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A Political Reading of Aristotle's Treatment of Pleasure in the Nicomachean EthicsAuthor(s): Aristide TessitoreSource: Political Theory, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 247-265Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191251 .

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A POLITICAL READING

OF ARISTOTLE'S TREATMENT

OF PLEASURE IN THE

NICOMA CHEAN ETHICS

ARISTIDE TESSITOREAssumption College

I. THE DOUBLE A CCOUNT OF PLEASURE

One of the most puzzling aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics is that itincludes two distinct treatments of pleasure: Book VII, 11-14, and BookX, 1-5. Neither discussion mentions the other; and, although the issuesand arguments presented in each account overlap, they are sufficientlydifferent as to raise a question concerning their compatibility.

A mountain of modern scholarship has been generated in the effort toaddress the problems posed by this part of Aristotle's treatise. At the riskof oversimplifying, it is possible to extract two authors who best framethe scholarly debate. The first, A. J. Festugiere, argues that thedouble account of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics repeats too muchto belong to the same work and, by the same argument, must beregarded as the work of the same author. He maintains that the secondaccount in Book X represents Aristotle's more mature and definitivetreatment of pleasure, whereas his first account in Book VII wasoriginally part of the earlier Eudemian version and was only latertransferred to the Nicomachean Ethics. I Since the appearance ofFestugiere's study, the tendency among scholars has been to play downthe differences in Aristotle's two accounts of pleasure, viewing theminstead as different stages in Aristotle's effort to develop a single unifiedteaching on this subject.2

A UTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to Professor Christopher Bruell of Boston Collegewhose ectures on classical olitical philosophy have greatly contributed o my under-standing of the Nicomachean Ethics.

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 17 No. 2, May 1989 247-265? 1989 Sage Publications, Inc.

247







248 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1989

This view has recently been challenged by G. E. L. Owen.3 Owenargues that Aristotle's treatment of pleasure in Book VII cannot beadequately understood as a rough version of his more polished accountin Book X. He maintains that each treatment possesses a teaching of itsown and the attempt to harmonize, or at least minimize, the differencesthat distinguish them does not do justice to the text. Owen observes thatAristotle's discussion in Book VII consistently addresses the question:What is pleasure? In Book X, Owen maintains, Aristotle is engaged in adifferent kind of inquiry. He is not concerned to say what our realpleasures are, but is offering to tell us what the nature of enjoying is byreviewing the logical characteristics of pleasure verbs. 4 Owen goes onto suggest that the discrepancies in these two accounts result fromAristotle's attempt to deal with different aspects of the problem ofpleasure. He writes, Traditionally the question has been whether thetwo accounts are too divergent to be compatible. I hope to show thatthey are too divergent to be incompatible. 5

Although the work of Festugi&re and Owen contains much that

warrants serious consideration, my own study of the Ethics6 eads me toquestion the adequacy of either of these approaches. The attempt toexplain discrepancies and repetitions in Aristotle's dual consideration ofpleasure with reference to theories about Aristotle's intellectualdevelopment 7 or by an artificially restricted logical-linguistic analysisis problematic at best. The purpose of this essay is to show thatattentiveness to the immediate contexts and particular purposes ofAristotle's twofold presentation, what can generally be referred o as the

political character of Aristotle's treatment, yields a richer understandingof Aristotle's teaching on pleasure as well as the Ethics as a whole.8

II. PLEASUREAND PHILOSOPHY(VII, 11-14)

A. The Political Philosopheras Architekt-n

Aristotle begins his discussion of pleasure in Book VII with theassertion that such a consideration properly belongs to the politicalphilosopher. If for no other reason, this assertion is striking becauseAristotle's references to the discipline that gives rise to his study tend to







Tessitore / ARISTOTLE'S TREATMENT OF PLEASURE 249

be sparing. This is, in fact, Aristotle's only explicit reference to politicalphilosophy in the Ethics and it is worth quoting in full:

It also belongs to the political philosopher to contemplate (theore-sai) pleasure andpain; for he is the mastercraftsman (architekton) of the end to which we look whenwe call each thing good or bad in an unqualified sense (1 152bl-3).

Two points should be noted with respect to this assertion. First,Aristotle maintains that pleasure and pain furnish worthy objects ofcontemplation for the political philosopher. This is in sharp contrast tothe attitude of the gentleman, who would regard any protracted orsystematic concern for pleasure and pain with noble disdain.9

The second and most striking feature of Aristotle's initial statementcan be seen in the following way. Aristotle began the Ethics with anexalted expression of the dignity of political science (politike) bymaintaining that it is the most sovereign and architectonic of thesciences (1094a26-28). In his later discussion in Book VI, Aristotleindicated that in ordinary usage the practitioners of this science arethought to be those who are most directly involved in politics, namely,statesmen (1 141b23-29). It is only at this point in his study that Aristotlereveals in an explicit and unambiguous fashion that the master-craftsman of the most sovereign science is not the statesman, but ratherthe political philosopher. It is the political philosopher who determinesthe end against which things are said to be good or bad. Hence it is notthe statesman but the philosopher who provides the fundamentalstandard against which the life of moral virtue is

measured.'0In Book VII, Aristotle recommends the study of pleasure as an objectof contemplation worthy of political philosophers; in Book X, as weshall see, the topic is reintroduced because of its importance for moraleducation (see 1172a19-28). This crucial difference furnishes the startingpoint for the thesis argued here: Namely, Aristotle's consideration ofpleasure in Book VII is addressed especially to philosophers or at leastpotential philosophers, whereas his reintroduction of this theme in

Book X is guided by his concern to integrate this subject (as far aspossible) into the moral-political horizon of gentlemen that dominatesthe Ethics as a whole. In this regard, Jaffa's observation that the seventhbook of the Ethics constitutes a fresh start, one that in some waypromises a consideration of godlike excellence (1145al3-33), isparticularly helpful. I hope to show that the treatment of pleasure withwhich Aristotle concludes Book VII fulfills this promise; it is best








understood as the culmination of the new beginning with which hebegan this book.

Aristotle's consideration of pleasure in Book VII can be roughlydivided into three major parts. In the first part (1152b25-1153b7),Aristotle argues against the view that no pleasure is a good thing. Thesecond and central part of Aristotle's investigation (1 153b7-1154a7)takes up the general view that pleasure cannot be the supreme good. Thethird part (1 154a8-1 154b34) is a consideration of bodily pleasure, whichis primarily directed against the view that most pleasures are base.

B. Pleasure as Telos

The first section of Aristotle's twofold response to the view thatpleasure is not a good (1 152b25-1153al7) makes up three generalarguments dealing with (1) the different meanings of the good, (2)accidental as opposed to essential pleasures, and (3) pleasure as activityand end. In the first of these arguments (1 152b25-33), Aristotle points to

two different meanings of the word good: that which is good withoutqualification and that which is good for someone. Aristotle argues that,even if one were correct in asserting that no pleasure is simply good, itdoes not follow from this that pleasure is not good for some particularindividual. Further, even those pleasures considered bad for a particularindividual may at certain times be good. To illustrate with an examplefrom the Politics, it is not enough for a good trainer to know the properamount of exercise and diet for an Olympian athlete, for the same

prescription would undoubtedly kill another man. So too, in an inquirygiven over to the human things, any general teaching about the goodmust take into account the specific and inevitably different capacities ofits addressees.

It is Aristotle's awareness of this necessity that gives rise to thepolitical character of his discussion in the Ethics. Although Aristotleconcludes his book by arguing that there is only one excellence that is bynature best for human beings, the ambiguity concerning the humangood that Aristotle retains throughout the body of his discussion isintelligible in light of the principle stated here. If, to anticipate part ofAristotle's concluding argument in Book X, not all human beings arecapable of the highest human excellence although most are capable ofserious attachment to the noble, then an adequate teaching on thehuman good would have to take into account these fundamentaldifferences in human capacity. At the outset of his first account of








pleasure, after maintaining that such a topic is suitable for seriousconsideration by political philosophers, Aristotle reminds his readersthat an investigation of the human good must be directed to the specificcapacities of its addressees. It should not therefore come as a surprisethat Aristotle's consideration in Book VII is addressed especially tothose who are capable of considering the question of pleasure from thepoint of view of political philosophers; those who, Aristotle has justasserted, in some way determine the standard of human excellence itself.

The core of Aristotle's second argument (1 152b33-1 153a7) is basedon the distinction between restorative pleasures that are onlyaccidentally pleasant and those pleasures that can be experiencedwithout pain or desire because they are pleasant in an unqualified sense.Accidental or restorative pleasures can be described as a becoming(genesis) or, more precisely, are associated with a process of becomingsince they lead to the perfection of our natural state. For example, thepleasure of eating falls into this category; it is experienced as pleasurablebecause it brings about a healthy natural condition. Aristotle uses this

distinction to oppose the view that pleasures are not good because theyare motivated by pain or desire (in this example, hunger), which impliesdeficiency. Aristotle argues that pleasures that are so motivated are onlyaccidentally pleasant, whereas some pleasures do not fall into thiscategory and so need not be excluded from the good.

The only example in the present context of a pleasure not belongingto this first category is the activity of contemplation (1 153al). AsAristotle will soon explain, this pleasure cannot be understood as a

becoming because it is not born of deficiency nor does it restore usto our normal condition; rather, it is the activity of a healthy or fullydeveloped nature. Aristotle here begins to suggest the further impli-cations of his initial assertion that the philosopher in some senseprovides the fundamental standard for human life. It is the activity ofthe philosopher, not the moral-political activity of gentlemen, thatAristotle offers as his only example of a truly pleasant activity, that is,one not born of deficiency. As Aristotle is more forthcoming about the

unique status of the philosophic activity in Book VII, his argumentimplies an at least partial demotion of the moral-political life, that lifethat the Ethics is rightfully famous for defending.

The third general argument in this section (1 153a7-17) takes issuewith the view that pleasure, because it is a becoming, cannot be a goodthat possesses the status of an end. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps,Aristotle denies the necessity of believing that there is anything better








than pleasure (1 153a7-8). He maintains that not all pleasures areprocesses or incidental to them. On the contrary, some pleasures can becorrectly understood only as activities (energeiai) and consequently asends. Aristotle explains that, whereas those pleasures that lead to thecompletion of our nature have an end other than themselves, this doesnot apply to all pleasures (1153all-12). In this argument, Aristotleopenly brings together two assertions that suggest a perspective quiteforeign to the moral-political horizon that dominates the Ethics as awhole: (1) It is not necessary that some other thing be better thanpleasure and (2) some pleasures are desirable for their own sake, that is,not because they bring us to the noble. This perspective could only beexperienced as jarring for those whose attachment to the noble leadsthem to regard any serious or protracted concern for pleasure with nobleindignation.

Aristotle concludes this part of his argument with a definition ofpleasure. He takes issue with the view that pleasure is a consciousprocess, defining it instead as the unimpeded activity of our naturalstate (1 153al4-15). It is possible to shed some light on this enigmaticdefinition by bringing the immediately preceding argument to bearupon it. Aristotle has just distinguished between that category ofpleasures that lead to the perfection of our natural state (genesis) andpleasure in the strict sense that is not a genesis but the activity (energeia)of our natural state. To recall our earlier example, the necessary activityof eating is pleasurable only to the point of satiety at which point itceases to be pleasant. Strictly speaking, this is an example of an

accidental pleasure, one that is born of deficiency (hunger) andrestores us to a normal or healthy condition. On the other hand,Aristotle's example of pleasure that is not born of deficiency, andconsequently does not share this same limitation, is the activity ofcontemplation. Contemplation is unimpeded activity in the fullest sensebecause it does not contain within itself the same kind of limit or

impediment as do corporal pleasures such as eating and drinking.It is also true that the characteristic activity of gentlemen (the practice

of moral virtue) would not be subject to the same kind of internallimitations as corporal activities. One might maintain, as do Gauthierand Jolif, that Aristotle's definition of pleasure describes the gentleman'sway of life as well as that of the philosopher.'2 This interpretation ofAristotle's definition, however, needs to be qualified in two importantrespects. First, the necessity of both economic well-being and a certainsocial-political status for the practice of moral virtue (NE, 1099a31-b8;








1101a14-16) constitutes an impediment for those who might lack theseadvantages. The pleasure of contemplation is less hampered by a lack ofexternal goods than the pleasure of moral-political activity. Second, thegentleman would certainly balk at the suggestion that his life can bedescribed as seeking pleasure, even of a certain kind. The gentleman ismuch more apt to understand himself and his way of life in light of thenoble; at best, he is willing to acknowledge that the practice of moralvirtue is accompanied by pleasure. (This is precisely the distinction thatAristotle introduces in Book I [1099a7-21] and to which he returns in anexplicit way in his second thematic consideration of pleasure in BookX.) The suggestion that pleasure, even of a certain kind, is itself the endfor which we act continues to reveal a perspective that is in tension withthe dominant horizon of the Ethics.

Nevertheless, it remains true that Aristotle's definition of pleasure asunimpeded activity is incomplete. Festugiere's explanation (followedby Gauthier and Jolif) is that Aristotle's definition in the presentinstance reflects the fire of dispute, 13 whereas his more completetreatment of the problem is found in Book X. Quite apart from the factthat the text in question furnishes no evidence of heated debate, themajor difficulty with Festugire's suggestion stems from the fact thatAristotle's treatment of pleasure in Book X completely abstains fromany question about the nature of pleasure itself. Whereas Book VIIattempts a definition of pleasure (even an incomplete or tentative one),Book X prescinds from this question altogether and appears content toconfine itself to a description of pleasure. Despite its more systematic

character, Book X brings us no closer to answering the question: What ispleasure?I would suggest that the incompleteness of Aristotle's definition in the

present context is best understood as a catalyst for philosophic wonder.In the Metaphysics Aristotle writes, It is through wonder that men nowbegin and originally began to philosophize: wondering in the first placeat those difficulties most at hand (982bl2-14). In this regard I wouldsimply point out that Aristotle returns to the view put forward here (the

identification of pleasure and activity) in the Metaphysics when hespeaks of divine activity (1072bl6-18). Although a consideration of theMetaphysics extends beyond the scope of this article, I introduce it inthe present context only to suggest that the completion of Aristotle'sunfinished treatment of pleasure in Book VII is not to be found in BookX nor in the Ethics as a whole. It is offered rather to those students of theEthics who are willing to study Aristotle's explicitly philosophic








works-perhaps in large measure because of the way in which he haspresented the philosophic life in his political treatises.

C. Pleasure as the Supreme Good

The second and central part of Aristotle's investigation (1 153b7-1154a7) is a refutation of the view that pleasure is not the supreme good.This section is also divided into three main arguments. Aristotle beginsthe first of these (11 53b7-25) with the assertion that nothing prevents a

certain kind of pleasure from being the supreme good. Aristotlemaintains this view with two arguments, both of which bring togetherpleasure and happiness. First (1 153b9-14), Aristotle argues that if it istrue that each state has its unimpeded activity, the activity of all of themor the activity of the one that constitutes happiness would be the mostdesirable thing there is.'4 But since unimpeded activity is pleasure,happiness must be some form of pleasure. Aristotle's second argument(1 153b14-19) is based on the view that happiness is essentially perfect

or complete activity. Since perfect activity is unimpeded, happinessmust also be understood in this way. Aristotle thus reaches the sameconclusion, namely, that happiness must be pleasure of a certain kind.

It is important that the jarring character of these (admittedlyproblematic) arguments not elude us.'5 The practical purpose of theEthics as a whole is to help decent individuals to orient their lives by atrue, rather than illusory, notion of happiness. In Book I, Aristotle hadindicated that happiness, as the supreme practical good for human

beings, furnished both the starting point and the end for ethical science.In his initial approach to the question of happiness, Aristotle arguedthat human happiness corresponds to specifically human activity andparticularly to the attainment of excellence in the exercise of the bestand most complete human activity. In the following books, however,Aristotle developed two different notions of human excellence, intel-lectual and moral. It is only at this point that he returns in a thematicway to the fundamental principle of ethical science as a whole.'6 To stateit baldly, Aristotle never explicitly identified happiness with the practiceof moral virtue and, to add insult to injury, he now identifies happiness,not with the noble or the moral good, but with pleasure. Further, it is notthe sort of pleasure of which all are capable; rather, it would seem thathappiness is the preserve of a very few, those whose lives are given overto the activity of contemplation.








If happiness is the preserve of a very few, it is nevertheless sought byeveryone. Aristotle takes up this issue in a surprising way in his secondargument (1 153b25-1154al). He suggests that since all animals, in-cluding human ones, seek pleasure, this indicates that pleasure is thesupreme good. Moreover, Aristotle warns that we should not allowourselves to be blinded by the fact that all do not seem to pursue thesame pleasure. He explains that living beings do not necessarily pursuethe pleasures they think and say they do, but it is possible that,unbeknownst to them, they actually pursue the same pleasure. For all

things, Aristotle writes, possess something divine by nature (1153b32).How are we to understand this unexpected and in some senseremarkable train of thought? At the very least, Aristotle's argumentinvites a kind of self-doubt with respect to those things that one pursueson the ground of their being pleasant. Even more surprising s Aristotle'ssomewhat Platonic suggestion about an underlying unity behind thevariety of particular pleasures. What is most striking is Aristotle'simplication that pleasure, or at least a certain kind of pleasure, is

something divine or at least connected to the divine. Perhaps thissuggestion is meant to reflect the disparity that has become increasinglyevident between a universal longing for happiness and the greatlyrestricted possibility for its fulfillment. Is it the longing for happiness,rather than its fulfillment, that constitutes the divine thing by natureplanted in every human being? Although this longing provides thefundamental principle for ethical science, the harsh truth that Aristotlecontinues to unveil is that some pleasures, particularly those that

constitute the fulfillment of this universal desire, are not within the reachof all.

D. Pleasure as Divine Activity

The third and final part of Aristotle's investigation of pleasure inBook VII (1 154a8-1154b34) addresses (for the most part) the view thatsome

pleasuresare

good but most pleasures are bad. Aristotle's responseis, not untypically, divided into three sections. The first is a refutation ofthis view. In the second, he explains why bodily pleasures seem to be themost desirable of pleasures. The third section offers a sober teaching onthe limited human capacity for pleasure.

Aristotle begins his refutation (1154a8-21) by taking a commonsenseposition against those who say that, whereas noble pleasures are highly








desirable, bodily pleasures are not. Aristotle maintains that bodilypleasures are good in moderation but that they are not the sole good.The reason why some might think they are bad, he continues, is thatsuch pleasures admit of an excess that is not good. Aristotle points outthat someone is considered base, not because he enjoys and pursuesnecessary bodily pleasures, but because he pursues them immoderatelyor in the wrong way. This is in contrast to those pleasures that do notadmit of an excess or cannot be in excess of the good (1 154a13-14).Although Aristotle gives no example here, he does make it clear thatthese cannot be bodily pleasures. Given Aristotle's

argumentin the

preceding section, the most likely candidate for what he has in mind inthe present context is the pleasure of contemplation. This pleasure,which is desirable for its own sake and constitutes happiness insofar as itis accessible to human beings, cannot be in excess of the good.

It is sufficient for our purposes to note that Aristotle offers tworelated explanations for the mistaken view that bodily pleasures aremore desirable than others. First, such pleasures drive out pain. Second,

bodily pleasures are sought because of their intensity by those who areincapable of enjoying other pleasures. What is more germane to thethesis of this article is Aristotle's allusion in his second explanation tothe findings of the natural scientists (hoiphusiologoi), who maintainthat a state of strain or toil is the natural condition for living organisms(1 154b6-8). On the basis of these findings, Aristotle explains that mostpeople seek intense bodily pleasure in order to relieve the toil or painthat is part of life itself.

Aristotle observes that there are two classes of persons especially aptto seek out intense bodily pleasures. The first of these are the young whoseek intense pleasure as a release from the intense pains involved ingrowth. The second group is made up of those who possess an excitablenature (hoi melancholikoi ten phusin).17 In contrast to youth, which isa transient state, the bodies of the melancholikoi are in a state ofconstant irritation, in which intense desires and longings are continuallyactive (1154bl1-13). Aristotle explains that some, possessingthis temperament, become profligate or base because they seek outintense restorative pleasures to drive out the pain.

This account is very striking. In a book that aims at fostering moralvirtue, Aristotle has succeeded in offering an explanation as to whysomeone might become profligate or base that is completely devoid ofmoral culpability. Profligacy, at least in some cases, is explained as the








result of a natural disposition that keeps the body in a state of constantirritation. Aristotle's analysis pursues a line of inquiry that is, to say

the least, uncharacteristic of the understanding of most decent persons.Aristotle's argument explains why the melancholikos might become

profligate while, at the same time, making clear the inadequacy of such aresponse. What they need, Aristotle says, is a perpetual restorative,and no amount of bodily pleasure can ever supply that want. Aristotlesuggests that the proper antidote, insofar as it is available to humanbeings, must be sought elsewhere. In fact, this will not be a restorativeat all, but rather pleasure in a strict or unqualified sense. The oneneeding such a pleasure turns out not to be more defective but,potentially at least, healthier than most, for such a person is by natureoriented toward and can be satisfied with nothing less than the activityof those pleasures that do not admit of excess. It would seem that it is forsomeone so constituted that the unimpeded activity that Aristotle hasdefined as happiness is most needed.18 If the melancholikos might beespecially inclined to profligacy, the argument of the Problems (BookXXX) maintains that this

same disposition also gives rise to differentkinds of greatness, including philosophic greatness.'9Aristotle concludes his consideration of pleasure in Book VII with a

sober teaching on the limits of human happiness (1 154b20-34). Hemaintains that nothing can give human beings pleasure always becauseof our composite nature; only god enjoys a single simple pleasureperpetually, for the activity of pleasure is greater in a state of quietudethan in a state of motion. The imperfect unity of a composite nature

prevents the continuous enjoyment of this state of quietude by humanbeings. As Aristotle has already suggested, the lives of human beings arecharacterized by continuous toil. Aristotle concludes by quotingEuripides: Change in all things is sweet but, Aristotle adds, owing tosome bad thing or deficiency in human beings. Several aspects of thisconcluding argument warrant further comment.

Aristotle concludes Book VII with a striking description of god.Clearly, this is not a reference to the Olympian gods. Whether Aristotle

believed in the existence of such a god or is replacing one myth withanother is not at issue here. What is important, however, is that Homer'spoetic myth of godlike virtue, with which Aristotle had begun Book VII,is now replaced with a philosophically refined image of divine nature(see Meta, 1072b13-3 1; 1074b15-45). Aristotle's most exalted speculationon the nature and activity of god comes to light, not during his







258 POLITICAL HEORY / MAY 1989

discussion of moral virtue, but only after putting that discussion aside.As such, it provides the culmination of the fresh start that Aristotleintroduced at the outset of Book VII.

What effect might we expect Aristotle's concluding description ofgod to have on the majority of his readers? It could hardly go unnoticedthat the activity of god is wholly given over to pleasure; Aristotle's finalimage in Book VII is one that clearly depicts pleasure as the supremegood. There is nothing in this to suggest that god is moral or evenconcerned about moral matters, that he is just or cares about the affairsof humankind. Aristotle presents his readers with a god who is veryremote from the concerns that occupy the lives of most decent humanbeings. He is completely self-sufficient and not in the least concernedabout the things that change, that is, those things that come into beingand pass away. Such a view of god could only be disturbing togentlemen, for he neither rewards the just nor punishes the wicked.Further, any attempt to find in god's activity a standard by which toguide one's own life would pose a special problem for gentlemen, sincethey, unlike god, exercise and manifest their virtue precisely in the realmof things that come into being and pass away. The attempt to realize agodlike perfection, if it does not require that one jettison the standardsof moral virtue, certainly appears to render those standards irrelevant.Indeed, the most godlike individual would be wholly given over to theenjoyment of pleasure, albeit of a rare and simple kind.

How then would Aristotle's concluding image affect that group ofreaders to whom, I have argued, he has been particularly attentive

throughout Book VII? On the face of it, they would seem to fare muchbetter. The only human activity suggested by Aristotle that evenapproximates that divine happiness found in quietude is the activity ofcontemplation. If this suggestion is not as disturbing to the potentialphilosopher as it would be for the nonphilosopher, it nevertheless bringswith it a sober and important Aristotelian teaching on the nature andlimits of human happiness. Because of our composite nature, even thosefew capable of participating in the most sublime pleasures that

constitute happiness are not able to do so all the time; other pleasuresare both attractive and necessary. Hence even the philosopher mustpractice continence or moral virtue with respect to those pleasures thatdraw the philosopher away from the best activity. If philosophers do nottake their fundamental bearings from the life of moral virtue, neither arethey able to dismiss those virtues as altogether irrelevant to their ownway of life.20







Tessitore ARISTOTLE'S REATMENT OF PLEASURE 259

III. PLEASURE AND MORALEDUCATION (X, 1-5)

A. The Horizon of Book X

Although a fully adequate analysis of Aristotle's consideration ofpleasure in Book X provides subject matter for another article, thefollowing remarks have the more modest aim of bringing to light thevery different horizon within which Aristotle offers his concludingtreatment of pleasure. The starting point for Aristotle's reconsiderationof pleasure in Book X (I 172al9-25) is the observation that pleasure isespecially bound together with human life. Aristotle explains this bypointing to the fact that those responsible for guiding children teach bymeans of pleasure and pain. Moreover, he observes that the mostimportant element in moral virtue is learning to be pleased anddispleased with what one ought. Pleasure and pain extend throughoutthe whole of life and exert a critical influence on the possibility of virtue

and happiness. Aristotle reconsiders the question of pleasure insofar asit bears on the education of the young toward moral virtue and theattainment of that happiness proper to the practice of virtue. His intentseems to be to encourage those who are unable to determine forthemselves the truth in ethical matters and who consequently need toguide their lives by what they are able to believe (1 172a25-b8).Aristotle's final presentation of pleasure, together with the considerationof happiness and philosophy that it introduces, is subordinated to the

moral-political horizon that-with the exception of Book VII-dominates the Ethics as a whole.

B. Aristotle's NewDescription of Pleasure

In Book VII, Aristotle defined pleasure as unimpeded activity andleft open the possibility that pleasure was both the highest good andsomething divine. In Book X, Aristotle offers not so much a redefinitionas a new description of pleasure. Pleasure perfects or completes activity(1 174b23). The activities of both sense perception and thought havecorresponding pleasures that complete them. Pleasure is not somethinginhering in the activity itself, but rather something that comes to be inaddition (11 74b32-33). In this new view, pleasure belongs to or dependsupon activity. This is the key difference in Aristotle's two treatments of








pleasure. In Book VII, Aristotle had defined pleasure as activity of acertain kind. In Book X, while maintaining that pleasure and activity are

inseparably linked, he emphasizes that they are nevertheless distinct.Although the nature of pleasure itself and its precise relationship to

activity are issues that are not addressed in Book X, the relevantconsequence of Aristotle's new distinction is that it makes possible anindependent standard by which to rank and judge pleasure. Activity andnot pleasure is the fundamental thing, for the latter depends upon theformer. On this basis Aristotle is able to offer a certain kind of credibilityto the commonsense opinion that pleasure is good but not the only orsupreme good. If pleasure comes from or belongs to activity, thesupreme good for human beings cannot be pleasure; rather, the supremegood must belong to the best activity. It is in this light that Aristotle nowprovides his readers with edifying explanations for some of the harshersuggestions and questions raised by his discussion in Book VII.

Aristotle begins by returning to a question that he had raised in hisearlier account: Why is it that no one is able to feel pleasurecontinuously? In Book X, he answers this question (1175a3-10) bysaying that no human faculty is characterized by uninterrupted activity.This clearly corresponds to his earlier teaching in Book VII. However, inBook X Aristotle illustrates his answer with reference to the experienceof seeing. The pleasure that we enjoy in seeing something, Aristotleexplains, depends upon our looking at it intently. As the activity oflooking becomes less vigorous and our attention relaxes, the pleasurealso fades. In Book VII, Aristotle had suggested an absolute limit to

pleasure imposed by our composite nature, a limit that came to light incontrast to that single simple pleasure enjoyed perpetually by god. Theharshness of his earlier teaching is mitigated but not denied in Aristotle'snew explanation, insofar as the latter places a greater emphasis on ourown activity. Although it remains true that human beings cannot feelpleasure continuously, Aristotle's example in Book X emphasizes adifferent aspect of the problem by suggesting that pleasure increases ordecreases in the measure that one increases or decreases one's effort with

respect to the activity from which the pleasure arises. In that part of histreatment that is intended to encourage his readers to take pleasure inwhat they ought, Aristotle's example implies that the effort necessaryfor excellence in any activity, and perhaps especially the activity ofvirtue, is not without a certain bonus.

Aristotle next turns his attention to his initial observation in Book X;namely, that pleasure and pain extend throughout the whole of human








life. He now explains that people have good reason to pursue pleasuresince it perfects activity and therefore life itself (1175al5-17). Aristotlerefers to the musician and the lover of learning as examples. The activityof each one is sharpened, prolonged, and improved by the pleasure thatbelongs to that activity. Hence pleasure perfects the life of each one bymaking him or her a better musician or philosopher. Aristotle concludesthis argument with the assertion that, for the present, we ought todismiss the question whether life is for the sake of pleasure or pleasurefor the sake of life (1 175al8-19). Although many commentators areuncomfortable with Aristotle's willingness to dismiss such a crucialquestion,2' I have found this statement (among others)22 o be especiallyrevealing of the particular horizon within which Aristotle is conductingthe present inquiry. Given the practical character of his discussion inBook X, Aristotle appropriately suggests that we allow this theoreticalquestion to drop out of our consideration.

Moreover, I would interpret the significance of this dismissaldifferently from most modern commentators. Gauthier and Jolif

maintain that for Plato (and Speusippus) the problem of pleasure is ametaphysical problem whereas for Aristotle it is a moral problem. This,they argue, explains why Aristotle is not concerned to analyze the natureof pleasure or describe its psychological reality, since it suffices for hispurposes to establish its connection with activity, which can then beevaluated from an ethical standpoint.23 As I have tried to show in thebody of this article, such an interpretation is essentially incomplete. It isclearly the case that Aristotle's argument in Book X provides a moral

rather than metaphysical account of pleasure. However, the attempt toreduce in an unqualified way Aristotle's presentation in Book X, or inthe Ethics as a whole, to a simply moral horizon is problematic. In fact,by reminding his readers of the metaphysical problem of pleasure andleaving it unresolved, Aristotle in effect reminds his most attentivestudents that there is a horizon beyond that which dominates Book X.His very dismissal of this fundamental question in the present instancein some way draws attention to the question itself and, in so doing, to the

central difference between Books VII and X. What constitutes thefundamental standard for human beings? Is it pleasure or is it a certainway of life characterized by a noble disregard for questions of this sort?

This particular example can be taken to illustrate what might becalled the two-edged character of Aristotle's political writings.Although his discussion takes place within the moral horizon ofgentlemen, Aristotle periodically and quietly reminds his most gifted








readers that these are self-imposed limits and do not represent the only,or even fundamental, perspective that informs his work as a whole. For

the purposes of the discussion in Book X, it is sufficient, even necessary,to put aside this fundamental question. However, a more adequateunderstanding of the relationship between philosophic and gentlemanlyexcellence requires greater attentiveness to the harsh character ofAristotle's teaching in Book VII, a harshness that is only partiallyeclipsed by Aristotle's reconsideration in Book X.

It is necessary to add a final word regarding the well-knownconclusion of the Ethics, for it is in Book X, not Book VII, that Aristotle

most clearly reveals his teaching on the superiority of the philosophiclife. Aristotle maintains that contemplation offers the most fully humanhappiness because it is the most continuous, self-sufficient, and leisuredactivity, involves the highest thing in us, offers pleasures of marvelouspurity,24 and is loved for its own sake (1 177al9-1 177b26). With respectto the thesis of this article, it is important to note that each of these sixarguments applies (albeit to a lesser degree) to the gentleman's way oflife as well. Despite the often disconcerting example of those who enjoy

political power (1 176b9-18), the gentleman is able to maintain that hisown activity is superior to and happier than a life given over to theenjoyment of bodily pleasures and amusements on the basis of thesesame arguments that Aristotle offers to establish the superiority of thephilosophic life. Thus Aristotle, with characteristic solicitude for thatwhich is best in the gentleman's way of life, leads his readers to thesomewhat surprising conclusion of his inquiry: The decisive standardfor the highest human life is drawn not from the characteristic activity ofgentlemen but that of philosophers; the life of moral virtue is happy in asecondary degree (1 178a9-10). Although Aristotle's final demotion ofmoral virtue is not apt to please the bulk of his readers, it is essential toobserve that it is only within the context of several arguments thatemphasize the similarity between the activity of the philosopher and thatof the gentleman that Aristotle confronts all of his readers in anunambiguous way with his teaching on the superiority of the philosophiclife.

Aristotle's double treatment of pleasure in the Ethics reveals thetwo-edged character of his political presentation of philosophy in thisbook. Aristotle's treatment of philosophy in Book X is characterized bya careful muting of the extent to which the life of the philosopher andthat of the gentleman constitute alternative ways of life. The radicaldifferences between these two ways of life emerge most clearly as a resultof a thoughtful consideration of the argument in Book VII. In Book X,







Tessitore /' ARISTOTLE'S TREATMENT OF PLEASURE 263

Aristotle does not deny but blurs the full extent of that difference; hechooses instead to reveal the extent to which the life of the philosopher

and that of the gentleman can be viewed as similar and even comple-mentary. Aristotle's final discussion in Book X imparts a serious andsalutary teaching, one that both mitigates the necessary harshness of hisearlier consideration and encourages his readers to live in accordancewith the best thing in them (1 177b31-78a2). This book does not,however, reveal Aristotle's complete or fundamental teaching on therelationship between the life of philosophy and that of gentlemen.Although in some respects similar and complementary, there remains anessential and ineradicable dissonance between these two ways of life, adissonance that Aristotle has brought to light most clearly in Book VIIand that he does not retract in the course of his argument in Book X.

NOTES

1. A. J. Festugiere, Aristote: Le Plaisir (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1936; rpt.1960), xxiv, xxv-xliv.

2. See Godo Lieberg, Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles(Munchen: C.H. Beck'sche, 1958), 2-15; R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, Aristote:

L'Ethique A Nicomaque, II (2nd ed.) (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970), 783;F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1956; rpt.1979), 567, 580-581. W. F. R. Hardie is more circumspect about the exact relationshipbetween Aristotle's two accounts of pleasure. Hardie's treatment essentially conflatesAristotle's two discussions. Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1968), 295.3. G.E.L. Owen, Aristotelian Pleasures, Articles on Aristotle, II: Ethics and

Politics, ed. by Jonathan Barnes et al. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 92-103.4. Owen, Pleasures, 103. Unfortunately, Owen's interpretation completely

abstracts from both the immediate context and overall aim of Aristotle's treatments ofpleasure. As such, Owen provides a helpful but, for this reason, limited logical-linguisticanalysis of the text.

5. Owen, Pleasures, 93. Although Owen's thesis has met with only limited successin displacing the understanding of the problem advanced by Festugiere, it has the merit of

bringing one to an appreciation of the extent to which Aristotle's account in Book VIIcontains a consistent and positive teaching of its own. Further, it leads Owen, and inviteshis readers, to grapple with the fundamental differences that distinguish this account fromthe one that appears in Book X.

6. Unmodified references to the Ethics refer to the Nicomachean Ethics. The Bekkernumbers and standard abbreviations are used in all references to Aristotle's works.

7. The interpretation of Aristotle's double account of pleasure as a reflection ofdifferent stages in his intellectual development is a particular application of the generalthesis pioneered by Werner Jaeger in Aristotle: Fundamentals ofhis Development, trans.








by Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948). The problematic character ofJaeger's thesis is incisively stated by Ernest Barker n The Politics of Aristotle (London:

Oxford University Press, 1946, rpt. 1973), xlii.8. My approach to Aristotle's treatment of pleasure has been influenced by thosestudies that take into account the pedagogical mode of argument that characterizesAristotle's political writings. See Robert Faulkner, Spontaneity, Justice, and Coercion:On Nicomachean Ethics, Books III and V, Coercion (Nomos, XIV), ed. by J.R. Pennockand J.W. Chapman (Chicago: Aldine/Atherton, 1972), esp. 85; Harry Jaffa, Thomismand Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), esp. chap. 4; LeoStrauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), esp.chap. 4.

9. Aristotle's initial presentation of the life of pleasure in Book I gives expression tothe noble disdain that is more characteristic of the gentleman. See 1095bl4-23; cf.1109b5- 13. For the purposes of this study, gentleman kaloskagathos) is used in a preciseAristotelian sense to describe someone who is characterized by both a certain economicand political status as well as a certain level of moral excellence. The gentleman is a citizenin the fullest and best sense of the word, one who embodies the highest aims of the polis.See EE, 1249a9-11; 1248b10, 34, and NE, 1099a31-b8; 1178a23-b3. Compare Strauss,Natural Right, 142-143.

10. The discomfort provoked by this Aristotelian statement is reflected in the effortsof some scholars to reinterpret its meaning. See, for example, H.H. Joachim, Aristotle:

The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by D.A. Raes (London: Clarendon Press, 1951), 234;W.F.R. Hardie, Ethical Theory, 299.

11. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism, 53-54. See Faulkner, Spontaneity, Justice,and Coercion, 98-100.

12. Gauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique, II, 797-798.13. Festugiere, Le Plaisir, xxix-xxx. See Gauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique, II, 796.14. I understand Aristotle's use of the conditional here to reflect a certain doubt

concerning the view that every state (hexis) has an unimpeded activity, at least to the samedegree. In fact, I think that Aristotle's tentativeness in this argument (the activity of all ofthem [hexeis] or the one that constitutes happiness) is intended to

leave open the twodifferent views of happiness that he later ranks in Book X: secondary happiness,understood as the unimpeded activity of all the moral virtues, and complete or perfecthappiness, understood as the more perfectly unimpeded activity of contemplation. SeeGauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique, II, 808-809.

15. The disconcerting character of Aristotle's arguments in Book VII did not escapehis earlier commentators. As Gauthier and Jolif point out, it was precisely in order toavoid the disastrous consequence of a teaching that identified pleasure and happinessthat Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Nemesius insisted on the importance ofAristotle's correction of this teaching in Book X. L'Ethique, 11, 780-781. The seriousnessof Aristotle's defense of hedonism has been argued by H.A. Prichard in The Meaning ofAgathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. byJ.M.E. Moravcsik (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 241-260.

16. The only intervening reference to happiness is in Book VI and it is consistent withAristotle's teaching in the present context. In Book VI, Aristotle indicates that happinessis most directly linked to the activity of sophia (rather than moral virtue) (1 144a3-6).

17. It is difficult to find an adequate translation of melancholikos because the range ofmeaning associated with Aristotle's use of the word is limited by the contemporary








meaning of melancholy. Perhaps the best indication of what Aristotle means bymelancholikos can be gleaned from the Problems, Book XXX (esp. 954a28-36;

955a39-40).18. Consider Aristotle's argument that the cure for certain kinds of desire can be

found only in philosophy (Pol, 1267a2-17).19. Book XXX of the Problems addresses the following question: Why is it that all

who have become outstanding appear to be melancholikoi? Empedocles, Socrates, andPlato (among others) are given as examples.

20. Thomas Nagel captures the harsh character of this teaching when he writes that,according to Aristotle, this is essentially a caretaker function of reason, in which it isoccupied with matters ... far below those that it might be considering if it had more timeand were less called upon merely to manage. Aristotle on Eudaimonia, Essays onAristotle's Ethics, ed. by A.O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 12. Itis important to add, however, that this view of moral virtue is at most implicit in BooksI-VI, comes to light most clearly in Book VII, and is qualified but not retracted n Book X.

21. Gauthier and Jolif observe that most major commentators (Alexander ofAphrodisias, Michael of Ephesus, St. Albert, St. Thomas, and the like) have not been ableto resist the temptation to try to resolve a question that Aristotle leaves in suspense byshowing that pleasure is for the sake of life or activity and not vice versa. Gauthier andJolif go on to argue that such efforts are misguided since, whatever the answer to thisquestion, Aristotle is here arguing that the contemplative activity-pleasure (le bloc

operation-plaisir) constitutes the ultimate end for human beings. L'Ethique, II, 843-844.Although Gauthier and Jolif are surely correct in maintaining that this constitutesAristotle's overall argument in Book X and in the Ethics as a whole, this does notadequately account for the passage in question that explicitly raises the question whetherlife is for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life. The discomfort of earliercommentators seems to be more justified than the effort of Gauthier and Jolif to dismissthe problem by subordinating it to the most obvious conclusion of the Ethics.

22. In the course of his argument in Book X, Aristotle quietly reminds his readersseveral times that this subject has already received a more radical consideration in Book

VII. See 1175b31-33 and the tentativeness of Aristotle's assertion at 1176al7-19. It is alsoworth noting that the examples that Aristotle uses to indicate the variety of humanpleasures at 1176al3-15 are those that he used in Book VII (sweet things; fever/goodhealth; invalid/robust character).

23. Gauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique, II, 845-846.24. This argument may recall, but certainly does not restate, the argument of Book

VII. The emphasis here is on the special character of the pleasures in question, namely,their marvelous purity and permanence (1 177a25-26). As such, Aristotle includes it withseveral arguments that are intended to show that happiness is activity in accordance withvirtue (kat'areten energeia) (I 177al 3-b26).

Aristide Tessitore is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Assumption College. Hehas published an article entitled Aristotle's Political Presentation of Socrates inthe Nicomachean Ethics and is currently preparing a book on Aristotle's politicalpresentation of philosophy in the Nicomachean Ethics.

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