Analysis Report on Comparative Data - Genron NPO · 2015-06-17 · and utilized in a dialogue...

Copyright(c) 2015 The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute All Rights Reserved.

The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2015)

Analysis Report on Comparative Data

In Cooperation with:

Japan: Public Opinion Research Institute Corporation

South Korea: Hankook Research Co.Ltd

May 2015


RECOMMENDED CITATION: The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, May 2015,

“The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2015) ”

The Genron NPO East Asia Institute

2


<INDEX>

1. Impression on One Another’s Countries ･･････････････････ 4

2. Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries ･･･････････ 7

3. Present and Future Japan-South Korea Relations ･･････････ 8

4. Diplomatic Relations and Private Exchange････････････････ 13

5. Historical Issues between Japan and South Korea ･･････････ 16

6. The Future of the Korean Peninsula ･････････････････････ 19

7. Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea ････････ 20

8. The Territorial Dispute and Security in East Asia ････････････ 21

9. Media Coverage and Public Opinion on the Internet ･････････ 23

10. Background to Mutual Understanding ････････････････････ 24

11. The Olympics/Paralympics and Japan-South Korea Relations･･･ 26

3


< Survey Overview>

From April to May 2015, The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted joint

public opinion polls in Japan and South Korea. The objective of this annual survey is to monitor

the state of mutual understanding and awareness of the Japanese and South Korean public, in

order to contribute closing the gap in the perceptions of each other between the two societies,

and promoting greater mutual understanding. The result of this survey will also be presented

and utilized in a dialogue between Japan and South Korea, ‘Japan-Korea Future Dialogue’ on

June 21, 2015. The dialogue and joint opinion polls have been conducted annually since 2013

aiming to improve the relationship between the two countries.

The opinion poll in Japan was fielded from April 9 to 30, through the door-to-door home-visit

method targeting the men and women over the age of 18 (excluding high school students). The

number of total valid responses obtained was 1,000. The final academic qualifications of

respondents were as follows: elementary/middle school certificate 9.9%, high school certificate

45.5%, junior college/technical college certificate 18.3%, bachelor’s degree 23.2%, and

master’s degree and above 2.1%.

The opinion poll in South Korea was fielded from April 17 to May 8, through face-to-face

interview, targeting men and women over the age of 19. The number of total valid responses

obtained was 1,010. The final academic qualifications of respondents were as follows: lower

than elementary school certificate 7.8%, middle school certificate 7.1%, high school certificate

37.4%, university/college (currently studying and expulsion) 11.4%, bachelor’s degree 35.0%,

and master’s degree and above 1.3%.

<Intellectual Survey>

From mid-April to early May 2015, the Genron NPO and EAI have conducted an additional

survey targeting intellectuals in Japan and South Korea. In Japan, the questionnaire consisted of

19 questions which excerpted from the public opinion poll was sent to approximately 6,000

intellectuals who have previously participated in the discussions and surveys organized by The

Genron NPO. Responses were obtained from 634 intellectuals. In South Korea, the same

questionnaire was sent to approximately 5,000 intellectuals by email. Total response obtained

was 310. Those respondents are considered as representative of well-informed intellectuals in

Japan and South Korea. The intellectual survey is designed to complement the analysis of

general public opinion poll.

4


1．Impression on One Another’s Countries

1-1. Impressions on One Another’s Country among the Japanese and South Korean Public

Impressions of South Korea among the Japanese public continues to be predominantly

unfavorable despite the slight improvement from last year. South Koreans’ impression of Japan

was further aggravated.

While over half of Japanese (52.4%) continue to have “unfavorable” impressions of South Korea (including

“relatively unfavorable,” same applies below), this percentage has slightly improved from last year (54.4%).

Those with “favorable” impressions (23.8%) also increased from last year’s 20.5%.

In South Korea, on the other hand, 72.5% continue to have “unfavorable” impressions of Japan (compared to

70.9% last year). The percentage with “favorable” impressions of Japan further decreased from last year’s

17.5% to 15.7%, showing that there has not been an end to the worsening of aggravated sentiments.

※ Among Japanese intellectuals, the percentage with “favorable” impressions (42.7% this year, 41.7% last year) continues to contend with “unfavorable” impressions (43.2% this year, 44.2% last year), following last year’s trend. For South Korean intellectuals, the percentage with “favorable” impressions increased to 55.2% from last year’s 51.7%, largely exceeding the 36.4% with “unfavorable” impressions (36.8% last year).

【Figure 1 Impression of One Another’s Countries】

※The data for “Favorable” impression includes both “Favorable” and “Relatively favorable” responses. The data for “Unfavorable”

impression includes both “Unfavorable” and “Relatively unfavorable” responses.

Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000） Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010）

23.8%

52.4%

23.8%

0.0%

20.5%

54.4%

25.1%

0.0%

0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%80.0%

2015

2014

15.7%

72.5%

11.9%

0.0%

17.5%

70.9%

11.7%

0.0%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0%

2015

2014

Favorable

impression

Unfavorable

impression

Neither

No response

5


1-2. Reasons behind the Impressions between the Two Countries

In both countries, “history” and the “territorial disputes” are the main causes that adversely affect

the impressions of the two countries on one another.

The Japanese public’s negative impressions of South Korea were found to mainly be due to “criticism of

Japan over historical issues” (74.6%), in line with last year’s response (73.9%). This cause is followed by

the “Continuing confrontation over Takeshima” (36.5%), which showed a slight decreased from last year

(41.9%).

On the other hand, the South Korean public’s negative impressions of Japan were found to be caused by

“Japan's lack of remorse for historical invasions” (74.0%), which slightly decreased in percentage points from

last year (76.8%) but largely remained the leading opinion. The second leading response was the “Continuing

confrontation over Dokdo,” cited by 69.3% (71.6% last year) of South Koreans.

In terms of reasons for positive impressions of one another’s countries, the majority (51.7%) of Japanese cite

their “interest in South Korean TV drama and music.” This percentage, however, has dropped from last year’s

59.0%. In contrast, a 63.9% majority of South Koreans (56.8% last year) cite their reason as “Japanese people

are kind and earnest,” followed by “Japan is a developed country with a high living standard” (49.4% this year,

53.4% last year). “Both countries are democratic” constituted a mere 8.9% of opinions, showing a decrease

from last year’s 14.8%.

6


【Figure 2 Reasons for Negative Impressions】

74.6%

36.5%

13.0%

19.1%

15.3%

28.1%

2.9%

0.8%

0.0%

73.9%

41.9%

17.5%

14.2%

30.0%

3.1%

2.2%

0.4%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

Criticism of Japan overhistorical issues

Continuing confrontation overTakeshima

Incomprehensible nationalismin behavior and ideas

South Korean people'semotional attitude toward

Japan

Some South Korean peoplemix politics with sports

The badwill expressed bysome South Korean

politicians toward Japan

Others

No particular reason

No response

2015

2014(N=544)

74.0%

69.3%

4.1%

16.7%

7.4%

24.7%

1.9%

0.5%

0.0%

76.8%

71.6%

5.5%

14.3%

6.3%

22.9%

0.7%

0.7%

0.7%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Japan's lack of remorse forhistorical invasions of South

Korea

Continuing confrontation overDokdo

Japanese people discriminateagainst South Koreans living in

Japan

There are differences betweenJapanese people's stated

principles (tatemae) and theirreal intentions (hon'ne)

Japan's conservative swing

The badwill expressed bySome Japanese politicians

toward South Korea

Others

No particular reason

No response

2015

2014(N=711)


7


1-3. Awareness of Issues on Current National Sentiment between Japan and South Korea

Approximately 70% of both Japanese and South Koreans consider the current worsening national

sentiments as “undesirable” or a “problem.”

Nearly a third (29.0%) of Japanese recognize current worsening national sentiment between the two

countries as “an undesirable situation” and express concerns. Furthermore, 38.8% feel that “there is a problem”

that needs to be resolved – together, a total of nearly 70% of Japanese see the current state of national

sentiments as a problem. On the other hand, 26.4% of South Koreans see the current state of national

sentiments as “an undesirable situation,” while 40.8% feel that “there is a problem” that needs to be resolved.

Together, nearly 70% of South Koreans likewise see the issue as a problem. The only difference is that, while

less than 10% of Japanese see the situation as something “natural can be understood,” this number is a

definitive 28.1% for South Koreans.

8


【Figure 3 Recognition of Current Situation between Japan and South Korea】

【2014 Result: Recognition of Current Situation between Japan and South Korea】

※This question was only asked to the respondents who answered that in the past year the “Changes in impressions of one

another’s countries” was either “No substantial change”, “Relatively worsened” or had “Greatly worsened” in 2014.

Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000）

A 28.1%

B 26.4%

C 40.8%

D 2.2%

E 2.5%

F 0.0%

A 9.6%

B 29.0%

C 38.8%

D 8.4%

E 13.8%

F 0.4%

A The situation is both natural and

understandable

B This is an undesirable situation. I

have concerns

C This sittuation is a problem and it

needs to be resolved

D I don’t think that the national

sentiment is unfavorable

E Don’t know

F No response

Public Opinion in South Korea (N=1010）

A 20.0%

B 23.3%

C 46.4%

D 8.2%

E 2.1%

A 13.2%

B 29.8%

C 31.4%

D 24.8%

E 0.7%

A The situation is both natural and

understandable

B This is an undesirable situation. I

have concerns

C This sittuation is a problem and it

needs to be resolved

D Don’t know

E No response


9


2．Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries

2-1. Understanding of the Social/Political Systems of One Another’s Countries

Over half of the Japanese public consider current South Korean society to be “ethnicism,” while

over half of the South Koreans public consider Japan as “militarism.”

In terms of the current social/political systems of one another’s countries, the majority of Japanese (55.7%)

see the current state of South Korea as “ethnicistic,” up 10 percentage points from last year’s 44.8%. Following

this, 38.6% see South Korea as “nationalistic,” also showing an increase from last year’s 32.4%. Only a mere

14.0% see South Korea as “democratic,” a large drop from last year’s 21.5%.

On the other hand, the majority of South Koreans (56.9%) see the current state of Japan as “militaristic,” (up

from last year’s 53.1%), followed by “capitalistic” at 38.9% (35.2% last year). At the same time, 34.3% of South

Koreans see Japan as “hegemonistic,” largely exceeding last year’s 26.8%. Following last year’s trend, only

20% or so see Japan as a “democratic” nation (22.2% this year, 24.9% last year).

Additionally, for both Japanese and South Koreans, less than 10% (6.6% and 4.2% respectively) see one

another’s countries as “pacifistic.”

※ Like the popular opinion poll, a nearly 80% majority of Japanese intellectuals also see South Korea as “ethnicistic” (78.1%,

70.6% last year). The majority of South Korean intellectuals, on the other hand, see Japan as “nationalistic” (64.8% this year, showing an increase from last year’s 57.8%), followed by “ethnicistic” (46.8%, 53.5% last year) and “capitalistic” (41.0%, 34.0% last year).

10


【Figure 4 Understanding of Social/Political Systems in One Another’s Countries】

Hegemonism Socialism/

Communism

4.2%

34.3%

31.5%

22.2%

56.9%

6.1%

38.9%

15.0%

26.5%

34.3%

11.2%

0.3%

0.0%

5.3%

35.7%

35.1%

24.9%

53.1%

3.9%

35.2%

11.5%

24.0%

26.8%

7.3%

0.7%

0.8%

0% 20% 40% 60%

2015

2014No Response

Pacifism

Ethnicism Democracy

International Cooperation

Nationalism

Capitalism

Militarism

Liberalism Great Power

Favoritism

6.6%

38.6%

55.7%

14.0%

28.9%

3.0%

20.6%

6.4%

5.4%

8.5%

5.1%

1.8%

6.1%

8.4%

32.4%

44.8%

21.5%

28.8%

1.9%

28.2%

6.7%

3.9%

4.7%

5.8%

1.6%

8.5%

0%20%40%60%

2015

2014Others

Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000） Public Opinion in South Korea（N=1010）

11


3． Present and Future Japan-South Korea Relations

3-1. How Current and Future Japan-South Korea Relations are Viewed

More than 60% Japanese and almost 80% South Koreans consider the current state of

Japan-South Korea relations to be “bad”. On the other hand, the expectations on the bilateral

relations to improve in the future are growing in both countries.

A high level of Japanese (65.4%) still see current Japan-South Korea relations as “bad” (including both

“extremely bad” and “relatively bad,” same applies hereafter), with a slight improvement from last year (73.8%).

On the other hand, 78.3% of South Koreans continue to see current Japan-South Korea relations as “bad,”

following the trend from last year (77.8%).

In terms of future prospects for Japan-South Korea relations, the majority of both Japanese (41.4%, 32.9%

last year) and South Koreans (45.9%, 38.1% last year) feel that the current state of difficult bilateral relations

will not change — a view that has increased in both countries since last year. However, there was also an

increase in both Japanese (21.9%, 15.6% last year) and South Koreans (19.0%, 13.8% last year) who feel that

relations “will improve” (including “will probably improve”), and the percentage of those who feel conditions “will

get worse” (including “will probably get worse”) dropped for both the Japanese (12.1%, 22.7% last year) and

South Koreans (28.4%, 39.4% last year). More people thus see a brighter prospect for improving relations

between Japan and South Korea.

12


【Figure 5 Current State of Japan-South Korea Relations】

【Figure 6 Future of Japan-South Korea Relations】

5.8%

28.8%

65.4%

0.0%

5.0%

21.1%

73.8%

0.1%

0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%80.0%

2015

2014

2.6%

19.2%

78.3%

0.0%

2.3%

19.9%

77.8%

0.0%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0%

2015

2014

21.9%

41.4%

12.1%

24.3%

0.3%

15.6%

32.9%

22.7%

28.6%

0.2%

0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%

2015

2014

19.0%

45.9%

28.4%

6.6%

0.0%

13.8%

38.1%

39.4%

8.7%

0.0%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0%

2015

2014

“Will improve” / “will

probably improve”

Will not change

“Will get worse” / “Will

probably get worse”

Neither / Don’t

know

No response


Extremely good /

Relatively good

Neither Good

nor Bad

Extremely bad /

Relatively bad

No response


13


3-2. What Hinders the Development of Bilateral Relations

Both Japanese and South Koreans consider the “Takeshima/Dokdo territorial disputes” and the

“comfort women issue” to be the greatest barrier to the development of bilateral relations.

The majority of Japanese (62.0%) still see the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” as the greatest barrier to the

development of bilateral relations, although a slight decrease can be seen from last year’s results (68.9%).

Likewise, 88.3% of South Koreans (92.2% last year) also voice the same opinion. This year, the “comfort

women issue” was also included as one of the answer choices, and this became the second leading response

in both countries (58.5% for Japanese and 63.5% for South Koreans).

※ For this question, results differed between intellectuals of the two countries. In Japan, the majority of intellectuals (47.3%) see the “comfort women issue” as the greatest barrier, followed by “education and recognition of history in South Korea” (34.1%), “anti-Japanese coverage in South Korean news media” (33.0%) and “anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean people” (31.5%). For South Korean intellectuals, on the other hand, “education and recognition of history in Japan” was overwhelmingly the leading response, at 66.8%.

【Figure 7 Barriers to Bilateral Relations】

62.0% 58.0%

5.0% 0.7% 1.6% 3.7%

33.0%

7.4%

32.5%

3.1%

20.8%

2.4%

22.2%

13.5%

1.4% 1.7%

88.3%

63.5%

9.8% 7.6%

1.4%

8.3% 16.6%

42.1%

15.2%

2.3% 1.6%

25.6%

7.8% 6.4%

0.7% 0.0% 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Disputes over T

akeshima/D

okdo

The com

fort wom

en issue

Econom

ic friction (over trade barriers,technology transfer etc.)

Japan's military buildup

South K

orea's military buildup

Anti-S

outh Korean sentim

entam

ong Japanese people

Anti-Japanese sentim

entam

ong South K

orean people

Education and recognition of history in

Japan

Education and recognition of history in

South K

orea

Anti-S

outh Korean coverage

in Japanese news m

edia

Anti-Japanese coverage in S

outh Korean

news m

edia

Japanese politicians' remarks inciting

anti-South K

orean sentiment

South K

orean politicians' remarks inciting

anti-Japanese sentiment

Lack of trust in relations between

Japanese and South K

orean people

Don't know

No response

Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000)

Public Opinion in Korea（N=1010)

14


3-3. How the Importance of Japan-South Korea Relations is Viewed

Over 60% of Japanese and nearly 90% of South Koreans consider the Japan-South Korea

relationship to be “important.”

A 65.3% majority of Japanese see Japan-South Korea relations as “important” (including “relatively

important,” same applies hereafter), exceeding last year’s 60.0%, while 87.4% of South Koreans (73.4% last

year) think the same. On the other hand, a mere 15.7% of Japanese (10.0% last year) and 9.1% of South

Koreans (6.7% last year) see Japan-South Korea relations as “unimportant” (including “relatively unimportant”).

This year’s results were influenced by the fact that “don’t know” was taken off the list of answer choices; the

results show that the majority of people who responded they “don’t know” last year shifted their responses to

“important.”

【Figure 8 Importance of Bilateral Relations Between Japan and South Korea】

Important or relatively

important

Neither

Unimportant or relatively

unimportant

Don’t know

No response


65.3%

15.7%

19.0%

0.0%

60.0%

20.9%

10.0%

8.9%

0.2%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

2015

2014

87.4%

9.1%

3.6%

0.0%

73.4%

17.8%

6.7%

2.1%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

2014

15


3-4. “Importance” and “Affinity” of Japan-South Korea Relations Compared to China

South Koreans feel more affinity towards China in comparison to Japan, and the majority of South

Koreans consider South Korea-China relations as “more important.” The percentage of Japanese

public who consider Japan-China relations as “more important” is on the rise.

In terms of the importance of Japan-South Korea relations in comparison to Japan-China and South

Korea-China relations, nearly half of Japanese (49.1%, 47.0% last year) feel that “both are of the same

importance.” Likewise, nearly half of South Koreans (46.6%, 47.0% last year) also view both as “of the same

importance.” In South Korea, however, an almost equivalent percentage (44.8%, 43.8% last year) feel that

“South Korea-China relations are more important.” There was likewise a 10-point increase in Japanese (from

15.6% last year to 25.1% this year) who feel Japan-China relations are “more important.”

Regarding which country the Japanese feel more affinity to, most Japanese (34.5%, 31.8% last year) say

that they feel no affinity toward either. While the majority of Japanese (37.2%) responded that they feel “more

affinity to South Korea” last year, this response decreased this year to 31.0%. For South Koreans, a 41.0%

majority (38.8% last year) feel “more affinity to China” while a mere 11.1% feel “more affinity to Japan” (12.3%

last year).

【Figure 9 Importance of Japan-South Korea Relations and Relations with China】

5.0%

44.8%

46.6%

3.7%

0.0%

4.0%

43.8%

47.0%

5.1%

0.1%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0%

2015

2014

Japan-South Korea relations

are more important

Relations with China

are more important

Both relations are

equally important

Neither / don’t know

No response


10.6%

25.1%

49.1%

15.0%

0.2%

12.4%

15.6%

47.0%

24.7%

0.3%

0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%

2015

2014

16


【Figure 10 Affinity Toward One Another’s Countries and Toward China】

More affinity felt toward

Japan/Sotuh Korea

More affinity felt toward

China

Equal affinity felt toward

both

No affinity felt toward either

Neither / Don’t know

No response


31.0%

6.5%

11.3%

34.5%

16.7%

0.0%

37.2%

5.0%

10.2%

31.8%

15.8%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%

2015

2014

11.1%

41.0%

12.0%

30.4%

5.5%

0.0%

12.3%

38.8%

12.1%

29.3%

7.6%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60%

2015

2014

17


4. Diplomatic Relations and Private Exchanges

4-1. Necessity of a Japan-South Korea Summit and the Summit’s Agenda

Over 80% of both Japanese and South Korean consider a Japan-South Korea summit. However, in

South Korea, approximately 70% say that “the need exists but there is no urgency.” In terms of

summit’s agendas for bilateral talks, the majority in Japan consider a “broadranging discussion on

how to improve relations” to be the most important agenda, while, in South Korea, there is a

strong tendency to focus on issues regarding “history” and “territory." .

A total of over 80% of both countries’ people feel the need for a Japan-South Korea summit. However, the

majority of both Japanese (43.5%, 40.5% last year) and South Koreans (69.9%, 72.4% last year) say that “the

need exists but there is no urgency.” In regards to the summit’s agenda, a 45.3% majority of Japanese consider

a “broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between the two countries” to be the most important

agenda, largely surpassing last year’s 35.6%. In contrast, a 77.7% majority of South Koreans (76.3% last year)

view “issues on historical understanding and comfort women” to be the most important agenda, closely followed

by the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” (69.3%, 70.3% last year), highlighting the high level of interest in issues

regarding “history” and “territory” in South Korea.

※ On the other hand, a 53.5% majority of Japanese (50.2% last year) and 68.1% majority of South Korean intellectuals say that the most important agenda at a Japan-South Korea summit is a “broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between the two countries.”

【Figure 11 Necessity of Japan-South Korea Summit】

A 38.0%

B 43.5%

C 6.2% D

11.9%

E 0.4%

A 16.9%

B 69.9%

C 8.8%

D 4.4% E 0.0% A Yes, every effort should be made

to achieve this

B Yes but it is not urgent

C No, it is not necessary

D Don’t know

E No response


18


【Figure 12 Agendas for Japan-South Korea Summit】

4-2． Impression of One Another’s Political Leaders

The majority in both countries see one another’s political leaders as “unfavorable.” Over 80% of

the South Korean public have an “unfavorable impression” of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo

Abe.

Nearly half of Japanese (48.3%, 45.3% last year) have an “unfavorable impression” (including both

“extremely unfavorable” and “relatively unfavorable,” same applies hereafter) of the South Korean president,

while a mere 5.2% (7.0% last year) have a “favorable impression.” On the other hand, 80.5% of South Koreans

have an “unfavorable” impression of the Japanese prime minister (exceeding last year’s 75.9%) and a mere

2.1% have a “favorable” impression (1.8% last year).

22.9% 22.0%

45.3%

16.1% 23.0%

6.0% 3.8%

22.0%

6.4% 1.0%

9.7%

0.1%

21.7%

43.0%

33.5%

77.7%

26.5%

10.8% 10.5%

69.6%

8.9%

0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

North K

orea's nuclear program

Building trust betw

een the political leaders of the tw

o countries

A broad ranging discussion on how

to im

prove relations between the tw

o countries

Issues of historical understanding and former

comfort w

omen

Intergovernmental program

s of cooperation in areas such as econom

y and culture for the future of both countries

Various civil exchange program

s

How

to strengthen cooperative relations on trade and investm

ent and create a free trade zone

Takeshim

a/Dokdo issues

Japan-South K

orea cooperation on military

and security

Others

Don't know

No response

Public Opinion in Japan

Public Opinion in South Korea

19


Yes

No

Don’t know

No response

【Figure 13 Impression of One Another’s Leaders】

4-3. Views about Visits to Each Other’s Country

Over 40% of Japanese and nearly 60% of South Koreans hope to visit one another’s countries.

Like last year, both countries’ people were highly interested in visiting one another’s countries, with 40.7% of

Japanese (41.6% last year) expressing interest in traveling to South Korea, and 59.2% of South Koreans

(60.9% last year) expressing interest in traveling to Japan. On the other hand, 35.9% of Japanese (37.3% last

year) and 31.0% of South Koreans (30.9% last year) were uninterested in visiting the respective countries.

【Figure 14 Do You Hope to Visit Each Other’s Country?】

Extremely favorable

/ Relatively

favorable Neutral

Extremely unfavorable /

Relatively unfavorable

Don’t know

Indifferent

No response



5.2%

25.8%

48.3%

8.9%

11.8%

0.0%

7.0%

25.3%

45.3%

10.0%

12.1%

0.3%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

2015

2014

2.1%

8.8%

80.5%

2.2%

6.4%

0.0%

1.8%

10.6%

75.9%

4.9%

6.8%

0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

2014

40.7%

35.9%

23.1%

0.3%

41.6%

37.3%

21.1%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%80%

2015

2014

59.2%

31.0%

9.8%

0.0%

60.9%

30.9%

8.3%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

2015

2014

20


5. Historical Issues between Japan and South Korea

5-1. Views of Japanese and South Korean Peoples about Historical Issues

In Japan, the majority see historical issues as difficult to resolve, while in South Korea, the

majority say that “relations will not develop further if issues of historical understanding are not

resolved.” This infers a general perception in South Korea that the resolution of historical issues is

a necessary premise for improving Japan-South Korea relations.

In regards to Japan-South Korea relations and historical issues, most Japanese (35.1%, 34.7% last year)

feel that “even if relations develop further, it will be difficult to resolve issues of historical understanding.” On the

other hand, the optimistic view that “as relations develop further, issues of historical understanding will be

gradually resolved” remained at around 20% (19.3% this year, 20.0% last year). In contrast, 52.5% of South

Koreans feel that “relations will not develop further if issues of historical understanding are not resolved,” largely

exceeding last year’s 41.1%. At the same time, 24.8% of South Koreans feel that “even if relations develop

further, it will be difficult to resolve issues of historical understanding” (30.6% last year), while 20.9% feel that

“as relations develop, issues of historical understanding will be gradually resolved” (23.3% last year).

As for issues of historical understanding that need to be resolved, a 52.5% majority of Japanese say

“anti-Japan education and the depictions of history in textbooks in South Korean schools,” closely followed by

“South Koreans’ excessive anti-Japan acts of aggression over historical issues” (52.1%).

For South Koreans, 76.0% feel the need to resolve “the depiction of history in textbooks in Japanese

schools,” a slightly lower percentage than last year’s 81.9%, but still the leading response. This is followed by

the issues of “Japanese people’s perception of comfort women” (69.8%, 71.6% last year), “Japan’s perception

of its invasions of South Korea” (60.9%, 70.6% last year) and the “Japanese lack of apology or remorse for

historical events” (59.6%, 58.7% last year).

【Figure 15 Bilateral Relations and Historical Issues】

Public Opinion in South Korea（N=1010） Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000）

A Relations will not develop further

if issues of historical

understanding are not resolved

B As relations develop further,

issues of historical

understanding will be gradually

resolved

C Even if relations develop further,

it will be difficult to resolve

issues of historical

understanding

D Don’t know

E No response

A

27.1%

B

19.3%

C

35.1%

D

18.1%

E

0.4%

A

52.5%

B

20.9%

C

24.8%

D

1.9% E

0.0%

21


【Figure 16 Challenges to Resolve First in Issues of Historical Understanding

between Japan and South Korea】

Public Opinion in Japan（N=1000）

Public Opinion in South Korea（N=1010）

25.2%

18.6%

9.5% 16.9% 9.3%

10.7% 10.5%

52.5%

32.8% 29.2%

52.1%

1.2% 2.8% 11.8%

0.1%

22.7% 19.2%

10.6%

24.1%

9.2% 11.0% 10.7%

56.1%

34.8% 32.1%

54.4%

1.0% 1.9%

15.3%

0.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Japan's perception of its invasions of S

outh Korea

The depiction of history in

textbooks in Japanese schools

Reparations by Japan for W

WII

and forced labor

Reparations to form

er comfort

wom

en

Japanese politicians' remarks

about South K

orea

Japanese news coverage of

South K

orea

Japanese lack of apology or rem

orse for historical events

Anti-Japan education and the

depictions of history in textbooks in S

outh Korean schools

South K

orean politicians' remarks

about Japan

South K

orean news coverage of

Japan

South K

oreans' anti-Japan acts of aggression over historical issues

There are no m

ore major issues

to be resolved

Others

Don't know

No response

2015

2014

60.9%

76.0%

39.1%

69.8%

46.7%

27.2%

59.6%

18.4% 10.1%

8.9% 12.6% 0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 0.0%

70.6%

81.9%

47.1%

71.6%

53.8%

35.0%

58.7%

27.2%

16.4% 13.7%

16.0%

0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 0.0% 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Japan's perception of its invasions of S

outh Korea

The depiction of history in textbooks

in Japanese schools

Reparations by Japan for W

WII and

forced labor

Japanese people's perception of com

fort wom

en

Japanese politicians' remarks about

South K

orea

Japanese news coverage of S

outh K

orea

Japanese lack of apology or rem

orse for historical events

Anti-Japan education and the

depictions of history in textbooks in S

outh Korean schools

South K

orean politicians' remarks

about Japan

South K

orean news coverage of

Japan

South K

oreans' anti-Japan acts of aggression over historical issues

There are no m

ore major issues to

be resolved

Others

Don't know

No response

2015 2014

22


5-2. Views About Japanese Prime Minister’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine

While 70% of Japanese acknowledge and accept their prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni

Shrine, nearly 70% of South Koreans are against the visit, stating that it is “not acceptable even if

the visit is as a private citizen.”

In terms of the Japanese prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, 41.3% of Japanese (43.0% last year)

continue to acknowledge the visit as “not a problem.” Adding in the 29.1% (24.9% last year) who say that the

visit is “not a problem if the visit is as a private citizen,” over 70% of Japanese accept and acknowledge the

prime minister’s visit. On the other hand, 64.6% of South Koreans (66.5% last year) say that the visit is “not

acceptable, whether [it] is made in an official capacity or as a private citizen.” Those who view the visit as “not a

problem” constituted a mere 3.3% (3.1% last year) and, adding those who say that the visit is “not a problem if

the visit is as a private citizen” (22.4%, 21.8% last year), a total of less than 30% accept the Japanese prime

minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

【Figure 17 Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to Yasukuni】

A Not a problem

B Not a problem if the visit is

as a private citizen

C Not acceptable, whether [it]

is made in an official capacity

or as a private citizen

D Don’t know

E No response


A 41.3%

B 29.1%

C 16.7%

D 12.7%

E 0.2%

A 3.3%

B 22.4%

C 64.6%

D 9.8%

E 0.0%

23


6. The Future of the Korean Peninsula

6-1. Korean Peninsula in a 10 Years’ Time

In regards to the state of the Korean Peninsula in 10 years, the view that the situation “will not

change” increased among both countries’ respondents.

In regards to the state of the Korean Peninsula 10 years on, the view that it “will remain unchanged” largely

increased among the Japanese, from 26.2% last year to 42.1% this year, exceeding the 33.9% who say that it

“cannot be predicted” (50.6% last year).

The view that the current state “will remain unchanged” was also the leading opinion (35.0%) this year in

South Korea, one of the countries in the Korean Peninsula, and the large rise from last year’s 23.2% pushed it

above last year’s leading opinion that the situation “cannot be predicted” (26.3% this year, 36.9% last year). In

South Korea, 27.6% also expressed the view that “will move toward reunification” (26.4% last year).

※ While the majority of Japanese intellectuals feel that the situation “cannot be predicted” (33.4%, 30.8% last year), nearly 30% also feel that “will move toward reunification” (27.8%, 30.3% last year). On the other hand, the view that “will move toward reunification” constituted a 46.1% majority of South Korean intellectuals’ opinions (50.9% last year).

【Figure 18 State of Korean Peninsula in 10 Years】


A 42.1%

B 13.5%

C 9.6%

D 33.9%

E 0.7%

F 0.2%

A 35.0%

B 10.6%

C 27.6%

D 26.3%

E 0.5%

F 0.0%

A Will remain unchanged

B South Korea-North

Koreaconfrontation will be

intensified

C Will move towards

unification

D Others

E Can't be predicted

F No response

24


7. Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea

7-1. Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea

In regards to economic relations between Japan and South Korea, the majorities in both countries

consider that one another’s economic development will have a positive influence on their own

countries.

Nearly half of the Japanese public (49.5%, 42.8% last year) express the view that “economic growth in South

Korea is both beneficial and necessary to Japan” (including those that “tend to agree,” same applies hereafter),

showing an increasing understanding that South Korea’s economic development is also beneficial to Japan.

This “beneficial” view of economic relations has also become prevalent among the South Korean public as

well (46.6%, 43.3% last year), exceeding the view that “economic growth in Japan is a threat to South Korea”

(37.0%, 37.5% last year).

【Figure 19 Economic Relations between Japan and South Korea】

Ａ Economic growth in Japan is both beneficial and necessary for South Korea.

Ｂ Economic growth in Japan is a threat to South Korea.

Ａ Economic growth in South Korea is both beneficial and necessary for Japan.

Ｂ Economic growth in South Korea is a threat to Japan.

Agree with A 19.9%

Agree with A 14.2%

Tend to agree with A 29.6%

Tend to agree with A 28.6%

Tend to agree with B 13.0%

Tend to agree with B

18.1%

Agree with B 9.6%

Agree with B 8.5%

Don't know 27.2%

Don't know 29.8%

No response 0.7%

No response 0.8%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

2014

Agree with A, 26.0%

Agree with A, 23.5%

Tend to agree with A

20.6%

Tend to agree with A

19.8%



Agree with B 18.3%

Agree with B 16.9%

Don't know 16.3%

Don't know 19.1%

No response 0.0%

No response 0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

2014


25


8. The Territorial Dispute and Security in East Asia

8-1. Views on Military Threat and Dispute in East Asia

In South Korea, nearly 60% see “Japan” as a military threat. Furthermore, nearly 40% foresee a

future military dispute between Japan and South Korea.

The majority of Japanese see “North Korea” as the largest military threat (71.6%, 72.5% last year), followed

by “China” (64.3% this year, a decrease from last year’s 71.4%). The majority of South Koreans likewise cite

“North Korea” as the largest military threat (83.4%, also 83.4% last year), but this is followed by “Japan” at

58.1% — a large increase from last year’s 46.3% — exceeding “China” at 36.8% (39.6% last year).

In regards to the possibility of military conflict between Japan and South Korea, 65.7% of Japanese say that

it “will not occur,” showing a rise from last year’s 57.0%. Less than 10% of Japanese express concerns that

military dispute between Japan and South Korea “will occur within a few years” (0.7%, 0.4% last year) or “will

occur in the future” (8.6%, 8.8% last year). On the other hand, while a 48.2% majority of South Koreans

likewise say that military conflict “will not occur” (47.9% last year), a total of nearly 40% of the South Korean

public also foresee a future military dispute “within a few years” (5.3%, 6.7% last year) or “in the future” (32.5%,

34.1% last year).

In terms of resolving the territorial dispute in East Asia, the majority of Japanese (38.8%) believe that “the

matter should be taken to the International Court of Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law,”

followed by the view that “the matter should be resolved by the two countries involved by peaceful means”

(21.5%). In South Korea, a 33.4% majority feel that “the matter should be resolved by the two countries

involved by peaceful means,” followed by the view that “the matter should be taken to the International Court of

Justice to be resolved in accordance with international law” (25.0%), and the opinion to “strengthen practical

control and prevent intervention from other countries” (17.9%).

※ The majority of Japanese intellectuals feel that “the dispute should be shelved over the long term [to] prioritize the amelioration of bilateral relations and strengthening of friendly ties” (31.2%). In contrast, 37.1% of South Korean intellectuals feel the best solution is to “strengthen practical control and prevent intervention from other countries.”

26


【Figure 20 Countries and Areas Percieved as Military Threat】

※Korean respondents were asked to identify up to two countries or areas.

Japanese respondents were not restricted in the number of countries or areas they could choose.


11.2%

64.3%

71.6%

36.0%

2.3%

16.4%

9.8%

1.7%

1.4%

4.3%

1.4%

15.1%

71.4%

72.5%

29.0%

1.9%

6.6%

9.9%

0.4%

0.3%

4.9%

0.7%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

South Korea

China

North Korea

Russia

India

Middle East

United States

EU

Others

No country posesa military threat

No response

2015

2014

58.1%

36.8%

83.4%

4.9%

0.0%

3.2%

3.1%

0.2%

0.1%

1.4%

0.0%

46.3%

39.6%

83.4%

5.9%

1.0%

2.9%

4.8%

0.2%

0.0%

2.1%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Japan

China

North Korea

Russia

India

Middle East

United States

EU

Others

No country posesa military threat

No response

2015

2014

27


【Figure 21 Will a Military Confrontation Occur Between Japan and South Korea?】

【Figure 22 How to Resolve the Territorial Dispute】

Will occur within a few years

Will occur in the future

Will not occur

Don’t know

No response


0.7%

8.6%

65.7%

24.8%

0.2%

0.4%

8.8%

57.0%

33.8%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%80%

2015

2014

5.3%

32.5%

48.2%

14.0%

0.0%

6.7%

34.1%

47.9%

11.4%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

2015

2014


A 25.0%

B 33.4%

C 9.9%

D 17.9%

E 7.6%

F 1.0%

G 5.1%

H 0.0%

A 38.8%

B 21.5%

C 12.1%

D 2.5%

E 9.9%

F 0.8%

G 14.3%

H 0.1%

A The matter should be taken to the

International Court of Justice to be

resolved in accordance with

international law

B The matter should be resolved by the

two countries involved by peaceful

means

C The matter should be resolved through

dialogue involving neighboring

countries

D Strengthen practical control and prevent

intervention from other countries

E The dispute should be shelved over the

long term and prioritize amelioration of

bilateral relations and strengthening of

friendly ties

F Others

G Don’t know

H No response

28


9. Media Coverage and Public Opinion on the Internet

9-1. Is Media Coverage in Japan and South Korea Objective and Impartial?

In regards to whether domestic media is “objective and impartial,” the majority of Japanese say

that they “don’t know,” while the majority of South Koreans feel that their domestic media is “not

objective nor impartial.”

In response to the question, “is media coverage in your own country objective and impartial?” the majority of

Japanese say they “don’t know” (43.0%, 48.7% last year), while those who “think so” and those who “don’t think

so” are at almost equal levels at 28.8% (27.0% last year) and 28.2% (24.2% last year) respectively. In

comparison, a 51.7% majority of South Koreans don’t think domestic media is objective and impartial, while

only 26.5% (22.7% last year) think of domestic media as objective and impartial.

【Figure 23 Is the Media Coverage in Your Own Country Objective and Impartial?】

9-2. Do Opinions on the Internet Appropriately Reflect People’s Views in Japan and South

Korea?

The half of South Koreans and 40% of Japanese feel that the Internet “does not appropriately

reflect the state of general public opinion.”

In regards to whether opinions on the internet appropriately reflect people’s views, the response that it does

not reflect public opinion (including “not very appropriately”) increased from 34.1% last year to 42.9% this year

among the Japanese, bringing it almost equal to the 45.3% majority who “don’t know.” The response that it

appropriately reflects public opinion constituted a mere 11.5% of opinions in Japan (11.7% last year). On the

Yes, I think so

No, I don’t think so

Don’t know

No response


28.8%

28.2%

43.0%

0.0%

27.0%

24.2%

48.7%

0.1%

0%20%40%60%

2015 2014

26.5%

51.7%

21.8%

0.0%

22.7%

50.9%

26.4%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60%

2015 2014

29


other hand, more than half of South Koreans (51.2%, 50.6% last year) think that the internet does not

appropriately reflect public opinion, while a steady 35.2% (35.2% last year) think it appropriately reflects public

opinion.

【Figure 24 Do Opinions on the Internet Reflect Public Opinion in Your Country?】

Think the Internet appropriately reflects public opinion

Think the Internet less appropriately reflects public

opinion

Think the Internet does not appropriately reflect public

opinion

Don’t know

No response


11.5%

31.0%

11.9%

45.3%

0.3%

11.7%

25.4%

8.7%

54.0%

0.2%

0%20%40%60%

2015

2014

35.2%

34.8%

16.4%

13.6%

0.0%

35.2%

39.5%

11.1%

14.2%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60%

2015

2014

30


10-1. Degree of Direct Interaction between Japanese and South Koreans

Approximately 20% of both the Japanese and South Korean public have visited one another’s

countries. Over 70% of the Japanese public and over 80% of the South Koreans have no

acquaintances in each other’s country.

In Japan, 26.0% of respondents had visited South Korea (22.5% last year), while similarly, 26.0% of South

Koreans (24.8% last year) had visited Japan. At the same time, 75.7% of Japanese (82.2% last year) and

88.2% of South Koreans (87.2% last year) say that they have never had acquaintances in the respective

country, showing that direct contact between Japanese and South Koreans is extremely scarce.

【Figure 25 Have You Ever Visited Each Other’s Country?】

【 Figure 26 Do You Have Acquaintances in Each Other’s Country?】

10. Background to Mutual Understanding

Yes

No response

No

No response

Yes – Close friends &

acquaintances

Yes – To the extent we

are in contact

No, never.



26.0%

74.0%

0.0%

24.8%

75.2%

0.0%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0%

2015

2014

26.0%

74.0%

0.0%

22.5%

77.3%

0.2%

0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%80.0%

2015

2014

6.0%

5.5%

88.2%

0.2%

6.0%

6.8%

87.2%

0.1%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%

2015

2014

7.6%

16.6%

75.7%

0.1%

5.8%

11.7%

82.2%

0.3%

0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%80.0%100.0%

2015

2014

31


10-2. Information Sources on One Another’s Countries

In both countries, over 90% of the people obtain information on one another’s countries through

“domestic news media,” with an especially strong dependence on “TV.”

Over 90% of both countries’ people (94.3% in Japan and 94.6% in South Korea) obtain information on one

another’s countries through domestic news media, with an especially strong dependence on “TV” sources.

18.1% of Japanese and 58.1% of South Koreans cite “South Korean TV drama, documentaries and films” as

their source of information. In South Korea, other information sources include “experience of family, friends and

acquaintances” (44.0%) and “debate between leading figures in South Korea,” which rose over 20 percentage

points from last year’s 3.2% to 23.5%.

【Figure 27: Source of News for One Another’s Country and Relations between Japan and South Korea】


4.1%

2.4%

94.3%

8.9%

24.5%

7.1%

0.2%

4.4%

0.4%

18.1%

10.9%

9.4%

0.3%

0.4%

2.2%

2.1%

91.5%

7.2%

24.6%

5.3%

0.1%

5.0%

0.1%

19.3%

9.7%

6.9%

0.1%

0.5%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

Conversation with South Koreanpeople

Visits to South Korea

Japanese news media

Japanese books (includingtextbooks)

Japanese TV drama,documentaries and films

South Korean news media

South Korean books

South Korean music

South Korean "anime"

South Korean TV drama,documentaries and films

Debate between leading figures inJapan

Experience of familiy, friends andacquaintances

Others

No response

2015

2014

2.5%

5.7%

94.6%

16.6%

58.1%

10.8%

1.0%

1.1%

6.8%

14.4%

23.5%

44.0%

0.9%

0.0%

3.8%

7.1%

91.3%

24.4%

55.2%

15.3%

3.8%

2.9%

11.6%

11.3%

3.2%

38.7%

0.7%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Conversation with Japanese people

Visits to Japan

South Korean news media

South Korean books (includingtextbooks)

South Korean TV drama,documentaries and films

Japanese news media

Japanese books

Japanese music

Japanese "anime"

Japanese TV drama,documentaries and films

Debate between leading figures inSouth Korea

Experience of familiy, friends andacquaintances

Other

No response

2015

2014(N=1004)

32


11. The Olympics/ Paralympics and Japan-South Korea Relations

11-1. The Olympics/Paralympics and Japan-South Korea Relations

A majority of Japanese see the Pyeongchang 2018 and Tokyo 2020 Olympics/Paralympics as events that

will help the development of Japan-South Korea ties, while 41.9% of South Koreans have not much

expectations.

The Olympics/Paralympics will be held in Pyeongchang, South Korea and Tokyo, Japan in 2018 and 2020

respectively. In this year’s survey, new questions were posed concerning these sporting events. First, regarding

the question of whether Japan and South Korea will be able to strengthen friendly ties through the Olympics

and Paralympics in both countries, 41.6% of Japanese “think so” (including “somewhat think so,” same applies

below), exceeding the 34.8% who “don’t think so.”

In contrast, most South Koreans do not believe the Olympics and Paralympics will play a major role in

developing bilateral relations, and 41.9% of South Koreans answered they “don’t think so,” exceeding the

33.8% who “think so.”

The next question posed was whether the Paralympics could foster greater understanding of the elderly and

disabled. To this, over half of both Japanese (57.4%) and South Koreans (53.4%) answered in the affirmative.

Lastly, in regards to how both Japan and South Korea should conduct dialogue, exchange and cooperation

towards the Paralympics in both countries, over half of Japanese responded “dialogue and exchange on

disabled people’s social participation” (53.0%) and “cooperation on the promotion of sport for disabled people”

(50.3%).

In South Korea, the majority replied “dialogue and exchange on disabled people’s social participation”

(45.5%), followed by “cooperation on the promotion of sport for disabled people” (33.7%)

【Figure 28: Can Japan and South Korea Strengthen Their Friendly Ties

Through the Olympics and Paralympics?】


A 13.2%

B 28.4%

C 23.4%

D 25.8%

E 9.0%

F 0.2%

A 5.5%

B 28.3%

C 24.3%

D 30.4%

E 11.5%

F 0.0%

A Think so

B Somewhat think so

C Neutral

D Somewhat don’t think so

E Don’t think so

F No response

33


【Figure 29: Can the Paralympics Foster Greater Understanding of the Elderly and Disabled?】

【Figure 30: Areas of Japan-South Korea Cooperation and Exchnge for Paralympics】

53.0%

34.9%

50.3%

35.4%

30.0%

0.9%

14.2%

0.0%

45.5%

19.6%

33.7%

19.5% 23.2%

1.2%

8.9%

0.0% 0%

20%

40%

60%

Dialogue and exchange on disabled people’s social participation

Exchange betw

een disabled people

Cooperation on the

promotion of sport for

disabled people

Exchange betw

een the governm

ents and local authorities

Cooperation am

ong relevant com

panies and the private sector

Others

Don't know

No response

Public opinion in Japan(N=1000)Public Opinion in South Korea(N=1010)


A 23.2%

B 34.2%

C 19.4%

D 19.1%

E 4.0% F 0.1%

A 11.2%

B 42.2% C

19.2%

D 19.4%

E 8.0%

F 0.0%

A Think so

B Somewhat think so

C Neutral

D Somewhat don’t think so

E Don’t think so

F No response

34


＜Please send any inquiries about this survey to the address below＞

Authorized Non-profit Organization The Genron NPO

1-20-7 Nihonbashi

Chuo-ku, Tokyo Japan 103-0027

e-mail：[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Analysis Report on Comparative Data - Genron NPO · 2015-06-17 · and utilized in a dialogue...

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Transcript of Analysis Report on Comparative Data - Genron NPO · 2015-06-17 · and utilized in a dialogue...