PERSPECTIVES

An operationalized post-normal science frameworkfor assisting in the development of complex science policysolutions: the case of nanotechnology governance

Michael J. Bernstein • Rider W. Foley •

Ira Bennett

Received: 17 January 2014 / Accepted: 5 June 2014 / Published online: 28 June 2014

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Scientists, engineers, and policy analysts

commonly suggest governance regimes for technol-

ogy to maximize societal benefits and minimize

negative societal and environmental impacts of inno-

vation processes. Yet innovation is a complex socio-

technical process that does not respond predictably to

modification. Our human propensity to exclude com-

plexity when attempting to manage systems often

results in insufficient, one-dimensional solutions. The

tendency to exclude complexity (1) reinforces itself by

diminishing experience and capacity in the design of

simple solutions to complex problems, and (2) leads to

solutions that do not address the identified problem. To

address the question of how to avoid a complexity-

exclusion trap, this article operationalizes a post-

normal science framework to assist in the enhance-

ment or design of science policy proposals. A

literature review of technological fixes, policy pana-

ceas, and knowledge-to-action gaps is conducted to

survey examples of post-normal science frameworks.

Next, an operational framework is used to assess the

case of a proposed international nanotechnology

advisory board. The framework reveals that the board

addresses a slice of the broader, more complex

problem of nanotechnology governance. We argue

that while the formation of an international advisory

board is not problematic in-and-of-itself, it is symp-

tomatic of and plays into a complexity-exclusion trap.

We offer researchers, policy analysts, and decision-

makers three recommendations that incorporate a

more appropriate level of complexity into governance

proposals.

Keywords Socio-technical problems � Complexity-

exclusion trap � Science advisory boards � Ethical �Legal � Societal

Introduction

Scientists, engineers, and policy analysts commonly

suggest governance regimes for technology to mini-

mize negative societal and environmental impacts of

innovation processes and maximize societal benefits

(Renn and Roco 2006). Paradoxically, potential soci-

etal benefits often come at the cost of serious

environmental degradation, human health impacts,

and social inequality (UNEP 2011; UNCDF 2013).

Drinking-water purification (Truffer et al. 2010) and

M. J. Bernstein (&)

School of Sustainability, Arizona State University,

Tempe, AZ, USA

e-mail: mjbernst@asu.edu; Michael.j.bernstein@asu.edu

M. J. Bernstein � I. Bennett

Center for Nanotechnology in Society, Consortium for

Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University,

Tempe, AZ, USA

R. W. Foley

Engineering and Society, University of Virginia,

Charlottesville, VA, USA

123

J Nanopart Res (2014) 16:2492

DOI 10.1007/s11051-014-2492-1

energy production and distribution systems (Kemp

2011) provide two illustrative examples. Access to

clean drinking water may be taken for granted in one

nation while a few miles across an international

border, the tap water is of questionable quality or

rationed daily. Consistent availability of electrical

energy may be an expectation in one nation yet in

another nation, a lack of access to electrical energy

hinders the ability of young children to learn and limits

economic productivity.

In part, the inadequacy of technologies as panaceas

reflects the complex, interconnected societal and

technical dimensions of the problems that technical

solutions seek to solve. Our human propensity to

exclude aspects of both societal and technical com-

plexities when attempting to manage tightly-coupled

systems can result in insufficient, one-dimensional

solutions. Examples can be made of water and energy

solutions that are overly simplistic and seek to address

‘‘end-of-pipe’’ challenges (Wiek et al. 2012). For

instance, providing foreign aid incentives to distribute

water purification technology (policy intervention) or

promoting the installation of decentralized solar

energy systems in the rural areas of developing nations

(technology intervention).

Simplifying problems with central assumptions is

one common approach to managing complexity in

modeling (Oreskes et al. 1994). Managing complexity

by substituting simpler ideas for more complex ones is

another common response. Psychology research docu-

ments this in experiments that assess self-reported life

satisfaction. In these experiments, when subjects are

asked to rate life satisfaction, they invariably substitute

that question with the one much easier to answer,

namely: how happy am I right now (Kahneman 2003;

Strack et al. 1988). A third common approach to

managing complexity is to apply mental shortcuts,

known as heuristics, to ease decision making (Gigeren-

zer and Goldstein 1996). Binary evaluation of risk, for

example cost vs. benefit, for a single outcome, such as

minimizing risk, is one heuristic. Another response to

complexity is the human proclivity to rely on technology

to solve societal problems (Boserup 1981; Lane et al.

2009). In reality, technologies are embedded in societal

and political contexts that are inextricable from the

technologies themselves (Pinch and Bijker 1987; Win-

ner 1986). Returning to our energy example, exporting a

decentralized energy infrastructure would involve, in

addition to the physical infrastructure, skilled labor and

attendant education systems, new norms on energy use,

and revisions to regional and national energy policies

and management practices.

The practice of excluding complexity reinforces

itself by diminishing experience with and capacity for

designing complex solutions for complex problems

(Kaplan 1964). Beyond reinforcing this practice,

excluding complexity leads to solutions that do not

address the identified problems. To avoid a complex-

ity-exclusion trap, researchers, policy analysts, and

decision-makers will require a new form of science

that can better illuminate and inform complex, socio-

technical solutions. This is especially the case as

science is increasingly relied upon to recognize,

understand, and solve socio-technical problems. When

problems are narrowly framed, characterized by

manageable uncertainty and low decision-stakes,

solutions from applied science may be appropriate

(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Conversely, when

dealing with complex socio-technical problems, char-

acterized by high levels of uncertainty and high

decision-stakes, science needs to be employed differ-

ently to solve problems—this is the argument made by

Funtowicz and Ravetz when proposing post-normal

science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).

A post-normal science framework holds that chal-

lenges like societal and environmental risk require

solutions that include multiple classes of expertise

(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). In doing so, post-

normal science makes explicit challenges related to

building knowledge that

(1) Appropriately accounts for the societal and

technical dimensions of societal problems;

(2) Directly contributes to problem solving;

(3) Legitimately includes diverse types of knowl-

edge; and

(4) Credibly connects to the local contexts that

inform socio-technical problems.

As these requirements illustrate, post-normal sci-

ence makes socio-technical problem-solving a far

more complex task. A post-normal science framework

precludes the possibility of excluding complexity

derived from dealing with societal conflicts, incorpo-

rating local knowledge, and connecting knowledge

across scales.

This article builds upon and operationalizes a post-

normal science framework as a tool for developing

complex socio-technical solutions. Our principle

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question is one of how to address complex problems so

that new solutions themselves do not produce more

problems. A literature review of approaches to solving

technical and societal problems and ways of closing

knowledge-to-action gaps is presented. Next, the

reviewed approaches are synthesized and operation-

alized in an assessment tool to diagnose complex

science policy proposals. Marchant and White (2011)

proposed an international nanotechnology advisory

board to facilitate the global governance of nanotech-

nology. This case is reviewed and used to demonstrate

how the assessment tool can identify and augment an

existing science policy proposal. We close with three

guidelines intended to help researchers, policy ana-

lysts, and decision-makers layer complexity back into

the planning and design of governance regimes.

Operationalizing the post-normal science

framework as an assessment tool

As discussed above, the framework of post-normal

science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) makes explicit

four challenges. Each of these four challenges high-

lights an issue with knowledge generation. Such post-

normal science solutions come from literature on

technological fixes, policy panaceas, boundary orga-

nizations, solutions agendas, and polycentric gover-

nance. This section reviews each solution-related

research stream and summarizes a set of guiding

questions relevant to science policy proposals.

The technological fix: challenges and guidelines

for appropriate use

An early proponent of the technological fix was Alvin

Weinberg, nuclear physicist, key player in the Man-

hattan Project, and proponent of commercial nuclear

power (Weinberg 1994). Weinberg (1967) argued that

technological solutions facilitated by modern technol-

ogy are most appropriate because of the challenges

with identifying and fixing societal problems. Reli-

ance on technological solutions to societal problems

can marginalize, miss, or exacerbate other aspects of

the problem. In addition, navigating a societal problem

with technical solutions leaves the societal problem to

fester and reduces the capacity of societies to tackle

societal issues (Kaplan 1964). Relying on technology

to solve societal challenges, Kaplan (1964) notes,

creates a ‘‘trained incapacity’’ that unintentionally but

systematically closes-down dialogues seeking com-

plex solutions to complex problems.

Sarewitz and Nelson (2008) offered three rules for

helping policy makers determine when ‘‘scientific

research and technological innovation’’ may be appro-

priate for addressing societal problems. Taken

together the three rules provide policy makers with a

strategy for un-learning such ‘‘trained incapacity’’

(Kaplan 1964), which relies on technology to solve

societal problems. The first rule Sarewitz and Nelson

(2008) propose is to be specific, meaning a techno-

logical fix must address the link between a problem

and a corresponding solution. Wiek et al. (2012)

illustrated this first rule by demonstrating the limited

ability of nanotechnology to address water contami-

nation in a broader context that defines socio-technical

problems more holistically. The second rule proposed

is to be uncontroversial; link the effectiveness, mea-

sured by a record of success, of any technological fix

to evidenced, unambiguous criteria (Sarewitz and

Nelson 2008). This second rule helps to bypass the

messy aspects, such as values conflicts, of societal

problems (Metlay and Sarewitz 2012; Pielke 2007).

The third rule builds off of the second; research

funding for technological solutions should flow

toward those technologies that can be developed

around a core of uncontroversial evidence (Sarewitz

and Nelson 2008). The third rule essentially provides a

decision-making heuristic: allocate money to projects

that have demonstrated success.

The societal fix: moving beyond policy panaceas

Reliance on a narrow subset of societal solutions

creates the trap of panacea thinking (E. Ostrom et al.

2007). Social policies are often called upon to solve

the tragedy of the commons.1 These policy pana-

ceas—like coercive policies or the creation of private

property rights (Hardin 1968)—intimate that individ-

uals are universally greedy, unable to self-organize

without being forced to, and incapable of acting out of

any impulse other than to safeguard personal belong-

ings. Taking issue with these assumptions, E. Ostrom

1 The tragedy of the commons describes cases in which all

individuals involved in an open-access resource system have an

incentive to take as much as possible, but no individuals have an

incentive to safeguard the resource from such behavior—the

result being resource-system collapse (Hardin 1968).

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et al. (2007) argued that (1) not all resource systems

are similarly uniform and (2) not all individuals are

similarly uniform across resource management cases

to warrant such narrow-gauged societal solutions.

Building off of hundreds of cases in which individuals

acted collectively to successfully manage resources,

E. Ostrom et al. (2007) proposed instead that research-

ers must better diagnose the context-specific structure

of a problem, identify the indicators relating the

system structure to the emergence of problems, and

learn from these diagnoses to better address complex

societal problems.

Automobile safety exemplifies the need for more

open thinking around problems with interconnected

social and technical components. Wetmore (2009)

presented a combination of technological and societal

fixes that enhanced automotive safety. These solutions

included safety belts (technological), law-making

(policy), and public education campaigns (social) to

engineer, legislate, and promote the use of safety belts.

Wetmore (2009) argued that by pitting societal and

technological fixes in opposition to each other, society

loses the benefits of each, polarizes the debate, wastes

resources, makes compromise more difficult, and thus

perpetuates the problem. Wetmore (2009) articulated

that middle paths, elevating the problem of automobile

safety above reliance on any single safety strategy

provides a more synthetic solution.

With the knowledge that synthetic solutions are

important, the question becomes one of when and how

to pursue technological fixes in combination with

appropriate policy and societal solutions. Understand-

ing when to use technological fixes (Sarewitz and

Nelson 2008) and when and how to escape panacea

thinking (E. Ostrom et al. 2007) boils down to a

sensible recommendation: ensure a proposed solution

can—and actually does—address the identified prob-

lem. Underlying this observation is the assumption

that more knowledge of a societal or technical problem

will lead to different actions. Research into the links

between knowledge and action, however, suggests this

is not straightforward and that more nuanced connec-

tions need to be considered.

Unpacking knowledge-to-action connections

The final three challenges raised by a post-normal

science framework involve the relationships between

knowledge and action. Knowledge–action networks are

characterized as complex, multi-dimensional, and con-

text dependent (Munoz-Erickson 2013). Research on

knowledge–action networks illuminates how different

types of knowledge management enterprises are

required to incorporate diverse types of knowledge

(Clark et al. 2011). In the case of post-normal science,

solution agendas help link scientific research to prob-

lem solving and not simply problem understanding.

Boundary organizations help to transfer knowledge

between practitioner–expert communities (Guston

2000). Polycentric governance arrangements build

connections among local, regional, and national levels

of networks, facilitating the adaptation of knowledge to

different social contexts (Clark et al. 2011). In the

following section, we review each of these three

knowledge–action systems and close with a synthesis

of the operationalized post-normal science framework.

Solution agendas

The risk-assessment community largely assumes that

more risk-based information will lead to a solution of

the risk predicament (Brown 2009). This knowledge-

first approach holds that no-actions be taken until

comprehensive risk analyses resolve uncertainties.

Given the volume of uncertainty involved in post-

normal science, this insistence effectively halts prob-

lem-solving efforts (Brown 2009). An alternative

strategy for resolving highly uncertain problems is to

adopt a solutions agenda (Sarewitz et al. 2012).

Proponents of solutions agendas ask, ‘‘What opportu-

nities exist for steering the design, production, and use

of technologies away from unsustainable practices

toward more sustainable ones, without sacrificing the

value of these technologies?’’ (Sarewitz et al. 2012,

p.5). Instead of becoming mired in the ‘‘technical

disputes about weight of evidence and uncertainty’’

(Sarewitz et al. 2012, p. 4) endemic to risk assessment,

a solution agenda advances research that can curtail

the risk problem at the point of innovation and not

after broad societal uptake. Proponents of the solutions

agenda approach posit that knowledge will never be

complete, so instead of waiting for the impossible

(complete knowledge), scientists and policy makers

can improve innovation and technology development

today by promoting research that, straightforwardly,

improves innovation and technology development

(Sarewitz et al. 2012). By focusing research efforts

primarily on how to solve problems, a solutions

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agenda address the first dimension of post-normal

knowledge–action challenges.

Boundary organizations

Boundary organizations translate different types of

knowledge into action. In the post-normal science

framework, boundary organizations actively include a

broader diversity of experts and employ science to

tackle uncertain, or high-stakes risk-related policy

issues (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Key goals for

boundary organizations are participation, accountabil-

ity, and relevance and generalizability (Clark et al.

2011). The goal of participation is to enrich research

endeavors by incorporating diverse communities of

knowledge. The goal of accountability challenges

boundary organizations to operate within governance

frameworks that are responsible to local stakeholders.

The twin goal of relevance and generalizability calls

for outputs of the boundary organization that connects

with place-specific knowledge, while also accounting

for relationships that allow for knowledge transfer and

outputs for adaption to different contexts.

Each of these goals for boundary organizations—

participation, accountability, and relevance— apply to

three different uses of knowledge in particular cases

(Clark et al. 2011). Uses vary in how they involve

experts (the enlightenment case of basic research),

decision-makers (the case of decision support), and

local stakeholders who hold diverse, often conflicting

interests (the case of supporting negotiations). For

each use, the boundary organization must meet criteria

related to credibility, salience, and legitimacy (Cash

et al. 2002). Credibility relates to participation,

salience to accountability, and legitimacy to the

boundary objects produced. By providing a structured

way to integrate extended types of expertise, boundary

organizations address the second dimension of post-

normal knowledge–action challenges.

Polycentric arrangements

While appropriate for certain types of problems or

contexts, centralized problem-solving administered

through organized public bureaucracies creates several

challenges. One such challenge is the accumulation of

red tape that does not ‘‘advance the legitimate purposes’’

that ‘‘the rules were intended to serve’’ and therefore

negatively impact the efficacy and effectiveness of some

public organizations (Bozeman 2000, p. 12). Central-

ized efforts, however well-intentioned, hamper or run

roughshod over local capacity for collective action

(Scott 1998). Centralization requires spending an

increasing proportion of resources to simply maintain

the status quo, due to the increasing complexity of

centralized management (Tainter 1988). Centralized

efforts are vulnerable to external stressors (Anderies and

Janssen 2013), become unwieldy with diverse units of

measure (Scott 1998), and privilege the technical

expertise of scientists and elites (Jasanoff 2003). In a

world in which globalization and global environmental

change break the links between past experience and

future outcomes, centralized efforts (Janssen and An-

deries 2007) are ill-suited for navigating increasingly

dynamic, highly uncertain times.

One alternative to a centralized approach is poly-

centric governance, literally meaning one that

employs many centers. The term ‘‘polycentric’’ draws

from the work of the late Vincent Ostrom, who studied

the arrangement of government services in metropol-

itan areas (V. Ostrom et al. 1961). Polycentric

arrangements consist of multiple centers of function-

ally autonomous units. Any one unit will consider and

react to the actions of other units—perhaps in com-

petition, perhaps in cooperation—but remain inde-

pendent, allowing the divided whole to coherently and

predictably organize to solve problems (V. Ostrom

et al. 1961). A core benefit of polycentric governance

flows from such autonomy. Local centers of decision

making, rich with idiosyncrasies unfathomable to

higher-level governing bodies (Scott 1998), become

free to organize to solve local challenges (E. Ostrom

1990). Polycentric models build trust across local

networks and enhance the capacity of higher levels in

the network to learn from diverse contexts (Marshall

2007) by creating natural experiments that units can

learn from each (E. Ostrom 1999, p. 526). In the face

of globalization and global change (Janssen and

Anderies 2007), a polycentric approach to governance

addresses the third knowledge–action challenge of a

post-normal science framework (Table 1).

This post-normal science framework can be used to

assess proposed governance regimes and help avoid

complexity-exclusion traps and enhance science pol-

icy proposals by pushing policy analysts, researchers,

and decision-makers to explicitly engage with the

technological and societal dimensions of solutions. In

addition, the framework provides design guidelines

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that would enable the creation of knowledge critical to

solving problems. Including all four elements of the

framework is essential: a solution may be designed

with local contextual knowledge in mind or with input

from diverse perspectives and still not be tuned to a

specific problem; likewise a solution may be tuned to a

specific problem, but not include the knowledge

needed for a solution. Each guiding question may be

viewed in light of a specific case, for example, in the

electricity generation illustration, the guiding question

related to connecting to local contexts might be

adapted to read, ‘‘are local actors included in a process

that transfers ownership of the decentralized technol-

ogy?’’ We now turn to Marchant and White’s (2011)

proposed international nanoscience advisory board2 as

an example that demonstrates the diagnostic capabil-

ities of the operationalized framework.

Applying the post-normal science framework:

assessing a case of nanotechnology governance

The selection of the board as a case study for appraisal

is warranted; numerous legal, policy, and risk analysis

scholars have called for international advisory boards

(Ramachandran et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2011) or more

generally for legal structures that address the environ-

mental, health, and safety concerns raised by nano-

technology (Beaudrie et al. 2013; Schulte et al. 2014).

Additionally, scientific and technological uncertain-

ties confound regulatory agencies. For example, the

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is faced with

complex decisions on the regulation of devices and

drugs (Fatehi et al. 2012; Koolage and Hall 2011), as

well as cosmetics (Wilson 2006; 2013) and food

(Cushen et al. 2012; FDACFSAN 2012). Similarly,

efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) are too often understaffed,

underfunded, under-specialized, and ill-equipped, to

Table 1 Synthesis of post-normal science challenges, solutions, and guiding questions

Post-normal challenge Post-normal solution (s) Guiding questions Sources

Account for the distinct

social and technical

dimensions of societal

problems

Make solving the problem more important

than choosing among social or technical

solutions

Is solving the problem paramount

or is choice of solution

unintentionally being elevated in

importance?

Kaplan (1964);

Wetmore (2009)

Follow guidelines for technical fixes What components of the problem

are suitable for technological

fixes?

Sarewitz and

Nelson (2008)

Diagnose specific local problem features What contextual factors of the

problem inform societal

solutions?

E. Ostrom et al.

(2007)

Ensure the proposed solution can and does

address the problem

Is this solution addressing the

intended problem?

Sarewitz and

Nelson (2008)

Generate knowledge

central to problem-

solving

Adopt a solutions agenda to avoid the

knowledge-first trap

Does the knowledge generated

minimize risks ex-ante or address

risk ex-post?

Sarewitz et al.

(2012)

Include diverse types of

knowledge

Establish boundary organizations that

ensure participation, accountability,

relevance and generalizability

Are multiple types of knowledge

accounted for?

Jasanoff 2003

Are criteria in place to evaluate the

knowledge generated across

these types?

Cash et al. (2002);

Clark et al. (2011)

Connect to local contexts

that inform socio-

technical problems

Create polycentric arrangements that build

trust across local levels and enhance the

capacity of higher levels to learn from

diverse contexts

Are local actors empowered to

self-organize?

V. Ostrom et al.

(1961); E. Ostrom

(1999); Marshall

(2007)Are institutions in place to

facilitate knowledge sharing

across local levels and along

vertical levels?

2 We refer to the international nanoscience advisory board as,

‘‘the board’’ throughout this case study. ‘‘The board’’ is not used

in reference to any other advisory or regulatory boards proposed

or in existence.

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match the complexity and uncertainty surrounding

novel nanotechnology applications (Davies 2007;

Maynard et al. 2011). Marchant and White (2011)

called for a harmonized system of nanotechnology

regulations that ensures human and environmental

health and safety and facilitates international trade and

commerce.

In the past 20 years, increased funding for nano-

technology has come with a promise to improve access

to clean drinking water through new treatment and

filtration technologies and to enhance the generation,

storage, and distribution of electrical energy (Diallo

et al. 2013; Roco et al. 2011). There is, however, an

absence of formal regulations that specifically address

the novel material properties and uses of nanotechnol-

ogy in society (Kimbrell 2009). In the US, nanotech-

nology falls under existing regulatory jurisdictions like

the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, or Toxic

Substance Control Act, but few new policies have

been presented (Bosso 2010; Beaudrie et al. 2013).

Formal governance of nanotechnology is touted as

necessary to realize greater societal benefits and

simultaneously mitigate potential negative impacts

(Bennett and Sarewitz 2006). Yet nanotechnology-

enabled products arise from a sequence of scientific

and technical contexts embedded within complex

processes (Robinson et al. 2011; Foley and Wiek

2013) unlikely to yield to straightforward alteration.

Governing nanotechnology demands that stakeholders

act as a collective to guide innovation, responsibility

for which cannot be held by any one governmental

agency or organization (Foley et al. 2012).

Given the complexity of nanotechnology innova-

tion, Marchant and White (2011) proposed that an

international nanoscience advisory board be convened

to harmonize the global governance of nanotechnol-

ogy as part of the effort toward responsible innovation

(Stilgoe et al. 2013). In the case analysis that follows,

the post-normal science framework is used to assess

the Marchant and White (2011) science policy

proposal. Our assessment proceeds according to a

modified policy analysis (Patton and Sawicki 1993).

The specific and general objectives of the board are

identified and assessed, as are the sources of inspira-

tion for the board. Based on these reviews, the policy

role of the board is assessed. The core question levied

against the case is: does the board, as it is currently

designed, solve the problems it proposes to address?

Case of the international nanotechnology advisory

board: a review

Marchant and White (2011) argued that one solution to

the challenge presented by nanotechnology oversight

is to convene an international nanoscience advisory

board, comprised of leading scientists, engineers, legal

scholars, industry experts, and liaisons to national and

international regulatory agencies, to provide scientific

guidance. The board would be charged with three

tasks. First, the board would centralize scientific

information and assure its accuracy for the diverse

number of regulating bodies responsible for nano-

technology-enabled products and devices. Second, the

board would note relevant uncertainties for regulators

and provide advice on how to address those uncer-

tainties through policies. Third, the board would make

available top experts from a diverse array of scientific

disciplines for consultation with regulatory agencies

in an effort to harmonize policies among and between

jurisdictions. The board thus represents a valuable

proposal for solving the problem of constructing

scientific consensus around nanotechnology risks,

recognizing uncertainty, and pooling and disseminat-

ing expert knowledge. The central role of the board, as

a science policy instrument, is to serve as a clearing-

house of scientific information, risks, benefits, and

uncertainties related to nanotechnology by: grounding

regulations in best available science, promoting con-

sistency in regulations across individual jurisdictions,

and enhancing harmony in regulations across over-

lapping and related jurisdictions (Marchant and White

2011). In support of their argument, Marchant and

White (2011) draw upon past experiences of the

United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) and the Convention on Biological

Diversity (CBD).

Recognizing the seeming intractable volume of

information available on nanotechnology, Marchant

and White (2011) noted an innovative proposal by

Revkin (2009) to open-source the information-gath-

ering process of the information-clearinghouse com-

ponent of the board. The US National Climate

Assessment may be transitioning to a similar ‘‘sus-

tained assessment’’ model for gathering, synthesizing,

and curating new findings related to the impacts of

global environmental change on the United States

(USGCRP 2012). A sustained assessment of

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nanotechnology risks would render the information-

gathering process more facile and manageable.

To achieve the objectives of transparency and

reflexivity, Marchant and White (2011) concluded that

the board must adhere to quality criteria capable of

satisfying audiences of experts, publics, and decision-

makers. These criteria for transparency resemble the

quality criteria of credibility, in terms of scientific

rigor; salience, meaning clarity and relevance for

decision-makers; and legitimacy, as in an agreement

on meaning across a diverse set of publics (Cash et al.

2002).

A critique of the board using the post-normal science

policy framework

Despite the merits of Marchant and White’s (2011)

proposal, appraising the board against the post-normal

science framework reveals several points for improve-

ment. In this section, we critique the board’s tendency

to adopt a knowledge-first approach, disaggregate

expert scientific knowledge, and discount connections

across local and global levels.

Critique 1: Takes a knowledge-first approach The

board takes a knowledge-first approach to risk

governance (Brown 2009). Underlying the

motivation for the board is the assumption that more

information cataloging the risks associated with a

technology can, if independently gathered by a high-

level group of experts, provide a key input for

governance efforts by politically legitimate decision-

makers of said technology. This assumption hinges on

a belief that harmonized knowledge about dose,

response, and toxicity from nanotechnology

exposure is the priority input to fix when governing

nanotechnology risk. Risk assessments, however,

primarily develop more information about the

problem and not information about solutions.

Developing scientific consensus on post hoc

exposure hazards certainly builds knowledge about

exposure hazards, but offers little in the way of

scientific consensus about how to mitigate, avoid, or

remedy such hazards. Few methods are suitable for

assessing the life cycle of emerging technologies early

enough to provide meaningful, critical feedback to

alter technology development or government funding

(Wender et al. 2014; Zimmerman et al. 2014). The

argument seems circular, but the difference in type-of-

knowledge pursued has significant impacts on the

ability of any advisory board to provide meaningful

solutions for ameliorating nanotechnology risks and

maximizing societal benefits.

Critique 2: Disaggregates expert scientific

knowledge In the Marchant and White (2011)

proposal, the board separates expert scientific

knowledge, through the service of convening top

scientific experts for national government

consultation, from the local contexts of regulatory

decisions. As proposed, the international nanoscience

advisory board would take the place of variegated

independent jurisdictions. Yet such a board would still

need to account for the political intricacies of these

jurisdictions to meaningfully resolve human health

and environmental policy issues. The high decisions-

stakes surrounding nanotechnology development—

involving human health, environmental, and

economic factors alike—will vary across localities.

The challenge is that local political pressures and

regulatory decisions would make it difficult to realize

centralized international efforts. Harmonized

scientific information disaggregated from political

factors lack relevance and legitimacy for policy

decisions at the local level (Clark et al. 2011). From

a post-normal science framework perspective, a

science policy instrument like the board would be

unlikely to advance comprehensive policies without

more fully incorporating diverse forms of knowledge

related to nanotechnology and the different values sets

that shape political decisions at local levels of

jurisdiction. Divorcing a knowledge enterprise like

the board from decentralized and localized political

contexts would hinder one of the goals of the board:

promoting efficiency in decision making.

Critique 3: Does not account for linkages across levels

of governance The authors argue that a, ‘‘Key lesson

from the IPCC experience is that the international

nanoscience advisory body must be separate and

insulated from policy and politics as much as

possible’’ (Marchant and White 2011, p. 1496). The

IPCC made claims to the same effect regarding policy

neutrality3 proposed for the board, yet the IPCC is

3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Organization.

Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.

shtml#.UqiaNI1RbP8. Accessed on 11 December 2013.

2492 Page 8 of 14 J Nanopart Res (2014) 16:2492

123

mired in politics and has largely failed to maintain

neutrality (Bodansky 2010). This indicates that the

lesson concluded by Marchant and White (2011) may

be the incorrect one to draw. Charging a new science-

based intergovernmental body to travel the same path

as a previously established science-based

intergovernmental body risks replicating an

unsuccessful strategy. The argument for insulation

from policy is a natural consequence of a knowledge-

first approach and an attempt to disaggregate scientific

and expert information (critiques 1 and 2) from

decision contexts, indicating entrance into a

complexity-exclusion trap.

Critique 4: The board offers a solution only tangentially

related to the larger challenge Ultimately, the call for

an international nanoscience advisory board

substitutes the narrowly-defined challenge of getting

scientists to agree on the nature of and certainty around

nanotechnology risks, defined as human and

environmental dose response and exposure or

contaminant fate and transport, with the more

complex challenge of situating the role of

nanotechnology in solving societal challenges. To be

sure, centralizing information regarding the risks and

benefits of nanotechnologies is vital to developing risk

reduction strategies. That said, if the work of the IPCC

is any indication, the board would not directly

contribute to the larger issue of minimizing the risks

of nanotechnology development. While, the

accomplishments of the IPCC to build scientific

consensus are notable, such accomplishments have

not translated into sufficient actions required for

climate change mitigation or adaptation (Rockstrom

et al. 2009). Sarewitz and Pielke (2008) discussion of

the ineffectiveness of The Kyoto Protocol and other

such international efforts bears this out.

Proposed amendments to the board

In light of these critiques, we use the post-normal

science framework to offer several strategies for

amending the proposed board. The following four

amendments are proposed:

(1) Adopt a solutions agenda;

(2) Frame knowledge generation as a boundary

organization activity;

(3) Connect across levels of governance with poly-

centric arrangements; and

(4) Align the solution with the problem.

Amendment 1: Avoid the knowledge-first trap

with a solutions agenda

The proposal for the board falls victim to the

knowledge-first trap because it frames nanotechnol-

ogy risk mitigation as an issue, first and foremost, of

scientific knowledge. Rather than developing scien-

tific consensus based upon hazard characterization, a

solutions agenda would generate insight about ways to

mitigate, avoid, or remedy hazards. Another way out

of the knowledge-first trap would be to adopt a

research agenda that promotes pursuit of technologies

that avoid undesirable or unsustainable outcomes in

the first place, instead of after-the fact remedies

(Sarewitz et al. 2012).

Amendment 2: Integrate expertise through a boundary

organization

Integrating diverse sources of knowledge and expertise

would widen the solutions available to the board and

secure the support of local partners, strengthening the

legitimacy of scientific information that advances

problem solving. If the frame of a boundary organiza-

tion were applied to the board, a variety of local

nanotechnology units, such as laboratories or busi-

nesses, could be connected to policy analysts, decision-

makers, and public interest groups to address common

agendas around nanotechnology development that

reduce risk by design, instead of post hoc. Integrating

the knowledge enterprise with the political enterprise

in a collaborative, solution agenda may also enhance

the potential that information gathered is relevant to

jurisdictional political concerns and interests.

Amendment 3: Connect across levels of governance

by adopting a polycentric approach

An international nanoscience advisory board would

collect and aggregate information at a global level, yet

there are no mechanisms for global governance on

nanotechnology capable of acting on the harmonized

information produced. Most actions taken to regulate

nanotechnology are at the national, state, city, university,

J Nanopart Res (2014) 16:2492 Page 9 of 14 2492

123

or laboratory scales. Information designed to inform

policy at these levels needs to be attuned to local context.

While a centralized advisory board would have a hard

time managing the complexity of such a sprawling

organization (see 2 .3.c., above), a polycentric approach

would allow for an explicit integration of the political

with the informational across levels. The autonomy

afforded to multiple centers at multiple levels would

allow for nanoscience assessment attuned to local

political contexts; the interconnection of the multiple

centers acting together would allow for the maintenance

of coherence across the whole. Thinking globally but

acting locally is a clear challenge for any international

organization tasked with integrating information from

multiple sources created at different levels. A polycentric

structure would help to better connect levels from local to

global in the quest to govern nanotechnology.

Amendment 4: Align the solution to the problem it

seeks to address

As presently structured, the board provides a way to

ground regulations in a synthesis of best available

science (Marchant and White 2011) by solving the

problem of how to assess the latest nanoscience. This

problem is not the challenge of how to govern

nanotechnology. This mismatch could be resolved by

reconsidering the implicit goal of the board, namely to

aid nanotechnology governance, and its explicit activ-

ities, namely synthesis of the latest nanoscience. Re-

aligning the board’s mission would allow for the

incorporation of the earlier amendments proposed and

lead to the creation of a polycentric arrangement of

solution-oriented boundary organizations.

Suggestions for the design of post-normal science

policy solutions

Building off of the post-normal science framework

and the case study of the board, we offer here three

suggestions for designing complex socio-technical

solutions to avoid the complexity-exclusion trap.

Orient technological and social fixes toward

solving a common problem

We lose the benefits of societal and technical solutions

when we place them at cross-purposes, as discussed in

the case of automotive safety (Wetmore 2009). Socio-

technical solutions require a middle path that elevates

the problem at hand above any individual societal or

technical solution. Understanding more about risks of

nanotechnology is indisputably important, and the

board proposed by Marchant and White (2011) would

undoubtedly go a long way toward resolving knowl-

edge about these risks. Using a post-normal science

framework as an assessment tool demonstrates the

additional benefits of enriching such knowledge with

knowledge of local practitioners, disseminating inte-

grated knowledge across a polycentric decision-mak-

ing network, and orienting toward problem solving.

Tune the solution to the problem

As our case study highlighted, the board addresses the

specific challenge of building scientific consensus

around nanoscience risks. Over an unspecified long-

term, it is conceivable that such knowledge might

diffuse among society to change norms around

innovation and lead to technology outcomes that

maximize public value (Bozeman and Sarewitz 2011)

and minimize risk. However, when alternative

approaches could allow for the advance, with empir-

ical evidence, of a research agenda that would more

immediately respond to the problem at hand, we have

a moral obligation to pursue that alternative. Science

policy solutions should adopt a post-normal science

framework because of the realities of uncertainty and

values conflicts associated with post-normal science.

Adopting principles from the operationalized post-

normal science framework to account for a solutions

focus, diverse forms of knowledge, and polycentric

efforts contributes to this need.

Match the problem-solving process

with the objectives of the solution

A central design attribute of a socio-technical system

is the idea of compatibility. Cherns (1976) proposed

that the process of designing a socio-technical system

must be compatible with the objectives of the system.

For example, if a system is intended to be participa-

tory, ‘‘a necessary condition for this to occur is that

people are given the opportunity to participate in the

design’’ (Cherns 1976, p. 785). Earlier, we pointed out

how the proposed board relies on a knowledge-first

approach (critique 1) disaggregated scientific

2492 Page 10 of 14 J Nanopart Res (2014) 16:2492

123

knowledge from other policy inputs (critique 2), and

was disconnected from decision-making contexts

(critique 3). For a board designed only to synthesize

scientific consensus, these design parameters may be

acceptable; for a board that seeks to more significantly

influence the development of nanotechnology, these

critiques must be addressed.

Challenges with the operationalized post-normal

science framework

One challenge with using the operationalized post-

normal science framework is the inherent subjectivity

involved in the act of framing problems. The very idea

of a fix presupposes that there is a problem at hand.

Drawing on Bijker’s (1997) concept of interpretive

flexibility, a socio-technical system that seems broken

to one stakeholder group, might seem, to another, to be

working quite well. This observation is inextricably

related to the nature of post-normal science challenges

dealing with contested issues. In part, solving con-

tested problems requires hard work, negotiation, and

compromise. A complementary but contributing strat-

egy is to separate the societal problems plagued values

conflicts and high uncertainty into less-messy parts, as

suggested by Metlay and Sarewitz (2012). Such

problem disaggregation allows for incremental com-

promise through the resolution of smaller societal

issues. While shrinking the socially contested dimen-

sions of the problem in question is an obvious benefit

of this approach, additional benefits come from (1)

using initial collaboration and success to enhance the

trust requisite for problem solving, and (2) reducing

the remaining number of problems, potentially making

the larger issue more tractable.

An additional challenge with the post-normal

science framework stems from the reality that even

when all parties agree a problem might exist, not all

problems are created equal. In our suggestion to orient

technological and societal fixes toward solving a

common problem, we offered the example of the

automotive safety challenge. A fair critique of this

example is that the automotive safety problem is a

very different type of problem than the ones presented

by nanotechnology. Relevant parties to the automotive

safety problem had a very specific, well-bounded

problem: unrestrained passengers were dying when

ejected from colliding vehicles (Wetmore 2009).

Oppositely, and as discussed, the case of

nanotechnology is plagued by uncertainty not only

about contaminant fate and transport, but also about

exposure and dose response. The need to find ways of

managing such uncertainties makes the board pro-

posed by Marchant and White (2011) a valuable part

of what would need to be a larger science policy

recommendation. And yet despite the difference in

type that might make it more manageable, the

automotive safety problem persists to this day.

Although vehicle deaths per million miles traveled is

on the decline, automotive accidents remain a leading

cause of death across US demographics and claim an

average of eighty-nine lives per day (USDOT 2013).

Knowing when a problem is solved thus itself presents

a problem, heightening the need for adaptive, flexible

solutions that continuously engage with the challenge

at hand.

Conclusion

The tendency to exclude complexity from socio-

technical problems leads to solutions that too often

miss the mark. In part, this observed tendency stems

from the nature of highly uncertain, contested, and

high decision-stake issues endemic to post-normal

science. In an effort to answer the question of how to

avoid a complexity-exclusion trap, we employed a

post-normal science framework as an assessment tool.

Research experiences with technological and societal

solutions, boundary organizations, and polycentric

governance arrangement were combined to operation-

alize the framework. The operationalized post-normal

science framework was then used to review the case of

a proposed international nanoscience advisory board.

Our analysis revealed that in order to connect to the

larger problem it was designed to address, the board

could benefit from adopting a solutions agenda,

framing knowledge generation through a boundary

organization, and connecting across levels of gover-

nance with polycentric arrangements.

With the acceleration of global environmental

change (Rockstrom et al. 2009), progress on reaching

Millennium Development Goals advancing sluggishly,

and global inequality on the rise (UNCDF 2013),

humanity faces no shortage of unsolved complex

problems. In facing these challenges, researchers,

policy analysts, and decision-makers would do well

to remember that eliminating complexity related to the

J Nanopart Res (2014) 16:2492 Page 11 of 14 2492

123

problem does not equate to solving the problem. We

have argued that designing science policy solutions

with complexity in mind offers an important first step

in escaping a complexity-exclusion trap. Subsequent

steps may be charted by using an operationalized post-

normal science framework to augment the design of

science policy solutions. Reflexively questioning if

technological and societal solutions are included,

balanced, and geared to solve specific problems may

seem a common-sense suggestion, but history suggests

that this question too often goes begging. Investigating

answers to this reflexive question should drive

researchers, policy analysts, and decision-makers

when setting science policy solution agendas.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the two

anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier

version of this article and Youngjae Kim for early conversations

around nanotechnology governance. An earlier iteration of this

work was presented in May 2013 at the First Annual Conference

on Governance of Emerging Technologies: Law, Policy and

Ethics, Chandler, Arizona. This research was undertaken with

support from The Center for Nanotechnology in Society at

Arizona State University (CNS-ASU), funded by the National

Science Foundation (cooperative agreement #0531194 and

#0937591). The findings and observations contained in this

article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

views of the National Science Foundation.

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