Alix Cohen (Edinburgh): Kant on the Ethics of Belief (PDF + Podcast)

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ACCORDING to Kant, we are responsible for, and can be blamed for, our beliefs.

We can of course blame someone who has given approval to a false cognition, namely, when the responsibility actually lies with him for rejecting those grounds that could have convinced him of the object of the cognition he has, and could have freed him from his error. (LL 126 [24:160])2

In line with many contemporary philosophers, Kant treats as

obvious the fact that we are epistemically responsible and yet denies the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colloque of the Université de Neuchâtel. I would like to thank all the participants for a very stimulating discussion. Insofar as the following works by Kant are cited frequently, I have used the following abbreviations: LL (Lectures on Logic), LA (Lectures on Anthropology), G (Groundwork), A (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View), CPR (Critique of Pure Reason), CPrR (Critique of Practical Reason), CJ (Critique of the Power of Judgment), MM (Metaphysics of Morals), CF (Conflict of Faculties), WOT (What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?), WE (What is Enlightenment?), 2 See also ‘when one judges and accepts something before investigation, with the resolve not to undertake any closer investigation concerning the whole thing, but rather to rest completely content with it, then this is in fact a punishable prejudice’ (LL 130 [24:165]).

This paper will explore the possibility of developing a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the toolbox provided by Kant’s ethics. To do so, I will begin by showing that contrary to what is often assumed, autonomy is not just the remit of practical reason. I will then discuss whether Kant’s universalisability test is applicable to the domain of epistemic deliberation. I will conclude that it is not only possible, it also produces results that are compatible with Kant’s epistemic positions, as I will show in the case of evidentialism and moral faith. Finally, I will suggest that the epistemic version of the universalisability test I have delineated also produces unexpected results, and that these results have the potential to form the basis of fresh Kantian answers to contemporary questions, as I will show in the case of testimony.

alix cohen kant on the ethics of belief draft paper

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possibility of a direct influence of the will on our beliefs:3 ‘The will does not have any influence immediately on holding-to-be-true; this would be quite absurd’ (LL 577 [9:74]). Although much if not all of our beliefs are beyond the realm of direct voluntary control, he allows for an indirect form of influence of the will on judgment. Whether we are right or wrong, whether our beliefs are justified or unjustified, we are responsible for them because we have the capacity to direct our cognition according to rules.

But I will not defend this claim today.4 Instead, I will draw its implications for a Kantian account of the ethics of belief, and in particular the idea that the most fruitful analogy is not between belief and action, as is often claimed, but between moral and epistemic principles.5 To do so, I will explore the possibility of developing a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the toolbox provided by Kant’s ethics. This paper is thus in many ways programmatic. Eventually, I hope to be in a position to examine whether such an account can provide plausible, Kantian answers to certain debates in contemporary epistemology. But in the meantime, I will reconstruct epistemic concepts and arguments on the model of their ethical counterparts: the notions of epistemic autonomy, epistemic principle, epistemic maxim, epistemically permissible, and epistemic universalisability test.

i. the principles of thinking

On the Kantian picture, we are always the agents of our cognition, even when it does not seem to be the case, for our capacity for rational agency underlies all our cognitive activity: ‘the power to judge autonomously – that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) – is called reason.’ (CF 255 [7:27]) Thus contrary to what is often assumed, autonomy is not just the remit of practical reason. To

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 See for instance Shah (2002): 436. For traditional arguments against doxastic voluntarism, see Williams (1973). 4 I have already defended this claim in Cohen (2013). 5 For instance, as Audi writes, ‘Belief is profoundly analogous to action. Both are commonly grounded in reasons; both are a basis for praising or blaming the subject; both are sensitive to changes in one’s environment; both can appropriately be described as objects of decision and deliberation, and beliefs can appear quite action-like when conceived as formed by assent or by acceptance’ (Audi (2001): 93).


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understand this claim, let’s turn briefly to Kant’s argument for moral autonomy.

Kant argues that all competing ethical theories are wrong because they share a common premise: they define what is morally acceptable on the basis of what agents (supposedly) want, and prescribe what they should do if they want it to obtain, whether it is happiness, maximum utility, or something else. By relying on agents’ desires in one form or another, these theories defend what Kant calls heteronomous accounts of moral value – the good is agent-relative, subjective, and contingent. They prescribe that “If I want my action to be right, then I should ground it on X”, with X taking the place of whichever value they put forward. By contrast, Kant’s moral law is of the form ‘You ought to X’. No ‘if’, no ‘then’. Autonomy as the source of moral value is defined in terms of what all agents can will as a universal law. It prescribes for everyone, equally and necessarily, irrespective of their desires.

On my interpretation, the same conception of autonomy applies to the epistemic realm. Competing epistemic theories are wrong because they make the same mistake: they assign an unconditional value to a heteronomous conception of truth – whether it is what is supported by evidence, what is useful, what the community believes or what god tells me. They prescribe that ‘If I want my belief to be true, then I should ground it on X’, with X taking the place of whichever value they put forward. By contrast, Kant’s epistemic principles are of the form ‘You ought to X’. No ‘if’, no ‘then’. They command to all, in the same way, and in all cases: ‘thinking according to a commonly ruling maxim […] is only using your own reason as the supreme touchstone of truth’ (LA 521 [25:1481]). In the case of epistemic norms as well as moral norms, the only authority that can, and ought to, be shared by others, and in fact by all others, is the authority of reason.

freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws except those which it gives itself; […] if reason will not subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it has to bow under the yoke of laws given by another (WOT 16 [8:145]).

Just as we act autonomously if we act on the moral principles we give ourselves, we believe autonomously if we believe on the basis of the epistemic principles we give ourselves.

From reason’s autonomy in thinking can be deduced three epistemic principles that Kant groups under the term sensus communis: ‘1.


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Thinking for oneself. 2. Thinking in the place of another. 3. Always thinking in agreement with oneself.’ (LA 520 [25:1480]) These are the principles according to which we ought to form our beliefs. They guide our thoughts, or to use the title of one of Kant’s essays, they orient ourselves in thinking. Thus, following them amounts to acknowledging the normative requirements of cognition. On the one hand, whatever I believe ought to be guided by the appropriate epistemic principles. And on the other hand, holding a particular belief is only justified if we see epistemic norms as binding.

Crucially, as shown in Table 1, each of the principles of the sensus communis is the epistemic equivalent of one of the three formulations of the moral law. The maxim to think for oneself corresponds to the formula of the law of nature. For, they both reject heteronomy and command that we act or believe on sharable, universalisable principles rather than private, subjective ones. The maxim to think oneself in the position of everyone else corresponds to the formula of humanity. For, they both prescribe that I ought to take others into consideration as rational beings, whether morally or epistemically.6 Finally, the maxim to always think consistently corresponds to the formula of the realm of ends. For, they both demand systematicity in the form as well as the content of our beliefs and our actions so as to allow the possibility of a realm of ends.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 Through this principle, he ‘sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment […] and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others).’ (CJ 175 [5:295])


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Table 1. Moral vs. epistemic principles

Moral principle7 Epistemic principle8

Formula of the law of nature

(FLN/FUL)

Formula of enlightened thought

(Think for oneself)

Formula of humanity

(FH)

Formula of extended thought

(Think in the position of everyone else)

Formula of the realm of end

(FRE/FA)

Formula of coherent thought

(Think consistently)

The fact that our epistemic and moral principles are formally equivalent is decisive because it shows that they are expressions of the same normative power, reason. Thereby, it also substantiates Kant’s cryptic remarks on ‘the unity of practical with speculative reason in a common principle’ (G 46 [4:391]).9 From reason’s common principle, the single supreme source of normativity, derive both epistemic and moral normativity, moral norms in the case of the principles that guide our will, and epistemic norms in the case of the principles that guide

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 Here are three of the formulations from the Groundwork: (FUL) ‘Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (G 73 [4:421]). (FH) ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (G 80 [4:429]). (FRE) ‘Act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends.’ (G 88 [4:439]) 8 For formulations of the principles of the sensus communis, see LL 563 [9:57], CJ 174-5 [5:294-5] and A 308 [7:200]. For helpful discussions of the content of these maxims, see McBay Merritt (2011): section 2, Wood (2002): 103 and O’Neill (1989): chapters 1-2. 9 See also ‘…to attain insight into the unity of the whole rational faculty (theoretical as well as practical) and to derive everything from one principle—the undeniable need of human reason, which finds complete satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of its cognitions’ (CPrR 213 [5:91]). However, it goes beyond the remit of this paper to defend Kant’s claim about the unity of reason. My point is merely that the interpretation I defend in this paper seems to support it. For useful discussions of the unity of reason, see for instance O’Neill (1989): Part I, Neiman (1994): 76-77, 126-28, Nuzzo (2005): 57-sq. and Korsgaard (2008): 27–68, 100–126.


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our thought: ‘there can, in the end, be only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in its application.’ (G 46 [4:391])

If this is the case however, Kant’s account of epistemic principles seems to be vulnerable to the same objection as his account of moral principles. Namely, by defining cognition as a process guided by principles, it ends up proving too much, for it entails that we believe in an epistemically responsible way if and only if we are actually aware of the epistemic principles that govern the acquisition of our beliefs. Yet in many if not most cases, we do not in fact attend to the norms that guide our cognitive endeavours and thus fail to demonstrate any such reflective awareness. This would suggest that most of our beliefs are in fact irresponsibly held.

Once again the analogy with moral deliberation can be useful to address this objection. According to Kant, we do not, nor should we, reflect on our moral principles every single time we act. Rather, we select general principles of action that we then spontaneously apply to the situations we find ourselves in. These principles have been reflected upon and adopted on the basis of reasons for which we are answerable. But once these are settled, we do not need to repeat the reflective process every single time we act on them.10 The only requirement is that we act from principles we have reflected upon. In this sense, whilst the routine task of judgment is one of applying general principles to particular cases, the moral principles we have adopted reflectively simply play a background role in our everyday moral life.11 But instead of entailing that we are not responsible for our everyday choices, this account locates the primary burden of responsibility at the level of the choice of principles rather than the level of their routine use. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 As Sullivan notes, ‘Many readers have been led to think that Kant claims we need to use the Categorical Imperative in all our everyday decisions about how to act here and now, when we generally already know in principle what is right and what is wrong. It can be argued that Kant did know that in such decisions we simply act on the appropriate moral principles – substantive categorical imperatives – we have already adopted as our own policies.’ (Sullivan (1989): 56) See also O’Neill: ‘acting on a maxim does not require explicit or conscious or complete formulation of that maxim. Even routine or thoughtless or indecisive action is action on some maxim.’ (O’Neill (1989): 84) 11 Note the distinction between moral principles in a background role and a moral principles turned into habit. Only the latter are problematic: ‘virtue is not to be defined and valued as […] a long standing habit of morally good actions acquired by practiced. For unless this aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the changes that new temptations could bring about’ (MM 515-6 [6:383]).


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The same is true of epistemic deliberation. Kant’s account of the role of epistemic principles does not imply that conscious reflection upon them is necessary for the acquisition of every single belief: ‘For common cognition it is not necessary that we be conscious of these rules and reflect on them. If we were to do that we would lose very much.’ (LL 15 [24:27])12 Rather, it is only necessary for complex or uncertain beliefs – what he sometimes calls learned cognition:

If our understanding wants to have ascended to learned cognition, then it must be conscious of its rules and use them in accordance with reflection, because here common practice is not enough for it. (LL 15 [24:27])

Although actual awareness of epistemic rules is not necessary for

every single belief-acquisition, it does not entail that we are not responsible for every belief that is thereby acquired. Just as in moral deliberation, the only requirement is that we act from the principles we have reflected upon. On this basis, the authority we have over our beliefs comes from our authorial role vis-à-vis the principles that guide their acquisition. So it is not that our cognitive states are open to deliberation as such. It is rather that when necessary, whether in a case of learned cognition or when asked what we believe, we can, and ought to, reflect upon our beliefs by investigating their grounds in accordance with the epistemic principles we have adopted.

If approval does not arise immediately through the nature of the human understanding and of human reason, then it still requires closer direction of choice, will, wish, or in general of our free will, toward the grounds of proof. (LL 125 [24:158])

If we chose not to do so, we should be blamed for it. But in this case, is the blame epistemic or moral? Or to put it slightly differently, is breaking an epistemic norm a moral violation or a mere epistemic violation?

On the basis of Kant’s claim about the primacy of practical reason, one may be tempted to think that his position should go along

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12 See also ‘Not all judgments require an investigation, i.e. attention to the grounds of truth; for if they are immediately certain, e.g., between two points there can be only one straight line, then no further mark of truth can be given for them than what they themselves express.’ (CPR 366 [A261/B317])


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Cliffordian lines. 13 For, it would seem to entail that epistemic normativity is a sub-category of, or grounded on, moral normativity. And of course, it is true that epistemic and moral normativity are both practically normative in the Kantian sense of the term: they have to do with our capacity for self-determination, our autonomy. However, it does not entail that epistemic norms are reducible to moral norms. Rather, it entails that they are first and foremost rational norms. The application of reason’s authority to a particular domain, whether we are deliberating about what to believe or what to do, gives rise to moral or epistemic norms. But what I take to be Kant’s point is that whatever the domain, the source of normativity is the same, the authority of reason. If this is correct, it should follow that the rational procedures that apply to the moral domain ought to apply equally to the cognitive domain. Otherwise, we need to question the idea that the same normative power is at work.

The aim of the following section is to explore this claim by examining whether Kant’s account of the universalisability test is applicable to the domain of epistemic deliberation.

ii. the universalisability test of epistemic maxims

According to Kant, when an agent adopts a principle, it thereby becomes his subjective principle of action, what he calls his maxim. Thus a maxim formulates an agent's actual policy or intention: ‘A rule that the subject makes his principle is called a maxim.’ (LL 473 [24:738]) Most familiar of course are our moral maxims, the maxims that guide our actions. They are ‘the subjective principle[s] of acting […] the principle[s] in accordance with which the subject acts’ (G 73n [4:421]). Less familiar are our epistemic maxims, the ‘[u]niversal rules and conditions for avoiding error’ (LL 563 [9:57]) an agent adopts to orient his thought. They are the subjective principles of thinking, an agent’s epistemic strategy.14

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13 Kant claims that practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason at various points, but in particular in CPrR 236-8 [5:119-21]. For discussions of Kant’s claim, see for instance Neiman (1994): Chapter 3 and Korsgaard (1996): 173. Cf. Clifford (1999). 14 See also ‘By what, however, does one recognize a sound reason? By the maxims, when its maxims are so constituted, that its greatest use is possible by their means.’


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Famously for Kant, maxims of action are only morally permissible if they pass a universalisability test.15 Its function is to rule out any maxim that cannot become a universal law. In the following passage, Kant suggests, albeit rather elusively, that epistemic maxims should also pass a universalisability test.

To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to himself (WOT 18 [8:146n]).

Whilst this is as close as Kant gets to an epistemic universalisability test, I will show that such a test can be reconstructed on the model of the formula of universal law.

The formula of universal law states that ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law’ (G 94 [4:402]). It is a negative procedure that establishes whether my maxims are legitimate by determining whether they can be willed as universal laws without generating contradictions. It consists of two steps. First, I need to test whether my maxim leads to a contradiction in conception: can I conceive of a world governed by it as a law of nature? If I can’t, as in the case of breaking promises, I have the perfect duty to refrain from acting on it: I ought to always keep my promises. Second, I need to test whether my maxim leads to a contradiction in the will: can I rationally will to act on it in a world governed by it as a law of nature? If I can’t, as in the case of refusing to help others, I have the imperfect duty to act on the opposite maxim: I ought to help others. If my maxim passes both tests without generating contradictions, it is morally permissible.16 By contrast with the realm of the obligatory, permissible actions are morally neutral. They do not

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(LA 109 [25:548]) Note that this paper is not concerned with the regulative principles of reason (for instance, the principle of systematic unity, in CPR 620-1 [A700/B729]). They are commonly interpreted as transcendental or methodological principles (respectively by Guyer (2000) and Grier (2001) for instance), but it has recently been argued that they should be thought of as practical principles (Mudd (2013)). As far as I can tell, my account is neutral on this question.

15 There is controversy surrounding the interpretation of the role of maxims in this context. See for instance Wood (1999): 40-42, O’Neill (1989): 83-sq. and Sullivan (1989): 47-53. However, these debates are irrelevant to my argument. 16 See in particular G 73-76 [4:421-424].


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violate any rational norm, nor do I have any positive duty to perform them. They belong to the domain of the discretionary ends I adopt as part of pursuing my own projects, and in particular my happiness.17

Thus, the universalisability test stipulates first what is morally wrong (any maxim that cannot be universalised without leading to a contradiction); second, what is morally obligatory (to refrain from acting on any impermissible maxim and to act on the opposite maxim); and third, what is morally permissible (to perform any action based on a maxim that passes the universalisability test).

Now, let’s apply this model to the epistemic realm. Here is the epistemic version of the formula of universal law: “I ought never to believe except in such a way that my maxim should become a universal law”.18 What does it mean for an epistemic maxim to be able to become a universal law? To make sense of it, let’s begin by examining what it means for an epistemic maxim not to be able to become a universal law.

The test of universalisability excludes any epistemic maxim that bases beliefs on subjective grounds. For, they are not sharable by all others in principle, and thus cannot be universalised. Kant calls this class of impermissible maxims ‘prejudice’: ‘Prejudice is a maxim of judging objectively from subjective grounds’ (LL 473 [24:737]). 19 Typical examples of impermissible maxims of this kind are maxims of wishful thinking:

frequently we take something to be certain merely because it pleases us, and we take something to be uncertain merely because it displeases or annoys us. This certainty or uncertainty is not objective, however, but instead subjective. (LL 157 [24:198])

Adopting as an epistemic maxim the principle ‘Take to be certain whatever pleases me’ cannot be universalised, and thus it is epistemically forbidden. More generally, any maxim based on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 ‘An action that can coexist with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does not accord with it is forbidden.’ (G 88 [4:439]) 18 Or on the model of the alternative version of the formula of universal law: “Believe only in accordance with that maxim that could be a universal law”. 19 Kant often notes that prejudices are of three kinds: inclination, habit and imitation (LL 579 [9:76]). For a discussion of custom and imitation, see Munzel (1999): 223-235 and McBay Merritt (2009): 992-3.


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‘subjective private conditions of judgment’ (CJ 175 [5:295]) – which includes my desires, my idiosyncratic tendencies, my temperament, my personal preferences, my history, but also other’s, including my priest’s, my king’s and so on – none of these will pass the universalisability test since by definition, it is not sharable by all others. Everything that makes me who I am qua individual rather than qua rational cognizer should not play an epistemic role, for the ‘objective grounds of truth […] are independent of the nature and interest of the subject’ (LL 574 [9:70]). By contrast, maxims that do pass the universalisability test are maxims that can be adopted by all, at least in principle if not in practice: they are ‘valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; […] regardless of the difference among the subjects’ (CPR 685 [A820-1/B848-9]).

But this is all very abstract, so to make this account of epistemic universalisability more concrete, let’s try the test on an actual maxim, the maxim of evidentialism.

Evidentialist maxim (1): “I ought to base my beliefs (fürwahrhalten) solely on the evidence that supports them”.20

Does it pass the universalisability test? No, for the universalisation of the evidentialist maxim (1) would rule out beliefs that are not based on evidence and that we nevertheless want to hold – a priori propositions such as that of mathematics or geometry for instance. I cannot possibly will to give up a priori, non-evidential beliefs as part of my belief-system. Therefore, the universalisation of the evidentialist maxim 1 generates a contradiction in the will, and I can’t will that it be universalized. So we need to reformulate the maxim in the following way:

Evidentialist maxim (2): “I can base my beliefs on the evidence that supports them”.

Now we seem to have the opposite problem. This maxim is obviously permissible, but it doesn’t say much, in particular about the epistemic situations in which it should apply and the ones in which it shouldn’t.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20 See for instance Feldman (2004). Note that Kant’s notion of evidence includes logical inference between evidence.


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So we need to reformulate the maxim so that it contains a clear epistemic rule and a clear context for its application.

Evidentialist maxim (3): “I can base my a posteriori beliefs (wissen) on the evidence that supports them”.

First, the universalisation of the evidentialist maxim (3) does not generate a contradiction in the will, contrary to the evidentialist maxim (1). For, it does not rule out other forms of non-evidential beliefs I want to keep believing in (fürwahrhalten), including mathematics and geometry. Second, its universalisation does not generate a contradiction in conception. For, I can conceive of a world governed by it as a law of nature. In fact, it seems that such a world would be quite a good epistemic world. Therefore, it is permissible for me to adopt it as my epistemic maxim since it generates no contradiction. However, this will not do, for we want our evidentialist maxim to be an obligatory maxim that prescribes an ‘ought’, and yet what we have so far is a mere permissible maxim.

Evidentialist maxim (4): “I ought to base my a posteriori beliefs (wissen) on the evidence that supports them”.

So to move from the evidentialist maxim (3) to its obligatory version (4), we need to show that the universalisability test not only allows it, but that moreover, it forbids any exception to it. For, if we can show that we have a negative duty to refrain from acting on an impermissible maxim, then we have the corresponding positive duty to adopt the opposite positive maxim. For our evidentialist maxim to become obligatory, we thus need to show that exceptions to it are impermissible. So let’s discuss the case of a maxim that recommends an exception to the evidentialist maxim (4) to see whether it is impermissible.

Say I am in the process of determining whether I should believe that p, an a posteriori proposition about the empirical world. As I do so, I encounter a piece of evidence that falsifies it. If I choose to ignore this evidence and believe p anyway because it suits my desires, I am in effect acting under the maxim “I can ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a belief I desire to be true”. Yet this maxim is not universalisable, for it refers to my inclinations, which, as subjective, differ depending on the agent who adopts it. Therefore, first, it is not a policy that everyone can follow. In fact, no maxim that involves holding something to be true on


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mere subjective grounds (desires, inclinations, etc.) rather than objective grounds (evidence, proof, etc.) is universalisable for this reason.

Second, even if everyone could follow this maxim, the result would be chaotic for science and defeat any attempt to acquire beliefs. For, human beings are not cognitively self-sufficient, they have to rely on epistemic cooperation and division of labour. Yet if this maxim was universalized, they could not carry on relying on the evidence others provide. And yet they need to since they are epistemically dependent and their cognitive needs require the cognitive contribution of others. Therefore, the maxim “I can ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a belief I desire to be true” leads to a contradiction in the will: I cannot consistently will it to be universal. So insofar as this maxim is not universalisable, first, I have a negative duty to refrain from acting on it, namely “I ought not ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies an a posteriori belief I desire to be true”. And second, I have the positive duty to adopt the opposite maxim, namely ‘I ought to take evidence into account in cases of a posteriori beliefs’. Therefore, in the case of the epistemic role of evidence, the test seems to give us the right kind of results.

Of course a lot of work needs to be done to determine whether it does so in most, if not all, cases, and unfortunately, I cannot do this today. But as you can see in Table 2, I have spelt out what I take to be the epistemic duties that result from the universalisation of the principles of the sensus communis. This should give you a sense of the potential of Kant’s account.


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Table 2. Epistemic principles and epistemic duties

Epistemic principle

Positive duty Negative duty

Think for oneself

Unprejudiced

(free from constraint)

Prejudiced

(chained to constraint)

Enlightened

(not subject to rules of nature)

Superstitious

(subject to laws of nature)

Active

(autonomous)

Passive

(heteronomous)

Think in the position of

everyone else

Broad-minded way of thinking

Narrow-minded way of thinking

Universal standpoint of judgment

Subjective condition of judgment

Extended mode of thought Restricted mode of thought

Think consistently

Coherent mode of thought Incoherent mode of thought

Logical way of thinking Illogical way of thinking


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Although I would like to think that the principles spelt out in Table 2 are rather plausible, one may worry that Kant’s account is actually unfit to provide an adequate epistemic framework. For, he famously posits as epistemically permissible beliefs that are by his own definition objectively insufficient. These are the Postulates of practical reason – what is better known as his account of moral faith. We can never ‘know’ whether god exists or the soul is immortal: their existence is neither susceptible of empirical support, nor demonstrable on a priori ground. Believing in them does not have any objective ground, and yet it is epistemically permissible (and of course, also morally necessary – although there is no space to discuss this part of the argument here).21 Does it mean that Kant’s account of epistemic norms delivers inconsistent results? For, it seems to entail that there are different grounds for different beliefs, each with their own incompatible standard. If this is the case, it threatens the very notion of an epistemic universalisability test, for its intended function was precisely to provide a universal formal procedure that applies to all beliefs, equally and uniformly.

However, recall that as I noted at the beginning of this paper, the maxims of reason are ‘principles of thinking’ (LA 520 [25:1480]).22 And crucially for Kant, thinking is broader than believing, and knowledge does not exhaust the domain of cognition. For, there are three modes of holding a proposition to be true (fürwahrhalten): knowledge (wissen), which is both subjectively and objectively sufficient; opinion (meinen), which is subjectively as well as objectively insufficient; and faith (glauben), which is objectively insufficient but subjectively sufficient (CPR 686 [A822/B850]). In other words, we only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21 Note that beliefs in the existence of god and the immortality of the soul are epistemically permissible but morally obligatory. However, in this paper, I am only interested in the former. A postulate of practical reason is ‘a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law’ (CPrR 238 [5:122]). It is posited on the basis that it fulfils a need of practical reason, based on the command of duty, and theoretical reason cannot prove its impossibility: ‘pure rational faith (Vernunftglaubens) can never be transformed into knowledge by any natural data of reason and experience, because here the ground of holding true is merely subjective, namely a necessary need of reason’ (WOT 13-4 [8:140-1]). See Wood (1970): 13-25 and (2002): chapter 3 for enlightening discussions of Kant’s position on moral faith. 22 See also ‘the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the way of thinking (Denkungsart) needed to make a purposive use of it’ (CJ 175 [5:295]). In fact, it is the aim of university education to instil students with the correct epistemic principles: ‘instruction in universities is properly this, to cultivate the capacity of reason, and to get [students] into the habit of the method of ratiocinating, and to establish the appropriate maxims of reason.’ (LA 107 [25:547])


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‘know’ if our belief has both subjective and objective grounds.23 Otherwise, it is not knowledge but mere opinion or faith. And whilst it is permissible to hold opinions, it is only qua opinions, that is to say, as long as we acknowledge their lack of sufficient grounds. Insofar as these modes of holding to be true set the norms of belief, Kant’s account does entail that there are different kinds of beliefs, each with their own standard.24 But far from being a weakness, I believe that it is one of its strengths. For, although there are different types of grounds for modes of believing, some objective, others subjective, they all obey the same rational norm – they are all universalisable.

As a result, this section has argued that the application of the universalisability test to the epistemic realm is not only possible, it produces results that are compatible with Kant’s familiar epistemic positions, as I have shown in the case of evidentialism and moral faith. The final section will suggest that the epistemic version of the universalisability test also produces unexpected results, and that these results have the potential to form the basis of fresh Kantian answers to contemporary questions. To support this claim, I will discuss the case of testimony.

iii. the case of testimony

A number of commentators have argued that Kant belongs to an individualist tradition according to which testimony has no epistemic importance.25 For, if testimony is epistemically unreliable, it should follow that either we have a duty not to rely on it, or we can only rely on it if it plays a merely corroborative role. Either way on this view, testimony is not, and should not be, a fundamental source of knowledge. By contrast with this interpretation, I will argue that Kant’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23 Note that the strength of our objective grounds give rise to different degrees of objective certainty. See Chignell (2007b) for a details account of this claim.

24 As Chignell has convincingly argued, ‘In contemporary discussions, the fundamental attitude is assumed to be belief. For Kant (as for Locke, Leibniz, and some others in the early modern tradition), the attitude is Fürwahrhalten —’assent’ or, literally, ‘holding-for-true.’ Assent for these writers is the genus of which most other positive propositional attitudes (opining, having faith in, knowing, and the like) are species. Kant doesn’t have an exact equivalent of our contemporary concept of belief, but if he did that concept would also fit under the genus of assent.’ (Chignell (2007b): 34) 25 See for instance Schmitt’s claim that in Kant’s philosophy, ‘there is no reliance on testimony’ (Schmitt (1987): 47).


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epistemic universalisability test commits him to the opposite position.26 I will support this claim in three steps.

First, if I were to reject testimony as a source of information, I would be unable to perform my duty of extended thought.27 For, the duty to think oneself in the place of others requires that one ‘reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others).’ (CJ 175 [5:295]) Yet I cannot access the standpoint of others without relying on their testimony. Therefore, testimony is a pragmatically necessary means to realize one of my core epistemic duties.

Second, the maxim not to rely on testimony can be thought of on the model of the maxim not to keep our promises. When universalized, the maxim not to keep our promises entails the disappearance of the practice of promise making – a contradiction in conception.28 Similarly, the universalisation of the maxim not to believe testimony would entail the disappearance of the practice of testimony. For everyone would eventually stop giving testimony since it would be a pointless exercise – no one would believe it. Therefore, we have the negative duty to refrain from not believing in testimony.

Third, the maxim not to rely on testimony can be thought of on the model of the maxim of refusing to help others in need. The universalisation of the maxim of refusing to assist others generates a contradiction in the will. For, we are dependent and vulnerable beings, and we know that we will probably need to rely on others’ help; or at least that it is not impossible that we may need to at some point. Our lack of self-sufficiency leads us to will that others help us if and when we need it. Therefore, we cannot possibly will that the maxim “Refuse to assist others in need” be universalized without being inconsistent. Now, the universalization of the maxim ‘Do not believe testimony’ leads to the same result. For, our anthropological situation means that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26 This is what Gelfert calls ‘a presumptive principle regarding the acceptance of testimony’ (Gelfert (2006): 627). Whilst I agree with many of his claims, Gelfert fails to relate what he takes to be Kant’s argument for testimony to the universalisability test as the ground of our epistemic duties. Moreover, he seems to suggest that failure to believe testimony is a moral failure (‘a lack of moral character’) whilst I argue that it is rather an epistemic violation (Gelfert (2006): 649).

27 This is what Kant calls the maxim of incredulity: ‘To be incredulous means to stick to the maxim not to believe testimony at all’ (CJ 336 [5:472]). 28 See G 57, 74 [4:403, 422].


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we are epistemically dependent: not only do we need epistemic cooperation, we naturally desire to communicate our thoughts.

There lies in our nature a certain inclination to communicate our opinion to others […] This inclination does not arise from vanity at all but rather from human reason's particular and excellent disposition to communicate. (LL 140-1 [24:178])

Yet universalizing the maxim against testimony would generate a world in which others would stop believing our own testimony, which we cannot possibly will since we have a desire to communicate our thoughts. Moreover, we cannot will that others believe our testimony and at the same time that we ought not believe theirs without being inconsistent. Therefore, since the maxim ‘Do not believe testimony’ fails the contradiction in the will test, we have the imperfect duty to believe testimony – although of course Kant notes that we should only do so in the absence of defeating conditions.29

As a result, Kant’s argument for the epistemic role of testimony is not merely that it is ineliminable given the kind of cognitive creatures we are. Rather, it is a threefold: first, we need it; second, we ought to refrain from not believing it; and third, we ought to believe it.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29 Far from recommending credulity, the maxim that commands to believe testimony is one of innocence until proven guilty. As Kant writes, ‘As for other things that concern the credibility and honorability of witnesses who make assertions about experiences they have obtained, everyone is taken to be honorable and upright until the opposite has been proved, namely, that he deviates from the truth.’ (LL 196 [24:246]) For an insightful parallel between trust and testimony, see Gelfert (2006): 634-5, 647. Moreover, as Gelfert notes, belief based on testimony is just as good as belief based on experience, although just as with the epistemic role of evidence, the legitimacy of testimony is limited to certain domains – in this case, empirical certainty. With regards to a priori certainty, since reason can do so by relying on its own operations, testimony is not only unnecessary, we have a positive duty to do it ourselves: ‘When cognition has its ground of proof in nothing but reason, however, but does not take it from experience, then the testimony of others cannot be a ground of conduct’ (LL 320 [24:870]).


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conclusion To conclude. My aim today was to explore the possibility of a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the toolbox provided by Kant’s ethics. Although much of it is still programmatic, I hope to have shown that the account I have delineated is not only plausible from the perspective of Kant scholarship, it has the potential to contribute beyond it to current debates in the ethics of belief.

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences University of Edinburgh Dugald Stewart Building

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b i o g r a p h y

Before joining the University of Edinburgh as Chancellor’s Fellow in January 2014, Alix Cohen taught at the universities of York and Leeds, having previously held a Junior Research Fellowship at Newnham College, Cambridge. She is the author of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History (Palgrave, 2009) and has published papers on Kant as well as Hume and Rousseau. She is currently editing Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide (CUP, 2014) and Kant on Emotion and Value (Palgrave, 2014). Alix is also Associate Editor of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy and the Oxford Bibliography Online (OUP), and Executive Member of the British Society for the History of Philosophy and the UK Kant Society.

e d i t o r i a l n o t e

The following paper is a draft version that can only be cited or quoted with the author’s permission. The final paper will be published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Issue No. 3, Volume CXIV (2014). Please visit the Society’s website for subscription information: www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk.

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