ABSTRACT€¦ · Web viewA crisis of confidence: an assessment of REDD+ stakeholder experiences...
Transcript of ABSTRACT€¦ · Web viewA crisis of confidence: an assessment of REDD+ stakeholder experiences...
A crisis of confidence: an assessment of REDD+ stakeholder experiences in Indonesia
Abstract:
Identifying challenges and opportunities for REDD+ will help to inform future
policy and implementation of the program in Indonesia and other countries. The aim of
this research is to identify and elucidate challenges and opportunities for REDD+, and
other environmental governance initiatives, through perspectives of people working with
REDD+ in Indonesia. This paper presents the perceptions of stakeholders and
practitioners involved in REDD+ in Indonesia at multiple scales varying from global to
local. Our research demonstrates stakeholders are struggling with problems of corruption,
bureaucracy, and a lack of confidence in REDD+. Ultimately, our respondents and
supporting documents indicate the cultural and governance contexts in Indonesia are
particularly complex. Furthermore, there are problems surrounding funding, logistics of
implementation, corruption, stakeholder engagement and buy-in. Despite challenges,
REDD+ may have increased attention to these issues and acted as a catalyst for change.
Effectiveness for REDD+ in Indonesia will require both nuanced understanding of the
local and cultural context as well as long-term perspectives.
Keywords: REDD+; Forest Management; Payment for Ecosystem Services; Environmental Governance; Indonesia; Stakeholders; Ethnography
1 Introduction
While Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)
has been introduced in over 65 countries (UN-REDD Programme 2018), yet there is still
uncertainty about its’ future. Indonesia provides an important example for understanding
challenges for REDD+. It is one of the most biodiverse places on the planet (Convention
1
on Biological Diversity n.d.), experiences significant deforestation and degradation
(Margono et al. 2014), leading to high levels of carbon emissions (Carlson et al. 2012).
Thus REDD+ presents widespread opportunities for Indonesia to benefit financially from
their forest reserves and minimize environmental and social consequences of large-scale
deforestation. Despite the promises REDD+ offers for Indonesia’s forests (Busch et al.
2015), its implementation has been complicated as a result of the political climate in
Indonesia (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; Brockhaus et al. 2012), high demand for forest land
for palm oil production (Abood et al. 2014) , and a history of questionable forest
management practices (Transparency International 2011; HRW 2013).
As REDD+ projects globally demonstrate varying levels of success, understanding
challenges and opportunities for successful implementation will be crucial to help shape
approaches and future policy. While implementation has been ongoing in Indonesia since
2007, long-term outcomes are unclear and more information about how projects are
working on the ground is needed. This paper provides such insight by relating results of
in-depth research with stakeholders of REDD+ in Indonesia.
2 Background: REDD+ & Indonesia’s forests
With the third largest extent of tropical forest, Indonesia had the highest rate of
deforestation on the planet in 2013 (Margono et al. 2014) and is known for its
complicated forest governance context (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005; Indrarto et al.
2012). Because of this combination of factors, REDD+ implementation in Indonesia has
received much attention – Indonesia’s government has publicly committed to REDD+,
created REDD+ agencies, and these efforts have been encouraged by funding pledges
from Norway, Germany and the UK (Government of Norway et al. 2015). Yet,
2
deforestation rates in Indonesia remain high (WRI 2016), and based on results from this
research the majority of REDD+ stakeholders feel it remains uncertain how successful
REDD+ has been, or will be.
Stakeholder groups in Indonesia are involved in REDD+ implementation at
national, provincial, and local levels with a diverse range of interests in program
outcomes. REDD+ demonstration sites in Indonesia display a wide variety of structures
and goals (Global Canopy Programme 2013; REDD Net 2013). No single established
source of funding exists for REDD+ projects: many report receiving funding from
international aid agencies or multilateral development banks, some projects are working
to secure funding from carbon markets, and other projects are funded and facilitated by
NGOs. Many projects are still searching for secure, long-term funding.
Projects can also vary in how they are implemented (see Table 1). Some have
obtained licenses from Indonesia’s government to operate Ecosystem Restoration
Concessions (ERC). Projects can also be established as official customary forest, also
known as hutan adat, a status that potentially gives forest communities legally
recognized tenure over their forest territories. Or, as in the case of the Carbon Fund, some
projects may approach REDD+ at a larger scale by engaging entire regions (kabupaten)
in REDD+ activities (World Bank Group 2013).
Table 1
Type of REDD+ Project
Locational basis of Project
Funding sourceFocal point for conservation
activities
Examples
Ecosystem Ecosystem- Private entity Concession Harapan
3
Restoration Concession
based license in production
forest
holds the ERC – donors, carbon
fund, NTFPs, etc.
based on ecosystem and restoration of
ecosystem
Rainforest; Rimba Raya; Rimba
Makmur
Community Based Project
Centered around hutan
adat (community
forest)
Usually funded by an NGO or Development organization
Empowering forest
communities and improving
tenure
WWF’s Kutai Barat; GIZ’s Kapuas Hulu
National level institution Sponsored
Centered around a district or
region
National level institution such as the carbon Fund or the
United Nations
Engaging region or districts,
including local governments,
NGOs and forest communities in
forest conservation
activities
Indonesia District Level
REDD+ ER Program;
The United Nations REDD+
Pilot Project
Regardless of differences among manifestations of REDD+ projects in Indonesia,
they all share Indonesia’s complex governance system of inherent tensions between
devolution of authority to provinces and districts and an inherent tendency towards
centralization and state control. Forest governance in Indonesia is particularly complex
(Enrici and Hubacek 2016) and, as indicated by some of our respondents, requires a
nuanced understanding and long-term perspective. While this paper addresses research
specific to REDD+, the results are also broadly applicable to environmental governance
challenges in Indonesia more broadly.
4
3 Methods and case study
Data collection was undertaken from 2012 to 2014 including participant
observation, interviews, and a review of relevant forest policies. This ethnographic
research was supplemented by a range of other sources including research publications,
grey literature, newspapers and other media reports, as well as policy documents in order
to understand the context of REDD+ stakeholder experiences and potential disconnects
between the literature and what was happening on the ground. Triangulating data by
including a full spectrum of sources from national to local scales – and combining
multiple sources, such as literature and forest policy, with interviews among stakeholder
groups, provides insight into how international and national initiatives manifest, increases
validity of data and helps to bridge gaps between literature, policy and reality.
All participants were stakeholders of REDD+, and are defined as someone who is
currently, or has previously been, involved directly in the REDD+ program, working on a
project, collaborating on a project, or living in or adjacent to a project, as in the case of
forest communities. A chain referral and preferential sampling method was used, and
interviews were conducted with key stakeholders with an effort to include REDD+
participants from a broad and representative range of stakeholder groups. Interviews
were conducted with 71 stakeholders, including 45 Indonesian and 26 foreign
respondents, from a variety of stakeholder groups: donors, project managers, employees
and heads of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government officials,
policymakers, members of civil society organizations, academic researchers, and local
forest communities. While some respondents work at multiple scales, others operate
exclusively at the national, provincial or local scales.
5
Interviews in Indonesia were conducted in English and Bahasa Indonesia, or with
assistance from a local translator. Data collection took place in Jakarta and Bogor, as well
as in a variety of locations in provinces and districts where REDD+ is being
implemented. A small number of interviews were also conducted in Washington, DC
where some REDD+ stakeholder groups have headquarters. Informal semi-structured
interviews with informants from key stakeholder groups were primary tools for data
collection. Interviews consisted of approximately five to seven standardized questions
developed based on relevant literature and preliminary scoping fieldwork. Interviews
began with broad questions aimed at getting a general understanding of respondent’s
experiences with REDD+, and when topics relating to challenges, successes, or
perceptions of REDD+ were mentioned those were explored in more depth. In addition,
18 meetings were attended in total, including nine at national and provincial levels
relevant to REDD+ policy and strategy as well as nine local meetings relevant to REDD+
implementation and stakeholder engagement. Meetings selected for inclusion in the study
included any meeting directly or indirectly related to REDD+ implementation at any
scale, and open to the public, or to which an invitation was extended. At these meetings
special attention was paid when stakeholders mentioned successes, opportunities,
challenges, and perceptions of REDD+.
When possible interviews were recorded, with permission of respondents, and
transcribed. Grounded theory and inductive methods were used for data analysis, for
forming frameworks and research conclusions (Charmaz 2011). Interviews were
transcribed and entered into a TAMS Analyzer database in order to apply this grounded
theory approach to analyzing data (Charmaz 2006). Following an inductive coding
6
method interview transcripts, and meeting notes and transcripts, were reviewed at various
stages of data collection to develop a list of coding categories based on recurring themes
and issues mentioned by respondents. All interview transcripts were coded using these
categories. Themes that emerged from interviews were used in conjunction with literature
and policy review to identify major challenges and opportunities as discussed in
following sections.
4.0Results and discussion
The themes presented by stakeholders can be grouped into five categories: (1)
Complicated and often confusing governance, regulations and policy; (2) Securing
sufficient funding; (3) Corruption and resulting inability to enforce project boundaries;
(4) Cultural complexity (5) Stakeholder doubts and fatigue; and (6) REDD+ as a catalyst
for change and new opportunities. All of these challenges can compound and create a
situation in which it is often difficult for project organizers to move forward with a
REDD+ project. Each of these topics is discussed in further detail below.
4.1 Complex and confusing regulations
Indonesian governance is known for being complex and characterized by sometimes confusing laws (Bell 2003; Bakker and Moniaga 2010), something which extends to the forestry sector (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011). Sometimes regulations and tenure overlap and conflict with each other (Beckert et al 2014; Fauzi and Anna 2013), leading to a challenging context for REDD+ projects. Local stakeholders working from within Indonesian institutions as well as foreign stakeholders expressed frustration with complexities surrounding forest governance. One national level foreign informant described it like this, “It’s an interesting sector to be in...you could spend 10 years here and still not understand...a lot of very experienced colleagues, who’ve worked all over the world, have said to me they’ve never worked in a more complicated system than here.” –RespondentID-10369. Another national level foreign stakeholder, said, “It just makes it really, hard…the whole regulatory process....at some point, they had three non-aligned, sometimes contradictory regulations on REDD1 and they were in the process of
1 In some quotes respondents use the term REDD interchangeably with REDD+. While sometimes the use of the term REDD is in reference to an earlier iteration of REDD+, for the purposes of this paper all
7
developing a 4th one…so then they try to start over and try and fit it together, and you wind up with this impossible framework.” – RespondentID-10371. All of this manifests in complexity of institutional arrangements (Fauzi and Anna 2013) and a multiplicity of interpretations and perspectives regarding resource use and conservation (Galudra et al. 2011).
Many foreign stakeholders operating at national or international levels felt unable to find
pathways to move forward with REDD+ projects as well as other aspects of the forestry sector,
which in some cases have led to withdrawal from Indonesia or REDD+ projects. One stakeholder
reported this kind of situation with a partner-organization,“…I was working with someone from
[an international] Development Agency, and she was in Indonesia specifically for the purpose of
closing down all of [their country’s] development activities. They are completely pulling out
because they find it too difficult to work here and have any positive effect, and they think their
dollars are much better used [elsewhere].”—RespondentID-10377. While the complicated
forestry context creates a challenge for actual implementation of forest conservation projects
(Enrici and Hubacek 2018), it can also provide a daunting environment for stakeholder groups
establishing and maintaining long-term working relationships. Furthermore, without sufficient
understanding of Indonesia’s context, some foreign stakeholders may not be able or willing to
persevere with projects -- another foreign informant said, “There’s no kind of clear information
pathway on any of this…you can’t quite [go by] what’s written down. You’ve got to meet the
right people and do the kind of social appraisal of asking something and then asking them to
introduce you to other people and then try and collate your information and get back to the
truth. So it’s a completely labor intensive process. I think there’s a lot of donors that just won’t
have time or resources to do that. They don’t want to have relationships that intensive.” –
RespondentID-10376.
references to REDD should be considered to be referring to REDD+.
8
Stakeholders working within Indonesian institutions also expressed frustration
with complex governance and regulations. Governance in Indonesia often overlaps
between different scales, particularly in a conflict of interest and control between national
and local governments (Stevens et al. 2014; Brockhaus et al. 2012). One Indonesian
stakeholder working at the national level put it like this, “Now there are too many
regulations, too many institutions...managing REDD+.”-- RespondentID-10395.
Throughout Indonesia overlapping authority among different agencies, or various scales
of government, can also contribute to confusion and challenges for those working in
forestry (Indrarto et al. 2012; Bakker and Moniaga 2010; Resosudarmo 2004).
Overlapping authority presents a challenge for forest governance in Indonesia, and can
also generate doubt and confusion among those involved in REDD+, or similar
conservation initiatives (Galudra et al. 2011; Fauzi and Anna 2013), something expressed
by foreign and Indonesian informants alike.
There is a disconnect between what happens at national and local levels in
Indonesia, highlighted in the following quote by a foreign NGO worker “Coming in, the
Ministry of Forestry was the leader on REDD in Indonesia…but the problem is…if you
talk to the Ministry of Forestry and look at regulations, it actually largely is under
district control. So those gray areas people talk about today…that's how you know where
you have a huge number of problems.” -- RespondentID-10380. At one meeting among
Indonesian government officials and foreign researchers, an Indonesian representative
said this, “The state wants to implement [this], but the district doesn't have the same
awareness level"—RespondentID-10402. Another national level Indonesian stakeholder
said, “And as you probably know already, in Indonesia it's the Bupati [district
9
government head] that basically make decisions about land allocation. So they have a
very important role in deforestation, they give the license.” --RespondentID-10404.
Sometimes those locally issued licenses contradict official land use categories designated
by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry at the national level (Barr et al. 2006;
Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). A recent law, ‘‘Law Number 23 about Local
Government,’’ UU/23/2014, intended to rectify some problems resulting from extreme
decentralization (Prasetyia 2012; Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015) attempts to shift
authority from districts to provinces. While Indonesia has over 500 districts, it only has
34 provinces, so the new law has potential to strengthen connections between central and
regional governments by shifting power from many district governments to provincial
governments. However, this shift has not yet materialized.
Overlap in authority and confusing governance have been particularly
problematic as they manifest with licensing and tenure in Indonesia, as parcels of land
may have conflicting licenses for different uses (Resosudarmo et al. 2011; Contreras-
Hermosilla et al. 2005). Confusion or conflict over tenure can pose problems for REDD+
projects (Resosudarmo et al. 2014), or areas designated as protected forest by Indonesia’s
government. Some members of forest communities involved in our fieldwork were not
aware that palm oil concessions overlapped with their customary forest (hutan adat).
Many community customary forests in Indonesia are vulnerable because of challenges
associated with establishing community forest rights despite a 2012 court ruling that
established rights of communities to have tenure rights to customary forests
(Natahadibrata 2013), so far very few claims of community forest rights have been
established, presumably because of complicated and challenging processes reported by
10
our informants and supported by the literature (Sahide et al. 2016).
There is no single authority or database for land-use permits, and different
government agencies and sectors have different maps (Sills et al. 2014). The introduction
of REDD+ and attention it has brought to forestry in Indonesia has increased awareness
of these issues and as a result, one solution was proposed in which a single database
would be established in order to sort out conflicting licenses and overlapping tenure.
However, this project, called “One Map”, has not yet been completed (WRI 2018),
potentially as a result of the enormity of the task. One Indonesian stakeholder who had
been involved in development of One Map said this, “We are engaging into an MoU with
the governor of [the province]…so the governor requested companies there provide them
with all of the licensing...and administrative data...We gathered all of them…it was…a
lot because we received like ten boxes of documents each day, and it keeps on going and
going and going. And that’s only from [three districts], not the whole [province]”
RespondentID-10394. Indonesia has over 500 districts which, in consideration of the
overwhelming documentation described here, may partially explain why One Map has
not yet materialized. The stakeholder then goes on to describe problems with
documentation, something indicative of tenure issues found throughout Indonesia
(Sunderlin et al. 2014), …there are some licenses that are not there. It’s a really huge
problem. We’ve asked the government, but they said they don’t have them but then they
will [speak to] the company. But the company said they don’t have them.”
RespondentID-10394. This scenario, while described by someone working for the central
government, is indicative of what was reported by many stakeholders at both national and
local levels from both Indonesian and foreign agencies. Confusion and a lack of
11
transparency, as described above, are linked to higher levels of corruption (Kolstad and
Wiig 2009). Complex and confusing governance thus not only frustrates efforts to
implement REDD+ in Indonesia, but has the potential to directly fuel corruption,
nepotism and collusion systemic throughout Indonesia’s forest governance system.
Setting up a REDD+ project as an Ecosystem Restoration Concession may come
with even further complications. Stakeholders who have approached REDD+ as an ERC,
have described difficulty in navigating processes for obtaining a license(Walsh et al.
2012). One project level foreign stakeholder described frustration working with
Indonesia’s central government to establish an ERC and the impact it had on obtaining
funding , “We kept getting money from investors...but then we couldn't get more because
we never had any progress to show, there was no good news.”RespondentID-10382.
Some already established ERC based REDD+ projects have reported procedures for
obtaining an ERC as long and daunting. Rimba Makmur and Rimba Raya, projects in
Central Kalimantan, both report the licensing process years and even then they were also
only granted partial licenses (Indriatmoko et al. 2014). As obtaining an ERC license will
be essential for development of many REDD+ projects, difficulties in obtaining licenses
has potential to greatly affect overall progress of REDD+ in Indonesia.
4.2 Issues with funding
Difficulty finding sufficient funding was frequently reported as another major
challenge towards project implementation. While lack of funding has been discussed in
the literature (Phelps et al. 2011; Dixon and Challies 2015), it is still important to discuss
financing for REDD+ in Indonesia because of the contrast between perceptions of
funding available, and the reality of a shortage of available funds at the local level. While
12
some international stakeholders seemed to think there was plenty of funding for projects,
local level stakeholders emphasized that securing funding was one of the greatest
challenges to ensuring REDD+ long-term effectiveness and there is evidence to support
this (Diana and Jong 2018; Enrici and Hubacek 2018; UN-REDD Programme 2013).
When national and international level stakeholders are not in touch with challenges faced
by those working on REDD+ projects at local levels it may contribute to logistical
problems for project implementation. Results of this research suggest knowledge about
lack of funding is prevalent among many stakeholders working on REDD+ at project and
local levels, which undermines confidence and buy-in.
Despite widespread reports of substantial funding for REDD+, many projects are
lacking basic funds to support on-the-ground efforts. Norway’s government reports
approximately 8% of the USD1billion promised to Indonesia have either been released or
“committed’ and distribution of funds will be results based (Royal Norwegian Embassy
Jakarta 2016). While many REDD+ projects were initiated with assumptions that
funding, or carbon markets would be easily accessible for project financing, that has not
been the case for many REDD+ stakeholders. Lack of sufficient funding can also impact
stakeholder perceptions of REDD+ and belief in possibilities for achieving successful
outcomes, especially given competing income opportunities from resource extraction:
“One of our economists...saw the scale of the coal mining and scale of money coming in
formally and informally to the local district government. And his feedback to me was
REDD’s got a tough job to do here if it can even try and compete with the level of money
flowing in. And he became a skeptic overnight.” -- RespondentID-10377. Such
sentiments of doubt were prevalent across stakeholder groups, as discussed in greater
13
detail in section 4.5 below.
From inception, REDD+ has been envisioned as a market based mechanism
(Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). Though early pilot projects and readiness efforts
have largely been funded by donor grants (Streck 2012), intentions were for a carbon
trading mechanism to sustain long-term viability of projects and incentivize expansion.
Despite these intentions, results from this research and evidence from available
documentation demonstrate the carbon market has not provided a viable funding option.
Many forest conservation activities including REDD+ are excluded from some carbon
market mechanisms including the compliance market (Carbon Market Watch 2016;
Butler, Koh, and Ghazoul 2009) and furthermore, carbon markets are still insufficiently
developed to support climate change mitigation efforts (Johannsdottir and McInerney
2016).
Some at the local level reported that it did not seem they would be able to secure
sufficient funding to maintain projects over the long-term. One such individual said, “We
need more support, [people are] always thinking about the money. We need more cash
from outside, from donors. There's not enough money to scale up.”-- RespondentID-
10392. This speaks to the fact that REDD+ finances may not be sufficient to effectively
compete with other land uses, such as palm oil (Butler et al. 2009). Stakeholders are
aware how this imbalance of economic incentives may impact REDD+, and it may also
create doubts for long-term success. One foreign NGO worker said, “The other issue is
that REDD money is not unlimited. It's going to be a drop in the bucket compared to the
revenue that palm oil brings in…So how do you address the real drivers of
14
deforestation? How can you use REDD to really do that? I don't know.”-RespondentID-
10379. The inability of REDD+ to compete with mining and palm oil may continue to be
problematic for a number of reasons. For example, globally REDD+ has created new
opportunities for securing local tenure rights (Larson et al. 2013). However, while
securing community rights can lead to more successful forest management in some
situations (Stevens et al. 2014), it may not in cases where other activities can offer
communities more financial compensation for their community forest (Resosudarmo et
al. 2014). Ultimately, the lack of funding reported by some of our respondents is
problematic as exemplified by the end of the UN REDD+ Pilot Project, which closed due
to a lack of funding (UN-REDD Programme 2013) and is an issue which continues to
threaten other REDD+ projects in Indonesia (Diana and Jong 2018) and elsewhere
(Sunderlin et al. 2015).
4.3 Corruption and inability to enforce project boundaries
Both foreign and Indonesian stakeholders operating at all scales of REDD+
implementation expressed concerns about corruption and how it impacts REDD+
projects, an issue also documented in the literature (Luttrell et al. 2014 Indrarto et al.
2012). At one time the Ministry of Forestry was ranked the lowest ministry in Indonesia
on an integrity survey done by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
and was furthermore found responsible for inaccurately mapping forest cover, land use,
concessions and unfairly allocating land rights ( HRW 2013). While such high level
corruption is problematic for forest management, corruption in forestry also occurs at
local levels (Prasetyia 2012; Kuncoro et al. 2013) and both can be problematic for
REDD+ projects.
15
–For example, stakeholders working at local or project levels reported instances
where authorities expect bribes or payments in order to enforce project boundaries and
stop encroachment, a phenomena also documented elsewhere (Dermawan et al. 2011;
Butt 2011). While some projects seem to have enjoyed support from local officials, other
stakeholders reported that they often cannot get approval for projects, even after a project
has been approved by the central government. A number of stakeholders reported a lack
of enforcement of current regulations, something evidenced by encroachment onto
protected areas (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; WWF 2013; Yuliani et al. 2010) and the lack
of sufficient sanctions (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005; Faure and Wibisana 2013;
Indrarto et al. 2012), and which can also lead to a sense of general frustration and fatigue
with REDD+. One informant who works at both the international and project level,
referring to a visit to one of the provinces where REDD+ is being implemented, said: “It
was really staggering, the amount of...complete lack of enforcement of any rules or
regulations about destruction of [the forest]…”. RespondentID-10375.
Corruption has been reported in the literature to lead to higher rates of
deforestation in general (Galinato and Galinato 2013, 2012), and based on the results of
this research, appears to facilitate encroachment into protected areas. This is evidenced
by the same phenomena occurring across protected forest areas in Indonesia (Gaveau et
al. 2013; Margono et al. 2012; Broich et al. 2011; Indonesia Ministry of Forestry 2014).
Such corruption extends to REDD+ efforts, affects stakeholder authority over project
areas and reduces their ability to enforce project boundaries. Without proper governance
over REDD+ project territories, it makes it difficult to achieve goals for carbon
sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Other stakeholders also reported local
16
authorities failed to respond to encroachment within project boundaries, something
widely reported as a problem in Indonesia’s protected forest areas (Murdiyarso et al.
2011; Gaveau et al. 2013; Sloan et al. 2012). For some stakeholders, having to pay bribes
in order to get local support was both expected and necessary. As a foreign stakeholder
working at the local level stated, “…to make it work we have to make tribute payments to
local authorities…we’ve got to find ways to get support from local authorities.”-
RespondentID-10387. Some stakeholders expressed concern about how local law
enforcement failed to protect their rights. Some stakeholders described experiences with
local police and authorities who were allegedly involved in encroachment activities,
something which has also been documented elsewhere (Smith et al. 2003; Butt 2011).
Sometimes encroachment is done by other entities, such as agricultural companies
or smallholders (WWF 2013; Krishna et al. 2014), but without local governmental
support there is very little project organizers, or even local communities within those
projects, can do about it. In other scenarios, sometimes outside entities encourage
encroachment by local villagers, which can make it more difficult for project organizers
to stop encroachment – without local government support it is nearly impossible. One
stakeholder said, “We have villagers planting palm oil inside our concession. The [palm
oil company] pays them to plant it there.” – RespondentID-10383. Project organizers
turned to local authorities for support, but were expected to make payments, which their
international-aid-agency-funded budget did not allow for. Complaints of this kind were
common. One stakeholder involved in a REDD+ project working at local levels stated,
“Illegal oil palm from [our REDD site] is sold to agents or a local mill, owned by the
government of Indonesia.“ – RespondentID-10422. Stakeholders’ experiences with
17
corruption can make REDD+ project management challenging, as extensive
encroachment can lead to forest cover and biodiversity loss. Corruption such as
mentioned by our respondents can also lead to stakeholder fatigue and doubt, discussed
further below.
4.4 Cultural barriers: Complexity and insufficient open discussion about REDD+
Many stakeholders, both foreign and Indonesian, expressed sentiments regarding
a lack of clarity and openness surrounding REDD+ in Indonesia. Collaboration among
stakeholder groups has been identified as an important component of long-term
successful ecosystem and natural resource management schemes (Vacik et al. 2014;
Blumenthal and Jannink 2016). While inclusion and collaboration of stakeholders at
multiple scales has been acknowledged in many REDD+ documents (CIF 2013; UN
REDD Programme 2015), many of our respondents reported feelings of frustration at
cultural disconnect and misunderstandings.
Indonesia has a complex and rich cultural context, reflected by the over 700
languages spoken there. This cultural diversity has contributed to a complicated context
some describe as chaotic (Parry 2007; Forrester 1999) or confusing (Gallemore and
Moeliono 2014; Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015; Galudra et al. 2011) and which may be
challenging for foreign, or even local, stakeholders to navigate. One stakeholder from
Indonesia working at the national level put it like this, “This issue is really challenging…
the system in Indonesia is very complex.” RespondentID-10404, another foreign
stakeholder put it simply, “Operating here is difficult” RespondentID-10368. These
perceptions of unnecessary institutional complexity are supported by evidence that
sometimes the government’s priorities conflict (McFarland et al. 2015; Simamora 2011),
18
laws are sometimes confusing and conflicting (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011;
Gallemore and Moeliono 2014) and there is evidence of insufficient communication
among governance actors at varying scales (Moeliono et al. 2014). Both foreign and
Indonesian stakeholders reported feelings of frustration and sometimes even confusion
when working on REDD+ efforts, particularly at national or international levels.
Many stakeholders seemed concerned about how the complexity of Indonesia’s
context was impacting outcomes for REDD+. One Indonesian stakeholder working at the
national level described frustrations in regard to overlapping authority (Ministry of
Forestry 2009; Brockhaus et al. 2012) and lack of reference levels (Virah-Sawmy et al.
2015), “REDD cannot work here, we don't have the reference levels. And Indonesia is
too diverse and vast. The national government cannot control the subnational, provincial
or kabupaten [district].”—RespondentID-10367. Confusion can happen when well-
meaning foreign donors or project organizers approach situations with less knowledge
about cultural context than may be necessary and some stakeholders seemed to lack the
understanding necessary to navigate Indonesia’s cultural context in a way that would
allow them to be successful over the long term. Other foreign stakeholders expressed
confusion and uncertainty about how to deal with problems in a culturally appropriate
way. Some who had been working in the country for a long time had a better sense of
how to approach issues, yet still expressed frustration at having to adapt to the cultural
context. One stakeholder working at the national level for many years said, “It’s difficult
because you can never say anything directly”- RespondentID-10381. And another
working at national scales, emphasizing the frustration felt as a result of the cultural
disconnect, and expressing concerns about how this has led to challenges for REDD+,
19
“The Ministry of Forestry's definition of degradation and deforestation [differs] from
[others]…And it's the same data, it's the definitions and what they're calling
deforestation. So, getting those definitions in place like we agreed to is going to be a bit
of a challenge”—RespondentID-10370. Such differing interpretations and definitions
have in fact lead to conflicts over forest cover assessment (Romijn et al. 2013).
Comments such as these were common and furthermore connect to lack of buy-in and
stakeholder fatigue.
4.5 Stakeholder fatigue -- stakeholders doubt possibilities for success of REDD+
Sentiments of doubt, stakeholder fatigue, and lack of buy-in are representative of
feelings of the majority of our respondent, and such doubts have also been expressed in
the literature (Fletcher et al. 2016; Redford et al. 2013) . In 2015 President Jokowi
disbanded the National REDD+ Agency (BP REDD+), an act which may both have
reflected and added to doubts about the future of REDD+ (Jong 2015). Stakeholders
from all groups and scales expressed some doubt and disenchantment with REDD+, and
these were some of the most emphasized and salient themes presented by respondents.
Disappointment with achievements of REDD+ in Indonesia were also expressed publicly
by government officials from Norway, one of the major donor countries (Parlina and
Nicholas 2016). At the national level, this stakeholder fatigue is often expressed as a
doubt REDD+ would endure and be able to achieve long-term success. This is how it was
noted by one informant, “There are so many problems we are dealing with to overcome
these REDD+ issues like local conflicts, either vertical conflict or horizontal conflict, or
law enforcement, corruption, licensing, there’s [so much].”—RespondentID-10396.
While many of these feelings about REDD+ were often specific to Indonesia’s context,
20
but also extended to the global perspective, “This is all incredibly difficult work. So to
not have made the progress anyone hopes, or even 10%, is not surprising…So, when I
say we all have failed, it's not really a criticism...it's just the way it is....it's certainly an
issue globally too.”—RespondentID-10374. While globally successful forest
management is a major challenge, some stakeholders seem to recognize that it is
particularly so in Indonesia’s context, “It's been really painful to watch actually, I feel
really bad for [Indonesia’s government]. You know, people underestimate how hard it is
to do certain things well. It's a ridiculously hard problem. Especially in a country like
Indonesia, where it's so resource dependent and corrupt.” RespondentID-10411.
At the community level stakeholder fatigue manifests as doubts promises would be met. Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) was developed as a way to make sure communities were fairly and ethically being involved in the process (Colchester 2010). In some cases well-meaning stakeholders, some of whom may have been doing their best to offer communities FPIC, may have approached communities years ago. However, when licenses take many years to obtain, or financing turned out to be difficult to find, communities may feel they have been made false promises and lose faith – a sentiment expressed by several of the communities included in our research. One village head said this, “I do not believe the benefits from [this project] will happen…How can I turn down the benefits offered by [the palm oil company] even if I know they’re bad? I think this [REDD+ project] will just be like every other group that’s come here with promises that have not been met.” RespondentID-10414.
Some stakeholders were even starting to suggest that their organizations were
moving away from REDD+ even if they were still interested in achieving outcomes. This
can be described as doubt in REDD+’s label, and in some cases stakeholders
disassociated their forest governance projects with the REDD+ label (William D.
Sunderlin, Ekaputri, et al. 2014; Enrici and Hubacek 2018). One respondent operating
within the Indonesian government directly stated that individuals from the former
Ministry of Forestry were not interested in being involved in REDD+, “REDD now is
forestry, but then the Ministry of Forestry says we don't want REDD. Because REDD is
21
now being managed by [other agencies]. For a long time I've always been saying...we
still have to have REDD. But, they don't want to use the term REDD.”-RespondentID-
10393. Other stakeholders had doubted REDD+ would be successful because similar
programs had not achieved what they set out to do, something that has also been
expressed in the literature (Redford et al. 2013).
Some stakeholders felt although there was much attention given to REDD+
nationally, this was not the case on the ground, “There's projects...but really if you look
at what's happening on the ground, it's not that much…some of them are also making
more noise than anything. -- RespondentID-10367. And another said, “REDD+ isn’t
happening yet…”—RespondentID-10405. Other stakeholders felt attention to REDD+ at
National and provincial levels, combined with a lack of action at project levels was part
of what caused stakeholder fatigue, “I get a lot of impressions from people and it seems
like Central Kalimantan has had so much focus on it...there is a bit of, a kind of REDD
fatigue there,...and frustration with all the things...happening.” — RespondentID-10370.
Related to stakeholder fatigue, lack of buy-in is stakeholders’ lack of belief that
REDD+ will be effective, and subsequent lack of interest in supporting projects and other
efforts. Analysis of Indonesia’s political context demonstrates REDD+ lacks support at
national and local government levels as well as among the public (Luttrell et al. 2014).
Respondents from our research expressed frustration at lack of buy-in by government
agencies at both national and local levels, but also many other stakeholders expressed a
lack of buy-in. Buy-in was discussed by respondents in two different capacities – first
their own lack of buy-in, and second their perception of a lack of buy-in from other
22
stakeholder groups. While these two aspects of buy-in were often mentioned separately,
there is a relationship between the two. Often informants would explain their own doubts
about REDD+ as being influenced by seeing a lack of buy-in from other stakeholder
groups. This is characterized in the following quote, by a stakeholder working at both
national and project levels,“ On one hand, [Indonesia’s Government] make[s] all these
public announcements about climate change, and they support this and they support that.
And then over here, it’s one concession after another for conversion to oil, and then they
don’t do anything about all the small-scale conversion….”.RespondentID-10419.
Frequently, comments such as above, about buy-in and concerns about how much
buy-in other stakeholder groups had were directed towards Indonesia’s Government at
both national and local scales. Concern about a lack of buy-in was voiced frequently
regarding local governments, as one stakeholder stated rather bluntly, “…buy-in from the
government [in that district] is still pretty weak.”RespondentID-10407. Other accounts
support these sentiments, include reports of a lack of enforcement experienced in national
parks and by some REDD+ projects at the local level (Yuliani et al. 2010; WWF 2013).
A variety of stakeholders expressed concern that plans for REDD+ in Indonesia had not
included ways to create buy-in or incentives for local governments, which ultimately
impacts how much local governments support REDD+. One national-level government
official explained it like this, ”There is no reason for these subnational governments to
buy-in, there is no buy-in at all. Why should they be interested in REDD? What is it
doing for them? Bupati [district heads] are only around for 5 years, they want some
kind of reward that'll happen when they're there.” – RespondentID-10413
23
Some stakeholders involved in running REDD+ projects were not even certain
their own projects would be successful. Such doubt has potential to undermine longevity
and commitment to achieving REDD+ outcomes. As one stakeholder stated, “ Not that
there's any success stories. You know, I think the stuff we're doing [at our REDD+
project], you know we really don't have it figured out there.”—RespondentID-10380.
Members of forest communities, extensively involved in some REDD+ projects also
expressed doubts about REDD+’s ultimate utility, “All I think we can really hope for is
ownership over our forest. These projects are only helping us a little.” – RespondentID-
10416. Other stakeholders felt challenges discussed above compounded the fact many
stakeholders failed to see, or believe, how REDD+ could benefit them, “There are so
many issues going on here…we have to find what the source of issues is first.”–
RespondentID-10385. Getting support and buy-in for REDD+ at all scales will be
necessary if REDD+ is to have any hope for success in the long run.
4.6 Hope for the future: REDD+ as a catalyst for change
While many REDD+ sentiments expressed by stakeholders were negative, there
were also positive reflections expressed by respondents. While many stakeholders have
doubts about the future of REDD+, many at least acknowledge some good has come
about as a result of REDD+ activities. Despite evidence REDD+ has not yet achieved the
ambitious goals of reducing Indonesia’s deforestation rate (WRI GFW 2016), some
actions towards forest governance reform have resulted from REDD+’s introduction and
the international attention it has drawn to Indonesia’s forests. These actions include the
presidential moratorium on new licenses (Busch et al. 2015), intensified discourse
24
regarding Indonesia’s sometimes problematic forest classifications (Enrici and Hubacek
2016), as well as continued international support for REDD+ efforts (Government of
Norway, Government of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany 2015).
One Indonesian stakeholder working at the national level framed the positive side
of REDD+ as increased interaction among the Indonesian government and other
stakeholder groups, “But in terms of the REDD process itself…I think a lot of good
things [are] happening when they engage various stakeholders. And I think that never
happened before”—RespondentID-10396. Another similar perspective is REDD+,
although different than its original design, is acting as a catalyst which will drive change
and help encourage policy reform and better forest management, shared by an Indonesian
stakeholder working at national and local levels, “ I really like the perspective, the idea
REDD is going to drive change.” – RespondentID-10499. Other stakeholders felt by
entering into projects for the long-term, there was a possibility for positive change. As
has been mentioned by many of the stakeholders interviewed for this study, working in
the Indonesian context requires perseverance and understanding. One foreign stakeholder
working at the national scale said, “ It’s almost a kind of a test of stamina here. A lot of
donors have decided to withdraw because they’ve just had enough…and for some
reason, we’ve stayed. So it’s almost like we have a good relationship because we’ve been
around the longest.”—RespondentID-10376. If REDD+ is to succeed it will be important
for NGOs and stakeholders to recognize both positive outcomes as well as shortcomings,
and for stakeholders to remain committed and work towards their goals in REDD+, even
in the face of challenges.
25
5 Conclusions
One of the most prominent themes of this research is that REDD+ is undergoing a
crisis of confidence in Indonesia. Few stakeholders at local, regional, national and
international levels have much faith REDD+ will be successfully realized in Indonesia in
the near future. This lack of confidence is likely compounded by the rest of our findings
that regulations are complex and sometimes confusing; there is a lack of funding;
corruption and enforcement are problematic; and a complicated cultural situation is
exacerbated by a need for more nuanced understanding by foreign stakeholders. Many
respondents working directly on REDD+ felt a serious lack of pathways for moving
forward and project implementation, something which likely added to delays in REDD+
development and may have exacerbated feelings of doubt.
At all levels, frustrations exist with corruption, governance, land tenure, slow
progress and bureaucracy. Furthermore, this research shows a widespread loss of faith in
REDD+’s central mission. Most stakeholders no longer believe the REDD+ mechanism
can compete with alternative land uses and that REDD+ can be a successful mechanism
using carbon markets to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. While
some actors are turning their backs on the REDD+ altogether, many actors are content to
use REDD+, and the recognition and funds it makes available, to achieve other long-term
goals such as biodiversity conservation and community rights.
However, despite all these challenges, there are some positive outcomes from
REDD+ and opportunities for the future. The introduction of REDD+ has arguably
increased attention to forestry challenges in Indonesia, and the program is potentially
26
acting as a catalyst for change. Furthermore, stakeholders who are able and willing to
persevere for the long-term may have better opportunities for future action. Despite all of
the challenges, two major conclusions can be drawn that would warrant future research
and may help efforts towards REDD+ and other conservation initiatives throughout
Indonesia: 1) Environmental governance work in Indonesia will require a long-term
perspective, stakeholders must adjust their expectations for how long implementation will
take and when they will see results; and (2) working on REDD+, and any kind of
environmental initiative, in Indonesia is going to require nuanced approaches within
Indonesia’s diverse contexts.
Compliance with Ethical Standards:Funding: This study was funded by the Fulbright Commission and a Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship from the University of Maryland. The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
References
Abood, Sinan A., Janice Ser Huay Lee, Zuzana Burivalova, John Garcia-Ulloa, and Lian Pin Koh. 2014. “Relative Contributions of the Logging, Fiber, Oil Palm, and Mining Industries to Forest Loss in Indonesia.” Conservation Letters. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12103/full.
Bakker, Laurens, and Sandra Moniaga. 2010. “The Space between: Land Claims and the Law in Indonesia.” Asian Journal of Social Science 38 (2): 187–203.
Barkmann, Jan, Günter Burkard, Heiko Faust, Michael Fremerey, Sebastian Koch, and Agus Lanini. 2010. “Land Tenure Rights, Village Institutions, and Rainforest Conversion in Central Sulawesi (Indonesia).” In Tropical Rainforests and Agroforests under Global Change, 141–160. Springer. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-00493-3_6.
Barr, Christopher M., I. A. P. Resosudarmo, A. Dermawan, John McCarthy, Moira Moeliono, and Bambang Setiono, eds. 2006. Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic Development, and Community Livelihoods. CIFOR. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-bh1QmnPD_cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=forest+concessions+sanctions+indonesia&ots=RnJsm167lp&sig=FnoVU9WCjYyrMZKqMGvlZATj7Eg.
27
Beckert, Barbara, Christoph Dittrich, and Soeryo Adiwibowo. 2014. “Contested Land: An Analysis of Multi-Layered Conflicts in Jambi Province, Sumatra, Indonesia.” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 7 (1): 75–92.
Bell, Gary F. 2003. “Indonesia: The New Regional Autonomy Laws, Two Years Later.” Southeast Asian Affairs, 117–131.
Blumenthal, Dana, and Jean-Luc Jannink. 2016. “A Classification of Collaborative Management Methods.” https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/handle/10919/66233.
Brockhaus, Maria, Krystof Obidzinski, Ahmad Dermawan, Yves Laumonier, and Cecilia Luttrell. 2012. “An Overview of Forest and Land Allocation Policies in Indonesia: Is the Current Framework Sufficient to Meet the Needs of REDD+?” Forest Policy and Economics 18 (May): 30–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.09.004.
Broich, Mark, Matthew Hansen, Fred Stolle, Peter Potapov, Belinda Arunarwati Margono, and Bernard Adusei. 2011. “Remotely Sensed Forest Cover Loss Shows High Spatial and Temporal Variation across Sumatera and Kalimantan, Indonesia 2000–2008.” Environmental Research Letters 6 (1): 014010.
Busch, Jonah, Kalifi Ferretti-Gallon, Jens Engelmann, Max Wright, Kemen G. Austin, Fred Stolle, Svetlana Turubanova, et al. 2015. “Reductions in Emissions from Deforestation from Indonesia’s Moratorium on New Oil Palm, Timber, and Logging Concessions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (5): 1328–33. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412514112.
Butler, Rhett A., Lian Pin Koh, and Jaboury Ghazoul. 2009. “REDD in the Red: Palm Oil Could Undermine Carbon Payment Schemes.” Conservation Letters 2 (2): 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00047.x.
Butt, Simon. 2011. “Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia: An Obituary?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 47 (3): 381–394.
Carbon Market Watch. 2016. “REDD Archive - Carbon Market Watch.” 2016. http://carbonmarketwatch.org/category/redd/.
Carlson, K. M., L. M. Curran, D. Ratnasari, A. M. Pittman, B. S. Soares-Filho, G. P. Asner, S. N. Trigg, D. A. Gaveau, D. Lawrence, and H. O. Rodrigues. 2012. “Committed Carbon Emissions, Deforestation, and Community Land Conversion from Oil Palm Plantation Expansion in West Kalimantan, Indonesia.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (19): 7559–7564.
Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis. Sage Publications Limited. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w2sDdv-S7PgC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=charmaz+grounded+theory&ots=p_qn0SGJav&sig=pcji1ThvK9n979FiCal9QhdS7kE.
———. 2011. “Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research.” The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 4: 359–380.
Charmaz, Kathy, and Liska Belgrave. 2002. “Qualitative Interviewing and Grounded Theory Analysis.” The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craft 2: 2002.
28
Climate Investment Funds. 2013. “FIP: REDD+ Stakeholder Collaboration.” https://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/knowledge-documents/fip_learning_product_redd_stakeholder_collaboration_0.pdf.
Colchester, Marcus. 2010. “Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Making FPIC Work for Forests and Peoples.” Research Paper 11.
Contreras-Hermosilla, Arnoldo, Chip Fay, Elfian Effendi, and Forest Trends. 2005. Strengthening Forest Management in Indonesia through Land Tenure Reform: Issues and Framework for Action. Forest Trends Washington, DC. http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/WCA2009/regions/southeast_asia/publications?do=view_pub_detail&pub_no=BK0092-05.
Convention on Biological Diversity. n.d. “Indonesia - Country Profile.” Convention on Biodiversity Country Profiles. Accessed December 2, 2018. https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/default.shtml?country=id.
Corbin, Juliet, and Anselm Strauss. 2007. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Sage Publications, Incorporated. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0TI8Ugvy2Z4C&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=strauss+corbin+qualitative+methods&ots=bkSihjTULw&sig=P2HtpL5q9P2Z7Tvd71pSguK7Ouw.
Dermawan, Ahmad, Elena Petkova, A. C. Sinaga, Mumu Muhajir, and Yayan Indriatmoko. 2011. Preventing the Risks of Corruption in REDD+ in Indonesia. CIFOR. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=K2czHGS_iIcC&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=Preventing+the+risks+of+corruption+in+REDD%2B+in+Indonesia&ots=1Sjq_KqXFo&sig=CG1dah9GI11-bOXRT_p2A-2cFsI.
Diana, Elyiza, and Hans Nicholas Jong. 2018. “End of Funding Dims Hopes for a Sumatran Forest Targeted by Palm Oil Growers.” Mongabay Environmental News, November 9, 2018. https://news.mongabay.com/2018/11/end-of-funding-dims-hopes-for-a-sumatran-forest-targeted-by-palm-oil-growers/.
Dixon, Rowan, and Edward Challies. 2015. “Making REDD+ Pay: Shifting Rationales and Tactics of Private Finance and the Governance of Avoided Deforestation in Indonesia.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 56 (1): 6–20.
Enrici, Ashley, and Klaus Hubacek. 2016. “Business as Usual in Indonesia: Governance Factors Effecting the Acceleration of the Deforestation Rate after the Introduction of REDD+.” Energy, Ecology and Environment 1 (4): 183–196.
———. 2018. “Challenges for REDD+ in Indonesia: A Case Study of Three Project Sites.” Ecology and Society 23 (2).
Ewing-Chow, Michael, and Junianto James Losari. 2015. “Multiple Authorisation: The Legal Complexity of Desentralisasi in Indonesia and the Potential Contribution of IIAs in Reducing Confusion.” Indonesia Law Review 5 (3): 241–256.
Faure, Michael, and Andri Wibisana. 2013. Regulating Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Harm. Edward Elgar Publishing. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xQsCAQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=Regulating+Disasters,+Climate+Change+and+Environmental+Harm&ots=0lIxr2YL9v&sig=Z4HACb6BaUE_Qp110icsXmu49KU.
29
Fauzi, Akhmad, and Zuzy Anna. 2013. “The Complexity of the Institution of Payment for Environmental Services: A Case Study of Two Indonesian PES Schemes.” Ecosystem Services 6: 54–63.
Fletcher, Robert, Wolfram Dressler, Bram Büscher, and Zachary R. Anderson. 2016. “Questioning REDD+ and the Future of Market-Based Conservation.” Conservation Biology 30 (3): 673–675.
Forrester, Geoff. 1999. Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? St. Martin’s Press.Galinato, Gregmar I., and Suzette P. Galinato. 2012. “The Effects of Corruption Control,
Political Stability and Economic Growth on Deforestation-Induced Carbon Dioxide Emissions.” Environment and Development Economics 17 (01): 67–90.
———. 2013. “The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Corruption Control and Political Stability on Forest Cover.” Ecological Economics 89: 153–161.
Gallemore, Caleb T., and Moira Moeliono. 2014. “Discursive Barriers and Cross-Scale Forest Governance in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” Ecology and Society 19 (2).
Galudra, Gamma, M. Van Noordwijk, Sardi Suyanto, I. Sardi, U. Pradhan, and D. Catacutan. 2011. “Hot Spots of Confusion: Contested Policies and Competing Carbon Claims in the Peatlands of Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” International Forestry Review 13 (4): 431–441.
Gaveau, David LA, Mrigesh Kshatriya, Douglas Sheil, Sean Sloan, Elis Molidena, Arief Wijaya, Serge Wich, et al. 2013. “Reconciling Forest Conservation and Logging in Indonesian Borneo.” PloS One 8 (8): e69887.
Global Canopy Programme. 2013. “The REDD Desk | A Collaborative Resource for REDD Readiness.” 2013. http://www.theredddesk.org/.
Government of Norway, Government of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany. 2015. “Joint Statement by Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Unlocking the Potential of Forests and Land Use.” In . http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/joint_statement_redd_cop21_en_bf.pdf.
Holloway, Vivienne, and Esteban Giandomenico. 2009. “The History of REDD Policy.” Carbon Planet White Paper, Adelaide, Australia.
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2013. “The Dark Side of Green Growth The Human Rights Impacts of Weak Governance in Indonesia’s Forestry Sector.” Human Rights Watch.
Indonesia Ministry of Forestry. 2014. “Forest Area Statistics 2013.” Jakarta: Indonesia Ministry of Forestry. http://www.dephut.go.id/uploads/files/2fba7c7da8536e31671e3bb84f141195.pdf.
Indrarto, Giorgio Budi, Prayekti Murharjanti, Josi Khatarina, Irvan Pulungan, Feby Ivalerina, Rahman Justitia, Nala Prana Muhar, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, and Efrian Muharrom. 2012. “The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, Agents and Institutions.” http://forestclimatecenter.org/files/2012-08-09%20The%20Context%20of%20REDD+%20in%20Indonesia.pdf.
30
Indriatmoko, Yayan, S. Atmadja, Andini Desita Ekaputri, and Mella Komalasari. 2014. “Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Project, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” In REDD+ on the Ground: A Case Book of Subnational Initiatives across the Globe. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia. http://www.cifor.org/library/5280/rimba-raya-biodiversity-reserve-project-central-kalimantan-indonesia/.
Johannsdottir, Lara, and Celine McInerney. 2016. “Calls for Carbon Markets at COP21: A Conference Report.” Journal of Cleaner Production 124: 405–407.
Jong, Hans Nicholas. 2015. “BP REDD+ Officially Disbanded - National - The Jakarta Post.” The Jakarta Post, January 29, 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/29/bp-redd-officially-disbanded.html.
Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. 2009. “Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?” World Development 37 (3): 521–532.
Krishna, Vijesh V., Unai Pascual, and Matin Qaim. 2014. “Do Emerging Land Markets Promote Forestland Appropriation? Evidence from Indonesia.” EFForTS Discussion Paper Series.
Kuncoro, Ari, Vid Adrison, Ifa Isfandiarni, and others. 2013. “Varieties of Governance of Public Goods Delivery in Indonesia: The Case of Roads after Decentralization and Local Democratization.” Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. http://econ.feb.ui.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/201301.pdf.
Larson, Anne M., Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin, Amy Duchelle, Andrea Babon, Therese Dokken, Thu Thuy Pham, et al. 2013. “Land Tenure and REDD+: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.” Global Environmental Change, April. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.02.014.
Luttrell, Cecilia, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Efrian Muharrom, Maria Brockhaus, and Frances Seymour. 2014. “The Political Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Constituencies for Change.” Environmental Science & Policy 35: 67–75.
Margono, Belinda Arunarwati, Peter V. Potapov, Svetlana Turubanova, Fred Stolle, and Matthew C. Hansen. 2014. “Primary Forest Cover Loss in Indonesia over 2000-2012.” Nature Climate Change. http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2277.html?utm_source=Daily+Carbon+Briefing&utm_campaign=1f7e4f67b5-DAILY_BRIEFING&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_876aab4fd7-1f7e4f67b5-303421281.
Margono, Belinda Arunarwati, Svetlana Turubanova, Ilona Zhuravleva, Peter Potapov, Alexandra Tyukavina, Alessandro Baccini, Scott Goetz, and Matthew C. Hansen. 2012. “Mapping and Monitoring Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Sumatra (Indonesia) Using Landsat Time Series Data Sets from 1990 to 2010.” Environmental Research Letters 7 (3): 034010.
McCarthy, John, and Moira Moeliono. 2012. “16 The PostAuthoritarian PoliticsofAgrarian and Forest Reform in Indonesia.” Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N-
31
rGBQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT427&dq=regulations+contradict+indonesia&ots=cfA2ulBtpG&sig=0nwdI48bWzxUlStTFylO_a-AeqM.
McFarland, Will, Shelagh Whitley, and Gabrielle Kissinger. 2015. “Subsidies to Key Commodities Driving Forest Loss: Implications for Private Climate Finance.” Overseas Development Institute.
Moeliono, Moira, Caleb Gallemore, Levania Santoso, Maria Brockhaus, and Monica Di Gregorio. 2014. “Information Networks and Power: Confronting the" Wicked Problem" of REDD+ in Indonesia.” Ecology and Society: A Journal of Integrative Science for Resilience and Sustainability 19 (2). http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/79135/.
(MoF) Ministry of Forestry Center for Forestry Planning and Statistics. 2009. “Indonesia Forestry Outlook Study.” APFSOS II/WP/2009/13. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.
Murdiyarso, Daniel, Sonya Dewi, Deborah Lawrence, and Frances Seymour. 2011. Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium: A Stepping Stone to Better Forest Governance? CIFOR. http://www.google.com/books?hl=id&lr=&id=tK4i9uUZz10C&oi=fnd&pg=PP5&dq=daemeter+moratorium&ots=zmxP6Fq_tR&sig=1SpYHsMAFRpw1YMuSs--dWt2854.
Natahadibrata, Nadya. 2013. “Government Recognizes Customary Forests.” The Jakarta Post, May 18, 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/18/government-recognizes-customary-forests.html.
Parlina, Ina, and Hans Nicholas. 2016. “Norway Slams Slow REDD+ Project Progress.” The Jakarta Post, February 4, 2016. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/04/norway-slams-slow-redd-project-progress.html.
Parry, Richard Lloyd. 2007. In the Time of Madness: Indonesia on the Edge of Chaos. Grove Press. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8imo5gPToE8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=chaos+indonesia&ots=mKW483MAZE&sig=CuM4p1l6lt8kjIlJJZq4ConEt1E.
Phelps, Jacob, Edward L. Webb, and Lian P. Koh. 2011. “Risky Business: An Uncertain Future for Biodiversity Conservation Finance through REDD+.” Conservation Letters 4 (2): 88–94.
Prasetyia, Ferry. 2012. “Corruption and Decentralisation: Some Evidence in Indonesia.” Journal of Indonesian Applied Economics 4 (1). http://jiae.ub.ac.id/index.php/jiae/article/view/121.
REDD Net. 2013. “REDD-Net: Networking for Equity in Forest Climate Policy.” REDD Net: Networking for Equity in Forest Climate Policy. 2013. http://www.redd-net.org/.
Redford, Kent H., Christine Padoch, and Terry Sunderland. 2013. “Fads, Funding, and Forgetting in Three Decades of Conservation.” Conservation Biology 27 (3): 437–438.
Resosudarmo, I. A. P., S. Mardiah, and N. Utomo. 2011. “Extractive Land Use, Spatial Planning and Their Implications for REDD+ in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis.” 3rd IRSA International Institute, Padang, 19–21.
32
Resosudarmo, Ida Aju Pradnja. 2004. “Closer to People and Trees: Will Decentralisation Work for the People and the Forests of Indonesia?” The European Journal of Development Research 16 (1): 110–132.
Resosudarmo, Ida Aju Pradnja, Stibniati Atmadja, Andini Desita Ekaputri, Dian Y. Intarini, Yayan Indriatmoko, and Pangestuti Astri. 2014. “Does Tenure Security Lead to REDD+ Project Effectiveness? Reflections from Five Emerging Sites in Indonesia.” World Development, Land Tenure and Forest Carbon Management, 55 (March): 68–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.015.
Romijn, Erika, John Herbert Ainembabazi, Arief Wijaya, Martin Herold, Arild Angelsen, Louis Verchot, and Daniel Murdiyarso. 2013. “Exploring Different Forest Definitions and Their Impact on Developing REDD+ Reference Emission Levels: A Case Study for Indonesia.” Environmental Science & Policy 33: 246–259.
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. 2016. “Norway-Indonesia REDD+ Partnership - Frequently Asked Questions.” Norway - the Official Site in Indonesia. July 20, 2016. http://www.norway.or.id/Norway_in_Indonesia/Environment/Questions--answers/#.V48A8I40rPc.
Sahide, M. A. K., S. Supratman, A. Maryudi, Y.-S. Kim, and L. Giessen. 2016. “Decentralisation Policy as Recentralisation Strategy: Forest Management Units and Community Forestry in Indonesia.” International Forestry Review 18 (1): 78–95.
Sills, Erin O., Stibniati S. Atmadja, Claudio de Sassi, Amy E. Duchelle, Demetrius L. Kweka, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, and William D. Sunderlin. 2014. REDD+ on the Ground: A Case Book of Subnational Initiatives across the Globe. CIFOR. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=co4UBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=REDD%2B+on+the+ground:+A+case+book+of+subnational+initiatives+across+the+globe&ots=KiZfg-8Ynm&sig=yPSBYceSHSiorExOIPwIs1xo8sI.
Simamora, Adianto P. 2011. “SBY Vows to Protect Palm Oil Interests.” The Jakarta Post, March 26, 2011. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/26/sby-vows-protect-palm-oil-interests.html.
Sloan, Sean, David P. Edwards, and William F. Laurance. 2012. “Does Indonesia’s REDD+ Moratorium on New Concessions Spare Imminently Threatened Forests?” Conservation Letters 5 (3): 222–231.
Smith, J., K. Obidzinski, S. Subarudi, and I. Suramenggala. 2003. “Illegal Logging, Collusive Corruption and Fragmented Governments in Kalimantan, Indonesia.” International Forestry Review 5 (3): 293–302.
Stevens, Caleb, Robert Winterbottom, Jenny Springer, and Katie Reytar. 2014. “Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change: How Strengthening Community Forest Rights Mitigates Climate Change.” World Resources Institute.
Streck, Charlotte. 2012. “Financing REDD+: Matching Needs and Ends.” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 4/6 Climate systems, 4 (6): 628–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2012.10.001.
Sunderlin, W. D., E. O. Sills, A. E. Duchelle, A. D. Ekaputri, D. Kweka, M. A. Toniolo, S. Ball, N. Doggart, C. D. Pratama, and J. T. Padilla. 2015. “REDD+ at a Critical
33
Juncture: Assessing the Limits of Polycentric Governance for Achieving Climate Change Mitigation.” International Forestry Review 17 (4): 400–413.
Sunderlin, William D., Andini Desita Ekaputri, Erin O. Sills, Amy E. Duchelle, Demetrius Kweka, Rachael Diprose, Nike Doggart, et al. 2014. The Challenge of Establishing REDD+ on the Ground: Insights from 23 Subnational Initiatives in Six Countries. Vol. 104. CIFOR. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5Ze2AwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=%22redd+on+the+ground%22&ots=5kyGEple-V&sig=285Ej7DHfI_A-v1cb7iTPFX-YNI.
Sunderlin, William D., Anne M. Larson, Amy E. Duchelle, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Thu Ba Huynh, Abdon Awono, and Therese Dokken. 2014. “How Are REDD+ Proponents Addressing Tenure Problems? Evidence from Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam.” World Development 55: 37–52.
Transparency International. 2011. “Forest Governance Integrity Report Indonesia.” Indonesia: Transperancy International. http://www.ti.or.id/media/documents/2011/11/23/f/a/faaa1-report_indonesia_final_rev.pdf.
UN REDD Programme. 2015. “UN_REDD Programme 2016-2020 Strategic Framework.” http://www.unredd.net/index.php?view=document&alias=14096-un-redd-pb14-2015-strategic-framework&category_slug=session-3-strategic-and-policy-issues&layout=default&option=com_docman&Itemid=134.
UN-REDD Programme. 2013. “Final Evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme In Indonesia.” United Nations REDD Programme. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwjjorirvLrNAhVCJ5QKHZZ_DRoQFggkMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unredd.net%2Findex.php%3Fview%3Ddownload%26alias%3D15077-final-evaluation-of-the-un-redd-programme-in-indonesia%26category_slug%3Dindonesia-187%26option%3Dcom_docman%26Itemid%3D134&usg=AFQjCNHnqpevUuEpNyMDp-pdnQo66OFDGw&sig2=VeOgXP3DJVdlf5-_X8GIMw.
———. 2018. “Regions and Countries Overview.” 2018. https://www.unredd.net/regions-and-countries/regions-and-countries-overview.html.
Vacik, Harald, Mikko Kurttila, Teppo Hujala, Chiranjeewee Khadka, Arto Haara, Jouni Pykäläinen, Päivi Honkakoski, Bernhard Wolfslehner, and Jukka Tikkanen. 2014. “Evaluating Collaborative Planning Methods Supporting Programme-Based Planning in Natural Resource Management.” Journal of Environmental Management 144: 304–315.
Virah-Sawmy, Malika, Jakub Stoklosa, and Johannes Ebeling. 2015. “A Probabilistic Scenario Approach for Developing Improved Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) Baselines.” Global Ecology and Conservation 4: 602–613.
Wadley, Reed L., and Michael Eilenberg. 2005. “Autonomy, Identity, and ‘Illegal’Logging in the Borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia.” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 6 (1): 19–34.
34
Walsh, Thomas A., YH Asmui, Y. Hidayanto, and A. B. Utomo. 2012. Supporting Ecosystem Restoration Concessions in Indonesia’s Production Forests: A Review of the Licensing Framework 2004-2012. Burung Indonesia-Climate and Land Use Alliance. http://www.climateandlandusealliance.org/uploads/PDFs/Working_Paper_ER_Licensing.pdf.
World Bank Group. 2013. “Emissions Reduction Program in Indonesia: A District-Wide Approach to REDD+.” June 25, 2013. https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/june2013/District%20Approach%20to%20REDD%20in%20Indonesia%20-%20FCPF%20Carbon%20Fund%20Jun_20.pdf.
WRI. 2018. “World Resources Institute | Understanding Indonesia’s OneMap Initiative.” February 2, 2018. https://www.wri.org/tags/understanding-indonesias-onemap-initiative.
(WRI GFW) World Resources Institute Global Forest Watch. 2016. “Indonesia | Global Forest Watch.” 2016. http://www.globalforestwatch.org/country/IDN.
(WWF Indonesia) World Wide Fund for Nature Indonesia. 2008. “Deforestation, Forest Degradation, Biodiversity Loss and CO2 Emissions in Riau, Sumatra, Indonesia.” One Indonesian Province’s Forest and Peat Soil Carbon Loss over a Quarter Cebtury and Its Plans for the Future. http://assets.panda.org/downloads/authors_and_methodology_of_riau_co2_report__25feb08_.doc.
(WWF) World Wide Fund for Nature. 2013. “Palming Off a National Park: Tracking Illegal Oil Palm Fruit in Riau, Sumatra.” http://awsassets.wwf.or.id/downloads/wwf_indonesia_palming_off_a_national_park_final.pdf.
Yuliani, L., Y. Indriatmoko, A. Salim, I. Z. Farid, M. Muhajir, L. B. Prasetyo, and V. Heri. 2010. “Biofuel Policies and Their Impact on Local People and Biodiversity: A Case Study from Danau Sentarum.” https://mahider.ilri.org/handle/10568/20773.
35