A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer - Part X

PART X

Living Off the Same Land,

Eating from the Same Pot

95. Can you give us an overview of the problems currently

confronting the peoples of Mindanao?

We are today confronted with a Mindanao whose population profile is ap-

proximately seventy-five percent settlers, their descendants included, twenty

percent Bangsamoro and five percent Lumad, three major segments of our

population who, especially the latter two, are not exactly happy with their mar-

ginalized situation.

The MILF-led Bangsamoro rebel-

lion is still very much active – a state

of war has been there since January

1997 and, believe it or not, they are

quite serious with independence –

and the guns are only temporarily si-

lenced by a tenuous ceasefire agree-

ment between the GRP and the MILF.

The Lumad are persistently call-

ing for the full implementation of IPRA, the law they helped nurture to fruition

which has enshrined their desired self-governance within their ancestral do-

main in accordance with their customary laws. Oh yes, this law (IPRA) says they

can title their ancestral domain! A century late but better late than never. And,

they have also started to visualize an autonomous region for themselves.

A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer [Part X] B. R. Rodil

of 19

96. From all indications, there seems to be a serious prob-

lem of relationship in Mindanao. What has been done

about it?

Yes, there is, indeed. Hand in hand with these conflicts of interests, there

lurks – because it is often not so obvious – deep-seated historical biases which

we have inherited from our colonial past and nurtured subsequently by our-

selves. I can say this with conviction because as team leader of the Mindanao

Regional Development Project’s research on the National Cultural Minorities of

Mindanao in the mid-70s I saw with my own eyes and discovered through my

own investigation the process by which the Lumad and the Moros lost their

lands to the settlers and other corporate interests. As Commissioner of the Re-

gional Consultative Commission in Muslim Mindanao in 1988, my public con-

sultations in my district brought me face to face with tons and tons of settler

prejudices against Muslims or Moros, and vice versa. Other commissioners un-

covered similar findings in their respective districts. As a regular member (in

1993-96) of the five-man Government Negotiating Panel that conducted formal

peace talks with the MNLF, I was there in the midst of conflicting climate of

opinions when the

controversy of SPCPD

exploded in the thir-

teen provinces enu-

merated in the Tripoli

agreement. Not eve-

ryone knew that

SPCPD means South-

ern Philippines Coun-

cil for Peace and De-

velopment, but no

matter, those who did

not like it opposed it

with grim determina-

tion, armed only with their negative sentiments. The NO opinions did not dwell

on the issues related to SPCPD, the focus was on what they did not like about


of 19

the Muslims! I am thus inclined to say, after 30 years of study and observation,

that the primary problem of our region is relationship; all others like economic

and political come as logical consequences or accumulations of the lack of re-

gard for the basic human dignity among the tri-people. By sheer weight of

numbers, the Lumad and the Bangsamoro generally have become the hapless

victims of social imbalance and in the same token, the settlers the beneficiaries.

Mindanao at this point in time is now a shared territory. Our only choice is

to live with each other in peace. In order for the region to move forward as

one, mutual respect and mutual acceptance among the tri-people is a must.

No single unit is to be left out by reason of number. The tri-people are the tri-

pod for cooking pot that is Mindanao. Take away one leg and the whole device

topples over. There is a long tradition among the varied peoples of the Philip-

pines for several families in one household to eat from the same cooking pot.

We are no strangers to sharing. We can regard Mindanao as our common cook-

ing pot to the filling of which everyone must contribute and from which every-

one can eat.

Two specific solutions have emerged so far for the two aspects of the same

problem of relationship. For the issue of armed rebellion, it seems best for the

government to hold formal

peace talks with organized

rebel groups, the MILF, in

this instance. Measured in

money terms, this process

now called peace process is

without question less costly

than war. Measured in moral

and other social standards,

resolving conflict among our

own citizens through peace-

ful means will build our character as a nation on solid moral grounds. Or put in

another way, it will reveal how profoundly we value human life – are we a nation

of warmongers or a nation of peacemakers?


of 19

For the question of deep-seated prejudices among the people, there is a

whole wide arena for people’s initiatives, for people to people dialogues (or

trialogues for that matter). There are no rules here, only goodwill.

This section will cover efforts in the last quarter of a century to restore

severed relationships: the status of the formal peace process with the MNLF and

the MILF, and the people’s initiatives in the creation of the culture of peace.

97. What is the status of the formal peace process between

the government and the MNLF?

To get a good view of the status, we need to do a quick review of the for-

mal process from the beginning.

Although the formal peace talks between the government and the MNLF

were made up of the five distinct phases – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1975; Tripoli,

Libya in 1976; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1987; Exploratory Talks in Tripoli, Libya

and Cipanas, Indonesia in 1992, and Jakarta in 1993-96 – these five may be

broken down to a three-tiered process, the Tripoli agreement in 1976, the Jed-

dah accord in 1987 and the Final Peace Agreement in 1996.

The first paragraph of the Tripoli Agreement established an autonomous

region for the Muslims of Southern Philippines “within the realm of the sover-

eignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines,” and the se-

cond paragraph specified its territory as the thirteen provinces of Davao del

Sur, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, Cotabato, Lanao del Sur,

Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-

Tawi and Palawan.

The document is divided into three major segments. The first segment

consisting of paragraphs one and two establishes the autonomous region for

the Muslims of Southern Philippines and defines its territory as the thirteen

provinces cited above. The second segment delineates in thirteen sub-

paragraphs the substance of the autonomy. Sub-paragraph one is on foreign


of 19

policy; two on defense; three on judicial system; fourth on education; fifth on

administrative system; sixth on economic and financial system; seventh on the

right of representation in the central government; eight on regional security

force; ninth on legislative and executive; tenth on mines and mineral resources;

eleventh on the creation of the mixed committee; twelfth on ceasefire; thir-

teenth on the meeting of the mixed committee subsequent to the signing; four-

teenth on the signing of the final agreement in Manila; fifteenth on the provi-

sional government and, sixteenth on the implementation of the entire agree-

ment.

Notice that the sub-paragraphs two to teen lack details which is why para-

graph 11 provides for a mixed committee whose specific task is precisely to fill

in these details. Paragraph one is a settled issue that foreign policy is within

the competence of the central government. Paragraph 16 puts the full weight

of implementation on the government by saying: “The Government of the Phil-

ippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation

of the entire Agreement.”

Why did it take full twenty years before the full implementation of the

agreement? The main bone of contention is the meaning of “constitutional pro-

cesses.” President Marcos insisted on conducting a plebiscite to decide which

of the thirteen provinces would want to be part of the autonomous region. This

is a given in the Philippine political system; a plebiscite is a fundamental requi-

site in the creation of political units, whether, barangay, municipal, provincial or

an autonomous region. The MNLF flatly rejected it at that time (and consistent-

ly upheld this position until the Final Peace Agreement of 1996). The mixed

committee met in Jeddah but the two parties never arrived at any agreement on

the details. Thus, Marcos felt justified to unilaterally pursue his version of the

agreement. He held a plebiscite in April 1977, resulting eventually in the crea-

tion of two autonomous regions, Region IX and Region XII with five provinces

each. Davao del Sur, South Cotabato and Palawan allegedly opted not to be

part of the autonomous region. Bitter, MNLF chairman Nur Misuari declared

that they were reverting to independence.

This was the situation when President Corazon Aquino assumed the presi-

dency in 1986. Moves by both government and MNLF at this time were, techni-


of 19

cally, a deviation from the Tripoli document. First, there was the Jeddah accord

where both parties, the GRP and the MNLF, agreed “to continue discussion of

the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-

Tawi and Palawan, subject to democratic processes.” No agreements were

reached in the subsequent negotiations. Second, the government, without offi-

cial MNLF participation, went into full implementation of the new constitution,

which contains specific provisions on how to put in place the Autonomous Re-

gion in Muslim Mindanao. The President created the Regional Consultative

Commission which helped draft the organic act for Muslim Mindanao. Based on

this draft, Congress enacted R.A. 6734. After the plebiscite of November 1989,

the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao was in place. But as far as the

MNLF and the OIC are concerned, the Tripoli Agreement had yet to be imple-

mented.

One of the first acts of President Fidel V. Ramos when he assumed office

was to put the formal talks back on track. He organized a team to conduct ex-

ploratory talks with the MNLF in 1992, first in Tripoli, Libya and then in

Cipanas, Indonesia. They agreed on the agenda for the resumption of the for-

mal negotiations; this lasted for three years.

On 2 September 1996, twenty years after the signing of the Tripoli docu-

ment, the two parties had, at last, the final agreement on its implementation.

All three parties who signed the first document now appear also as signatories:

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the Moro National Lib-

eration Front (MNLF), and the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial

Committee of the Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic

Conference.

The Final Peace Agreement was divided into two phases. Phase I, the Tran-

sitional Period, covers a three-year period starting after signing the Peace

Agreement, and Phase II entails the enactment of an amended organic act with-

in two years from the establishment of the SPCPD, the installation of a new au-

tonomous government and the expansion of its territory as determined by the

result of a plebiscite.


of 19

The two main elements in Phase I were (a) the creation of the Southern

Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) which was to swerve as

the transitory body to enable the MNLF to settle down, as it were, in the busi-

ness of governance and in re-establishing themselves in normal life, and, (b)

the joining of 7,500 MNLF forces into the Armed Forces of the Philippines and

the Philippine National Police: 5,750 MNLF members were to be integrated into

the AFP, 250 absorbed into the auxiliary services, and 1,500 MNLF integrated

into the PNP and 250 were to be absorbed into the auxiliary services. The OIC

provided its counterpart in the Joint Monitoring Committee to oversee the im-

plementation of the peace agreement.

The integration process took more time than agreed upon, but by the first

quarter of 2003, the entire process was completed. The legislative process for

the amendment of the organic act, too, took more time – almost three years –

than was prescribed in the agreement; the plebiscite was finally held on 14 Au-

gust 2001. A few months later, the ARMM election took place and a new set of

officials were elected. Dr. Parouk Hussin, a Tausug from Sulu, was and still is

the new Regional Governor; Vice Governor is Dr. Mahid Mutilan from Lanao del

Sur. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi opted to be added to the

territory of the autonomous region.

At this point in time, both GRP and MNLF have yet to come to terms

about whether or not the peace agreement has been fully implemented. The

MNLF claims that several items in the document have yet to be done; the GRP

says that it has done its part fully, to the letter.

98. What major agreements have been reached between the

GRP and the MILF?

From the first meeting on 27 January 1997 to October 2003, there have

been numerous agreements between the GRP and the MILF, but only a few of

which may be regarded as major. The first major breakthrough was the

Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities on 18 July 1997. In November

of that same year, they signed the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the


of 19

same. But apparently this did not amount to much because from January 1997

until 2003 there had been more armed clashes than peace talks.

The meeting on 25 October 1999, tough merely a ritual, is significant in

that it produced the Joint Statement for the Formal Opening of the Peace Talks

that, at last, the two parties were entering into the formal phase of the negotia-

tions – meaning that all this time, from January 1997, all meetings could only

be described as preparatory or exploratory. Again, armed encounters marred

the talks, until it finally rapidly developed into what we all know now as Presi-

dent Joseph Estrada’s declaration of an all-out war against the MILF in March

2000. From March to July of that year, the Armed Forces of the Philippines,

overrun all 46 camps of the MILF, the last to fall being Camp Abubakar, the

main stronghold of the rebel group.

Talks were suspended, but apparently there have been back-channeling

activities going on. Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Presidential Adviser on the Peace

Process, signed a document with Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, Chair of the MILF Peace

Panel, on 24

March 2001, for

the resumption of

the stalled peace

talks between the

GRP and the MILF.

A highlight of this

document was the

commitment by

both parties “to

honor, respect

and implement all

past agreements

and other supplementary agreements signed by them.”

A clear forward movement was made on 22 June 2001 when the two par-

ties signed another document in Tripoli, Libya, wherein they zeroed in on three

key aspects of the talks: Security, Rehabilitation and Ancestral Domain, thus

setting the clearest and most specific direction of the negotiation, so far. It will


of 19

be useful for those who would like to monitor developments to cite the perti-

nent provisions here.

Under Security, the provisions are:

1. All past agreements of the parties shall be implemented in accord-

ance with the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resump-

tion of the Peace Talks signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 24

March 2001 for the progressive resolution of the Bangsamoro prob-

lem with honor, justice and integrity for all sectors of society.

2. The negotiation and peaceful resolution of the conflict must involve

consultations with the Bangsamoro people free of any imposition in

order to provide chances of success and open new formulas that

permanently respond to the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people

for freedom.

3. The Parties agree to invite representatives of the Organization of Is-

lamic Conference (OIC) to observe and monitor the Implementation

of all GRP-MILF Agreements. The Parties further agree to strengthen

the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities date

18 July 1997. Upon signing of this Agreement, a Monitoring Team

shall be constituted with representatives from the OIC.

Under Rehabilitation, four provisions follow:

1. The observance of international humanitarian law and respect for

internationally recognized human rights instruments and the pro-

tection of evacuees and displaced persons in the conduct of their

relations reinforce the Bangsamoro people’s fundamental right to

determine their own future and political status.

2. The MILF shall determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and de-

velopment projects in conflict affected areas, except when public

funds are involved, in which case Government procedures and rules

will be observed.


of 19

3. The parties shall safely return evacuees to their place of origin,

provide all the necessary financial/material and technical assistance

to start a new life, as well as allow them to be awarded reparations

for their properties lost or destroyed by reason of the conflict.

4. In order to pave the way for relief and rehabilitation of evacuees

and implementation of development projects in the areas affected

by conflict, the parties agree to implement the GRP-MILF Agree-

ment on the General Cessation of Hostilities dated 18 July 1997.

There is only one paragraph under Ancestral Domain, which follows:

On the aspect of ancestral domain, the parties, in order to address the humanitarian and economic needs of the Bangsamoro people and preserve their social and cultural heritage and inherent rights over

their ancestral domain, agree that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting.

The highlight of the subsequent agreement on the implementing guide-

lines on the security aspect, signed on 7 August 2001, was – aside from the

usual technical matters affecting ceasefire, like the definition of “hostilities,”

“prohibited hostile acts” and “prohibited provocative acts,” and the participation

of the OIC monitoring team – the creation of Local Monitoring Teams (LMT).

This institutionalizes the participation of the local people in the peace process.

They agreed that the LMT shall be composed of five members, one each from

the following: (a) representative from the local government units, designated by

the GRP; (b) representative from the MILF local political committee; (c) repre-

sentative from the NGOs nominated by the GRP; (d) representative from the

NGOs nominated by the MILF, and (e) representative from the religious sector,

chosen under mutual agreement. The LMTs shall designate their respective

chairman and co-chairman.

Things seem to be going well for a while, serious preparations were being

made for the resumption of talks. The GRP, for one, was particularly interested

in the possibility of coming up with a draft final agreement as the subject for

the next meeting. But then a new round of major hostilities broke out in Feb-


of 19

ruary 2003 in Buliok, Pikit, Cotabato, spilling over into other areas of central

Mindanao, including Lanao del Norte.

At this point both sides are making preparations for a discussion, for the

first time, of ancestral domain. There is news that the ceasefire guidelines have

been refined to prevent another outbreak of hostilities similar to Buliok.

99. Have there been assessments made on the formal

peace process between the GRP and the Bangsamoro

revolutionary groups?

Here, we can only give comments on the GRP-MNLF peace processes. The

GRP-MILF is still ongoing and it is premature to offer any evaluation about it at

this point. Also, we can only include here government observations because

these are available. We have yet to find a similar document put out by the

MNLF.

Stories have been told by no less than MNLF Chairman Misuari himself

that he cried when he affixed his signature to the Tripoli Agreement, implying

that accepting autonomy within the territorial integrity of the Republic of the

Philippines and the framework of the Philippine constitution was not exactly

what he had dreamed of. But being under pressure from the OIC, he had no

choice but to sign. What exactly did he mean by this?

Then Undersecretary of Defense Carmelo Barbero, chair of the GRP Panel

submitted his own official assessment of the negotiation in 1976. It was a long

one and we cannot print it in full here. We are excerpting the first five observa-

tions without alterations. He reveals from first hand the government viewpoint,

long kept from public scrutiny, especially the difficulties they had to undergo.

The personalities he mentioned were the people he had to deal with. Dr. Ali

Treki was the Libyan foreign minister who was presiding over the talks; Secre-

tary General Dr. Karim Gaye was there as OIC representative; Colonel Muammar

Khadaffy was and still is the president of Libya.266


of 19

1. Throughout the negotiations, Dr. Ali Treki was the dominant fig-

ure, in his role as conference chairman. The RP panel was actually

negotiating with him, not with Misuari. Misuari himself was totally

subservient to Treki, and was allowed to speak only three times dur-

ing the entire conference. Likewise, any illusions which we might

have harbored before the negotiations that Secretary General Dr.

Karim Gaye exerted at least some amount of independent influence

with the Islamic Conference as regards this issue, were completely

shattered, after our observance of his complete deference to Treki.

The three other members of the Committee of Four also seemed

ready to blindly follow the lead of Libya insofar as this question is

concerned.

2. It was apparent, at every stage of the negotiations, that Col.

Khadaffy and Libya were determined to make the talks successfully

solved the problem before the eyes of the Islamic Conference. This

bolsters the belief of the undersigned as well as those who went on

the First Lady’s visit to Libya, that Khadaffy had been sold on the

Third World challenge and was therefore ready to consolidate ties

with the Philippines, but only if Libya could find a face-saving de-

vice which would enable her to still face the Islamic world with

some pride.

3. On the other hand, the Libyans did not leave any trace of doubt in

our mind that they would also strike back with full force, should

they be embarrassed by a breakdown of the talks. They seemed to

imply that any half, or part success, was no success at all, bearing

in mind, perhaps that the longer the matter was left hanging, the

more the MNLF would lose its bargaining leverages, to the eventu-

al embarrassment of Libya. It seemed, therefore, imperative to the

Libyans that some form of settlement of the problem be in effect by

the time the Eight Islamic Conference meets in Tripoli in May, any-

thing less than this implied failure, as far as they were concerned.

4. In view of all these, it was therefore only logical that the threats

which were brought to bear against the Philippine Government by

Libya and the Islamic Conference during the moments of impasse

in the negotiations were never more unequivocal and straightfor-

ward as they have ever been. More ominously, whenever Treki ex-

pressed these threats, there appeared to be unanimous expressions

of approval from the Secretary General and the other three repre-

sentatives of the Committee of Four. The new elements of the

threats which were expressed on two different occasions, were as


of 19

follows: (a) complete blame on the RP government for the failure of

the negotiations; (b) recommendation to Islamic Conference to stop

all negotiations with the Philippine government; (c) elevation of the

matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations; and (d) ap-

plication of economic sanctions against the Philippines.

It was, and still is, the opinion of the undersigned that Libya and

the Islamic Conference are very much capable, at present, of carry-

ing out these threats, and the thought of the possible damage to the

Philippine government of the eventuality of these threats indeed be-

ing carried out, weighed heavily upon the undersigned in his con-

duct of the negotiations.

5. As we had been warned by the members of the First Lady’s mission,

Libya, as the host country, used all available physical and psycho-

logical means in order to achieve maximum advantage for them

and for the Misuari group. All scheduling was controlled by the

Libyans, as well as all movements, appointments, and even

mealtimes. Even the crateful of supplies which was brought along

as accompanied luggage, was intentionally withheld from the dele-

gation for almost five days. As such it is an understatement to say

that the RP Panel was negotiating under the worst possible physical

and psychological circumstances. The same circumstances should

be expected by the RP panel which will return to Tripoli on Febru-

ary 5.

Undersecretary Barbero proceeded with more observations:

Comparing the original objective of the delegation to what has actu-

ally been accomplished by it, it seems clear that the RP Panel was

highly successful in achieving what it set out to do.

It must be admitted that the Philippine Government has had to pay

the necessary price of sitting down officially and signing an agree-

ment with a rebel group which it sought to completely disregard be-

fore. Concessions to this group also had to be made, in terminolo-

gies perhaps more palatable to the Libyans than to the Filipinos, to

afford the Libyans their much needed face-saving device. But in es-

sence, there is nothing to indicate that the implementation of the

terms of the agreement would be beyond the future actual control by

the Philippine government.

Much more has been achieved on the more favorable side of the

balance sheet. A ceasefire has been drawn up with a separate com-


of 19

muniqué, promising the saving of thousands of valuable Filipino

lives, as well as resources. The goodwill of the 42-member Islamic

Conference has been assured as evidenced by the very generous

words of praise from both President Khadaffy and Dr. Treki, as well

as from the Secretary General, for the cooperation shown by Presi-

dent and Mrs. Marcos and the Philippine government. There has

been a pledge from no less than Libya of sponsorship of the Philip-

pines as an observer in the Eighth Islamic Conference to be held in

Tripoli. As most tangible sign of the fruits that we are beginning to

reap, the Department of Foreign Affairs only yesterday received a

cable from Dr. Treki informing them of the coming arrival of Mr.

Mohammad Dreiza and his staff, to open the Libyan Embassy in

Manila.

President Fidel V. Ramos, too, had four pages of very interesting observa-

tions – he calls them lessons – of the peace process in his time. Again, we can-

not accommodate everything, so we will only pick some for our purposes; they

are not numbered in his book, but we number them here for convenience.267

We encourage those who are interested to read his account of the entire pro-

cess from 1992 to 1996.

1. There was a focus by both sides on commonalities, rather than disagree-

ments. I could say that the plenary sessions at times proved to be highly

contentious, but the committee level discussions were, in large measure,

more problem-solving working sessions leading to common objectives.

The latter dispensed with the usual ceremony and formalities, and

brought the issues to a more focused, down-to-earth level.

2. The way issues are ranked and tackled in the agenda is most important.

Both the panels and the facilitators agreed early enough not to frontload

the talks with highly contentious political issues. By focusing first on the

moderate ones, goodwill and rapport were steadily built; as greater trust

and confidence set in, the major items could be handled with better un-

derstanding and accommodation.

3. In the search for innovative solutions, one must strive to explore the mul-

ti-faceted angles of a single idea. In the case of the SPCPD, it will be re-

called that even the Aquino administration had a similar concept in mind

when it proposed the creation of a “Provisional Autonomous Council” to

the MNLF in lieu of the “provisional government.” At the earlier stages

of the negotiation, in 1994, the GRP Panel proposed an “Advisory Coun-

cil for Regional Autonomous Government Affairs” as a supportive ad-

ministrative option. These have roots in the same institutional idea. The


of 19

strategy is to keep on turning the idea around until finally, the peg fits in-

to the hole and becomes acceptable to everybody.

4. Third party facilitation is indispensable if the parties are poles apart on

fundamental political issues. In the case of the GRP-MNLF Talks, Gov-

ernment needed the participation of the OIC not as much as to demon-

strate its sincerity, but to show that its positions stood for universally-

accepted principles such as Constitutionalism, Sovereignty, Territorial

Integrity and Democratic Processes.

5. There is an informal structure of relationships, friendships and shared

sentiments that is present in every organized negotiations. The Govern-

ment peace team built bridges not only across the main table, but on the

level of the Support Committees and on the ground through the joints

ceasefire teams. The GRP and the MNLF counterparts dined together

and often had coffee fellowships at every opportunity. As friendships

broadened and deepened, so did the will to push forward and win the

peace.

6. The selection of the negotiating team is also important. There must be a

combination of stature, statesmanship, generosity and the “human

touch,” as well as competence and professional seriousness in the group.

Hard work must go into written plans and strategies, consistent lines of

approach and effective advocacy. Negotiators must also be backed up by

the best technical support from the government, especially from the Cab-

inet. They must have full access to decision-makers in various depart-

ments and institutions, all the way to the top, avail of policy expertise

when needed and must be accorded sufficient autonomy to make deci-

sions within the general guidelines given to them.

7. When the going gets rough, relax for a while and given the difficult sit-

uation time to settle down. There are many downsides to a negotiation

and there are times when futility begins to set in. Complete faith in one’s

own ideals, those of the participants and most of all, the Almighty, does

wonders to reduce the bad “vibes” and calm the stormy weather.

One will notice that the spirit of the process in 1976 tended to be adver-

sarial, and triumphalist. That seems to be the mood at that time. Both sides

were still fresh and smarting from the heat of combat, as it were. The one in

1992-96 was conciliatory, even humble. President Ramos’s instruction, as ex-

emplified by the quotation below, to the GRP Negotiating Panel may have set

the tone, at least for the GRP side.

The conduct of the formal talks shall be in line with the aim of the na-

tional comprehensive peace program to seek a principles and peaceful


of 19

resolution of armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with

dignity for all.268

We shall await the time when the MNLF will reveal how it was at their end.

But certainly, on the morning of the signing of the Final Peace Agreement at

Malacanang, all smiles seemed ecstatic; goodwill and hope became one.

100. What has been the reaction from the Lumad communi-

ties with respect to the formal peace negotiation be-

tween the Government and the MNLF/MILF?

Alarmed that their lives are also affected by the negotiation, they have

been expressing their desire to be heard, too, and have been demanding par-

ticipation in the process, but more loudly in the time of the GRP-MILF talks.

What is it exactly that they want? Relevant portions of a recent manifesto may

be cited here. Aptly entitled Agenda for Peace of the Lumad of Mindanao and

written in Cebuano Bisaya language, the lingua franca, the document is the uni-

fied stand of sixty-seven leaders from twenty tribes who took part in the Min-

danao Indigenous Peoples

Peace Forum on 17-19 Janu-

ary 2001 in Davao City. The

English version here is my

translation.

They describe in what

way they have been affected

by the armed conflict. The

encounters of between Armed

forces of the Philippines (AFP)

and the Moro Islamic Libera-

tion Front (MILF), between the

AFP and the New People’s Ar-

my (NPA) within their ancestral domain have had devastating results: “many

lives were lost, many properties, domesticated animals, and farm crops were


of 19

destroyed. Due to unbearable fears, were compelled to evacuate and abandon

our sources of livelihood. But at the evacuation centers, the government did

not respond to our basic needs. We experienced hunger, crisis and sickness,

especially among the children.”

Desperate, their reactions have been varied. Some of them joined groups

“with varying ideologues even if such were inconsistent with indigenous desires,

dreams and aspirations in accord with our lifestyle.” This affiliation brought di-

vision among them.

Not only these, they also recall that there have been

“violations of dyandi and pakang, pacts earlier entered into by our

elders with those of the Maguindanao Moros prior to the estab-

lishment of government in Mindanao, in which both parties recog-

nized the territorial boundaries between said Lumad and the Mo-

ro…today these boundaries are not being acknowledged. In fact

we the Lumad who are encompassed within the Autonomous Re-

gion in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) are aware that we are not free

to claim our ancestral domains and to implement our cultures and

traditions.”

And so, they conclude that the “the root cause of the absence of peace

among us is the continuing threat to our ancestral domain and the degradation

of our culture.”

Among these threats to their ancestral domains are projects, commercial

and government development activities such as “plantations, logging conces-

sions, dams, geo-thermals, mines, cattle ranches, or…eco-tourist spots.” They

are made to understand that these are “for development” but upon closer ex-

amination, the projects “diffuse our right to a peaceful life within our ancestral

domain and weaken our authority to govern our own tribe.”

Firmly emphasizing that they have the “capability to determine our life and

search for solutions to the difficulties we face,” they declare their preparedness

“to sit with the MILF, the CPP/NDF-NPA and the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines (GRP) to deliberate on the true, comprehensive and lasting peace


of 19

in Mindanao.” Hence, their strong request for “consistent participation of the

tribe in the peace process.”

To date, despite their demand for representation in the panel itself, the

most that the government negotiating panel in the talks with the MILF has done

is to allow one Lumad representative to sit in the technical working group on

ancestral domain.

Finally, they urge Congress to enact a law (this is new!)

“declaring the territories of the Lumad in Mindanao as Autonomous

Region, including those communities which are encompassed within

the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in order that

the Lumad will be able to establish and strengthen their own self-

governance within their territory, and in order that they will be able to

take care of and protect the natural resources of their ancestral do-

main, and also strengthen their culture.”

101. What has been the position of the Christian popula-

tion?

There was popular confusion in the first quarter of 1977 when, for the

first time, the issue of Muslim autonomy was introduced to the public for open

discussion. Hardly anyone, not even academics, knew what autonomy was all

about.

In the systematic survey conducted in 1988 by a consortium of five uni-

versities in Mindanao (Xavier University, Ateneo de Davao University, Notre

Dame University in Cotabato City, Mindanao State University and Western Min-

danao State University), on Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao in the 13 provinces

enumerated in the Tripoli agreement, one of the questions was: “Would you like

your municipality to be part of the proposed Muslim Autonomous Region?”

Majority of the Muslim respondents (96%), said YES, majority of the Lumad –

called Tribals in the questionnaire (92.5%) said NO, and majority of the Chris-

tians (98.6%) said NO.


of 19

This pattern found confirmation in the public consultations undertaken

by the Regional Consultative Commission, also in the same thirteen provinces

in 1988. The eight Christian-dominated provinces took the NO position with

respect to inclusion in the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. Only the

five Muslim-dominated provinces said YES.

The same trend appeared in the results of the November 1989 plebiscite,

with the inexplicable exception of Marawi City and Basilan which voted for ex-

clusion. But later, in the August 2001 referendum, these two voted YES.

What must be noted here is the public outcry against inclusion in SPCPD

in 1996. The opposition came mostly from the same eight Christian-

dominated provinces, their component cities included.

The main argument was their refusal to be “dominated by Muslims,” but

the evidences put forward were mostly expressions of deep-seated prejudices

against Muslims, so unpalatable that we cannot put them in print here. But this

brings us to the next chapter.

A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer - Part X

Documents

Transcript of A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer - Part X