Ferdinand Tonnies: Utopian VisionaryAuthor(s): Christopher Adair-ToteffSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 58-65Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202006Accessed: 06/03/2009 04:27

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Ferdinand Tonnies: Utopian Visionary CHRISTOPHER ADAIR-TOTEFF

American University in Bulgaria

Among the founders of classical German sociology, Ferdinand Tonnies is still relatively neglected. Many reasons are given, but the most widespread and the most damning is that Tonnies is a pessimist who wished, in the face of modernity, to return to the supposed Golden Age of rural Germany, when the community, ruled by patriarchs, gathered on the land. This interpretation is fundamentally flawed: although Tinnies wanted to describe the rootless, ruthless, calculating individuals of modern society, he wished to recall the past primarily in order to develop a blueprint for the future, in which the so-called feminine traits of conscience, empathy, and care would govern the community. Rather than yearning for the past, Tinnies was a utopian who had a vision of the future and tried to make it a reality.

Ferdinand T6nnies (1858-1936), Georg Simmel, and Max Weber are generally considered the founding fathers of classical German sociology. During their lives they were generally recognized as the leading thinkers in social theory. Scholars from around the world read their works and debated their ideas. In the 1930s, however, interest in men diminished, in part because of the Nazi repudiation of sociology. Interest in Weber revived after the war; this resurgence continues today. During the late 1950s and the 1960s Simmel enjoyed a renewal of interest, a movement that continues to grow. There has been no comparable resurgence of interest in T6nnies, however; indeed, he still suffers from relative neglect.

It is true that in Germany T6nnies' reputation has been growing since the late 1960s. It is also agreed widely that he is one of the founding fathers of sociology; some scholars even claim that he is the original founder (Ringer 1969:164). Yet his writings have not received the attention they deserve. Compared with the work on Weber and on Simmel, the literature on T6nnies is sparse and uneven.

One can offer a number of possible reasons for this neglect. The available literature contains a number of complaints about T6nnies. A common objection is that T6nnies writes in the old-fashioned, nineteenth-century Germanic style (Liebersohn 1988:11). Another complaint is that his thinking is too complex to be understood readily (Ringer 1969:167). Other critics claim that T6nnies had few good ideas; those which he had, he borrowed from other, more important writers such as Hobbes (Bickel 1991), Kant (Samples 1989), Marx (Cahnman 1973), Nietzsche (Zander 1981), or all of these (Liebersohn 1988). Still another complaint is Tonnies' alleged connection to the Nazis. Perhaps the most damning criticism, however, is that Tonnies is a pessimist about modernity. The charge is twofold: first, that he is the historian who sets out the historical development from the community to society; second, that if he could, he would recreate some idyllic North Frisian past in which the members of a small, tight-knit community share in their forefathers' irrational customs (see Mitzman 1973:93, 100; Rode and Klug 1981: 255). In this community, the charge continues, the men are strong and the women are weak: the men take part in the operation of the community, while the women remain at home (see Liebersohn 1988:32).

If this last charge is correct, it is no wonder Tonnies remains neglected while Weber and Simmel have been resurrected. This accusation suggests that T6nnies has nothing to say to

Sociological Theory 13:1 March 1995 ? American Sociological Association. 1722 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036

us because he only looks longingly to the past, whereas Weber and Simmel gaze boldly into the future. This estimation of Tonnies would be damning if it were correct. It is totally mistaken, however, and it is mistaken because it is based on a fundamental misunderstand- ing of what Tinnies intended to do. His major work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887), is in part a "scientific" book, in which he describes the positive features of the Gemeinschaft and the negative elements of Gesellschaft. Yet he also intended it to be a revolutionary blueprint for the future. Tinnies was adept at seeing things in opposition, but he was also at ease in reconciling elements that seem forever diametric. He had no difficulty in reconciling his dispassionate sociological inquiry with his passionate belief in how the true community should be constructed.

Scholars have been blind to Tonnies' concern about forming the future. Like Weber and Simmel, he was interested in the past; like them, he wanted to learn from the past in order to understand the future. In this respect, Tonnies was also a "scientific man." But unlike Simmel, who wished only to observe and theorize, and unlike Weber, who tried to separate his political ambitions from his academic calling, Tinnies was a utopian visionary. He did not believe that the past should be, or even could be, resurrected.' Tonnies never expected to recover the past; his intention was to help create the future. It was to be a utopia based on equality, freedom, and ethical conduct, in which the proper use of traditional customs would reinforce the secure and comforting bonds of the Gemeinschaft. His philosophical and sociological work convinced him that the natural and organic Gemeinschaft of the past was gone forever; he envisioned it as replaced by the modern and artificial Gesellschaft.

Tonnies was not alone in diagnosing the spirit of the modern age. Both Simmel, in his book on money economy, and Weber, with his notion of the "iron cage," described it. In this future, individuals would act according to their own rational self-interests. Tonnies, Simmel, and Weber discussed the modern age, but only Tonnies envisioned what could (and should) follow such an age. I will argue that Tonnies' astute diagnosis of the modern age led him to develop a blueprint of the future, one that he tried to realize.

GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT

Tonnies wrote many works, but his reputation rests primarily on his major work, Gemein- schaft und Gesellschaft. Tonnies began preparatory work for the book in 1881, but he had not yet decided on the primary focus. It grew out of his work on Hobbes; he conceived of it as a reply to some of the leading legal theorists in Germany, particularly Rudolf Ihring and Rudolf Gneist. Tonnies intended to examine the notion of state and society. The book was to be a philosophical treatment of historical material; he intended to submit it to the University of Kiel as his Habilitations-schrift (Mitzman 1973:74).

By 1881 Tonnies had decided on the title Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, but the first draft does not bear much resemblance to the work that he finally published. Around 1885 he finally identified one of the distinctions that underpin the entire work-the distinction between Wesenwille and Kiirwille.2 In the published version, Wesenwille is connected to the Gemeinschaft and is the will that represents the traditional and unchanging essence of the community. In contrast, Kiirwille (or Willkiir) is the modem individual's will. This term, derived from the word kiren, means roughly "to choose" (Ringer 1969:165). The modern individual chooses the end that he wants to reach, as well as the means necessary to reach it (Tonnies [1887]1991:90-91, 1955:138-39). These choices may, and often do, appear

I Liebersohn (1988:30) and even Ringer (1969:167) appear to believe that Tonnies was a pessimist because the old German community had perished. 2 For helpful discussions of the meanings of these terms, see Ringer (1969:165) and Heberle (1973:52).

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arbitrary to the individual and the observers. Because of the emphasis on the individual and his arbitrary choice, T6nnies associates Kirwille with Gesellschaft.

In 1887, when Tonnies finished his book, he retained the fundamental concepts of Gemeinschaft/Wesenwille and Gesellschaft/Kirwille. He expanded them, however, in order to deal with an astonishing number of topics, including agrarian history, the roles of men and women, and the proper foundation for the state. Yet the primary purpose of these fundamental distinctions is to draw an idealized picture of the two types of interaction between people: the type found in the Gesellschaft and the type found in the Gemeinschaft.

TONNIES' CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY: DIE GESELLSCHAFT Tonnies took obvious pride in conducting serious research and producing scholarly work. In this respect he shares with Weber the emphasis on "objectivity" in historical and scientific work. The results of this science of society are found in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. The book, however, is not merely a sociological treatise. It is more than a description of social interaction; it also offers value judgments on the types of social interaction. Tonnies essentially praises what is found in the Gemeinschaft and condemns what is found in the Gesellschaft. The praise and the condemnation are not based on an arbitrary standard; rather, Tonnies bases his value judgments on a fundamental Weltanschauung, that of a future world community whose members are bound by traditional practices and ethical norms.

For Tonnies, the modern world is the Gesellschaft. The Gesellschaft originated in the trading practices of the medieval merchants, who took calculated risks to secure profit. These men lived rationally but arbitrarily. By this Tonnies does not mean to suggest that they acted in some random fashion; rather, they chose to act on the basis of certain individual means of calculation. These traders were developing the traits of the Gesellschaft but were still part-time members of communities. In this sense they were not yet cut off totally from the natural state of the community.

In the modem age, Tonnies argues, the community has disappeared and people are essentially cut off from each other; everyone is isolated ([1887]1991:34, 1955:74). The structure that organizes the Gesellschaft is ideal; it is artificial and mechanical. Because it exists merely by convention, there is continuous tension ([1887]1991:216, 1955:271). Everyone wants something from everyone, but no one wants to do anything for anybody. Instead the basis of interaction is solely economic. Thus Tonnies concentrates on theories of exchange, money, and credit ([1887]1991:91, 21, 23).

Also, because the artificial foundation of Gesellschaft is commerce, Tonnies quotes Adam Smith's comment that everyone is a merchant ([1887]1991:44, 1955:87). In keeping with his socialistic leanings, he decries the impact of capitalism on society: because it fosters competition, it cuts us off from each other, from the community, and even from nature (Ringer 1969:167-68; 1991:45, [1897]1990:18-19, Tonnies [1887]1955:88-89). Because of the ruthless competition in the Gesellschaft, Tonnies believes that this state of commerce resembles Hobbes' state of war.

Tonnies also believes that the notion of Kirwille resembles the arbitrary will of Hobbes' Sovereign; the difference is that because modern man lacks the Sovereign's power, he cannot choose arbitrarily but must be calculating in making his decisions. Kiirwille encompasses intentions, purposes, and means (Tonnies [1887]1991:93, 1955:142). Thus deliberation is a major component of the Kiirwille,3 and the supreme goal of deliberation is happiness. This may not seem remarkable; Aristotle also holds that "happiness" is the proper end for man. T6nnies, however, maintains that this goal is foreign because it is the individual's sole

3 This may be why Loomis translates Kiinville as "rational will" (see T6nnies 1955).

60 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

concern ([1887]1991:95, 1955:144). Here Tonnies' difference from Aristotle is clear be- cause he holds that happiness can come either from contemplation or through political action. Again he follows Hobbes, who believes that people strive after power and want other people to envy them. Thus self-interest and vanity are the prime movers in the search for individual happiness (Tonnies [1887]1991:97, 1955:145-46).

Tonnies' dislike of the emphasis on the individual's preoccupation with self is the main reason why, after an youthful infatuation with Nietzsche, he rejected him.4 To Tonnies, Nietzsche represents much that is wrong with the modern age: the rejection of tradition, the relativization of values, the rejection of any ethical considerations toward one's fellow man, and the emphasis on the individual's "will to power." Also, because Tonnies saw that Nietzsche's followers made almost a cult of their mindless devotion to Nietzsche and to pseudo-Nietzschean beliefs, he was vociferous in his denunciation. In the 1890s Tonnies devoted considerable energy to turning people away from what he viewed as Nietzsche's destructive influence, which was leading people to glorify the worst aspects of modernity. He urged them to pay attention instead to his vision of how the future was supposed to be.5

TONNIES' ALTERNATIVE VISION OF THE FUTURE: DIE GEMEINSCHAFT

For T6nnies the Gemeinschaft is connected intimately to the land and the community that farms it ([1887]1991:21, 1955:59). Whereas the Gesellschaft is artificial and mechanical, the Gemeinschaft is real and organic ([1887]1991:3, 1955:37). If the theme of the Gesell- schaft is individuality, the theme of the Gemeinschaft is commonality: shared enjoyments, shared possessions, shared friends, and common enemies ([1887]1991:20, 1955:57-58).

Unlike the arbitrary connections of the Gesellschaft, which can be broken at will at any time, the many strong connections of the Gemeinschaft are deeply rooted and cannot be cut easily. The first bond is to the land. Those who work the land receive not only the rewards of their labor, but also a sense of enjoyment from their work ([1887]1991:10, 1955:45-46). This intensifies the reciprocal relationship between work and pleasure.

The second connection is to the house that is on the land, in which are focused the connections of the family at home. The hearth and the table strengthen the relationships among those who are under that roof. This is true especially for the members of the family, but it also applies to servants or visitors. There are three relationships Tonnies maintains: husband and wife, father and mother, and master and servant ([1887]1991:22-23, 1955:60- 61). This last relationship is the "newest" and consequently the most tenuous, and it holds Tonnies' attention the least. He is concerned more with the family, and to this end he discusses the relationship between parents and children. Children are naive and harmless; they live in the present and need to be protected ([1887]1991:129, 1955:179). What Tonnies says about children may or may not be controversial, but what he says about women has drawn criticism.

The charge that Tonnies is sexist and opposed to feminism is based on such passages as "women and children belong together" (Tonnies [1887] 1991:129, 1955:179), on the state- ment that men are "active" and "women are passive" ([1887]1991:128, 1955:178), and on his delineation of the differences between men's and women's temperaments, characters, and ways of thinking. He claims that women are motivated by conscience and sentiment, whereas men are driven by calculation and effort ([1887]1991:128, 1955:178).

These notions appear to provide ample ammunition for criticism. On closer scrutiny, 4 See Tonnies (1897, 1922). Tonnies' relation to Nietzsche is intriguing and complex (see Zander 1981). 5 In the first 25 years after publication, only 750 copies of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft were sold (Schroeter

1993:60). It began to attract a following, however, even if for the wrong reasons, and went through eight editions in Tonnies' lifetime.

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however, they do not support the charge of sexism. First, T6nnies makes clear that these descriptions are not firm and fixed; they are representations of different types of people, which can, and do, change over a person's lifetime. Second, these representations do not always apply to all people. Third and most important, careful reading reveals that T6nnies' sympathies lie with the feminine delineation. Although he stresses the qualities of organic life, he does not always uphold that which is "natural." For example, animals are more "natural" than humans, but Tonnies is concerned with the latter. Thus, when he claims that men are more like animals because they are stronger, he is not saying that men are "better." More important, given his intensive dislike of the artificiality of society, we must conclude that he is condemning men when he insists that they are "artificial." Again, considering his praise for the organic naturalness of the community, we must understand that he is giving women the highest praise when he says that "the woman is the natural human being" ([188711991:128, 1955:178).6

If anything, Tonnies provides a type of philosophical anthropology designed to show that humanity has evolved from that which is natural, with its emphasis on the members of the community; they use their powers of sensitivity and the voice of conscience to enhance the permanent pleasures of community life. He shows that man has evolved to the type of individual who uses cold, calculating reason and who abandons all ethical concerns in order to achieve personal, yet temporary, pleasures.7 It is also clear that Tonnies does not believe this is the ultimate stage. If faced with such a bleak inevitability, he would have been the pessimist that many people believe he is. But if T6nnies had been such a pessimist, he would have been paralyzed. He was not an extreme pessimist, however; although his optimism varied, he continued to work with single-minded determination for the betterment of life. For Tonnies that meant developing a new Gemeinschaft which would embody the best of the old, yet would be right for the future. Above all, it meant ethical concern for all members of the community. Because men are the calculating ones, the ones who cheat and lie, they are the ones most in need of reform. Women, on the other hand, are "naturally" concerned with truth and honesty; thus it is necessary for men to become "more feminine" in order to create the new, ethical community.8 Far from being sexist and an antifeminist, Tonnies believed that those traits which he saw in women were the proper ones; if the new community was to be formed, all of its members, not only the women, would have to possess them.

Tonnies returned to the theme of women and ethical concerns in the small volume Die Sitte (1909). Sitte is difficult to translate; it means "custom" or "morality." There is nothing arbitrary about Sitten; instead T6nnies holds that they are representative of the Volk. He objects to the attempt to conceptualize the Volk and advises us instead to "feel" what it is (1909:14, 1961:39). Although he spends considerable time on various "customs," such as those concerning marriage, drinking, and dress, it is clear that throughout the book his primary concern is the continued "welfare" of the people. Tonnies reminds us that "welfare" is connected to "will." Thus the Sitten of the Volk express the "essential will" (1909:16, 1961:41-42). Women play the active role in maintaining Sitten in the community; indeed,

6 Despite his claim that women live in the present, Tonnies credits them not only with the arts but also with memory, that which is designed to maintain continuity through the generations of the community. He says, "All the Muses are women, and memory is their mother" ([1887] 1991:136, 1955:187). Loomis omits the emphasis on "memory," just as he does on "weaker sex." I am inclined to read T6nnies' use of "weaker" in one of two ways: either it refers to the difference in physical strength, which Tonnies does not believe is a bad thing in itself, or it is used ironically, which appears to be the case here.

7 It is clear that T6nnies has little use for capitalism because the capitalist, in the pursuit of more money, will use any tricks and lies possible in order to increase profit. Indeed, Tonnies contends that lies are essential tools of capitalism ([1887] 1991:138, 1955:187). 8 T6nnies was rather impressed with Johann Jakob Bachofen's discussion of women in his book Das Mutterrecht (1861, 1897).

62 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

custom designates it (1909:46, 59, 1961:82, 98). "Customs" occupy a large role in Sitten, but women also are concerned with ethics and responsibility.

From his early work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft to Die Sitte and perhaps beyond, T6nnies tried to describe social reality, but in doing so he also showed what should be kept and what should be rejected. Unwilling to simply describe, he wished to prescribe as well. For this reason, much of these two works sounds "nonscientific" and instead seems didactic. Tonnies evidently believed that one should practice what he preaches; he attempted several times to make his prescription for the ideal community into a reality.

FROM VISION TO REALITY

Tonnies was not content to criticize the Gesellschaft for what he took to be its fundamental shortcomings, nor would he rest after setting forth the vital perfections inherent in the Gemeinschaft. He intended to turn his utopian vision into concrete reality. Tonnies made several preliminary attempts to organize a community: the first was his attempt to build an alternative academic community, and the second was his effort to stress the values of the Gemeinschaft through his lectures and his writings in Ethische Kultur.

Tonnies first attempted to found a "community of scholars." In a letter to Friedrich Paulsen dated March 1881, he sketched out his "newest great project." In five years or less, he believed, the university would be unsuitable for philosophy students, and they would leave.9 He thought a suitable alternative should be built, and he hoped Paulsen would join the project. The project was nothing less than a community of scholars, similar to the Lyceum, the Academy, or the Stoa (T6nnies and Paulsen 1961:120). The whole undertaking was to be based on trust, community (Gemeinschaft), and friendship. For T6nnies, philoso- phy was bound up with ethical concerns. These included the concerns of the community- trust, friendship, mutual support, and above all, concern for the welfare of all members. His community would recognize differences in professional rank, but there would be no differences in economic rank: for T6nnies, the community stood at the heart of the socialist community (see Scaff 1989:208).

Paulsen's response was initially warm, but later it cooled. T6nnies, meanwhile, was still convinced of its necessity. In a letter dating from 1882, he first painted the contrast between the fresh air of the beautiful countryside, with its fantastic sunrises and sunsets, and the stifling environment of the city (T6nnies and Paulsen 1961:157 ff.). Then he turned to the subject of the universities. Writing not ironically but earnestly, he questioned how the universities (which, after all, are state universities with state concerns) could provide lectures on ethics. T6nnies' position was that philosophy belongs not in forum Romanum but in the "shady grove of the Academy."

Tonnies could not persuade Paulsen to give up his life in Berlin, with all of his commitments to the university. Faced with no prospect of success, he began to lose interest in his project. Mitzman (1973:90-91) claims that as Tonnies' interest in forming the community of scholars weakens, one can see a growing attachment to his native "father- land." Mitzman is correct in noting such an inverse relationship, just as he is correct in insisting that "fatherland" refers not to Germany but to Schleswig-Holstein. He is incorrect, however, in thinking that T6nnies' attachment to his native soil should be taken as an abandonment of interest in his utopian vision. Undoubtedly the lack of success in founding the community of scholars caused T6nnies considerable unhappiness, but the failure was not powerful enough to make him cease all efforts at creating the future.

In the 1890s, concern for Nietzsche's growing reputation prompted Tonnies to write 9 Tonnies does not state why he believes this will occur; perhaps he thinks that many students will become

disillusioned with the state universities.

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"Nietzsche Narren" (1893) and to publish it in Ethische Kultur. In this work he inveighed against Nietzsche's burgeoning popularity, protested that Nietzsche's followers misunder- stood and misused Nietzsche, and complained that Nietzsche's glorification of the strong type led to the enslavement of the weak. T6nnies, as always, was concerned with the equality that is connected with the socialism of the community. Nietzsche, however, despised equality and the community; Tonnies insisted that Nietzsche, with his rejection of morality, was justifiably known as the philosopher of capitalism (Tonnies [1897]1990:101, 103).

Tonnies returned to his attack on Nietzsche in 1897 with Der Nietzsche-Kultus. He objected to Nietzsche's championing the new aristocracy (Tonnies [1897]1990:23), which wanted only to enjoy a type of libertinism ([1897]1990:43). He also feared Nietzsche's extremism because it was of the despotic type that allowed for no compromise. To Tonnies, Nietzsche represented the opposite of almost all that he valued: morality, equality, commu- nity, the English, and woman's character. Whereas Nietzsche extolled the pleasures of solitude, Tonnies praised the virtues of the community.

Tonnies had given up on his "philosophy home" but continued his search for a community of like-minded scholars. He thought that the German Society for Ethical Culture (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur ethische Kultur) was composed of people who shared his ethical concerns, which certainly included his socialist tendencies (see Liebersohn 1988:37-38 and 210, note 100). Tonnies, however, was to be seriously disappointed because the other members did not support his calls for improvement in workers' conditions.

In his later years, Tonnies tried to see his work in perspective. He knew that when he placed the individualistic type of life in opposition to the "socialistic" type, he would be misunderstood (Tonnies 1922:31). It was clear that he favored the latter, but at no time did he claim that capitalism had caused the decline of the community; rather, it was the symptom and the sign of decline (1922:33). He maintained that he was only an advocate for social reform, and that his interest was always in working to change the economic conditions so that people could lead healthy physical and rewarding spiritual lives (1922:32).

CONCLUSION

Weber and Simmel viewed the future with trepidation. Weber thought that modem man had made his own "iron cage" and was now trapped in it; Simmel projected his own sense of tragedy onto others and was convinced that alienation would continue. Like Weber and Simmel, Tonnies submitted a critique of modernity that made him pessimistic. Unlike them, however, he looked to the future with some hope. He could see that the age of the Gesellschaft was only temporary.10 He could see the possibility of a brighter future, in which the best features of the Gemeinschaft would be realized. Tonnies attempted to bring this future into being by helping the workingman achieve a better life and by attempting to establish a community of scholars.

Even though Tonnies failed to establish a utopian community on earth, he nevertheless provided us with a book rich in ideas to consider seriously. Its fascination has cast a spell over some of the most critically minded scholars: Max Weber ([1921]1976:1) referred to

10 Thus Ringer is wrong when he writes, "He did not feel that the decline of modern culture could actually be reversed" (1969:168). Also, Liebersohn is incorrect when he insists that the fatalism of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft is extreme (1988:39). Liebersohn writes that in Tonnies' mind, the progress of society was as fixed as the stars, as if Tonnies viewed society in the same way as Hegel viewed history. He also claims that Tonnies was irrational in not following his own advice about reform, and that his utopian efforts were "silly" (Liebersohn 1988:36, 38).

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Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft as das schone Werk. We should follow Weber's lead and look carefully at T6nnies' writings, particularly Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. This is not only a sociological treatise of the first rank, but also a gifted scholar's contribution to the efforts to make utopia a reality. In this sense it is a sociology of the future.

REFERENCES

Bickel, Cornelius. 1991. Ferdinand Tonnies: Soziologie als skeptische Aufkldrung zwischen Historismus und Rationalismus. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Cahnman, Werner J. 1973. 'Tonnies and Marx." Pp. in Ferdinand Tonnies: A New Evaluation, edited by Werner J. Cahnman. Leiden: Brill.

Heberle, Rudolph. 1973. "The Sociological System of Ferdinand T6nnies." Pp. in Ferdinand Tonnies: A New Evaluation, edited by Werner J. Cahnman. Leiden: Brill.

Liebersohn, Harry. 1988. Fate and Utopia in German Sociology, 1870-1923. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Mitzman, Arthur. 1973. Sociology and Estrangement: Three Sociologists of Imperial Germany. New York: Knopf. Ringer, Fritz. 1969. The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890-1933.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rode, Horst and Ekkehard Klug. 1981. "Ferdinand Tonnies Verhaltnis zu National-Sozialismus und Faschismus."

Pp. in Ankunft bei Tonnies: Soziologische Beitrige zum 125. Geburtstage von Ferdinand Tinnies, edited by Lars Clausen and Franz Urban Pappi. Kiel: Muhlau.

Samples, John S. 1989. "Kant and the Origins of German Sociology: The Case of Ferdinand T6nnies." Pp. in Ferdinand Tinnies in the USA: Recent Analyses by American Scholars, edited by Klaus H. Heberle. Hamburg: Fechner.

Scaff, Lawrence. 1989. Fleeing the Iron Cage. Berkeley: University of California Press. Schroeter, Gerd. 1993. "Review of Bickel and Herberle." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 29:. Tonnies, Ferdinand. [1887] 1991. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der Reinen Soziologie. Darmstadt:

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. .1893. "Nietzsche Narren." Ethische Kultur? Volume: pages .[1897]1990. Der Nietzsche-Kultus: Eine Kritik. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 1909. Die Sitte. Frankfurt: Ritten and Loening.

.1922. "Ferdinand T6nnies." Pp. in Die Philosophie der Gegenwart: In Selbstdarstellungen, edited by Raymond Schmidt. Leipzig: Meiner.

.1955. Community and Association, translated by Charles P. Loomis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

.1961. Custom: An Essay on Social Codes, translated by A. Farrell Borenstein. New York: Free Press. Tonnies, Ferdinand and Friedrich Paulsen. 1961. Briefwechsel: 1876-1908, edited by Olaf Klose, Eduard Georg

Jacoby, and Irma Fischer. Kiel: Hirt. Weber, Max. [1921]1976. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie. Fifth revised

edition. Tibingen: Mohr. Zander, Jurgen. 1981. "Ferdinand Tonnies und Friedrich Nietzsche mit einem Exkurs: Nietzsches 'Geburt der

Trag6die' als Impuls zu T6nnies' 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft." Pp. in Ankunft bei Tonnies: Soziologische Beitriige zum 125. Geburtstage von Ferdinand Tinnies, edited by Lars Clausen and Franz Urban Pappi. Kiel: Mihlau.

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Article Contentsp. [58]p. 59p. 60p. 61p. 62p. 63p. 64p. 65

Issue Table of ContentsSociological Theory, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 1-109Front MatterNeglected Theorists: Part IIFrom Creative Action to the Social Rationalization of the Economy: Joseph A. Schumpeter's Social Theory [pp. 1 - 13]Herbert Spencer and the Professions: Occupational Ecology Reconsidered [pp. 14 - 24]Intersubjectivity and Domination: A Feminist Investigation of the Sociology of Alfred Schutz [pp. 25 - 36]Conspicuous Confusion? A Critique of Veblen's Theory of Conspicuous Consumption [pp. 37 - 47]The Twentieth Century's Saint-Simon: Georges Gurvitch's Dialectical Sociology and the New Physics [pp. 48 - 57]Ferdinand Tonnies: Utopian Visionary [pp. 58 - 65]Gabel's "Micro/Macro" Bridge: The Schizophrenic Process Writ Large [pp. 66 - 99]

TranslationIntroduction to the Translation: Weber and Social-Psychological Research [pp. 100 - 101]On the Method of Social-Psychological Inquiry and Its Treatment [pp. 102 - 106]

Back Matter [pp. 107 - 109]