A Multi Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing

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A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing Paul Gill, School o Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland

urn:nbn:de:0070-ijcv-2007246

IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159

Editorial (p. 91)

From Classical Terrorism to ‘Global’ Terrorism Michel Wieviorka (pp. 92 –104)

Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States

Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Robert Y. Shapiro (pp. 105– 126)

Attributions o Responsibility or Terrorist Attacks: The Role o Group Membership and Identifcation

Bertjan Doosje, Sven Zebel, Marieke Scheermeijer, Pauline Mathyi (pp. 127– 141)

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing Paul Gill (pp. 142– 159)

Suicide Bombers in Israel: Their Motivations, Characteristics, and Prior Activity

in Terrorist Organizations Revital Sela-Shayovitz (pp. 160–168)

Living with Contradiction: Examining the Worldview o the Jewish Settlers in Hebron

Hanne Eggen Røislien (pp. 169 –184)

Explaining the Long-Term Trend in Violent Crime: A Heuristic Schemeand Some Methodological Considerations Helmut Thome (pp. 185 – 202)

Focus: Terrorism

Open Section



143IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159

Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing

1. Introduction

Late on the night o Friday June 1, 2001, Saeed Hotary le

the Palestinian West Bank city o Kalkilya by car. wo

colleagues, who also made the journey, dropped him o

at the promenade in el Aviv. According to eyewitness

reports, Hotary joined a long queue o people awaiting

entry into the Dolphinarium nightclub. He mingled with

some o the teenagers in the queue and irted with one

girl in particular. Without warning, Hotary detonated

an explosive device strapped to his body, which held a

large number o metal objects including ball bearings

and screws. Within an instant, both Hotary and the girl

evaporated. In total, twenty-one people died and one

hundred and twenty were injured, the vast majority o

whom were teenagers gathering on el Aviv’s promenade

to socialize at the weekend (O’Reilly 2001).

Condemnation rom world leaders ollowed the next day.Despite that, Palestinian terrorist organizations competed

or claims o responsibility. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the

little known Palestinian Hezbollah claimed the bomber

as their own (MIP Database). Dozens o Palestinians

in Ramallah reportedly celebrated the act. Hotary’s

amily and neighbors also celebrated. His ather stated

he wished he had twenty more sons to become suicide

bombers (Khala 2001). His neighbors hung pictures o

the new martyr holding seven sticks o dynamite around

the neighborhood and arranged owers in the shapes o

a heart and a bomb to display. His picture adorned an el-

ementary school entrance in his hometown (Kelley 2001).

wo weeks later, an opinion poll showed 68.6 percent sup-

port or suicide bombings amongst a sample o over one

thousand Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (JMCC

Poll no. 41). In a separate poll 82.3 percent o respondents

did not view this incident as an act o terrorism (PCPSR

Poll no. 3).

Many questions arise rom this story. Why would an

otherwise normal twenty-one-year-old electrician blow

himsel up? Why do terrorist organizations use this

tactic? Is the death o the perpetrator instrumental to the

success o the act? What role do the bomber’s colleagues

play in the acil itation o suicide bombing? Why doterrorist organizations compete to claim such a violent

attack against innocents? How can a suicide bombing

and actors involved receive such levels o support rom

the wider community?

Tese questions have become more important over the

last ew years. Te Iraqi insurgency has produced more

Understanding suicide bombing entails studying the phenomenon on three dierent dimensions: the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization, and the com-

munity rom which suicide bombings emerge. Political and social psychology allow us to establish the reciprocal relationships that underpin the exchanges

between the three dimensions. This method increases our theoretical understanding o suicide bombing by moving away rom the unidimensional models

that have previously dominated the terrorism literature.

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing Paul Gill, School o Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland



144IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


suicide bombings than the previous twenty-ve years.1

Between 1980 and 2004, suicide bombings accounted or

48 percent o all deaths through terrorism despite its use inonly 3 percent o incidents (Pape 2005).2 Sustained suicide

bombings occurred in various Lebanese groups’ campaigns

to drive American, French, and Israeli orces out o Leba-

non, attempts by various Palestinian groups to coerce Israel

into leaving Gaza and the West Bank, the amil, Chechen,

Kashmiri, and Kurdish separatist movements, al Qaeda’s

sustained eorts against the United States and its allies,

and the Iraqi and Aghan insurgencies. Suicide bombers

have also emerged rom Britain, Belgium, Somalia, Mali,

Iran, Syria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi

Arabia , the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.

Figure 1: Number o suicide bombing by year

Current research on terrorism in general, and suicide

bombing in particular typically ocuses on one o three

possible dimensions; the terrorist/suicide bomber, theterrorist organization and to a lesser extent, the com-

munity rom which suicide bombings emerge. Studies on

individual terrorists and suicide bombers seek to ascer-

tain actors driving individuals to engage in terrorism.

Various analyses have ocused on pathological disposition

to violence (Gordon 2002; Post 1990), an authoritarian

personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), general

socialization actors (Atran, 2003; Post 2005; Sageman

2005; Silke 2003), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice

(Gupta 2004), religious anaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive

dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge or personal suer-ing (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005).3

1 See gure 1. Data is derived rom my database

o incidents o suicide bombing. Tis database

synthesizes inormation rom online internet

databases such as MIP and IC with general

chronologies (Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005) and

LexisNexis searches.

2 Tis gure excludes 9/11.

3 For a general review o the psychological litera-

ture on terrorism, see Horgan (2005) and Victoro

(2005).

*Many thank s to obias Teiler, Indraneel Sircar,

Matteo Fumagalli, Karen Jacques, and the two

anonymous reviewers or their helpul comments

on earlier dras o this work. Research u nded by

the Irish Research Council or the Humanities and

Social Sciences.

0

100

200

300

400

1 9 8 1

1 9 8 2

1 9 8 3

1 9 8 4

1 9 8 5

1 9 8 6

1 9 8 7

1 9 8 8

1 9 8 9

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 1

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 3

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 5

1 9 9 6

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

Year



145IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


Studies on the organizational dimension o suicide bomb-

ing generally oer rational-choice explanations. Examples

include cost-benet analyses (Harrison 2001; Pape 2005),suicide bombing’s ability to balance power in an asymmet-

ric war (Gupta and Mundra 2005; Lu 2002), domestic

political competition and outbidding by dierent organi-

zations or public support (Bloom 2005), and other strate-

gic motives such as the efciency with which the terrorist

can still activate the charge when captured (Ganor 2000).4

Studies on the societal dimension o terrorism and

suicide bombing ocus on actors such as the degree o

political reedom and poverty in a g iven society (Abadie

2004), rustration caused by social injustice (Bloom 2005;Khashan 2003; Merari 1990), and an attachment to politi-

cal Islam (Haddad 2004).5 Haez (2006a) outlines that a

sense o victimization and threat combined with sym-

bolic narratives that venerate martyrdom and legitimate

leaders consenting to violence lead to societal support or

suicide bombing.

Tese studies have all contributed to our knowledge o

suicide bombing but the literature lacks a ramework that

ties all three dimensions together to explain the interac-

tion between them.6 Unidimensional explanations are

unconcerned with the wider process that enables suicide

bombing. Without incorporating other dimensions, the

studies mentioned can oen be misleading. Studies ocus-

ing on the individual suicide bomber cannot explain or-

ganizational motivations and societal support. Organiza-

tional approaches concentrating on strategic and tactical

advantages cannot explain how a culture o martyrdom is

socially constructed. Societal approaches cannot take into

account ully the complexity o individual and organiza-

tional processes. Te point o this article is not to present

new empirical data, but instead to synthesize the wealth

o existing data into a broad conceptual ramework.

Political and social psychology provide insights into

behavior within groups, decision-making by individu-

als, political socia lization, conormism, group conict,and symbolic attachment. Tese insights underpin the

reciprocal relationships outlined in gure 2. Tey occur

unsystematically and can begin on any dimension. (A)

depicts the observation that terrorist organizations are

ultimately dependent on the social, political, nancial,

and moral patronage o the constituency they claim to

represent. With this in mind, the terrorist organization

must calibrate its tactics and the t iming o its operations,

and its leaders must wield material and/or non-material re-

sources to maximize societal support. (B) + (C) start with

the proposition that when eelings o threat are salient, in-dividuals are more likely to be submissive toward certain

types o leaders and symbolic narratives. Aggressive poli-

cies ostensibly aimed against those who cause the threat

and anxiety become more readily acceptable. (D) + (E)

ocus on how societal support coupled with catalysts and

amilia l and riendship ties are behind the process o an

individual joining a terrorist organization. (F) ocuses on

how the would-be-bomber radicalizes urther through

the internalization o relevant organizational norms.

Figure 2: Multi-dimensional model

Terrorist organization

(D) Volunteers

(C ) Lends Support

Individual Society

( F ) R a d i c a

l i s a t i o n

P r o

c e s s

( E ) V o l u n

t e e r s

( B ) L e n d s S u p p o r t

( A ) S e e k s S u p p o r t

4 For a general literature review o the organiza-

tional dimension to terrorism, see Cronin

(2003, 8–12).

5 For a general review on the societal literature, see

urk (2004).

6. Haez (2006b) and Moghadam (2006) have both

put orward their own multi-causal rameworks

but have not ocused upon the interactions be-

tween dimensions. Pedahzur’s model (2004) does

account or some interactions but is too systematic

and ails to propose an interpretive lens through

which these interactions can be explained.



146IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


With slight alterations most o the processes described

above or this model also have the potential to explain

other (non-suicidal) acts o terrorism. However, in ex-plaining suicide bombing this model contains three major

dierences rom a model explaining ordinary terrorism.

Firstly, the social construction o a “culture o martyr-

dom” is not necessary to explain non-suicidal terrorism.

Secondly, as wi ll be outlined later, in the Palestinian case,

support or orthodox acts o terrorism remained more or

less constant over the period examined whereas support

or suicide bombing uctuated. Tis uctuation negatively

correlated with optimism or the uture. Tereore, a sense

o threat correlates with support or suicide bombing.

Perhaps, the surrounding political conditions are enoughor support or orthodox acts o terrorism. Treat salience

leads individuals toward escalatory tendencies in conict

and suicide bombing corresponds with this tendency or

both normative and strategic reasons. Normatively, sui-

cide bombing violates almost every predominant ethical

norm in societies in which it takes place (i.e. not to kill in-

nocents and not to commit suicide). Strategically, suicide

bombing causes more casualties. Tirdly, the radicaliza-

tion process or a suicide bomber within the group setting

is a longer and more intense one. Preparation to kill and

be killed simultaneously requires a more nuanced psycho-

logical conditioning.

2. The Interactions Between Dimensions

2.1 The Terrorist Organization Seeks Societal Support by Creating a

Culture o Martyrdom (A)

Prominent in terrorism studies is the argument that al l

terrorist acts are a rational strategic move vis-à-vis a more

powerul opponent (Pape 2005, Crenshaw 1990). Tis is

only partly correct. errorist acts are not only an attempt

to communicate to the political el ites and public opinion

o the targeted state. errorist organizations also aim to

communicate to the community they claim to represent(Homan and McCormick 2004). aking this into con-

sideration, Weinburg and Pedahzur (2003) likened ter-

rorist organizations to political parties because they are

both ultimately dependent upon the moral and economic

patronage o their supporters. For example, Richardson

(2006, 84) argues that the IRA was always mindul not to

disaect the Catholic population o Northern Ireland or

ear o losing support. Tese concerns were reected in

its targeting strategies. Pape (2005) may be correct in

asserting that suicide terrorism is a strategy to compel

oreign occupiers to withdraw but he ails to recognizethat this is just one part o the strategy. He ails to clariy

that, as illy (2005, 11) points out, terror is a strategy that

involves interactions among political actors at dier-

ent levels, “and that to explain the adoption o such a

strategy we have no choice but to analyze it as part o a

political process.” Tis section deals with how terrorist

groups use their resources (both material and non-mate-

rial) to promote suicide bombing by creating a culture o

martyrdom. In creating a culture o martyrdom, lead-

ers o terrorist organizations seek to generate support

rom their constituency o supporters. In the Palestinian,amil, Iraqi, Aghan and Chechen cases, this constitu-

ency is large and surrounds the organization itsel. For al

Qaeda and one-o cases such as 9/11, the Bali bombings,

and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, the constitu-

ency mainly entails a “virtual constituency” consisting

o global supporters on the internet and a small minority

rom within their own country holding similar sentiments.

Resources utilized by terrorist organizations include; the

use o propaganda, charismatic leaders, epistemic authori-

ties, agency-laden institutions, raming justications, and

using euphemistic language. I will now approach each o

these resources in turn. Te aim is to show that in spite

o the heterogeneous political or religious motivations

espoused by organizations using suicide bombing, the

tactics used to garner support are very similar.

2.1.1 Propaganda

Propaganda is one obvious method by which the terrorist

organization seeks support. Tis includes; communiqués,

media coverage depicting suicide bombers as martyrs,

websites, public discourses, street posters, pamphlets, and

attendance by respected public ofcials at the unerals

or memorial ceremonies or suicide bombers. A ull stateuneral was held or a suicide bomber in Palestine in 2000.

amil iger suicide bombers have orphanages named aer

them. A Palestinian suicide bomber had a youth ootball

tournament held in his honor. Hamas calendars herald the

“martyr o the month” (Hassan 2001). Te amil igers,

PKK, and Hezbollah commemorate the anniversary o

their rst suicide bombers each year. Chechens commem-

orate the rst Chechen suicide bomber in a popular song.



147IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


ogether, these acts produce an inormal communication

network that venerates suicide bombing. Tey supply the

public with moral justications or suicide attacks andhelp create a culture o martyrdom.

2.1.2 Leaders and Epistemic Authority Figures

Most terrorist organizations using suicide bombing pos-

sess either leaders revered by their ollowers or epistemic

authority gures. Godlike leaders include Osama bin

Laden o al Qaeda, Vellupillai Prabakharen o the Sri

Lankan amil igers, Abdullah Ocalan o the PKK in

urkey, and al-Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency. Other

groups rely on epistemic authorities in the construction

o societal knowledge. Religious leaders are one example(Bar-al 2000, 65). For example, Hamas, Hezbollah, al

Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Iraqi and Aghanistan insurgents,

and other suicide bombers such as those involved in 9/11

and 7/7 rely on the religious rulings o Sheikh Ahmad

Yassin, Sayid Muhammad Hasayn Fadlalla, Shaikh Yusu

Qardawi, and others to provide a legitimating ideology

or suicide bombing.

2.1.3 Agency-Laden Institutions

Utilizing agency-laden institutions, dened as “cultural or

organizational resources that can be mobilized to launch

collective action” (Morris 2000, 450), is critical or a mass

movement to be successul. Coupled with charismatic lead-

ership, these institutions provide ertile ground or the mo-

bilization o a mass movement. Leaders rame the necessity

or, and means o, mobilization within these institutions.

Tese institutions are oen long-standing resources:

Such institutions are congurations o cultural belies

and practices that permeate and shape their social net-

works. Teir cultural materials are constitutive in that

they produce and solidiy the trust, contacts, solidar-

ity, rituals, meaning systems, and options o membersembedded in their social networks. Endemic to some

agency-laden institutions is a transcendent and coher-

ent belie system that shape its actors’ moral and politi-

cal views about the kinds o relationships that ought to

exist between individuals and social groups. Tese po-

litically relevant belies inspire … actions geared toward

the realization o group interests. (Morris 2000, 447)

Some terrorist groups dominate such institutions and ex-

ert an inormational inuence to aid in political socializa-

tion. Tis is important in shaping behavioral compliance.Hamas, Hezbollah, and the amil igers capitalized on

the lack o state structures to set up their own quasi-state

systems. For example, Hamas ounded hospitals and paid

or unerals, medical care, dentistry, scholarships, pre-

natal care, and other social services. Hamas spokesman

Ismail Abu Shanab explains the logic o this well: “Te

political level is the ace o Hamas, but without the other

divisions Hamas would not be as strong as it is now… .

I nobody supports these needy amilies, maybe nobody

would think o martyrdom and the resistance o the

occupation” (cited in Bloom 2005, 27–8). Hamas leaderIbrahim al-Yazuri considered Hamas’s intention as “the

liberation o all Palestine rom the tyrannical Israeli oc-

cupation… . Tis is the main part o its concern … social

work is carried out in support o this aim” (cited in Hu-

man Rights Watch 2002, 103–4). Other material resources

include subsidies and apartments given to the amilies o

suicide bombers (Human Rights Watch 2002, 16 and 100).

2.1.4 Public Discourse and Framing Justifcations

Edelman (1971) argues that public discourse is central to

evoking cognitive arousal and radicalization within the

public. He explains behavior by ocusing on what people

expect o the uture. Readily available evidence does not

shape expectations. Instead, expectations based upon

cues rom legitimately perceived groups are absorbed

more easily. Tis eect strengthens when cues include

emotionally persuasive inormation and when they

connect current events to a historical narrative (McDer-

mott 2004, 64–5; Della Porta and Diani 1999, 184). Tis

is especially true in ambiguous situations. Actions by

groups perceived as legitimate help to shape and create

belies and norms, help create perceptions o what is true,

and help shape expectations o the uture. For example,Prabakharen, the leader o the amil igers, instrumen-

tally justied suicide bombing because “with persever-

ance and sacrice, amil Eelam can be achieved in a

hundred years. But i we conduct Black iger (suicide)

operations, we can shorten the suering o the people and

achieve amil Eelam in a shorter period o time” (cited

in Richardson 2006, 157). Without competing narratives

rom other sources, the cue eects strengthen urther. In



148IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


these circumstances, they are a persuasive inuence upon

behaviour (Edelman 1971, 7).

Language is a key element in the construction o a legiti-

mating ideology or myth. “Language is capable not only

o constructing symbols that are highly abstracted rom

everyday experience, but also o ‘bringing back’ these

symbols and appresenting them as objectively real ele-

ments in everyday lie. In this manner, symbolism and

symbolic language become essential constituents o the

reality o everyday lie and o the commonsense appre-

hension o this reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 55).

errorist groups consistently use euphemistic language

when reerring to suicide bombing. Tis portrays suicidebombing as heroic and deects attention rom the human

suering on both sides o the conict. Prior to the attack,

the would-be-bomber is a “living martyr” (al Shahid al

hai). Aerwards, the uneral o the “martyr” is reerred

to as a “wedding.” In Palestinian Arabic, the phrase or

a suicide bombing attack is an amaliyya istishadiyya, a

“martyrdom operation,” or an amaliyya da’iyya, a “sac-

ricial operation” (Human Rights Watch 2002, 36). Te

amil phrase or suicide bombing is thatkodai, meaning

“to give yoursel” (Richardson 2006; 140, Hopgood 2005,

74). Tose who have given themselves to the cause are

mahaveera, meaning “brave one,” and their mother is

veeravati or “brave mother” (Richardson 2006, 141).

Leaders o terrorist organizations and prominent politi-

cians rame justications or suicide bombings in a number

o ways. All attempt to cast the blame onto the other side

or accentuate the success o the suicide bombing. Firstly,

leaders rame suicide bombing as a response to state provo-

cation. Hamas labeled one set o bombings “the natural

retaliation by a people slaughtered day and night, whose

dignity is humiliated by the Zionist enemy’s war ma-

chine” (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 27–8). Haez’sanalysis o propaganda emanating rom Iraqi insurgents

(2007) details how they oen present a problem (the

United States), a cause o the problem (the subordination

o existing Muslim regimes to the United States), and a

solution (pious aith and martyrdom). Secondly, suicide

bombing is ramed as a tactic that balances power in what

is an otherwise asymmetric war. Hamas spokesman ‘Abd

al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi stated: “We don’t have F-16s, Apache

helicopters and missiles… . Tey are attacking us with

weapons against which we can’t deend ourselves. And now

we have a weapon they can’t deend themselves against… .We believe this weapon creates a kind o balance, because

this weapon is like an F-16” (Human Rights Watch 2002,

56–7). Similarly, al-Zarqawi, leader o the Iraqi insurgency

until his death, stated that his men “aced the strongest

and most advanced army in modern times… . When the

holy warriors noticed this huge disparity in numbers and

armaments between them and the enemy, they looked or

alternatives to amend this deciency” (cited in Haez 2007,

98). Suicide bombing reduced the decit. Tirdly, suicide

bombing is ramed as an act o national struggle. ‘Abd

al-Rahman described suicide bombings to al-Jazeera as“the highest orm o national struggle. Tere is no argu-

ment about that” (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 37).

Fourthly, death under occupation is ramed as inevitable

anyway. Al-Rantisi also claimed that “to die in this way

is better than to die daily in rustration and humiliation”

(cited in Soibelman 2004, 180).

Te examples provided show a remarkable similarity

between organizations using suicide bombing in terms

o leadership, how leaders rame justications or sui-

cide bombing, and the use o propaganda, euphemistic

language, and agency-laden institutions. Organizational

leaders harness these non-material resources eectively in

creating a culture o martyrdom.

2.2 Societal Support or Bombers and Terrorist Organizations (B + C)

Te previous section introduced means by which leaders

o terrorist organizations seek societal support or suicide

bombing. Tis section depicts the process whereby audi-

ences become susceptible to symbolic anxiety-reducing

narratives and to the inuence o leaders who promote

the use o suicide bombing. I propose that key to account-

ing or this is the theory o terror management.

Greenberg et al. (1986, cited in Hogg and Vaughan 2005,

138, and in Gordan and Arian 2001, 208) developed ter-

ror management theory. Tey argue that knowledge o

the inevitability o death is the most undamental threat

that people ace. Tereore, it is the most powerul mo-

tivating actor in human existence. Experimental stud-

ies strengthened the concept. When a sense o threat is



149IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


salient, positive eelings toward one’s belie system and

those holding similar belies increase while negative eel-

ings toward those perceived to be a threat also increase.Te strategy adopted to combat the threat is l ikely to be

inammatory (Castano et al. 2003, Voci 2006, Gordon

and Arian 2001). Under conditions o threat decisions

are based on emotion, but when eelings o threat are

low decisions made are based on both logic and emotion.

Tereore, when one is in a conict situation, the course o

action chosen is more likely to escalate and continue the

conict. Treat salience increases the likelihood o a reli-

ance on stereotypes to characterize the threatening out-

group (Schimel et al. 1999, Arndt et al. 2002). Importantly,

Greenberg et al. (1990) and Lavine et al. (2002) ounda positive correlation between threat salience and the

likelihood o resorting to authoritarian modes o think-

ing. Tis may result in a search or an outgroup, thinking

in black-and-white terms, and the need or strong leaders

to lessen the anxiety produced by the situation (Montuori

2005, 22–24). In other words, under conditions o threat,

people are more likely to ollow certain types o leaders

espousing authoritarian values and symbolic narratives

perceived to be legitimate and aggressive toward those

who cause the threat and anxiety.

Sustained conict brings a sense o threat to the ore. Tis

impacts strongly upon the behavior o both individuals

and collectives. Bar-al (2004) argues that in a conict

situation, individuals and collectives behave in particular

ways. From an Israeli perspective, Bar-al (2004, 684–90)

ound that:

• Individuals perceive inormation supplied by the

ingroup’s epistemic authorities about the threatening

outgroup as valid.

• Violence increases threat perception and eelings o

ear and mistrust.• Violence and threat perceptions cause delegitimization

o the rival group.

• Violence, threat perception, and ear increase support

o violent means to cope with the rival.

• During times o violence and perceived threat, people

support a leader who projects orceulness.

• Violence, threat perception, and ear lead to group

mobilization, patriotism, and unity, cause sel-percep-

tion as a victim, increase internal pressure or conor-

mity and a readiness to impose sanctions on dissenting

members o society.

Te above points indicate that experiences o sustained

conict lead societies toward authoritarian mindsets.

error management theorists posit that individuals search

or sel-esteem through their social identity to counteract

eelings o threat. Any act can increase positive ingroup

status i members o the ingroup attach a positive role

to the act itsel (Rubin 2004, 825). Jerusalem Media and

Communication Center (JMCC) and Palestinian Center

or Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) survey data showthat many orms o violent action toward Israel have a

positive value attached to them in Palestinian areas.

Tey show strong support or military actions against the

Israeli Deense Forces, Israeli civilians, and settlers in

the West Bank and Gaza. Over the course o 16 surveys,

undertaken between May 1997 and February 2006, JMCC

survey data average 60.9 percent support or military

operations against Israeli targets. Te PCPSR ndings

average 88.1 percent support or any military operation

against Israeli military targets over 13 surveys between

August 1995 and March 2005. Support or armed attacks

against Israeli civ ilians average 51.7 percent over nineteen

surveys between August 1995 and June 2006 (PCPSR).

Support or armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the

West Bank and Gaza average 86.6 percent over twelve sur-

veys between August 1995 and December 2004 (PCPSR).

Support or these acts was consistently higher amongst

those who were educated, young, emale, living in reugee

camps, earning a higher income, and Hamas supporters.

As stated earlier, or al Qaeda, and one-o cases such as

9/11, the Bali bombings, and 7/7, the constituency mainly

entails a “vir tual constituency” consisting o global sup-porters on the internet and a small minority rom within

their own country holding similar sentiments. Te work

o Sageman (2005) and Haez (2007) reveal the ubiquitous

extent o propaganda or suicide bombing on the inter-

net. Opinion polls in many states reveal evidence o small

minorities justiying suicide bombings. For example, ICM

opinion polls undertaken or the British Guardian news-

paper reveal that in March 2004, 13 percent o Muslims



150IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


polled in Britain were willing to justiy uture al Qaeda

attacks on the United States while in July 2005, 5 percent

o Muslims polled were willing to justiy uture attacksby British suicide bombers in the UK. Populus opinion

polls undertaken or the British imes newspaper reveal

that o the British Muslims polled in December 2005, 7

percent were will ing to justiy suicide bombings in the

UK, 16 percent in Israel, 13 percent in Chechnya, and 15

percent in Iraq. A separate Populus opinion poll in June

2006 showed 13 percent o polled British Muslims con-

sidered the 7/7 perpetrators to be martyrs. In the same

poll 16 percent were willing to justiy suicide bombings in

the United Kingdom against military targets, 11 percent

against government buildings/workers, 10 percent againstthe police, and 7 percent against civi lians. A major Pew

Research Center poll o sixty thousand Muslims living

in the United States ound that 5 percent justied suicide

bombings. O those aged under thirty, 15 percent saw jus-

tication. Pew’s “Global Attitudes Project” in May 2006

asked “Can suicide bombing o civil ian targets to deend

Islam be justied?” Muslim respondents rom states in

which suicide bombers have emerged showed a small,but signicant in its implications, minority who justiy

suicide bombing. Examples include Jordan (29 percent),

Egypt (28 percent), urkey (17 percent), Great Britain (15

percent), Pakistan (14 percent), and Indonesia (10 percent).

Support or suicide bombings in the Palestinian regions is

even higher. Over the course o nineteen sur veys under-

taken between June 1995 and February 2006, JMCC sur-

vey data averaged 52 percent support or suicide bomb-

ings against any Israeli target. Support or specic suicide

bombings in PCPSR surveys garnered even higher levels.Te Maxim Restaurant bombing in 2003, which kil led

twenty Israeli civil ians, received 74 percent support. Te

Beer Shiva suicide bombing in 2004 received 77 percent

support, while 69 percent supported the suicide bombing

in el Aviv in April 2006 that killed eleven civil ians.

0

30

40

50

10

20

60

70

80

90

05/95 05/97 08/97 03/99 12/00 04/01 06/01 12/01 03/02 05/02 09/02 12/02 04/03 10/03 06/04 01/06 06/06

Date of survey

Levels of optimism

Support for suicide bombing

Figure 3: Levels o support or suicide bombings versus optimism levels

Source: Collated JMCC survey data



151IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


Support or orthodox (para)military operations against

Israeli Deense Forces, Israeli settlers, and Israeli civilians

remained more or less constant over the period examined.Support or suicide bombing, on the other hand, uctu-

ated. JMCC survey data reveals a negative correlation be-

tween support or suicide bombing and optimism about

the uture (see gure 3). Tis nding corresponds with

the terror management hypothesis that anxiety about the

uture turns individuals toward authoritarian and escala-

tory tendencies. Suicide bombings correspond with this

escalatory tendency or both normative and strategic rea-

sons. Normatively, suicide bombing violates almost every

predominant ethical norm in societies in which it takes

place (i.e. not to kill innocents and not to commit suicide).Strategically, suicide bombing causes more casualties.

Since the rst Palestinian suicide bombing in April 1993,

suicide bombing has accounted or 78 percent o Israeli

deaths through terrorism despite its use in only 12 percent

o incidents.7 Seventeen JMCC surveys included both o

the ollowing questions: “Are you optimistic or pessimis-

tic about the uture?” and “Do you support suicide bomb-

ings?” When optimists outnumbered pessimists, support

or suicide bombing averaged 40 percent. When optimists

were in the minority, support averaged 65.6 percent.

o sum up, the variables listed in sect ion (A) detailed how

terrorist organizations seek to alter public opinion to elic-

it support. Tis section, on the other hand, proposed one

major variable that stipulates the conditions under which

audiences may become susceptible to these tactics. Tis

is not to suggest however, that one psychological variable

(sense o threat) by itsel determines support. Instead,

surrounding political conditions such as harsh anti-ter-

rorism policies, poverty, a sense o relative deprivation

and/or the initiation o peace processes may also contrib-

ute toward individuals increasing or decreasing support

or terrorist organizations or, at the very least, agreeingor disagreeing with their justications. An example o

surrounding political conditions lessening societal sup-

port or suicide bombing occurred in Palestine in Febru-

ary 2005. Journalists reported that the suicide bombing

by Abdallah Badran was not celebrated. Te surrounding

community did not print posters o the new martyr. No

social event was planned or his uneral. One local stated;“Tings were getting better and then no sooner do we have

money coming in again then it is stopped by this suicide

bombing” (cited in Urquhart 2005). No suicide bombings

emerged rom Palestine in the ollowing sixteen months.

In other words, surrounding political conditions, coupled

with a shared sense o threat (or lack thereo) can con-

tribute toward either increasing or decreasing support or

suicide bombing.

2.3 The Individual Volunteers (D + E)

Studies ocusing on motivations or joining terroristorganizations have evolved over the past three decades.

Early research in the 1970s and 1980s searched or a “ter-

rorist personality.” Tis entailed the search or a deviant

personality characteristic within some individuals using

psychoanalytic theories. Essentially, the argument was

that terrorist group members are born and not made by

the surrounding social and political conditions and group

processes. Studies o this nature usually contained no

empirical data, neither primar y nor secondary, and were

oen condemnatory in nature.

Academic work on terrorism improved in the 1990s. Em-

pirical work increased and there was a shi away rom

ocusing on the terrorist as being deviant in nature.

Group processes, the role o leaders, surrounding politi-

cal conditions and organizational motivations became

incorporated into the literature. Despite this improve-

ment, research on individual motivations has been overly

simplistic and deterministic. ypically, this work ocuses

upon a very small number o group members (i any at all)

and extrapolates these ndings onto the wider terrorist

community. Various analyses have ocused on pathologi-

cal disposition to violence (Gordon 2002, Post 1990), anauthoritarian personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004),

general socialization actors (Atran, 2003, Post 2005,

Sageman 2005), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice

(Gupta 2004), religious anaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive

7 Mipt database o terrorism incidents

(www.mipt.org).



152IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge or personal suer-

ing (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005). Although

the above-mentioned studies have all contributed some-what to our understanding o individual motivations,

their generalizations are problematic. Te diversity o

demographic backgrounds o suicide bombers alone is

striking. Bombers are between een and seventy years

old, overly educated and uneducated, male and emale,

rom all socio-economic classes, Christian, Hindu, Sikh,

and Muslim, religious and secular, single and married.

Tese studies also only ocus on the “supply side” and ail

to account or the “demand side” o joining a terrorist

organization. In other words, by ocusing on the underly-

ing conditions that may create a large pool o potentialrecruits, they ignore the impediments to membership.

Organizational leaders careul ly choose who can join.

Tis is essential due to the secretive nature o their work.

Te risk o any new recruit becoming a state inormant

or reneging on their task is too large. As will be outlined

later, the role o amilial and riendship ties is key to un-

derstanding how a person becomes a member. Motivation

to become a suicide bomber should be viewed as a process

(depicted in gure 4). Te socialized individual is aware

o potential increases in social status rom membership o

the organization. Although this awareness is usual ly long-

standing, it is only aer the experience o a catalyst when

compulsion to join becomes salient. Pre-existing amilial

and riendship ties mediate the recruitment process.

Despite the heterogeneity in the demographic back-

grounds o suicide bombers, all suicide bombers do share

two common characteristics. One is membership in a

terrorist organization. Never has a lone suicide bomber

carried out an operation in a bout o heavenly revelation

or vengeance. Instead, all suicide attacks are coordinated,

designed, premeditated and organized by a terrorist or-

ganization. Kimhi and Even’s typology o suicide bomb-ers (2004) il lustrates the second common characteristic.

Tey operationalized sixty Palestinian bombers into our

categories: religious, exploited, retribution or suering,

and social/nationalist. Support o the community that

reveres martyrdom was a supportive actor in each ideal

type. It was the only common actor included in all our

ideal types. By acknowledging the important role a “cul-ture o martyrdom” plays, they strengthen the argument

that it is the surrounding social environment rather than

a personality aw that compels people to join terrorist

organizations.

Te inuences mentioned in connection with interac-

tions A, B, and C also aect the would-be-bomber. Te

role o propaganda, proclamations supporting suicide

bombing rom leaders perceived to be legitimate, and a

sense o threat because o the ongoing conict may cre-

ate a pool o willing recruits or terrorist organizations.Propaganda that makes a celebrity o the suicide bomber

may play a large role in helping others to make the same

decision. Range et al (1997) provide persuasive sociologi-

cal evidence that “suicidal contagion” exists ollowing an

extensively publicised celebrity suicide. Other actors may

also play a role and are outlined below.

Trough interviews with terrorists, Silke (2003) describes

the process o becoming a terrorist as primarily an issue

o socialization. Fields (1978) came to a simi lar conclu-

sion. Her eight-year longitudinal study ound exposure to

terrorism as a child produces a tendency toward terrorism

as an adult. Bloom (2005, 1) points out that suicide bomb-

ing campaigns usually occur in the second iteration o

violence, citing examples such as Aghanistan, Iraq, Israel,

Chechnya, and Sri Lanka. When socialized into a society

where violence is a regular, highly publicized, and visible

experience, one may start to think o violence as a normal

part o everyday lie. Post et al ’s interviews with captured

terrorists (2005) reveal awareness o the potential o

increased social status as a prime motivator in joining a

terrorist organization.

Silke (2003) also outlines that catalysts usually precipi-

tate the compulsion to join a terrorist group. Tis is very

true or would-be suicide bombers. Te catalyst could be

a response to personal suering,8 revenge or imprison-

8 Waaa Nour E’Din (23), emale. Carried out

bombing or Hezbollah on May 9, 1985.

Her husband had been killed in conict by t he IDF

earlier that year.



153IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


ment,9 a recent conversion to Islam,10 an act o violence by

opposition orces,11 a response to restrict ions on move-

ment12, a response to personal desperation,13 or rustra-tion o personal goals.14 Te list o catalysts and examples

o bombers are endless.

Empirical studies o recruitment processes in terrorist

organizations highlight the important role o pre-existing

amilial or riendship ties. Familial ties aid recruitment

in the IRA (oolis 1995), and the recruitment o emale

EA members (Reinares 2004). Friendship ties are impor-

tant or enrolling Italian and German le-wing militants

(Della Porta 1992). Mixtures o both are important to the

recruitment process o Palestinian groups (Post et al. 2005),global jihadists (Sageman 2005), and Colombian groups

(Florez-Morris 2007). Plenty o evidence exists to show

the importance o pre-existing amilial and riendship

ties in recruiting would-be-suicide bombers Examples

include husband and wie teams o bombers in Palestine,

Chechnya, Iraq, and Jordan, a ather and daughter team

in Chechnya in November 2002, two Chechen sisters in

August 2004, a sister o a top aide to al-Zarqawi in Jordan

in November 2005, a sister o a deceased Islamic Jihad

militant in October 2003, a sister o an imprisoned Fatah

operative in May 2003, a nephew o a prominent leader o

Hamas in March 2001, and a nephew o a prominent Fatah

leader in May 2005. O the twenty-one Chechen suicide

bombers I have identied, ourteen had direct amily

members taking part in the conict. O the 220 Palestinian

suicide bombers I have identied, there is clear evidence

o pre-existing amilial and riendship ties within the

organization in 56 o the cases. Among the 9/11 hijackers

there were many pre-existing riendship ties, two sets o

brothers, and three hijackers who shared tribal afliations.

One would-be-bomber in the Iraqi insurgency claimed he

had een riends who had become suicide bombers them-

selves (Ghosh 2005). Examples o best riends carrying out

double suicide bombings include Palestine in December

2001, January 2003, September 2003, March 2004, and

Chechnya in August 2004. Seven members o the samePalestinian ootball club carried out a wave o suicide at-

tacks in late 2002, early 2003 (Hammer and Zidan 2003).

2.4 The Individual Radicalizes Within a Group Setting (F)

Munir al-Makdah, a trainer o suicide bombers, out-

lines, “much o the work is already done by the suering

these people have been subject to… . Only 10 percent

comes rom me. Te suering and living away rom their

land has given the person 90 percent o what he needs to

Socialization processes,

community support,

other environmental factors

Catalyst

Suicide bomber

Pre-existing ties

to aid recruitment

9 Yuse Ali Mohammed Zughayer (22) and Sulei-

man Musa Dahayneh (24) both served time in

Israeli prisons. Tey conducted a double suicide

bombing on November 6, 1998, in Jerusalem.

10 Sergey Dimitriyev, ormer Russian soldier,

who converted to Islam and conducted a suicide

truck bombing on June 11, 2000, or the Chechen

separatist movement.

11 aysir Ahmed Ajrami (22) carried out a suicide

bombing on the November 26, 2001.Te bomber‘s

suicide note said the attack was in response to the

killing o ve Palestinian children the previous

week by an Israeli mine.

12 Abdel-Basset Odeh (25), carried out bombing

on March 27, 2002. Restrictions on movement pre-

vented him rom seeing his ancée in Baghdad.

13 Ala Araeshi (17) was a victim o AIDS. He tar-

geted Israeli police using a belt bomb.

14 Tree bombers carried out three separate acts

over the course o one weekend in Israel. All three

had attended Hebron Polytechnic University,

which had been closed by IDF orces months

beorehand.

Figure 4: The path to becoming a suicide bomber



154IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


become a martyr. All we do is provide guidance and help

strengthen his aith and help set the objectives or him”

(cited in Davis 2003, 154). Tis section deals with the extra10 percent that al-Makdah reers to. Upon joining the

group, what behavioral and psychological characteristics

o the individual alter?

Social identity theory (SI) explains how individuals

dene themselves by their social group memberships. SI

accounts or two dual processes: social comparison and

categorization. Both processes have their own underlying

motivations – to eel positive about onesel and to reduce

the complexity o the surrounding world (Hogg and Grieve

1999, 81). Sel-perception o group membership creates psy-chologically distinguishing eects. From a SI perspective,

groups vie to be dierent rom one another in positive

ways because this provides individual group members

with positive social identities (Hogg and Vaughan 2005,

410). Te improvement o sel-esteem in the group setting

strengthens the individual’s group identication.

Stereotyping within the group creates a group prototype

that species the mindsets, sentiments, perceptions,

norms, and codes o conduct that characterize the group.

Te stereotype aids in the social categorization process

whereby the individual assimilates others into relevant

in- and outgroups. Tis depersonalizes the sel, ellow

ingroup members, and outgroup members because they

are all viewed no longer as idiosyncratic individuals but

as members o groups. Te individual stereotypes the

ingroup as homogenous and coherent. Tis accentuates

the similarities o ingroup members while simultaneously

accentuating the dierences between ingroup and out-

group members. Tis also increases subjective certainty

and “renders existence meaningul and thus gives one

condence in how to behave, and what to expect rom the

physical and social environment within which one ndsonesel” (Hogg and Grieve 1999, 81). rust, mutual aid

and compassion extend to ellow ingroup members but

not to those in the outgroup.

Group norms deepen group bonds by increasing group

solidarity and aiding the internalization o a group identity.

When this occurs, the individual views the newly acquired

norms as normal and thereore legitimate. Te eects

strengthen i this “sub-universe” o thought and knowl-

edge contains inuential leaders. One obvious example is

the inuence o religious gures. Tese leaders may replacesignicant others who played a role in the individual’s pri-

mary socialization. In other words, “the socializing person-

nel take on the character o signicant other vis-à-vis the

individual being socialized” (Berger and Luckmann 1966,

165). Signicant others and group norm acquisition ulti-

mately acilitate the suicide bomber throughout his train-

ing, the nal process o which is acquiring the willingness

to sacrice onesel or the belies and norms internalized.

Group norms include coping strategies or the terrorist to

insulate himsel rom the human suering o his actions.Bandura (1990) outlines our commonly used strategies.

Firstly, they may imagine themselves as saviors. “Te Israe-

lis, the enemy itsel, they are the ones who caused me to do

what I did” argues a ailed suicide bomber in an interview.

(Schechter 2004). Secondly, they displace responsibility

onto the leader or other members. Tirdly, they minimize

or ignore actual suering. “I do not accept responsibi-

lity or their deaths. I eel pain, o course. Tey are little

children. But the government o Israel is solely responsible”

a captured bomb-maker stated (Schechter 2004). Finally,

they dehumanize their victims. Palestinian propaganda is

ull o imagery o Israelis depicted as pigs, dogs, monkeys,

and donkeys (Oliver and Steinberg 2005, 101–2).

Group identity overrides individual identity upon the ac-

quisition o group norms. Tis leads to a tendency toward

group polarization, dened as a propensity or groups “to

make decisions that are more extreme than the mean o

individual members’ initial positions, in the direction al-

ready avored by that mean. So, or example, group discus-

sion among a collection o people who already avor capital

punishment is likely to produce a group decision that

strongly avors capital punishment” (Hogg and Vaughan2005, 342). With group identity overriding individual iden-

tity, the group, i highly cohesive, will tend toward a state

o mind known as groupthink. Hogg and Vaughan (2005,

340) list the antecedents o groupthink as being:

• Excessive group cohesiveness

• Insulation o group rom external inormation and

inuence



155IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


• Lack o impartial leadership and o norms encouraging

proper procedures

• High stress rom external threat and task complexity Tey also list the symptoms o these antecedents as;

• Feelings o invulnerability and unanimity

• Unquestioning belie that the group must be right

• endency to ignore or discredit inormation contrary

to the group’s position

• Direct pressure exerted on dissidents to bring them

into line

• Stereotyping o outgroup members

Te antecedents and their symptoms (which have all been

discussed in this paper) show how a commonly held groupidentity can radicalize the individual group members to-

ward a state o mind that they may not reach independent

o a group setting. In terms o suicide bombing, terrorist

cells “canalize disparate religious or political sentiments

o individuals into an emotionally bonded group o ctive

kin who will ul ly commit to die spectacularly or one

another” (Atran 2003, 1534). Suicide bombing, in this light,

is a orm o Durkheim’s (1953) concept o altruistic suicide

whereby, due to the deep integration o the individual in

the group, the suicide is carried out or the group rather

than or the individual himsel.

Social psychologists argue that conormity is a big actor

in explaining behavior in a group setting. Conormity to

group norms is a less direct manner o social inuence

than Milgram’s amous experiments (1974). Conormity to

an authoritative gure does not explain the behaviour but

“the subjective validity o social norms; that is, a eeling

o condence and certainty that the belies and actions

described by the norm are correct, appropriate, valid and

socially desirable” (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 245). Leaders

o terrorist organizations ensure norm conormity until

moments beore the suicide bombing. Fellow terroristgroup members closely guard the bomber. Tis acilitates

suicide bombing by guarding against the bomber reneging.

In Palestine, i the would-be-bomber does show signs o

weakness, a senior trainer will be called or to reinorce his

determination (Hassan 2001). Eyewitness reports o suicide

bombings in Israel consistently include the description o

three or our men dropping the bomber o at his destina-

tion. Other organizations use multiple bombers at the

same time to build more pressure to conorm. Al Qaeda,

the amil igers, and the Chechen and Iraqi insurgents

regularly use more than one bomber. Iraqi and Palestin-ian suicide bombers are constantly subjected to videos o

past suicide bombings in the days beore their operation

(Hassan 2001, Ghosh 2005). Would-be bombers write and

record their last wills and testaments, the eect o which

may create a point o no return. Te charismatic leader

o the amil igers, Pirabhakaran, has a nal meal with

would-be bombers the night beore their operation. On

one occasion, Anita Pratap, an Indian journalist was pres-

ent. She described the would-be bombers as “utterly emo-

tionless … they could have been lobotomized or all I knew

… the only time they showed some emotion was when they talked about Pirabhakaran” (Pratap 2001, 102–104).

Some Palestinian areas requently produce bombers in

intermittent phases. Tis may be because the bombers are

trained and socialized into the group together, and are set

down a path dependent process whereby the rst bomb-

ing produces a pressure on the next in line to become a

bomber. Tere are many examples o this. Tree university

students rom Hebron all carried out separate attacks in

Israel over the course o three days in May 2003. A ourth

Hebron resident ollowed our weeks later. welve suicide

bombers came rom Nablus between December 2, 2001,

and March 30, 2002. No Nablus residents carried out a

suicide bombing in the ollowing ve weeks. en suicide

bombers broke this phase between May 7 and August

6. Again, no bombers emerged rom Nablus or another

two months beore our more carried out their operations

between October 27, 2002, and January 5, 2003. What is

striking is that when no bombers emerged rom Nablus,

plenty came rom Jenin. For example, between 25 May,

2001, and 12 August, 2001, there were seven Jenin suicide

bombers. No Jenin bombers materialized or almost two

months. Between October 7, 2001, and December 9, 2001,three Jenin residents blew themselves up. No Jenin bomb-

ers emerged until March 5, 2002, and there was a urther

ve beore June 5. Again, there was a two-month spell with

no Jenin suicide bombers but our bombers ollowed in the

space o two months between August 4 and October 21.

O the eighteen months covered here, there is only eight

weeks o overlap between the two towns producing suicide

bombers. Tis pattern o intermittent phases also occurs in



156IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


Bethlehem, Hebron, ulkarem and Kalkilya. Te same may

also be true o bombers within the Iraqi and Aghanistan

insurgencies but data is too sparse at this moment in time.

Tis pattern o intermittent phases may be reinorced by

domestic competition actors between Palestinian actions.

Palestinian terrorist organizations are not as hierarchi-

cally structured as, or example, the IRA, or EA. Because

o the restrictions on movement and communication, and

the targeted assassination o their leaders, these organiza-

tions rely on a high degree o autonomy o local leaders and

activists (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006). A Hamas suicide

bombing by their Nablus cell, or example, would create

a pressure on the rival Nablus cells o Fatah, Palestinian

Islamic Jihad and the PFLP to carry out a similar operation

or ear o losing local support. Tis nding coupled with

Pedahzur and Perliger’s social network analysis o Palestin-

ian terrorist organizations (2006) supports Bloom’s thesis

(2005) o domestic political competition actors driving sui-

cide bombings except at a local rather than national level.

3. Conclusion

Tis paper has proposed a theoretical prism to view sui-cide bombing by incorporating the interactions between

the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization and the sur-

rounding society rom which suicide bombing emerges. By

synthesizing empirically rich unidimensional approaches,

this multi-dimensional model provides us with a broader

understanding o suicide bombing. Leaders o terrorist

organizations use material and nonmaterial resources to

venerate suicide bombing. Resources include the use o

charismatic leaders, epistemic authority gures, agency-

laden institutions, raming justications, euphemistic

language, and monetary rewards. Under conditions o threat, societies accept the proclamations o authoritarian

charismatic leaders as authentic and resort to authoritar-

ian mindsets. Treat sal ience coupled with, and caused

by, surrounding political conditions acilitate support or

suicide bombing. Te individual, in search o a positive

identity, joins the terrorist organization with the support

o a surrounding community. Experiencing catalysts and

recruitment through pre-existing amilial and riendship

ties drive the process o becoming a suicide bomber or-

ward. Within the group, the new recruit radicalizes urther.

Relevant norm internalization, group polarization, groupconormity, group identity overriding individual identity,

the use o multiple bombers and other techniques are used

by group leaders to acilitate the individual becoming a

suicide bomber.

Tis model is stronger than others in the current eld o

research or many reasons. By ocusing on organizational

and individual motivations as two distinct processes, the

models proposed by Moghadam (2006) and Haez (2006)

ignore why and how leaders o terrorist organizations so-

cially construct a “culture o martyrdom” and under what

conditions audiences become susceptible to such narratives.

Te radicalization process o the would-be-bomber within

the group setting is also largely ignored. Insights rom so-

cial and political psychology provide an eective interpre-

tive lens to understand these symbiotic processes. By his

own admission, Pedahzur’s model (2004) is too systematic.

Various interactions have shown dissimilar causal weights

in each case o a terrorist organization resorting to suicide

bombing. Elites within Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian

Islamic Jihad resorted to suicide bombing aer careully

craing a “culture o martyrdom.” Te amil igers spent

three years radicalizing and training cadres to become sui-cide bombers. Tis ollowed the apparent accidental suicide

bombing o Captain Miller in 1987, which LE supporters

celebrated as the highest orm o martyrdom. In this case,

grass roots support or suicide bombing preceded the social

construction o a “culture o martyrdom” and the train-

ing o members. When these conditions converged rom

1990 onwards, the LE became the most prolic users o

suicide bombing until the Iraqi insurgency began. Fatah’s

Table 1: Bombers rom Nablus and Jenin, May 25, 2001 — January 5, 2003

Dates Town No. o bombers

May 25 — July 22, 2001 Jenin 5

August 2 — 8, 2001 Nablus 2

August 9 — 12, 2001 Jenin 2

October 7 — December 9, 2001 Jenin 3

December 2, 2001 — March 30, 2002 Nablus 12

March 5 — June 5, 2002 Jenin 6

May 7 — August 8, 2002 Nablus 10 August 4 — October 21, 2002 Jenin 4

October 27, 2002 — January 5, 2003 Nablus 4



157IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


declining support in the Palestinian regions led them to

undertake suicide bombing campaigns to boost support.

Lower-level members o the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)resorted to suicide bombing ollowing the imprisonment

o their leader in urkey. Sel-starter suicide bombers such

as the London bombers make their own decisions but

are heavily motivated by pre-existing calls to arms by al

Qaeda leaders, “virtual” supporters, and ultimately group

radicalization.

Focusing on organizations that have not resorted to

suicide bombing also conrms this model. Kalyvas and

Sánchez-Cuenca (2005, 211) provide details o Colombian

terrorist organization FARC’s attempt to recruit suicidebombers. Despite oering a $2 million reward to the

amilies o potential bombers, FARC was unsuccessul.

Te model outlined in this paper provides two reasons or

this ailure. Firstly, FARC does not possess charismatic

leaders or epistemic authority gures, nor does it control

social institutions. Tis makes it impossible to success-

ully create a “culture o martyrdom” to garner support

or suicide bombing rom the wider community. Secondly,

oering substantial amounts o money does not overcome

the unwillingness o potential recruits to become suicide

bombers. Without a “culture o martyrdom” and support

or suicide bombing amongst their constituency o sup-

porters, FARC ound it impossible to radicalize recruits

to the point o becoming a suicide bomber. EA never re-

sorted to suicide bombing, also or these reasons. A urther

reason may explain the IRA’s unwillingness to use suicide

bombing despite possessing a historical narrative o mar-

tyrdom to rely upon. Kalyvas and Sánchez Cuenca (2005)

provide examples o how the IRA marginalized them-

selves within their community aer indiscriminate acts

o violence. Suicide bombing causes more deaths than any

other terrorist method. Possessing this knowledge through

social learning, the IRA knew it could not aord the costso losing more support. Te examples, provided by Kaly-

vas and Sánchez Cuenca, also suggest that EA’s and the

IRA’s supporters were considerably more moderate than

the members o the organizations themselves. Te IRA

perhaps were also mindul not to disaect their American

support base. Utilizing a tactic originally developed to kill

American orces in Lebanon might have isolated the IRA

rom their lucrative undraising contacts in America.

Further research will be required to rene the model. Is

there a relationship between acts o suicide bombing and

counter-terrorism techniques such as targeted assassina-tions and incursions? Is there an association between so-

cietal support or suicide bombing and counter-terrorism

techniques? In what way do some counter-terrorism tech-

niques inuence the target society? Interviews with ailed

suicide bombers may urther our knowledge o the group

radicalization process while more detailed case studies o

individual terrorist organizations and campaigns would

allow or a comparative approach to this model.



158IJ CV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142– 159


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Paul Gill

[email protected]

A Multi Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing

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