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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATIONCRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

RESOLUTION

RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the Department of Justice to rescind the memorandum issued by Attorney General Sessions in May 2017 that directs federal prosecutors to charge and pursue the most serious (as measured by sentence length, including mandatory minimums), readily provable offense.

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the United States Department of Justice to reinstate its policies permitting federal prosecutors to make individualized assessments of each case and to pursue mandatory minimum sentences and recidivist enhancements only where justified by a defendant’s leadership role in the offense, use or threat of violence, significant criminal history, ties to large-scale drug trafficking organizations, gangs or cartels, or the avoidance of a gross sentencing disparity with equally or more culpable co-defendants.

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10AREPORT

I. Introduction

On May 10, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a two-page memorandum that overhauled charging and sentencing guidelines for the Department of Justice (“Sessions Memo”). This memorandum orders federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense."  The memorandum identified as “most serious” that offense carrying “the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences.” It also announces that “[a]ny inconsistent previous policy of the Department of Justice relating to these matters is rescinded.”

The Sessions Memo permits discretion but only with the approval of a United States Attorney, Assistant Attorney General, or a supervisor designated by them, and any decision to vary from this policy must be documented in the file.

The Sessions Memo also directs prosecutors to obtain supervisory approval to vary from recommending a sentence within the guidelines range, state reasons for doing so in the file, and disclose to the court all facts that impact the guidelines calculation or mandatory minimum sentence. It also mandates that each Assistant United States Attorney and Assistant Attorney General must ensure that the policy is followed and that “any deviations… are justified by unusual facts.”

The Sessions Memo effectively reverses important groundbreaking charging reforms enacted during the previous administration. The draconian charging and sentencing policies urged by Sessions are a throwback to the policies of limited prosecutorial discretion and increased mandatory minimum sentences—policies that did not work—and are in stark contrast to the progressive trend in policies over the last 10 years. If followed, it will usher in an increased use of mandatory minimum sentences for low level and nonviolent drug offenders and a rise in the over-incarceration that has plagued the federal prison system for the past 25 years.

The Sessions Memo is out of sync with ABA Criminal Justice Standards and policies and has been criticized by legal practitioners, lawmakers, and think tanks, including the Center for American Progress, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The American Civil Liberties Union, Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL), Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime & Incarceration, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), The Sentencing Project, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, and the New York Times Editorial Board.

II. The Sessions Memo Reverses the Progress Made by Previous Attorneys General

Set against the historical evolution of federal prosecutorial charging policies, the Sessions Memo is a regression in criminal justice reform. An understanding of this evolution is critical to appreciating the severity and backwards trend of the Sessions Memo.

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10AIn 1980, Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti promulgated the “Principles of Federal Prosecution” (“Principles”). These Principles instructed federal prosecutors how they should determine which charges to bring, when to plea bargain, and which sentences they should seek in court.1 These Principles were subsequently clarified by a series of memoranda by successive attorneys general—Thornburgh (1989), Reno (1994), Ashcroft (2003), Comey (Deputy Attorney General) (2005), Holder (2010 & 2013) and, recently, Sessions (2017).

A. Civiletti’s Principles of Prosecution (1980)

Civiletti’s Principles gave birth to the position that prosecutors should charge defendants with the most serious, readily provable offense. But, those principles also provided for flexibility in plea bargaining and, in the pre-guidelines era, limited prosecutorial input at sentencing. The Principles stated that, when plea bargaining, a prosecutor could bargain for a plea to a charged offense or a “lesser or related offense” that “bears a reasonable relationship to the nature and extent” of the defendant’s conduct. The Principles also provided that the prosecutor’s role in sentencing was “to assist the sentencing court” and that “sentencing in federal criminal cases is primarily the function and responsibility of the court.” Prosecutors were to “avoid routinely taking positions with respect to sentencing” and only authorized to recommend a specific sentence when it was required by the plea agreement or justified by some public interest concern.

In the limited instances when a prosecutor was authorized to recommend a sentence, the Principles instructed prosecutors to consider several factors including the defendant’s background, personal circumstance, cooperation, age, mental health, physical health, drug dependence, employment record, roots in the community, remorse or contrition, and acceptance of responsibility—even though many of these factors were “the very same factors that the Sentencing Commission declared, seven years later, were generally irrelevant in determining whether a court could depart from a guideline range in imposing sentence.”2

B. Thornburgh Memo (1989)

Under the 1989 memorandum issued by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (“Thornburgh Memo”), prosecutors were again instructed to “initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s conduct.”3 But, the Thornburgh Memo provided some additional flexibility with regard to plea bargaining. His memorandum directed prosecutors to plea bargain down from the most serious charges when the prosecutor believed that there was insufficient evidence to sustain those charges in court, when the indictment exaggerated the seriousness of the offense, when the applicable guidelines range would be unaffected, or when a supervisor approved the plea bargain “for reasons set forth in the file.” Those reasons could be, for 1 Principles of Federal Prosecution (U.S. Dept. of Justice, July 1980).2 Alan Vinegrad, Justice Department’s New Charging, Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Policy , N.Y.L.J., June 10, 2010). 3 Memorandum from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to all federal prosecutors on Plea Bargaining Under The Sentencing Reform Act (Mar. 13, 1989) (“Thornburgh Memo”).

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10Ainstance, “the U.S. Attorney’s Office was overburdened, the case would be time consuming to try, and proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the number of cases disposed of by the office.”4 The Thornburgh Memo directed prosecutors to bargain for a sentence within the guidelines range, but it also authorized prosecutors to depart from the guidelines with supervisory approval or to recommend sentences at the low end of the guidelines range.

C. Reno Memo (1993)

The Thornburgh policies were clarified by Attorney General Janet Reno in 1993 (“Reno Memo”).5 In the Reno Memo, prosecutors were given additional flexibility to consider various subjective factors in determining charges and in plea-bargaining. The Reno Memo stated that “a faithful and honest application of the guidelines is not incompatible with selecting charges or entering into plea agreements on the basis of an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of the case.” This “individualized assessment” allowed prosecutors to determine when, for instance, the available charges were too severe for the facts of the particular offense conduct.

Mindful of the potential consequences at sentencing, the Reno Memo also instructed prosecutors to weigh such factors as “the Sentencing Guideline range yielded by the charge, whether the penalty yielded by such sentencing range (or potential mandatory minimum charge, if applicable) is proportional to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, and whether the charge achieves such purposes of the criminal law as punishment, protection of the public, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in deciding whether to recommend a sentence, prosecutors were advised to consider whether that sentence was “proportional to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.”

D. Ashcroft Memo (2003)

Attorney General John Ashcroft swiftly brought an end to much of the discretionary flexibility given to prosecutors by Reno, in his 2003 memorandum (“Ashcroft Memo”).6 The Ashcroft Memo stated that prosecutors “must” (as opposed to the “should” of past directives) charge the most serious, readily provable offense. Exceptions to this required supervisory approval were to be included in the file, in writing. The Ashcroft Memo also limited the prosecutors’ discretion in plea bargaining, authorizing plea agreements to less than the most serious offense in only narrow and limited circumstances such as when the lesser plea did not affect the sentencing guidelines range or when it was required to secure a defendant’s cooperation. The Ashcroft Memo dropped the flexibility given to prosecutors to strike a plea bargain based on an “individualized assessment” of the facts 4 Vinegrad, supra note 4.5 Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to Holders of U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9, Principles of Federal Prosecution (Oct. 12, 1993) (“Reno Memo”).6 Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors on Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003) (“Ashcroft Memo”).

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10Aor based on the prosecutor’s determination that the indictment exaggerated the seriousness of the offense.

The Ashcroft Memo also took a more rigid stance toward sentencing, forbidding prosecutors from recommending a downward departure except in very limited circumstances. Moreover, prosecutors were instructed to “affirmatively oppose” any such request for a departure by a defendant and not “stand silent.”

E. The Comey Memo

In 2005, the Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional and, thus, the guidelines were rendered advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Following Booker, Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey issued a memorandum that reiterated the hardline charging and plea bargaining policies outlined in the Ashcroft Memo and that instructed prosecutors to “actively seek sentences within the range established by the Sentencing Guidelines in all but extraordinary cases” and that they “must take all steps necessary to ensure adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines.”7

F. The Holder Memos (2010, 2013, and 2014)

In 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum that signaled a return to the more flexible pre-Ashcroft policies (“2010 Holder Memo”).8 For instance, the 2010 Holder Memo states that prosecutors “should ordinarily charge” the most serious readily provable offense and this decision “must always be made” based on an “individualized assessment” of the factors listed in the Reno Memo. In plea bargaining, the Holder memo also returned to the pre-Ashcroft prosecutorial discretion, noting that plea bargains should be “informed by an individualized assessment of the specific facts and circumstances of each particular case.” The 2010 Holder Memo also addressed the importance of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors in sentencing and recognized that, in light of Booker, the guidelines were advisory. This Memo states that “given the advisory nature of the guidelines, advocacy at sentencing—like charging and plea agreements—must also follow from an individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” The memo prohibited filing or dismissing charges to gain leverage in plea negotiations.

Three years later, in 2013, Holder issued a second memorandum on mandatory minimum sentences (“2013 Holder Memo”).9. This memo "refine[d]" the DOJ's charging policy for crimes carrying a mandatory minimum sentence. He instructed that the most severe mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses be reserved for “serious, high-level, or

7 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James Comey, to All Federal Prosecutors on Departmental Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing (Jan. 28, 2005) (“Comey Memo”).8 Memorandum from Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. to All Federal Prosecutors on Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing (May 19, 2010) (“2010 Holder Memo”).9 Memorandum from the Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to The United States Attorney and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division on Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases (Aug. 12, 2013) (“2013 Holder Memo”).

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10Aviolent drug traffickers,” as long sentences for low level offenders have led to unduly harsh sentences that do not advance public safety, rehabilitation, or deterrence. The 2013 Holder Memo directed that such charges should not be brought for low-level drug offenders without significant ties to gangs; whose conduct did not involve violence, death or injury, the use of weapons, or involvement of minors; and where the defendant did not have a significant criminal history.

Prosecutors were also instructed to limit using severe mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements under 21 U.S.C. § 851 to only those defendants whose history or conduct made such increases appropriate.

In 2014, the Attorney General forbade prosecutors from threatening or imposing a so-called “trial penalty,” by manipulating severe mandatory minimum enhancements under 21 U.S.C. § 851 in plea negotiations. The need to secure a plea agreement was not, he said, an appropriate factor to be considered when determining whether to seek the recidivist enhancement which could double a five or ten-year sentence and result in a life sentence in certain cases.

At the time, Attorney General Holder endorsed a “fundamentally new approach” to incarceration.10 He criticized the war on drugs for its contribution to a prison population that was growing at a rate of almost 800 percent and a country that incarcerates almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners, while representing only five percent of the world’s population. President Obama recognized that mandatory minimum sentencing of drug offenders was a “primary driver of this mass-incarceration phenomenon.”11 By avoiding charges that trigger mandatory minimums—where appropriate—the Holder Memo policies were intended to help mitigate the overpopulation of federal prisons that stemmed from the lengthy imprisonment of low-level, non-violent drug offenders and ensure charging practices advanced public safety and individual justice.

G. The Sessions Memo

As noted above, in May 2017, Attorney General Sessions issued a memorandum to federal prosecutors that signaled a return to the Ashcroft era charging and plea bargaining policies with a call for a catastrophic [Rules and calendar asks that you tone down that adjective] sentencing regime that reintroduces mandatory minimums in all cases where they may be applicable. Like the memoranda of several previous attorneys general, the Sessions Memo states that prosecutors “should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.” The Sessions Memo, however, provides for only limited exceptions to this rule, all requiring written supervisory approval. It also instructs prosecutors to charge those offenses that carry the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences. With this memo, Sessions has limited 10 Attorney General Eric Holder Remarks, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations 11 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President after Visit at El Reno Federal Correctional Institution, (July 16, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/16/remarks-president-after-visit-el-reno-federal-correctional-institution.

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10Aprosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining to a standard more similar to that of the Ashcroft regime.

The sentencing mandate in the Sessions Memo, however, is what renders his policies truly regressive. In it, prosecutors are required to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range and to disclose to the court all facts that impact the guidelines calculation or mandatory minimum sentence. [Suggestion: It sounds like this is a return to the Ashcroft approach, which doesn’t seem so radical. Maybe explain how it’s different from even the Ashcroft memo? Also, the concept of regressive has not previously been introduced. You may need to explain what you mean here.]

III. Impact on Criminal Justice System – Reintroducing Mandatory Minimum Sentences & Over Incarceration

The Sessions Memo policies will effectively force prosecutors to charge all defendants, regardless of their criminal histories or personal circumstances with the most serious crimes and to seek the lengthiest sentences available under the guidelines, including mandatory minimum sentences. These policies threaten to eradicate years of progress in criminal justice reform.

A. Longstanding ABA Policy Opposes Mandatory Minimum Sentencing

The ABA has opposed mandatory minimum sentencing—which it believes raises grave issues of public policy—for almost 50 years.1213 All senses of “fairness, due process and the rule of law” require that criminal sentencing be uniform amongst similarly situated offenders and proportional to the criminal conduct.14 Mandatory minimum sentences are inconsistent with both of these principles. For almost 25 years, the ABA has adopted resolutions and issued recommendations challenging mandatory minimum sentences as unjust and as a driving force in over incarceration:

(1995) The ABA adopts a resolution calling for the equalization of the federal penalties for crack and powder cocaine.15

12 See 1968 ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 2.1(c); Proceedings of the 1974 Midyear meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, Report No. 1 of the Section of Criminal Justice, at 443-44; 1980 ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (2d Ed.) § 18-4.3(a).13 Letter from ABA President Karen Mathis to Committee Leadership regarding the House of Representatives Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws (July 3, 2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/letters/crimlaw/2007jul03_minimumsenth_l.authcheckdam.pdf (“Mathis Letter”) Mandatory minimum sentences are also against the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice on Sentencing. The Standards state clearly that “[a] legislature should not prescribe a minimum term of total confinement for any offense.” Standard 18-3.21(b). In addition, Standard 18-6.1(a) directs that “[t]he sentence imposed should be no more severe than necessary to achieve the societal purpose or purposes for which it is authorized,” and “[t]he sentence imposed in each case should be the minimum sanction that is consistent with the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the offender, the offender’s criminal history, and the personal characteristics of an individual offender that may be taken into account.”14 Mathis Letter. 15 Recommendation 129, Annual 1995 (Special Committee on the Drug Crisis).

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(2003-2004) The ABA establishes the Justice Kennedy Commission to further investigate the state of sentencing and corrections in the United States and to make recommendations to address the problem of over-incarceration. The Kennedy Commission issues a series of recommendations urging broad reforms to address sentencing policy, racial and ethnic disparities in the justice system, use of clemency and sentence reduction, and prison conditions and prisoner reentry.16 The Kennedy Commission issues a recommendation urging all jurisdictions, including the federal government, to “[r]epeal mandatory minimum sentence statutes.”17

(2005) The ABA expresses its concerns regarding over-reliance on imprisonment in a policy adopted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), urging Congress to permit increased judicial discretion in departing from the ranges of imprisonment advised by the federal Sentencing Guidelines.18

(2010) The ABA advocates against mandatory minimum sentencing before the Sentencing Commission, offering testimony that “[s]entencing by mandatory minimums is the antithesis of rational sentencing policy.”19

(2011) The ABA recognizes the unwarranted severity of the federal guidelines for the sentencing of high loss economic crimes and issues a recommendation urging the Sentencing Commission to complete a comprehensive assessment of the guidelines for these offenses to ensure that they are proportional to offense severity and adequately take into consideration individual culpability and circumstances.20

(2011) The ABA advocates for further reform of drug quantity laws through the retroactive application of the amendments to the federal guidelines enacted pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.21

(2011) The ABA issues a resolution urging the Sentencing Commission to complete a comprehensive assessment of the guidelines for child pornography offenses, taking into account the severity of each offense and factors pertaining to the current nature of these offenses, offenders, victims, and the role of technology in these offenses.22

(2015) The ABA advocates for further reform of economic crime guidelines and publishes a report drafted by the ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on The

16 Recommendation 121A, Annual 2004 (Criminal Justice Section).17 Id. 18 Recommendation 301, Midyear 2005 (Criminal Justice Section).19 See Testimony of James E. Felman on behalf of the American Bar Association before the United States Sentencing Commission, June 2, 2010.20 Recommendation 104C, Midyear 2011 (Criminal Justice Section).21 See, e.g., Testimony of James E. Felman on behalf of the American Bar Association before the United States Sentencing Commission (June 1, 2011).22 Resolution 105A, available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_105a.authcheckdam.pdf.

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10AReform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes. The report provides an entirely new model for sentencing economic crimes.23

B. Practitioners, Lawmakers, and the Sentencing Commission Have Criticized Mandatory Minimum Sentences

Criticism of mandatory minimum sentencing is widespread. In response to the Sessions Memo, Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ), Mike Lee (R-UT), Dick Durbin (D-IL), and Rand Paul (R-KY) issued a bipartisan letter questioning the Sessions policies and their likely result in “counterproductive sentences that do nothing to make the public safer.”24 The letter emphasizes that mandatory minimum sentencing “requires nonviolent first-time offenders to receive longer sentences than violent criminals… [s]entences of this kind not only ‘undermine respect for our legal system,’ but ruin families and have a corrosive effect on communities.” Even before Sessions issued his memorandum, Sens. Cory Booker of New Jersey, Dick Durbin of Illinois and Patrick Leahy of Vermont sent Sessions a letter “pleading with him not to promote mandatory minimum sentencing.25 The senators wrote:

“Changes to current drug charging policies that lead to more mandatory minimum penalties in low-level, nonviolent drug cases will not increase public safety and will only increase taxpayer spending on our bloated federal prison system…”

“We are concerned about a possible shift in the Justice Department’s treatment of federal drug cases and the specter that mandatory minimum penalties may once again be used by the Justice Department on a routine basis as tools to prosecute low-level nonviolent drug offenses.”26

In a recent Washington Post analysis by former federal judge Nancy Gertner and former federal prosecutor Chiraag Bains, the authors warn:

“[M]andatory minimums have swelled the federal prison population and led to scandalous racial disparities. They have caused untold misery at great expense. And they have not made us safer.”27

23 See Testimony of James E. Felman on behalf of the American Bar Association before the United States Sentencing Commission (March 12, 2015).24 (June 7, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/350652153/6-7-17-Letter-to-the-Attorney-General-on-DOJ-Charging-and-Sentencing-Policy-FINAL-SIGNED. 25 Josh Gerstein, Senators press Sessions on drug policy changes, Politico (March 21, 2017, 2:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2017/03/jeff-sessions-drug-policy-cory-booker-dick-durbin-patrick-leahy-236309. 26 Id. (emphasis added).27 Nancy Gertner & Chiraag Bains, Analysis, Mandatory Minimum Sentences are Cruel and Ineffective. Sessions Wants Them Back., Wash. Post, May 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/15/mandatory-minimum-sentences-are-cruel-and-ineffective-sessions-wants-them-back/?utm_term=.1db91e809c49.

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10AThe critical flaws of mandatory minimum sentences have been recognized by the Sentencing Commission for over 25 years. A Commission report from 1991 identified several problems including that a “lack of uniform application [of mandatory minimum] creates unwarranted disparity in sentencing and the “disparate application of mandatory minimum sentences . . . appears to be related to the race of the defendant.” 28 Twenty years later, a 2011 Commission report identified many of the same flaws:

The certain mandatory minimum provisions apply too broadly, are set too high, or both, to warrant the prescribed minimum penalty for the full range of offenders who could be prosecuted under the particular criminal statute;

Notable differences exist in the application of drug mandatory minimum penalties among various demographic groups, but these differences are largely attributable to the cumulative effects of criminal history and weapon involvement.

The “stacking” of mandatory minimum penalties for multiple violations of section 924(c) results in excessively severe and unjust sentences in some cases.

The severity of the mandatory minimum penalties for violating section 924(c), particularly the penalties for committing multiple violations of section 924(c), has produced inconsistencies in the application of the penalties among judicial districts.

[M]andatory minimum penalties for certain child pornography offenses and the resulting guidelines sentencing ranges may be excessively severe and as a result are being applied inconsistently.29

The Department of Justice recently released a report entitled “Review of the Department’s Implementation of Prosecution and Sentencing Reform Principles under the Smart on Crime Initiative.”30  The report found that between 2010 and 2015, sentencing outcomes in drug cases had shifted in a manner that was consistent with the first two principles of Smart on Crime [“prioritize prosecutions to focus on most serious cases” and “reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities and reduce overburdened prisons”]. This was reflected by significantly fewer mandatory minimum sentences being imposed in drug cases nationwide, as well as a decrease in mandatory minimum sentences for those defendants who might otherwise have received such a sentence…”31

C. Mandatory Minimums Lead to Disparate Sentencing

28 United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: MandatoryMinimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System at ii-iv (1991) (“USSC Special Report”).29 United States Sentencing Commission, 2011 Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, Conclusions and Recommendations (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_12.pdf. 30 United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. June 2017. https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1704.pdf.31 Id.

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In practice, mandatory minimums paradoxically result in disparate sentences for similarly situated offenders. Drug offenses, which contribute to a large proportion of mandatory minimum sentences, can give rise to arbitrary, severe punishments.32 Even minor differences in drug quantities can lead to similar offenses where only some trigger mandatory minimums, leading to a resulting “cliff effect” between similarly situated offenders.33 For instance, someone arrested with 0.9 gram of LSD will not likely spend much time incarcerated, while an arrest for one gram will trigger a mandatory minimum sentence of five years behind bars.

Application of mandatory minimum sentencing is also more harsh for one specific racial community—African Americans. The Commission’s 2011 Report to Congress explains that “Blacks account for 30.3 percent of drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty” but they account for a higher percentage of drug offenders who receive a mandatory minimum at sentencing—40.4 percent.34 The Commission states that this disparate application is “largely attributable to the cumulative effects of criminal history and weapon involvement.”35

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides one example in which the race-based disparity in sentencing that is created by mandatory-minimum sentencing has been documented. In 2009, the Massachusetts Bar Association concluded that in that state, where the racial minority composition of the state population was determined to be 20%, approximately 75% of mandatory minimum offenders were determined to be racial minority members.36 This was despite evidence that -- at this same time-frame -- the national drug use rates among white, black and Latino racial groups was nearly identical.37 The 2009 Massachusetts Bar Association study concluded, citing a review conducted under the auspices of the Boston University School of Public Health, that 74.6% of defendants convicted of mandatory drug distribution offenses were racial/ethnic minorities and only 25.4% of defendant’s convicted of such mandatory minimum offenses were white.38

32 Paul Larkin & Evan Bernick, Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The Arguments for and Against Potential Reforms, Heritage Foundation (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/reconsidering-mandatory-minimum-sentences-the-arguments-and-against. 33 Id. (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199, 213 (1993)).34 United States Sentencing Commission, 2011 Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, Conclusions and Recommendations (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_12.pdf. 35 Id. 36 Report of the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, “Survey of Sentencing Practices FY 2006”, January 2007, p.53, available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/admin/sentcomm/fy2006survey.pdf. .37 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, “Illicit Drug Use, By Race/Ethnicity in Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan Counties: 2004-2007”, June 21, 2007. 38 “The Failure of the War on Drugs: Charting a New Course for the Commonwealth”, Report of the Massachusetts Bar Association Drug Policy Task Force, 2009, p. 18-19 & n.55, available at http://www.massbar.org/media/520275/drug%20policy%20task%20force%20final%20report.pdf .

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10AThe gross, race-based, disparate impact of mandatory minimum sentencing policy is long-recognized as a national phenomenon. As far back as in 1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Special Report to Congress on mandatory minimum sentences observed “the disparate application of mandatory minimum sentences” in that “whites are more likely than non-whites to be sentenced below the applicable mandatory minimum.”39 Indeed, a 2013 Yale study found that “prosecutors file mandatory minimums twice as often against black men as against comparable white men. Moreover, for those concerned about mass incarceration of black men, expanding mandatory minimums would be counterproductive.”40

D. Mandatory Minimums Lead to Unduly Harsh Sentences

The research on mandatory minimum sentences is replete with stories of unduly harsh sentences for drug offenses. In one case, a financially desperate single mother with four children and zero criminal history was paid $100 by a stranger to mail a package that, unbeknownst to her, contained 232 grams of crack cocaine. For that single act, she was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment even though the sentencing judge believed that sentence was completely unjust and irrational.41

Mandatory minimum sentences also ignore all the circumstances surrounding the conduct and blind the court to all factors outside of the criminal act itself—courts cannot consider the defendant’s role in the offense, the defendant’s level of culpability, nor his or her acceptance of responsibility.

E. Mandatory Minimums Lead to Over Incarceration

Between 1980 and 2013, the combined federal, state, and local prison populations increased at 340% from 503,600 to 2,200,300 individuals. In this period, the federal population grew the most, 786% from 24,363 to 215,866 individuals.42 The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world at a cost of more than $80 billion a year.

39 U.S. Sentencing Commission, “Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System”, August 1991, Summary, pp. ii, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf. 40 Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, “Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker,” Yale Law Review, Vol. 123 (Oct 2013) (finding that “prosecutors file mandatory minimums twice as often against black men as against comparable white men. Moreover, for those concerned about mass incarceration of black men, expanding mandatory minimums would be counterproductive.”).41 Id. (citing Steven Nauman, Brown v. Plata; Renewing the Call to End Mandatory Sentencing, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 855, 866–67 (2013)). 42 William A. Galston & Elizabeth McElvein, Addressing mass incarceration with evidence-based reform, Brookings Inst. (Apr. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/04/08/addressing-mass-incarceration-with-evidence-based-reform/.

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Mandatory minimums have been a driving force in the mass incarceration that plagues the United States, placing an enormous burden on taxpayers and having dire social consequences. Former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates explains in a recent Washington Post article that the Holder policies enabled prosecutors to focus “limited federal resources on cases that had the greatest impact on our communities — the most dangerous defendants and most complex cases.”43 She emphasizes that the resources spent on imprisoning low-level nonviolent offenders “is a dollar we don’t have to investigate and prosecute serious threats, from child predators to terrorists.”44 Packing our prison system with low-level nonviolent offenders is costly and it does nothing to improve public safety.

Conclusion

The American Bar Association calls upon the Department of Justice to rescind Attorney General Sessions’ memorandum that limits prosecutorial discretion and increased mandatory minimum sentences.

The American Bar Association also urges the United States Department of Justice to reinstate its policies permitting federal prosecutors to make individualized assessments of each case and to pursue mandatory minimum sentences and recidivist enhancements only where justified by a defendant’s leadership role in the offense, use or threat of violence,

43 Sally Yates, Opinion, Making America scared again won’t make us safer , Wash. Post (June 23, 2017). 44 Id.

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10Asignificant criminal history, ties to large-scale drug trafficking organizations, gangs or cartels, or the avoidance of a gross sentencing disparity with equally or more culpable co-defendants

Respectfully submitted,

___________________________

Jeffrey N. CatalanoPresident, Massachusetts Bar Association

August 2017

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10AGENERAL INFORMATION FORM

Submitting Entity: Massachusetts Bar Association, ABA Criminal Justice Section

Submitted By: Jeffrey N. Catalano (MA Bar), Matthew Redle, Chair (ABA Criminal Justice Section)

1. Summary of Resolution(s) .

This Resolution implores for the Department of Justice to revoke Attorney General Sessions’ memorandum from May 2017 that orders prosecutors to pursue the most serious, readily provable offense. The guidelines retreats from the significant reform implemented during the previous administration in favor of advancing the outdated limited prosecutorial discretion and mandatory minimum sentencing policies that will only exacerbate the federal prison system’s over-incarceration problem. Ultimately, the ABA urges the Department of Justice to restore prosecutorial discretion in choosing the charges s/he wishes to pursue and reserve mandatory minimum sentencing to only the most serious drug traffickers and prohibit its use to secure plea agreements.

2. Approval by Submitting Entity . This resolution was passed by Massachusetts Bar Association in July 2017 and by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Council in July 2017.

3. Has this or a similar resolution been submitted to the House or Board previously ?

No.

4. What existing Association policies are relevant to this Resolution and how would they be affected by its adoption?

As the report outlines, this resolution is consistent with previous ABA policy on mandatory minimums, prosecutorial discretion, and criminal justice charging decisions.

5. If this is a late report, what urgency exists which requires action at this meeting of the House?

The Sessions Memo (the subject of this resolution) was released shortly before the initial filing deadline for resolutions and reports. Because the House of Delegates will not meet again until February 2018, this resolution is being submitted as a late resolution and report to allow the ABA to speak in a timely and relevant fashion and to join the large number of organizations and individuals who have spoken out against this memo.

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10A

6. Status of Legislation . (If applicable)

N/A

7. Brief explanation regarding plans for implementation of the policy, if adopted by the House of Delegates.

This resolution will be used in lobbying efforts, amicus briefs, and public awareness campaigns.

8. Cost to the Association . (Both direct and indirect costs)

None.

9. Disclosure of Interest . (If applicable)

N/A.

10. Referrals . Concurrent with the filing of this resolution and Report with the House of Delegates, the Criminal Justice Section is sending the resolution and report to the following entities and/or interested groups:

Commission on Veteran’s Legal ServicesLegal Aid & Indigent DefenseCommission on Disability RightsSpecial Committee on Hispanic Legal Rights & ResponsibilitiesCommission on Homelessness and PovertyCenter for Human RightsCommission on ImmigrationRacial & Ethnic DiversityRacial & Ethnic JusticeYouth at RiskYoung Lawyer’s DivisionCivil Rights and Social JusticeGovernment and Public Sector LawyersInternational LawFederal Trial JudgesState Trial JudgesLaw Practice DivisionScience & TechnologyHealth LawLitigation

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10A

11. Contact Name and Address Information . (Prior to the meeting. Please include name, address, telephone number and e-mail address)

Rebecca BrodeyCozen O’Connor1200 19th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036T: (202) 912-4892Email: rbrodey@cozen.com

James E. FelmanKynes, Markman & Felman100 S. Ashley Drive, Suite 1300Tampa, FL 33602T: (813) 229-1118Email: jfelman@kmf-law.com

Kevin J. Curtin200 Trade Center, 3rd floorWoburn, MA. 01801T: (508) 423-0140Email: kevinjcurtin@icloud.com

Sara Elizabeth Dill American Bar Association – Criminal Justice Section1050 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 400Washington, D.C. 20036T: (202) 662-1511Email: sara.dill@americanbar.org

12. Contact Name and Address Information . (Who will present the report to the House? Please include name, address, telephone number, cell phone number and e-mail address.)

Neal Sonnett2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2600Miami, Florida 33131-1819T: 305-358-2000 Cell: 305-333-5444E: nrslaw@sonnett.com

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10AEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Summary of the Resolution

This resolution urges the Department of Justice to rescind Attorney General Sessions’ memorandum from May 2017 that orders prosecutors to pursue the most serious, readily provable offense. These guidelines limit prosecutorial discretion and exacerbate mandatory minimum sentencing policies that will only exacerbate the federal prison system’s over-incarceration problem. This resolution urges the Department of Justice to restore prosecutorial discretion in choosing the charges s/he wishes to pursue based on the particular circumstances of each case.

2. Summary of the Issue that the Resolution Addresses

This Resolution addresses the new policies of Attorney General Sessions and the Department of Justice.

3. Please Explain How the Proposed Policy Position Will Address the Issue

This Resolution calls upon the Department of Justice to re-examine their new policies, and can be used in lobbying efforts, amicus briefs, and public awareness campaigns.

4. Summary of Minority Views or Opposition Internal and/or External to the ABAWhich Have Been Identified.

None.

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