Abortion for or against?

7/28/2019 Abortion for or against?

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/abortion-for-or-against 1/4

Abortion

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/abortion.htm

MAIN ETHICAL ISSUES. The applied ethical issue of abortion involves a consideration of

the reasons for or against terminating the life of a fetus. Much has been written on the issue of

abortion both in the popular press and in the philosophical literature. The debate focuses on two

distinct issues: (1) whether a human fetus has a right to life, and, if so, (2) whether the rights of the mother ever override the fetus's right. Often the issues are discussed independently of each

other. Discussion of the first issue, regarding a fetus's right to life, usually draws on the concept of

moral personhood. A being is a morally significant person when it is a rights holder, and we are

under moral obligation to that being. For example, I am a morally significant person and am

entitled to the right to life, which others have a moral duty to acknowledge. The problem for

moral theorists is to establish a criterion that explains why I am a morally significant person, and

a fly or a worm is not a morally significant person.

Some religious philosophers suggest that we are morally significant persons at the moment

of conception. Nonreligious criteria include, when we first take the human form (in the fourth

month of pregnancy), when our organs become differentiated, and when the fetus can survive

outside the womb (both around the seventh month of pregnancy). Some philosophers suggest

more general criteria such as when a being is self-aware or rational. These criteria are not

exhibited until an infant is one or two years old. The criterion of personhood selected has decisive

implications on the morality of abortion. If personhood is conferred on a being at the moment of

conception, then, all things considered, aborting a fetus is immoral. On the other hand, if we

select a criterion such as self-awareness, then, all things considered, aborting a fetus is not

immoral. The challenge is in providing reasons in support of one criterion over another.

But even if we all could agree on a criterion of personhood, such as the moment of

conception, the abortion debate would not be over. For, questions arise about whether themother's right of self-determination overrides the rights of the fetus. It is the mother's body that

is affected by the pregnancy, and it is her emotional and social life that will be drastically altered

for at least the next nine months and beyond. These factors carry at least some weight. Other

potentially overriding factors complicate the rights of the fetus, such as whether the pregnancy

resulted from rape, or contraception failure. Arguments are required from both camps to

establish the relative weight of these factors.

Historically, attitudes about abortion and the moral status of a fetus have fluctuated.

Aristotle endorses abortion when writing that "when couples have children in excess, let abortion

be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these

cases depends on the question of life and sensation" (Politics, 7:16). The Hippocratic Oath states"Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion." The Jewish Talmud, compiled around

600 CE, holds that "an embryo is a limb of its mother" [Hulin 58a] and for the first forty days

after conception, the embryo is "simply water" [Yevamot 69b]. A fetus's life is of equal

importance to that of the mother's only "once its head has emerged (from her body)"[Mishna

Oholot 7:6].

Medieval theologians address the question of the moral status of a fetus by examining

whether the fetus has a human soul. Aquinas held that the fetus only gradually acquires a human

soul, and in the early stages of pregnancy is not technically human. The basis for Aquinas's view

is a position called hylomorphism, that is, that the human soul can only exist in a distinctly

human body. For example, a wooden chair cannot have a human soul. God, then, does notimplant the human soul in a fetus until it that fetus takes a distinctly human form. Aquinas

believed that this happened at about 40 days for males and 80 days for females. Scholars

speculate that the difference was based on the point at which male and female sex organs could be



observed in miscarriages. The implication is that one does not kill a human by aborting a fetus

prior to the point at which it obtains a soul. In the selection below, Aquinas describes the process

by which a fetus acquires a distinctly human soul. Following Aristotle's tripartite division of the

soul, Aquinas argues that the fetus first has only the vegetative soul, which allows it to take in

nutrition. For Aquinas, the fetus gets this directly from the father's semen, which follows the

natural mechanism by which life produces more life. Next, the fetus develops a sensitive soul,

which allows it to have sensations. Finally, though a special act of creation, God implants the

intellectual soul in the fetus, which supercedes and perfects the previous two souls. The

intellectual soul is what makes the fetus human.

During the Renaissance and modern period of philosophy, philosophers did not discuss the

topic of abortion in detail. However, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John

Locke implies that it "is part of the worship of God, not to kill another man; not to know more

women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not" (Essay, 1:2:19).

MARQUIS'S CRITIQUE OF ABORTION. In one of the most influential contemporary

critiques of abortion,"Why Abortion is Immoral" (1989), University of Kansas philosophy

professor Don Marquis argues that killing in general is wrong because it deprives an individual of

a future which contains value. Most abortions, therefore, are fundamentally immoral since they

deprive fetuses of a future containing value. Marquis addresses only the first of the above twoissues, and concludes that a human fetus has a right to life at the moment of conception. Marquis

begins by noting the pitfalls of both the traditional pro-life and pro-choice arguments on this

issue. Pro-life arguments begin noting facts, such as the fact that fetuses look like babies and

already have their complete genetic codes. As supportive arguments they note that it is wrong in

principle to kill a human being. The problem, Marquis argues, is that it is not clear that a fetus

qualifies as a human being (as opposed to a mere human growth, such as a cluster of cancer cells).

By contrast, typical pro-choice arguments begin with facts, such as the fact that fetuses are not

rational or social creatures. As supportive arguments they note that, in principle, it is wrong to

kill only rational and morally significant persons. The problem here, Marquis argues, is that

infants are also nonrational, thus, in principle, killing infants would be permissible on this view.

Both pro-life and pro-choice arguments flounder since they appeal to biological and psychological criteria of moral personhood. Marquis attempts to bypass this problem by isolating

the specific criterion which makes all killing wrong.

In general, killing is wrong because it deprives a being of its future. For example, I recognize

that Jones will have a future similar to my own, containing experiences of great value. To deprive

Jones of this is immoral. Marquis believes that the success of his theory hinges on whether his

account of wrongful killing fits our intuitions, and whether it is superior to rival accounts of

wrongful killing. In support of his criterion, he argues that killing generally is believed to be

among the worst crimes since it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime. Also,

people dying of AIDS or cancer report that their main tragedy is being deprived of a future. He

notes four points as further evidence that his criterion is consistent with our intuitions. First,

unlike many pro-life criteria, his criterion applies not only to human life, but to theoretically

possible extra-terrestrial life as well. Second, in keeping with the intuitions of some animal rights

advocates, his criterion may apply to higher animals. Third, in keeping with the intuitions of

defenders of mercy-killing, his criterion does not rule out euthanasia. Finally, unlike many

pro-choice criteria, his criterion makes infanticide wrong. Having established his general criterion

of wrongful killing, Marquis concludes that abortion is clearly wrong since it deprives a fetus of a

value-filled future (which would be a future similar to our own). He cautions that his argument

establishes only the prima facie wrongness of abortion, thereby allowing that there may be

overriding circumstances.

Marquis again notes that his criterion of wrongful killing will succeed only if rival criteria

fail. Turning to the rival criteria, he begins by criticizing a view he calls the desire account: killing

is wrong since it deprives us of our desire to live. For Marquis, this criterion fails since it implies



that it is permissible to kill people who lost their desire to live. Also, this criteria fails to recognize

that the goodness of life rests in our valuable experiences, not in the desire itself. He also finds

problems with a view he calls the discontinuation account: killing is wrong since it discontinues the

experiences of the victim. This criterion fails, though, since if Jones's life right now is bad

(although his future will be good), then killing Jones right now would be permissible.

Critics of Marquis might argue that it is not enough for the fetus to merely have a

value-filled future. It must have an interest in its future before it can have a right to it. For

example, some might argue that the fetus must be able to value its future. Marquis responds thatthis condition fails since it would make it permissible to kill someone in despair who no longer

valued her life. Michael Tooley has suggested that a being must have the capacity to care about its

continued existence. Marquis argues that, even when we are unconscious and unable to care about

anything, we still retain certain rights. Finally, Marquis addresses a possible counter-example

which the issue of contraception might pose to his criterion. For, if killing is wrong because it

deprives a future, then contraception would also be wrong since it deprives a future. This counter

example fails, though, since it would be arbitrary to select a single victim from among an egg and

millions of sperm.

THOMSON'S DEFENSE OF ABORTION. In "A Defense of Abortion," Massachusetts

Institute of Technology philosophy professor Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that, even if we grantthat fetuses have a fundamental right to life, in many cases the rights of the mother override the

rights of a fetus. Accordingly, abortions are permissible in cases of rape, life-threatening

pregnancies, and contraception failure. For the sake of argument, Thomson grants the initial

contention made by Marquis and others that the fetus has a right to life at the moment of

conception, even though she does not personally believe that a fetus has rights. She comments

that, for critics this is all that is needed to establish the immorality of abortion. However,

Thomson explains, it is not self-evident that the fetus's right to life will always outweigh the

mother's right to self-determination. She makes her point with the following illustration. Imagine

that you wake up one morning and find that you have been kidnapped, taken to a hospital, and a

famous violist has been attached to your circulatory system. You are told that the violinist was ill

and, in an emergency decision, you were selected to be the host because only you had thecompatible blood-type. The violinist will recover in nine months, but will die if disconnected from

you before then. Clearly, Thomson argues, you are not morally required to continue being the

host. This, she believes, parallels the situation of pregnancy by rape, and situations where the

mother has to spend nine months in bed.

Thomson next examines an extreme anti-abortion view which maintains that abortion is

impermissible even to save the mother's life. The rationale behind this view is that the child is

innocent, and killing the child would be active; on the other hand, letting the mother die would be

passive. Thomson criticizes that additional premises are needed to get to the conclusion that

killing the child is murder; but when formulated, such premises are not universally acceptable.

For example, it is an overstatement to say that directly killing an innocent person is always and

absolutely impermissible. She concludes that abortion is justified if the mother's life is in danger.

She then criticizes a modified extreme view: abortion is permissible to save the mother's life, but a

third party cannot perform the abortion, since the third party must be impartial. Thomson

criticizes that impartiality here is an illusion since the mother owns her body, and thus has first

rights; a particular bystander may not feel justified in intervening, but some authority will be

justified in performing the abortion.

Thomson continues by examining the notion of the right to life, and what it implies. Some

have suggested that the right to life is the right to be given the bare minimum of what one needs

for continued existence. She replies that if I need "the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on myfevered brow" to survive, I have no right to that. Some have also suggested that the right to life

means that one has the right not to be killed. This is inadequate, though, since frequently

dilemmas arise when one innocent life must be selected over another. Finally, she suggests that the



right to life means that one has the right not to be killed unjustly. Thus, if abortion is wrong, it

needs to be shown that it is unjust killing. In cases of rape and where the mother's life is in

danger, this cannot be shown.

Regarding abortion in non-life threatening and non-rape cases, the critic argues that when a

woman voluntarily has sex, and accidentally gets pregnant, she is partially responsible; and this

partial responsibility gives the fetus a right to her body. Thomson replies that if reasonable

contraception precautions are taken, then the woman does not give the fetus a right to her body.

Thus, abortion will be wrong only in those cases where pregnancy is intentional.

Returning to rape cases, Thomson notes that the fetus's right to life would not be any

stronger if the pregnancy lasted only one hour. Although the mother would be callous for not

bringing the pregnancy to term, she would still be in her rights. She concludes by noting the

unfair demands that society places on women by making them bring unintentional pregnancies to

term. In no other area of social conduct are people required to be such good Samaritans. It will

not help the critic to argue that the mother has a special responsibility which issues from her role

as a mother. For Thomson, a person does not have a special responsibility unless it has been

assumed by that person.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Robert M. Baird, ed., The Ethics of Abortion (Prometheus, 1989).

Jane English, "Abortion and the Concept of a Person"

Joel Feinberg, The Problem of Abortion (Wadsworth, 1984).

R.D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and Abortion (University of California Press, 1988).

B.W. Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Beacon Press,

1983).

J.C. Mohr, Abortion in America (Oxford University Press, 1978).

John T. Noonan Jr., The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives (1970).

L.W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton University Press, 1981).

Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford University Press, 1983).Mary Anne Warren, "The Abortion Issue"

IEP © 1996

Abortion for or against?

Documents

Transcript of Abortion for or against?