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Annual Security Assessment Report 2015

Pak Institute for Conflict and Security Studies © All Rights Reserved



Acknowledgement

.

The credit for conducting research and preparing this Annual Security Assessment

Report 2015 goes to tireless efforts of the entire Research and Publication team of Pakistan

Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) including Mr. Abdullah Khan (Managing

Director/ Security Analyst), Ms. Reema Asim (PRO & Research Assistant) Mr Arfa Mehmood

(Research Assistant), Ms. Haleema Amin (Research Assistant), Mr. Muhammad Ishaq

(Research Assistant), and Mr Muhammad Rafiq (Internee).

Special thanks to Senator (r) Akaram Zaki, Chairman PICSS, for his kind supervision

and guidance throughout the preparation of this report.

Gul Dad

(Director Research & Publications)



Table of Contents

1 Sources, Methodology and Working of PICSS ......................................................................................... 1

1.1 Sources: .......................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Methodology: ................................................................................................................................. 1

1.2.1 Violent Militant Activities ........................................................................................................... 1

1.2.2 Security Forces Actions .............................................................................................................. 2

1.3 Focus: ............................................................................................................................................. 2

1.4 Defining anti-state violence: .......................................................................................................... 2

1.4.1 Target: ........................................................................................................................................ 2

1.4.2 Perpetrator: ................................................................................................................................ 3

1.4.3 Circumstances: ........................................................................................................................... 3

1.4.4 No Doubtful Entry: ..................................................................................................................... 3

2 Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 4

3 Overall Security Situation/ National Security Profile .............................................................................. 7

3.1 Countrywide Militant Attacks ......................................................................................................... 9

3.1.1 Type of Militant Attacks and their Impact ................................................................................13

3.1.2 IED Based Attacks .....................................................................................................................14

3.1.3 Suicide Attacks .........................................................................................................................16

3.1.4 Militants Physical Assault .........................................................................................................17

3.1.5 Target Killings ...........................................................................................................................17

3.2 Nationwide Security Forces Actions .............................................................................................18

4 Provincial Security Profile .....................................................................................................................21

4.1 Security Situation in Balochistan ..................................................................................................21

4.2 Security Situation in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) ...............................................24

4.3 Security Situation in Khyber Pakhtoonkha (KPK)..........................................................................26

4.4 Security Situation in Sindh ...........................................................................................................29

4.5 Security Situation in Punjab .........................................................................................................32

4.6 Security Situation in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) .....................................................................................35

4.7 Security Situation in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) .................................................................35

4.8 Security Situation in Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) ...................................................................35

5 Significant Security/Political Developments .........................................................................................36

5.1 Daesh/ ISIS in Af-Pak Region ........................................................................................................36

5.1.1 Emergence ...............................................................................................................................36



5.1.2 Levels of Associations with IS in Af-Pak Region........................................................................36

5.1.3 First Category ...........................................................................................................................37

5.1.4 Second Category ......................................................................................................................38

5.1.5 Third Category ..........................................................................................................................38

5.1.6 Groups Playing the Middle .......................................................................................................39

5.1.7 Sunni Sectarian Outfits .............................................................................................................39

5.1.8 Challenge to Afghan Taliban .....................................................................................................39

5.1.9 Setbacks to DAESH in the region ..............................................................................................40

6 Militant Groups Operating in/from Pakistan.........................................................................................42

6.1 Anti-Pakistan with Global Ambitions and Connections ................................................................42

6.1.1 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): ............................................................................................42

6.1.2 Al-Qaeda ..................................................................................................................................43

6.1.3 DAESH or Islamic State .............................................................................................................43

6.1.4 East Turkistan Islamic Movement: ...........................................................................................44

6.1.5 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: ............................................................................................44

6.2 Anti-State religious groups with local focus .................................................................................44

6.2.1 Lashkar-e-Islam: .......................................................................................................................44

6.2.2 Toheed wal Jihad ......................................................................................................................45

6.2.3 Lashkar-e-Khurasan ..................................................................................................................45

6.2.4 Ahrar-ul-Hind: ..........................................................................................................................45

6.3 Militant Groups based in FATA having objectives in Afghanistan, ................................................45

6.3.1 Haqqani Network: ....................................................................................................................45

6.3.2 Hafiz Gul Bahdur Group: ..........................................................................................................46

6.3.3 Mullah Nazir Group ..................................................................................................................46

6.4 India-Focused Groups...................................................................................................................46

6.4.1 Indigenous Kashmiri Groups ....................................................................................................47

6.4.2 Pakistan-Based groups fighting in Kashmir ..............................................................................47

6.5 Sectarian Militant Groups ............................................................................................................49

6.6 Secular Anti-State Groups ............................................................................................................50

6.7 Political Militant Groups ...............................................................................................................52

6.8 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Present Status and Security Challenges ...............................52

7 Pakistan’s Regional and International Relations ...................................................................................56

7.1 Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations and Afghan Reconciliation Process ............................................56

7.2 India- Pakistan Relations and Dialogue Process ...........................................................................59



7.3 Pakistan-Saudi Relations and Pakistan’s Approach to Issues in ME .............................................61

8 Year 2016: Trends and Challenges ........................................................................................................63

List of Tables

Table 1: Overall violent incidents of the year 2015 ......................................................................................... 9

Table 2: Provincial Distribution of Militant Attacks in 2015 ..........................................................................12

Table 3: Break up of Type of Attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries (2015) .................................................14

Table 4: Geographical distribution of IED attacks (2015) ..............................................................................15

Table 5: Geographical distribution of Suicide Attacks (2015) .......................................................................16

Table 6: Geographical distribution of Militants Physical Assaults (2015) .....................................................17

Table 7: Geographical distribution of Incidents of Target Killings (2015)......................................................18

Table 8: Geographical distribution of SFAs (2015) ........................................................................................20

Table 9: Monthly break up of militant Attacks in Balochistan .......................................................................22

Table 10: Type of Attacks in Balochistan (2015) ............................................................................................23

Table 11: Monthly break-up of militant attacks in FATA ................................................................................26

Table 12: Type of Attacks in FATA ..................................................................................................................26

Table 13: Monthly break up of militant attacks in KPK and their human impact .........................................29

Table 14: Type of militant attacks in KPK and their human impact ...............................................................29

Table 15: Monthly break up of militant attacks in Sindh and their human impact .......................................31

Table 16: Type of militant attacks in Sindh and their human impact ............................................................32

Table 17: Monthly break up of militant attacks in Punjab and their human impact (2015) .........................34

Table 18: Type of militant attacks in Punjab and their human impact (2015) ..............................................35

List of Figures

Figure 1: Death and injuries in 2015 - Monthly Graph.................................................................................... 7

Figure 2: Regional distribution of overall incidents ........................................................................................ 8

Figure 3: Overall violent incidents and resultant deaths/ injuries since 2008 ................................................ 9

Figure 4: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks and resultant deaths since 2008 .......................................10

Figure 5: Monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2015 ...........................................................................11

Figure 6: Categories of deaths in Militant Attacks in 2015 ...........................................................................12

Figure 7: Geographical distribution of Militant Attacks (2015) .....................................................................13

Figure 8: Geographical distribution of deaths resulting from Militant Attacks (2015) .................................13

Figure 9: Percentage share of Type of Militant Attacks (2015) .....................................................................14

Figure 10: Monthly Comparison of IED based Attacks (2015) ......................................................................15

Figure 11: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact since 9/11 ....................21

Figure 11: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact (2015) .......................23

Figure 13: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and resultant deaths & Injuries ..........................24

Figure 14: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and their impact (2015) ..................................25

Figure 15: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in KPK ...............................................................................27

Figure 16: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in KPK (2015) ...............................................................28



Figure 17: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in Sindh ............................................................................30

Figure 18: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in Sindh (2015) ............................................................31

Figure 19: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in Punjab ..........................................................................33

Figure 20: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in Punjab (2015) ..........................................................33



List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AJK Azad Jammu & Kashmir

Arst Arrested by Security Forces

C Civilian

CBA Cross Border Attack

FATA Federally Administrated Tribal Areas

FC Frontier Corps

GB Gilgit-Baltistan

GrA Grenade Attack

IED Improvised Explosive Device or Handmade bombs

ICT Islamabad Capital Territory

IS, ISIS Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations

JuD Jamat-ud-Dawa

KP, KPK Khyber Pakhtoonkha

K Kidnapping

KK Kidnapping and Killing

Kdnp Kidnappings by Militants

LeI Lashker-e-Islam

LeJ Lashker-e-Jhangvi

LOC Line of Control

M Militant

MA Militants’ (Physical) Assault

MAs Militant Attacks

MC Militant Clash

MrS Mortar Shelling

NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority

NAP National Action Plan

Nos Number of Incidents

PAF Pakistan Air Force

PGR, RZ, R Razakar (Pro government tribal militias)

RA Rocket Attack

SFAs Security Forces Actions

SFP Security Forces Personnel

SA Suicide Attack

TK Targeted Killing

TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban

TTP JA Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamatul Ahrar

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e | 1


1 Sources, Methodology and Working of PICSS

1.1 Sources:

Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), an Islamabad based think

tank, collects information from all available sources and makes an utmost effort to record

each and every violent incident available from reliable and quotable sources. PICSS uses

following sources:

1. Open Sources e.g. newspapers, TV Channels, news websites, Inter Services

Public Relations (ISPR), government websites, militant websites, forums and

their social media accounts;

2. Government offices, e.g. ministry of interior, police, ministry of health, etc.;

3. Own correspondents: PICSS employed own network of two types of

correspondents:

a. PICSS own correspondents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Federally

Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan.

b. Volunteer's network: Local journalists and volunteers contribute

voluntarily in reporting violent incidents and other militancy related

developments.

1.2 Methodology:

PICSS corroborates every incident from as many sources as possible to make sure the

information recorded in the database is correct to the best possible level. Database is

continuously reviewed and updated. Incidents are recorded mainly in two categories.

1.2.1 Violent Militant Activities

a. Militant Attacks against government, public, or private targets. These

targets can be against life or property e.g. government installations

such as gas pipe lines, electricity transmission lines, etc.

b. Militant clashes among different militant groups



1.2.2 Security Forces Actions

a. Violent responses in which arms/weapons are used

b. None-violent responses such as arrests without using/firing weapons

and defusing bombs etc.

Drone strikes are recorded in separate database. Statistics of drone strikes are not

mixed with other incidents related to anti-state violence.

1.3 Focus:

PICSS is focused on anti-state violence and related response. Sectarian violence,

general crimes, ethnic or linguistic based violence are not recorded. However, there is

overlapping trend related to actions of certain sectarian groups who were previously

involved only in sectarian violence but now have nexus with anti-state armed groups thus,

PICSS tries to record those violent incidents of such groups which have connection of

anti-state intentions. Sectarian violence has different dynamics and requires separate

analysis.

1.4 Defining anti-state violence:

Following factors are considered in deciding whether an incident is anti-state or not.

1.4.1 Target:

a. Generally target of a violent militant activity helps to define the nature of

attack. Activities in which government installation are targeted are considered

anti-state.

b. Attack against on-duty uniformed personnel of security forces are recorded as

anti-state militant activities.

c. Attacks against a group of government officials where circumstances show

that target was not an individual official but government functioning was

targeted are also recorded as anti-state.

d. Attacks against individual officials whether in uniform or part of civil

government is evaluated from different aspects. Only being a member of



government or military is not enough to determine whether the aim was to

target state or it was due to personal enmity. In such cases perpetrators and

other circumstances are used to determine the nature of the attack.

1.4.2 Perpetrator:

a. If an activity is perpetrated by known militant groups fighting against state

such as Al-Qaeda, TTP, BLA, etc. is recorded as anti-state activity.

b. In case a sectarian militant group perpetrates a violent act then it is

determined from the nature of target. If the target was of sectarian nature

only then it is not recorded in anti-state database.

c. If perpetrator is not known then nature of the target is used to determine

whether it is anti-State or general crime.

1.4.3 Circumstances:

Sometimes target of the violent activity and perpetrator both remain unclear then

nature of the incident is determined based on the circumstances of the incidents. For

example, a blast occurs at a place where no one is targeted and apparently it is not known

who carried out the blast. There are possibilities that militants were transporting some

explosives which could detonate accidently. This will be anti-state activity. However, it is also

possible that criminals other than militants were transporting the explosives and it got

detonated. In such cases police investigations and different dimensions of the incident are

kept in view to determine the exact nature of the incident. This type of situation arises rarely

during the data collection operations thus, it is least likely that an error can influence overall

pattern of violence.

1.4.4 No Doubtful Entry:

PICSS researchers use this principle while recording violent incidents "when there is a

doubt, cut it out'. Only those incidents are recorded in the database where PICSS has no

doubt about the nature of incident being related to anti-State violence.



2 Overview

Following two watershed incidents in 2014 including attack on Karachi Airport in June

and Army Public School Peshawar in December, the government responded by initiating

operation Zarb-e-Azb and devising National Action Plan to fight militancy, respectively. While

the former had been mainly use of kinetic force, the latter contained broad based measures

including use of power and other elements that the political and military leadership

contemplated to be mandatory for ending militancy in the country. As was projected in

Annual Security Assessment Report 2014, the measures adopted under the National Action

Plan would help reduction in violence in the country but total elimination of it would not be

possible. Year 2015 proved exactly as was projected by PICSS.

Notwithstanding some sporadic incident of violence including some high profile

attacks, year 2015 witnessed a substantial decrease in militant attacks and resultant deaths/

injuries and the year proved to be a much better in terms of security situation in Pakistan

when compared with previous year(s). This year, anti-state violence reached to the minimum

level than previous years and was almost equivalent to the average attacks of year 2008.

Security situation improved in KPK while Baluchistan witnessed most number of anti-state

violent activities than rest of provinces. The year witnessed 56 percent decline in militant

attacks than year 2014, while there was 48 percent decline in resultant deaths and 57

percent reduction in injured persons.

In 2015, there were 1901 overall incidents of anti-state violence by militants and

counter-insurgency operations by the state in which 3368 people were killed including 2312

militants, 641 civilians, 382 security forces personnel and 33 pro-government Razakars while

1774 others were injured including 994 civilians, 516 security forces personnel, 250 militants,

and 14 pro-government Razakars. 6392 suspected militants were arrested by the security

forces while 89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Among the total deaths, almost 69

percent were militants, more than 19 percent civilians, more than 11 percent security forces

personnel and almost one percent was pro-government Razakars. Among those injured, 56

percent were civilians, 29 percent security forces personnel, 14 percent militants and less



than one percent was pro-government Razakars. In terms of deaths during 2015, militants

were on the receiving end while the civilians were the worst sufferers in terms of injuries.

As compared to year 2014, there has been 33 percent decrease in overall number of

incidents with 37 percent reduction in deaths and 55 percent reduction in overall injuries.

Thus, reduction in violence in 2015 can be attributed to continued military offensive against

militants in tribal areas and country wide intelligence based operations (IBOs) that badly

damaged urban networks of the militant outfits. However, continued violence in the country,

albeit of comparatively lessor scale, suggests that militants are yet to be completely

neutralized and they are able to plan and execute attacks intermittently.

Substantial reduction in militant attacks and resultant deaths as well as injuries

across the country was observed in 2015 as compared to previous year. In 2015, as many as

706 militant attacks were observed in which 1325 people were killed including 619 civilians,

348 SFPs, 33 PGRs, and 325 militants while 1464 others were injured including 988 civilians,

417 SFPs, 14 PGRs, and 45 militants. 89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Thus, there

has been almost 56 percent reduction in militant attacks across the country with 48 percent

reduction in deaths and 58 percent reduction in injuries as compared to the previous year.

The highest number of militant attacks (40 percent of total) was recorded from Balochistan

while the highest number of deaths and injuries in militant attacks were reported from FATA.

While the military continued its offensive in 2015 in North Waziristan under the

operation Zarb-e-Azb and in Khyber Agency under operation Khyber-I, it entered into second

phase of operation in Khyber Agency code named Khyber-II wherein it targeted militants in

Tirah Valley and areas adjoining Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While majority of area in North

Waziristan had been cleared of the militants except some pockets in Shawal Valley, it made

notable success in Khyber Agency and got control of some strategic passes from where

militants were believed to be making their to and fro movement into Afghanistan. In

addition to military operations in FATA, security forces focused on intelligence based

operations across the country to keep a check on militants to carry out their attacks in

settled areas and establish sleeper cells.

Security forces conducted as many as 1195 actions/ operations across the country in

which 2043 people were killed including 1987 militants, 22 civilians and 34 SFPs while 310



others were injured including 205 militants, 99 SFPs and six civilians. At least 6349 suspects

were arrested. Almost 33 percent of these security forces actions were reported from

Balochistan where forces conducted in which 290 people were killed including 277

suspected militants and 13 SFPs while 42 others were injured including 24 SFPs and 18

militants. At least 250 security forces actions were conducted in KPK where 52 people were

killed in these operations including 38 suspected militants, eight SFPs and six civilians while

21 others were injured including 16 SFPs, four civilians and one SFP. At least 1925 suspects

were arrested in the province. Most of the killings and injuries resulting from security forces

actions were reported from FATA where at least 1410 people were killed including 1389

suspected militants, 11 civilians and 10 SFPs while 196 others were injured including 186

militants, eight SFPs and two civilians. 325 suspected militants were arrested in FATA. In

Sindh, forces conducted as many as 218 operations in which 231 people were killed

including 228 suspected militants, two civilians and one SFP while 30 SFPs were injured in

these operations. 653 suspected militants were arrested in Sindh. In Punjab, forces

conducted 128 operations killing 38 suspected militants while eight civilians and eight SFPs

were also killed. 769 suspects were arrested in Punjab.

One of the most worrying trend of the year was increasing footprints of Daesh/ ISIS

particularly in urban areas with increasing threat of educated, well-off youth (both men and

women) being attracted to Daesh. Although there is no organized presence of the militant

outfit but there are elements who have either joined the ISIS or having sympathies with

ultra-violent Middle Eastern group.



3 Overall Security Situation/ National Security Profile

The year 2015 witnessed substantial improvement in security situation across the

country as compared to past few years. There were 1901 overall incidents of anti-state

violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the state in which 3368 people

were killed including 2312 militants, 641 civilians, 382 security forces personnel and 33

pro-government Razakars while 1774 others were injured including 994 civilians, 516

security forces personnel, 250 militants, and 14 pro-government Razakars. 6392 suspected

militants, their handlers, and supporters were arrested by the security forces while 89

people were kidnapped by the militants. Among the total deaths, almost 69 percent were

militants, more than 19 percent civilians, more than 11 percent security forces personnel

and almost one percent was pro-government Razakars. Among those injured 56 percent

were civilians, 29 percent security forces personnel, 14 percent militants and less than one

percent was pro-government Razakars. In terms of deaths during 2015, militants were on

the receiving end while the civilians were the worst sufferers in terms of injuries. Monthly

graph of deaths and injuries is given in Figure-1 while provincial/regional distribution of

overall incidents and break up of overall incidents (SFAs and MAs) is given in Figure-2 and

Table-1, respectively.

Figure 1: Death and injuries in 2015 - Monthly Graph

Source: PICSS Militancy Database

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Deaths Injuries



Figure 2: Regional distribution of overall incidents


As compared to year 2014, there has been 33 percent decrease in overall number of

incidents with 37 percent reduction in deaths (with 41 percent decrease in SFPs killings, 59

percent decrease in killing of Razakars, 32 percent decrease in militants deaths, and 48

percent reduction in civilian deaths) and 55 percent reduction in overall injuries (with 42, 77,

51 and 60 percent reduction of injuries caused to SFPs, Razakars, militants and civilians,

respectively). Since overall figures contain deaths/injuries resulting from both, security

forces actions and militant attacks, this data will not be used for regional/ provincial analysis

of security situation. Instead, militant activities in each region/ province will provide the

basis for assessing security situation in those areas, which is covered in depth in the Section

“Provincial Security Profile”.

Although the number of incidents might be higher yet the number of causalities and

injuries has returned to the status that of 2008 when new era of militancy started after Lal

Masjid Operation in 2007. As it was projected in PICSS Annual Security Assessment Report

2014, military actions and measures adopted under National Action Plan post-APS attack,

security situation in the country would improve but the militant activities would not

completely diminish as the measures adopted were more focused on eliminating militants

instead of militancy since the measures adopted mostly fell in the domain of hard measures.

Thus, this reduction in violence in 2015 can be attributed to continued military offensive

Balochistan 36%

FATA 18%

KPK 21%

ICT 1%

GB 0%

Punjab 8%

Sindh 16%



against militants in tribal areas and country wide intelligence based operations (IBOs) that

badly damaged urban networks of the militant outfits. However, continued violence in the

country, albeit of comparatively lessor scale, suggests that militants are yet to be completely

neutralized and they are able to plan and execute attacks intermittently.

Table 1: Overall violent incidents of the year 2015

Category Nos Deaths Injuries

Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

SFAs 1195 34 0 1987 22 2043 99 0 205 6 310 6349 0

MAs 706 348 33 325 619 1325 417 14 45 988 1464 43 89

Total 1901 382 33 2312 641 3368 516 14 250 994 1774 6392 89


Figure 3: Overall violent incidents and resultant deaths/ injuries since 2008


3.1 Countrywide Militant Attacks

Substantial reduction in militant attacks and resultant deaths as well as injuries

across the country was observed in 2015 as compared to previous year. In 2015, as many as

706 militant attacks were observed in which 1325 people were killed including 619 civilians,

348 SFPs, 33 PGRs, and 325 militants while 1464 others were injured including 988 civilians,

417 SFPs, 14 PGRs, and 45 militants. 43 militants were arrested during militant attacks while

89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Thus, there has been almost 56 percent

reduction in militant attacks across the country with 48 percent reduction in deaths (41, 59,

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

Nos Deaths Injuries

Year-2008 Year-2009 Year-2010 Year-2011




53, 48 percent reduction in deaths of SFPs, PGRs, militants and civilians, respectively) and 58

percent reduction in injuries (46, 77, 77 and 60 percent reduction in deaths of SFPs, PGRs,

militants and civilians, respectively) as compared to the previous year. Figure-4 shows a

comparison of militant attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries since 2008. As the figure shows,

militant attacks have gone to the level of the year 2008 (even less than that) and number of

deaths and injuries far less than the year 2008 suggesting that this heightened phase of

militancy started after Lal Masjid Operation has ended.

Figure 4: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks and resultant deaths since 2008


Militant activities and resultant deaths witnessed a continuous pattern of variations

(as reflected in Figure-5) but these variations were comparatively much smaller than the

previous year. Strong military tactics in the form of operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Wazriistan

and operation Khyber-I in Khyber Agency as well as measures adopted under National Action

Plan devised after APS tragedy brought about a substantial change in security situation in

the country as the militants found it expedient to go into hide to protect themselves.

Resultantly, reduction in militant attacks was observed. Moreover, in March 2015, military

also started operation Khyber-II in the pockets of Khyber Agency which were earlier not

covered in operation Khyber-I. Operations in Khyber Agency in particular improved security

situation in the adjoining settled areas of KPK as majority of militants operating in Khyber

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

Nos Deaths Injuries





Agency found it safer to sneak into Afghanistan as the security forces shown constant vigil

and were proactive in intelligence based operations in all parts of the country. These military

operations in Khyber Agency particularly targeted militants affiliated with TTP, TTP Jamatul

Ahrar and Lashker-e-Islam. Due to these factors, militant activities in the country were

constantly decreasing till April but witnessed a sudden increase in May 2015 as TTP, TTP

Jamatul Ahrar and Lashker-e-Islam formed an alliance to fight collectively with the State

machinery. In May, Pakistan openly blamed Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and

Analysis Wing) for supporting anti-Pakistan elements in carrying out attacks in FATA/ KPK,

Balochistan and Karachi. In this regard, statements were issued by the Pakistan Army,

Defence Minister and Foreign Secretary. Around May, Daesh/ Islamic State also came into

play and local militants got inspiration from the Middle Eastern group who had shown its

presence in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces bordering with Pakistan. The leadership of local

militant outfits who was hiding in Afghanistan also developed understanding with Daesh,

which provided both of them protection and breathing space. In subsequent months,

militant attacks in Pakistan hovered around 50 attacks (on average) suggesting that hard

measures adopted by the state attained their maximum utility.

Figure 5: Monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2015


As reflected in Figure-6, civilian casualties formed 47 percent of total deaths, while

casualties of militants, security forces personnel and pro-government razakars stood at 25,

0

50

100

150

200

250

Nos Deaths Injuries



26 and two percent, respectively. This percentage is not different from that of 2014 when

civilians’ deaths resulting from militant attacks stood exactly the same (47 percent) while

militants, security forces personnel and pro-government razakars were killed at the

percentage of 27, 23 and three, respectively.

Figure 6: Categories of deaths in Militant Attacks in 2015


The highest number of militant attacks (40 percent of total) was recorded from

Balochistan while the highest number of deaths and injuries in militant attacks were

reported from FATA as shown in Table-2 and Figures 7 & 8. This shows that militant attacks in

FATA were comparatively more lethal as compared to attacks in Balochistan.

Table 2: Provincial Distribution of Militant Attacks in 2015

Province Nos Killed Injured


Balochistan 280 95 1 57 202 355 112 1 3 217 333 14 52

FATA 170 108 29 183 76 396 161 11 39 220 431 20 35

GB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ICT 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0

KPK 139 84 3 34 103 224 103 2 1 147 253 6 0

Punjab 25 7 0 34 69 110 11 0 0 232 243 0 0

Sindh 89 54 0 17 169 240 30 0 2 171 203 3 2

Total 706 348 33 325 619 1325 417 14 45 988 1464 43 89


Security forces

personnel 26%

Razakar 2%

Militants 25%

Civilians 47%



Figure 7: Geographical distribution of Militant Attacks (2015)


Figure 8: Geographical distribution of deaths resulting from Militant Attacks (2015)


3.1.1 Type of Militant Attacks and their Impact

A detailed break-up of various types of attacks and their impact is given in Table-3. As

reflected in Figure-9, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) based attacks were highest in

number with a share of 38 percent in total attacks. These 267 IED based attacks caused 268

deaths and 671 injuries. Highest number of deaths resulted from suicide attacks which

caused 252 casualties and 436 injuries. Militants’ physical assaults and target killings were

other notable types of militant attacks. A detailed analysis of major type of attacks is given

following sub-sections.

Balochistan 27%

FATA 30%

GB 0% ICT 0%

KPK 17%

Punjab 8%

Sindh 18%

Balochistan 40%

FATA 24%

GB 0%

ICT 0%

KPK 20%

Punjab 3%

Sindh 13%



Table 3: Break up of Type of Attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries (2015)

Type Nos Killed Injured


GrA 31 1 0 1 7 9 6 0 0 34 40 7 0

IED 267 78 16 43 131 268 219 11 8 433 671 17 0

K 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71

KK 15 4 11 1 53 69 0 0 0 1 1 0 8

MA 180 177 3 213 89 482 153 1 17 52 223 10 10

MC 4 0 0 28 0 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

RA 31 8 0 12 2 22 17 0 12 11 40 0 0

SA 18 21 0 27 204 252 10 0 7 419 436 1 0

TK 143 59 3 0 133 195 12 2 0 30 44 8 0

Total 706 348 33 325 619 1325 417 14 45 980 1456 43 89


Figure 9: Percentage share of Type of Militant Attacks (2015)


3.1.2 IED Based Attacks

As reflected in Figure-9, IED based attacks formed 38 percent of total militant attacks

during 2015 and these attacks caused more injuries than compared to any other type of

attacks. The number of people killed in IED attacks was 268 people including 131 civilians, 78

SFPs, 43 militants and 16 PGRs while the number of those injured was 671 with more than

2/3 of them being civilians (433 people), 219 SFPs, 11 PGRs and eight militants. As compared

to previous year, there has been much reduction in IED based attacks but the percentage of

these attacks out of total incidents were exactly the same (38 percent). As shown in Table-4,

highest number of IED based attacks were observed in Balochistan but the number of

GrA 4%

IED 38%

K 2%

KK 2%

MA 26%

MC 1%

RA 4%

SA 3%

TK 20%



casualties and injuries resulting from such IED attacks were higher in FATA suggesting that

militants operating in FATA are more capable of acquiring/producing good quality of

explosive and required devices as well as planting them where more destruction was

possible than militants operating in Balochistan. Despite military claims that it has destroyed

militants’ infrastructure (including IED factories) in North Waziristan from where most of the

militant attacks in other parts of the country were originated, the continued IED based

attacks suggest that militants still have access to explosive material and that such “resources”

could not be completely dried out. However, Figure-10 depicts that reduction has been

witnessed when IED based attacks are monitored on monthly horizon suggesting that

military offensive in North Waziristan and Khyber Agency did impact occurring of such type

of attacks.

Table 4: Geographical distribution of IED attacks (2015)



Balochistan 117 14 1 8 48 71 61 1 0 150 212 0 0

FATA 95 58 15 31 55 159 113 10 5 145 273 16 0

KPK 37 4 0 2 12 18 33 0 1 16 50 1 0

Punjab 2 0 0 2 10 12 0 0 0 77 77 0 0

Sindh 16 2 0 0 6 8 12 0 2 45 59 0 0

Total 267 78 16 43 131 268 219 11 8 433 671 17 0


Figure 10: Monthly Comparison of IED based Attacks (2015)


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Nos Deaths Injuries



3.1.3 Suicide Attacks

During 2015, a 40 percent reduction in suicide attacks was observed as 18 suicide

attacks were observed across the country in 2015 as compared to 30 recorded in the

previous year. As reflected in Table-5, the highest number of suicide attacks were observed

in Punjab, which is quite contrary to previous pattern of militants’ suicide attacks as such

attacks were more rampant in FATA/ KPK region but increase in suicide attacks suggests that

militants have tried to open up new avenues of their militant activities. Most notable suicide

attacks in Punjab included attacks of sectarian nature when, in two separate incidents,

Imambargahs (mosques) of Shia Muslim community were targeted in Rawalpindi, attack on

Christian Churches in Lahore, attack on Punjab Home Minister Col. (r). Shuja Khanzada killing

him in his home town Attock, an attack on political office of PML-N parliamentarian in DG

Khan, and attack on Police Headquarters in Lahore. Other notable suicide attacks in other

parts of the country included suicide attack on Imambargah in Shikarpur (Sindh), suicide

attack in Peshawar targeting another Imambargah, suicide attack on the convey of Qaumi

Watan Party Chief Aftab Ahmed Sherpao in Charsadda (KPK), suicide attack targeting Deputy

Commandant of Frontier Reserve Police in Peshawar, suicide attack targeting the office of

political administration in Jamrud (Khyber Agency), suicide attack targeting Shia Muslim

community in Kacchi (formerly known as Bolan) district of Balochistan, and suicide attack

targeting Shia Muslims in Jacobabad (Sindh). Out of total 18 suicide attacks, seven were

targeted against Shia Muslim community in different parts of the country suggesting the

secretion violence was on the increase in 2015 when overall violent militant activities were

decreasing.

Table 5: Geographical distribution of Suicide Attacks (2015)

Region Nos Killed Injured


Balochistan 2 1 0 0 12 13 0 0 0 21 21 0 0

FATA 2 10 0 19 2 31 3 0 7 56 66 1 0

KPK 4 3 0 0 46 49 6 0 0 108 114 0 0

Punjab 7 5 0 7 57 69 0 0 0 148 148 0 0

Sindh 3 2 0 1 87 90 1 0 0 86 87 0 0

Total 18 21 0 27 204 252 10 0 7 419 436 1 0




3.1.4 Militants Physical Assault

During the year, 180 incidents of militants physical assault were monitored in which

482 people were killed and 223 others injured. Militants’ physical assaults constituted 26

percent of total militant attacks during the year. The highest number of such attacks were

monitored in Balochistan (See Table-6 for provincial breakup), followed by FATA and KPK.

This type of attacks holds significance since militants, mostly in groups, carry out such

attacks with higher probability of being killed in retaliation by the forces but also signify the

confidence of the militants and their ability to mobilise armed fighters. Considering the risks

attached to such attacks, sometime such attacks are carried out in sheer frustration when

militants find it difficult to carry out other type of attacks. In addition to these factors, such

attacks also signify the fragile law and order situation as approaching target with guns and

ammunition could never be easy in majority of the cases. The highest number of such

attacks in Balochistan clearly suggests that the province is still lacking effective policing and

security forces are not fully able to control large swath of area.

Table 6: Geographical distribution of Militants Physical Assaults (2015)



Balochistan 63 54 0 29 17 100 45 0 3 21 69 9 0

FATA 44 39 3 114 5 161 34 1 14 12 61 0 10

GB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

KPK 42 52 0 31 20 103 54 0 0 13 67 1 0

Punjab 7 0 0 24 0 24 8 0 0 2 10 0 0

Sindh 23 32 0 15 47 94 12 0 0 4 16 0 0

Total 180 177 3 213 89 482 153 1 17 52 223 10 10


3.1.5 Target Killings

During 2015, as many as 143 incidents of targeted killings were reported in which

195 people were killed including 133 civilians, 35 SFPs and 18 PGRs while 44 others were

injured including 30 civilians, 12 SFPs and two PGRs. Balochistan, where law and order

situation remained less than the ideal despite considerable improvement, witnessed highest

number of incidents of target killings followed by KPK and Sindh. Table-7 provides a detailed



breakup of the incidents of target killing across the country. Although target killings provide

a better option for militants, particularly when spaces for militants to engage in other major

type of attacks are squeezed. As compared to previous year, there has been more than 48

percent reduction in such type of attacks with more than 50 percent reduction in resultant

deaths. In Sindh, there has been almost 60 percent reduction in incident of target killings

courtesy Rangers led Karachi operation in the metropolitan. In 2015, a new style of target

killing of security forces personnel was introduced by the militants in KPK and Karachi. They

use to target small number of security forces personnel usually one or two, mostly from

police or traffic police with sharp shooting from close range. Such attacks took place against

Rangers, Military Police, Police and Traffic Police in Karachi, Peshawar, Mardan and Swabi

districts. In almost all cases, militants fled away from scenes undetected.

Table 7: Geographical distribution of Incidents of Target Killings (2015)



Balochistan 51 16 0 0 78 94 2 0 0 14 16 5 0

FATA 9 3 0 0 8 11 0 0 0 1 1 3 0

ICT 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0

KPK 42 20 3 0 19 42 6 2 0 5 13 0 0

Punjab 4 2 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sindh 35 18 0 0 26 44 4 0 0 9 13 0 0

Total 143 59 3 0 133 195 12 2 0 30 44 8 0


3.2 Nationwide Security Forces Actions

While the military continued its offensive in 2015 in North Waziristan under the

operation Zarb-e-Azb and in Khyber Agency under operation Khyber-I, it entered into second

phase of operation in Khyber Agency code named Khyber-II wherein it targeted militants in

Tirah Valley and areas adjoining Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While majority of area in North

Waziristan had been cleared of the militants except some pockets in Shawal Valley, it made

notable success in Khyber Agency and got control of some strategic passes from where

militants were believed to be making their to and fro movement into Afghanistan. In

addition to military operations in FATA, security forces focused on intelligence based

operations across the country to keep a check on militants to carry out their attacks in



settled areas and establish sleeper cells.

As shown in Table-8, security forces conducted as many as 1195 actions/ operations

across the country in which 2043 people were killed including 1987 militants, 22 civilians

and 34 SFPs while 310 others were injured including 205 militants, 99 SFPs and six civilians.

At least 6349 suspected militants, their supporters, handlers and financiers were arrested.

Almost 33 percent of these security forces actions were reported from Balochistan where

forces conducted as many as 399 operations in which 290 people were killed including 277

suspected militants and 13 SFPs while 42 others were injured including 24 SFPs and 18

militants. 2478 suspected militants were arrested by security forces in Balochistan. After

Balochistan, at least 250 security forces actions were conducted in KPK where 52 people

were killed in these operations including 38 suspected militants, eight SFPs and six civilians

while 21 others were injured including 16 SFPs, four civilians and one SFP. At least 1925

suspects were arrested in the province. Most of the killings and injuries resulting from

security forces actions were reported from FATA where at least 1410 people were killed

including 1389 suspected militants, 11 civilians and 10 SFPs while 196 others were injured

including 186 militants, eight SFPs and two civilians. 325 suspected militants were arrested

in FATA. In Sindh, forces conducted as many as 218 operations in which 231 people were

killed including 228 suspected militants, two civilians and one SFP while 30 SFPs were

injured in these operations. 653 suspected militants were arrested in Sindh. In Punjab, forces

conducted 128 operations killing 38 suspected militants while eight civilians and eight SFPs

were also killed. 769 suspects were arrested in Punjab. As reflected in Figure-11, security

forces actions across the country witnessed a consistent pattern with some small variations

across the months. However, deaths, injuries and arrest resulting from these security forces

actions witnessed some variations with comparatively more variations in the latter.

As compared to previous year, security forces not only expanded their operations in

FATA but also tried to consolidate their gains. As reflected in Table-8, security forces did not

shy away from employing encounter policy in various parts of the country particularly in

FATA, KPK, Balochistan and Sindh despite the fact that military courts were established after

amendment in the Constitution. This encounter policy has instilled fear among the militants

and, along with intelligence based operations, badly damaged urban networks of the



militants. Prominent successes among these operations were arrest of Abdul Salam Regi,

who is the top commander of Iran based militant outfit Jaish-el-Adl, and killing of Usman

Saifullah Kurd, who was heading Balochistan chapter of sectarian outfit Lashker-e-Jhangvi

(LeJ). Killing of Kurd is significant development as he managed to escape from a jail in Army

Controlled area in 2008. He was operational head of the LeJ and was involved in various

sectarian killing including attacks on buses carrying Shia pilgrimages in addition to massacre

of Hazara Shia community. Extending this policy, LeJ Chief Malik Ishaq was killed during an

“encounter” in Muzaffargarh along with his two sons and other top leaders of the outfit.

Similarly, Haroon Bhati, another key commander of LeJ who was brought from Dubai

through the help of Interpol was also killed in such an encounter.

Table 8: Geographical distribution of SFAs (2015)

Region Nos Killed Injured Arst Kdnp

SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

Balochistan 399 13 0 277 0 290 24 0 18 0 42 2478 0

FATA 177 10 0 1389 11 1410 8 0 186 2 196 325 0

GB 4 0 0 1 0 1 10 0 0 0 10 11 0

ICT 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 188 0

KPK 250 8 0 38 6 52 16 0 1 4 21 1925 0

Punjab 128 2 0 54 3 59 11 0 0 0 11 769 0

Sindh 218 1 0 228 2 231 30 0 0 0 30 653 0

Total 1195 34 0 1987 22 2043 99 0 205 6 310 6349 0




4 Provincial Security Profile

4.1 Security Situation in Balochistan

Balochistan witnessed the highest number of militant attacks and security forces

actions as compared with other geographical areas/ provinces during the year suggesting

volatility in security situation. However, overall security situation in the province witnessed a

positive change when compared to previous year (See Figure-11). During the year, militant

attacks witnessed visible variations as reflected in Table-9 and Figure-12.

Figure 11: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact since 9/11


Improvement in security situation in Balochistan could be attributed to multiple

factors including behind the scene efforts for engaging angry Baloch leaders including Khan

of Kalat and Brahamdagh Bugti, improved governance of Dr Abdul Malik Baloch as Chief

Minister, announcement of “Pur-Aman Balochistan” Program for insurgents to surrender in

return for financial gains and reintegration, enhanced security measures and conducting of

operations by paramilitary forces/ police, killing/ arrest of some top tier insurgent (including

killing of chief of the Balochistan chapter of outlawed Jaish-ul-Islam Mehmood-ur-Rehman,

arrest of Abdul Salam Regi belonging to Jundullah, etc). In addition to these factors, tussle

between insurgent groups have also weakened them while killing of their leaders by security

forces, surrender of some of the insurgents, etc. created disorientation among the foot

0

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800

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1200

1400

1600

Nos Deaths Injuries



soldiers of the insurgent groups that helped improved security situation the province.

As reflected in Table-9 and Figure-12, militant attacks in the province were higher at

the start of the year as militants from FATA, where military operations were conducted,

started to move into Balochistan and started their militant activities there. However, the

situation witnessed improvement from April onward with some variation May. In

Balochistan, an effort was made to pitch Balochs against Pashtuns when 22 passengers (of

Pashtun origin) were kidnapped and later killed in Mastung district. It was expected that

situation will turn violent across the province with retaliation from Pashtun elements but the

sanity prevailed.

Table 9: Monthly break up of militant Attacks in Balochistan

Month Nos Killed Injured

M Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

January 42 22 1 1 11 35 13 1 0 11 25 0 23

February 43 8 0 3 10 21 18 0 0 22 40 0 17

March 30 17 0 3 16 36 7 0 0 12 19 0 5

April 13 2 0 2 26 30 3 0 1 28 32 0 1

May 34 2 0 1 41 44 18 0 0 33 51 2 3

June 21 11 0 20 13 44 9 0 0 2 11 5 2

July 21 7 0 1 16 24 0 0 1 24 25 0 0

August 13 6 0 5 9 20 12 0 0 6 18 0 1

September 11 2 0 1 12 15 1 0 1 0 2 0 0

October 17 7 0 5 32 44 9 0 0 47 56 0 0

November 19 5 0 5 10 20 7 0 0 26 33 5 0

December 16 6 0 10 6 22 15 0 0 6 21 2 0

Total 280 95 1 57 202 355 112 1 3 217 333 14 52


The province also witnessed militant attacks of sectarian nature including suicide

blast on an Imambargah in remote Bhaag area of Bolan (Kachhi) district killing at least 12

Shia Muslims and injuring 21 others. Militants also attacked leaders of various political

parties in the province in addition to targeting non-settlers as in one incident reported from

Godgan area of Turbat (Kech) district, 20 labourers hailing from Sindh and working on road

projects, were killed by militants. In another incident reported from Loralai district, at least

12 government employees including police SHO were killed after being kidnapped from a

bus. Attack was also observed on ill-fate Rawalpindi bound Jafar Express in Dasht area of



Mastung district killing at least four passengers and injuring 12 others.

Figure 12: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact (2015)


As reflected in Table-10, IED based attacks were highest in the province that caused

more than 2/3rd of total injuries reported from the province while militants physical assaults

were more lethal causing higher average number of deaths and injuries. Similarity, target

killings remained one of the widely used type of attacks. Continuing with the past trend,

rocket attacks were also witnessed including those carried out against military installations

and FWO units working on road/ bridge construction in the province.

Table 10: Type of Attacks in Balochistan (2015)


M Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

GrA 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0

IED 117 14 1 8 48 71 61 1 0 150 212 0 0

K 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44

KK 10 4 0 0 47 51 0 0 0 1 1 0 8

MA 63 54 0 29 17 100 45 0 3 21 69 9 0

MC 1 0 0 20 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

RA 17 6 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 6 10 0 0

SA 2 1 0 0 12 13 0 0 0 21 21 0 0

TK 51 16 0 0 78 94 2 0 0 14 16 5 0


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Nos Deaths Injuries



4.2 Security Situation in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)

Courtesy continued military operations, security situation in FATA has seen a much

positive change in 2015 as number of militant attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries

witnessed a nose dive as compared to previous year(s) as being reflected in Figure-13. The

year 2015 witnessed 170 militant attacks in which 396 people were killed including 183

militants themselves, 108 SFPs, 76 civilians and 29 PGRs. The killing of comparatively less

number of civilians and comparative higher number of SFPs is due to displacement of people

from FATA and overwhelming presence of security forces. The number of militant attacks in

2015 has gone even lower than the years 2007 and 2008 when an upsurge in violence in

FATA was observed after formation of TTP as an umbrella organization and reaction of Lal

Masjid operation in federal capital. Due to on-going military operation Zarb-e-Azb in North

Waziristan and operations Khyber-I and Khyber-II conducted sequentially in Khyber Agency,

a large number of militants were either killed or felt it expedient to disperse into other areas

including settled area of Pakistan, rest of FATA agencies and moved into Afghanistan. Forces

cleared more than 90 percent areas of North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies and operations

are continuing to clear remaining pockets close to Pakistan-Afghanistan border in Shawal

Valley of North Waziristan and Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency.

Figure 13: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and resultant deaths & Injuries


In 2014, when government initiated peace talks with TTP, a fragmentation was

observed in the umbrella organization. However, when military operations were started,

0

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800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

Nos Deaths Injuries



various militant groups and factions came closer to each other. In one such example, TTP,

TTP Jamatul Ahrar and Khyber Agency based Lashker-e-Islam had decided to make a united

front against security forces but the alliance could not bother security forces much though it

had some effect on security situation in the tribal areas as shown in Figure-14 and Table-11.

Sudden increase in violence in FATA in April, after touching the lowest point in March when

Operation Khyber-II was started, could be attributed to this operational alliance between

militant outfits. With the gradual return of Temporary Displaced Persons (TDPs) to their

homes, the situation could get complicated as the state has thus far not been able to

develop necessary political infrastructure and reforms that create vacuum for militants to

operate. One such clear example is South Waziristan where military had conducted an

operation in 2009 and cleared the whole tribal agency but now sporadic incidents of

violence are being reported from the same agency. South Waziristan has also witnessed

revival of militant activities by some groups like Mehsud group led by Khan Said Sajna

though there were reports that Sajna was killed in US drone strike in Afghanistan.

Figure 14: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and their impact (2015)


In terms of type of attacks, IED based attacks and militants physical assaults were the

top selection of militants as shown in Table-12. The use of IEDs in more than 50 percent of

total attacks clearly suggests that militants still have access to explosive material despite

military claims that it has destroyed IED factories and relevant infrastructure in North

Waziristan. One of the most notable militant activity (by the end of the year) was a suicide

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Nos Deaths Injuries



blast in Parachinar (Kurram Agency) in which at least 25 people were killed and 70 others

were injured. Other notable militant activities included suicide attack on political

administration office of Jamrud (Khyber Agency), kidnapping in South Waziristan of 21

Labourer working for Frontier Works Organization (FWO) and kidnapping of 10 labourers in

Kurram Agency.

Table 11: Monthly break-up of militant attacks in FATA


Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

January 24 13 3 21 11 48 12 1 1 18 32 0

February 15 6 3 26 2 37 15 9 1 15 40 0

March 7 3 0 15 1 19 16 0 0 4 20 0

April 19 10 0 13 2 25 12 0 12 19 43 0

May 15 9 8 19 6 42 28 0 8 7 43 0

June 16 17 0 23 7 47 18 0 7 8 33 1

July 13 13 0 25 3 41 18 0 0 3 21 3

August 18 10 0 29 7 46 16 0 0 6 22 0

September 13 7 13 5 4 29 8 0 0 60 68 0

October 10 11 0 0 0 11 7 1 0 1 9 0

November 12 6 2 4 3 15 4 0 5 8 17 0

December 8 3 0 3 30 36 7 0 5 71 83 16

Total 170 108 29 183 76 396 161 11 39 220 431 20


Table 12: Type of Attacks in FATA


Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total

GrA 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 5 5 0

IED 95 58 15 31 55 159 113 10 5 145 273 16

K 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

KK 2 0 11 0 2 13 0 0 0 0 0 0

MA 44 39 3 114 5 161 34 1 14 12 61 0

MC 3 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 1 0 1 0

RA 10 2 0 11 2 15 13 0 12 1 26 0

SA 2 10 0 19 2 31 3 0 7 56 66 1

TK 9 3 0 0 8 11 0 0 0 1 1 3


4.3 Security Situation in Khyber Pakhtoonkha (KPK)

Notwithstanding sporadic incidents of violence, security situation in erstwhile



troubled province of KPK improved substantially during 2015 as the year witnessed 139

militant attacks in which 224 people were killed including 103 civilians, 84 SFPs, 34 militants

and three PGRs while 253 others were injured including 147 civilians, 103 SFPs, two PGRs

and one militant. Thus, there has been almost 70 percent reduction in militant attacks with

almost 65 percent reduction in deaths and almost 74 percent reduction in number of injured

when compared with figures of the previous year (2014). As shown in Figure-15, militant

attacks in the province as well as resultant deaths and injuries witnessed a nose dive in 2015

and situation returned to the status (albeit got even better) as that of 2007/2008 when this

wave of militancy picked momentum.

Figure 15: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in KPK


This substantial improvement in security situation is directly linked to military

operations in FATA particularly those conducted in adjoining Khyber Agency as well as

measures adopted under National Action Plan post Peshawar APS attacks. Moreover, police

force in the province has also improved its performance, as was indicated in PICSS Annual

Report 2014, due to less political interference. As shown in Figure-16 and Table-13, sporadic

violent incidents of significance occurred in the province during February, May, September

and December last year, which included attack of sectarian nature in the form of suicide

attack claimed by Jandullah in provincial capital targeting Shia Muslim Imambargah in

Hayatabad area killing 20 people and injuring 50 others; militants physical assault on

Pakistan Air Force Camp in Badabher in outskirt of Peshawar killing 29 people including 6

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Nos Deaths Injuries



civilians and 23 security forces personnel in addition killing of 13 attackers while 25 other

security personnel were injured; suicide attack towards the end of the year in Mardan,

claimed by TTP Jamatul Ahrar, targeting civilians at National Database and Registration

Authority (NADRA) office killing at least 26 people and injuring 56 others. During the year,

militants also tried to target politicians of various political parties including Qaumi Watar

Party chief Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, Federal Minister for Housing and Works Akram Khan

Durani belonging to Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam- Fazal (JUI-F) (both remained safe), and local

leaders of Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz and Awami National Party (ANP). In addition,

TTP also tried to kill, in a suicide attack, the Deputy Commandant of Frontier Reserve Police

(FRP) when his vehicle was targeted in Peshawar's Hayatabad area.

Figure 16: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in KPK (2015)


As shown in Table-14, militants’ physical assaults and incidents of target killings

outnumbered the IED based attacks, which had remained preferred choice for militants

carrying their attacks in the province. While the incident of target killing suggest that there is

still lot of room to improve law and order situation in the province, the militants physical

assaults suggests that militants are showing courage to carry out such attacks despite the

fact that such attacks are considered more dangerous as retaliation from forces remains high

while detection en-route also remains possibility. These two types of attacks proved

dangerous as 72 security forces personnel were killed and 60 others injured in 74 incidents

of target killing and physical assaults. On the other hand, civilians were worst sufferers in

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Nos Deaths Injuries



four suicide attacks reported from the province.

Table 13: Monthly break up of militant attacks in KPK and their human impact



January 8 2 0 0 5 7 6 0 0 0 6 0 0

February 8 6 0 2 24 32 12 0 0 52 64 0 0

March 13 4 1 1 6 12 8 2 0 6 16 0 0

April 14 6 0 1 3 10 19 0 0 2 21 0 0

May 18 13 2 2 8 25 11 0 0 7 18 0 0

June 12 6 0 3 1 10 6 0 0 4 10 0 0

July 13 6 0 6 2 14 1 0 0 3 4 0 0

August 8 4 0 0 4 8 2 0 0 4 6 0 0

September 17 26 0 19 10 55 34 0 1 6 41 2 0

October 8 5 0 0 2 7 2 0 0 2 4 4 0

November 11 3 0 0 6 9 1 0 0 5 6 0 0

December 9 3 0 0 32 35 1 0 0 56 57 0 0

Total 139 84 3 34 103 224 103 2 1 147 253 6 0


Table 14: Type of militant attacks in KPK and their human impact



GrA 8 1 0 0 4 5 2 0 0 1 3 4 0

IED 37 4 0 2 12 18 33 0 1 16 50 1 0

KK 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

MA 42 52 0 31 20 103 54 0 0 13 67 1 0

RA 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 4 0 0

SA 4 3 0 0 46 49 6 0 0 108 114 0 0

TK 42 20 3 0 19 42 6 2 0 5 13 0 0


4.4 Security Situation in Sindh

Quite consistent with national trends, security situation in Sindh also witnessed

substantial improvement in 2015 as there has been almost 64 percent reduction in militant

attacks, almost 23 percent reduction in resultant deaths and almost 63 percent reduction in

number of injured as compared to previous year. In 2015, a total of 89 anti-State militant

attacks were reported in which 240 people were killed including 169 civilians, 54 SFPs, and

17 militants while 203 others were injured including 171 civilians, 30 SFPs and two militants.



Yearly comparison of anti-State militant attacks in Sindh is reflected in Figure-17 while

monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2015 is shown in Figure-18 while monthly break

up of violence is shown in Table-15. As shown in Figure-18 and Table-15, January, May and

October were the most lethal months in terms of causalities while January, February, March

and October witnessed higher number of injuries. Some of the notable militant attacks in

the province included IED blast on railway track in Jacobabad injuring 25 people in February,

killing of two policemen and injuring of 14 other people in a TTP claimed attack in Qaidabad

area of Karachi in March, killing of at least 45 people and injuring of several others in

Jundullah claimed attack on Ismaili Shia community bus near Safoora Chowrangi area of

Karachi in May, and Lashker-e-Jhangvi claimed suicide attack in October on Muharram

procession in Jacobabad district of Sindh killing at least 22 people and injuring 40 others.

Figure 17: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in Sindh


Despite intermittent incidents of violence, overall improvement in security situation

in Karachi, mainly its provincial capital, can be attributed to on-going Rangers Operation in

the metropolitan as the paramilitary force is operating in Karachi under special powers while

intelligence based operations against urban networks of various militant, sectarian and

criminal elements also helped in reduction in violence. In Karachi, police and Rangers have

adopted a visible encounter policy that created fear among militant outfits putting them on

the defensive.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Nos Deaths Injuries



Figure 18: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in Sindh (2015)


Table 15: Monthly break up of militant attacks in Sindh and their human impact



January 9 10 0 1 61 72 0 0 0 50 50 0 0

February 12 0 0 0 8 8 1 0 0 29 30 0 0

March 10 8 0 0 7 15 15 0 0 20 35 0 0

April 4 3 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

May 8 5 0 8 50 63 2 0 0 10 12 0 0

June 6 3 0 8 2 13 2 0 2 0 4 0 0

July 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0

August 13 8 0 0 7 15 5 0 0 5 10 0 2

September 8 4 0 0 3 7 2 0 0 4 6 0 0

October 4 3 0 0 27 30 2 0 0 36 38 0 0

November 9 8 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 16 16 0 0

December 3 2 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0

Total 89 54 0 17 169 240 30 0 2 171 203 3 2


In terms of type of attacks, as reflected in Table-16, almost 90 percent were either

militants’ physical assaults or incidents of target killings while these types of attacks

accounted for more than 50 percent of deaths. Majority of other deaths and injuries

resulted from either suicide attacks or IED based attacks. Despite comparative success as

compared to previous year, the forces could not effectively control the incidents of target

killing despite arrest of many target killers either affiliated with political parties or those

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Nos Deaths Injuries



falling in category of criminals.

Table 16: Type of militant attacks in Sindh and their human impact



GrA 9 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 19 20 3 0

IED 16 2 0 0 6 8 12 0 2 45 59 0 0

K 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

KK 2 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

MA 23 32 0 15 47 94 12 0 0 4 16 0 0

SA 3 2 0 1 87 90 1 0 0 86 87 0 0

TK 35 18 0 0 26 44 4 0 0 9 13 0 0


4.5 Security Situation in Punjab

In the previous year (2014), Punjab had witnessed notable increase in militant

attacks and the trend remained the same during 2015 as well (See Figure-19 for yearly

comparison). Thus security situation in Punjab remained questionable despite the fact that

security forces intensified their intelligence based operations against various brands of

militants including those affiliated with Al-Qaeda/ TTP and sectarian elements with special

focus on Lashker-e-Jhangvi in addition to capturing sympathizers of Daesh/ IS. During the

year, 25 militant attacks in Punjab were reported in which 110 people were killed including

69 civilians, seven SFPs and 34 militants while 243 others were injured including 232 civilians

and 11 SFPs. A detailed break of militant attacks in the province is given in Table-17 and

monthly trend of attacks in Figure-20.

Among the most prominent militant attacks in the province was killing of Punjab

Home Minister Col. (retd) Shuja Khanzada along with 20 others in twin suicide blasts in

August, claimed by TTP, in his home town in Attock while 23 people were also injured. The

killing of Khanzada was serious blow to the Punjab government as he was spearheading

counter-terrorism operations in the province while he had made Counter Terrorism

Department of the police a quite effective and professional force.

Other most prominent militant attacks in the province during the year included

killing of 17 Christian minority community members and injuring of 70 others in March when

TTP Jamatul Ahrar claimed suicide bombers attacked two churches in Youhannaabad area of



Lahore; killing of eight people and injuring of dozen others in TTP claimed attack in February

on Lahore’s police headquarters; killing of three people and injuring of 10 others in February

when Jandullah claimed suicide bombers targeted an Imambargah at Kuri Road in

Rawalpindi; killing in May of a PML-N member of Punjab Assembly Rana Shamshad and his

son and a friend in an attack claimed by TTP in Kamoki area of Gujranwala district; killing in

July of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) chief, Malik Ishaq along with his two sons and other leaders of

the outfit in so-called police encounters in Muzaffargargh when, according to police, the

militants attacked the convey to get LeJ chief released from police custody; and killing of

eight people in October when political office of PML-N Member of National Assembly Sardar

Amjad Khosa was targeted in a suicide attack claimed by Lashker-e-Jhangvi in Taunsa Sharif

area of Dera Ghazi Khan district.

Figure 19: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in Punjab


Figure 20: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in Punjab (2015)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Nos Deaths Injuries

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Nos Deaths Injuries




Table 17: Monthly break up of militant attacks in Punjab and their human impact (2015)



January 4 1 0 2 8 11 0 0 0 36 36 0 0

February 3 1 0 2 11 14 0 0 0 29 29 0 0

March 3 2 0 2 14 18 0 0 0 72 72 0 0

April 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

May 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

June 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 6 6 0 0

July 2 0 0 16 0 16 8 0 0 0 8 0 0

August 1 2 0 0 19 21 0 0 0 23 23 0 0

September 5 1 0 9 9 19 0 0 0 58 58 0 0

October 2 0 0 1 8 9 0 0 0 3 3 0 0

November 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0

December 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 6 0 0

Total 25 7 0 34 69 110 11 0 0 232 243 0 0


Notwithstanding the presence and/ or reach of Al-Qaeda/ TTP and their affiliates in

Punjab, another worrying aspect was increase in sectarian violence as well as signs of

Daesh/ IS gaining ground in the province. As shown in Table-18, the province witnessed

seven suicide attacks, which is highest number as compared to other geographical regions/

provinces. This indicates that militant outfits have increased their focus on Punjab. Some of

the attacks in Punjab were carried out by militant outfits in retaliation to killing of

Lashker-e-Jhangvi chief Malik Ishaq, killing of another LeJ top tier founding member Haroon

Bhati, who was extradited from United Arab Emirates with the help of Interpol, and crack

down on various sectarian elements with possible linkages with Daesh. Despite continued

focus of security forces to hunt down various militant outfits, there is a strong possibility

that militants will continue their policy of carrying out attacks in near future on vital security

installations in the province as well as public places to remain in the headlines. In this regard,

Lashker-e-Jhangvi and sympathisers of Daesh will continue to prove their presence in the

province. Southern Punjab is being slated as the hot bed of militant outfits and full-fledged

operation, either led by Counter Terrorism Department or Rangers in this particularly region

is very much on the card.



Table 18: Type of militant attacks in Punjab and their human impact (2015)



GrA 5 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 5 8 0 0

IED 2 0 0 2 10 12 0 0 0 77 77 0 0

MA 7 0 0 24 0 24 8 0 0 2 10 0 0

SA 7 5 0 7 57 69 0 0 0 148 148 0 0

TK 4 2 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 25 7 0 34 69 110 11 0 0 232 243 0 0


4.6 Security Situation in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)

Overall security situation in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) remained stable throughout the year

with only one militant activity in the entire region while a bomb placed on the route of

Governor GB was diffused. Due to sectarian polarity in the region, if sectarian unrest in the

country increases in future or if Daesh increases its foothold in rest of the country,

Gilgit-Baltistan region could get polarized.

4.7 Security Situation in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)

Federal Capital witnessed two militant attacks including the one in which President

of Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamat Ghulam Mustafa Baloch and his brother narrowly escaped an

attempt on their lives while the other militant activity reported in Islamabad was target

killing of a doctor of Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences. The security forces actions,

recorded as much as 18 in total, caused arrest of 147 suspects including those belonging to

various banned outfits including TTP and seizer of explosive materials. The thrust of security

forces actions suggest that militants tried to penetrate into the federal capital but

heightened security and vigil from the security forces thwarted such designs. Some arrests

were made ahead of Republic Day Military Parade, which Pakistan conducted after the gap

of seven years, and visit of Chinese President to Pakistan.

4.8 Security Situation in Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K)

Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) remained the only region where no militant activity

or any counter-insurgency operation was noticed suggesting that the area was the most



peaceful among all the regions under the control of Federation.

5 Significant Security/Political Developments

5.1 Daesh/ ISIS in Af-Pak Region

5.1.1 Emergence

Although the defection from Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan had started in 2014 when at

least nine members of the group had pledged allegiance with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

(ISIS) but the group has announced formation of Khorasan Province in January 2015 when

many former commanders from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan along with commanders of some

small groups had joined Islamic State. These commanders had themselves chosen former

TTP commander Hafiz Saeed Khan as their head and pledged allegiance with head of IS Abu

Bakar Al-Baghdadi. Their allegiance was accepted by IS in a video message by its spokesman

Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani. He also announced Khoransan as a ‘province’ of so-called

Caliphate which comprises of Afghanistan, tribal belt of Pakistan, some parts of Balochistan

provinces of Pakistan and Iran and some area of Muslim central Asian States. Hafiz Saeed

Khan was accepted as Wali or Emir of Khorasan province and Abdur Raoof Khadim (former

commander of Afghan Taliban) as deputy of Hafiz Saeed Khan. Abdur Raoof Khadim had

visited Iraq and had defected to DAESH or Islamic State long before announcement of

Khorasan chapter. He had established DAESH in Helmand and Farah provinces.

Describing the Islamic Sates Khurasan Chapter is a difficult task. The network is

dynamic and changes more frequently. The creation, spread, and development of the DAESH

in Af-Pak region is also clouded in rumour and speculation, fanned by informational wars

being waged by Islamic State supporters, the Afghan and Pakistani government, and their

respective agents. The number of militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the

diversity of their agendas, and the shifting and at times unclear nature of their allegiances

often obscures things even further.

5.1.2 Levels of Associations with IS in Af-Pak Region

There are three types association with IS in the region.



a. Groups and commanders who have publicly pledged allegiance with IS and IS

has accepted their allegiance

b. Groups and commanders who have pledged allegiance with IS but IS has not

publicly accepted their allegiance

c. Groups who support IS and are willing to cooperate with the group without

pledging allegiance.

5.1.3 First Category

The first category include senior commanders defected from Pakistani and Afghan

Taliban including Hafiz Saeed Khan (former head of TTP Orakzai Agency), Shahidullah Shahid

(former spokesman of TTP), Abdur Raoof Khadim (Former Afghan Taliban commander in

Helmand Province), Hafiz Daulat (former TTP commander in Kurram Agency), Gul Zaman

(TTP Commander from Khyber Agency), Mufti Hasan (former TTP commander in Peshawar),

Khalid Mansoor (former TTP commander in Hangu district of KPK), Saad Imarati (former

Afghan Taliban commander active in Logar province), Ubaidullah Al- Beshawari (commander

of Toheed wal Jihad, a Salafi militant group), Sheikh Mohsin (A Salafi Taliban commander

from Afghanistan’s Kuner Province), Commander Talha from Laki Marwat area of KPK,

commander Omar Al Mansoor (Head of Jamia Hafsa Brigade, a sub group of TTP formed to

take revenge against Pakistani military’s infamous Red Mosque operation)

A statement issued at that time suggests that a broader network of groups which

ranges from the Qambar Khel tribe in Khyber and the Hudhayfah group in Dir to Qari Harun’s

group in Kunar province had also pledged their support for Hafiz Saeed Khan and his

position as the Emir of the militants of Khorasan chapter. Less than one week after the

release of the video, 50 hard-core militants of the Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkar

group (Active in Khyber Agency of FATA), led by Commanders Haya Khan and Waheed Khan

joined Islamic State. Then on January 26 the Islamic State’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad

al-Adnani, released a statement in which he formally announced the creation of ‘Khurasan

Chapter’ with Hafiz Saeed Khan serving as its head.



5.1.4 Second Category

The second category of groups and individuals who have also publicly pledged

allegiance to Islamic State/ DAESH but whose allegiance has yet to be officially

acknowledged or accepted by the Islamic State’s leadership. At this point, these entities are

best understood as self-affiliated actors who extend the reach, influence and capabilities of

the Islamic State. This does not make a big difference if their allegiance is not accepted

publicly as the ideology which drives the concept of Caliphate does not require exclusive

acceptance by the head of DAESH to respond to each and every group or individual.

However, it is not clear whether these groups have been still operating independently as

sub-entities or they have disbanded their chain of command and handed over their fighters

to the local leadership of DAESH. These groups include Tehreek-e-Khilafah Wal Jihad and

Pakistani Jundullah. Tehreek-e-Khilafah was the first Pakistani group who had pledged

allegiance with DAESH in July 2014. It had renamed itself as ‘Ansar ul Khilafa wl Jihad

(supporters of Caliphate and Jihad). In January 2015, it again pledged allegiance with DAESH.

However, PICSS believes that this group is one of the sub-groups run by TTP’s former senior

commander Umar Khalid Khurasani in Karachi and Hyderabad. The group which had claimed

responsibility of attack on foreign tourists at Nanga Parbat (Gilgit-Baltistan) has also pledged

allegiance with DAESH.

5.1.5 Third Category

The third category is that of the supporters of DAESH but has not publicly pledged

allegiance with the group. One of them is infamous Molvi Abdul Aziz of Red Mosque or Lal

Masjid. Lal Masjid is a key militant reference point or an ideological center and that the

activities of its leader, Molvee Abdul Aziz, matters to TTP affiliated networks as well. When

asked about his views on the Islamic State in an interview during the summer of 2014, Abdul

Aziz offered had said “We want a Caliphate across the whole world, including Pakistan. The

caliphate is the solution to the problems. These Arab Mujahideen have started the process

of creating a caliphate, and we think this is good news for the Muslim Ummah. God willing, if

their order continues, we will see it flourish all over the world.” This statement was followed

in November 2014 when a collection of female students from Jamia Hafsa released a video



supportive of the Islamic State, which Abdul Aziz has publically defended.

5.1.6 Groups Playing the Middle

DAESH in Af-Pak region is also benefiting from another category of groups who have

not publicly pledged allegiance to DAESH, but whose key members are openly supportive of

the Islamic State and appear to be taking steps to provide indirect support to the Islamic

State’s agenda. Jamat-ul-Ahrar is one of such groups. According to PICSS information Its

operational commander Umar Khalid Khurasani was in talks with DAESH and was a

contender of top post of the group but he was not preferred by groups and commanders in

the region thus he stuck to JA. However, PICSS has information that he might join DAESH as

there were some unconfirmed reports of him joining the group. This will be real boost to

DAESH in the region as the network operated by Khurasani is the strongest in the region.

5.1.7 Sunni Sectarian Outfits

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-ul-Islam have anti-Shiaism common with DAESH and there

are strong intelligence reports that a group of LeJ was going to pledge allegiance with DAESH

but its founder was killed in a police encounter and nationwide crackdown has put the group

on back foot. Nevertheless, the group is believed to be in contact with DAESH’s central

leadership and indirectly supports its activities. Defections from Pro Pakistan Jihad groups

have also taken place along with youth previously not associated with violence such as

Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith is a new phenomenon. The groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba,

Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Mujahideen face tough task to keep their cadres intact.

5.1.8 Challenge to Afghan Taliban

Islamic State claims that it is legitimate Caliphate representing entire Muslim world.

Its Khurasan chapter started to question not only legitimacy of Mullah Omar but his very

existence. Afghan Taliban sent a letter to Omar Al-Baghdadi in the name of Mullah Omar in

which Islamic States successes in Iraq and Syria were admired but its separate network in

Afghanistan was criticized with a request that Afghan ‘Jihad’ should be fought under one flag

of Taliban. The language was very lenient and polite but Islamic State responded with harsh

criticism on Taliban and claimed that Mullah Omar was killed by Mullah Akhtar Mansoor



(now head of Afghan Taliban). Afghan Taliban were pressed by DAESH as well as Afghan

government to prove existence of Mullah Omar. In mid-2015 after first ever direct talks

between Taliban and Afghan government represetatives in Pakistani city of Murree, Afghan

government claimed death of Mullah Omar two years back. Afghan Taliban had to accept it

publicly. Death of Mullah Omar gave boost to DAESH in the area as the stature of Mullah

Akhtar Mansoor was not as big to put a parallel challenge to Baghdadi’s Caliphate. DAESH

soon started to become operational in bordering areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It swiftly

captured many districts in Kunar and Nangerhar provinces of Afghanistan and kicked out

Taliban from the area. Imposed strict laws which they claimed to be Islamic, rejected by

mainstream Muslim scholars around the world.

There is limited information about DAESH’s presence in other parts of Afghanistan.

Another former Guantanamo detainee, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, is reportedly serving as a

representative of the group in Kunar and Nuristan but other accounts suggest that he is only

based in Pakistan. He was the first representative of the group in the region, however, not

having operational experience he was not fit to lead the group. He is mere a propagandist

who has also written a book of his experience in US prison. DAESH itself claims that it also

has a presence in Kunar, Nuristan, Logar and Nangahar provinces through individual

commanders loyal to its group, although it is unclear how active or large these groups are, or

what kind of capabilities they have. There also appears to be an Islamic State-linked group

active in Farah province, led by two brothers, Abdul Malek and Abdul Razeq. DAESH had also

claimed that Mullah Mansoor Dadullah, a disgruntled Taliban commander joined the group

but this proved to be wrong as he is now serving as deputy of the head of another faction

of Taliban Mullah Rasool who has rejected Mullah Akhtar Mansoor as being new Emir of the

group.

5.1.9 Setbacks to DAESH in the region

DAESH was taken lightly by Afghan Taliban but when it captured several districts in

Nangerhar and Kuner provinces, Taliban started to fight against the group. Recently, after

fierce fighting, Taliban has regained control of some districts in Nagerhar and only few are

remaining. Also US drone strikes have killed scores of DAESH fighters in the province. There



are reports with PICSS that the recent operation by Taliban against DAESH was indirectly

supported by Pakistani Security Forces who sealed the border and stopped DAESH fighters

from fleeing the area barring them from tactical retreat. There are also unconfirmed reports

that Hafiz Saeed Khan has been killed in a US drone strike in first week of January. This is the

second time the news of his death has emerged. It is yet to be confirmed. However, last year,

a U.S. drone strike did eliminated his deputy Abdur Raoof Khadim in Helmand province.

There are reports with Pakistani intelligence that DAESH is being supported by rogue

elements from within Afghan government who want to use the group against Pakistan. A

recent suicide attack against Pakistani consulate is being viewed as retaliation against an

attack on an Indian consulate in Bagram earlier this month. Pakistani officials believe that

DAESH in Af-Pak region gets adequate funds and financial resources from Indian through

Afghan Intelligence. However, Afghan Army has also conducted operations against DAESH in

Kuner and Nangerhar provinces thus making it a complex picture that who is supporting who.

An Afghan official blamed Pakistani ISI for supporting DAESH.Although Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan had pledged allegiance with DAESH but no significant operational development

has been observed so far.

As far as DAESH’s presence in Pakistan is concerned, the group has been making

strong inroads. Government of Punjab has started a province-wise crackdown against the

group in central Punjab and dozens of its supporters has been arrested. DAESH in Pakistan is

attracting youth from urban areas making it complex for security forces to launch operation

against the group. Recently, news of female supporters of DAESH has also emerged and

there are reports that few of the females have travelled to Syria as well. Pakistani

intelligence network is on its toes these days. However, there is strong belief that the group

will not pose a bigger threat to Pakistan’s national security but will remain an irritant

overtime.

The point of worry is that DAESH has established its organizational network in

Pakistan which was not known previously. The groups like Hizb-ut-Tehrir, Tanzeem-e-Islami,

Jamiat-Ahl-e-Hadiht, Jamat-ud-Dawah, Jamat-e-Islami, Ahl-e-Sunnat wal-Jamat and other

Sunni extremist groups are potential recruitment pools for DAESH. To protect them from

DAESH inroads, these groups have started to wage counter propaganda against DAESH.



Jamat-ud-Dawah and Lashka-e-Taiba are in the forefront in fighting ideological counter

attack against DAESH in the region. They seem to be successful in maintaining their upper

hand in this ideological warfare, nevertheless, defections from other groups have taken

place.

6 Militant Groups Operating in/from Pakistan

6.1 Anti-Pakistan with Global Ambitions and Connections

6.1.1 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP):

TTP was formed in December 2007 as an umbrella of different local militant groups

fighting against Pakistani security forces in FATA. It gradually expanded in all over the country.

Initially it was supported by Al-Qaeda as TTP itself was not experienced in fighting guerilla

warfare but overtime the group itself became battle hardened and pose a serious threat to

Pakistan’s national security as well as regional stability. The group had its headquarters in

South Waziristan before a military operation Rah-e-Nijat in 2009 expelled its command and

control structure along with its senior leadership. Its founder head was Baitullah Mehsud

who was killed in a drone strike in 2010. His deputy Hakeemullah Mehsud replaced him.

Under Hakeemullah, TTP showed its global intents. TTP facilitated an attack on CIA’s facility

in Khost province of Afghanistan with the name ‘Camp Champman’ when a Jordanian doctor

had carried out a suicide attack killing many CIA officers. It had also owned responsibility of

failed attack in Time Square of New York by the alleged attacker Faisal Shahzad. After killing

of Hakeemullah Mehsdu in a drone strike in 2013, Mullah Fazlullah became Emir or head of

TTP who is allegedly hiding in Afghanistan. After Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, TTP faced

serious infighting and rift in its ranks and files. Following groups defected from TTP:

a. Sajna Group: Most of the Mehsud fighters defected from main body of TTP

alleging that the group has been hijacked by forces not loyal to the cause of

Jihad. Senior TTP commander Khan Saeed Sajna is now heading this faction of

TTP and practically the group has been neutralized and not fighting against

Pakistani forces. Reportedly, its head and other senior commanders have also

shifted to Afghanistan. Azam Tariq works as spokesman of the Sajna group.



b. Punjabi Taliban: Another defection was that of Punjabi Taliban led by

Asmatullah Muawaia who was once a commander of Jaish-e-Muhammad

group before defecting to Al-Qaeda and then joining TTP. He announced that

fighters under his control ceased their operations in Pakistan and their focus

will be fighting against U.S. led forces in Afghanistan. The term Punjabi is used

for all non-Pashtuns fighters in FATA.

c. Jamat-ul-Ahrar: in late 2014, about 70 senior commanders along with

hundreds of fighters defected from main body of TTP and formed TTP

Jamat-ul-Ahrar which is practically more powerful and well resourced tan the

main body of TTP. A less known Muhammad Qasim Khurasani was appointed

its head but practically Umar Khalid Khurasani, the former head of Mohmand

Chapter of TTP is running Jamat-ul-Ahrar. It has its network from Pak-Afghan

border to Karachi.

6.1.2 Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is the oldest militant group operating in the region. It has formed a special

sub group for south Asia with the name Al-Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent (a.k.a. AQIS)

headed by a former TTP commander Asim Umar. AQIS was mostly active in Karachi beside

having presence in other urban areas. Al-Qaeda’s chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri is also reportedly

hiding somewhere in Af-Pak region however, major chunk of Arab fighters have migrated to

Middle East and North Africa. There are reports that Arab fighters are coming back in

Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda is trying to reassert its position which it has lost to new entrants

like DAESH.

6.1.3 DAESH or Islamic State

This is a new entrant into militancy landscape of Af-Pak region. DAESH in Afghanistan

and FATA calls it part of Khurasan chapter or province of the Islamic State while DAESH in

Pakistan is not yet properly operational. It has been emerging as a serious threat in urban

areas like Karachi, Islamabad and Sialkot. A nationwide crackdown is underway against the

group. Command and control structure of the group is not known but its aim is to facilitate



future arrival of Islamic State in the country. Defections took place in major Sunni militant

organizations for DAESH.

6.1.4 East Turkistan Islamic Movement:

The group is fighting for rights of Muslims in China. Before Zarb-e-Azb it was

operating from North Waziristan. Now the group has dislocated from the area. It is yet not

clear where it has shifted its basis.

6.1.5 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan:

The group had carried out some spectacular attacks inside Pakistan including an

attack on Karachi Airport. But due to Zarb-e-Azb, it shifted its base to north of Afghanistan

and now once again focusing on its primary objective of waging Jihad in Uzbekistan and

Tajikistan. In August 2015, the group has announced its merger into DAESH or Islamic State.

But it still operated an independent entity associated with DAESH.

6.2 Anti-State religious groups with local focus

6.2.1 Lashkar-e-Islam:

This group was formed even prior to 9/11 and its aim was to fight a sectarian war

against a rival group Ansar-ul-Islam which was formed by followers of a Sufi Peer Saifur

Rehman. Gradually Lashkar-e-Isalm got upper hand over Ansar-ul-Isalm and became very

powerful in Bara Tehsil of Khyber Agency. The group extended its operations inside Peshawar

but due to its anti-TTP stance Pakistani state tolerated its activities. However, in 2014 the

group became too rogue and joined hands with TTP to fight against Pakisani Security Forces.

The group is expelled from most parts of Khyber Agency and now its leader Mangal Bagh is

also hiding in Afghanistan like many other anti-Pakistan militant groups. The group’s fighting

force has considerably diminished due to operation Khyber 1, and Khyber 2 in 2015. It has

claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on Khasadar force on 18th of January 2016.

Previously, the group was not known for suicide attacks. Pakistani Intelligence fear that

Lashkar-e-Isalm’s head Mangal Bagh is playing in the hands of hostile agencies. There are



reports that he is operating an FM radio from across the border to promote his message in

Khyber Agency.

6.2.2 Toheed wal Jihad

A small group operating in Peshawar and adjacent areas have now pledged allegiance

with Islamic State. It is headed by Abdul Qahhar Khurasani.

6.2.3 Lashkar-e-Khurasan

A small group previously associated with Al-Qaeda had joined TTP few years back.

In late 2015, TTP had claimed to have assassinated its head alleging that he was a senior

officer from Pakistani Intelligence Agency ISI. This group was actually formed by Shoora

Mujahideen led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan to trace out CIA spies who were

helping the Americans in spotting militant leaders. Later the group became out of control

and Gul Bahadur had announced that the group is not under Shoora Mujahideen. It is not

clear what is its current position after Zarb-e-Azb dismantled militant infrastructure from Mir

Ali and Miran Sha areas of North Waziristan.

6.2.4 Ahrar-ul-Hind:

It is also a TTP splinter group which had claimed responsibility for the attack on

Islamabad Judicial Complex. The group is believed to be headed by a former Al-Qaeda

operative commander Dost Muhammad. The group had emerged in February 2014 but

merged into TTP-Jamat-ul-Ahrar in August 2014. PICSS believes that it was not an

independent group but a dummy used by commander Umar Khalid Khurasani to perpetrate

attacks during ceasefire to avoid direct blame against TTP.

6.3 Militant Groups based in FATA having objectives in Afghanistan,

6.3.1 Haqqani Network:

It is part of Afghan Taliban and its head Siraj Haqqani is now working as deputy of

Mullah Akhtar Mansoor. The group had its strong base in North Waziristan prior to

Operation Zarb-e-Azb but now has shifted to unknown locations, mostly inside Afghanistan.

The group had previously great influence over all militant groups operating in FATA whether



Pakistan Taliban, Al-Qaeda or local small groups. However, after TTP becoming too strong

and developing differences with Afghan Taliban stopped to listen to Haqqan Network. The

group is considered most sophisticated, well equipped, well trained having operational

capabilities ranging from Afghan Pakistan border to the capital Kabul. This is the oldest

remaining Mujahideen who had fought against Russian forces in 80s.

6.3.2 Hafiz Gul Bahdur Group:

The group led by Hafiz Gul Bahdur was active in North Waziristan. The group had a

peace deals with Pakistani security forces since 2006. Gul Bahadur had announced operation

Zarb-e-Momin to fight against Operation Zarb-e-Azb but practically his group was not seen

fighting Pakistani forces. As the military had conducted an operation across the board, thus

Gul Bahadur too had to flee to Afghanistan. As per PICSS’s sources, his group is now divided

into five smaller groups who are weaker enough to carry out any activities against Pakistani

forces. However, these commanders were not targeting Pakistani forces even before and

they are more likely involved in targeting security forces across the border.

6.3.3 Mullah Nazir Group

This was very powerful group active in South Waziristan. It had helped Pakistani

forces expelling Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other foreign fighters from South

Waziristan. Mullah Nazir himself was killed by a U.S. drone strike. The group is still active in

South Waziristan and headed by Bhawal Khan. But its ineffective and divided into at least

four sub groups.

6.4 India-Focused Groups

There are two categories of India-Focused groups operating from Pakistan

a. Indigenous Kashmiri groups

b. Pakistan based groups fighting in Kashmir



6.4.1 Indigenous Kashmiri Groups

There are 14 such groups but most of them are operationally dormant. These groups

are united under an umbrella United Jihad Council.

1. Hizbul Mujahideen: Headed by Syed Salahuddin (also head of Unite Jihad

Council) is a group which is ideologically associated with Jamat-e-Islami but

operationally it is totally an independent group. It is the oldest and largest

group fighting in Kashmir

2. Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen

3. Al-Umar Mujaideen

4. Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen

5. Al-Umar Mujahideen

6. Muslim Janbaz Forces

7. Al-Jihad

8. Tehreek-e-Jihad

9. Islami Inquilabi Mahaz

10. Hizb-ul-Momineen

11. Hizb-e-Islami

12. Al-Barq Mujaideen

13. Islamic Front

14. Al Mujahid Force

6.4.2 Pakistan-Based groups fighting in Kashmir

a. Lashkar-e-Taiba: A UN proscribed organization accused of perpetrating

Mumbai Attacks in 2008 is one of the most capable militant group fighting

against Indian interests in Kashmir as well as operating in mainland India. U.S.

also accuses group for operating in Afghanistan against U.S. led forces. The

group was part of Jamat-ud-Dawah but publicly announced dissociation from

JuD in December 2001. Government had then banned LeT in January 2002

along with Jash-e-Muhammad. Qari Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, a Kashmir cleric



based in Azad Kashmir is public head of the group. Analyst believe that

Lashkar-e-Taiba is militant front of Jamat-ud-Dawah. Let belongs to Salafi

school of thought.

b. Jash-e-Muhmmad: Accused of recent Pathankot airbase attack is also a

powerful militant group who is accused of perpetrating attacks on Indian

parliament in 2001 and many other high profile attacks in Kashmir. It is

headed by a cleric Moulana Masood Azhar who was released from an Indian

Jail in 2000 in exchange of passengers of an Indian hijacked plane.

Jash-e-Muhammad was created from Harkat-ul-Mujahideen one of the oldest

organization formed during Afghan Jihad.

c. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen: The first group operating in Kashmir which was

included in Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by United States few years

before 9/11 because of group’s alleged involvement in kidnapping and killing

of Western tourists in Kashmir in 90s. The groups is also blamed for

supporting Afghan Taliban.

d. Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami: This was the first Pakistani independent group

formed in Afghanistan back in 80s. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen took birth from HuJI

due to differences among its commanders. Later, HuM and HuJI were merged

to form Harkat-ul-Ansar. But in late 90s, Harkat-ul-Ansar again split into HuJI

and HuM.

e. Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami 313 brigade: It is also a splinter group from HuJI. It

was headed by a former SSG commando Ilyas Kashmiri who defected to

Al-Qaeda and started to fight against Pakistan. But the group did not follow its

leader and now its head is Nasrullah Mansoor Langrial.

f. Al-Badar Mujahideen: It was previously part of Pakistani’s Jamat-e-Isalami

but now operated as an independent group led by Bakhat Zameen Khan. It is

also accused of operating in Afghanistan. Recently, more than forty of its

fighters were killed in a U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan. Their coffins were

brought to different parts of Malakand division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.



6.5 Sectarian Militant Groups

There are many sectarian militant groups who were previously not fighting against the

State but now some of them have strong ties with anti-State transnational groups. Here are

some of the sectarian militant groups

a. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Fighting against Shia community in the country. It has

strong ties with Al-Qaeda and TTP as well as it cooperates with nationalist

militants in Balochistan. The groups was founded by Malik Ishaq who was

shot dead mysteriously by Punjab Police last year. The groups ideological

support lies in central and south Punjab but it is stronger in operations in

Balochistan. In 2015, many of its convicted members were hanged after

moratorium on death penalty was removed by Pakistani government in the

wake of Army Public School Attack in Peshawar. The group retaliated with

spate of suicide attacks in the country. It also killed Punjab’s Home Minister

Shuja Khanzada. The group is also active in Sindh. The group has potential to

lend its services to possible expansion of DAESH in the country. There are

reports that DAESH has held talks with LeJ leaders.

b. Sipa-e-Muhammad: The Shia militant group formed in 90s to fight back

Lashkar-e-Jhanvi. Involved in assassination of many Sunni clerics and attacks

on Sunni interests. The group in its original name is dysfunctional but Shia

militants are active in different parts of the country especially in Gilgit and

Para Chinar. A recent report in Express Tribune suggests that thousands of

Shia youth has been recruited for war in Syria and Iraq. Iranian Revolutionary

Guard is paying having salaries to Pakistani Shia fighters.

c. Sunni Tehreek: It is a semi militant group mostly active in Karachi and parts of

Sindh is group of Brailvee school of thought. It is alleged to be involved in

assassination of clerics from Deobandi and Salafi schools of thoughts.

Generally Brailvee school of thought is considered to be following Sufism but

clerics of this sect openly support Mumtaz Qadri, the killer of Punjab’s



governor Salman Taseer. Qadri had killed Taseer on allegations of Blasphemy.

Sunni Tehreek is backing the campaign of release of Mumtaz Qadri.

d. Jundullah (Irani): A group active in some parts of Balochistan provinces of

both Pakistan and Iran was previously very active against Iranian interests but

after hanging of its head Abdul Malik Regi in 2010.

e. Jaish-ul-Islam: It also operates in Iran’s Balochistan and Sestan provinces but

uses Pakistani soil for organizing its activities. The group has also targeted

Shia pilgrims in Balochistan.

6.6 Secular Anti-State Groups

Groups active in Balochistan are mostly secular and inspired by Baloch

sub-nationalism. They include:

a. Baloch Liberation Front: Led by Dr Allah Nazar, BLF claimed responsibility for

the murder on April 11 of 20 labourers in Turbat. Unlike most other separatist

leaders, the BLF chief does not have a feudal background. He belongs to a

middle-class family from Mashkay in district Awaran. This, coupled with the

fact that he is the only leader of the main insurgent groups who is engaged in

actual fighting on the ground in Balochistan, contributes to his popularity

among the younger Baloch. BLF’s area of operations stretches largely across

Awaran, Panjgur, Washuk, Turbat and Gwadar districts in southern

Balochistan where, contrary to popular belief, the sardari system in which

powerful tribal chiefs own huge tracts of land, does not exist. However,

following the earthquake in Awaran in late 2013, the Army has made

considerable headway in accessing parts of the district that were hitherto

‘no-go areas’ due to risk of insurgent attacks. BLF’s cadres include large

numbers of Zikris, as members of this sect are concentrated in the Makran

belt. In August 2015, the Pakistani military announced that Baloch had been

killed while fighting government forces in Awaran district. Two months later

he released a video, revealing that he had survived the encounter and

remains in charge of the BLF.



b. Balochistan Liberation Army: From 2000 until his death in 2007 on the

Pak-Afghan border in disputed circumstances, the BLA was led by Balaach

Marri — a son of veteran Baloch nationalist, the late Khair Bux Marri. The

mantle of leadership was then taken up by his brother Hyrbyair Marri, who

lives in self-exile in London. He was granted political asylum in the UK, having

successfully argued that his life was in danger in Pakistan. The June 15, 2013

attack on the Ziarat Residency of founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah

was carried out by the BLA, which also claimed responsibility for the murder

of 13 non-Baloch labourers in September of the same year. The BLF mainly

operates in Khuzdar and Bolan districts although like the other insurgent

groups, its area of operations is not rigidly defined.

c. Baloch Republican Army: After Akbar Bugti’s death in 2006, his Jamhoori

Watan Party broke into three factions, one of them — the Baloch Republican

Party — controlled by his grandson Brahamdagh Bugti. According to a

Wikileaks cable dated March 6, 2009, “The Baloch Republican Army is

rumoured to be the military wing of the BRP under control of Brahamdagh

Bugti from his refuge in Kabul”. The younger Bugti escaped the military

operation that killed his grandfather and lived in Afghanistan for several years

after which he moved to Geneva and applied for political asylum

d. United Baloch Army: The UBA is the outcome of a reported rift between

Mehran Marri, youngest son of Khair Bux Marri, and his brother Hyrbyair,

who heads the BLA. According to a pro-militant web portal, the BLA

leadership has accused Mehran and some of his companions of “stealing

three million dollars from BLA funds as well as half its weapons stash worth

800 million rupees” with which they then launched the UBA.

e. Lashkar-e-Balochistan: Led by Javed Mengal, the brother of Akhtar Mengal

(former Chief Minister of Balochistan), the LeB claimed responsibility for two

bomb blasts in Lahore and Karachi in 2012. In a sign, perhaps, of differences

between the separatist groups, it gave a statement to an Urdu newspaper



recently saying that the BLA was more active on social media than the actual

battleground.

f. Baloch Students Organisation-Azad: Dr Allah Nazar, current leader of the BLF,

joined the Baloch Students Organisation, while he was in college. In 2002 he

created a breakaway faction — BSO-Azad — that advocated armed struggle

for an independent Balochistan. It operates mainly in educational institution

to promote propaganda of separatists. It can be described as recruiting

machine for BLF among youth.

6.7 Political Militant Groups

In Karachi, there are militant wings active of different political parties. Nadeem

Commando group is associated with MQM, while there are reports that MQM runs its own

militant wing secretly as well. However, MQM officially deny having any militant group.

Peoples Amn Committee is a group active in Liyari area of Karachi and in the past Peoples

Party was blamed to be its supporters. A report submitted to Pakistan’s Supreme Court by a

Joint Investigative Team says that PTI and Jamat-e-Islami also have militant wings active in

Karachi. Recent operation in Karachi has improved security situation considerably, but street

crimes are yet to be brought down.

6.8 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Present Status and Security Challenges

Strong bilateral trade, economic ties, and co-operation between China and Pakistan

have been developed after signing Bilateral Trade Agreement in 1963 and both the countries

are considered to be strategic partners. In 2015, this strategic partnership was further

expanded when, in April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Islamabad and both the

countries signed 51 MoUs relating to diverse aspects of bilateral relations, including the

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) containing Chinese investment estimated to be

$45 billion. CPEC is a network of highways, railways, and pipelines. Under CPEC project,

China will construct 4000 kilometre rail-road network from Kashgar to Gawadar. China will

also construct twelve economic zones along the corridor. This infrastructure project will link

Gawader port in southwestern part in Pakistan to north-western region of Xinjing in China.



It is composed of various sectoral frameworks which will cover energy, infrastructure,

Gwadar, and industrial sector in the country. The project is being dubbed as game and fate

changer not only for Pakistan but for the whole region. CPEC is a comprehensive package of

co-operative projects which will cover the areas including connectivity, information network

infrastructure, energy co-operation, industrial parks, agriculture development, poverty

alleviation, tourism, and financial co-operation.

In fact, China Pakistan Economic corridor is an extension of China’s 21st century Silk

Road and one bed and belt initiatives. The Silk Road Economic Belt, Maritime Silk Road, and

One Bed and Belt policy was initiated by Chinese President in 2013 which aimed to revive

the ancient trade routes that extended to Asia, Africa, and Europe.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is divided into two areas: first is transportation and

second is energy. On the side of the transportation, $12 billion has been planned to build a

rail link connecting Gawadar to the Western Chinese city of Kashgar, widening of Karakoram

highway, upgrading of Gawadar airport, to build a 125-mile tunnel to link the two countries,

and to upgrade other highways, and constructing Karachi-Lahore motorway. The second area

of interest in CPEC includes various energy projects. For this purpose, $34 billion are on the

drawing board. It is one of the largest investments of China outside its country.

Transportation of oil and gas to Kashgar, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline,

and other energy producing sectors are included in it.

Both China and Pakistan are implementing energy and infrastructure projects under

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on a fast track basis in order to convert the plans into

reality. On the side of China, China established the Silk Road Fund Co Ltd in December. It will

extend financial support to CPEC projects. It will do financial investment and industrial

co-operation with Pakistan. The Chinese banks, The China Exim Bank and China

Development Bank, had provided ten billion dollars for various projects under the CPEC. On

the side of Pakistan, implementation of projects under CPEC gains momentum because

tangible progress with the help of Chinese has been made not only in the field of

infrastructure but in energy sector as well. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif recently inaugurated

the western route of CPEC at Balochistan’s Zhob. The foundation stone of upgrading the

Zhob-Mughal Kot section of Dira Ismail Khan-Qila Saifullah Highway (N-50) has been laid



down. It is a part of the western route of CPEC which start from Burhan on

Islamabad-Peshawar Motorway (M-1) after moving through Dera Ismail Khan, Zhob, Quetta,

Surab, and Khushab. It ends at Gwadar. Construction work on the upgradation on Qila

Saifullah Waigam Rud Road section (N-70) has also been started. The construction of

18.981km East bay has been taken up. It will link Gawadar with national highways and

motorways network. Construction work on Faisalabad and Multan motorway has also been

started. The section of the Gojra motorway has been completed. Work on the construction

of Lahore and Karachi motorway has been taken up. 136 kilometre of Hyderabad and Karachi

section motorway has been completed. 502 kilometre out of 870 kilometre road network

linking the Gawadar with the rest of Pakistan have been completed by Frontier Work

Organization. It will connect Gawadar port with the rest of Pakistan. Construction work on

the upgrading of Karakoram highway phase two has also been started. Construction of

Gawadar port and airport, and construction of eastern, western, and central alignments will

connect all the provinces and region of the country.

In the sector of energy; a construction work has been taken on to build a largest solar

project in the world in Bahawalpur. It will cost 1.5 billion dollars. It will add 50 megawatt to

the national grid. Construction work on Karot hydropower plant is being started by

Chinese companies. It is the first investment project of the Silk Road Fund. It will cost 1.6

billion dollar. This project will start operation in 2020 and will add 720 megawatt to the

national grid. The Port Qasim Coal-Fired Power Plant is also the energy project under the

CPEC framework. The construction of this plant has been started. It will cost 2.085 billion

dollar and will start operation in 2017. Its construction will minimize the load on national

grid. These multiple energy projects will help to overcome the energy crises, increasing

power generation capacity, and will fulfil the electricity needs of the country.

Insecurity is the major challenge towards the implementation of China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor. The security of the corridor is the real concern not only for China but for

Pakistan as well. Major security challenges to CPEC are the following:

a. India poses a huge security challenge to CPEC. India is in a struggle to

sabotage the entire venture. India raised objections to the project citing its

passage from Gilgit-Baltistan being part of Kashmir and a disputed area.



Modi’s government gives unprecedented boast to RAW activities inside

Pakistan in order to create security challenges to CPEC. They can finance

those extremist and militant groups not only in Balochistan but in the rest of

Pakistan having the potential to create trouble for the government in

implementing projects under the CPEC.i

b. Insurgency and militancy inside Balochistan poses another security challenge

to CPEC. A major portion of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will cover the

province of Balochistan. It is a known history that Balochistan hit by

insurgency and militancy since the formation of Pakistan. Baloch nationalists

started insurgency against the state of Pakistan to get separation from the

rest of Pakistan. They always created security problems for the federal

government whenever it tried to implement any type of developmental

projects in Balochistan. Due to which it remained the Achilles Hill of the CPEC.

Thus, Baloch insurgent has the potential to sabotage the entire project of

CPEC. ii

c. Ulighur militants from Xingjiang province in Western China involved from the

very beginning to target Chinese citizens, workers, and engineers. They are

active in China under the banner of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement

(ETIM). These militants from Xingjiang province pose a challenging security

threat to CPEC project inside China.iii (Rana, 2015).

d. Multiple terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the self-styled Islamic State,

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Turkistan Islamic Party which are hiding inside

Kunar and Nuristan, provinces of Afghanistan, can pose a security threat to

CPEC in Pakistan’s northern region. CPEC will also cover the militancy hit

province of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa. Militants in FATA and KPK are involved in

targeting not only Chinese workers but Pakistani citizens as well. The military

operations in FATA and paramilitary forces operations in Balochistan and

Karachi have reduced violent trends. But sectarian and communal attacks

inside Pakistan are in the rise which shows that the operational capacity of

various violent groups has not been reduced. These groups can pose a direct



threat to CPEC. The bigger challenge for Pakistan is to root out terrorist

infrastructure if it wanted to implement CPEC. .iv

In order to overcome security challenges to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,

government has raised a Special Security Division headed by a Major General and

comprising 10,000 troops including those drawn from Special Services Group (commandos

of Pakistan Army) specially trained for counter-terrorism and security. The Special Security

Division contained nine Army Battalions and six Wings of civilian armed forces/ paramilitary. In

addition to Special Security Division, China will provide six patrol ships to Pakistan Maritime

Security Agency for eliminating any security challenge to CPEC. Recently, Navies of the two

countries conducted joint naval exercises aimed at providing maritime security. The

deep-rooted naval collaboration between Pakistan Navy and PLA (Navy) has become even

more important against the backdrop of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to effectively

handle complex asymmetric challenges in the maritime domain.

Apart from security challenges, political issues have lately emerged regarding CPEC as

various political parties mostly belonging to KPK and Balochistan raised objections not only

on the route alignment but also work on development of special economic zones. Political

parties desire that western route of the corridor, which passes through the troubled areas,

should be completed first in addition to seeking ironclad guarantees from the federal

government of necessary investments in construction of economic zones.

7 Pakistan’s Regional and International Relations

7.1 Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations and Afghan Reconciliation Process

Afghanistan-Pakistan relations witnessed ups and downs in 2015. After formation of

Unity Government in Afghanistan and coming into power of President Ashraf Ghani in 2014,

a warmth in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan was witnessed. In November 2014,

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had visited Islamabad and even went to GHQ to meet Army

Chief General Raheel Sharif. After APS attack in Peshawar in December 2014, Afghan

government extended its cooperation to Pakistan and some arrests were made in

Afghanistan and people, suspected for their involvement in said attack, were handed over to



Pakistan. Army chief General Raheel Sharif along with DG ISI had visited Kabul on the very

next day of the school attack and sought cooperation from Afghan leadership for hunting

down those behind the attack. Subsequently, DG ISI visited Kabul in January followed by a

visit of Army Chief along with DG ISI in February suggesting that cooperation between the

two countries was on the increase.

In April 2015, Afghan Army Chief Gen Sher Mohammad Karimi visited Pakistan and

met with top political and military leadership in addition to attending passing out parade of

Pakistan Military Academy as Chief Guest to become the first foreign dignitary to be the

chief guest of the ceremony. This was the high point of military to military relations between

the two countries. In May, PM Nawaz Sharif along with Army Chief General Raheel Sharif and

DG ISI Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar visited Kabul. During the visit, PM Sharif condemned

upsurge in violence by Taliban and called it an act of terrorism. Pakistan also assured Afghan

leadership of its continued support for Afghan reconciliation process. During the visit, an

MoU for intelligence sharing between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan NDS was signed, however,

the agreement was criticised by Afghan Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of Afghan Parliament).

With active involvement of the US and China, Pakistan hosted first formal talks

between Afghan government and Afghan Taliban on 7 July in Murree (a hill station near

Islamabad) wherein both the sides agreed to meet again and to take steps for confidence

building. However, anti-talks lobby continued to find ways and means to spoil these talks

when eventually they got an opportunity and Afghan NDS announced that Afghan Taliban

chief Mullah Omar died two years back. Resultantly, the second meeting scheduled on 31st

July between the two sides was suspended amidst the news of the death of Afghan Taliban

Chief Mullah Omar. Later, the death of Mullah Omar was confirmed and a leadership crisis

emerged in Afghan Taliban. Later, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor who was deputy to Mullah Omar

was elected as new chief of Afghan Taliban but some key Afghan Taliban figures, including

Mullah Yaqoob and Mullah Abdul Manan (son and brother of Mullah Omar, respectively), did

not accept him as their new leader. However, in September, the family of late Mullah Omar

accepted Mansoor as new chief and pledge allegiance to him. By the end of October and

start of November, Afghan Taliban dissidents named Mullah Mohammad Rasool as the head

of a splinter group following the collapse of months’ long efforts to end the rift within the



insurgent group announced a new faction. This was for the first time since Taliban

movement came into existence 1994 that a faction emerged from within the Taliban.

Following Rasool’s appointment by dissidents, fierce clashes were witnessed between

Afghan Taliban and their dissident group while Daesh in Afghanistan was reportedly

supporting the later. However, scores of dissents were killed in these clashes.

Nonetheless the power tussle within Afghan Taliban groups, relations between

Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated in this period with blame game from Afghanistan

started again while Pakistan showed considerable restraint. After inactivity for months

regarding Afghan reconciliation process, PM Nawaz Sharif met Afghan President Ashraf

Ghani in November at Paris on the side-lines of the Climate Summit. The meeting was

facilitated by the British Prime Minister David Cameron wherein it was decided to jointly

promote Afghan peace process. In the meeting, President Ashraf Ghani also accepted

invitation to visit Pakistan to attend “Heart of Asia Conference”, which was to be co-hosted

by Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the said conference, an international consensus was

developed to resume Afghan peace talks while Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US on

the side-lines of the conference decided to make fresh efforts for resuming dialogue process

through a quadrilateral arrangement comprising these four countries.

By the end of December 2015, Pakistan Army Chief visited Kabul and held talks with

Afghan military and political leadership. During the visit, both the sides decided not to allow

their respective soil against each other through better intelligence sharing and intelligence

based operations while it was agreed to resume Afghan reconciliation process with a

quadrilateral meeting between the representative of Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the

US in January 2016 wherein a roadmap and responsibility of each side will be determined.

As decided, the Quadrilateral Coordination Committee met in Islamabad on 11 January 2016

but the differences emerged as Pakistan suggested not to set pre-conditions for talks as the

Afghan side insisted for taking action against those Afghan elements who do not agree for

joining peace talks. Pakistan has also proposed that distinction be made between

reconcilable and irreconcilable elements and decision to take action against the latter be

made once all avenues for bringing them to negotiation table are exhausted. It was decided

to hold next meeting in Kabul on 18 January to decide the roadmap of direct talks between



Afghan government and Taliban groups.

It is too early to predict the outcome of talks between Afghan government and

Taliban groups as and when they are held yet it is clear that objective of peace in even

through peace talks will not be easy. However, cordial relations between Pakistan and

Afghanistan and bridging of trust deficit between the two countries will be pivotal for

achieving that objective. Moreover, all relevant stakeholders will have to keep a close eye on

saboteurs of these peace efforts as it might be the last opportunity for finding a political

settlement of the Afghan imbroglio.

7.2 India- Pakistan Relations and Dialogue Process

Historically, relations between Pakistan and India had never been smooth. There had

been some instances where both the countries were seen engaged in dialogue process

without much success but most of the times they remained hostile to each other and fought

many wars. Among others, Kashmir issue is one of the main bones of contention. Year 2015

started with both the countries engaged in ceasefire violations along the Line of Control as

well as Working Boundary while the formal dialogue process known as Composite Dialogue

still remained suspended. While the political government in Pakistan was interested to

normalize relations with India so that its ambitions of economic revival and regional

connectivity could be achieved the military was interested to see tranquillity on Pakistan’s

eastern border so that forces could remain more focused internally as well as on the western

front against militants.

However, political leadership in India of ruling Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) continued to

remain hostile in their posture towards Pakistan and both the countries got involved in tense

media war. Indian Defence Minister went to suggest a policy of “neutralise terrorists through

terrorists only” suggesting that India was interested in proxy war inside Pakistan. On the

other hand Pakistani political and military leadership went public to blame India for creating

trouble in Pakistan by supporting militants in carrying out violent activities in Balochistan,

FATA/ KP and Karachi. During his visit to Bangladesh in June, Indian PM Modi had admitted

that India played a part in the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 war. He had said that he was

proud that Indian troops sacrificed themselves for breaking up of Pakistan. Pakistan took this



“acknowledgement” as precursor that India continues with this policy and involved in

creating trouble in Pakistan.

However, under international pressure, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian PM

Modi met in July in Ufa on the side-lines of SCO summit in Russia wherein it was, inter alia,

decided that national security advisors of the two countries will meet in New Delhi. However,

the meeting could not take place as India objected to meeting of Hurriyat leadership with

Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India in addition to restricting the agenda of the meeting

between national security advisors of the two countries to the issue of terrorism only while

Pakistan asked for discussions on all outstanding issues including that of Kashmir while

calling for unconditional talks. After the cancellation of visit, both the countries again

resorted to turf war while ceasefire violations continued unabated.

The issue got so tense that Pakistan decided to take the issue of Indian involvement

in sponsoring and supporting militant activities through Afghanistan to the UN. During UN

General Assembly annual session in September, Pakistan shared dossiers of Indian

involvement in anti-Pakistan activities with the UN Secretary General. While taking up the

issue of Kashmir and India creating troubles in Pakistan, PM Nawaz Sharif during his address

in the General Assembly, however, proposed four peace measures with India, including

formalizing of 2003 understanding of ceasefire on Line of Control in Kashmir for which he

called for expansion of UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to

monitor observance of ceasefire; Pakistan and India to reaffirm that they will not resort to

the use or the threat of use of force under any circumstances; taking steps for to demilitarise

Kashmir; and agree to an unconditional mutual withdrawal from Siachen Glacier. India

rejected these proposals and asked Pakistan to act against perpetrators of Mumbai attacks.

Pakistan also took up diplomatically the issue of Indian involvement in anti-Pakistan

activities with various countries including the US, UK, and other western countries.

After background efforts particularly of the US, the two prime ministers held an

informal chat on the side lines of Climate Summit during November in Paris, which paved

the way for a meeting between the national security advisors of the two countries in

Bangkok and the visit of Indian External Affairs Minister to attend Heart of Asia Conference

in early December. During the latter’s visit, Indian minister held talks with her counterpart



and it was decided to resume dialogue process now termed as Comprehensive Dialogue to

discuss all issues including the issue of Kashmir for which the foreign secretaries of the two

countries will meet to decide the schedule of various meetings of the dialogue process while

national security advisors of the two countries will continue to engage each other on the

issue of terrorism. The year ended with a surprise short visit of Indian PM Modi to Lahore on

25 December 2015 on his way back from Kabul and meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister.

The engagement between the two countries at the end of the year completely

changed the atmosphere and hopes were generated that both he countries will be able to

normalize their relations and work towards resolution of outstanding issues. The responsible

attitude and cooperative behaviour of the two countries in the wake of Pathankot attack on

Indian Airforce Base on 2 January 2016 suggests that both the countries are eager to move

forward in their relations although the road ahead would be thorny and full of complexities,

and even developments related to this single incident could make their relations tense once

again.

7.3 Pakistan-Saudi Relations and Pakistan’s Approach to Issues in ME

Historically, Pakistan and Kingdom of Saudi Araba (KSA) had enjoyed cordial and

friendly relations. However, the year 2015 witnessed some variations in their bilateral

relations for certain internal issues. Since Saudi Arabia is facing some serious internal and

regional challenges, it has high hopes on Pakistan to support her in hour of need. While

Pakistan has a genuine interest for helping the KSA but it does not want to engage itself in

the Middle Eastern crisis primarily due to its own internal security challenges in addition to

its relations with western neighbour Iran.

The real test for Pakistan earlier during the year came when KSA asked Pakistan to

send its troops join a coalition against Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen. However, Pakistani

government took the issue to the Parliament to seek advice. The Parliament while pledging

Pakistani support to KSA territorial integrity advised against sending troops to join the

coalition as it will create serious Sunni-Shia conflict within the country which Pakistan

cannot afford at the time when its forces are extensively engaged in fight against militancy.

Subsequently, the government politely denied sending the troops but the decision of the



parliament and that of the government was not received well in KSA and the relations

between the two countries got tensed. PM Nawaz Sharif along with Army Chief visited Saudi

Arabia in third week of April to minimize the damage caused by Pakistan’s decision of not

sending troops.

In November 2015, Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif paid an important visit to the

Kingdom and met with top leadership of the country including King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz.

Gen Sharif once again assured Saudi leadership to defend the Kingdom against any foreign

aggression. During the meeting, both sides emphasized that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia need

to join hands to eliminate the menace of terrorism and reinvigorate the mechanism to roll

back extremism from the whole region. By then Saudi Arabia had made up its mind to form a

coalition of Muslim block to fight the menace of terrorism. While the Pakistan had earlier

categorically made it clear that it will not engage military in any foreign conflict, the Kingdom

took Army Chief’s call for fighting extremism as tactical agreement for joining the coalition of

34 Muslim countries that Saudi Arabia announced later that excluded Iran, Iraq and Syria. In

essence, the Kingdom went to make such alliance comprising mainly the Sunni countries due

to its uneasy relations with Iran putting Pakistan once again in a very awkward position.

However, Pakistan once again shown a lukewarm response to committing any troops

engagement with the alliance and pledged to support the alliance through all other available

means. With the latest diplomatic row between Saudia and Iran over attack on Saudi

Embassy in Tehran, Saudi government is again expecting Pakistan to remain on its side while

Pakistan is interested to play a mediating role to defuse the tension between the two

Muslim countries. In this regard, PM Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff has visited Iran as

well as to Saudi Arabia to help defuse tensions.

With continued historical tensions between Saudia and Iran, the two countries might

not come closer to each other in near future even if the current crisis is settled amicably.

Therefore, Pakistan will continue to feel itself in awkward position as and when tensions

between Saudi Arabia and Iran escalate.



8 Year 2016: Trends and Challenges

a. PICSS foresees no further reduction in anti-State violence especially

perpetrated by religiously motivated militants. As mentioned earlier,

maximum utility of military operations has been achieved therefore, if

government does not come up with a comprehensive plan encompassing

political, social and economic aspects, hard power alone may keep the

situation at stand-still with chances of escalation of violence. DAESH or

Islamic State is trying to establish its network in urban areas. This will further

complicate the security landscape of the country. If Islamic States sustains

combined efforts of U.S. and Russia and manages to survive for a longer

period of time, it will emerge as more attractive for disgruntled youth in

Pakistan where bad governance, lack of merit, decaying justice system,

corruption and other systematic crimes are paving way for a ‘revolutionary

change’ in the society.

b. Despite success of military operations, leadership of TTP could not be

eliminated which is active across the border and mistrust between Pakistan

and Afghanistan will keep the situation favourable for them there. The

militant leadership hiding in Afghanistan is busy in regrouping and 2016 is

expected to see more violence in urban areas.

c. Sectarian violence is also expected to rise because of many issues directly or

indirectly linked with sectarian tension in the country. Most of the militants

hanged after National Action Plan belonged to Lashkar-e-Jhanvi. Its founder

Malik Ishaq was eliminated in apparently fake police encounter while another

founder Haroon Bhatti was also killed in apparently fake police encounter.

The group also blames security forces for killing of many of its commanders

and workers in Karachi in fake encounters. Revenge attacks will be obvious

outcome as seen in Punjab during 2015. Government failed to give an

impression that it is targeting militants and extremists from both sects.

Iranian backed militants are recruiting thousands of Pakistani Shia youths to



fight in Syria and Iraq. No action has been taken so far by the government or

law enforcement agencies to stop Pakistani youth from going for a sectarian

war. This overlooking is giving negative signals to Sunni extremist groups. Also

when these battle hardened fighters will come back, the sectarian rivalry and

fighting are expected to escalate. Saudi-Iran tension will also pour fuel on the

fire. Pakistan is generally closer to Saudi Arabia but it cannot go against Iran.

Pakistan’s Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith Muslims openly support Saudi Arabia

and publicly criticise Iran, while Shia and Brailvee Muslims are openly against

Saudi Arabia. Traditionally, Pakistan’s State functioning does not take into

account sectarian issues as from Pakistan’s founder to ex-President Asif Ali

Zardari many Shia ruled the country despite 85 percent population being

Sunni Muslims. However, presence of militant groups and propaganda

machinery of Iranian and Saudi funded groups in the country are making

situation worse.

d. The peace talks between Afghan Taliban and Afghan government are vital for

improvement in security situation in the region. If an agreement is reached

then, its positive impact is expected for Pakistan as well. But presence of

DAESH and sanctuaries of TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups in Afghanistan

will keep the situation complex for Pakistan

i Siddiqa, A. (August 13, 2015). Providing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor a Security Blanket.

Institute of Strategic Studies. ii Khan, M. ( May 04, 2015). Tackling the Security Challenges to CPEC. Pakistan Observer. iii Rana, A. M. ( May 17, 2015). Economic Corridor Challenges. Dawn. iv Khan, M. ( May 04, 2015). Tackling the Security Challenges to CPEC. Pakistan Observer.

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