Mansehra which

were otherwise considered to be peaceful. Under the supervision of Inspector General KP

Nasir Khan Durrani and with comparatively less political interference, police in the province

improved its image as well as shown effectiveness in maintaining law and order and

improving overall security situation in the province. However, police remained as one of the

targets of the militants. Self-explanatory monthly break up of security forces actions and

monthly comparison is given in Table-8 and Figure-29, respectively.



Figure 28: Monthly Comparison of security forces actions in KP

Table 9: Monthly break up of security forces actions in KP



January 25 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 3 22

February 38 0 0 17 0 17 0 0 7 0 7 24

March 20 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 362

April 19 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 31

May 34 1 0 13 0 14 2 0 4 0 6 101

June 26 0 0 2 3 5 0 0 0 2 2 700

July 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 208

August 30 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 1 0 1 78

September 34 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 2 0 2 279

October 18 0 0 9 0 9 0 0 4 0 4 240

November 24 2 0 4 0 6 9 0 0 0 9 30

December 34 2 0 9 0 11 4 0 0 0 4 107

Total 323 5 0 73 4 82 15 0 21 4 40 2182

Sindh

Overall security situation in Sindh remained quite stable except provincial capital

Karachi, which remained hub of various types of violence including militant activities of

TTP/Al-Qaeda, criminal elements, sectarian killings, political violence, etc. Security and law &

order situation in financial capital of the country, Karachi, presented a diametrically opposite

picture of overall security situation in the rest of the province. While in other parts of the

province, sub-nationalist tried to create some unrest in the form of violent protests when

central leader of the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) Maqsood Ahmed Qureshi, the brother

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Monthly comparison of SFAs in KP

Nos Deaths Injuries



of the former JSQM chairman late Bashir Khan Qureshi, was found dead but situation was

controlled soon without further escalation.

Due to economic/ job opportunities in financial capital of the country, people from

various parts of the country get attracted to port city making Karachi multi-ethnic urban

center. Currently, major ethnic groups in Karachi included Mohajirs (an ethnic unit

comprising those who migrated from India at the time of partition), native Sindhis, Pathans

(including those who migrated/shifted from KP/FATA) and people of Baloch origin.

Traditionally, a tussle between Mohajirs and Sindhis was existent but with settlements of

Pathans due to unrest in KP/ FATA, a triangle was developed. These ethnic groups have their

roots in political parties as well. While Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) mainly

represents Mohjir community, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) claims to be championing and

safeguarding the rights of Sindhis while pathans are represented by Awami National Party

(ANP). These parties are also said to have given patronage to various armed groups to

further their own interests and these groups were involved in various kind violent activities

against each other. Due to patronage from various political parties, security forces were not

able to take stern action against them.

Cutting the ethnic or party lines, the issue of sectarianism has also plagued Karachi

where various sectarian outfits were seen active and involved in sectarian killings. Icing on

the cake is crime rate in the city. Due to inactiveness of law enforcement agencies and the

space available to them due to political expediency, criminal elements got an opportunity to

remain hyper-active. In addition, gang wars were also witnessed particularly in Lyari area.

On the other hand, TTP/Al-Qaeda has sizeable presence in Karachi and their

influence increased when militants moved into the city and established sleeper cells once

they were under pressure from continuous military operations in FATA. TTP/Al-Qaeda

particularly focused on Pashtun ethnic community dwelling in various parts of the city,

where they not only propagated their ideology but also made recruitments for carrying

various militant activities. Due to this variety of heightened violence in Karachi, the federal

government initiated Karachi Operation in September 2013 which is continued till-date. But

surprisingly this operation has so far failed to curtail the overall violence and anti-state

activities in Karachi.



Security Forces Actions in Sindh

Security forces conducted 226 operations in Sindh in which 154 people were killed

including 151 militants, two security forces personnel and one civilian while six others were

injured including five SFPs and one civilian. More than 1379 suspected militants were

arrested by security forces. Monthly Comparison of security forces actions is given in

Figure-30 while detailed monthly break up is given in Table-10.

Figure 29: Monthly comparison of security forces actions in Sindh

Table 10: Monthly break up of security forces actions in Sindh



January 9 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 0 0 1 116

February 16 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 28

March 31 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 517

April 14 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 61

May 20 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 29

June 35 0 0 15 0 15 3 0 0 0 3 176

July 21 0 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 25

August 6 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 167

September 15 1 0 17 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 33

October 20 1 0 19 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 121

November 18 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 44

December 21 0 0 40 0 40 1 0 0 0 1 62

Total 226 2 0 151 1 154 5 0 0 1 6 1379

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Security forces actions in Sindh - Monthly Comparison

Nos Deaths Injuries



Militant Attacks in Sindh

An unprecedented increase in militant activities was observed in Sindh (mostly

Karachi) as compared to previous years (see Figure-31). In 2013, there were 81 militant

activities in Sindh with 225 deaths which increased to 248 militant activities with 310 deaths.

Thus an increase of more than 200pc was witnessed in militant activities and more than

30pc in resultant deaths.

Notable incidents in Sindh (mostly Karachi) included attack on Police bus in Karachi

using IED in February killing 13 police constable and injuring 47 others while Khushal Khan

Khatak train was also targeted in February through blast on rail track killing 10 people and

injuring 60 others in Jacobabad. Most prominent incident in Karachi (Sindh) was attack on

Karachi Airport in June killing 19 people (in addition to 10 attackers) and injuring 29 others.

TTP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claimed responsibility of the attack terming it a

“joint operation”. The attack on Karachi Airport buried all the chances of government

returning to negotiation table and a full-fledged military operation was started on 15 June.

In September, another significant incident was recorded in the form of attack on Karachi

Naval Dockyard which was foiled by security forces.

Figure 30: Militant Activities in Sindh – Yearly Comparison

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350


MAs in Sindh - Yearly comparison

MAs Deaths



Figure 31: Monthly comparison of militant activities in Sindh

Table 11: Monthly break up of militant activities in Sindh and their human impact



January 34 22 0 5 21 48 22 0 4 43 69 0

February 29 20 0 2 25 47 51 0 0 129 180 1

March 7 2 0 0 4 6 1 0 0 2 3 0

April 35 3 0 1 17 21 3 0 0 59 62 0

May 16 7 0 0 4 11 4 0 0 26 30 0

June 28 32 0 18 21 71 9 0 0 38 47 0

July 20 14 0 5 5 24 3 0 0 8 11 0

August 21 13 0 0 13 26 3 0 0 6 9 0

September 23 13 0 5 12 30 13 0 0 21 34 0

October 16 2 0 0 5 7 12 0 0 17 29 0

November 15 3 0 0 10 13 12 0 0 54 66 0

December 4 1 0 4 1 6 2 0 0 3 5 0

Total 248 132 0 40 138 310 135 0 4 406 545 1

The Punjab

Punjab emerged to be the region where militant activities have increased manifold as

compared to past years. This increase in militant activities could be attributed to spreading

out of militants when military started operations against them in FATA. While earlier only

presence of militants was noticed in Southern parts of the province which are close to

Balochistan providing Baloch insurgents opportunity to carry out such activities in those

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Militant Actvities in Sindh - Monthly Comparison

Nos Deaths Injuries



parts. However, later in the year a growing trend was observed in which TTP/ Al-Qaeda

affiliated militants showed-cased their presence in almost all areas of Punjab with incidents

in various districts. Resultantly, security forces also intensified their intelligence based

operations across the province and arrested at least 520 suspected militants. Detailed

monthly break up of security forces actions is given in Table-12 while monthly comparison of

SFAs is given in Figure-33.

Prominent militant activities in Punjab included suicide attack in RA Bazar near GHQ

in Rawalpindi killing 15 people and injuring 33 others in January. Similarly, Khushal Khan

Khattak train was targeted in January with an IED blast on railway track killing four people

and injuring 60 others. Baloch insurgent group Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) claimed

responsibility of the attack. Another notable incident was recorded in November when TTP

Jamatul-Ahrar claimed an attack near Wagha Border killing 61 people and injuring 100

others. Detailed monthly break up of militant activities is given in Table-13 while monthly

comparison of militant activities is given in Figure-34.

Figure 32: Monthly comparison of security forces actions in Punjab

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Monthly comparison of SFAs in Punjab

Nos Deaths Injuries



Table 12: Monthly break up of security forces actions in Punjab

Month Nos

Killed Injured

Arst SF

P

RZ M C

Tota

l SFP

RZ M C

Tota

l

January 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

February 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28

March 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31

April 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42

May 7 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 19

June 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41

July 18 2 0 3 0 5 7 0 0 0 7 76

August 6 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 16

September 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37

October 3 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4

November 18 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 108

December 38 0 0 14 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 115

Total 126 2 0 24 1 27 7 0 0 0 7 520

Figure 33: Monthly comparison of militant activities in Punjab

0

50

100

150

200

250

Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10

Militant Actvities in Punjab - Monthly Comparison

Nos Deaths Injuries



Table 13: Monthly break up of militant activities in Punjab and their human impact



January 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0

February 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 7 7 0

March 4 16 0 50 6 72 0 0 0 203 203 0

May 7 6 0 4 91 101 6 0 0 211 217 0

June 2 4 0 0 9 13 0 0 0 9 9 0

July 8 1 0 4 43 48 5 0 0 195 200 0

August 2 0 0 0 29 29 0 0 0 202 202 0

September 4 0 0 3 39 42 7 0 0 208 215 0

October 2 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 27 27 0

November 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0

Total 33 27 0 61 226 314 19 0 0 1068 1087 0

Gilgit-Baltistan

Overall security situation in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) remained stable throughout the year

with only three militant activities reported, two in July and one in October. The area also

witnessed one security forces action in July. Although there were fears that Al-Qaeda/TTP

affiliated militants might have moved into GB after military offensive against them in FATA

but the apprehension turned false.

Islamabad Capital Territory

As compared to previous years, security situation in the federal capital remained

slightly tensed. Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) witnessed eight militant activities causing

44 deaths including three SFPs, one suicide bomber and 40 civilians while 178 others (all

civilians) were injured. Among these incidents, one suicide-cum-gun attack in districts courts

in F-8 Sector of Islamabad occurred days after announcement of month long ceasefire by the

TTP killing 10 people including an Additional Session Judge. The attack was claimed by a

lesser known Ahrar-ul-Hind (a pseudo name considered to have been adopted by TTP to

avert any public pressure when the outfit had announced the ceasefire). Federal Capital

witnessed another deadliest attack in April when an IED blast in fruit-and-vegetable market

killed 24 civilians while injuring 115 others. The attack was claimed by Baloch separatist



group United Baloch Army, though Interior Ministry rejected this claim.

Federal capital also witnessed 33 security forces actions in which at least 628

suspects were arrested. Most of such arrests were made in the wake of district courts attack

and vegetable market attacks. In addition, security forces also kept vigilance and arrested

many suspects including Afghan nationals in the wake of threats of militants’ reaction to

military operations in FATA.

Azad Jammu & Kashmir

Autonomous region of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) remained the only region

where no militant activity or any counter-insurgency operation was noticed suggesting that

the area was the most peaceful of all the remaining parts of the State.

Figure 34: District Map of Pakistan



i

“Hakimullah Mehsud drone strike: 'Death of peace efforts'”, BBC World, 2 November 2013.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24787637 ii “No more drone strikes during Taliban talks, US assures Pakistan”, The Dawn, 20 November 2014.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1057411 iii

Nawaz forms 4-member committee for peace talks with TTP,

http://tribune.com.pk/story/664867/nawaz-forms-4-member-committee-for-peace-talks-with-ttp/ iv

“Taliban nominate Imran, Sami among others to mediate peace talks”, the Dawn, 2 February 2014.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1084259 v

“10-member Taliban panel to oversee talks”, the News, 3 February 2014.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28333-10-member-Taliban-panel-to-oversee-talks vi

“Govt, TTP negotiators chart roadmap for peace talks”, the Dawn, 6 February 2014.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1085278 vii

“Taliban claim killing 23 FC soldiers in custody”, the Dawn, 17 February 2014.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1087438 viii

“Taliban announce ceasefire for a month”, Tribune, 1 March 2014.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/677634/taliban-announce-ceasefire-for-a-month/ ix “Twin suicide attack in Islamabad district court leaves 11 dead, 25 injured”, Tribune, 3 March 2014.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/678286/firing-ensues-in-district-court-in-islamabad/ x

“Govt forms new committee to hold talks with Taliban”, Dunya News, 12 March 2014.

http://dunyanews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/215106-Govt-forms-new-committee-to-hold-talks-with-Taliba xi “TTP decides not to extend ceasefire”, the Dawn, 16 April 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1100293

xii “TTP claims attack on Karachi airport”, the Dawn, 9 June 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1111397

xiii “Finally, Taliban split into factions”, Daily Times, 29 May 2014.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/29-May-2014/finally-taliban-split-into-factions xiv

“TTP suffers a split-up following the formation of Jamaatul Ahrar”, the Nation, 26 August 2014.

http://nation.com.pk/national/26-Aug-2014/ttp-suffers-a-split-up-following-the-formation-of-jamaatul-ahrar xv

“Watershed event: Punjabi Taliban renounce violence”, Tribune, 14 September 2014.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/762038/watershed-event-punjabi-taliban-renounce-violence/ xvi

“Six top TTP commanders announce allegiance to Islamic State's Baghdadi”, the Dawn, 14 October 2014.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1137908 xvii

“TTP splinter group vows allegiance to Islamic State”, The Nation, 18 November 2014.

http://nation.com.pk/national/18-Nov-2014/ttp-splinter-group-vows-allegiance-to-islamic-state xviii

“India committed 243 ceasefire violations last year, NA told”, the Nation, 13 January 2015.

http://nation.com.pk/national/13-Jan-2015/india-committed-243-ceasefire-violations-last-year-na-told

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24787637

http://www.dawn.com/news/1057411

http://tribune.com.pk/story/664867/nawaz-forms-4-member-committee-for-peace-talks-with-ttp/


http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28333-10-member-Taliban-panel-to-oversee-talks



http://tribune.com.pk/story/677634/taliban-announce-ceasefire-for-a-month/

http://tribune.com.pk/story/678286/firing-ensues-in-district-court-in-islamabad/

http://dunyanews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/215106-Govt-forms-new-committee-to-hold-talks-with-Taliba



http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/29-May-2014/finally-taliban-split-into-factions

http://nation.com.pk/national/26-Aug-2014/ttp-suffers-a-split-up-following-the-formation-of-jamaatul-ahrar

http://tribune.com.pk/story/762038/watershed-event-punjabi-taliban-renounce-violence/


http://nation.com.pk/national/18-Nov-2014/ttp-splinter-group-vows-allegiance-to-islamic-state

http://nation.com.pk/national/13-Jan-2015/india-committed-243-ceasefire-violations-last-year-na-told

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