Brendan Nagle

Alexander and Aristotle's PambasileusIn: L'antiquité classique, Tome 69, 2000. pp. 117-132.

RésuméBrendan NAGLE, Alexander and Aristotle's Pambasileus. - Aristotle's or absolute king (Politics III, 14, 1285b 29-33) is not atheoretical constmct, an hypothetical element in his theory of distributive justice, but a real, existential king who rules justly overpoleis and ethne. The article discusses how it was possible for Aristotle to include this type of king in his list of orthodox,monarchic politeiai.

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Nagle Brendan. Alexander and Aristotle's Pambasileus. In: L'antiquité classique, Tome 69, 2000. pp. 117-132.

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Alexander and Aristotle's Pambasileus*

The nature and identity of Aristotle's absolute king in Book ?? of the Politics has long been the subject of dispute1. Should we regard the pambasileus as a real, existential king whose presence can be accounted for by an extra-philosophical or biographical explanation, or is he simply a theoretical construct, an intrinsic part of Aristotle's theory of distributive justice? Newman seems to reflect the first position when he remarks that "Aristotle probably has the Persian kingship before him", because the Persian king was a law to the Persians2. In the 1930s Kelsen went so far as to claim that Aristotle made the choice of kingship as the best constitution because he was a client of the Macedonians3. On the other hand Schiitrumpf, following Dummler, holds that the pambasileus is a Platonic ideal4.

This wide divergence of opinion - and its basis - needs explanation. The awkwardness oi Politics III, 14, where the pambasileus is introduced and defined, was noted in a footnote by Jaeger5, and followed up by others with the suggestion that this chapter was inserted by Aristotle after he had developed his analysis of oligarchy and democracy in Book IV6. More generally scholars tend to solve the discrepancy on

This paper was presented at the 1998 meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. I am very grateful to David J. Depew, W. Lindsey Adams and David L. Toye for helpful comments on an earlier version of it.

1 For the fullest, recent review of the subject see E. SchÜTRUMPF, Aristoteles Politik, in H. Flashar (ed.), Aristoteles Werke, 9.2, Berlin, 1991, p. 527-530; cf. also, A. Kamp, Die politische Philosophie des Aristoteles und ihre metaphysischen Grundlagen, Munich, 1985, p. 296-301; P. CarLIER, La notion de pambasileia dans la pensée politique

in M. Piérart (ed.), Aristote et Athènes, Paris, 1993, p. 103-118; F.D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics, Oxford, 1995, p. 191-193, 234-239.

2 W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, 3, Oxford, 1887, p. 255-256, 290. 3 H. KELSEN, Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy, in J. BARNES et al. (eds.),

Articles on Aristotle 2: Ethics and Politics, London, 1978, p. 170-194. Others who see the influence of Macedonia include W.W. Tarn, Politics, Alexander the Great, 2, Cambridge, 1948, p. 366-368, 371; W.T. Bluhm, The Place of Polity in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State, in Journal of Politics, 24 (1962), p. 753, n. 31; R.G. MULGAN, Aristotle's Political Theory, Oxford, 1977, p. 87; C. KAHN, The Normative Structure of Aristotle's Politics, in G. Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles' "Politik". Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum, Göttingen, 1989, p. 375; B.S. Strauss, Aristotle 's Critique of Athenian Democracy, in C. Lord and D. O'CONNOR (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science, Berkeley, 1991, p. 229-232.

4 F. Dümmler, Kleine Schriften 2, Leipzig, 1901, p. 316-321; cf. p. 324, 328; Schütrumpf, loc. cit. (?. 1), p. 538.

5 W. Jaeger, Aristotle: The Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Oxford, 1948, p. 291 n. 1.

6 W. Siegfried, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Aristoteles' Politik, in Philologus, 88 (1933), p. 377 (= ?. Steinmetz (ed.) Schriften zu den Politika des Aristoteles, Hildesheim and New York, 1973, p. 81); K. Kahlenberg, Zur Interpretation von Buch III

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the basis of the degree to which they think Aristotle is responding to Plato in philosophical dialogue rather than engaging in empirical analysis of existing or historical constitutions7.

The basis of the problem and at the same time the means of solving it lies, I believe, in the fact that in the discussion of kingship in Politics III, Aristotle describes two kinds of absolute kings, the one real and the other theoretical, the latter being part of his analysis of who should be sovereign in the state. Nevertheless, scholars have either passed over without comment the description of what I regard as the real absolute king in chapter 14, or have assumed without discussion that the description given there is identical to that of the theoretical absolute king presented elsewhere in Book III8.

Here I will argue that Aristotle did not subvert his own theory of kingship for reasons of political expediency, nor did his theory on the subject emerge entirely as the result of a purely intellectual exercise. Instead, reflection on the historical events of the times led Aristotle to revise his theory of kingship by adding references to a real absolute king in chapters 14-17. Aristotle did not so much change his mind on the subject of kingship as expand his definition of it in light of new political realities9. The term and the concept of pambasileia are the result10.

der Politik, Inaug. Diss., 1934, also in Steinmetz above, p. 140-145; W. Theiler, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Aristoteles' Politik, in Philologus, 89 [n.s. 43] (1934), p. 252; Id., Bau und Zeit der Aristotelischen Politik, in MH, 9 (1952), p. 76.

7 Those approaching the problem from a theoretical viewpoint emphasize Aristotle's debt to Plato e.g. Dümmler, op. cit. (?. 4), p. 316-320; R.G. Mulgan, Aristotle and Absolute Rule, in Antichthon, 8 (1977), p. 22-24; D. Keyt, Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice, in D. Keyt and F.D. MILLER Jr., A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, Oxford, 1991, p. 239-240; Kahn, loc. cit. (?. 3), p. 379-380. ?. Schütrumpf's argument that Aristotle's composition of Politics IV-VI was not influenced by his empirical research, is not convincing (Platonic Methodology in the Program of Aristotle's Political Philosophy: Politics IV. 1, in TAPhA, 119 [1989], p. 209-218).

8 There is a dispute regarding whether Aristotle thinks his paradigmatic absolute king could actually exist. A. Kamp, Aristotele e I'ottima polis: leggi, politeia, aristocrazia o regno?, in ASNP, 5 (1987), p. 370, and Vander Waerdt, Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime, in Phronesis, 30.3 (1985), p. 251, n. 4, believe that Aristotle left the door open to the possibility; D.J. Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, Oxford, 19702, p. 145; Bluhm, loc. cit. (?. 3), p. 753; C. Johnson, Aristotle's Theory of the State, New York, 1990, p. 164, and R.G. Mulgan, op. cit. (?. 3), p. 87, deny it. The discussion here, however, assumes that this is a misleading issue deriving from a failure to distinguish between the ideal and the real pambasileus.

9 I would include under "historical experience" a broad range of factors: Aristotle's on-going understanding of constitutional development as his students gathered and documented information on constitutions; the continuing interest in kingship in the thought of such figures as Isocrates and Xénophon; Aristotle's own experience with monarchs and strong men; and the communis opinio regarding kingship and tyranny in Greek popular thought and the particular application of this in the rhetoric of the fourth century (on this cf. P. Barcelo, Basiléia, Monarchia, Tyrannis, Stuttgart, 1993; J. Cobet, König, Anführer, Herr; Monarch, Tyrann, in E.C. WELSKOPF, Belegstellenverzeichnis altgriechischer socialer Typenbegriffe von Homer bis Aristoteles, Berlin, 1985; G. Giorgini, La città e il tiranno: II concetto di Tirannide nella Graecia del VII-IV secólo

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 1 9

1.

Aristotle's discussion of pambasileia in Book III of the Politics comes as part of his analysis of groups that might legitimately claim sovereignty in the state11. The main subject of chs. 9-13 is the matter of distributive justice. Is the basis of the claim to sovereignty to be found in qualities of birth, wealth, goodness, or strength of

In ch. 9 Aristotle examines the claim of the few that if people are unequal in wealth their rights should be proportionately curtailed, and of the many, that equality of birth should guarantee equality of rights. He continues the discussion of the

of who is to be sovereign in the state, and we meet for the first time the of the desirability of the rule of the best man (ton spoudaiotaton). It occurs in the

context of the competing claims of the masses, the rich, the respectable people (epieikeis), the one most worthy (ton beltiston), the tyrant, and the laws. All of these claims, Aristotle says, present problems. Even the law reflects the biases of its makers and the rule of the best man restricts the opportunities of others to have a share in ruling.

The discussion of the rule of the best man recurs in ch. 13 following an analysis of the claims of the masses (ch. 11) and of the principle of proportional equality (ch. 12). Once again Aristotle is analyzing problems regarding the claims of the various groups to be sovereign, noting that while each may have a certain element of justice in its claim, none is absolute. Aristotle demonstrates the weakness of the logic of the claims of individual groups by pointing out that on the same principle that is argued for the group, an individual within the group, e.g. the richest among the rich, the best born among those of free birth and so on, could claim on that principle of "justice", the right to rule. The logic here, however, leads directly to the claims of the one truly virtuous individual, the one who is better than anyone else (1283b 21- 23), in regard to whom all the rest are incomparable (më sumblëtën) in virtue and political ability (aretë/dunamis politikë), a person who is as a god among men, who is a law unto himself (1284a 5-11). In the best state, Aristotle goes on to say, it would obviously be inappropriate to exile or otherwise dispose of such an individual; he should rather be obeyed and be king for all time (1284b 28-34). Having identified the one best man as a king, Aristotle is now ready to move on to fulfill a promise made earlier in Book III, namely, that he will discuss in detail the three right constitutions, kingship, aristocracy and polity (1279a-22f). Thus in ch. 14 begins the examination of the first of these, royalty.

The chapter announces a discussion of the question "[WJhether it is for a city or a country that is to be well administered to be ruled by a king,

A.D., Milan, 1993; J.F. MCGLEW, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece, Ithaca, 1993.

I ° The term pambasileus is rare, but does appear in a text of Alcaeus (fr. 2 Diehl). The feminine proparoxyton, pambasileia, "all-powerful queen", is found in Aristophanes' Clouds, 357 and 1150. The term pambasileia does not appear before Aristotle according to P. Carlier, loc. cit. (η. 1), p. 108.

I 1 On the importance of Aristotle's use of the aporetic method in Book III, see Schütrumpf, loc. cit. (n. 1), p. 110.

12 Sumpheron, not dikaion as it has been to this point. Aristotle is now discussing real kings, not kings in an ideal state.

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whether it is not so but some other constitution is more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for some states and not for others (1284b 37-40)"13. The answer to this aporia is not provided in ch. 14 and instead the text digresses to provide a list of types of contemporary or historical monarchies. The discussion of the aporia is then picked up and continues through chs. 15 to 17. In order to pursue the logic of the discussion I pass over for the moment the discussion of the historical kings in ch. 14, and move on directly to ch. 15.

Ch. 15 begins by summarizing the findings of ch. 14. Kingship lies along a continuum from military commanders for life of the Spartan type, to absolute kingship. The discussion then moves on to the question of whether it is expedient for either the Spartan type king to rule or the pambasileus. Aristotle says he will continue the discussion of the Spartan type general later, and concentrates instead on "whether it is expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign over everything", referring back to the definition of the absolute king in ch. 14. However, instead of answering the proposed question, Aristotle once more digresses and raises a series of aporiai: Is it "more advantageous to be ruled by the best man (ΰπδ του αρίστου ανδρός) or by the best laws (1286a 7-9)"? "Ought the one best man (πότερον ενα τον άριστον) govern or all the citizens" (1286a 25)14?

So, despite the introductory comments (viz. 1285b 33-1286a 7) regarding the king who is kurios pantön, the king that Aristotle actually ends up discussing in ch. 15 is still the most virtuous man of chs. 10-13.

The king of ch. 16 receives somewhat similar treatment. The account begins with the declaration that time has come (once again, as in ch. 15) to discuss "the type of monarchy under which the king governs all men according to his own will", but the discussion following assumes, as in ch. 15, a polis context, and the pambasileus is still the best man king. The objection that it is wrong for "one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the state consists of men who are alike", is raised once more. Again, this is a familiar argument we have encountered as early as ch. 10. In response we are told that it is preferable for the law to rule "rather than any one of the citizens".

We have finally reached the end of the traditional objections to royal rule and come, in ch. 17, to what is generally taken to be Aristotle's own opinion. But even here there is nothing wholly new. The chapter deals with the question raised at the start of ch. 14: the appropriateness of different kinds of rule for different kinds of states and peoples. Aristotle reminds us of the principle that constitutions correspond to the make-up of their constituent populations. Thus, he says, "there is such a thing as being naturally fitted to be controlled by a master (φύσει δεσποστόν); and in another case to be governed by a king (βασιλευτόν); and in another to exercise citizenship (πολιτικόν); and a different government is just and expedient (δίκαιον και συμφέρον) for different people". He goes on to say that from what has been said it is clear that "among people who are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor just for one to be sovereign over all". At this point Aristotle repeats the argument of ch. 13

1 3 All translations are from Rackham unless otherwise noted. 14 I.e. since they are collectively better and less corruptible (assuming they are both

good men and good citizens). This is a repetition of the argument already presented at length in chapter 11 (the summation principle).

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 2 1

for the necessity of the best man to be incomparably more virtuous and politically capable than his fellow citizens.

Here in ch. 17, for the first time, all of the actual circumstances envisioned for kingly rule are brought together. Some populations belong to the category of those who need the rule of a strongly despotic ruler; others need the more restrained rule of a king; citizens of pole is will not be ruled by a king but will rule themselves except, of course per impossibile, in the case of the appearance of the best man king. The

of the rule of the one over equal and alike men is resolved as it was in ch. 13. The main reason for this lengthy exposition of Aristotle's Politics chs. 9-17 is

to draw attention to what seems to me the anomalous character of the absolute king delineated at the end of ch. 14. The description of this king is located in the midst of what otherwise is a rather straightforward analysis of distributive justice in the polis, and the relevance of the best man to that discussion. All the analysis from ch. 10 onwards involves the best man in the context of the polis addressing the theoretical question of how equal and alike citizens could be ruled by a king. If we were to ignore the definition of the absolute king at the end of chapter 14 or read it as referring to a real world king, and similarly read the references to the pambasileus in the

to chs. 15 and 16 and parts of 17, then the peri basileias section of Book III, namely chs. 9-17 would read as a coherent whole, in which the best man king would be a theoretical construct and an integral part of Aristotle's discussion of distributive justice as Mulgan claimed15. The problem arises with conflating the pambasileus of the end of ch. 14 with the best man king.

2.

Before moving on, as promised earlier, to chapter 14, we need to summarize briefly the nature of the best man king Aristotle has delineated for us to this point.

First it needs to be stressed that this king rules in a polis, not some other kind of state. Secondly, the best man king rules in the best state. We are told that his aretë and politikë dunamis are so outstanding that they cannot be compared {më sumblëtën) with those of others. The ruler's qualities are not simply greater than the sum of the others; they are in a class by themselves16. He is a god among men17. He has no part of the city because his virtue is incomparable. The best man's will is supreme because he always makes the right decision; his phronësis is always up to par. It is

1 5 Op. cit. (η. 3), p. 87. As we might expect, real kings would not have featured significantly in this analysis because real kings were irrelevant to contemporary polis life in so far as potential politeiai were concerned; kingship was not a practicable option. The fact that some poleis came under the rule of despotic kings was irrelevant to this discussion; they were conquered poleis, not poleis which had made a choice to be ruled by a despot.

16 Or, as Vander Waerdt puts it: "Aristotle's usage of sumblëtos shows that things are 'comparable' only if they belong to the same kind {eidos ox genos ...); hence the king's virtue is incomparable to that of his subjects not because it exceeds all of theirs, taken together, but because it differs in eidos" {loc. cit. [η. 8], p. 266).

17 The best man's title to rule "consists not in philosophia, like Plato's philosopher kings, but in a kind of heroic or even divine virtue which differs in eidos from both moral and philosophical virtue", Vander Waerdt, loc. cit. (η. 8), p. 264.

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the unfailing certainty of the outcomes of the decisions of the best man that provides the reason why all in the city of otherwise equal citizens should obey him. This is what makes the best man king a god among men for Aristotle18.

Finally we arrive at chapter 14. The chapter begins with the question "whether it is advantageous for a king to rule if a city is to be well administered, or whether another constitution is more desirable". Aristotle, as we have seen, does not answer these questions but digresses to discuss the well know forms (eidë) of kingship: The first form of monarchy is Spartan kingship which is kata nomon and not over everything; it is merely a generalship for life. Some kingships of this type are hereditary, others elective. Second is monarchy among "some"19 barbarians, resembling tyranny but according to law. Succession is hereditary20. Third, elective tyranny, aisymnëtës, which, like barbarian monarchy is kata nomon, but differs from

1 8 "Strongly, however, as the Absolute Kingship contrasts with what we may call the typical form of the State, one paramount feature of the latter still survives in it. It is a means of placing the individual in constant contact and connection with Reason, here indeed represented not by Law but by an Absolute King - a means of realizing the highest and most complete form of human life ... The State may exist without Law, if only it secures to its members the highest quality of life" , Newman, op. cit. (η. 2), 1, p. 289 (emphasis added). Vander Waerdt makes a related point: the best regime frees up its citizens to pursue the life of philosophy because the ideal king's "incomparable political virtue and beneficence make their life of scholl· possible ... The king's permanent rule not only releases them from politics, providing them with the leisure to engage in their highest activity, philosophia, but it also facilitates the comprehensive reorientation of their activities toward the proper enjoyment of leisure and thus enables them to become better citizens and human beings than they could through ruling themselves ... [It] ensures that the citizens will continue to seek eudaimonia in the proper enjoyment of leisure and not become distracted by politics or conquest" (loc. cit. [η. 8], p. 252, 259, 261).

1 9 The choice of "some" is presumably intended as a contrast with "others" who were either under the fifth kind of monarchy (absolute kingship), or under tyrants, or were possibly barbarians not under formal kingly rule at all, but living scattered in the countryside. Common opinion held that the Persian kings were tyrants as were the kings of Macedonia, cf. Barcelo, p. 272, and J. Cobet, p. 50f, op. cit. (n. 9). Aristotle could, at times, accept what looks like common opinion about the Persians as tyrants, as for instance where he discusses how tyrants stay in power, citing techniques used by the Persian kings for this purpose: killing off outstanding men, prohibiting associations, "and all other similar devices of Persian and barbarian tyranny" (1313a 37 - 1313b 10). Yet Cyrus is cited, along with Codrus and the kings of Sparta, Macedonia and Epirus, as examples of men who became kings because of their good deeds: "For in every instance this honour fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus, others having set them free, for instance Cyrus, or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings of Sparta and Macedón and the Molossians. And a king wishes to be a guardian, to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and the people from suffering insult ..." (1310b 35 - 1311a 2).

20 Barbarian kingship was also elective: "for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with autocratic powers; and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called aesymnetae" (IV, 1295a 11-14).

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 23

it in not being hereditary21. Fourth, the monarchy of the Greek heroic period, over willing subjects, in certain limited areas of responsibility, viz. war, judicial matters and religion (1285b-22).

After summarizing the four kinds of kingship Aristotle adds what looks like an afterthought, the fifth form, absolute kingship:

But a fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign over all matters in the way in which each race and each city is sovereign over its common affairs; this monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of monarchy in the home, absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a race, or several races (1285b 29-33).

What kind of king is this pambasileus who is described as a householder king ruling poleis or ethnël How does he compare to the best man king we have been looking at? Are they the same?

Both, it is true, have in common that they are a law with regard to their individual communities. The bases of their claim to constitute the law for their subjects, however, are as different as are their respective subjects. As noted previously the best man rules because of his incomparable virtue, his politikë dunamis, his indefeasible phronesis. His rule is based on an intrinsically just claim, namely, that he himself is a just man. On that basis he can legitimately rule over even the most elite of all citizens - those of equal and similar status. His rule is narrowly focused in terms of his subjects. They are the inhabitants, by definition, of the best polis.

By contrast the absolute king of ch. 14 is simply a defacto ruler oí poleis and ethnë, a despot who rules according to his will, a shade only distinguished from a tyrant by the fact that he rules over willing subjects22. But willing only because these subjects have no other choice, just as the members of a family - wives, children and slaves - have no choice.

Thus the fifth king's power, unlike that of the best man king, is not derived from his recognized, incomparable virtue and political ability. No claim is made that his power is the result of his outstanding virtue, his arete or politikë dynamis, and recognized as such by his people, as is the case with the ideal best man ruler (VII, 1332b 20-21). He rules by virtue of his position as head of the state, and not because

21 Aristotle goes on to discuss tyranny in the way he has previously analyzed democracy and oligarchy (IV, 1291b 30 - 1292a 37; 1292a 39 - 1292b 10). This involves establishing a continuum of traits by means of which he measures the degree to which a particular form of rule is more or less tyrannical. At one end of this continuum is the purest form of tyranny, rule by an individual who does not have to give an account of his actions (anupeutheunos) over equals or betters, against their will, in the interests of the ruler only. This kind of tyranny is contrasted with that of the pambasileus who is said to be his contrary (antistrophos) (1295a 17-23). Lesser forms of tyranny are barbarian kingship and the Greek elected tyranny of ancient times (1295a 7-17). I am not convinced by F.E. Romer 's argument that Aristotle knew of only one example of an aisymnëtës, namely Pittacus: The Aisymneteia: a Problem in Aristotle's Historical Method, in AJPh, 103 (1982), p. 25-46.

22 Nevertheless, the real absolute king's rule is legitimate; his politeia is among those designated as orthê.

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of his accumulated or superordinate virtue and political ability23. And he rules not in the best polis or even, necessarily in a polis at all, but over the members of his ethnos or polis. The subjects of the best man king are, by definition, equal and alike citizens in a polis which is the best polis; those of the fifth king are simply the members of poleis or ethnë who are ruled with the concentrated power of their respective politeumata concentrated in the hands of a single individual.

To my way of thinking this suggests that the fifth king of ch. 14, is like the other four kings mentioned in that chapter, a real, existential king, not a hypothetical construction, a mere, although necessary, element in Aristotle's theory of distributive justice. He is a real king who somehow (and this is the nub of the problem) rules justly over poleis or ethnë. Accordingly, it would be invalid to predicate of him qualities of the best man king who presumptively rules only in an ideal state24. The problem is to understand how this kind of king fits into Aristotle's overall, well elaborated taxonomy of kings. The resolution will take a number of steps which will take up the rest of this study.

3.

It might help, first, to say something about how we should see the structure or context of Aristotle's reasoning in the peri basileias section of Book III. Aristotle's list of kings, I believe, represents a continuum along which are located the different types of kingship which are delineated by the presence, and level of intensity of certain traits. Kings seem to be located along this continuum in terms of the more and the less principle by which species are distinguished in his biological works25.

23 We learn in Book I that the household is by necessity, 1252a 26-34, and I assume that this is Aristotle's view here also although the connection between Books I and III is problematical, cf. Schütrumpf, loe. cit (η. 1), p. 115, and IX, 1, 126-128. I take it that Book III, 12-17 is early, even if it is not, as Schütrumpf believes, Aristotle's response to Plato's Politicus, loc. cit. (η. 1). p. 117-118. Book III is referred to by all other books of the Politics except Books I and VIII.

24 Above, p. 121-122. 25 J. Lennox in his discussion of biological traits claims that Aristotle "treats

variations between one form of a kind [i.e. the eidos of a kind] and another as differences in degree", Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in Aristotle's Biology, in A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical issues in Aristotle's Biology, Cambridge, 1987, p. 340. Notions of deficiency and excess mark off segments of the continuum that differ from one another to the same extent. "Thus", Lennox continues, "should one wish to distinguish one sort of bird from another, it will be in part by noting the differences in degree between the parts of one and the parts of another - thicker or thinner bone or blood, heavier or lighter body, thicker or thinner beak, and so on", p. 346. The differentiae of animals within a kind vary only by the more and the less. In support of this Lennox cites Aristotle as follows: "One should try to take the animals by kinds in the way already shown by the popular distinction between bird kind and fish kind. Each of these has been marked off by many differentiae, not dichotomously" (PA 643b 10- 13). I suggest that this kind of thinking underlies Aristotle's analysis of constitutions as presented in what follows, i.e. Aristotle sees his types of democracy, oligarchy and kings as eidë along a continuum of traits. On another way of interpreting Aristotle's genos/eidos division, cf. DJ. Depew, Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle's History of Animals, in Phronesis, 40.2 (1995), p. 156-181.

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 25

Correlations exist among a number of traits, as, for example, between a king's powers of coercion and the presence or absence of restraints; between a king and the level of equality or freedom to be found among the people he rules; or between the type of kingship and its durability.

At one end of the spectrum we are told in ch. 15 are the constitutional kings such as the kings of Sparta and the rulers of Epidamnus and Opus (III, 1287a 4-8); at the other, the pambasileus. The kings at the Spartan end of the spectrum exercise their authority over citizens in a way that is not repugnant to the general principle that ruling over equals and similars is not justifiable26. What makes this possible is the fact that the powers of these men are highly circumscribed; they are really magistrates performing some specific military or civilian functions, as opposed to the

who is kurios pantön. While the powers of coercion of these kings are restricted, these constitutional monarchies are also the most durable, "for the fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the office in its entirety must last, for they themselves become less despotic and more equal to their subjects in temper, and their subjects envy them less" (V, 1313a 20-24). Aristotle goes on to say that this is why the Spartan and Molossian kings have survived for so long. There is thus a correlation of durability and restraint, and its contrary, a correlation of lack of durability and lack of restraint; high levels of despotism correlate with high levels of instability. It is interesting that Aristotle uses an example of a barbarian and a Greek monarch to illustrate this point, suggesting that barbarian kingship is itself a more flexible category than might appear at first sight, i.e. not all barbarian kings are despotic in the same degree; some are less so than others and thus manage to survive for longer periods27. At the other end of the continuum the more despotic kings correlate with less equal and alike peoples, and with more unrestrained coercive powers. Kings of this type include "barbarian" kings, and the aisymnëtës of the Greek archaic age

26 In the eyes of some, according to Aristotle, such rule is against nature, 1287a 2. There is an even more fundamental principle that "the higher the type of subject the

loftier the nature of the authority exercised over them" (I, 1254a 26). This statement occurs in the context of the discussion of the nature of the household and of the general principle that authority and subordination {to archein kai archesthai) pervades all of nature. There is thus a correlation between the level of authority or coercive force possessed by magistrates and the level of political accomplishments possessed by the citizenry. The more advanced citizens are in terms of being equal and alike, the lower the levels of coercive powers that magistrates should possess, and vice versa.

27 This would explain why, among other things, no mention is made of heritability as a means of passing on the power of the absolute king, whereas heritability is associated with kings of lesser levels of despotism, such as category #2, barbarian kings. Indeed, as Aristotle notes, tyrants have difficulty passing on their power (1312b 21-23). V. Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks, Oxford, 1938, p. 81-82, finds the omission of Macedonian kings from the list of examples of enduring monarchies significant, and believes its absence implies criticism of Philip or Alexander, but he does not say on what grounds. I would suggest that in his decision to omit Macedón Aristotle was applying his principle that high levels of despotism correlate with instability. The constitutional contrast between the Epirot koinon and unstable Macedón was striking. Early in the fourth century Molossia possessed officials {prostates), a secretary (grammateus), representatives (demiourgoi), and federal officials (sunarchontes) (SEG 23, 471; SGDL 1334f.). According to Justin King Tharyps in the fifth century gave the Molossians "laws, a senate, annual magistrates and a regular constitution" (XVII, 3, 9-13).

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"which, only differs from the monarchy that exists among barbarians in not being hereditary" (III, 1285a 31-33).

This correlation of traits of coercion, restraints and types of people ruled is why in ch. 15 Aristotle seems to digress from his main argument to offer an explanation for the rise of kings. Early Greeks, he suggests, lived in small communities and it was hard in such environments to find significant numbers of men who excelled in virtue, though it was still possible to discover at least one capable person. As cities grew it came about that "many men arose who were alike in respect of virtue and would no longer submit to royalty but sought some form of

and set up a republican constitution" (III, 1286b 11-14). This reflects as well as demonstrates Aristotle's belief in the incompatibility of kingship with the

of a society of equals and similars. As polis -type societies developed it became both difficult, and eventually unacceptable, for the coercive powers of a community to reside in the hands of a single individual. This principle is, in fact, coherent with the history of the rise of poleis in various parts of Greece28.

Aristotle does not raise the interesting corollary of the possibility of a society of equals submitting itself willingly to the rule of a less than incomparably virtuous individual. A reading of chapters 13 and 17 where the arguments for the incomparably best man are presented, and of V, 1313a (above), seem to suggest that it would be impossible to find equals who would be willing to submit themselves to a less than superlatively distinguished leader. Apparently, the difficulty in deciding in a society of equals who is the relatively best man was seen by Aristotle as insuperable29. Thus he arrives at the conclusion that, in the absence of a truly incomparable individual, the normal way a single ruler will come to power will be through force or deception.

To return to the analysis and to the largest of the aporiai that have emerged from this discussion: At the extreme end of the spectrum in terms of coercive powers and lack of external restraints, is pambasileia. It is postulated in ch. 14 that the absolute king rules poleis and ethnë legitimately, because absolute kingship is counted among right forms of government.

This leads us to the core of the problem. Despotic rule over some kinds of ethnë does not present a problem since some ethnë, according to Aristotle's general

28 The same principle appears in Aristotle's parenthetical obiter dictum of V, 1313a 3-10: "Royal governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies do occur they are rather tyrannies, because royalty is government over willing subjects but with sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office; so that for this reason the subjects do not submit willingly, and if a man has made himself ruler by deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny". Aristotle has discussed the principle earlier in Book III: "[Although it is possible for one man or a few to excel in virtue, when the number is larger it becomes difficult for them to possess perfect excellence in respect of every form of virtue, but they can best excel in military valour, for this is found with number" (III, 7, 1279a 39 - 1279b 4).

29 It would be interesting to know how he thought it might be possible to identify the absolutely best man. However, since this was a theoretical consideration, there was no point in devoting space to it. The historical examples he does cite of the kinds of problems distinguished men present to all forms of states are those of relatively best men (1284a 15 - 1284b 34).

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 27

principles, need this kind of rule, but rule over poleis is problematic since high levels of coercion are not compatible with legitimate rule over communities made up of

who are equal and alike. Yet we are told that the pambasileus' rule is legitimate. If the king of III, 14 were the best man king there would be no problem

because the fact that he was so incomparably virtuous would give him just title to rule over poleis and ethnë alike. But I have already argued that the fifth king of ch. 14 is not this kind of king. I suggest two approaches to resolving the problem. The one is extraphilosophical or biographical; the other is contained, I believe, within the definition itself of the pambasileus of ch. 14. First the biographical.

4.

The evolution of Macedonia from a backward Balkan nation, not greatly distinguishable from its neighbors, to a powerful, centralized state of immense

though uncertain political power, must have been of more than scientific interest to Aristotle. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle grew up in a world in which ethnë - Macedonians, Persians, Molossians, Paeonians, Thracians and others - were as familiar to him as were po/w-dwellers. Stagira was a frontier town, so that beyond personal connections with the Macedonian court, Aristotle was familiar with a world many southern Greeks would have found alien. The destruction by Philip of the great city of Olynthus (348), the most important true Greek metropolitan center in the region, the dissolution along with it of the Chalcidian league, and the destruction of Stagira (349), cannot have left him unaffected. True, he was not in the region when all of this happened; he was in Athens, perhaps pondering, among other things, Plato's experiences with the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse, as well as the heated debates over Macedonian policy then taking place in the city30.

From Athens Aristotle journeyed northward again in 347 to Assos under the sponsorship of Hermeias with whom he developed a close personal relationship. Perhaps at Hermeias' recommendation Aristotle went on to become tutor of

Following his stint in Macedonia and having had first-hand experience with Philip and Alexander, Aristotle was again in Athens, soon after the destruction of Thebes by Alexander. In Athens he was able to witness the reaction of a prominent Greek state to this event31. He must have watched the progress of Alexander's

closely. There were the results of the visit to the shrine of Zeus Ammon followed by the claim to the Great King's title in 331; the murder of Cleitus; the events at Bactra; the execution of Callisthenes; the heavy handed treatment of the

30 He was in Athens for Demosthenes' first Philippic (351 B.C.) and three Olynthiacs (349 B.C.), with their denunciations of the Macedonian king and their easy equations of him with tyrant and barbarian. On the use of the title "king" by the tyrants of Syracuse, cf. S.I. Oost, The Tyrant Kings of Syracuse, in CPh, 71.3 (1976), p. 224-236.

3 1 Aristotle must have been well aware of the tenor of the anti-Macedonian speeches in the assembly and courts with their themes of loss of liberty, hubris, despotism, lawlessness, servitude, and of tyrants whose whim was law ([Dem.], 17, 4; 12; 26; Dem., 18, 65-66; 72; 203; 235; Hyper., 6, 20; fr. 214; Lycur., Leocr., 50; Din., 1, 19-20).

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Greek states of Asia Minor; the humiliation of the veterans at Opis, and finally the promulgation of the Exile's Decree (324 B.C.)32.

It is hardly speculation to think that these events must have made Aristotle reflect more deeply on the subject he regarded with such importance. The debate with Plato over kingship belonged in the past, by now long since subsumed by later experiences, and the acquisition of a considerable body of knowledge about kingship in its many forms. The debate over kingship was not merely about the hypothetical king of Plato or even the long tradition regarding tyranny in popular thought. He must surely have had to factor in the reality of Macedonian overlordship and its implications for Greece and for his political theory.

What Aristotle saw unfolding before him was something wholly new in Greek history. Prior to Philip, the inhabitants of the old, independent poleis of the mainland would not have dreamed of being ruled by a king, neither one of their own nor any one else's33. The fact that the Greeks of Asia Minor and some of the islanders had come under the control of a barbarian monarch, the Persian king, was an historical accident. It did not affect the fact that they were still /?o/zs-dwellers; their

status was not at issue because they were under the overlordship of foreigners. But the appearance of a king claiming Argive descent was something new. He would be a Greek king claiming to rule Greek cities34. What is more, this king was now, it seemed, asserting his power not just over the Greek cities of Asia Minor, but over those of the mainland as well in much the same way as the Great King had ruled the rest of his subjects. Such, at any rate, is a reasonable assessment of the implications of the Exile's Decree35. It was no longer unthinkable that Greeks should be ruled by a king. Hence the question of kingship needed to be revisited.

32 E. Badián, Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia, in E. Badián (ed.), Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg, Oxford, 1966, p. 37-69; A.B. BOSWORTH, Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great, Cambridge, 1988, p. 187-228, 250-258.

33 Aristotle was, of course, aware of the existence of tyrants in Greek cities and of figures such as Hermeias and Evagoras of Cyprus. He would most likely have categorized most of these technically as tyrants as defined in IV, 1295a. Hermeias as ruler of Atarneus, a non-Greek city, and Evagoras as ruler of barbarian cities would probably have come under category #2, barbarian kingship, if they ruled according to law over willing subjects. It is unlikely that he would have regarded any of the above as candidates for best man absolute kingship. Whether he might have thought of Evagoras as an example of a real absolute king (i.e. as the pambasileus of ch. 14) in his capacity as ruler over Greek cities is a possibility, but not likely to have been uppermost in his mind.

34 For a recent discussion of the claims of the Argeads to Greek ancestry, see E. Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedón, Princeton, 1991, p. 80-83, 110-114, and J.M. Hall, Ethnic identity in Greek antiquity, Cambridge, 1997, p. 64. Borza argues convincingly that the claim to Greek descent belongs to the fifth century, probably to the time of Alexander I. Whatever the claims of the Argeads, Greeks, as Badián has argued, did not regard Macedonians as Greeks nor did Macedonians think of themselves as Greek: Greeks and Macedonians, in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza, Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, Washington, 1982, p. 33-51; Borza, ibid., p. 96, agrees with this judgment.

35 "With this decree Alexander treated every single Greek state as though it had been just defeated. However, as became apparent, this act of authority, of mastery by force, reflected not the actual ascendancy achieved but only the king's claim to dominate the

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 29

It seems that in a general way Aristotle had at first dismissed the rule of one as an irrelevancy to the Greeks of his times. At most, Greek kings were like the kings of Sparta, or the appointed administrators of Epidamnus and Opus, barely kings at all, weak in the scale of kingship. It was thus a purely theoretical question that a king should rule over free Greek cities. Correspondingly, his original analysis of types of kings was restricted to four categories. The highest level of despotism in the list was category #2, that of barbarian kingship which existed among "some" of the

This kind of kingship was a legitimate constitution and Aristotle may well have had this category in mind for all barbarian kingships that were real kingships and not mere tyrannies or ephemeral chiefdoms36. It was a broad category and he may well have considered it comprehensive. At some point, perhaps in the 320s, Aristotle added the fifth form oi pambasileus now found in ch. 14 when it became clear to him that the old category #2, despotic kings ruling over non-Greeks, was no longer precise or comprehensive enough. This category assumed that only coerced poleis or barbarian peoples were being ruled, whereas the actual situation was that of a new kind of king who claimed to rule legitimately over both ethnè and poleis. This was the de facto situation by the time of the Exiles Decree in 324. To the list of four historical monarchical categories he added a fifth on the consideration that the list was, as he now realized, incomplete. The list needed expansion beyond barbarian kingship. The likelihood of kingly rule over Greek poleis had to be dealt with, and Aristotle added the fifth category to deal with this eventuality.

5.

How Aristotle thought all this might be reconciled theoretically is less clear. One hint is perhaps contained in his comparison of the rule of the real absolute king to that of the householder. We already know from principles discussed in book I that all households are ruled monarchically37, but this rule is divided into three subtypes corresponding to the constituent sub-koinoniai of the household: over slaves the

Greeks in the same way and from the same place, Susa, from which the Great King of Persia had for long years held sway over the Greeks of Asia Minor": R.M. Errington, A History of Macedonia, Oxford, 1990, p. 96; "[T]here was not even lip service to the concept of autonomy. Alexander simply imposed his will by fiat. He might subsequently be swayed by diplomacy but the final decision was his alone. It was absolute rule by royal command, the polar opposite of the facade of consensus which Philip had attempted to create": Bosworth, op. cit. (?. 32), p. 228.

36 Naturally Aristotle would not have accepted as scientific what was said popularly about the Persian empire. Strictly speaking (i.e. according to Aristotle's criteria for legitimate monarchies), the Persian monarchy was not a tyranny. Indeed, he seems to have thought of tyranny proper as something limited to tyranny in Greek cities since it took the presence of equals and similars to create the conditions for the most complete category of tyranny.

37 "Republican government (? d? p???t???) controls men who are by nature free, the master's authority men who are by nature slaves; and the government of a household is monarchy (? µ?? ??????µ??? µ??a???a) since every house is governed by a single ruler (µ??a??e?ta ?a? pa? ?????), whereas statesmanship (? d? p???t???) is the government of men free and equal" (1255b 18-20). Although the relationship of Books I and III is difficult to determine, there is no inconsistency in the doctrine propounded in Books I and III regarding the nature of mastership, whether in the household or outside it.

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householder rules as a master because slaves need a master, being incapable of ruling themselves; children are to be ruled royally; wives are to be ruled politikös, but on a permanent basis38. Thus we might argue that Aristotle believes that the (real) absolute king rules over some populations despotikös because they require this kind of rule by nature; others need somewhat less despotic rule and are ruled royally; some are ruled politikös, but on a permanent basis because they, like wives, are deficient in some way relative to the householder. This is reminiscent of Aristotle's supposed advice to Alexander in the doxographic tradition that he treat Greeks hegemonikös and barbarians despotikös (fr. 658 Rose)39. In a general way this also corresponds to Aristotle's basic principle that different constitutions are suited to different peoples, as well as to the conventional wisdom of the fourth century. Thus Isocrates urged Philip not to rule the Macedonians tyrannikös but basilikös and he should rule the Greeks as an euergetës (V, 154-155). The opinion that Macedonians should be ruled by custom and consent, not force, is also found in Arrian's version of Callisthenes' speech40.

3 8 "And since as we saw, the science of household management has three divisions, one the relation of master to slave . . . one the paternal relation, and third the conjugal - for it is a part of the household science to rule over wife and children (over both as freemen, yet not with the same mode of government, but over the wife to exercise republican government [p???t????], and over the children monarchical [ßas??????]) ... it is true that in most cases of republican government the ruler and the ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on an equal level in their nature and to have no difference at all) . . . but the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously. The rule of the father over the children on the other hand is that of a king; for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of affection and of seniority, which is characteristic of royal government" (1259a 37 - 1259b 12). Politikös is the rule, in turn, of free and equal citizens (1252a 13-16; 1255b 20; 1261a 32f.; 1279a 8f.; 1287a 12; 1325b 7-10; 1332b 12f.). Although elsewhere Aristotle describes husbands' rule over their wives as kingly or aristocratic (1255b 19; 1259b 1; EN 1158b 1 If., 1160b 32-35, 1161a 22-25), here he implies that a husband is to treat his wife as one citizen treats another, i.e. as a person who deserves consultation and argument. However, because the woman's deliberative capacity is akuros (1260a 13) Aristotle escapes the inevitable conclusion that a wife will in turn rule her husband. In his excellent discussion of "gendered virtue" S.G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Philosophy, Princeton, 1990, p. 185, makes the following comment on this point: "The rotation in office that ordinarily characterizes political rule is absent here, but other key elements of political rule are not: rule is to be in the interest of both rulers and ruled (which is only incidentally so in the case of slaves), there is rough equality of ruler and ruled, and an impersonal legal authority limits and informs the action-choices of the rulers. Women should not rule, but they should be ruled as fellow-citizens - that is, they should get the same benefits from the political relationship as males - and not as children or slaves, whose needs, and hence, whose status, are entirely different (temporarily or permanently) from the needs of their rulers". This suggests a way in which the householder king could take into account the sensibilities of his citizen-subjects while still ruling monarchically.

39 Cf. ?. Badián, Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind, m Historia, 1 (1958), p. 440-443. Alexander took to heart the second part of this advice but neglected the first.

40 The authenticity of the speech has been defended recently by E. Badián, The Deification of Alexander the Great, in H.J. Dell and E. Borza (eds.), Ancient Macedonian Studies in honor of Charles F. Edson, Thessaloniki, 1981, p. 28-32, 48-54; L. Mooren, The Nature of Hellenistic Monarchy, in E. Van't Dack et al, Egypt and the Hellenistic

ALEXANDER AND ARISTOTLE'S PAMBASILEUS 1 3 1

There are other examples so much so that the sentiment that the consent of the governed be respected was a fourth century commonplace41.

The rule of kings is justified on a sliding scale of proportionality between a ruler's virtues and capacities and those of the people for whom his rule is intended. Each eidos of kingship corresponds to the type of population ruled. In his first consideration of the subject I would argue that Aristotle had come to the well-known and much-discussed conclusion that truly free and equal citizens could be ruled legitimately only by a king of incomparable virtue and ability. This was, as Mulgan rightly points out, an integral part of Aristotle's discussion of distributive justice in book III42. Only an ideal, superlatively endowed individual, whose existence is very unlikely, could rule free and equal citizens. The rule of the best man absolute king in the best state is a theoretical construct43. Initially, at least, Aristotle was not thinking of the actual possibility of a king ruling in a traditional Greek polis inhabited by free, equal and alike citizens. After modifying his theory it would still be difficult for a king to rule in a city such as Athens which was made up of truly free and equal citizens. The justification of rule by a king over cities of this type would demand a ruler of outstanding virtue and ability, but not necessarily of the level of excellence required for the ideal city of equal and alike citizens. Proportional excellence would suffice. Cities with weaker claims to rule by equal and alike citizens would require proportionately lower levels of virtue and ability on the part of their rulers. It would thus not be unthinkable that disorderly poleis, for example, might legitimately be ruled by a king who would not, however, be justified in ruling an Athens or any other city where equals ruled each other in some orderly fashion.

Aristotle could not offer a detailed solution to the problem of the just rule of a monarch over the free cities of Greece, but he could provide a way of thinking constructively about this problem. It would have been easiest to grasp the extremes of the proposed sliding scale. At one end was the ideal city with its free and equal citizens ruled by the presumptively best man. At the other end of the continuum was the real absolute king ruling despotikös (but still legitimately) over otherwise unruly peoples. In between lay many, if not the majority, oi poleis and ethnë, and here the application of the principle would depend on the individual historical circumstances of each particular city or people. Some Greek poleis might be ruled politikös until such time as their citizens recovered themselves and once more attained the capacity to rule and be ruled in turn as free and equal people. By the same token, as some ethnë moved from extreme ungovernability, the level of justifiable despotism or force would have to decline in proportion as they reached the stage of self-rule. Ethnë such as the Macedonians who had long standing claims to freedom and equality, but not at a level sufficient for self-rule, could claim that they deserved to be ruled basilikös.

World, Louvain, 1983, p. 222; A.B. Bosworth, From Arrian to Alexander, Oxford, 1988, p. 113-123.

41 Confirmed by the Daochus inscription cited by MOOREN, loc. cit. (?. 40), p. 220- 221, and Bos worth, op. cit. (?. 40), p. 122.

42 Loc. cit. (?. 7), p. 27. 43 Cf. Mulgan 's comment, op. cit. (?. 3), p. 87: "Nothing that Aristotle says leads

one to believe that justifiable absolute rule for Greeks was anything more than a theoretical possibility".

132 D.B. NAGLE

Clearly the principle does not justify, as such, the rule of kings over poleis, but only over those that needed it at any given time, and only for as long as such rule was necessary. Meanwhile they would be ruled politikös in the sense suggested above. The principle allows for flexibility since historically, as Aristotle knew, peoples moved in both directions, from self-rule to ungovernability and vice versa. Indeed, the very model for this, I suspect, was early Greece which went from kingly rule to less despotic forms of government. As the number of free and equal peoples increased over time in early Greek communities, the rule of kings declined to the point where, as he says, there are "now no kings in Greece", at least no legitimate ones (1313a 3-10).

With the description of the pambasileus in place Aristotle had in hand a range oieidë of orthodox royalty with which to categorize states ruled by kings.

Beyond the pambasileus was the now accurately identified tyrant44. Aristotle's is an instrument that comprehends all forms of royalty. He has identified the

key traits for royal rule and the way in which it differs from tyranny45. In his analysis Aristotle surpassed Plato who limited his view of monarchy to the polis alone and so produced a relatively undeveloped theory of kingship compared to that of Aristotle. It is not that Aristotle advocates, contrary to Plato, the real existence of a philosopher- king, so much that he takes a hard look at real kings and then explains under what circumstances a king might reign legitimately. Plato held a more restricted view of kingly rule. If a monarch rules according to his own devices, behaving as if he really knew, he is a tyrant (Pol., 301e). Aristotle finds a place in his royal continuum for someone who rules in this fashion, but who is not a tyrant. He accommodates Plato in so far as his approach allows for the education of a king, or more precisely, the development of a community itself as it might move, for instance, from the excessive power of the tyrant to absolute kingship, to finally, the constitutional kings of Sparta and elsewhere46. Alexander's contribution to Aristotle was to provide him with the impetus to consider more deeply the nature of kingship and ways in which real kings could justly and expediently rule various populations.

University of Southern California D. Brendan NAGLE Department of History Los Angeles CA 90089-0034 USA

44 That is, a tyrant not defined by rhetoric or common opinion, but by comparative analysis.

45 Thus I would agree with Vander Waerdt, loc. cit. (?. 8), p. 251, ?. 4, that we should not underestimate the preeminence of the philosophical aspects of Aristotle's analysis of kingship in the Politics. By the same token I would disagree with those who claim that if Aristotle was thinking of Alexander in connection with absolute kingship he would have come out and said so. Historical and contemporary events were used by Aristotle to illustrate particular points, not because they were of special interest to him per se. The absence of an historical example for the fifth type of king in chapter 14 is of no particular significance. No examples are given either of the barbarian kings who feature so importantly in category #2 of the same list of kings.

46 On this subject, see H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen, Munich, 1967, p. 363-364.