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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

Interim V2.0

(Chapter 2 ± Situational Awareness)

04 October 2013

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COPD V2.0

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Table of Contents

2-1. Introduction. ................................................................................................................... 2-1

2-2. Information Management for Crises and Operations. ..................................................... 2-3

2-3. Horizon Scanning ........................................................................................................... 2-3

2-4. Situational Awareness .................................................................................................... 2-5

2-5. Knowledge Development Process................................................................................ 2-10

Table of Figures

Figure 2.1 - Situational Awareness Main Activities ................................................................... 2-6

Figure 2.2 - Example Influence Diagram (TOPFAS) ................................................................. 2-9

Figure 2.3 - The Knowledge Development Process ................................................................ 2-11

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2 CHAPTER 2

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

2-1. Introduction.

a. NATO Strategic Concept. The Alliance, in its 2010 Strategic Concept, has undertaken to continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts, including through diplomatic and political measures. The Concept also guides engagement with other international actors, including encouraging collaborative analysis.

b. NATO Policy. The Supreme Allied &RPPDQGHU�(XURSH¶V��6$&(85¶V) Terms of Reference1 (TOR) details responsibilities for his Area of Responsibility and Areas of ,QWHUHVW��$25�$2,���LQFOXGLQJ�WKRVH�EH\RQG�1$72¶V�WHUULWRU\��DQG�WKH�QHHG�WR�PRQLWRU�and analyse regional instabilities, military capabilities, and transnational issues that may directly or indirectly impact NATO's security interests. Further, the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) and MC 166 series (NATO Intelligence Warning 6\VWHP��1,:6���SURYLGH�PRUH�GHWDLO�RQ�6$&(85¶V�URle in Indications and Warning of potential or actual crises, and AD 65-112 provides the complementary direction and guidance for the management of intelligence production in Allied Command Operations (ACO).

c. Strategic Environment. The strategic environment has evolved into a highly complex, dynamic and adaptive system with many new, state and non-state, actors (both local and international). Understanding their relationships and their interdependencies within an agreed AOI is key to identifying emerging crises with potential impact to 1$72¶V�VHFXULW\�LQWHUHVWV�DQG�IRU�WLPHO\�SUHSDUDWLRQ�IRU�WKH�FRQGXFW�RI�SRVVLEOH�1$72�operations. NATO requires capabilities and procedures that can monitor, assess and warn of impending crises in the vicinity of NATO territory or beyond, to provide strategic warning to decision-makers in a timely and effective manner. SACEUR, in carrying out the responsibilities of monitoring, assessing and warning of impending crisis within the AOR and beyond, conducts horizon scanning, information/knowledge management and knowledge development (KD) to facilitate detection of potential crises further in advance and the development of situational awareness (SA) and understanding of emerging crises for the conduct of prudent preparatory and formal planning activities.

d. Understanding.

(1) Within a military context, understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making3. This includes answering the main questions of who, what, where, when, why and how to provide the context and narrative of events. In turn, this informs when the application of military power may be necessary to achieve strategic objectives or when its use should be avoided, such as when political or diplomatic means, in consultation with others,

1 MC 0053-4, 12 Apr 10. 2 ACO Directive (AD) 65-11 (NR) - Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence Production Management, Mar 13. 3 AJP-2 (A) - Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine, Ratification Draft.

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may achieve the same ends.

(2) Understanding flows from developing a detailed perspective of an actor, group, environment or situation. Building an µenhanced¶ understanding, necessary for operations planning, takes time and, therefore, it may not be immediately available at the moment of emergence of a potential crisis. This highlights the importance of horizon scanning activities, and the necessity for prompt direction to focus on emerging crises of relevance to the Alliance. Also, as a crisis situation continues to evolve, development of an understanding of it is an on-going process, with the need for continuous holistic re-evaluation of developments of potential challenges to NATO and its security interests.

(3) Developing a holistic understanding of a crisis is by its very nature, a multi-agency and multisource process, which requires drawing on all available NATO and non-NATO expertise (both military and non-military). A sufficiently broad, inclusive, flexible and adaptive approach needs to be taken to accommodate a wide range of experts, both within and external to the formal NATO structure. Such experts may provide the necessary subject matter expertise to understand the possible operating environment.

(4) Understanding of an emerging crisis is built over time including horizon scanning, development of initial SA and throughout the Operations Planning Process (OPP). The development and sharing of understanding is further enhanced through information/knowledge management, KD and stakeholder engagement capabilities.

e. Knowledge Development.

(1) Knowledge is the meaning rendered from data and information, using the skills acquired through experience or education, that contributes to the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. Iteratively applied, the KD process converts basic data to more usable information, information to awareness (what is happening) and awareness to understanding (why it is happening). This contributHV�WR�WKH�SUHSDUDWLRQ�IRU�DQG�H[HFXWLRQ�RI�1$72¶V�PLVVLRQV�E\�SURYLGLQJ�higher levels of awareness and understanding that can support NATO senior military leaders and political officials in their political-military, strategic and operational level decision-making processes.

(2) In general, KD is a proactive, collaborative and iterative process, carried out at all levels of ACO, and contributed to by all functional and special staff. While some functional areas (e.g. Intelligence) have their own internal processes, their output contributes to the overall knowledge requirements of their headquarters and ACO.

(3) While the structure and processes of each headquarters may be unique, ideally all those involved in NATO planning and operations would have some resident civil expertise and additional mechanisms to obtain further specialist advice when required. Drawing on NATO and non-NATO entities, these subject matter experts (SMEs) would apply regional and thematic (political, economic, social, information and infrastructure) expertise towards the development of contextual understanding of external actors in crisis or current operation situations especially as they impact Alliance interests.

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f. Stakeholder Engagement. Due to the nature of modern crises, crisis prevention and crisis management efforts demand a comprehensive approach by many stakeholders. Through established mechanisms (especially in the early stages of a crisis) or devolved authorities, appropriate engagement with relevant stakeholders, for the horizon scanning or OPP activities being conducted, will facilitate development and maintenance of a holistic understanding of an emerging crisis of interest to NATO. As there is a risk of inadvertent, damaging impact from ad hoc or casual communication with other actors, there is a need for a more structured and considered approach to stakeholder engagement.

2-2. Information Management for Crises and Operations.

a. Information Management (IM) is a discipline that directs and supports the handling of information throughout its life-cycle ensuring it is the right information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy the demands of an organisation. The NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP)4 establishes a framework to ensure that information is handled effectively, efficiently and securely in order to serve the interests of NATO. This includes managing all aspects of information throughout its life-cycle. :LWKLQ�WKLV�SROLF\��WKH�WHUP�µLQIRUPDWLRQ¶�LV�XVHG�WR�HPEUDFH�DOO�LQIRUPDWLRQ��LQFOXGLQJ�related data, rHTXLUHG�LQ�VXSSRUW�RI�1$72¶V�PLVVLRQV��ZKHWKHU�VXFK�LQIRUPDWLRQ�originates in NATO civil or military bodies or is received from member nations or non-NATO sources. Such information, and the media and resources used to record and process it, shall be managed in accordance with the NIMP and other relevant NATO agreements and legal obligations.

b. The efficient and effective management of information and knowledge is a critical VXFFHVV�IDFWRU�IRU�DFKLHYLQJ�1$72¶V�JRDOV�DQG�REMHFWLYHV���7KH�SULQFLSOHV�DQG�REMHFWives of the NIMP, as directed in the Primary Directive on Information Management (PDIM), are to be applied in all ACO endeavours in the planning and conduct of tasks and DFWLYLWLHV�XQGHU�1$72¶V�FULVLV�PDQDJHPHQW�DQG�RSHUDWLRQV�SODQQLQJ�SURFHVVHV, as well as in the conduct of operations.

2-3. Horizon Scanning.

a. Horizon scanning5 is a collaborative effort drawing on all NATO political and PLOLWDU\�FDSDELOLWLHV�DW�DOO�OHYHOV�WR�DVVHVV�SRWHQWLDO�ULVNV�DQG�WKUHDWV�WR�1$72¶V�VHFXULW\�interests. Within ACO, horizon scanning should provide SACEUR with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive and wide-ranging contextualised information and intelligence, to help prevent strategic surprise and deliver a decision advantage to NATO political-military authorities. Throughout, SACEUR will draw on advice from his military commanders, including those who may be given specific responsibilities for monitoring an AOI.

b. Specifically, a horizon scanning capability should:

(1) Enable crisis identification within designated AOI by continuously monitoring the security environment. SACEUR has responsibility for AOI beyond NATO's territory in which NATO commanders monitor and analyse regional

4 C-M(2007)0118, The NATO Information Management Policy, 28 Jan 08. 5 6WUDWHJLF�&RQFHSW��/LVERQ���³1$72�ZLOO�FRQWLQXDOO\�PRQLWRU�DQG�analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where DSSURSULDWH��WDNH�DFWLYH�VWHSV�WR�SUHYHQW�WKHP�IURP�EHFRPLQJ�ODUJHU�FRQIOLFWV�´

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instabilities, military capabilities, and transnational issues6 that include military aspects, in order to identify their potential military consequences which may directly or indirectly influence NATO's security interests.

(2) Establish, maintain and, as appropriate, share an initial perception of HPHUJLQJ�FULVLV�VLWXDWLRQV�UHOHYDQW�WR�1$72¶V�VHFXULW\�LQWHrests.

(3) Understand transnational issues of interest to the Alliance. In reviewing the global geo-political situation and transnational issues, in terms of possible threats and risks to NATO security interests, the following should be considered:

(a) Threats or acts of armed attack or aggression.

(b) Proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(c) International terrorism/extremism.

(d) Instability from failed and failing states.

(e) Environmental and humanitarian disaster.

(f) Security of vital resources.

(g) Organised/Transnational crime, for example human trafficking and narcotics.

(h) Hostile information activities and propaganda directed at NATO.

(i) Cyber threats.

(4) Maintain a matrix of potential crisis regions/countries (and related relevant actors) not addressed in the NIWS or Potential Crisis Update List (PCUL). This matrix should be based on factors derived from NATO policy and command guidance; it should also provide a methodology to reduce the range of possibilities and ensure their relevance to NATO.

(5) Take maximum advantage of non-NATO expertise, including assessments, analysis and networks of experts, as authorised.

(6) &RQWULEXWH�WR�LGHQWLI\LQJ�DQG�GHILQLQJ�6$&(85¶V�$2,���7DNLQJ�DFFRXQW�RI�the prevailing geo-political situation, SACEUR may designate AOI for approval by the Military Committee (MC) or the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Operations Policy Committee (OPC).

(7) Identify indications and warnings. Indications and warnings may be identified and reported by NATO operations centres monitoring an AOI, as well as by nations. They are shared and assessed using the NIWS, which is designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or concern

6 Transnational issues, which include military aspects, encompass activities such as: terrorism/extremism; proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction; malicious cyber activities; military technological developments; and the military use of space.

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that could impact on NATO security interests.

(8) &RQWLQXRXVO\�UHYLHZ�6$&(85¶V�$25�$2,�IRU�FKDQJLQJ�WUHQGV�

(9) Continuously review warning problems (WPs) and indicators and identify QHZ�:3V�IRU�LQFOXVLRQ�LQ�WKH�1,:6�RU�UDLVH�DV�µSUREOHPV¶�LQ�WKH�3&8/7.

2-4. Situational Awareness.

a. Situational Awareness (SA)8 is the human perception of all available elements of information in relation to a specific situation that allows for a more holistic and informed interpretation of reality. SA contributes to all phases of the process by providing a holistic understanding of the environment.

b. Levels of Situational Awareness. Different levels of SA9, perception, comprehension and projection, reflect the range of contextual understanding to support decision-making.

(1) Perception involves the processes of monitoring, indicator detection, and simple recognition leading to an awareness of multiple situational elements (objects, events, people, systems, environmental factors) and their current states (locations, conditions, modes, actions) to provide an initial awareness of the environment.

(2) Comprehension requires integrating this information to understand how it will impact upon goals and objectives. This includes developing an initial understanding of the AOI as it pertains to NATO.

(3) Projection involves the ability to make assessments as to the range of possible outcomes that potential actions may have within the engagement space or operational environment leading to a more enhanced understanding. This is achieved through building knowledge on the status, dynamics and interrelations of the elements and more detailed comprehension of the situation and then extrapolating this information forward in time to provide estimates of how it could affect future states of a potential AOI.

7 AD 65/11 - ACO Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence Production Management, 13 Mar 13. 8 Pre-doctrinal Bi-SC Knowledge Development Handbook, 09 Feb 11. 9 :LWK�FRQVLGHUDWLRQ�WR�(QGVOH\��0LFD��³7RZDUGV�D�7KHRU\�RI�6LWXDWLRQ�$ZDUHQHVV�LQ�'\QDPLF�6\VWHPV´��+XPDQ�)DFWRUV��������)LJXUe 1 p. 35, and pages 35-40.

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(3) Develop Encyclopaedic Information about Actors and Systems in the Area. Drawing on information and intelligence provided by J2/KD, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) and other staff, planners ensure that their information and knowledge are at the appropriate level of granularity to support operations planning.

d. Develop Information/Knowledge Requirements.

(1) Determine Information/Knowledge Requirements10. Based on the initial awareness of the situation and its potential for development, the staff determines specific requirements for information/knowledge to support the analysis and decision-making during the different phases of the OPP. Some of these requirements may EH�JHQHUDWHG�WKURXJK�WKH�LGHQWLILFDWLRQ�RI�DQ\�&RPPDQGHU¶V�Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) required at this point to support timely decision-making and their supporting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)11. These requirements, managed through the request for information process, may include further knowledge about the capabilities and behaviour of different actors, their relationships and influences, as well as key factors within the strategic environment.

(2) Confirm or Develop other Information Sources. KD elements must collect information and knowledge from all sources. In addition, it is highly likely that international, governmental and non-governmental organisations are already engaged in the AOI. They represent a potentially vast source of information and knowledge about different aspects of the area related to humanitarian assistance, development and reconstruction, including logistics, transportation and communications infrastructure.

(3) Coordinate Requirements between Levels. It is important that knowledge management (KM) elements at each level (i.e. strategic, operational and component) coordinate their knowledge requirements across all levels through liaison elements to make the best use of all available means in NATO.

e. Acquire Information and Develop Knowledge about the Designated AOI.

(1) General.

(a) A product plan is developed to acquire and analyse the information necessary to generate the required knowledge to better understand the situation.

(b) Different actors have their own internal dynamics and external linkages within one PMESII12 domain, or even crossing several domains. It is possible to understand actors and resources that are linked as a system

10 Knowledge Requirement - A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system in order to make a decision. 11 To satisfy PIRs, J2 staff initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the NIFC as well as to nations in accordance with the NATO intelligence Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) process. 12 PMESII ± Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (e.g. Systems within the Engagement Space). The PMESII model is a way to explain the inter-related elements or domains of a complex operations environment. All analysis should integrate a gender perspective in line with the Bi-SC Directive 40-1, dated 08 Aug 12. Note that AD65-���XVHV�µPMESII SOXV¶�ZKLFK�LV�GHVFULEHG�DV�PMESII, plus technological and environmental elements.

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or a system of systems with each having numerous distinct system elements. Creating effects in one domain often influences conditions in another domain, system or system element.

(c) Analysing the systems in an AOI can contribute to a more detailed understanding about the environment and the roles played by the different actors including any actions that have established the conditions that characterise the current situation and/or may influence its likely development.

(2) Analyse AOI Systems.

(a) Complex Adaptive Systems. The complexity of a given situation depends on the number, composition and structure of the different systems and the ways they interact. The structural complexity of a system is directly proportional to the number of related systems and system elements, while WKH�V\VWHP¶V�LQWHUDFWLYH�FRPSOH[LW\�LV�UHODWHG�WR�WKH�IUHHGRP�RI action of each individual part and the number of linkages among the components. Complex systems that are able to learn and adapt in response to their interaction with other systems and changes in the operational environment can be considered complex adaptive systems. A system analysis will enhance the understanding of complex adaptive systems, as well as the nature of the problem, and supports the development of possible response options.

(b) System Analysis. A system analysis examines potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors holistically as complex adaptive systems to understand their behaviour, capabilities and interaction within the operational environment. This analysis will reveal strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other critical factoUV��LQFOXGLQJ�DQ�DFWRU¶V�FDSDFLW\�IRU�adaptation, which provides insight into how they can be influenced. The following are basic steps in the system analysis:

1/ Analyse/update the composition of the system and identify essential subsystems and system elements in its PMESII aspects.

2/ Identify system strengths and weaknesses. This process will identify key system elements, which will assist centre of gravity determination, as well as its ability for adaptation during interaction with other systems.

3/ Identify relations between system elements. Next it is important to determine how key actors (individuals, groups and organisations) interact with each other and which interrelationships are particularly important. 5HODWLRQVKLSV�EHWZHHQ�D�V\VWHP¶V�elements will influence its strengths and weaknesses as it interacts with other systems. This will reveal potential vulnerabilities. It is important to identify those vulnerabilities that have potential for exploitation. Identify which system elements are associated with HDFK�V\VWHP¶V�YXOQHUDELOLWLHV���([DPLQLQJ�WKH�NH\�SHUVRQDOLWLHV��organisations, facilities, features and materiel associated with the vulnerable system elements should begin to reveal whether they

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might be influenced by an action that could in turn create a desired effect on the system.

(c) Influence Diagrams. Influence diagrams can be used to help visualise a systems relationships, including critical requirements, capabilities or vulnerabilities and can help appreciate where the behaviour of system elements can be influenced or affected in either a positive or negative way. Such a visual representation helps in understanding situations that may be complex in terms of structure, interactivity and adaptation. These diagrams can also depict objectives, criteria for success and decisive conditions, as appropriate. An example of such a diagram is shown below in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 - Example Influence Diagram (TOPFAS)

f. Establish and Share Common Situational Awareness.

(1) Share Information, Knowledge and a Common Operating Picture. Establishing common SA may be achieved by drawing information from any number of sources and displaying it using a number of tools such as Joint Common Operational Picture13 (JCOP) or Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Service (TOPFAS) as a medium for sharing information or collaborating on an agreed AOI.

13 Note that NATO Common Operational Picture (NCOP) is in development to replace JCOP.

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(2) Further Develop the Knowledge Base14. KM elements will orchestrate the further acquisition of information about assigned AOIs. These acquisition efforts require functional expertise from across the HQ as well as collaboration with external organizations to build up a repository of information, expertise and contacts about any given area and its main actors. This repository of information must be accessible through shared work-spaces to support further analysis and planning. Therefore, it is imperative that information about the area is collected, organised and stored in a manner that ensures that it can be managed and shared efficiently and effectively within the HQs, with other HQs and with relevant external actors, using common schemes.

(3) Monitor the situation in area of interest. The current operations centres will continuously monitor designated areas, paying close attention to CCIRs established by the operational commander and SACEUR. They will be aware of the current activities of each actor in the area and will look for any changes that might impact the overall situation. They may submit requests for information to fill gaps or gain a better understanding of the scope, scale and impact of changes on the overall situation.

2-5. Knowledge Development Process.

a. The KD process15 covers the acquisition, integration, analysis, and sharing of information and knowledge from relevant military and non-military sources. It includes analysis of the relationships and interactions between systems and actors taking account of different PMESII and environmental factors to enable a Commander and staff to better understand the situation as well as the possible effects of Military, Political, Economic and Civil actions on different systems and actors. The KD process supports horizon scanning activities and the entire OPP, including the planning and execution of operations, as well as periodic operations assessment.

b. An effective ACO-wide KD process will contribute proactively to shared SA and an understanding of potential crises and conflict situations. This supports timely and informed political and military authority decision-making, at all levels, and interaction with cooperating national and international actors by:

(1) Improving understanding and ability to influence issues, which integrate into wider actions, events and third party activities that impact upon Alliance interests.

(2) Avoiding the consequences of inappropriate engagement by ensuring relationships with non-NATO entities are within the bounds of NAC/MC direction, SACEUR¶V�725 and command intent.

(3) Allowing external organisations to develop effective relations with ACO.

(4) The steps in the KD process are:

14 The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, knowledge, expertise and established contacts that is distributed, inter-linked and standardised. 15 To support the KD process, HQs at the Strategic level and below require capabilities to coordinate and prioritise requirements, draw together information/Intel from internal NATO and external sources, analyse it and make it available to decision makers and other relevant entities. Within the NATO Command Structure (NCS) the manner in which this will be accomplished is under review.

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(5) Feedback. All of the above activities include an essential mechanism for receiving and acting on feedback. This involves activities to collect and evaluate feedback received from knowledge product consumers and to take necessary actions to improve all aspects of the process.

(6) Information and Knowledge Management. An essential supporting element of the KD process, KM is a multi-disciplined approach to make the best use of information, insights and best practices, to facilitate the achievement of organisational goals. KM, and its intrinsic component IM, is the means by which NATO organisations determine what knowledge is required, manage existing knowledge and identify knowledge gaps to be filled, including who will fill them (e.g. Civil Military Analysis16 (CMA)/Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)/Intel other). It also includes managing the Knowledge Base (KB) which is a collection of data, information, expertise, established contacts and already developed knowledge that is distributed, inter-linked and standardised. Managing the KB involves activities to care for the KB (governance, storage, assurance), enhance its capabilities, and purge out-dated or no longer required knowledge products.

(7) KD requires close coordination with the Information Knowledge Management (IKM) staff to ensure effective and efficient acquisition and management of information within a HQ. This requires clearly established procedures for:

(a) Assigning information owners, authorities and responsibilities to all staff elements involved in the OPP.

(b) Creating and managing shared information space where all relevant information, knowledge products and automated information displays can be pulled from NATO Secret and/or mission secret wide-area networks.

(c) Sharing geo-spatial information using available core and functional services as well as establishing gateways to access national databases.

(d) Archiving and sharing key authoritative documents including relevant NAC and other strategic level documents as well as other international DFWRUV¶�GRFXPHQWV�

(e) Developing information capabilities and procedures to share relevant information/knowledge with non-NATO entities.

16 An envisioned SHAPE structural entity, the CMA branch applies regional and thematic (primarily Political, Economic, and Social) expertise through reseaUFK�DQG�DQDO\VLV�DFWLYLWLHV��LQ�RUGHU�WR�GHYHORS�SURGXFWV�FRQWULEXWLQJ�WR�6$&(85¶V�FRQWH[WXDOL]HG�XQGHUVWDQGLQJ�RI�HPHUJLQJ�Dnd on-going crises and current operations especially as they impact Alliance interest.