Agriculture, Land and Agrarian Reform: Policies and...

Agriculture, Land and Agrarian Reform: Policies and Programmes

September 2007

THE ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

EMAIL: [email protected] WEBSITE: www.zimbabweinstitute.org

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Agriculture, Land and Agrarian Reform: Policies and Programmes

Mission To ensure the full recovery of agriculture and place it firmly on the path of enhanced

productivity and strong sustainable growth so that Zimbabwe can regain its status as the

breadbasket of Africa. To achieve this objective we are determined to bring social justice

and economic stability to the country by implementing a just, orderly and equitable land

settlement programme, facilitating the transformation of smallholder (communal)

agriculture, and initiating an agrarian reform programme to ensure security of tenure,

social recovery and the economic well-being of all Zimbabweans. Our mission will be

underpinned by innovation and technological change, the revitalising of our agricultural

institutions, providing investment incentives and creating an enabling regulatory

framework. We also fully recognise that the success of agriculture depends crucially on

macro-economic stability, strong agro-industrial linkages, and the creation of jobs in the

industrial and service sectors.


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1. Introduction 1.1 Purpose and objectives of report The purpose of this report is to construct a way forward for an agriculture revival strategy in tandem with a programme of land and agrarian reform that will bring a final resolution to the land question. Closure can only be achieved, first, when there is a political consensus that sufficient land has been transferred into the hands of the black majority farmers; second, that those with the necessary farming skills and experience are selected for resettlement; third, that those without alternative incomes or farming skills, but who are committed to farming, are trained and given technical assistance to ensure they become fully productive; and fourth, that compensation is paid to those commercial farmers who lost their land and livelihoods at the hands of their own government. Once these conditions have been met it will be possible to draw a line under this tragic episode in our history, move beyond the issues of race and domination, and allow every citizen – regardless of race, ethnic origin, gender or political affiliation to contribute fully to Zimbabwe’s welfare and that of all its people. The policies in this document are proposed to that end. 1.2 Brief historical background At Independence in 1980 the government inherited a patently unfair distribution of land. About 6,000 white commercial farmers had access to 15.5 million hectares of the best farmland, while over 760,000 smallholder farmers were expected to eke out a living on a mere 16.4 million hectares of communal land – much of it in arid areas with poor soils. The Riddell Commission (1981) was the first report to outline a programme of land use reorganisation in the communal areas and the acquisition of commercial farms for resettlement. When the resettlement programme faltered in the late 1980s, the government passed the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, to speed up the land reform process by compulsorily acquiring commercial farms in the better farming areas. But, in truth, land reform was no longer the government’s priority. Scandals emerged in 1994 of land allocations to politicians and senior civil servants, while large swathes of land acquired for resettlement lay idle. After 20 years the government had resettled only 71,000 families on 3.3 million hectares. February 2000 marked a watershed in Zimbabwe’s fortunes. The government brushed aside the undertaking it had given at the 1998 international donor conference to resolve the land issue in a transparent, fair, lawful and sustainable manner. Stung by the people’s rejection of the draft constitution, and to maintain its grip on power, the government launched the ‘fast track’ land reform programme, marked by illegal land seizures, lawlessness and violence. It saw 10.8 million hectares of commercial farmland gazetted for acquisition, of which 6.4 million has passed into the hands of war veterans, political


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elites and other ruling party supporters. Most of Zimbabwe’s skilled white commercial farmers were driven off the farms. Today, the large-scale commercial sector produces less than half the output of the 1990s, while millions of Zimbabweans are hungry, poverty stricken and dependent on food handouts. Farm invasions and the plight of farm workers

The ‘fast track’ land reform policy characterised by violent farm invasions had a devastating effect on a highly skilled and well trained labour force. The overall picture is one of massive job losses. Prior to the fast-track programme an estimated 300,000 farm-workers, representing about 25 percent of Zimbabwe’s total work force (in formal employment), were employed on commercial farms. These workers and their dependants numbered nearly 1.8 million people. In the aftermath of the land invasions over 240,000 farm-workers and their families – an estimated 1, 4 million people – had lost their livelihoods and homes, as well as access to farm schools and other social amenities. The virtual destruction of the managerial and farm worker skills base has resulted in huge national food deficits and the collapse of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earning capacity. Failed land reform programme The fast track programme has been fuelled by populist appeals that encouraged ruling party supporters to indulge in xenophobia and violence. Under the guise of anti-colonial rhetoric, the programme descended into flagrant land-grabbing and outright theft by political elites and their supporters. Government’s own report by Flora Buka and the Utete Presidential Land Review Committee (2003) all admitted as much. The law has been ignored or selectively applied. The police have failed to act against lawlessness or protect victims of violence. They, the army, and even judges, have themselves acted unlawfully by taking possession of farms, equipment and property to which they have no right. This impunity has been buttressed by a series of laws and edicts of dubious constitutionality to dispossess farmers and farm workers of their livelihoods without compensation. The government’s Land Audit Report (2003) by Flora Buka, the then Minister of State for the Land Reform Programme, identified three key problems: i) the displacement of newly resettled farmers by powerful political elites; ii) multiple ownership of farms by these elites; and iii) huge swathes of highly productive farmland that had not been allocated and was therefore lying idle. Confronted by a lack of fuel, high transport costs and hyper-inflation, it seems likely that hundreds of highly productive former commercial farms will continue to lie idle. Yet, this has still not stayed the heavy hand of government from acquiring still more productive commercial farms.


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Many new A2 farmers, who had acquired their farms through political patronage, had no farming experience or any commitment to learn. Many, in fact, were ‘week-end farmers’ in full-time employment – often as civil servants. Farming for them has been a part time occupation, managed remotely by phone. While they ‘owned’ the farms, they did not have legal title to the land to secure bank loans. They therefore turned to the government for support. The government, eager to show that its controversial land reform programme was producing results, began funding inputs for farmers. The results proved disastrous. The bank through which funding was channelled lacked the capacity to manage the scheme properly. Due to mismanagement and corruption, financial records were ‘lost’. Most of the funds were evidently channelled into financing personal luxuries and never repaid. Even when farmers hoped to use the inputs for their intended purpose, poor administrative and coordination resulted in the wrong kinds of inputs reaching farmers too late. The government has threatened to discontinue funding inputs for farmers.


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1.3 The current state of affairs The government’s land seizures have led to a precipitous decline in agricultural production. Overall, gross production of the major commodities from the commercial sector in 2005 was less than half the production in 1998. Production in 2006 is estimated to have fallen still further. Particularly hard-hit has been tobacco. Production now stands at only one quarter of its previous levels. Commercial beef herds have been decimated, having declined to 150,000 head from 1.5 million. Current estimates are that it could take 10 years to regain the country’s former global position in tobacco production, and up to 15 years to rebuild the quality and quantity of the commercial beef production. The old adage was that when agriculture sneezed the economy caught a cold. The economy-wide impact of launching a full-frontal attack on commercial agriculture could therefore only have been imagined. The economic meltdown, as described by the World Bank, has been the most rapid outside a war zone, ever. This is not simply a result of farm invasions, but the cancer of a culture of impunity that tears at the economic and social fabric of society. Plundering that began with commercial farms has continued by the mismanagement and corruption in the county. As a result, Zimbabwe has seen the economy contract by over 40 percent in the last six years. Acute shortages of foreign exchange have reverberated throughout the economy, creating critical shortages of vital commodities, especially fuel and electricity, which have been exacerbated by price controls. Macro-economic instability has ensued. Zimbabwe’s rate of inflation exceeds 4,000 percent per annum, wiping out the savings of many who spent a life-time in employment or in service to their country. An ever-increasing proportion of Zimbabweans are slipping below the poverty line, compelling over 3 million people, mostly economic refugees, to flee the country; including skilled and experienced Zimbabwean farmers and farm workers. Tragically, the country – which used to pride itself on the high life expectancy of its people – now has one of the lowest in the world. Seventy percent of Zimbabweans depend on agriculture. There is need, therefore, for overarching policies for the restoration and future growth of the agricultural sector. Agricultural policies should aim to restore pre-2000 production levels, create employment for the many workers who lost their jobs, and enhance the productivity of the agriculture sector as a whole, assuring its contribution to the national fiscus, export revenues and food self-sufficiency. Agriculture needs to resume its role as an anchor of economic and social development in Zimbabwe.


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2. Basic principles and broad policies

2.1 Principles Defining a point of closure for correcting historical imbalance British colonialists took most of the best farming land, and the war of independence was fought, mainly, to regain that land. At independence, there was a highly skewed distribution of land between white commercial farmers and the majority black farmers. The need to correct this historical imbalance through an orderly, transparent and sustainable land redistribution programme was, therefore, never in doubt. The question remains, however: how much land transfer is necessary to put the ghosts of the past to rest? Reconciliation based on justice

For reconciliation, there must be justice. Justice requires that those who have committed crimes and who have enriched themselves corruptly and unlawfully should be prosecuted and stripped of their ill-gotten gains. It also requires that those citizens whose land has been unjustly acquired, who have suffered the loss of their homes, property and livelihoods be compensated to the fullest possible extent.

Selection of settlers based on fair and transparent land reform programme

The Fast Track Programme has been founded on a morally and politically bankrupt process. Unless an unequivocally fair and transparent settlement programme is put in place, there will be no closure to the land question, and Zimbabwe will sink further into an economic quagmire. The proper selection of farmers, based on training, skills and experience, is a sine qua non for any just and sustainable resettlement programme. Those Zimbabweans without experience, skills or alternative incomes, but who have demonstrated their commitment to farming, will receive training and technical support to ensure they are productive when allocated land.

The rule of law must be fully restored

Good governance means the full adherence to accepted norms of human and political rights, respect for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, as well as the application of fundamental economic principles in the way countries are managed. Agricultural recovery must be founded on an unequivocal return to the rule of law and adherence to the fundamental human and legal rights enshrined in the Constitution.

Human rights must be respected in terms of the constitution’s Bill of Rights

The Constitution’s Declaration of Rights entitles every person in Zimbabwe to certain fundamental rights – whatever his political opinions, creed or gender race – to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; to the freedom of conscience,


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of expression and of assembly and association; and to protection for the privacy of his home and other property.

The property rights of all citizens must be respected

The restoration of the rule of law means a return to constitutionality; rescinding laws that deny citizens their human rights; abiding by ruling of competent courts; enforcing the law without fear or favour; and affording protection to every person and their property from compulsory acquisition without proper compensation.

No agricultural land to be classified on the basis of race

Justice is blind to the colour of a person’s skin and every citizen is entitled to the same rights. This means that, once historical imbalances to land have been addressed, no rights to land should be based on race.

2.2 Land Reform and Resettlement Land reform to be addressed urgently in a fair, lawful and transparent manner

Zimbabwe needs a land reform and resettlement programme that meets the requirements of all Zimbabweans committed to seeing the rebirth and growth of an agricultural industry founded on fairness, transparency and productivity. Accordingly, the historical imbalance in the pattern of land distribution must be addressed urgently in a just and lawful manner in order to bring Zimbabwe’s land question to closure. This must be done through a democratic and participatory process that seeks to achieve the equitable and sustainable distribution and use of land.

We cannot return to the pre-2000 land-ownership patterns, but neither can we condone the inequitable and aberrant land distribution arising from the fast-track ‘land reform’ process. Any land-reform programme must be based on farming ability, and aim to revitalise the economy, empower farmers, enable the social recovery of farming communities, and facilitate sustained productivity and growth in agricultural production. Constitutionality and the rule of law are the only basis on which a democratic government can bring finality to the land crisis.

All citizens are entitled to earn their livelihoods through farming

Every citizen should enjoy the same rights for the acquisition and protection of their property, and every Zimbabwean is entitled to earn their livelihoods from farming or be eligible for settlement regardless of their gender, race, ethnic origin or political opinions. All Zimbabweans must be subject to the same criteria for resettlement.


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Anyone who has been unfairly affected by land acquisition and settlement decisions should be able with confidence to have any disputes settled in an independent and impartial court of law.

An inclusive consultative process that builds trust and confidence between stakeholders and policy makers is required to reach broad consensus on the means to achieve the reform programme’s objectives. All those affected by acquisition and settlement decisions must be consulted and disputes settled in an independent and impartial court of law. Justice requires that compensation be paid for land, property and consequential losses as soon as possible based on international norms and independently adjudicated claims.

The reduction of poverty and increasing agricultural productivity are fundamental objectives of the land reform programme

The land reform and settlement programme must ensure broad based economic empowerment and poverty reduction in the rural areas, without compromising national agricultural production. Land reform, in other words, must add value, especially for the poorest members of society. 2.3 Land tenure Land tenure systems to be developed that provide security of tenure and incentives for investment in agriculture:

° Ownership of communal land must pass to the people

Communal land in Zimbabwe vests in the President as the custodian of the land for ‘the people’. In future, land must vest directly in the people who use it, invest in it and whose livelihoods depend upon it.

° All communal land to be surveyed and registered

Sound administrative mechanisms must be put in place to facilitate the evolution of well-defined, secure, and transferable rights to land – especially for women – and the ability to exchange these land rights at low cost. Over time, the value of land can be unlocked by its use as collateral for credit, enabling farmers to invest and develop their smallholdings to their full productive potential and maximise market surpluses.

All agricultural land, including communal land, should evolve towards a system of tenure under long lease with options for title

Improving the security of tenure for all Zimbabwean farmers should encourage farm investment and agricultural productivity. This will be achieved by maintaining freehold tenure where it exists, reverting to freehold tenure where land has been ‘gazetted’, and offering resettlement and small-scale farmers long-term leases with an option for title. Resettlement schemes operating with communal grazing should be given the option of


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being replanned and demarcated into individual, self-contained family farms. In the communal areas, rights over land and resources will pass from the state to members of the village or ward assemblies. All land in villages will be surveyed and households issued with land registration certificates for residential and arable land. Overtime, provisions will be made, based on the democratic choices of villages, for full freehold title.

2.4 Agricultural transformation A resurgent agricultural sector will be based on the integration of subsistence farming into the mainstream of commercial agriculture

In keeping with the recommendations of the Rukuni Commission, an enabling environment should be created for farmers to move from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture in a meaningful way. The granting of land rights and responsibilities that come with land registration will allow farmers to unlock the value of their land rights by using it as collateral to invest and develop their lands to their full productive potential.

The success of a land reform programme is premised on sound land administration, transparent selection processes, the provision of basic infrastructure, as well as training and access to resources for settlers to farm productively. For their part, farmers are expected to become independent of government subsidies, commercialise their operations and pay for their benefits.

The private sector will play a key role in ‘smart partnerships’ with the public sector, including agricultural support services, research and extension Smart partnerships are mutually beneficial relationships between government, the private sector, international agencies and NGOs to tackle national problems, especially those related to finding solutions to reducing poverty. There are two areas of cooperation where a start can be made. The first is the development of outgrower schemes where smallholders provide their land, water and labour for production, while companies provide the finance (credit for inputs), technology (cultivars and techniques), and processing and marketing facilities for the commodity. The government, donors and NGOs can play a crucial facilitating role and provide oversight to ensure transparency. The other area where cooperation is possible is in research, training and extension. Parastatal organisations will be dissolved, reformed or privatised Marketing boards that once served as a stabilizing influence on production through sound pricing strategies have degenerated into mismanagement and corruption, serving the


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interests of a powerful ruling clique and not the people. They operate in an over-regulated and opaque business environment. An independent judicial commission should be established to investigate parastatal organisations, re-establish management control, transparency and financial probity. No privatisation should take place before this judicial inquiry takes place or before these parastatals are properly managed. Only then can any decision be taken to dissolve, reform (commercialise) or privatise parastatals. Any privatisation must be completely transparent, fair and benefit the common person – should they choose to participate. Farmers’ representative unions should build consensus through a coordinating council and, if possible, merge under one roof There is a need for the various unions to work together by forming a coordinating council to discuss policy and other issues when dealing with government. In the longer term, as more farmers turn to commercial production, there will be a need to consolidate the unions to realise economies of scale and to break the mould of racially based representation. A market for all agricultural land will be developed to ensure that it is more efficiently allocated “The great danger for Zimbabwe's land tenure system in the long term”, writes John Bruce, an international expert on land tenure “is that it will continue largely state administered, generating an ever larger bureaucracy, never making the transition from reform to a post-reform situation” (1990:55). Modern agricultural economies are based on secure property rights and a land market. The efficient allocation of factors of production – land, labour and capital – is determined by supply and demand, which determines their prices. Factors of production are most efficiently allocated when the ratio of their prices and their productivity are the same. Where land does not have a market price, for example, and is given away, there is an infinite demand. As supply is limited, it has to be allocated. When land is allocated on the basis of political patronage, as in Zimbabwe, this vital national asset falls into the hands of a rich elite, who are not genuine farmers and a small section of society that support the status quo. The rest of the citizens do not benefit from this largely partisan process. As a result, productive land is left idle and wasted. A land market and a land tax will ensure the most economic use is made of the land, to the benefit of all Zimbabweans.


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3. Agrarian Reform

3.1 Structural transformation The transformation of the dual agrarian structure requires very small plots to be consolidated and very large farms to be subdivided The structure of the agricultural sector will be transformed by moving from a pattern of a few large and successful commercial farms alongside many tiny and uneconomic subsistence plots into a more “unimodal” structure. This shift towards viable small and medium-sized family farms will be achieved by: a) sub-division of large farms (whose economic potential should not be compromised thereby); b) building strong agro-industrial linkages to create non-agricultural jobs in rural and urban centres to decongest the communal areas; and c) stimulating much higher levels of agricultural production in the communal areas. The renaissance of agriculture depends on macro-economic stability and strong agro-industrial linkages There is a pressing need for policy measures to bring about macro-economic stability. The levers controlling the rate of exchange must be smoothly released to bring about an equilibrium rate that restores viability to farming, stimulates growth in food production and restores competitiveness for export earning commodities, goods and services. Simultaneously, interest rates must move gradually into positive territory to protect incomes and pensions and encourage savings. This is only possible, however, once the rule of law is enforced and a slew of other policy measures are taken to restore confidence and production. The economy of Zimbabwe is based on interdependent linkages between agriculture and industry, which play a major role in supplying agriculture with its inputs and processing agricultural outputs. This intricate system of linkages indirectly spreads to all sectors of the economy, including the professional, manufacturing and services industry. For this reason, the collapse of commercial agricultural production has had a profound ripple effect throughout Zimbabwe’s economy. The links between agriculture and industry must be re-established and strengthened. 3.2 Transformation of the communal Areas About 42 percent of the land in Zimbabwe is Communal Land, on which 73 percent of the population live and eke out a living from subsistence agriculture. The government must ensure that productivity and incomes are significantly increased in both the communal and the resettlement areas and that they progress towards commercial production.


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Robust industrial growth is essential to create urban-industrial employment to decongest communal areas over time

The land reform programme must be accompanied by an industrial growth and development strategy to create sufficient jobs to attract labour from the rural areas.

The structural transformation of an economy requires that an increasing proportion of national employment and production (GDP) shifts from agriculture to industry. As the engine of industrial growth gathers momentum, people migrate from the countryside to urban centres, reducing pressure on natural resources and freeing up land for farmers who wish to consolidate their plots into viable holdings to increase their production and incomes.

Land tenure reforms will provide security of tenure, investment and consolidation of small plots The Rukuni Commission (1994) emphasised a policy shift towards small and medium-sized family farms under long lease with options for title for all commercial land. This applied to both resettlement and small-scale commercial farming areas. Where freehold tenure already existed, it recommended that it be maintained. For A1 resettlement schemes, which operate with communal grazing, it recommended that they should be given the option of being replanned and demarcated into individual, self-contained farms accommodating residential, arable and grazing land. Settlers who have had leasehold rights over their properties for a period of three years (in order to demonstrate farming ability) should, upon satisfactory performance, be given the option to acquire title. The government should also improve security of tenure and the legal and administrative mechanisms necessary for the long-term evolution of the communal system towards freehold title. All land in the communal areas should be surveyed (using low cost GPS techniques) starting with adjudication, mapping and the formalisation of village boundaries. Thereafter, all land within villages should be surveyed and households issued with land registration certificates for residential and arable land. These measures would provide the basis for a land market and for the consolidation of communal plots into larger more viable land-holdings. Communal areas, like resettlement areas should be given the option of being replanned and demarcated into individual, self-contained farms accommodating residential, arable and grazing land.

Land pressure in the communal areas from both livestock and a burgeoning human population has put increasing pressure on the natural resources within the communal lands. This problem has been exacerbated by open access to these resources. The challenge facing the communal areas is to establish a land tenure framework that allows for the sustainable management of natural resources.


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Since it is proposed that both arable and grazing areas should be converted to freehold title, a variation on Norman Reynolds’ share scheme may be appropriate. Initially, settlers within a scheme could exchange shares on a rental basis, thus allowing farm sizes to vary in line with resource availability—especially livestock ownership. After a prescribed period of 3 to 5 years, shares could then be sold, and farmers could be granted freehold title over the land represented by the shares they hold. Out-grower schemes and syndicates can bring the production of high value crops to smallholders Alternative policy options that raise smallholder production and dissolve the dual agrarian structure include (but are not limited to) syndicates, tenant schemes, and out-grower programmes with centralised processing and marketing of produce. The agricultural sector should focus on producing high value commodities in which it has a comparative advantage and the best foreign exchange earning potential through exports. This strategy, which includes agro-industrial processing, will generate new employment opportunities. Kondozi, a horticultural export enterprise, employed 5,000 workers before it was taken over and destroyed by the government. 3.3 Growth and development of rural centres The revitalisation of existing rural centres and the creation of new worker centres within the resettlement and commercial-farming areas, should gradually evolve into development nodes and growth centres. These would provide housing and social services for farm workers and serve as “incubators” for the development of small and medium-sized agricultural services provided by former skilled farm-workers and other entrepreneurs, as well as agro-based industrial production. Demand-led private sector agro-industrial processing, creating non-farm employment Opportunities for adding value to agricultural production by the establishment of agro-industrial processing should be based on the initiative of the private sector seeking business opportunities, rather than the centralised planning of ‘rural industrialisation’. These industries could vary in size and sophistication from local small-scale processing plants, such as grinding mills, to more complex processing plants for exports of high value goods. Agro-processing will provide the stepping stone for the creation of non-farm employment. Land tenure reforms that allow freehold title for business and housing in rural centres


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The principle that communal land can be bought or sold, has meant that businesses setting up shop in the communal areas have paid leases to council for stands in the rural centres. A slight mind shift is required that offers freehold title to attract businesses and those wishing to set up home in rural centres. Over time, this incentive will allow rural centres to develop into small towns that have all the essential services to support a vibrant farming community. Tax incentives to encourage commerce and industry to relocate in rural centres An added incentive for businesses to locate in the rural areas, would be ‘tax holidays’ similar to those offered for export processing zones. Infrastructure: energy, transport and communications Public-sector investment in communications, power and social services should be directed to centres that have shown their potential to be economically viable. The new government should aim to achieve universal access to modern infrastructural services at the earliest possible date. Social infrastructure and housing If business and personnel are to be attracted to rural centres, then it become essential to improve the social services and amenities, including schools and clinics. Councils need to provide incentives for sports clubs, family entertainment, religious gatherings, and so on. Plots for housing and the supply of water and sewerage should be high on the agenda.


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4. Land Policies and Programmes

4.1 Land Commission

Establishment The government should establish, in terms of a revised Constitution and by an Act of Parliament, an impartial, independent and well-resourced professional agency, known as the Land Commission. It will be vested with clearly defined powers and the authority to fulfil its mandate of formulating, planning and co-ordinating the implementation of an all-inclusive, orderly and well-planned land reform and settlement programme, with a limited life-span to complete its mission. Commissioners will be drawn from persons with a keen insight into land policies; experts with knowledge and experience in valuation, finance and agriculture; as well as the technical abilities to manage an effective and sustainable land reform process. The Commission will report directly to Parliament, through the appropriate standing parliamentary committee. Once a Land Commission Bill has been drafted, it will be subject to stakeholder scrutiny before being submitted to Parliament. The Act under which the Commission will be founded will have a limited life-span. After six years the Act will expire unless Parliament decides to extend it for a further three years. This will enable Parliament to review or revamp the mandate of the Land Commission, or simply end the Commission once the land question had been brought to closure. Powers The powers and functions of the Commission will be incorporated in a Land Commission Act. The Commission will carry out the substance of its mandate by administering other key Acts of Parliament, either in whole or in part. The Land Acquisition Act will be repealed and replaced by a much simplified, clear and concise Agricultural Land Act to restore justice and constitutionality to the land reform process. It will be drafted to conform to the new Constitution and will vest powers in the Commission to carry out a land audit; rationalise the use of land; plan and co-ordinate the implementation of the land reform programme; and take charge of land tenure reform in the communal areas.

The Commission will also administer the Rural Development Fund Act, which will incorporate the District Development Fund Act, to allow funds to be channelled into the land reform programme, the development of the communal areas, and pay compensation for land, improvements and consequential losses. The Commission will also administer those aspects of an amended Communal Areas Act dealing with the proposed changes in land tenure, land registration and administration or, alternatively, consolidate these land tenure matters into the proposed Agricultural Land Act. Various other legislation, such as the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act and the Traditional Leaders Act, will be


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reviewed, amended or repealed to conform to the government’s land reform agenda and the transformation of the communal areas.

The Act will grant the Land Commission powers, subject to judicial review, to rationalise the settlement of land and develop a system by which such land is accessed, leased or sold to eligible persons; and fix the terms and conditions under which settlers may occupy agricultural land. The Commission may apply to any competent court for an order to evict any persons who are not eligible for resettlement and who are unlawfully occupying agricultural land. With these powers comes the responsibility of the Commission to ensure that the land reform programme is lawful, just, equitable, transparent and sustainable. The Commission will be answerable to Parliament and, to ensure fairness and accountability, its decisions and actions will be subject to review and appeal. Functions The Commission’s functions will be to: ° Carry out a land audit that includes a survey of farms that have been occupied since

January 2000; a legal study to untie the legal knots created by the abuse of executive power; and a review of the capacity of institutions participating in the implementation of the land reform programme.

° Engage in a policy evaluation and consultative process, involving key stakeholders, to build consensus on the objectives and framework for the land reform programme.

° Undertake a transitional land rationalisation and co-development exercise (on land that has been settled under the ‘fast track’ programme) to bring farms back into full production at the earliest opportunity.

° Facilitate the rebuilding of the institutional capacity of those government ministries and departments that will participate in the land reform exercise, and establish a network of functional government and non-government agencies for programme implementation.

° Create the legal and regulatory framework for the land reform and settlement programme to allow for the evolution and efficient operation of a vibrant land market.

° Establish and administer the Rural Development Fund to finance the land reform programme.

° Formulate land settlement plans and programmes for each province, including budgets, and consolidate these into a national plan for Parliamentary approval.

° Co-ordinate the implementation of the land reform programme through a network of government, non-government and private agencies to: inter alia, rationalise settlement; facilitate co-development; select and settle farmers; replan farm


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subdivisions; survey boundaries; provide secure tenure; negotiate terms of conditions of occupation; assess and pay compensation; solicit and channel funding for the provision of adequate social and physical infrastructure and facilities; provide facilities for farmers to gain access to capital in order to acquire land, capital, farm inputs and services to farm productively; organise a revolving fund for the purchase of land and facilitate contracts for the direct transfers of land.

° Monitor and evaluate the progress of the land reform programme for each province and submit annual reports, plans and its audited accounts to Parliament.

4.2. Land Audit A land audit of settlement and production on former commercial farms

The Land Commission should carry out a land audit as a matter of urgency. This audit will consist of a farm settlement survey to document the acquisition process and the occupation of commercial farms under the ‘fast track’ programme, and a legal study to bring an authoritative judicial opinion to bear on the legality of that possession.

An independent land audit is the cornerstone on which a successful agricultural recovery and land reform programme can be built. It will provide essential information for the proper planning and implementation of the resettlement programme and to inform compensation claims for land, improvements and consequential damages. The land audit has two complementary components. The first is a farm settlement survey to establish the extent of subdivision and settlement, the physical status of farms, and how these are being utilised. The second is a legal study to establish the constitutionality and legality of settlement and to clarify the legal status of commercial farmers, settlers, and the land they ostensibly own or occupy. A farm settlement survey to document the land acquisition process and the occupation of commercial farms A professional and impartial survey of farms is required to gather relevant and reliable data on settlement under the fast track programme. This will enable the Commission to arrive at informed decisions for the rationalisation and co-development exercise, discussed below. The survey will also prove an invaluable planning tool and a platform for crafting a land reform programme. The main tasks of the farm settlement survey are to:

° Gather reliable information to create a database of all commercial farms by updating and verifying information on a digitised mapping programme.


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° Capture and verify the main physical and legal attributes of each farm: its name, owner, title deed description, location, size, natural region, main land uses and other relevant on-farm data; and consolidate and classify the information (e.g. number of farms occupied).

° Establish and record accurately the sequence of legal measures and illegal action taken on each commercial farm as part of the fast track land acquisition and settlement process; specifically identifying those farms that were illegitimately acquired, those whose acquisition has been finalised by the Administrative Court, and those that have been transferred to new black farmers.

° Determine how, when and which farmers lost their land, and how, when and by whom the land was taken over, specifying the number, identity and details of A1 and A2 settlers, multiple farm owners, those farmers willing and able to continue farming, and those eligible for compensation.

° Establish, in conjunction with the legal study (below), the ownership and status of the farm, defining the rights of those in possession of each farm, the rights of the title-holder, and the rights of the state.

° Assess the extent of land utilisation by occupiers of each farm and which land is ‘vacant’.

° Create an open source web-site on which key stakeholders – including the Land Commission, Deeds Registry Office, the Surveyor General, international organisations, NGOs, planners, farmers, scholars and others – can participate in developing, storing and applying the land information system.

° Provide the Land Commission with reliable and relevant data for the rationalisation and co-development exercise, and enable it to improve the capacity of government departments and agencies to implement the land reform programme, administer land properly, plan land settlement, and formulate workable agricultural development programmes.

The advantage of using the digital mapping system to capture data is its ability to add other fields of agro-economic data in order to build a land management information system that will prove, in future, to be useful to both policy-makers and farmers alike. Over time, the survey and land information system will cover the whole country – including the communal, resettlement, small scale farming areas and national parks. A legal study to bring an authoritative judicial opinion to bear on the legality of that acquisition and possession The legal component of the land audit will consist of an analysis of the constitutionality and legality of measures taken, as well as realities on the ground, to clarify the legal status of farmers, settlers, and of the land they own or occupy.


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The legal study will supplement and support the farm settlement survey by disentangling the interplay of political events, land legislation and court action since January 2000, and by establishing the legal status of those occupying farms, those holding title to the land, and the state. The study will seek an authoritative legal opinion to clarify the constitutionality, legality and justice of land laws passed. This judicial opinion should enable justice to prevail; for agreement to be reached on occupation, entitlement and compensation; and for new constitutional and land laws to be proposed for a just and lawful land allocation and resettlement programme.1 The main tasks of the legal study are to:

° Provide a brief but clear account of the political and legal history surrounding the acquisition of commercial farms for resettlement in Zimbabwe, especially since January 2000.

° Distil the key constitutional and legal issues of compulsory land acquisition in Zimbabwe within the context of the separation of state powers.

° Assess the legal status of ownership over the property from which farmers have been evicted, and the legal status of settlers who now occupy commercial farms, establishing the acquisition process for each farm, including, inter alia: preliminary notices (Section 5), authorisation of acquisitions (Section 7), acquiring farms (Section 8), evictions (Section 9), the ‘gazetting’ of land; de-listing and re-listings, valuations and compensation, objections and appeals, court rulings and confirmations in the Administrative Court.

° Suggest legal measures (and their enforcement) that should be instituted to reach agreements between title holders, occupiers and the state, including compensation.

° Provide guidance and propose constitutional and legal amendments to Zimbabwe’s land laws that will protect citizens and their property, and lay a firm legal foundation for a land reform programme.

4.3 Rural Development Fund

1 It must be resolved whether land acquired under Section 8 of the amended Land Acquisition Act to have been legitimately transferred to the state, i.e. deemed to be “previously acquired land” under the draft Land Commission Bill; or whether those farmers who still hold the title deeds to land (i.e. whose acquisition has not been confirmed by the Administrative Court) remain the legal owners of the land. In other words, the legal study should clarify whether the state ‘owns’ the land i) when Section 8 notice is issued, or ii) when acquisition is confirmed by the Administrative Court, or iii) when compensation is paid. But this is only one legal conundrum. Should the new government recognise, for example, the constitutionality of land laws and amendments passed by what it considers to be illegitimate regime, whose laws are endorsed by a compromised and partial judiciary? The legal study should shed light on these issues for a new government to take a legal policy position that avoids costly litigation and disruption to production when it comes to power.


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Establish a Rural Development Fund to channel government and international donor funds into the land reform programme, the development of the communal areas, and pay compensation for land acquisition and improvements An independently administered Rural Development Fund will be created by an Act of Parliament to meet the expenses of the land reform programme. This Fund will initially be vested in the Land Commission, as trustee, to reassure those contributing to the Fund that their donation would be in the safe and competent hands of a professional, non-partisan organisation with a clear mandate for land reform. The government will initiate dialogue with donor agencies and their governments to mobilise international financial support for the land reform programme. These funds will be earmarked for all aspects of the programme – from surveying, replanning farms and the provision of infrastructure and social services, to providing assistance to aspiring new farmers and rebuilding the productive base of Zimbabwe’s agriculture that was wantonly destroyed under the fast track programme. The international community have already sent strong and positive signals of their willingness to assist generously, once the rule of law is restored and a sensible land reform programme is in place. The Rural Development Fund will also serve as the repository into which national and international funds can be channelled to pay compensation for the acquisition of land, improvements and consequential losses to farmers in accordance with international legal precedents and norms. In order to allay the concerns of international donors, and to limit the impact of these payments on the national exchequer, various innovative measures are proposed (below) to solicit international financial support. The Rural Development Fund will keep the administration of land acquisition and compensation payable for land acquired by the state completely separate from all other income and expenditure. Parliamentary allocations to the Fund will clearly specify whether the monies are earmarked for compensation or other purposes. As the role of the Land Commission becomes more clearly defined, and after consultation with relevant stakeholders, the District Development Fund – which finances projects in the Communal Areas – will be consolidated in the Rural Development Fund. Eventually, the Fund could become an autonomous body, with its own mandate to raise funds and perform those functions to which it is most suited. 4.4 Administrating Land Reform Contractual competence The Commission will coordinate the implementation of the programme by being vested with the power to contract government departments, NGOs, contractors, consultants and other private implementation agencies. It will therefore focus on developing the


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professional competence – using lawyers, engineers, agriculturists, and experts from other disciplines – to draw up and supervise its contracts with the various implementing agencies. Decentralisation A new government must be committed to decentralisation and devolution. It is also recognised, however, that rural district councils (RDCs), having been depleted of financial and human resources, are struggling to cope under partisan political pressure and the harsh economic environment. There is, hence, an urgent need to facilitate the rebuilding of the financial, human and institutional capacity of the RDCs. In the interim, the Commission will initially decentralise to the provincial level to ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are not spread too thinly to be effective. Eventually there will be properly organised and well equipped provincial centres that are staffed with competent and professional personnel, who will work in close consultation with RDCs to ensure that their concerns and priorities are fully addressed. Once the operational capacity of the RDCs has been restored, appropriate components of the Commission’s work will devolve to the RDCs. For their part, RDCs will play a crucial role in the transformation of the communal areas and their integration with the wider farming community. The decision to decentralise and devolve power must rest as much with local authorities (to accept new responsibilities) as with the central authority, the Commission (to impose new ones). 4.5 Rationalisation and Co-development Making transitional arrangements for the lawful occupation of land A land rationalisation and co-development programme to make transitional arrangements for the occupation of land and get agricultural recovery underway at the earliest opportunity. A consultation and policy evaluation process to engage all key stakeholder and build trust, confidence and consensus on the main principles and policies will underlie the entire land reform programme.

The analysis of relevant and reliable information from the Land Audit will provide a basis for an effective land rationalisation exercise as a precursor to the proper planning and implementation of a sustainable resettlement programme. It will also inform any restitution and compensation to be paid for both the land and improvements. Rationalisation will be based on fairness and the most practical course of action The rationalisation of land allocation is a transitional exercise to reconcile policy principles with on-the-ground realities of farm occupation by applying the principles of justice, accountability, need and ability. In carrying out this task, the Land Commission


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will – on a farm-by-farm basis, or by dealing with categories of farms – adjudicate on the fairest and most practical course of action. The rationalisation process will be based on the land audit’s finding on the legality and legitimacy of farm occupations, and on a non-partisan set of criteria, established by the Commission, to assess whether those occupying the land qualify as bona fide settlers. Those farmers resettled under the fast track programme who were coerced by political circumstance to settle on farms may wish to opt out. Those who already own land, or who can afford to buy land, or who have alternative sources of livelihood, will not be eligible for settlement. Preference will be given to those people who possess farming knowledge, experience and proven ability, as well as those who do not have an alternative source of income and who have clearly demonstrated their determination to make a success of farming. The Land Commission will deal with both A1 and A2 settlers professionally, fairly and sensitively in order to avoid any unnecessary antagonism and conflict. Accordingly, the Land Commission Act will provide for regulations that set out those criteria that must be met for settlement to be considered legitimate. This will ensure that any person who is required to give up the land they occupy cannot construe their eviction either as victimisation or vindictiveness, but as the due process of law. Furthermore, in the case of a dispute, the occupier will have recourse to the courts of law to challenge an eviction order. Legitimate settlers will be issued with ‘certificates of occupation’ and will be given the Commission’s full support to contribute to Zimbabwe’s agricultural recovery, until such time as a fully-fledged settlement programme can confirm their settlement status. If they qualify for settlement, they may be allowed to continue farming on the land they occupy after it has been properly planned, surveyed and demarcated. Alternatively, they may wish to be settled on a properly planned settlement scheme in the normal way. Depending on the settlers’ needs and ability, and depending on the opportunities available, settlers will be offered secure tenure under terms and conditions set by the Agricultural Land Settlement Board. In general, however, settlers will either be granted concessionary loans to acquire registered title to land, or granted a lease over land with an option for title once certain conditions have been met. Co-development places development at the core of reconciliation Co-development seeks to defuse racial tensions by opening up new avenues for co-operation and placing development at the core of reconciliation, the building of good neighbourliness, and national healing. The expectation is that the principle of co-development will foster cooperation based on mutual agreement, toleration and accommodation within the rule of law and in accordance with the principles of social justice. It is a concept whereby a commercial farmer offers his farming expertise to help and mentor new farmers (those who have been issued with certificates of occupation).


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Co-development will be based on a two or three year contract in which an experienced farmer is paid from the Rural Development Fund to assist new farmers plan and manage their farms better and provide them with sound agricultural advice – a least until such time that a properly planned and fully-fledged resettlement scheme is in place. Once the status of the settlers (which includes the farmer) has been confirmed, the parties may wish to renew their co-development agreement on the basis of a properly surveyed and demarcated farm plan. The newly confirmed settled farmers would be eligible for state guaranteed low-interest loans with which to compensate the farmer for his land, and pay for equipment and farm inputs. Conversely, the parties may opt for an alternative arrangement after consultation between themselves and the Agricultural Land Settlement Board. Co-development is not a new concept. Before the onslaught of the fast track programme, there were many examples of co-development taking place between commercial farmers, settlers and communal farmers. The government should extend this cooperation on a more formalised but flexible basis, and within a modernising agrarian reform framework. In particular, experienced farmers should be able to enter into commercial agreements with settlers in a number of innovation ways: by providing extension advice and services, such as ploughing; by forming a syndicate to realise greater efficiencies and economises of scale for the purchase of inputs and the marketing of produce; by the centralised processing of capital intensive crops, such as tobacco or coffee, for outgrower settlers. In fact, there is a wide range of possible arrangements and expressions of the concept of co-development that would suit different situations for the mutual benefit of new and old farmers.

As the planning and implementation of formal, well-planned settlement schemes gets under way, the status of settlers who received ‘certificates of occupation’ under the rationalisation exercise would be reviewed. Those who still qualify for settlement may remain in situ under a replanned farm scheme, or be moved to a properly designated and planned settlement scheme.

4.6 Programme Planning and Implementation The planning of the land reform programme to determine the functions, activities and tasks involved in the programme, to define and allocate responsibilities for their performance, to establish targets and timeframes, and to draw up contracts with implementing agencies.

Building consensus between key stakeholders


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The Land Commission will only proceed with it major tasks and functions after extensive and on-going consultation with all major stakeholders to arrive at a broad consensus on the principles and policies underlying land reform, and on the best ways of planning, co-ordinating and monitoring the programme’s implementation. The Commission will therefore organise a series of multi-stakeholder debates, made up of representatives of the various farming organisations; those public and private organisations that are likely to be involved in implementing the programme; policy makers and international organisations; as well as NGOs and other organisations with an interest in moulding a legal and transparent programme that recognises the primacy of the rule of law. Rebuilding organisational and institutional capacity

The rebuilding of the institutional capacity to ensure that those government ministries, departments and other agencies contracted by the Land Commission to implement the land reform programme, are motivated, competent and cost-effective.

The Land Commission will coordinate the mammoth and multi-faceted task of planning, implementing and monitoring a land reform programme through a well-established network of government ministries and departments, NGOs, consultants and contractors. Many of these participating agencies, including government ministries and departments, once possessed the expertise and experience to contribute towards implementing various components of a land reform programme. For example, resettlement planning was carried out by Agritex and the Department of Physical Planning; the Surveyor General conceived of using new GPS technologies to survey and allocate land; the Deeds Registry was responsible for land registration and archiving documentation; environmental concerns were addressed by the Ministry of Environment and the Natural Resources Board; infrastructure development was carried out by ZESA, the PTC, the Ministry of Roads, the Ministry of Water and DDF; while the provision of social services rested with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. However, the morale of these organisations has been severely eroded and their capacity depleted over the past six years. Yet, within these structures there remain committed civil servants whose goodwill must be harnessed to rekindle their motivation and to realise the potential of their organisations. As a first step, therefore, the Commission will evaluate the organisational and institutional capacity of those government, non-government and private sector agencies that are most likely to participate in the implementation of the land reform programme. This will include an assessment of their current financial status, their human resource establishment, and their duties and responsibilities. Once the future tasks and responsibilities of each participating organisation have been considered, the Commission will estimate the capital, personnel, financial and other resource needed to make them fully functional participants in the land reform implementation network. The evaluation will establish a clear organisational structure and clearly defined roles to avoid overlapping responsibilities and competing interests. The Commission’s task will be to help rebuild institutional capacity, oversee institutional deepening, and maintain the


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organisations’ implementation capacity and, thereby, create an effective and enduring organisational network and regulatory framework that, if need be, can be sustained beyond the Commission itself. The Commission will also review the many ad hoc committees and organisations that have became ineffectual or defunct through loss of finance, commitment or use. The Commission will, through disbursements from the Rural Development Fund, be vested with the power to contract implementing agencies, including government ministries and departments, and ensure that they comply with their contractual obligations and are held accountable for their performance. One of the foremost tasks of the Commission, therefore, is to develop its professional competence to evaluate performance and supervise contracts.

Programme planning and evaluation The Land Commission will follow up the rationalisation and co-development exercise with an overall land reform plan for co-ordinating implementation, supervising the programme, and evaluating and monitoring its progress. Each year the Commission will prepare and update a resettlement plan for each province stating, inter alia: the number of farms, wards and districts it intends to replan; the amount of land and the size and number of farms available for settlement; any additional farms it intends to acquire; the number and category of farmers it intends to settle; the social and physical infrastructural development planned for the year; and an environmental impact assessment statement. The number of farmers selected should not exceed the number of farms available for settlement during the year. The Commission’s consolidated plan, programme of activities, and its budgeted income and cost statements – both for the Commission and the Rural Development Fund – will be presented to Parliament each year in time to be incorporated into the national budget. This consolidated plan will be presented with an independent evaluation report of the Commission’s progress and audited accounts for the previous year. 4.7 Land acquisition and compensation The Land Commission will become the acquiring authority The Land Commission will become the land acquiring authority in terms of the Agricultural Land Act to acquire or facilitate the transfer of land to meet the redistributive objectives of the programme. It will be tasked with establishing the rules and criteria for the acquisition of land for resettlement and the process and mechanics for land acquisition. Compensation determined by internationally accepted formula


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The Compensation Committee (currently under the Land Acquisition Act, section 29(A)(3)) will be reconstituted under the proposed Agricultural Land Bill. In determining compensation it will apply internationally accepted criteria and formulae for assessing compensation for land, improvements and consequential damages for farms that have been compulsorily acquired. The committee will also determine the means and procedures for paying compensation to ensure that the fullest possible compensation is paid as soon as possible. The Committee should apply the most cost effective, practical and beneficial approaches for compensation. Previous land reform attempts were severely constrained by the daunting administrative burden imposed by the Land Acquisition Act when assessing compensation. The valuation process and estimates made within this bureaucratic quagmire were easily challenged in court, resulting in huge delays, costly outlays, and a frustrating lack of progress. It will therefore be incumbent on the Committee to avoid time-consuming methods and costly litigation by creating a lean and motivated administration, characterised by streamlined procedures to reach swift, amicable and fair agreements on the terms and conditions of compensation. Assessment for classes of compensation claims would help to move the process forward quickly. When appropriate, the Board will seek professional assistance for valuations, legal advice and improving its operational efficiency and cost effectiveness. Procedures and funding to meet compensation commitments Despite the commitment to pay prompt and adequate compensation, there will be considerable fiscal constraints to meet these payments without jeopardising the land reform programme and the recovery of social services. The Commission should therefore devise innovative ways of ameliorating the need for compensation. These may include: ° Offering those persons who elect to farm, but whose land has been occupied for

settlement a farm, another farm of similar value as compensation.

° Allowing those who have taken over farms, and who meet the criteria for settlement, and who have the means to pay for them, to simply compensate the previous owner.

° Transferring land directly from owners to settlers. Settlers will be eligible for concessionary, government-guaranteed loans – including moratoriums on repayment, low deposits and interest rates, and flexible repayment periods – administered by the Rural Development Fund. The settler would then pay the farm owner directly for the subdivided portion of the farm. The farmer would receive compensation, the settlers would receive title to the land, and the Rural Development Fund would hold the title deeds as security against the loan.

° Seeking the support of the international community which has given undertakings to assist in land reform and settlement. Britain, for example, made pound-for-pound contributions for the purchase of land for resettlement. Other countries could be encouraged to follow suit. Alternatively, international agencies could contribute to a


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revolving fund, administered by the Rural Development Fund, through which concessionary long-term loans would be made available to new farmers for land, capital development, equipment and farm inputs. As these farmers repay their loans, the funds could be channelled back either into new loans or into agricultural infrastructural projects to support the land reform programme.

° Approaching donor nations for debt relief. It could be agreed that a portion of the savings realised from debt relief be paid into the Rural Development Fund for land reform or compensation.

4.8 Subdivision and farm planning The fast track programme has left a major problem in its wake. In the haste to allocate land, insufficient thought was given to the sensible, efficient and fair subdivision of commercial farms in order to optimise production, share access to the existing infrastructure fairly, and adequately provide for new infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, water, electricity and telecommunications. The task facing the Commission is to re-plan and subdivide large commercial farms, using the expertise of (former) commercial farmers, planners and surveyors, to suit a number of smaller farmers. Moreover, it must properly plan ‘communities of farms’ within a district to enable agricultural service centres to flourish. Infrastructure such as schools, clinics, government infrastructure and services (electricity, police, post offices, etc.) would be located within these centres. 4.9 Farmer selection process The Land Commission appoints members of the Land Settlement Board The Agricultural Land Settlement Board Act provides for the establishment of an Agricultural Land Settlement Board. The role of the Board is to select applicants for leases of farms. This Act will be amended and incorporated into the Agricultural Land Bill. The Land Commission would therefore become the authority responsible for administering the Act and appointing members to the Board. The Board, which will be tasked with: establishing the rules and criteria for the fair and transparent selection of settlers based on justice, accountability, ability; establishing the terms, conditions and tenure arrangements under which settlement may take place for different categories of farms and farmers; the process and mechanics for settlement; and the amount, nature, form and period of loans offered to different categories of settlers. The Board will also be tasked with streamlining the selection process and putting in place a transparent process for selecting settlers. Applications will be made directly to the


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Board or forwarded from the district to the provincial offices of the Land Commission for onward transmission to the Board. Application will be evaluated on a non-partisan basis and purely on the merits of each application. Land will be allocated in terms of the type and size (category) of farms available. A free and transparent selection and settlement process When selecting new farmers, the Board will: ° Ensure that any citizen may apply to be considered for selection for settlement

regardless of their gender, race, ethnic origin or political opinions.

° Select farmers for settlement in a transparent and objective manner to give every applicant the confidence that their application will be fairly processed according to carefully laid down criteria and procedures.

° Give preference to those applicants who have farming knowledge and proven farming ability, and those who do not have an alternative source of livelihood but who have a demonstrable commitment to farming.

° Allocate only one farm per family.

° Wherever possible, settle successful applicants in their own areas, close to their areas, in their areas of their choice, or on the specific farm for which they apply. (Lists will be kept of farms for all areas for which applicants may apply.)

° Settlers will pay for the use of their land, either through purchasing the farm or leasing it.

° Arrange for the training of less experienced settlers in farm management and practice as a condition of being settled. Practical training could take the form of a contractual mentoring arrangement between new farmers and experienced commercial farmers.

° Arrange loans for settlers to purchase land and buildings, equipment, inputs and services – whose terms and conditions will vary from highly subsidised and concessionary loans to the most needy farmers, to commercial loans for the most experienced and well-resourced farmers.

° Prepare farm plans and establish performance indicators to monitor the progress of settled farmers.

° State clearly – if it exercises its discretion to give preference to any group, such as caretakers for AIDS orphans, women’s groups or black commercial farmers – how affirmative action is justified, the extent of the benefit, and how this benefit will impact upon other applicants and the programme as a whole. In particular, it should be shown that they cannot be helped by any other poverty reduction or targeted programme.

° Settle farmers only on schemes where there is sufficient technical advisory and extension support, and where the provision of infrastructure, facilities and social


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services – from roads and water, to schools and clinics – gives settlers every opportunity to succeed.

Once the conditions of settlement have been agreed and the contract signed, the Board will monitor and enforce the conditions of the contract, while the Rural Development Fund will administer the receipts and payments, including the adjustments of rents in line with inflation. Lease with option to purchase or weeding out underperformers The Board must have a clear policy on those farmers who do not make productive use of the land. Support to new farmers, in other words, will be conditional. While concessionary loans, back-up service and infrastructural support will initially be generous, within a specified time farmers will be expected to be self-sufficient, weaned of subsidised support and, with the help of the Rural Development Fund, will be required to seek loans from commercial financial institutions. When a farmer defaults on loan repayments or the payment of lease fees, the Board must initiate a series of measures that gives the farmer an opportunity either to perform better or to opt out, giving other potential farmers the opportunity to prove themselves. Those farmers operating under leasehold tenure will be given a period (of, say, 10 years) within which to exercise their right to freehold title. Compensation or return of commercial farmers The Board will determine the status of commercial farmers to assess their claims for compensation and the conditions under which they will occupy land.

° Those farmers who lost their farms illegally or illegitimately, but who no longer wish to continue farming, will be compensated. Those farmers who elect to continue farming will be considered for resettlement under the process set up under the Land Commission.

° If A1 or A2 settlers are occupying the farm to which a displaced farmer wishes to return, the farm owner can enter into a co-development contract with those settlers who have been issued with certificates of occupation. Once the farm has been replanned, the farmer will be entitled to compensation for that portion of the farm acquired by the new settlers.


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5. Alternative Policy Options 5.1 Settlement models There is a need to move away from the rigid, centrally imposed A1 and A2 resettlement models, based on standardised farm sizes, and opt for a much more flexible approach. This will allow farmers more choice, depending on their resources, ambitions, their changing economic circumstances, opportunities and needs. Instead of allocating each settler the same area, the nature, size and quality of the land offered will be based on the settler’s farming and managerial skills, financial resources (what they can afford) and the type of farming operation he or she wishes to engage. The Land Commission will therefore develop a regulatory framework for settlement defined by the need for security of tenure, incentives for investment and productivity, and the flexibility for a range of livelihood options that would give substance to the new government’s ‘people-centred’ approach. 5.2 Farm size John Bruce, an international land tenure expert, asks the rhetorical question: “What then is the efficient scale?” His reply was that scale “will vary not only by crop, but by land capability, and capital and labour endowments of the farm firm” (ibid.:25). Because farm size varies with a multitude of factors, “any attempt to stipulate it will necessarily involve substantial inefficiencies” (ibid.:25). Binswanger and Elgin link management with economies of scale: “the better the manager, the larger the optimal farm size” (1989:744). Furthermore, as farm sizes would, over time, reflect the development of managerial skills, they would tend to gravitate towards a statistically normal distribution—larger commercial farms being subdivided, while minute communal farms were consolidated. Thus, concludes Bruce:

“Through the operation of the land market, agrarian structure changes with other transformations in the economy as development proceeds. Sizes of units increase or decrease and distributions change depending on changes in relative factor prices and other economic changes. Interventions in land markets are not at all unusual to manage change. ... But the market is the basic mechanism (op.cit.:55).”

Eventually, a unimodal agrarian structure with a range of farm sizes would emerge, and farmers would have the opportunity to expand their operations by exchanging smaller for larger farms through a land market. State planners should not impose standard farm sizes because:

° It is not the absolute size of a farm, but the productive potential and returns from the land that are important. One farm may be well-endowed with water and suitable soils,


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while another of the same size may be predominately characterised by non-arable soils.

° Farmers with different skills and capital level will be able to afford and efficiently manage different sizes of farms. A smallholder farmer, with limited capital and farming experience, will be able to manage a smaller farm than a skilled, experienced and well-resourced farmer.

° Different types of farming enterprises require different types and sizes of operation. An intensive horticultural operation will require only a fraction of the land needed for game ranching, and will need completely different resource endowments.

° The nature of the crop will require different sized land holding. Plantation crops, such as sugar, tea, and even tobacco, need to utilise capital-intensive processing plants to realise economies of scale.

° If the agricultural sector is to attract the most resourceful and competent farmers to feed the nation and earn foreign exchange, then the rewards from farming (the opportunity cost) must be commensurate with other sectors. This assumes that the more competent and able farmers should not be restricted in the size of their operations.

For these reasons, and because the fast track programme has already created many small farms, we believe that administratively determined farm sizes should not be imposed on the agricultural sector. 5.3 Land market Modern agricultural economies are based on secure property rights and land markets. Registered title provides farmers with an incentive for investment in the productive use of land because the benefits accrue directly to the farmer and his family. It also bestows on owners the freedom to mortgage their land for loans to provide capital for investments in buildings, farm equipment and inputs; or they may wish to sell their farm in their twilight years and re-invest the proceeds in another property for their retirement. Alternatively, they may wish to bequeath the land they have developed to their heirs. In this way, freehold title provides for security of tenure, inheritance, incentives for long term investments, and it unlocks the collateral value of land. The ability to subdivide, consolidate, or buy and sell land on a market allows people the freedom to choose the type, size and location of a farm that suits their particular financial and social circumstances best. It also gives them the mobility to transfer their capital into farming and, when they so decide, to move out into other sectors of the economy, such as a small business, should their circumstance change. Moreover, this ability to transfer land through the market ensures that land and other factors of production are allocated optimally and efficiently by equalising their marginal productivity and prices.


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Regrettably, the fast track programme and the nationalisation of land have destroyed the market for agricultural land. The constitutional amendments and the Gazetted Land Act have to be repealed before it is possible to resuscitate and revitalise the land market. It is recognised, however, that due to the chaos created on the ground, this will take time. Accordingly, we envisage two stages of development before a vibrant land market can be established. First, the land audit and the process of land rationalisation must take its course. And, second, the process of confirmation of title to land, the registration of land in the names of new settlers, and the payment of compensation must be underway. Although the land market will start to gather momentum, it will only be fully developed once the land reform programme draws to a close and a regulatory framework (including an efficient land registry) for a land market is in place. 5.4 Land tax A progressive land tax is economically sound in principle. It encourages the full utilisation of land, releases underutilised land onto the market through subdivision, dampens speculation of agricultural land, and it has the added advantage of raising revenues – but without distorting commodity prices. The main drawback is that land valuations to determine the tax payable are notoriously difficult to assess and costly to administer. In order to overcome this constraint it is proposed that a simple ‘insurance’ tax evaluation method is used. This places the onus on farmers to value their own land – on the understanding that their estimation will be used as prima face evidence of the value of their property – should the Land Commission decide to acquire. If the farmer undervalues the land to avoid tax, the Land Commission may acquire the land relatively cheaply. If the land is overvalued to avoid acquisition, then more than the full value of tax will be collected. Farmers would therefore have an incentive to make an accurate annual assessment of the market value of their land, while the administrative costs to the government would be minimal. The land tax would be progressive. This means that those farmers wishing to keep large farms would have to ensure that they are fully utilized, so that the cost of holding the land (the tax) is more than offset by the profitability of owning the additional land. A land tax would apply increasing resistance for farms to get bigger. This, however, would not apply if different farmers came together to create economies of scale – by, say, creating a conservancy or syndicate. Each farmer would be liable for pay tax only on his or her own property. The government should ensure that farmers paying the tax would benefit by allowing half the proceeds to accrue to the rural district council for improvements in public service and infrastructure, while the other half would accrue to the Rural Development Fund of the land reform programme.


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5.5 One farm policy A “one person, one farm” policy will apply during the transitional stage of rationalisation and co-development. Multiple farm owners will be allowed to keep one farm of their choosing, and they will be required to give up any additional farms to which they claim ownership. If they are confirmed as the legitimate and legal owners of those additional farms, they will be required to sell them or be paid compensation for them. Once the rationalisation phase moves into the formal land reform phase, the constraints on owning a single farm will be eased and the land market encouraged. As farmers’ and settlers’ entitlement to land is registered, when property rights are clarified, and tenure becomes more secure, a fully-fledged land market will operate allowing successful farmers to acquire additional land. However, in order to encourage single farm ownership and the full utilisation of farms, a single land tax will apply to the aggregate value of all the farms owned.


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6. Agriculture 6.1 Commercial Agriculture At its peak, in the mid-1990s, the commercial sector comprised of about 4,800 commercial farms, which produced over 20 commodities and earned in excess of USD1,2billion annually in export earnings, of which 40 percent was earned by the export of tobacco. Commercial agriculture as a whole contributed about 18 percent to GDP, employed over 300,000 workers, and over 2 million people lived on and earned their livelihood from commercial farms. It is estimated that a million children attended farm schools, frequently constructed and managed by the farmer, while many had sophisticated health care systems in place for their workforce. Following the defeat of the new government-sponsored constitution in a referendum in February 2000 and in the run-up to the June 2000 general election, the Zimbabwe government unleashed war veterans against the opposition MDC and to invade commercial farms, seen as an area of support for the opposition. The forcible and often violent eviction of farmers and their families from their homes, the wholesale looting of equipment, personal effects and crops of formerly productive farms – under the guise of a land reform programme that was often assisted by police themselves, in open defiance of court orders – shattered the agricultural sector, and with it, other sectors that contributed to a viable economy. Table 1. Large Scale Commercial production (000 tonnes) 1998 to 2005

Commercial Crops 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Maize 521 648 810 385 185 180 275 180 Cotton 76 61 53 38 16 2 1 1 Wheat 270 281 225 283 153 93 110 125 Sorghum 22 12 18 19 15 33 25 13 Tobacco (flue cured) 210 188 230 195 154 60 54 55 Tobacco (air cured) 3 3 2 2 2 1 - - Coffee 10 10 7 7 9 4 4 2 Sugar 553 553 522 505 552 483 405 384 Tea 18 18 21 21 22 21 20 22 Dairy 184 181 183 173 150 112 96 93 Barley 57 18 32 32 58 50 36 43 Horticulture 55 65 67 63 76 78 57 53 Beef (head sold) 350 320 400 440 550 250 270 150

Total (excl beef) 1975 2038 2170 1723 1392 1117 1083 971


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Figure 1. Commercial Production (all crops except beef - 000 tonnes)

Commercial Production (all crops - 000 tonnes)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

To

nne

s

Zimbabwe’s agricultural output from the commercial sector has been in free-fall since 2000. This is illustrated in Table 1 (above) and in Figure 1. We have aggregated agricultural production for illustrative purpose only as an indicator of the overall decline in the commercial agricultural sector (Figure 1.) Gross production of the major commodities from the commercial sector in the out-turn 2005 was about 48 percent of that of 1998. Production in 2006 is estimated to have fallen further. 6.2 Smallholder Agriculture The success of smallholder agriculture has been celebrated since the production of maize and cotton from the communal areas overtook production from the commercial areas in the mid-1980s. This was achieved on the back of extending grain marketing depots to nearly all parts of the communal areas; providing credit for farm inputs through the Agricultural Finance Corporation; and offering farmers a production incentive with a high guaranteed price for their maize. Without understating this achievement, this so-called ‘second’ agricultural revolution did not benefit farmers equally, nor was it sustainable. Subsequent research has shown that most of the increase in maize production came from just 10 percent of farmers in the better agro-climatic areas (NR II and III). For the majority of communal resident the gains in production and earning were marginal. It also showed that due to poor loan repayment rates, that smallholder credit tailed off considerably. For its part, the GMB incurred heavy losses by trying to sustain


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uneconomic collection points; by subsidizing the price of maize meal, mainly for the benefit of urban consumers; and by huge storage costs because the stockpile of maize could not be exported. By 1986, the government imposed maize production restrictions and was encouraging commercial farmers to move into oilseeds and high value exporting crops, especially tobacco – which had regained its lost markets – and horticulture. Yet, during the 1990s, with the liberalisation of agricultural marketing, a glimmer of the huge potential of smallholder agriculture could be seen. In cotton, this was known as ‘contract farming’. Organisations, such as Cottco, provided smallholders with inputs and extension advice to maximise yields of cotton, which Cottco guaranteed to buy at a contract price. The other was the development of smallholder outgrower schemes for horticultural products, of which Kondozi, a large exporter, was a model. Hyper-inflation has caused problems with cotton contract farming, and the government destroyed the Kondozi estate, putting thousands out of work, including outgrowers from the communal areas. These organisations, however, point the way to the future, where partnerships between companies and smallholders can bring the production of high value crops and commercialisation to the communal areas. In the longer term, the continued commercialisation of the communal areas will depend on far reaching institutional changes that transform the customary tenure system to provide security of tenure and collateral for farming loans, as well as the opportunity to rent or buy land to realise economies of scale. It will also depend on the extent to which an industrialising economy can absorb the increase in population from the communal areas. Sectors 6.3 Cereals Maize Commercial farmers used to crop from 140,000 ha to 160,000 hectares for maize and produce up to 850,000 tonnes. Smallholders planted about 1,1 million hectares and, in a reasonable growing season, produced about one million tonnes of grain. Much of this was retained for home consumption. The country was therefore self-sufficient in maize production for both human and stock feed requirements. The total out-turn for 2006 is estimated at 945,000 tonnes with the commercial farms producing 225,000 tonnes. This leaves a shortfall of around 500,000 tonnes, which has been imported, mostly from South Africa. The sale of maize and wheat is so highly subsidised that one can only ask: who benefits? The current producer price of maize is Z$ 33,000 per tonne (recently increased by Z$21,000 per tonne). The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) then sells to millers for Z$600 per tonne in order to maintain the very low cost of the staple (maize meal) to consumers.


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The subsidy therefore represents a massive Z$32,400 per tonne. In other words, producers are paid 54 times as much as the GMB sells maize. Many recently licensed small millers simply buy maize from GMB (the sole lawful dealer in maize) at the subsidised price and sell it back to the GMB at the producer price for a massive profit. For some it is not even necessary to take delivery of the product and thus incur the inconvenience of arranging transport. A co-operative clerk in the GMB will do the paper work without any product actually changing hands! On the import side of the equation the situation becomes even more bizarre. The price of maize in South Africa is R1, 290 per tonne. The cost of transport and handling would raise the landed cost to around R1, 500 per tonne. At the official rate of Z$32:1Rand the landed cost of South African maize would be about Z$48,000 per tonne. This too sells to millers for Z$600 per tonne. Estimates are that the country will import about 500,000 tonnes of maize in the current season, prior to next years harvest. This would require a subsidy, paid by the taxpayer, of Z$24 billion for maize imports alone. Recovery in maize production could be rapid as the country has the capacity to produce enough seed and fertilizer and given reasonable growing seasons, the country could be fully self-sufficient once more in this staple within two seasons. Wheat and barley Before the land invasion, the annual winter wheat crop reached about 275,000 tonnes (although at peak production levels 385,000 tonnes was produced), which still fell short of the national requirement of approximately 350,000 tonnes. The current wheat crop is estimated at no more than 60,000 tonnes from the commercial sector, with a total crop of around 130,000 tonnes. This places undue pressure on the country’s limited foreign currency to pay for food and stretches the capacity of the transport system, particularly rail transport. The country has the capacity to irrigate about 95,000 hectares to 100 000 hectares, excluding the lowveld irrigated sugar production, of which about 40 000 hectares to 45,000 hectares was sown to wheat and 8,000 hectares was sown to barley. Current estimates of production for 2006 are 130,000 tonnes of wheat and 50,000 tonnes of barley, the latter grown under contract to the breweries. While the number of growers has probably increased with resettlement, the scale of operation has declined and the yields have fallen dramatically. Wheat production will be about one third of the national requirement. The producer price for wheat has been hiked to Z$217,913 per tonne – about six times the world price (at the official exchange rate) of US$155 per tonne – in an attempt to get new growers to produce more wheat. Incredibly, this is passed on to the millers at less than one tenth of the producer price: a mere Z$12,338 per tonne, leaving a subsidy of around Z$205,000 per tonne. The price of wheat in South Africa is around R1,800 per tonne


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(somewhat higher than the world price). The landed cost would be a little over R2, 000 per tonne. At the official exchange rate this would cost the GMB Z$64,000 per tonne. Yet, it is also sold to the millers for Z$12,338 per tonne, incurring a subsidy of around Z$52,000 per tonne. Wheat imports of 250,000 tonnes would cost Z$13 billion. If 130,000 tonnes of locally produced wheat is delivered to the GMB, the subsidy would be Z$26.6 billion. If the Reserve Bank is able to provide all the necessary hard currency for wheat and maize imports, together with locally grown maize and wheat delivered to the GMB, the subsidy borne by the taxpayer would be around Z$113 billion in the current season. Since the government’s ballooning budget deficit will not cover these costs, it may resort to the printing press, setting in motion a new cycles of hyper-inflation. Alternatively, a benefactor may be extending considerable lines of credit to cover the cost of imports, but these too are unlikely to be repaid. 6.4 Cash crops Cotton Cotton production in Zimbabwe is labour intensive. The plant is relatively drought tolerant and well suited to small-scale producers, who have traditionally produced the bulk of the crop. Total production is therefore more dependent on rainfall than land reform. Production from the smallholder sector was estimated to be 312,000 tonnes for 2006, similar to levels produced in 1999, while production from commercial farms has slumped from 76,000 tonnes in 1998 to almost nothing. The actual out-turn for 2006 was below expectation, possibly due to fertiliser shortages, and 260,000 tonnes was delivered to the cotton gins. There are about 17 gins operating in the country and Cottco accounts for about 55 percent of the total intake. Cargil is the next largest player, with about 10 percent of the intake and a number of smaller players make up the balance. The total ginning capacity in the country is about 700,000 tonnes of seed cotton: well above current deliveries. By arrangement with the government, 25 percent to 30 percent of the total intake is reserved for the local market and the price is regulated, as the calculations are based on the official exchange rate. Thus 70 percent to 75 percent of the crop is exported at the current world price (approximately 57 cents/pound at present). Cotton seed is a valuable by-product from the ginning process, for its high oil yield and the quality of its oilcake meal as a protein source for livestock feed. Recovery of production from commercial farms could be rapid, but the decision whether to grow the crop will be market lead. About two thirds of the commercial crop was summer supplementary irrigated, which ensured high yields and a favourable return on investment. Recovery time is linked to that of maize and soyabeans, as cotton is an alternate summer crop for commercial producers.


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Oilseeds Soya bean production in Zimbabwe increased rapidly from the early 1960s, as rust tolerant varieties were developed and with the success of the rhizobium inoculant production (for atmospheric nitrogen fixing) initiated at the Grasslands Research Station near Marondera. Zimbabwe is still the only country, north of the Limpopo River that has a commercial rhizobium production factory. Soya beans are grown as an alternate crop to maize and its choice by the commercial sector was determined by the relative producer price of the two commodities. Whereas maize is a controlled commodity, soya beans are not. Nor are they as susceptible to theft. This makes soya an attractive alternate crop. The bean is grown for its high oil content, while the oil cake meal is a valuable high protein meal used in the pig and poultry industry. Because of the need to combine harvest the mature crop, soya bean production is suitable mainly for large-scale production. Production exceeded 126,000 tonnes prior to the fast track land reform programme. The current estimate of production is about 26,000 hectares planted to soyas, which will yield about 48,000 tonnes of beans. Recovery of full soya production could be as rapid – within two seasons - as recovery of the maize industry, as the production of the two crops is linked, and there is adequate combine harvester capacity to deal with a full crop. There is no clash with wheat production as the latter is harvested in the spring before soyas are planted. 6.5 Plantations Tea The tea industry has shown a great deal of resilience. Much of the industry is in the hands of a few large multi-national corporations, with a degree of protection, and production has continued largely unabated. Coffee Coffee is a plantation crop grown almost entirely on commercial farms in the Eastern districts, with some production from the Mashonaland West province. The number of small producers was increasing steadily, but was closely allied to the larger commercial farms through out-grower schemes for the supply of seedlings, inputs, and for the processing of the crop. At peak production levels there were 180 large growers producing 10 tonnes of green coffee annually. Production is now down to 13 growers who are expected to produce less than two tonnes in the current season.


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Processing capacity at The Zimbabwe Coffee Mill, of 25,000 tonnes annually, was more than adequate to handle the full crop of coffee. In a highly competitive world market, Zimbabwe coffee enjoyed a niche in the export market because of its reputation for a quality crop. The declining throughput has therefore placed the future of the processing factory in jeopardy, as the current crop cannot sustain the operation. Industry estimates are that the break-even point for the operation of the factory is 4,000 tonnes annually, well above current throughput. Should the factory close, the demise of the coffee industry may be complete. Recovery in the industry will depend on the state of the plantations, which – though many are still in place – have suffered considerable neglect as landowners were removed from their properties. Further, some plantations have been cut down by new farmers to make way for traditional crops. As the crop is slow to mature and yields can only be expected from the 4th/5th year after planting, recovery seems unlikely. Sugar Sugar is produced under full irrigation in the south eastern lowveld. There are 44,000 hectares under cane of which 27,000 hectares are planted by two large international companies, with a further 3,000 hectares planted by resettlement schemes for small farmers managed by those companies. The remainder is from the former commercial farms and small-scale production. Most commercial farmers have been displaced by settlers under the A2 resettlement scheme. The size of farms has been reduced dramatically and the yield have declined steeply with the fall in management standards and inputs. Average yields of between 90,000 tonnes and 100,000 tonnes of fresh cane per hectare have declined to about 30,000 tonnes per hectare under resettlement. Total production of sugar has therefore declined from 553,000 tonnes in 1998 to 429,000 tonnes in 2005. About 30 percent of production is exported to Europe under The Cotonou Agreement (the successor to Lomé) and to the USA through a bi-lateral arrangement under the ACP Protocol. The price realized in Europe is € 496 per tonne USD 635 per tonne, which approximates the world price for sugar and that paid by the US market. The local price of sugar is controlled at around Z$200,000 per tonne, the equivalent of about a fifth of the world price (at the market value of the exchange). The cane is processed through two mills, one at each of the two estates. The capacity of the mills is 600,000 tonnes annually. There is adequate stored water through the Lake Mutirikwe system and ancillary reservoirs to meet these levels of production. Industry estimates are that full recovery of production could be achieved within two seasons – given the necessary conditions – and following considerable refurbishment of the infrastructure related to the irrigation and services of the former commercial sector (roads, canals, pumps piping etc).


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Further, expansion by some 400,000 tonnes of sugar would be possible on completion of the Tokwe/Mukorse complex, which has been stalled for the last 7 years, largely through political interference and bureaucratic bungling. This level of expansion would, however, require the construction of an additional mill to handle the cane. 6.6 Export crops Tobacco In 2000 flue cured production reached 237,000 tonnes of which 6,000 tonnes came from smallholders. Thereafter many farmers were designated for resettlement and by July 2001, half the white-owned commercial tobacco farms had been designated. Tobacco output in 2001/02 declined 56 per cent compared to the average in the 1990s and continued to decline during the fast track resettlement programme. At peak production levels 1,700 large scale growers planted 90,000 hectares to produce around 237,000 tonnes of flue cured tobacco annually; 98 percent of which was exported and accounted for about 40 percent of total export earnings. The country was the second largest exporter of green tobacco in the world, second only to Brazil, and enjoyed a reputation as a world leader in the quality and presentation of the crop. About 30,000 hectares of the crop was early-planted in September and fully irrigated. This crop yielded about 3,000 kg per hectare against the average of the rain-fed crop of about 2,600 kg per hectare. About 430 established and new growers planted just 40,000 hectares for the 2006 season. As average production has fallen to 1,400 kg per hectare, a total delivery of about 55,000 tonnes is expected for the 2006 marketing year. Estimates from seed sales indicate that 43,000 ha will be planted in the 2006/07 season which will yield between 60,000 tonnes and 65,000 tonnes. About 8,000 hectares of this crop will be irrigated. Air cured tobacco has played a relatively minor role in the tobacco industry, but nevertheless has been an important export crop. Production has fallen from 3,200 tonnes in 1998 to negligible levels in 2006. Because of the specialised nature of the crop, requiring considerable experience and skills to produce successfully, full recovery in the industry will depend largely on the number of experienced growers who are prepared to go back into production – given the conditions that are required to attract growers into the industry once more – and on the training and extension services that can be directed towards new growers. It is estimated that within 5 years the country could produce 120,000 tonnes. This would again position the country strategically in the global market. Further expansion to 200,000 tonnes – a level at which the world market could comfortably absorb


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Zimbabwe’s production – could take another 10 years, given the stability and macro-economic situation required. Air-cured tobacco does not require expensive fuel (coal or electricity) to cure, it is suited to small scale production where open air-cured barns are relatively easily constructed; it seems likely that any recovery or expansion in the industry would come from this sector. Horticulture The production of horticultural commodities was the fastest growing component of commercial agriculture. Horticulture exports grew from US$3.5 million in the 1986/86 season to US$139.5 million in 2000/01. This was achieved by the specialized production of fresh produce (mange tout, baby corn, sugar snaps), cut flowers (roses and field flowers) and citrus (primarily oranges, with some easy peelers, grape fruit and lemons) for the sophisticated European market. Much of this (fresh produce and flowers) has been produced under green house conditions, with associated cold rooms and pack houses for direct exports by air to Europe. Coupled with the orchards of tropical fruit (and bananas), deciduous fruit (apples, peaches), tree nuts (macadamia), field flowers and fresh vegetables for the local market, this has constituted the highest level of intensification of production in the sector. Production for export has fallen from 64,700 tonnes (flowers, fresh produce and citrus) to an estimated 47,500 tonnes in 2006, largely through the disturbances on farms by the land reform programme. While many of the former producers have been displaced, production has continued, though at a reduced level, as those properties were targeted primarily by the ruling elite, who simply took over the existing operations, complete with orchards, pack houses, greenhouses and sheds and claimed all rights to product and the profits therefrom. There have been some serious casualties in the destruction of organisations such as Hortico, one of the biggest co-operative pack houses in the country with extensive out-grower schemes in the communal areas; and Kondozi in the Odzi area, one of the largest single operations also with extensive out-grower schemes and many of the smaller citrus producers. However, it is fortunate that many of the Beit Bridge citrus producers and the Mazowe Estates, the largest single citrus producer in the world, are still in operation and will provide the nucleus of material during the recovery process. Many of the citrus orchards on properties from which the owners have been displaced, are also still in place, though neglected, but with appropriate treatment could soon be back in full production. Industry estimates for full recovery of the industry are that, with considerable re-furbishment of infrastructure, particularly green houses, pack houses and irrigation equipment, together with the retention of existing skills and experience in established growers, two to five years should see the industry once more producing at peak levels.


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This would obviously require some intensive training and extension efforts to bring new producers up to standard. The international markets are likely to again recognize Zimbabwe growers as producers of quality products, a reputation that has been dented during the violent take over of commercial farms, and the re-establishment of market share is not seen as a stumbling block to recovery. The small-scale sector is viewed as vital in terms of the continued growth of the horticulture sector. By 2004 there were some 4,000 small-scale growers linked to established exporters, providing some 10 percent of total horticultural production for exports. The small-scale grower share could conceivably increase to 50 percent, hence doubling production within a relatively short time of five to seven years, with appropriate training, extension, research and market development. Out-grower schemes like small-scale farmers to established large-scale horticultural processing or marketing agents who are responsible for storage, handling and transport and marketing. They provide technical advice and extension to small growers, as well as providing them with credit for inputs. 6.7 Livestock Livestock was one of the major export sectors of Zimbabwe. The country lost the export market because the breakdown of the rule of law contributed to a lack of control over stock movements. Since 2000, Zimbabwe had the highest incidents of livestock diseases in a period of 6 years. Outbreaks of disease in Zimbabwe even affected neighbouring countries such as Botswana, whose livestock industry is therefore in jeopardy. The livestock breeding industry was very advanced and could boast that all major cattle breeds, both beef and dairy, were represented. Dairy Dairy production enjoys a degree of political protection from land invasions and acquisition that did not spare other commercial farms. About 280 producers remain in production, from a high of about 360 producers at peak production levels. Output has, however, fallen by some 50 percent because much of the grazing and arable land on dairy farms has been lost to the programme. In many cases dairy farmers have been permitted to retain their homesteads and parlours, and expected to feed their animals entirely on purchased stock feed, which is quite impractical. Milk, like other basic foods, is becoming scarce, with supermarket shelves sometimes bare of the product. Imports of milk powder and milk fat may be required to make up the shortfall. Current production is around 96 million litres per annum from a maximum produced of 265 million litres. There are about 26,000 adult cows on farms, of which about 75 percent


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are in milk at any one time. There are about 12,500 replacement heifers following, a third of which have been mated. The processing capacity in the country is around 300,000 litres annually, thus it is operating at less than 30 percent of capacity. The infrastructure required for full recovery is largely still in place, but is in much need of refurbishment. Farmers feel squeezed by controlled producer prices and a lack of confidence in the current political climate. Immediate recovery would commence with the correct feeding of animals, attention to animal health matters, and the refurbishment of plant and equipment (especially perishables which should be replaced regularly, but which are not). Industry estimates that this would raise production by 25 percent to 30 percent in the short term and recovery thereafter would have to come from an increased numbers of cows in milk and improved breeding and selection. Cows should be culled at a rate of 20 percent per annum. Reproduction on a national basis is about 75 percent, of which half are male calves, and thus heifers retained for replacement could constitute a growth rate of cows in milk at about 10 percent per annum. Imports from South Africa are not really an option because of the high costs, lack of hard currency and the risk of disease. At this rate, full recovery would take about 7 years at 10 percent growth rate per year, compounded. Limitations to consumption in Zimbabwe, which has one of the lowest per capita consumptions of milk in the world, is largely due to the lack of disposable income. As the economic situation improves, demand for milk and milk products will rise proportionately. The potential for expansion in the dairy industry is therefore limited only by the potential for growing the disposable income of the consumers. Beef Throughout the 1990s the cattle population increased until it reached a peak of 6.43 million in 2001, then declined in 2002 to 5.47 million. The largest numbers were in the communal sector, which reached a peak of 4.4 million in 2001. The majority of former commercial farmers ran beef cattle on their farms, although beef production may not have been the main enterprise. At its peak, there were about 3,500 producers, who ran 1,500,000 head and produced 75,000 head of slaughter cattle annually. The industry exported cattle regionally and, through the former Lomé Concession, exported 9,000 tonnes of boxed, prime beef to Europe. The beef industry showed a considerable increase in sales in the early stages of the land reform programme because producers had no option but to off-load their cattle at any price when they were evicted from their properties. The commercial herd is currently about 150,000 head strong, which is about one-tenth of the herd size prior to the land invasions. Tragically, the highly developed seed stock that supported beef production has been decimated. Much of the prize bloodstock, carefully selected and bred over generations, was slaughtered for no more than their value as beef.


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There are probably 400 to 600 commercial producers still farming who hold about 150,000 cattle. The Cold Storage Company, which holds the sole license to export to Europe, operated five export-approved abattoirs throughout the country. These had the capacity to slaughter and process 600,000 cattle. Currently the Company is operating at about 20 percent of capacity and, with the break down in law and order and the uninhibited movement of cattle by new farmers, foot and mouth disease is now endemic throughout the country. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the country will export to the European market again. The national system of livestock sale-pens will be maintained, but outsourced to the private sector under conditions negotiated annually by the Livestock Marketing Trust. The recovery of the beef industry is likely to be slow as the breeding herd has been decimated through enforced sales. The seed stock industry has suffered the same fate. The bulk of the national herd is held in the small-scale sector (about 3, 5 million head) and the off-take from this herd is traditionally very low (about 2 percent), as cattle are held for a variety of reasons other than beef production. Industry estimates that recovery will take 15 to 20 years. Pigs Pigs have traditionally been an intensive operation, benefiting from economies of scale, are highly stock-feed dependant and mostly under the control of large corporate producers. Smallholders enjoyed 51 percent share of the pig market which was almost equal to the few commercial producers. The impact of land reform on pig production has been minimal other than on the negative effect on supply of inputs for stock feed, and production will remain largely market directed. The smaller farm piggery has largely disappeared, but with the high rate of reproduction capable by pigs, recovery of breeding numbers will be rapid, if the demand so dictates. Poultry While the poultry industry has remained fairly active despite the land reform, experienced farmers who produced quality poultry lost their land. Zimbabwe was a regional exporter of day old chicks and eggs. Data shows the country still exports small quantities to a number of African countries. Zimbabwe chicken products are preferred because chickens are fed with natural grains as opposed to grains with hormonal additives used in the United States. The country is strategically positioned to provide quality poultry products. Hence to improve the poultry industry, finance and resources will be available (through an


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established finance system) to re-establish former commercial producers, increase the capacity of day old chick production, increase marketing and distribution capacity, and increase the production of eggs and chickens.


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7. Agricultural Organisations and Services 7.1 Farmer support Farmers unions There were attempts in the 1980s to bring together the Commercial Farmers Union, which represented mainly large-scale white farmers, and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, which represented small black farmers. When indigenisation became politically expedient, the Zimbabwe Commercial Farmer’s Union was established to cater for the new A2 resettled commercial farmers. Justice for Agriculture, a break-away commercial farmers’ organisation, was formed to contest the legality of land invasions and seek compensation for evicted farmers. Each of these organisations has differing objectives, and caters for different constituencies that face different constraints. As they are voluntary organisations, rather than government controlled, they should not be forced together. In the short term, there is a need for them to work together by forming a coordinating council to discuss policy and other issues when dealing with government. In the longer term, as more farmers turn to commercial production, there will be a need to consolidate the unions for economies of scale and to break the mould of racially based representation.

Pricing and marketing support In February 1991, parliamentary changes to the marketing board constitutions gave them greater autonomy in pricing and business decisions. First sorghum and millets were decontrolled, becoming regulated crops for which the GMB would set floor prices and remain the residual buyer. A year later, the free movement of maize was allowed in the arid region and between contiguous communal areas, the GMB remaining a residual buyer at a set floor price. The subsidy was removed from refined maize meal. The lifting of the subsidy and allowing smallholders direct access to urban markets resulted in a rapid expansion in the number of small milling companies. By 1993, prices and domestic markets were decontrolled for all commodities except maize and wheat. Maize marketing and prices were fully decontrolled on the domestic market by 1996, although the GMB remained the sole importer and exporter of maize, granting licences for trade on its behalf. Maize trading throughout the country was freed and all subsidies removed. The main advantages were that private traders paid instantly, collected the grain, and offered packing and grading services. In 1995, traders offered double that paid by the GMB in early 1996. Cotton farmers benefited from the intense competition between three large traders (Cottco, Cargill and Cotpro) to purchase the cotton crop and prices rose despite relatively low international prices. Despite the lifting of subsidies, real selling prices of maize were slightly lower than they had been before the reforms. Poor consumers benefited from the decontrol both nutritionally and financially.


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These highly beneficial reforms at GMB, especially for the poor, were systematically undone as the government sought to assert its control over food as a political weapon. It began in 1997 with the designation of 1471 farms that reduced maize supplies and caused a severe food deficit. This, together with inefficiencies at the GMB, lowered the prices paid to producers. Eventually, the GMB’s inability to compete with the private sector and replenish stocks contributed to the food riot in 1998. Large millers were again subsidised, not only giving them an unfair advantage over the small-scale millers, but maize prices soared. This gave government an excuse to reintroduce price controls on roller meal in 1999. In July 2001, Statutory Instrument 235A of 2001 was introduced declaring maize, maize products, wheat and wheat products controlled products within Zimbabwe. This made it illegal to buy, sell or move these products within Zimbabwe other than to the GMB. ZIMACE, the commodity exchange, was officially suspended. These restrictions were further tightened in December 2001 with the gazetting of Statutory Instrument 387. Grain farmers were compelled to deliver maize and grain stocks no later than 14 days after harvest. In early 2002, the holding of all grain stocks by farmers was banned and grain supplies were seized, leaving the livestock industry and farm workers facing disaster. Even some smallholder farmers had grain stock seized and all existing grain contracts were cancelled.2 The privatisation of the Cotton Marketing Board and the Dairy Marketing Board both proved successful. Although they are unlikely to revert to their former status, they have still been subject to government price controls. The senior management of Dairiboard Ltd were arrested for allegedly increasing prices without government permission. The cautionary tale is that while government can have a ‘light touch’ regulatory role, there is a temptation for governments to use the monopoly power of parastatals for flagrantly political purposes, such as subsidies in the guise of poverty reduction and equity concerns. In the case of the current regime, opaque bureaucratic procedures, political interference and privileged licensing has severely distorted the market to enrich a coterie of the ruling elite. Any monopoly and restraints on production, marketing or trade, including granting the Cold Storage Company exclusive rights to export beef, must be questioned. Was there any compelling reason why the GMB remained the sole importer and exporter of maize – even after liberation of maize marketing in the 1990s? Is there any reason why cotton producers should subsidise the cotton industry by selling its produce more cheaply locally, rather than exporting it at a larger profit. There has always been the argument that we should add value to our raw materials through manufacturing, but it should not be an the expense of farmers and protecting inefficient industries. There is a need to revisit the arrangement with government to reserve 25 percent to 30 percent of the total intake for

2 K. Muir-Leresche and C. Muchopa (2006) Agricultural Marketing. In Rukuni, et al. Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution Revisited. UZ.


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the local market at a regulated price, as this represents a tax on farmers. It is therefore incumbent on any incoming government to ensure a competitive pricing environment that creates conditions conducive to investment. Irrigation Initially the development of irrigation was slow, but some far reaching amendments to the Water Act, together with low interest bearing loans for the development of on-farm water storage facilities to encourage wheat production, resulted in the rapid development of Zimbabwe’s water resources. The impact of irrigation on crop production has been considerable, in many cases increasing yields by 50 to 60 percent, particularly in the marginal rainfall areas of the country where wheat and barley are grown during the dry winter months. Sanctions during the UDI era and the need to diversify production resulted in the rapid growth of the wheat industry – an entirely winter-irrigated crop – to the extent that, save for the hard wheat required for gristing purposes, the country became self-sufficient in wheat production (about 385,000 tonnes) by the late 1990’s. Further, about 12,000 hectares of barley were grown each year in the Midlands Province, mostly under contract to the brewing industry for malting purposes. In 1960 approximately 20,000 hectares of farmland were under irrigation. Development of this sector was spurred by the building of Lake Mutirikwe in the mid to late 1950s and the growth of the low-veld sugar industry, which now irrigates about 40,000 to 45,000 hectares for this crop. This had expanded to 130,000 hectares hectares in 1980 and to 145,000 hectares by 2000. With the growth in irrigation, the manufacturing and retail supply side rapidly followed suit, with the provision of pipes, pumps, motors, sprinklers, and, latterly, fully mechanized centre pivot units. At peak production in the late 1990’s, 185,000 hectares of crops under large scale irrigation were as follows: Sugar 45,000 hectares Wheat 70,000 hectares Barley 12,000 hectares Tobacco 25,000 hectares Maize and Soyabeans 15,000 hectares Horticulture/ Tree Nuts 8,000 hectares Coffee and Deciduous Fruit 10,000 hectares. (NB: There is some double counting here because summer supplementary and full winter irrigation was often on the same land.)


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Because of the semi arid conditions in Zimbabwe, coupled with periodic droughts, irrigation plays an important role in improving rural livelihoods. In order to optimise productive water use, smallholders should produce high value crops. Apart from developing reliable technical systems for harnessing water resources, markets need to be developed. More efficacious institutions and systems of management are also needed for the efficient operation and maintenance of smallholder schemes. Corporate-smallholder partnerships hold considerable promise in a commercial arrangement where smallholders provide their land, water and labour for production, while companies provide the finance (credit for inputs), technology (cultivars and techniques), and processing and marketing facilities for the commodity. The success of these commercial outgrower schemes have been tried and tested in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Before Kondozi (a horticultural exporting firm) was nationalised and stripped of its assets, it had established a model smallholder outgrower scheme in the semi-arid Marange communal area. Smallholders, companies, NGOs, the government and international agencies should come together and form ‘smart partnerships’ to promote corporate-smallholder irrigation schemes. The infrastructure for large-scale irrigation is largely still in place, though it will require extensive refurbishing. Many of the centre pivot systems have been dismantled and are in storage, but can be quickly brought back into service. Many of the boreholes have been vandalized, with pumps and motors stolen, but these can be replaced. Much of the movable piping has been vandalized or destroyed, but it too can be replaced. The Biri Dam project, a private sector development in the Mashonaland West Province, did not come into production as the landowners involved were displaced through the fast track land reform programme. This system, with minimal further development, offers a further 15,000 ha of irrigable potential. The full potential, with existing water resources in the country, is about 80,000 ha to 90,000 ha of full irrigation, excluding the lowveld sugar producing areas. Industry estimates that recovery in this sector could, therefore, be rapid with full production resuming in as little as two seasons and further expansion within 5 years thereafter. Seed Zimbabwe’s maize breeding programme started in the early 1930’s with the pioneering work of government plant breeders, H. C. Arnold and Alan Rattray. The first single hybrid (SR 52) was released in the late 1940’s and revolutionised maize production in the country. Since then considerable progress has been made in the areas of drought resistance, disease and pest tolerance, lodging, growing season length and agronomic features, resulting in continually increasing yield potential in a number of locally bred commercial and food crops, notably soya beans, cotton, wheat and barley, groundnuts, sorghum and others.


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Only relatively recently has the private sector developed its own breeding programmes. Emphasis now is on three-way hybrids (maize) and developing crops more tolerant of marginal rainfall growing conditions in the communal areas. Seed production is largely controlled by three seed houses: Pannar Seeds, Pioneer Hybrids and The Seed Company. Of these, The Seed Company has accounted for about 80 percent of production. There are also a number of smaller companies now selling open pollinated varieties because of the shortage of hybrids. The seed houses relied largely on production from certified commercial seed growers. This was carefully controlled and monitored by the Seed Maize Growers Association (a co-operative of growers for The Seed Co), with regular inspection by agents of the breeders and the seed inspectors from the Branch of Seed Services in the former Department of Research and Specialist Services (now Arex) of the Ministry of Agriculture. Zimbabwe needs to grow produce 1,8 million tonnes of maize annually to feed the nation and service the livestock industry. Of this, commercial farmers grew about 700,000 tonnes. Smallholder farmers produced the remainder (of over a million tonnes), selling any excess maize that was surplus to their requirements. This production level required about 35,000 tonnes of certified hybrid seed maize. Before 2000, the seed houses produced adequate seed for the country’s needs, as well as an annual reserve of about 15,000 tonnes. Any production in excess of these requirements was exported. Since 2000, seed production has fallen short of national requirements and has had to be imported from Zambia, where The Seed Company has relocated to maintain continuity of supply. About 8,000 to 10,000 tonnes of seed was imported last year (2005), on behalf of the government for its input programme for new farmers; but lack of payment to the company by the Government has placed further imports in jeopardy. Following a delivery of only 12,000 tonnes from growers in 2002/03, the companies embarked on a drive to increase production through incentive pricing and expanding the grower base. Deliveries for 2006 are therefore expected to reach 22,000 tonnes. While the number of local growers has increased (currently about 300) the production from the established commercial seed growers has declined. Overall, however, yields have dropped and the number of rejected crops has risen as new growers still lack the experience and expertise in clean seed production. The government expects to require 45,000 tonnes of seed maize, although current estimates suggest that, if the government dispenses with the input programme for new farmers, as publicly stated, it seems unlikely that all the seed produced in the current year will be sold. This could mean seed remaining in storage, productive land lying idle, and the government having to import food to stave off hunger.


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Fertilizer At peak production levels in the late 1990s, Zimbabwe used about 550,000 tonnes of fertilizer annually. Two main companies, Windmill Fertilizers and the Zimbabwe Fertilizer Corporation (ZFC), produced the bulk of this fertilizer, on an approximately equal basis. A third company (Omnia Fertilizers) imports a limited amount of manufactured product, mainly from South Africa. Ammonium nitrate, used as a straight nitrogenous fertilizer or in blends, is produced solely by Sable Chemicals, based in the Midlands. Although it has the capacity to produce 240,000 tonnes annually, it is currently operating at about 30 percent of capacity. This is due to foreign exchange constraints, power shortages (the process is a rather antiquated electrolysis process and the basic nitrogen source is imported as anhydrous ammonia) and other economic constraints. Phosphate production is controlled entirely by Chemplex Corporation, which is owned by government. Chemplex, at capacity, can produce up to 45,000 tonnes of phosphates annually, using sulphuric acid to dissolve the phosphate from raw rock phosphate mined at Dorowa, in the east of the country. The raw material is railed to the industrial plant at Masasa in Harare for the extraction process. The phosphate fertilizer is blended by ZFC and Windmill or sold as straight fertilizer in the form of single or double super-phosphate. The company is currently producing at about 50 to 60 percent of capacity. The imported components for manufacturing fertilizer – mainly anhydrous ammonia, sulphuric acid and potash – require about US$55 million annually. The fertilizer companies have been unable to secure foreign exchange either for these materials or to maintain plant and equipment. They are also subject to government price controls, thus cutting into profits for reinvestment. Ironically, although production in the industry may be reduced to 50 or 60 percent of former levels, in the absence of a government farm input programme for new farmers in the coming growing season, company officials are not confident of being able to sell all that is produced. To increase the provision of inputs, networks of rural traders should be encouraged. Credit could be provided to approved traders on a temporary basis Financial support: seasonal, capital and land loans

Zimbabwe’s financial services were well developed with the agricultural portfolio amounting to about 40 percent of the business transacted by major banks. Since 2000, Zimbabwe’s hyper-inflation has seen interest rates reach more than 500 percent per annum in 2006, thus constraining capital development for agricultural


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production. This makes it necessary to implement macro-economic stability measures to reduce the cost of borrowing to increase investment in agriculture. The government’s policy of subsidising inputs to small farmers and new farmers is unsustainable. The scheme has not only been abused, but it is also a drain on the fiscus and it has created an unhealthy dependency syndrome. The government itself is now the largest consumer of agricultural inputs, while the recovery of these input costs from farmers has been minimal. One of the major constraints for increased production by smallholders is their inability to borrow money. Farmers lack the collateral to receive loans from lending institutions. The government should set in motion a process that registers agricultural land in the communal areas. This process, however, will take many years. In the meantime, innovative ways should be found to improve savings and access to credit. While micro-credit schemes have an intuitive appeal, the very high transaction costs and high default rate make them unsustainable – either commercially or through non-government agencies. One of the key roles of the banking sector is to provide loans and financial services, based on the farmers’ experience, qualifications and acceptable forms of collateral, in a transparent and professional manner. Commercial banks could also manage donor contributions for support to smallholders and settlers who do not have collateral, but who meet other criteria for loans. 7.2 Government support Rebuild the organisational and institutional capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture After Independence, there was a significant increase in expenditure on social services, especially in the communal areas, which had previously been neglected. Inevitably, as the size of the public service grew to serve a needy population, so a greater proportion of government funds were allocated to employing a growing number of civil servants. By the late 1980s, it was evident that expenditure was outstripping revenues, and that a burgeoning budget deficit and inflationary pressures were unsustainable. Finance ministers stressed the need to reduce expenditure and the budget deficit, and to reform and reduce the size of the civil service. These pleas, however, fell on deaf ears. Over time, the proportion of the civil service wage bill increased as a proportion of government expenditure. In other words, the efficiency of the civil service was impaired as shortages of productive resources became ever more acute. This applied particularly to the Ministry of Agriculture where extension officers were office-bound for lack of transport and communications. In future, the government must rebalance the proportion of funds allocated to ministry salaries and to other resources within a process of reducing government expenditure


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generally. This means refocusing on the ministry’s core responsibilities and working closely with the private sector in matters such as research, training, extension and developing new and appropriate technologies. Similarly, the government should work more strategically with international agencies and NGOs.

Develop an efficacious agricultural regulatory framework One of the key problems in Zimbabwe is over-regulation. A farmer wanting to grow a particular crop is faced by a labyrinth of regulations: having to register to grow the crop; applying for foreign exchange to import inputs; accepting a controlled price by politicians and bureaucrats; selling to a designated government parastatal; paying a levy for research or to a marketing association; seeking permission to import materials or export their produce, etc. The government must free itself of a controlling mentality. It is not just that these controls increase government expenditure – which it cannot afford (see above) – but each time a producer has to seek permission from a ‘gate-keeper’, a potential source of corruption is created. What justice was served, for example, by a law that allows policemen to confiscate maize from some of the poorest farmers? A regulatory framework must allow producers the greater choice in terms of production and sale of commodities to enhance their livelihoods. Every control, restriction, law and regulation that constrains the freedom of choice must be carefully weighed and considered – in terms of costs both to the producer and the nation. In principle, the chief role of the Ministry of Agriculture should be to regulate the industry, rather than compete with the private sector by involving itself in productive activities – as ARDA does. The ministry might even devolve special independent status on research institutions and training centres so that they can enter into agreements with the private sector or with international agencies in their own right. The prime concern of the ministry is to provide quality and excellence, rather than simply exercising control over more tatty institutions that require ever-expanding budgets. Review agricultural boards and parastatal organisations The marketing of the main agricultural commodities, through government controlled marketing boards, had for many years been a stabilizing influence on production through sound pricing strategies. They successfully promoted exports, particularly of beef, cotton, coffee, tobacco, pork and dairy products, while the private sector promoted and developed the export of ostriches and crocodile skins, horticulture products and cut flowers, paprika, tea, timber, tree nuts, sugar and a host of minor products. Today, however, the various parastatals, not least the Grain Marketing Board, operate in an opaque business environment, where there is little transparency, and where corruption thrives as a powerful ruling elite do deals for their own enrichment. There is therefore a


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need to establish an independent judicial commission to make an in-depth investigation into all parastatal organisations, to re-establish management control, transparency, financial probity, and to make public their reports. Criminal charges should be brought against anyone who has illegally or corruptly siphoned off funds, and any moneys should be recouped from those proven guilty. No privatisation should take place before such investigations and before these parastatals are properly managed. Joseph Stiglitz’s account of privatisation in Russia in his book, Globalisation and its Discontents, provides a stark warning of how premature privatisation can see state assets fall into the hands of oligarchs, who would not think twice about stripping national assets to become instant billionaires. The next step is to clearly define the role and functions of the parastals to determine whether they should be reformed and commercialised, privatised, or simply abolished. There would be little argument that the Agriculture and Development Authority should be abolished and companies, such as Chemplex, should be privatised. If they are to be privatised, it should only be done in a completely fair and transparent manner, and in a manner in which all citizens may participate and benefit, as Britain did with the privatisation of British Telecoms. If it is decided that the GMB should operate on commercial principles, but undertake non-commercial functions, then these should be financed in an explicit and transparent fashion from the national budget. The social function may include the GMB being required to maintain a network of buying and supplying depots throughout the country and to act as a residual buyer of food grains and oil seed. The GMB may also be required to manage the food-security strategy, relying on forward market operations and strategic financial planning rather than maintaining expensive physical stocks of food grains. Where possible, private organisations, such as ZIMACE, should act as marketing agents to ensure producers receive prices that are closer to the world price for their produce. Rebuild and develop infrastructure: water (irrigation), roads, energy To reverse the massive collapse in farming infrastructure, the government should encourage public–private partnerships to finance and rehabilitate irrigation systems, electricity connections, storage and curing facilities, communication and general farming equipment in commercial farming areas. The objective is to restore infrastructure to a fully operational level within two seasons. The lack of infrastructure in the communal areas is one of the main reasons for the low profitability of agriculture for smallholders. Small farmers simply do not have the incentive to increase production if they cannot transport their goods to markets. Because of poor infrastructure, the transaction costs are high. This in turn leads to wide marketing margins. Public works programmes are usually considered to deliver two main benefits: they offer short-term income to vulnerable households and they create rural infrastructure, such as roads, electricity and water supplies. The main constraint to these


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public programmes is that they are so notoriously inefficient that they are perfect advertisements for privatisation. It may be far more economical to simply make food handouts and provide social services through normal tender channels to provide safety nets for the poor. 7.3 Smart partnerships Research Sophisticated crop breeding programmes provided some of the most productive varieties of crops for both commercial and food use, which were well adapted to various local conditions of variable rainfall and the hazards of pests and diseases. Over time, budget constraints have seen a continual decline and under-investment in Zimbabwe’s once proud research institutions. Current expenditure on agricultural research as a proportion of agricultural GDP (a measure of research intensity) is less than 0.2 percent, which is less than half the Africa region’s average of about 0.75 percent, and one third of other developing countries. In addition, the responsiveness and relevance of these services to client demands is found wanting. A number of semi-private research institutions, such as the Rattray-Arnold research centre into seed production, have made important contributions to new technologies. Most government research institutions have been dragged down by the general economic collapse and by being hide-bound by government regulations. If these research institutions became semi-autonomous organisations, which could recruit and adequately compensate seasoned researchers, and enter into agreements with the private sector, international donor and research organisations, their contributions to agriculture and the economy as a whole could be vastly improved. Training A high standard of agricultural training was achieved through both state and private institutes, colleges and the universities, at the certificate, diploma and graduate level. The government, in partnership with the private sector and international agencies, should expand and upgrade all agricultural training institutions in the country, transforming these into independent farmer-trainer entities, as opposed to their more limited function of producing extension officers. Agricultural training institutions will be placed under independent councils selected from the agricultural industry. The objective is to ensure that there are adequate numbers of trained personnel to take up the many opportunities that should be created in the farming sector by an agricultural recovery programme and an agrarian reform programme.


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Extension services The government should provide basic extension services to all farming communities through a system of extension agents who will work with local farm communities and research establishments. Particular regard will be paid to extension services in small-scale, resettlement and communal-farming areas. Private-sector firms with an interest in the agricultural industry will be encouraged to support extension services. Extension will not just be focused on production, but will start from the marketing side, helping farmers to identify the most profitable crops to produce.


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8. Agricultural Recovery Programme 8.1 Objectives The objective of this proposal is to achieve recovery and a sustained agricultural growth rate of least 5 percent per annum primarily through land reform that protects property rights and transforms small scale subsistence farming to commercial agriculture. This transformation should be led by the private sector through an enabling environment that enhances the productivity and profitability of agriculture. In particular, policy and public expenditure should encourage private sector investment in the agriculture sector. Core features of the strategy are to strengthen public-private collaboration across all levels of the sector. Priorities include the creation of a favourable environment for commercial activities; improving delivery of agricultural support services; greater efficiency in functioning of input and commodity markets; and strengthening the institutional and regulatory framework for agriculture. This section examines the prospects for recovery across a range of agricultural commodities produced in Zimbabwe. It then suggests recovery measures that range from the immediate need to increase food production to the long-term development of infrastructure and the transformation of the communal areas. The policy and programmes are categorised into three time horizons, immediate (first 100 days), the short term (1-3 years) and the long term. It also includes strategies for food security and poverty reduction. 8.2 Prospects for Recovery When time estimates are given for agricultural recovery, the response is usually premised on “if certain conditions are met”. Top of the list is the rule or law and protection of property rights. Recovery will then depend primarily on selecting new farmers with the commitment, skills and experience – master farmers, ex-farm workers and managers, college graduates and full-time black commercial farmers – and how quickly their productivity can be raised. And, it will depend on the response of the international community to help us rebuild agriculture. The estimated time recovery given below for various commodities assumes that these three basic conditions are met. Recovery is not a single guestimate for the industry. One of the interesting findings has been the wide variability in the ability of different sectors to recover. Tea, at one end of the scale, seems to have shown a slight increase in production; at the other, the beef industry could take between 15 and 20 years to recover. In this section we give estimates of how long various commodities may take to recover. Commodities largely unaffected by the fast track programme


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If the World Bank’s estimates are anything to go by, tea production suddenly doubled in 2004 and 2005, and grew by an incredible 64 percent since 2000.3 Our figures (p.32) suggest a discernable but more modest increase of about 10%. For the tea industry it has been, fortuitously, business as usual. The pig industry has also got off relatively lightly. As pork production is an intensive, pen-fed process, the main difficulty experienced by producers is securing adequate supplies of stock feed. Production has largely remained market directed. This is likely to apply in the future as well. As demand picks up and as people’s disposable income rises, recovery of breeding numbers should be rapid due to pigs’ high reproductive rate. Short term recovery (1 – 3 years) The World Bank has tended to ignore the estimates of international agencies and economists, which estimated that about 900,000 tonnes of maize would be produced in 2004/05. The Bank, as a sop to government, estimated that production would be 1.3 million tonnes. The actual production, as the Bank’s own figures show, was only 750,000 tonnes. For 2006, the Bank stuck with the same estimate of 1.3 million tonnes, when production was only 945,000 tonnes. 1990s Average 2006 % Communal areas 1,000,000 720,000 72 Commercial farms 670,000 225,000 33 TOTAL 1,670,000 945,000 56 The fall in communal area production is probably due to the difficulty of buying inputs. And, under the current occupation of commercial farms by those who are neither trained nor experienced, production is likely to remain depressed at or around 1 million per annum. All the money the government throws into giving free inputs to these farmers will not work. The 99-years leases will not serve as collateral, so there is little chance of agricultural funding outside government. As the government’s cupboard is bare, it might stop funding inputs (as it has threatened). In this case, there is probably sufficient seed maize and fertilizer available. On the other hand, if it again decides to fund inputs for settlers, it may resort to the printing press again, thus keeping the inflationary spiral surging upward, while the economy sinks further. As government buys up inputs for its supporters, other farmers – especially those in communal areas – will find it difficult to secure inputs.

3 World Bank (2006) Agricultural Growth and Land Reform in Zimbabwe (Table 8.2, p.68)


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With annual consumption of at least 1,8m tonnes, Zimbabwe will have to import about 850,000 to 1 million tonnes in 2007. The government will import half a million tonnes itself, while relying on the international community – which the government vilifies – to feed the most vulnerable and hungry. Yet, recovery in maize production could be rapid. The country has the capacity to produce sufficient seed and fertilizer to grow enough maize to feed the country and supply foodstuffs for livestock. If proper full time farmers are put back on the land, the country could be fully self-sufficient within two or three seasons. Cotton could also make a reasonably rapid recovery. The smallholder sector produced 260,000 tonnes of cotton in 2006, about 15 percent below previous levels, whereas commercial production slumped from 76,000 tonnes in 1998 to almost nothing, giving an overall reduction of about one third from pre-2000 levels. Recovery of production from commercial farms could be rapid, but the decision whether to grow cotton will be market lead – underlining the need to review subsidies on supplies to domestic industry. The smallholder sector also can expand production when inflation and the persistent shortages of inputs, transport and fuel are resolved. Soya bean production is down from 126,000 tonnes to 48,000 tonnes, but much of this production loss could be recovered within a few seasons – in line with the recovery of maize. There is adequate combine-harvester capacity to deal with a full crop as there is no clash with wheat production (as the latter is harvested in the spring before soyas are planted). Although dairy production enjoys a degree of political protection from farm seizures, output has fallen by about 50 percent because a quarter of the dairies went out of production, and because much of the grazing for dairy herds has been lost to settlers. (Some dairy farmers have only been permitted to keep their homes and parlours and feed their animals on purchased stock feed). Yet, despite its depressed state, the infrastructure required for recovery is still largely in place, but is in much need of refurbishment. Thus an immediate recovery could commence with the correct feeding of animals, attention to animal health matters, and the refurbishment of plant and equipment. This could raise production by 25 percent to 30 percent in the short term. Recovery thereafter would have to come from an increased numbers of cows in milk and improved breeding and selection to meet growing demand. Full recovery would take about 7 years. Medium term recovery (3 – 5 years) The recovery of wheat production is really dependent on the rehabilitation of irrigation equipment. While much of the movable irrigation equipment has been stolen and


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vandalised, the infrastructure for large-scale irrigation is mostly still intact; though it will require extensive refurbishing. Some of the centre pivot systems have been dismantled and are in storage, and could be brought back into service. Boreholes have been vandalized, with pumps and motors stolen, and much of the movable piping has been vandalized or destroyed, but these too can be replaced. The Biri Dam project, a private sector development in the Mashonaland West Province, did not come into production as the landowners involved were displaced by the fast track land reform programme. This system, with minimal further development, offers a further 15,000 ha of irrigable potential. It has been estimated that recovery in this sector could see full production resuming within two or three seasons and further expansion within 5 years thereafter. Average yields of between 90,000 tonnes and 100,000 tonnes of fresh cane per hectare have declined to about 30,000 tonnes per hectare under resettlement. Industry estimates that recovery of production could be achieved within two or three seasons – given the necessary conditions (unlikely) – and following considerable refurbishment of the infrastructure related to the irrigation and services of the former commercial sector (roads, canals, pumps piping etc). Five years is more likely. Many of the citrus orchards, from which the owners have been displaced, are still in place. Though neglected, they could soon be put back in production with the appropriate treatment and management. The Beit Bridge citrus producers and the Mazowe Estates are still in operation and could provide the nucleus of material during the recovery process. Given considerable refurbishment of infrastructure, particularly green houses, pack houses and irrigation equipment, together with the retention of existing skills and experience, recovery is possible in three to five years. This would obviously require some intensive training and extension efforts to bring new producers up to standard. On the horticultural side, the small-scale growers’ share of production could conceivably increase to 50 percent, hence increasing production within a relatively short time of five to seven years – again, given appropriate training, extension, research and market development. Long term recovery (5 – 15 years) Because the specialised nature of tobacco production requires considerable experience and skills to produce successfully, full recovery in the industry will depend largely on the number of experienced growers who are prepared to come back into production, as well as on the level and intensity of training new growers. It may be possible that within 5 years the country could produce 120,000 tonnes of tobacco. Further expansion to the pre-2000 level of 200,000 tonnes could take another 10 years. The possibilities of promoting and expanding air-cured tobacco should be investigated, as it does not require expensive


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fuel to cure and it is suited to small-scale production where open air-cured barns are relatively easily constructed. The other major casualty of the fast track programme was the decimation of the commercial beef herd and its seed stock. Due to low off-take levels from the communal areas, the Cold Storage Company is operating at about 20 percent of capacity. The beef industry is in disarray with many foot and mouth fences destroyed. Alarmingly, the beef industry estimates that recovery will take 15 to 20 years. Coffee is in intensive care. Processing capacity at The Zimbabwe Coffee Mill of 25,000 tonnes annually could cope happily with annual production of 13 tonnes, but is hardly economic for the 2 tonnes now produced. Plantations have been cut down to make way for traditional crops, while others have suffered considerable neglect. As the crop matures slowly, recovery remains precarious. 8.3 The first 100 days

Any new government must hit the ground running by implementing a two-track programme that represents two sides of the same coin: one for agriculture, the other for land. Agriculture The first priority is for food security and nutrition. An emergency food programme will be needed to relieve hunger and to avert the dangers of starvation with the assistance of international agencies and NGOs. During this emergency period, those who are most vulnerable – infants, children, the elderly and those living with HIV/AIDS – will be attended to first. In tandem with this general relief aid, the government should initiate small-scale nutritional welfare projects for the most vulnerable members of society. The next is to restore macro-economic stability to bring inflation and interest rates down, and stabilise foreign exchange rates. If pre-planting prices are to be announced as an incentive to immediately get food production going, and if the country is to earn desperately needed foreign exchange, then farmers must have confidence that their efforts will be justly rewarded. This will set the stage to announce incentive prices for agricultural production through a well-conceived pricing and marketing strategy. With this production incentive in mind, the incoming administration should prepare a detailed farm input delivery plan for communal farmers to stimulate food production. Maize production packs should be made available in a single one-off programme to get food production on its feet and to reward rural producers. The resulting multiplier effects will help regenerate growth in the rural areas. Mindful, however, that those farmers in


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areas of low agro-climatic potential are unlikely to benefit much, other approaches should also be considered to benefit the poor in semi-arid areas. There are also many others who, because of the collapse of the economy, are destitute, especially those headed by women or the elderly caring for AIDS orphans. As these households may not be able to respond to agricultural support initiatives, safety nets, such as food aid, will still prove necessary. A similar plan must be prepared for an emergency food production programme in the former commercial areas. The Land Commission should work with the various farmers’ organisations to identify all those farms whose ownership is undisputed so that black and white commercial farmers who have title and whose farms are relatively intact can re-engage farm workers to get production underway. These farmers will be the first to receive soft loans to get crops in the ground, especially maize to feed the people and to build up food stocks. This will help agriculture finds its feet before it begins to diversity into export earning crops. Land The first priority of government is to restore the rule of law and protect property rights, as well as the personal security of all farmers. Confidence in the police must be restored by enforcing discipline and professionalism in the force and cracking down hard on elements that have bought the force into disrepute. In restoring law and order, the government must invoke stiff penalties against anyone breaking the law, raiding farms or interfering with agricultural production. At the same time, the new government must establish a legal framework that defines agricultural land rights and ownership. This must immediately repeal certain sections of the constitution: Constitutional Amendment No.13 that denies citizens their constitutional right to a fair hearing in an independent and impartial court involving land-related matters; Constitutional Amendment No.16 (Section 16A) that denies Zimbabwean citizens their constitutional right to compensation for land based on their race; and Constitutional Amendment No. 17 that nationalises agricultural land and removes citizens’ right to own agricultural land. Indeed, anything that is inimical to our constitutional, human and property rights must be struck off the statute books. Legislation that must be reviewed includes the Gazetted Land Act and the Acquisition of Farm Equipment Act. The entire Land Acquisition Act, especially the amendments of 2003, has to be reviewed – paragraph by paragraph – and stripped of any content inconsistent with a just, transparent and sustainable land reform programme. The reviewing of these laws and the drafting of new Agricultural Land Bill should be done now – before the transfer of power to a new government. The new law will establish a Land Commission. The Commission’s first task will be to get those commercial farms, whose ownership and legitimacy is undisputed into operation. It should gradually work with those classes of farms where the issues are relatively easy to resolve to get them up and running. The more difficult ones – where


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ownership is disputed and where settlers are more established – will have to wait for the findings of the audit. While illegal settlers will not receive handouts, they will not be prevented from farming. In order to make the best use of land while the land audit is underway, they will be considered de facto farmers until their cases are heard. The land audit of settlement and production on former commercial farms will be undertaken in conjunction with a detailed legal study to establish a basis for future ownership and land rights. The new Agricultural Land Act will also bring into operation the Rural Development Fund through which government and international donor funds can be channelled for the financing of land acquisition and compensation, settlement, infrastructural development, and to help farmers acquire land, equipment, inputs and services. The mechanics of this process should be outlined before a new government comes to power. 8.4 Short and medium term measures Build up national and household food security systems In a democratic society everyone has a fundamental entitlement to sufficient food. To eliminate the threat of malnutrition and starvation, the government needs to build up food security systems that encourage market solutions to fund, store, distribute and trade food reserves. At times of drought-induced shortages, food distribution to achieve acceptable nutritional standards will be a fundamental principle of ensuring household food security. Rehabilitation of farm workers For all its socialist rhetoric, the ruling party cast aside more than 200,000 farm workers, destroying their livelihoods and the welfare of their families. Yet, over many years, they acquired a range of skills in crop production, the use of agricultural machinery, repair and maintenance of equipment, and the use of agricultural chemicals. Some workers were drivers, technicians, clerks and foremen. These skills will be vital to revive agriculture. They all have a role to play, either as new farmers, small scale artisans providing services to farmers, or returning to work on commercial farms for a decent wage. The imperative is to rebuild the lives of farm-workers and their families by rehabilitating their accommodation, refurbishing their schools and clinics, and resuscitating the early child education centres. As agriculture gets moving, incentives, such as training programmes, should be created to encourage farm-workers to enhance their commercial agricultural skills and earnings. Selection of settlers


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Without genuine farmers on the land, who have demonstrated their commitment, skills and farming experience, the agricultural revolution required to boost the economy will not happen. An administratively rigorous, patently transparent and hard-nosed approach of selecting the best farmers must be operating as soon as information from the land audit allows. As Zimbabwe’s future rests on this process, it should be placed under judicial review and parliamentary oversight. Liberalise the production and marketing of agricultural commodities There is no reason why a central agency like the GMB should dictate why a producer cannot sell his own produce to another at an agreed price, usually through a local market. The liberalisation of maize marketing in the 1990s particularly benefited the rural poor, as well as the rural millers. Prices were reduced to the poorest living in the remotest areas by savings on bureaucracy and transport. The maize, cotton, seed maize and dairy industries are all examples where the opening up of competition has driven producer prices up and kept consumer prices in check far more effectively than any price control ever could. Unless the state can demonstrate that it has a strong case for regulating the production and marketing of agricultural commodities, it should let markets signals inform individual decisions about what to grow and how much to grow. Review the role and functions of parastatal organisations It is doubtful whether any other organisations have been as great a drain on the economy as government parastatal organisations and their advisory boards, whose coffers have been raided and their procedures abused for the enrichment of the few. The liberalisation of markets should therefore go hand-in-hand with a review of parastatals to determine whether they should be dissolved, reformed or privatised. If they are privatised, then every citizen should be encouraged to participate in an unequivocally transparent process. Where parastatals are to remain in government hands, there must be overwhelming evidence to justify the decision. Vague excuses such as ‘national security’ or ‘in the national interest’ will not suffice. The basic principle is that government should simply keep an eye on the markets, intervening only when necessary and then only with the lightest of touches. Develop smart partnerships for research, training and extension Research is a key component of technological change and productivity gains in agriculture. The despair felt by researchers as their resources from government eventually dwindled to nought is palpable. The government has a responsibility to promote research. In doing so it should look for partners both locally and abroad to fund and staff research institutions. Commodity councils or associations should be brought in to find out what


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research their members want and would be prepared to pay for. Should we be researching the production of small grain crops in semi-arid regions or indigenous breeding stock? We should not simply suppose such research is ‘a good thing’, but assess the ‘economic’ demand for research from the farmers themselves. This is the essence of demand-led research. We should also invite donors to support their researchers to work with ours, creating a cross fertilisation of ideas and techniques that will invigorate our research. Finally, we need to see agricultural research it a broader context, especially the need to study economic and social systems that trap people in poverty and examine how institutional change might extricate them from it. We need to move away from the traditional systems of training and extension where we find a single desolate, underpaid and de-motivated extension worker living in a remote area doing little except wait for his next pay cheque. We should be thinking of how to link up with the private sector to change people’s behaviour and improve their living by using technological innovations, from improved seeds and fertiliser to machines and techniques, which go towards improving smallholder productivity and livelihoods. Reducing poverty by commercialising smallholder agriculture What hope can we bring to poor families by considering them to be subsistence farmers, who grow only food to feed their families? The poor need to enter the commercial world to specialise and trade, and to earn enough to contribute to their own well-being: from a wider variety of nutritious food and clean water, to improved housing, schooling and health care. Large and well-resourced horticultural and cotton companies have found it profitable to engage smallholders to produce commodities on a contract or outgrower basis, bringing the benefits of high-value crops to smallholders. This can be extended to many other relatively high value crops, such as forestry, tobacco, ostrich farming and others. 8.5 Long term programme for structural transformation The long term objective – which is rooted in the present – is the dissolution of the dual economy which has plagued Zimbabwe for the last century. Over time, perhaps decades, big farms should be scaled down and the very small communal plots should be scaled up, so that there is equilibrium between productivity increases (intensity of production) and increased earning (scale of production). This change in the scale and size of farming should not be determined by administrative fiat, but by a combination of a land market and a land tax. Scaling up plot sizes in communal areas


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Under the current communal system of tenure there is no mechanism to increase the size of a household’s plot – irrespective if the family size, their resourcefulness or their means to buy land. However, commercialisation requires flexibility in farm size to optimise production. As such, the development of the communal areas requires a change in the tenure system to develop a land market. A land market, which should eventually cover all agricultural land, requires gradual institutional changes in the communal tenure system. This will not work by using the heavy hand of a centralised bureaucracy to ‘reorganise’ land use. Rather, it must be based on the choices made by the people themselves, and in ways in which communal farmers can control the pace and direction of change, within an overall legal and regulatory framework. The enormity of the task should not be underestimated if this process is to be done in an efficient step-by-step manner. It is not a simple matter of “giving people title”. It requires a high level of land administration, detailed record keeping, cadastral surveys and conveyance, as well as a growing understanding by farmers of the risks as well as the benefits of using land as collateral. For this reason, the process should start with pilot programmes involving pockets of relatively high value communal land where land rental and sales are already taking place. It also requires a safety mechanism against poor households being exploited, losing their land, and being left destitute. At least initially, upper limits on communal farm sizes may be necessary. Scaling down large scale farms The mechanism by which to scale down large farms is to remove legal restrictions that disallow their subdivision, and the use of a land tax. The Rukuni Commission recommended removing restrictions on subdivision in 1994, but it was never acted upon by the government. Caution is, however, necessary. It will not serve any useful purpose to subdivide land into plots that are so small that they are uneconomic. In this case, minimum farm sizes will still be necessary. The land tax does two things: it increases the cost of holding land and therefore acts as an incentive to use it productively; and it reduces the market value of land, making it more affordable for those genuinely interested in farming to buy farms. The downside of the land tax is that it can become such an administrative burden, that its revenue collecting attributes may be lost. It should therefore be as simple as possible and start with only the larger farms. A simple ‘insurance’ method of land tax is one possibility that should be investigated. Industrialisation is a sine qua non for the success of agricultural transformation One of the most robust stylised facts of economic development is the decreasing proportion of a country’s labour force engaged in primary industries, such as farming. In most European countries, for example, less than 8 percent of the population are farmers.


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In Britain, it is less than 2 percent. In Zimbabwe it is over 70 percent. We have about 1.5 million households on agricultural land, much of it used unproductively. A mixture of viable small, medium and larger farms can probably accommodate a maximum of 500,000 farmers, but the less the better. This requires a transfer of over a million households to various type of formal and informal non-farm employment, without adding additional households through population growth. And how is this to be managed? Only by the most carefully considered policies that engage with the international market place as a source of private capital investment and as a market for our various products. It means creating a modern economy, based on macro-economic stability and a very careful allocation of limited resources for the long term economic benefit of the nation. This includes investments in the infrastructure and creating incentives within a market system governed by a well-conceived legal and regulatory framework. It means investing in our children and our future by giving priority to social investments, especially health and education. Can we achieve economic growth rates to enable this transformation process? In the 1970s this would have been considered a pipe dream. In the 1980s Japan and the Asian Tigers showed that some developing countries could sustain consistently high rates of growth. The 1990s showed that even the biggest countries, such as China, could achieve breath-taking rates of economic growth. Since 2000, many other countries – notably India, but also South American and Asian countries – are regularly posting growth rates of between 6 and 9 percent annually. Zimbabwe, too, can join the club – but only with a leadership with the compassion, wisdom and the drive to make it happen.


Agriculture, Land and Agrarian Reform: Policies and...

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