Analysis of Madrid Bombing

Terrorist Attack on Madrid BombingBy: David Raja Marpaung S.Ip, M.Def

David Raja Marpaung. Associate Lecture University of Indonesia, also Indonesia Politic and Defense Consultant. Email:

[email protected] phone: +62 81219588360

David Raja Marpaung. Associate Lecture University of Indonesia, also Indonesia Politic and Defense Consultant. Email: [email protected] phone: +62 81219588360

Short Brief• On 11 March 2004, a series of bombs exploded within minutes of

each other on four commuter trains in the Spanish capital Madrid.• The blasts killed 191 people and wounded 1,841. It was the worst

terror attack in Europe since the Lockerbie bombing in 1988.• Seven of the key suspects - including the alleged mastermind,

Tunisian Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet - died in an explosion at a Madrid flat in April 2004 as police were closing in on them. A policeman also died.

• Twenty one people, mostly Moroccans, were convicted of involvement in the attacks. Three of the key defendants received maximum jail sentences.


Operation

1 Mitsubishi mobile phone2 Copper detonator3 Explosives (10kg)4 Metal fragments

Investigators discovered a white van believed to belong to the bombers


AL-Qaeda AttacksYear Attacks

2001-2001 September 11 attacks · 2001 Indian Parliament attack , Terrorism in Pakistan · Ghriba synagogue bombing · 1st Bali bombing

2003-2004 Riyadh compound bombings · Casablanca bombings · 2003 Mumbai bombings · Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing · Istanbul bombings · SuperFerry 14 bombing · Madrid train bombings · Beslan school hostage crisis · Jakarta Australian embassy bombing

2005-2006 1st London bombings · 2nd London bombings · Sharm el-Sheikh attacks · 2nd Bali bombing · 1st Delhi bombings · Amman bombings · 2006 Varanasi bombings · 2006 Mumbai train bombings · Transatlantic aircraft plot · Toronto terrorism plot

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Indian_Parliament_attack

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Pakistan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghriba_synagogue_bombing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghriba_synagogue_bombing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Bali_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riyadh_compound_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Casablanca_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/25_August_2003_Mumbai_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Marriott_Hotel_bombing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Istanbul_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_SuperFerry_14_bombing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_SuperFerry_14_bombing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beslan_school_hostage_crisis

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beslan_school_hostage_crisis

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Australian_embassy_bombing_in_Jakarta

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_July_2005_London_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/21_July_2005_London_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Sharm_el-Sheikh_attacks

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Sharm_el-Sheikh_attacks

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Bali_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/29_October_2005_Delhi_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Amman_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Varanasi_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/11_July_2006_Mumbai_train_bombings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plot

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Toronto_terrorism_case


Al-Qaeda Interest in Spain

• Osama bin Laden issued a public threat in October 2003 to carry out suicide bombings against any countries joining the US-led invasion of Iraq: "We reserve the right to retaliate at the appropriate time and place against all countries involved, especially Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy." At the time, Spain had some 1,300 soldiers stationed on Iraqi soil.

• In addition, bin Laden had spoken earlier of wishing to return the southern Spanish region of Andalucía to Muslim control, reversing the Reconquista of 1492.


Actors

• Seven of the key suspects - including the alleged mastermind, Tunisian Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet - died in an explosion at a Madrid flat in April 2004 as police were closing in on them. A policeman also died.

• Twenty one people, mostly Moroccans, were convicted of involvement in the attacks. Three of the key defendants received maximum jail sentences.

• The attacks were one of the first signs that Europe was vulnerable to attacks from groups residing within the continent and who were inspired - but not necessarily formally directed - by al-Qaeda's leadership


Some LeadersZougam, a Moroccan national who ran a mobile phone shop in Madrid, was found guilty of 191 counts of murder, and sentenced to 30 years for each one. Finally, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison for belonging to a terrorist organisation

Abdelmajid Bouchar. The Moroccan, currently detained in Spain, was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He was accused of 191 counts of murder and 1,856 counts of attempted murder

Jose Emilo Suarez Trashorras. A former miner, the Spaniard was found guilty of supplying some of the explosives that were used in the attacks. He was sentenced to 25 years each for 192 deaths - the 191 who died in the bombings.


Ghalyoun was originally sentenced to 12 years in prison. A Syrian national born in 1980, he owned a Madrid apartment where members of an Islamist cell allegedly used to meet

Belhadj was found guilty of belonging to a terrorist group and sentenced to 12 years in prison. A Moroccan, he was charged with 191 murders and 1,755 attempted murder

Haski, a suspected leading member of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, was sentenced to 15 years for belonging to a terrorist group. He had been charged with 191 murders and 1,755 attempted murders.


The Madrid Roots• This changing jihadi landscape is revealed in the formation of the cell responsible

for the 2004 Madrid train bombings. As early as October 2002, the substitute imam of the Takoua Mosque in Madrid, was informing Spanish police under the codename “Cartagena” that a band of friends, unhappy with the mosque’s seemingly moderate preachings, had begun calling themselves Al Haraka Salafiya, “The Salafi Movement.”

• According to Cartagena, they met “clandestinely, with no regularity or fixed place, by oral agreement and without any schedule, though usually on Fridays.” Soon, the informal group of mostly homesick Moroccan descendants and émigrés “reached the conclusion that they had to undertake jihad.” By November 2002, opinion within the group began to shift against “going to other countries to undertake jihad, when operations were possible in Morocco and Spain.”

• A detailed action plan only began to coalesce later the following year, however, around the time the internet tract “Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks” began to circulate a call for “two or three attacks … to exploit the coming general elections in Spain in March 2004” on the Global Islamic Media Front Web, [ii] which the Madrid plotters had been systematically logging on to since the spring of 2003. The police reports show that targeting trains to force Spain out of the coalition in Iraq was only a late goal emanating from an informal network dedicated to the simple but diffuse project of undertaking jihad to defend and advance a Salafist vision of Islam.


Evolving Madrid Network:2001

Red – M30 Mosque Madrid

Blue– Core Arab Madrid

Black- Ahmidan Drug Gang


Evolving Madrid Network:2002





Evolving Madrid Network:2003-2004





Part of Al-Qaeda• Al Qaeda Central• This category comprises the remnants of the pre-9/11 al Qaeda organization. It is

believed that this hardcore remains centered in or around the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders and continues to exert actual coordination, if not some direct command and control capability, in terms of commissioning attacks, directing surveillance and collating reconnaissance, planning operations, and approving their execution

• Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates• This category embraces formally established insurgent or terrorist groups that over

the years have benefited from bin Laden’s largesse and/or spiritual guidance and/or have received training, arms, money and other assistance from al Qaeda. This category includes groups such as: al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), the late Abu Musab Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (formerly Jamaat al Tawhid wa’l Jihad), Asbat al- Ansar, Ansar al Islam, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Moro Islamic Liberation nFront (MILF), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), and the various Kashmiri nIslamic groups based in Pakistan


• Al Qaeda LocalsThese are dispersed cells of al Qaeda adherents who have or have had some direct

connection with al Qaeda——no matter how tenuous or evanescent. There are 2 categories: 1. comprises persons who have had some prior terrorism experience—

having been blooded in battle as part of some previous jihadi campaign in Algeria, the Balkans, Chechnya, and perhaps more recently in Iraq2. none of membes had previously fought in any of the contemporary, iconic Muslim conflicts such as Madrid and London Blast. They recruited others locally as needed, into the cell and undertook a relatively simple, but nonetheless sophisticated and highly consequential attack

• Al Qaeda Network• These are home-grown Islamic radicals——from North Africa, the Middle East, and

South and Southeast Asia. Like the “al Qaeda Locals” they too are motivated by a shared sense of enmity and grievance felt towards the United States and West in general and their host-nations in particular. Critically, these persons are neither directly members of a known, organized terrorist group nor necessarily even a very cohesive entity unto themselves


Joining Global Network Jihad(data from Marc Sageman,

currently being updated at University of Michigan)

• Friendship: 70%– Band of mostly normal – even nice – guys– Idealistic, compassionate toward their “fictive kin”

• Kinship: 20%– Sons, brothers, first cousins– Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement bonds

between Mujahedin• Discipleship: 10%

– Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah• Pesantren Al Mukmin: Abu Bakar Ba’asyir & Abdullah Sungkar• Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem: Mukhlas


Why Trains?1. panic-spreading ubiquity which reinforces the perception among the civilian

population that anyone using public transport could become a victim of the next terror attack.

2. land transport provides the terrorists with a high concentration of people in a confined space, creating a mass casualty environment. Attacks against land transport targets have been nearly twice as lethal as terror attacks overall.

3. a terror campaign targeting commuter transport can deter people from everyday travel, and have a profound economic impact by crippling the mobility of the work force and scaring away investors and tourists.

4. continuous attacks against such frequently-used means of transport can severely undermine a government’s authority as the populace grows increasingly frustrated over time, eventually blaming the government for its inability to maintain order.

5. terrorists pick land transport targets because they are an essential feature of large population centres and thus represent in the mind of the terrorist the heart of the enemy.

6. land transport is a soft target that provides the terrorists with an almost infinite number of options for operations with a high probability of success and low level of risk. In short, commuter transport is an attractive terrorist target; that is a reality that is unlike to change soon


Vulnerable Points

• Rail Stations and Railways– Open to public access– Busy/Crowded

• Small explosive device can have big impact• Difficult to monitor for terrorist activity• Difficult to screen passengers

– Can have economic impact with loss of public confidence


E-Almost 5 10 15 20 25Certain

D-Likely 4 8 12 16 20

C-Possible 3 6 9 12 15

B-Unlikely 2 4 6 8 10

A-Rare 1 2 3 4 5

Probability/

Likelihood

Risk Matrix

Impact/Criticality

1Insignificant

2Minor

3Moderate

4Major

5Catastrophic


Fault of Government• Many Spaniards felt that the Government of the Popular Party under the leadership of

José María Aznar was not providing reliable and updated information about the responsible terrorists Immediately after the bombings with the PP blamed ETA

• The political dilemma of the PP was twofold:

Firstly, announcing that an Islamist organization had perpetrated a terrorist attack in Spain was going to make PP’s unpopular decision to support the American military intervention in Iraq a damaging issue in an election it was fully expecting to win.

Secondly, by hinting at ETA, the PP Government attempted to endorse its hard line towards Basque nationalism.There was an effort by the Spanish government to blame ETA, something which was perceived to be a move for political

• Information made public on 12 March by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) revealed that intelligence agencies had known for two months that a terrorist attack was being planned against a country entering into an election period. However, they mistakenly believed that country to be Iraq


Effect• The attacks came three days before national elections. Prime Minister José Maria

Aznar’s conservative Popular Party was ahead in the polls, despite Spain’s participation in the unpopular war in Iraq. Aznar quickly blamed the Basque separatist group ETA for the attacks, but this judgment soon proved ill-founded. All signs pointed to Al Qaeda, hence linking Spain’s vulnerability to its participation in the war. There was a swift backlash and public demonstrations against the prime minister and his party.

• Three days after the attacks, the opposition Socialist Party under José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero secured a historic and unexpected victory, paving the way for troop withdrawals. Soon after having been elected primer minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, fulfilled his explicit electoral pledge of pulling the Spanish troops out of Iraq. He also took initiatives which made effective the realignment of Spain’s foreign policy with that of its traditional European allies, France and Germany in particular

• The attacks also reawakened fears of terrorism amongst investors with most European stock markets falling between 2 and 3 percent on 11 March. Stocks dropped in London and in New York, with the U.S. Dow Jones Industrial Average diving after speculation of involvement by al-Qaeda.


The Objectives of Madrid Bombing

• Gain recognition or attention – through publicity

• Disrupt and discredit the processes of government

• Create either sympathy or fear and hostility in an audience identified as the enemy

• Provoke over-reaction from the government.


Lesson Learned

The Threat

•Terrorist adversaries think in terms of endless war—long-term planning horizons•Remain determined to carry out attacks—they are opportunistic•Until jihadist enterprise completely destroyed, operative presumption must be that attack will occur at some time•Surface transportation clearly part of terrorist target set

SECURITY AT TIME OF ATTACK

•Multiple jurisdictions—German police, state forces, Railway Protection Force--with different tasks•Little security in place•No access control to platforms; no passenger screening•Madrid police lack the resources to secure trains


Question for the Future?

1.If 100 percent screening not possible, do selective searches make sense?

2.If only some passengers are screened, where there is no specific intelligence, what should be the appropriate selection process?

3.What combinations of selection methods are appropriate under different conditions?

4.What role can current and future technology play in passenger screening?

5.What are the characteristics of a good screening program?


Summary• Although it is believed that they were inspired to action after hearing

an October 2003 tape from Osama bin Laden, calling for attacks against countries participating in the Iraq war, it appears that none of the attack’s perpetrators received instructions or support of any kind from al Qaeda’s leadership

• That a group, which largely consisted of petty criminals and blue collar workers could plan, fund, and carry out an attack of this complexity and size, independent of al Qaeda’s leadership, illustrates the changing nature of the terror threat since 9/11

• These facts indicate that going after al Qaeda’s leadership alone will not prevent attacks like Madrid that are carried out by independent cells of al Qaeda Network members and al Qaeda Locals.


Recommendations Improving systems to counter an extremely rare terrorist attack is

costly and improvements should also serve the dual purpose of crime or safety improvement

• Remove or closely monitor hiding places for devices (trash cans, lockers, bathrooms, etc)

• Improve CCTV coverage of station areas• Reduce sources of secondary fragmentation (ground level glass,

vending machines, chairs, decorations, etc)• Improve transparency, visibility and lighting to all areas of station• Control air circulation and establish ventilation procedures in the

event of a chemical or biological attack• Use non-combustible and non-toxic materials in stations and rolling

stock• Improve interagency communication systems and protocol• Encourage passenger vigilance • Re-check Random in Station

Analysis of Madrid Bombing

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