83892 ANGOLA v1 - OECD · 2016. 3. 29. · FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, The...

2 Asiatisk PladsDK-1448 Copenhagen KDenmarkPhone: +45 33 92 00 00Fax: +45 32 54 05 33E-mail: [email protected]: www.um.dk

ISBN (report): 87-7964-986-6ISSN: 1399-4972

EvaluationDanish Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Angola 1999-2003

2003/9

Danish Assistance to Internally D

isplaced People in Angola 1999-20032003/9

Evaluation

Danish Assistance toInternally DisplacedPersons in Angola 1999 - 2003

File No. 104.A.1.39-1March 2004

© Ministry of Foreign AffairsMarch 2004

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign AffairsCover photo: John CosgraveGraphic production: Phoenix-Print A/S, Aarhus, Denmark

ISBN (report): 87-7964-986-6e-ISBN (report): 87-7964-987-4ISSN: 1399-4972

This report can be obtained free of charge by contacting:

Danish State Information CentrePhone + 45 7010 1881http://danida.netboghandel.dk/

The report can also be downloaded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ homepage www.um.dk or directly fromthe Evaluation Department’s homepage www.evaluation.dk

The cover photograph shows roof beams being placed on Alberto Jeje and Rebecca Clara’s house in Samosambo Novain Moxico. They returned to Samosambo Nova in May or June 2003. Alberto says it will take 2 months to finish thehouse. Rebecca makes the local brew and has maize germinating for it. When they left Luena after the ceasefire in2002 they went first to Camanongue where they stayed for one year. It took three days to walk from Camanongue.They have 5 children of which the eldest 2 are in school in the next village.

This report was prepared by independent consultants with no previous involvement in the activities mentioned.Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the evaluation team.

The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Danish Ministry ofForeign Affairs, the recipient governments, or the implementing organisations.

The report is printed on Multi Fine and the cover is printed on Invercote.

Preface

Responding to a request by EU’s Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) a group ofdonors initially consisting of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and ECHO decided toconduct a number of evaluations of humanitarian assistance with special focus on inter-nally displaced persons (IDPs). The overall plan is to conduct a range of evaluations,some in cooperation and some done individually by each organisation.

In order to synthesize the results of these and possibly more evaluations a commonframework was established. (Attached in Appendix 3.)

The following agencies are currently participating in this exercise: Danida (Denmark),DGIS (the Netherlands), DCI (Ireland), Sida (Sweden), USAID, ECHO, WFP, OCHAand UNHCR.

The Angola evaluation is part of this joint effort. The fieldwork was carried out in July –August 2003, in parallel with ECHO’s evaluation of its activities in Angola.

Evaluation DepartmentMarch 2004

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Preface 3Table of Contents 5Abbrevations 7Map of Angola 8

Executive Summary 9

1 Methodology 151.1 Method 151.2 Acknowledgements 171.3 Layout of the report 18

2 Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs 192.1 What are IDPs? 192.2 How many IDPs are there? 212.3 IDPs and other displaced 252.4 The life of the displaced in Angola 272.5 Minimum Conditions for Return 382.6 Coordination of the IDP response 412.7 Conclusions and recommendations 42

3 Relevance 453.1 Danida’s partners 453.2 Before and after the ceasefire 473.3 Conclusions and recommendations 49

4 Effectiveness 514.1 Prerequisites for assessing effectiveness 514.2 Lack of assessment and analysis 524.3 Lack of gender analysis 524.4 Lack of beneficiary consultation 544.5 Lack of competence 554.6 Timeliness 554.7 Conclusions and recommendations 56

5 Efficiency 595.1 Difficult to measure 595.2 Constraint on efficiency 595.3 Efficiency issues 595.4 Conclusions and recommendations 63

5

6 Impact 656.1 Measuring impact 656.2 Positive impacts 656.3 Negative impacts 656.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 66

7 Connectedness or Sustainability 677.1 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development 677.2 Social case: a forgotten caseload 677.3 A model for meeting the minimum conditions 687.4 Is rehabilitation humanitarian assistance? 687.5 Conclusions and recommendations 69

8 Lessons for learning 71

9 Critical issues 779.1 When does displacement end? 779.2 Lack of beneficiary consultation 789.3 Continuing difference in service levels to IDPs and Refugees 789.4 Assistance to IDPs displaced with combatants 799.5 Protection is a broad mandate 799.6 Shelter, land rights and livelihoods 809.7 When does the need for assistance end? 81

10 Conclusion 83

Appendices 851 Terms of Reference 862 Framework for a Common Approach to

Evaluating Assistance to IDPs 893 Bibliography 1024 Persons met 1055 Consultant’s itinerary 1116 Chronology 1127 Initial brief desk study 1168 Detailed technical comments 1189 The legal instruments: The norms 12710 The legal instruments: The regulations 13111 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators

for other standards 144

Table of Contents

6

Abbreviations

Abbreviations

CAP Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN)Danida Danish International Development AssistanceDCA DanChurchAid, in Danish Folkekirkens Nødhjælp (FKN)DFID Department for International Development. The UK government’s

Overseas Development Assistance departmentDKK Danish KroneDRC Danish Refugee Council, in Danish Dansk Flygtningehjælp (DF)ECHO European Commission Humanitarian OfficeERF Emergency Response Fund, a quick response funding

mechanism managed by OCHAEU European UnionFAA Angolan Armed ForcesFAO Food and Agriculture OrganisationFNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola,

The National Front for Angola’s LiberationGIDPP Global IDP ProjectHALO HALO Trust, a UK mine action NGOICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDP Internally Displaced PersonIERA The Evangelical Reformed Church of AngolaINAROEE Instituto Nacional de Angola da Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos

Explosivos, Angolan national institute for the removal of ordnance andexplosives

IRSEM National Institute for the Socio-Professional Re-integration of Ex-military Personnel

LWF Lutheran World FederationMINARS Ministry for Social Assistance and ReintegrationMPLA Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de

Libertação de Angola)MSF Médecins Sans Frontières, the leading medical relief NGONGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNPA Norwegian People’s AidOCHA UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsODI Overseas Development Institute. London based aid think tank.QERF Quartering Area Emergency Response Fund, a fund managed by

RB Save the Children Denmark (Red Barnet)SC-UK Save the Children United KingdomSida Swedish International Development Cooperation AgencyUCAH Unidade de Coordenacão para Asistancia HumanitáriaUK United KingdomUN United NationsUNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification MissionUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNITA União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola, the former

Angolan armed opposition movementUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSD United States DollarUXO Unexploded OrdnanceWFP World Food Programme

7

Map of Angola

Map of Angola

8

The map shows the travel undertaken within Angola by the evaluator as well as the sitevisits made by him.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

The situation of internally displaced persons

The restarting of the Civil War in Angola in 1998 led to a huge increase in internal dis-placement. Over 40% of the population of Angola were displaced by March 2002 whenthe ceasefire agreement was signed. Displacement in Angola has taken a wide variety offorms, with internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and UNITA non-combatantsall being displaced from their homes.

The majority of the displaced in Angola have now returned to their places of origin. Theexact number is not clear but it seems that between two and two and a half million havereturned to their places of origin. Between one and two million displaced have notreturned. The majority have stayed put because they are unable to return without assis-tance. Others have stayed because of the economic opportunities open to them wherethey are. A minority appear to have stayed because they were not yet fully confident thewar would not restart.

Some of those who have not returned because they need assistance are likely to return inthe coming two years as a growing economy in the areas of return provides livelihoodopportunities for them. IDPs who have taken refuge with families in Luanda are notexpected to return in large numbers.

OCHA (The UN’s Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) has playedan effective role in leading the response to the IDP crisis. OCHA’s fast disbursingEmergency Response Fund was a significant factor in ensuring an adequate response tothe rapidly changing situation since 1997. The OCHA provincial representatives playeda key role in the coordination of humanitarian assistance.

OCHA’s role in publishing IDP numbers was not helpful as the OCHA numbersexcluded those IDPs who were considered to be no longer in need of material assistance.Worse, the use of the term “confirmed IDPs” by OCHA made it seem that the OCHAnumber was the real number of IDPs rather than indicating the number being assisted.As a result of this the OCHA figures only covered about 40% of the total number ofIDPs.

While the inclusion of the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement intoAngolan Law is a very positive step, the law is not being implemented in the majorityof cases. Relatively few returnees are benefiting from the minimum conditions ofreturn mandated under the Angolan IDP decrees. Most of the displaced have returnedto areas without services and it will be some considerable time before they will be self-sufficient. They are receiving relatively little assistance from the international community.

NGOs do not have the resources to meet all of the needs of those returning. The bestapproach in the short term is to promote intermediate solutions while waiting for thegovernment to execute permanent solutions. The Government is apparently limitedboth by a lack of will and a lack of capacity to meet the enormous needs of returnees inrural areas. The humanitarian community has limited scope for influencing the Angolan

9

Government’s policy towards returning IDPs. The government is not susceptible tofinancial pressure from donors but is sensitive about its international image.

Danida funded activities

The evaluation focused on projects by the Danish Refugee Council, DanChurchAid’spartner, the Lutheran World Federation and the ICRC. The activities of the partnerswere based on support of the internally displaced and on returnees. The rapid return ofmany IDP meant that partners concentrated on communities in the areas of return.Their current operations concern: education, shelter, water, health, livelihoods, protec-tion and general social support.

All of Danida’s partners made a real difference to the beneficiary population. Althoughsome negative impacts were seen, they were far outweighed by the positive impacts ofthe assistance. The partners reduced suffering and prevented premature death among thedisplaced in Angola and they continue to reduce suffering among those returning totheir areas of origin.

Most of Danida’s partners are among the most effective agencies at linking relief todevelopment in Angola. They have done this either through a basic developmentalapproach or through carefully thought out handover arrangements.

The evaluation took place more than a year after the ceasefire, and therefore it is notpossible for the evaluator to comment categorically on the relevance of the Danida fund-ed interventions prior to the ceasefire. However, every indication, both from documentsand from beneficiary comments, indicates that these interventions were appropriate andrelevant to the needs of the beneficiary population.

The current projects seen by the evaluator were relevant to the needs of the beneficiariesand reflected good humanitarian practice. There were a small number of legacy projectsthat were no longer so relevant1 in the changed circumstances after the ceasefire, butthese represented only a small proportion of the overall project portfolio.

Overall, the programmes of Danida’s partners were relatively effective. Despite someareas of weakness, Danida’s partners delivered assistance to large numbers of IDPs, andare continuing to deliver assistance to returnees.

The biggest area of weakness was in project design and planning. The logical frame-works prepared by Danida’s partners do not allow a clear identification of what wasplanned. Assessment and strategic planning based on beneficiary needs were lacking.Beneficiaries were rarely consulted about projects, or if consulted, the consultation waslimited to traditional leaders. They had no real means of raising their concerns aboutprojects with agencies other than through the occasional visits of project staff. Genderanalysis was almost non-existent, and apart from a few individual agency staff there waslittle awareness of its importance.

Agencies still appear to be dominated by a relief mentality, with too little emphasis on de-velopmental or commercial approaches that might be more appropriate for the rehabilita-

Executive Summary

10

1) Projects such as DRC’s horticultural project had been appropriate and relevant when the population was constrained to the area immediately around the town, but are far less appropriate now that the war is over.

Executive Summary

tion phase, but there has been a change in attitude, for example LWF claims that the orga-nisation now has moved from working for the displaced populations to working for thecommunities, displaced, refugees and demobilised soldiers based on need not on category.Agencies sometimes implemented projects for which they did not have the technicalcapacity, such as the procurement of non-food-items2) by the Lutheran World Federation(DanChurchAid’s partner) or water projects undertaken by the Danish Refugee Council

There were problems with the timely delivery of assistance. This was a particular pro-blem for non-food-items and for seeds and tools projects. Much of this was funded bythe general humanitarian community rather than by Danida. It is often very difficult inthe field to establish what work has been paid for from what budget.

Angola is a difficult and expensive environment in which to operate. The lack of dataprevents any categorical statement about the efficiency of Danida partners. However, theexamples of inefficiency seen were relatively limited, suggesting that overall Danida’spartners were reasonably efficient in their operations. Danida partners expanded theiroperations significantly to meet the needs of those returning to their places of origin.However, although justified in the short term on humanitarian grounds, this expansionthreatens longer term efficiency.

Non-food-items have been widely issued but there are still many families left without.Many of the non-food-items distributed were of an inappropriately low quality and canbe expected to have a short life in rural conditions.

The only way in which the majority of communities can hope to achieve the minimumconditions for return is through their own efforts. They will need assistance to do this.The evaluation suggests that the role for NGOs in Angola should not be to providepermanent schools and other social infrastructure in rural areas, but rather to supportcommunities in the construction of community level infrastructure while they awaitdefinitive solutions from the government.

Even though the acute relief phase is largely over in Angola, there is a continuing needfor humanitarian assistance to bring people to the level where they have sufficient socialcapital to be no longer “potentially vulnerable”. The “social cases” that are unable toreturn unaided to their areas of origin are a forgotten caseload that should be targeted bythe humanitarian community. The continuing needs in the areas of return and the stag-gered returns mean that humanitarian assistance will probably be needed for anotherthree years.

The lessons to be learnt from the Angola case include the following:

• Change can happen faster than agencies can effectively respond. • NGOs have very real limits on their capacity to scale-up even in areas where they are

well established. • Assistance needs to be based on needs and not on IDP status and vice versa. • OCHA provincial coordination model and rapid response funding mechanism were

very useful. • The need for protection for the IDPs and returnees, while real, was not much differ-

ent from that of the resident community.

11

2) Relief items such as blankets, cooking sets, and other items needed for basic survival.

The evaluation identified a number of critical issues for further study:

• When does displacement end? Many IDPs in Angola were no longer considered asIDPs because they had no acute humanitarian needs, but lived the same marginalexistence as the rest of the population.

• Why was there so little effective beneficiary consultation by agencies? AlthoughDanChurchAid note that this is improving with the move to more developmentaltypes of programming, there were missed opportunities during the relief phase.

• Are the administrative arrangements for IDPS adequate? Returning refugees (inorganised returns) were clearly far better served than returning IDPs.

• How can the international framework for protection be improved to protect com-munities from abuses by combatants? In Angola, communities needed protectionfrom abuses by UNITA as well as by the Government.

Main recommendations

Danida should

• Continue to assist its NGO partners to provide services to the returned IDP’s, espe-cially agencies with a longer term rehabilitation perspective and a developmentaloutlook more suited to rehabilitation than a straight relief approach.

• Insist on a better quality of Logical Frameworks from its partners. • Ensure that project proposals and reporting indicate expected and achieved differen-

tial impact on men and women.• Look for evidence of beneficiary consultation in funding applications and reporting.• Immediately view activities, after major changes in the humanitarian situation of a

country.• Consider supporting quick funding mechanisms filling the same role as the OCHA

Emergency Response Fund did in Angola.• Phase out its support for ICRC operations in Angola other than ICRC’s core protec-

tion mandate where it provides a comparative advantage over other partners.• Consider that humanitarian assistance probably will be needed for another three

years in Angola.

Partners should

• Improve the quality of their planning so that their logical frameworks can be used asan active management tool.

• Project proposals and reporting should indicate the activities’ expected and achieveddifferential impact on men and women and beneficiary consultation.

• Place a higher emphasis on beneficiary consultation.• Investigate how many IDP’s wish to return and develop models for supporting com-

munities that will enable them to achieve the minimum conditions for return largelythrough their own efforts.

• Consider the limits of their own capacity and limit their operations to a few geo-graphical areas to establish models for rehabilitation that they can advocate for adop-tion by the government.

• Not undertake technical work unless they have the technical competence to superviseit and should follow internationally accepted standards for purchase of relief items.

Executive Summary

12

Executive Summary

• Evaluate their project portfolio and drop those projects that are no longer so relevantin the changed circumstances.

The humanitarian community should

• Avoid declassification of IDP’s unless it is certain that they no longer wish to return.IDP’s in old sites should be prioritised for assistance.

• Limit free distributions to situations of immediate vulnerability and assistanceshould be delivered according to need not according to affiliation with a particulargrouping.

• Establish mechanisms for feedback from the beneficiaries on completed projects.• Ensure that a survey of compliance with minimum conditions is carried out in each

commune across the nation.• Adopt the policy that long term infrastructures are the responsibility of the govern-

ment. They should focus on short term projects supporting community initiativesassociated with a more basic level of social infrastructure. They should integratetheir projects into national plans in a transparent fashion to curtail corruption.

• Plan for a continuing, but declining, return to rural areas. Improve market access toincrease income in these areas and use the government’s sensitivity of its interna-tional image to press for better government service to rural areas.

• Promote the approach taken in Angola with the incorporation of the GuidingPrinciples and minimum conditions into national legislation for countries with largeIDP populations.

• Be encouraged to learn from transitional programmes elsewhere to facilitate the necessary envisaging of future needs.

The Angolan Government should

• Permit remaining food in Gathering Areas to be distributed immediately.• Prioritise the transport of the demobilised to their areas of origin.• Consider a method to monitor the creation of the minimum conditions of return

consider a method

13

1. Methodology

1. Methodology

1.1 Method

The consultant undertook an initial desk study to identify the chief areas of concern inthe situation of IDPs in Angola, as well as an initial review of reports from Danida’spartners.

The desk study was followed by four weeks of field work in Angola visiting beneficiariesin three provinces and viewing a range of work executed with Danida funding. Thisfieldwork was carried out concurrently with an ECHO evaluation of ECHO fundedprojects in Angola.

The third phase included some research on issues arising during the field work, as wellas preparing a draft report. The draft report was presented to Danida in Copenhagenand was presented together with the work of the ECHO evaluation team to ECHO inBrussels.

Methodology generally

The evaluation was carried out by Mr John Cosgrave, Channel Research Ltd for Danidain July and August 2003.

The main information gathering tools were:

• Interviews with key informants.• Interviews with beneficiaries.• Document research.• Direct observation.• Discussion with the ECHO evaluation team

The evaluator placed a great deal of emphasis on beneficiary interviews and direct obser-vation. Because:

• The history of previous evaluations for which security issues constrained field work.• There can be a lag between developments occurring on the ground and national

offices being aware of them in a rapidly changing situation like Angola.• Information from key informants was found on occasion to be less reliable than

information from beneficiaries that was verified through direct observation.

15

The field work was supported by document research with over one thousand files in the electronic reference set for the evaluation. This evaluation set was a mixture of documents:

• Provided in the reference set supplied by the ECHO evaluation unit to the ECHOevaluation team.

• Obtained directly from key informants in Angola,• Obtained by searches on Relief-Web and the internet generally.• Research included searches for general background material before the field work

and searches on specific topics to triangulate information from interviews whenwriting the report.

The ECHO evaluation team that was conducting a concurrent evaluation on ECHOfunded assistance to Angola with an emphasis on IDPs. The primary focus of theECHO evaluation was on ECHO funded assistance for the period 2002-2003. Directreference has not been made to the ECHO report in the text, as the ECHO report wasnot yet finalised at the time of writing of this report.

Triangulation

Triangulation took a number of forms. While all information was triangulated by therange of methods and informants, where there were conflicts between different sources,the evaluator took steps to determine which source to place more weight on. The meansof triangulation included:

• Direct observations and interviewee statements were in some cases triangulated bylater questions to officials3.

• Conflicts between dates provided by interviewees that were not resolved by furtherinterviews and questions were generally triangulated by reference to written sourcesvia web searches.

Generally the greatest weight was given to direct observation.

Interviews

Interviews were the principal means of information gathering. The consultant met withover 200 people. Almost half of those met were beneficiaries.

Among the beneficiaries, vulnerable individuals such as the elderly and infirm, landminevictims, children, and widows were interviewed. 54% of the beneficiaries interviewedwere female. The proportion of women interviewed was less for the other groups,reflecting gender imbalances in the staff available for interview.

1. Methodology

16

3) The Sambo quartering area was an example of this. Interviewees said that they had not received maize fornearly three months. However, the evaluator observed that many families still had maize. Farm labourwould normally be paid in Cassava rather than maize, and the families were not allowed to plant theirown. The lack of distributions was confirmed by ICRC staff. The mystery was solved by a document show-ing that three months food was distributed at one of the last distributions to compensate families for all thedistributions that had been cancelled during the wet season following a landmine incident. (WFP does notcompensate beneficiaries for missed distributions, but ICRC has a different policy).

1. Methodology

Table 1: Distribution of interviews

Function No % of total Of which women

Agency 69 30% 23 33%

Beneficiary 113 48% 61 54%

Donor 17 7% 7 41%

Government 34 15% 6 18%

Total 233 100% 97 42%

Interviews were generally carried out using one of a series of question lists4 to structurethe interview. Interviews ranged from formal interviews of over an hour to interviews ofonly a few minutes’ duration during transect walks through areas of resettlement or IDPcamps. Shorter interviews were normally focused on a single topic of interest, usually tocheck if the experience reported by someone else was typical5.

Interviews were conducted directly by the evaluator in Portuguese and in English. Onlya minority of beneficiary interviews were conducted in Bantu languages. Typically, eitheragency staff members or other beneficiaries served as the translators for these. These lat-ter interviews were often carried out with groups of people present who would correctthe translator if there was any disagreement with the translation.

1.2 Acknowledgements

The evaluator wishes to express his gratitude to all those who took the trouble to answerhis questions. In particular the evaluator would like to thank all of those whose workmade this mission possible including Dona Gloria at the ECHO Delegation, and theECHO Delegates, Maria Olsen and Gunter Dietz. ECHO very kindly facilitated muchof the travel arrangements as well as providing working space, transport and telephoneaccess in Luanda.

The staff of the Danish Refugee Council facilitated the Evaluator’s Visit to Uige.Especial thanks are due to Yvonne Cappi, Anders Engberg and all their staff. Thanks arealso due to Red Barnet for their assistance.

Special thanks are also due to the ICRC who hosted the field visit to Huambo. In par-ticular the evaluator would like to thank Louise Montgrain-Boivin and MilaNegrera Espa-Sanoin of ICRC for their input.

17

4) Separate but similar question lists were prepared for Beneficiaries, Agency staff and other key informants. 5) One example of this was the case of one detailed interview where a family stated that they had only

received 10kg of maize in total. Other persons in the village were asked how much they had received toconfirm that the interviewed family’s experience was not an exceptional case.

The Lutheran World Federation facilitated the visit of the consultant to Luena. Theevaluator appreciated the efforts of Gerrit ten Velde, and of the LWF staff on the groundincluding Higino Marques and Fernando Rafael.

The evaluator would also like to thank the members of the ECHO evaluation team(Aart van der Heide, Robert Smith, and Petra Scheuermann) for sharing their data andimpressions with the evaluator and allowing him to take advantage of the transport andother arrangements made.

Finally the evaluator would like to thank the Danida staff who offered their commentson the evaluation including Danida’s consultant Ole Stage. The evaluator is also gratefulto Peter Cavendish and Martine Vanackere of the ECHO evaluation unit who facilitatedthe simultaneous ECHO and Danida evaluations.

1.3 Layout of the report

The report has five main sections:

• Chapter 1 contains details of the methodology and the approach used in the researchfor this report.

• Chapter 2 examines the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Angolaand forms the bulk of the report.

• Chapter 3 to 7 briefly examine Danish funded humanitarian interventions from1999 to 2003 in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and their con-nectedness and sustainability.

• Chapters 8 and 9 look at the Lessons for Learning and the Critical Issues arisingfrom the evaluation.

• Chapter 10 presents conclusions.

• The Appendices present the Terms of Reference, a Framework for a CommonApproach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs, a bibliography, a full list of persons met,the consultant’s itinerary, a chronology, the results of the initial desk study, somedetailed technical comments on projects visited, translations of the Angolan legislation, and a comparison of the criteria specified in the Angolan legislation with humanitarian standards.

1. Methodology

18

2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs


2.1 What are IDPs?

Internally Displaced Persons will be referred to as IDPs throughout this report. TheUN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide a definition of IDPs:

• Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forcedor obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particularas a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of general-ized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, andwho have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

This definition is clear enough, and it is used in Decree No 79/02 of the AngolanGovernment which presents the norms for dealing with the internally displaced.Principle 6.2(C) of the Guiding Principles also refers to persons displaced “In cases oflarge-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overridingpublic interests”. This could be an issue in Angola as there is already concern about dis-placement of populations by powerful interests in Angola6.

IDPs and Refugees

At the same time as there were four million internally displaced Angolans, there werefour hundred thousand Angolan refugees in the adjoining countries. Refugees comeunder the protection of the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 protocol, as well asthe OAU convention of 1969.

It is interesting to compare the definition of IDPs given above with that given forRefugees in Article 1 of the OAU convention7:

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “refugee” shall mean every person who, owingto well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membershipof a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality andis unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country,or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual resi-dence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

2. The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occu-pation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or thewhole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual res-idence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

19

6) In Mavinga, the Authorities forced 10,000 people from their homes to make way for a compound for alarge diamond-mining corporation. What was worse was that this was done just after the HALO trusthad de-mined the area for the use of the population. In Negage the evaluator saw fertile state land thathad been used by IDPs but which was now forbidden to them as it has been “privatised” by powerfulindividuals. In Moxico the evaluator was told that the food security of resettled IDPs is threatened by com-mercial interest in the fertile land alongside which they are resettled.

7) Section 1 of Article 1 of the OAU convention conforms to the 1951 Refugee Convention as amended bythe 1967 protocol. Section 2 of the OAU convention specifically included those fleeing all sorts of seriousdisturbances of public order.

The main differences between IDPs and refugees would therefore seem to be thefollowing:

Table 2: Main Differences between Refugees and IDPs

Refugee IDP

Reason for flight “Well founded fear of Any cause of involuntarypersecution” (1951) or “events displacementseriously disturbing public order” (OAU).

Economic Migration Excluded Excluded

International Crossed Not crossed Boundary

International Specific protection under the Generic human rights Instruments 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967 under the UN Charter,

Protocol, 1969 OAU convention Universal Declaration of (for refugees in Africa) etc. Human Rights etc.

Responsibility Host country Country of residence

International UNHCR Varies. OCHA in Angola Agency with one UNHCR Responsibility programme

Numbers in 2002 10.5 Million (UNHCR) 25 Million (GIDPP)

Angola Numbers in 410,000 Angolans refugees 4.2 Million IDPs in Angola 2002 12,000 (mainly Congolese) (Provincial Governors in

refugees in Angola June 2002).

Durable Solutions Return ReturnSettlement and naturalisation Settlement3rd country settlement Alternative settlement 8

It can be seen that the difference between IDPs and refugees is not only that IDPs havenot crossed an international boundary, but also in the reasons for displacement.The fact that Refugees have a UN organisation dedicated to their protection does makea difference. In Moxico, IDPs returning to their areas of origin were not getting foodassistance, allegedly because the food assistance was being kept in reserve for refugeesreturning in the organised repatriation.

Also refugees had the advantage that UNHCR had carried out a detailed assessment inthe areas to which refugees intended to return to determine if the minimum conditionsfor return were met there.

The comparison of IDPs with refugees is particularly relevant in Angola as UNHCR ranan IDP project from 2000 to 2002. This project was seen by many within UNHCR as


20

8) Alternative settlement here refers to settlement in a location other than the locations of refuge or origin.


politically driven9 and not directly relevant to the core UNHCR mandate for refugeeprotection. The project ended when donor funding for it ended in early 2002.

UNHCR’s apparent lack of interest in IDPs is surprising given that:

• The number of refugees continues to fall while the number of IDPs continues to rise.

• Refugees and IDPs in refugee-like situations are equally victims.• IDP populations often need the same sort of support (physical support and protec-

tions) as refugee populations need.• OCHA in Luanda were very clear that OCHA rather than UNHCR had the key

role in dealing with IDPs in Angola, and were even dismissive of the idea of anyUNHCR role with IDPs.

2.2 How many IDPs are there?

The Global IDP Project’s “league table” of the top ten internally displaced populationsplaced Angola at the top in May 2002 with 4.1 million IDPs.

Figure 1: Top Ten IDP countries - May 2002, (GIDPP)

Types of IDP

Given that there were so many IDPs it was only natural that the overall category ofIDPs was broken down into sub-categories. Unfortunately, these sub-categories are notalways well defined and definition may even change over time. While a detailed analysisof the numbers shows some inconsistencies over time, the underlying trends are clear.

21

9) Richard Holbrooke, then the US Permanent Representative at the United Nations, visited Luanda at thebeginning of December 1999. He was appalled at the condition of the IDPs that he saw in the “Malange”Camp on the outskirts of Luanda. The US took over the presidency of the Security Council the followingmonth and Holbrooke used this position to make the point that the bureaucratic distinction betweenrefugees and IDPs was negatively affecting the lives of millions. He also proposed that the UN should placeresponsibility for responding to IDP crises in one agency. Holbrooke preferred UNHCR for this role. TheHolbrooke agenda was accompanied by funding from the US government for UNHCR to experiment withsuch a role in Angola. Fuller details on the genesis of this issue can be found in Jamal and Stage (2001).

- 1 2 3 4 5

Angola

Millions

Sudan

DRC

Colombia

Indonesia and East Timor

Afghanistan

Tu rkey

Burma

Sri Lanka

Iraq

y p p ( )

The IDP categories used by OCHA (the UN’s Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance) included:

• Reported IDPs:This is the phrase used by the UN to refer to the estimates of internally displacedprovided by the Government of Angola. UN interviewees noted that these figureswere always substantially in excess of the OCHA figures for confirmed IDPs becauseof exaggeration, the inclusion of “old” IDPs, and the fact that the government neversubtracted those returning, and the inclusion of temporary IDPs (IDPs fleeing tomunicipal or provincial capitals for a few weeks after an attack in their area.). TheUN generally only used the figure of confirmed IDPs except in the CAP and otherhumanitarian statements where the larger government figures were preferred.

• New IDPs:Originally (1998) referred to those displaced since the restart of fighting in 1998.January 1st 1998 was used as the cut off date. Later, the cut-off date for this categoryseems to have shifted for OCHA to the January 1st two years prior to the year inquestion (e.g. January 1st 2001 for 2003). Other cut-off dates were also used.

• Old IDPs:Originally referred to those displaced before January 1st 1998, but later came to meanthose not classified as New IDPs. Between 1,300,000 and 2,000,000 people were dis-placed during the “war of the cities” from 1992 to 1994. Many of these returned totheir areas of origin between 1994 and 1998, but there were still 1,045,000 IDPs(about half of whom were registered in camps) at the beginning of 1998.

• Confirmed IDPs:Originally (1999) referred to IDPs whose number was confirmed by humanitarianagencies. However, this was later redefined to mean IDPs whose number was con-firmed by humanitarian partners for assistance10. Typically IDPs who had been in placefor two years were regarded as being self-sufficient. Similarly, IDPs who melted intofamily networks were not counted as confirmed IDPs. It was this narrow definition ofconfirmed IDPs that led to such a large difference with the Government’s figures.

• Assisted IDPs:This category was used in 1998 and 1999 to refer to that proportion of internallydisplaced population being assisted by the humanitarian community. The OCHAstatistics show that in 1998, on average, only 44% of the confirmed IDPs receivedhumanitarian assistance.

The same terms were not used consistently over the years, making it very difficult toestablish how IDP numbers have developed.

Numbers did not agree

A further complication was that even for the Government there were different numbers.Numbers from the Central Government did not agree with numbers for the provinces.Some of these differences appear to be related to policy issues, whereas others maysimply be related to administrative issues. The best figures for the government appear tobe the figures from the Provincial Governors in June 2002.


22

10) This precise form of words first seems to have been used in OCHA’s Humanitarian situation in Angola:monthly analysis: Feb 2002, but was clearly applied earlier so that only IDPs considered by theHumanitarian Agencies to be in need of assistance were regarded as “Confirmed IDPs”.


Table 3: Number of IDPs estimated by Provencial Governors and OCHA, 2002.

There are significant differences between the numbers. For the four years from April1998 to April 2002 the number of reported IDPs was on average 260% of the numberof confirmed IDPs. The reasons for the difference in numbers include:

• The inclusion of the 1,045,000 old IDPs existing on 31 December 1998 in theGovernment total.

• The reclassification of IDPs no longer seen as needing humanitarian assistance byOCHA (typically reclassified as settled IDPs).

• Technical competence. The non-inclusion of IDPs staying with friends or family inthe confirmed IDP figures.

Using the confirmed IDP numbers published in the OCHA humanitarian situationreports from 1998 to 2003 the following developments can be seen:

• A very rapid rise in IDPs from mid 1998 to mid 1999 (about 800,000). • Nearly another 1,200,000 IDPs over the next thirty months.

23

Province Provincial Governors June 2002

OCHA Reported Sep 2002

OCHA Confirmed Sep 2002

Provincialas % of

reported

Provincialas % of

confirmedBengo 179,413 120,070 21,418 149% 838% 1)

Benguela 453,331 435,013 92,194 96% 492% 1)

Bie 208,952 523,016 202,740 250% 103%

Cabinda 11,877 11,877 - 100%

Cunene 69,278 71,908 10,050 104% 689%

Huambo 435,000 435,053 140,402 100% 310%

Huila 229,170 218,073 190,564 95% 120%

Kuando Kubango 156,445 621,044 76,031 397% 206%

Kwanza Norte 109,587 109,585 24,915 100% 440%

Kwanza Sul 413,341 413,034 113,760 100% 363%

Luanda 673,526 84,301 17,500 13% 3849% 2)

Lunda Norte 438,203 438,013 13,040 100% 3360% 3)

Lunda Sul 184,919 184,091 81,240 100% 228%

Malange 288,536 288,686 70,125 100% 411%

Moxico 206,297 550,220 80,930 267% 255%

Namibe 24,812 22,275 18,454 90% 134%

Uige 64,832 186,960 113,058 288% 57%

Zaire 38,054 23,127 2,126 61% 1790%

Total 4,185,573 4,736,346 1,268,547 113% 330%

1) In Bengo as in other locations, part of the difference between Reported and Confirmed figures may stemfrom IDPs who have been in place for long periods.

2) The difference between national and provincial figures for Luanda may be related to the reluctance of theGovernment to acknowledge the large number of displaced in Luanda.

3) Lunda Norte is an area where there is a large amount of diamond mining. Agencies believe that many ofthose registered as displaced are in fact diamond miners.

Data from “Sustaining the Peace in Angola” (Porto and Parsons, 2003) (incorrect additions in the original arecorrected in this table)

Figure 2: Confirmed New IDPs in Angola

• However, the number of confirmed IDPs only includes those IDPs who were passingthrough vulnerability11. Careful analysis of the number of confirmed IDPs showsudden falls in the numbers in periods when there were no substantial returns. Theclue to what was happening was provided by the OCHA use of cut off dates to indi-cate confirmed IDP status. It appears that IDPs who had been in place for morethan two years were effectively declassified at the start of the year12, at least for 2000and 2001.

The graph above shows the effect of “reclassification” on the numbers of “confirmed”IDPs. The numbers of confirmed new IDPs drops at times suggesting that some of theIDPs have been reclassified as “resettled” or as some other category.

The use of the adjective confirmed for the group of IDPs passing through vulnerabilitywas unfortunate as it suggests at first glance that the number of confirmed IDPs is thereal number of IDPs as opposed to the number of reported IDPs provided by the go-vernment. The Government figures are a far better estimation of the IDP populationthan the OCHA numbers.

When does IDP status end?

At the heart of this difference is the definition of IDPs and particularly of when peoplecease to be IDPs. There is no requirement in the definition of IDPs for only thosepersons passing through vulnerability to be considered as IDPs.


24

(Data from various UNOCHA reports)

0

500,000

1, 000,000

1, 500,000

2,000,000

Jan98

Apr98

Ju l98

Oct98

Jan99

Apr99

Jul99

Oct99

Jan00

Apr00

Jul00

Oct00

Jan01

Apr01

Jul01

Oct01

Dec01

Apr02

Jul02

Sep02

Dec02

Confirmed No Reclassification

11) Interview with OCHA, Luanda.12) Sometimes other dates are quoted, such as July/August 1998 for “New IDPs” (in Waves of displacement in

Angola have resulted in categorization of “old” and “new” IDPs (2001) from the Global IDP project.(http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/2603D287369B2316C1256A3E004CBBF4)


Issue 17 of the Forced Migration Review13 considers the question of when displacementends. Erin Moony (2003) suggests three alternative criteria for the ending of the InternalDisplacement status:

• Cause-based criteria, when the case for the displacement no longer continues.• Solution-based criteria, i.e. through the opportunity to return or resettle.• Needs-based criteria, when needs and vulnerabilities directly related to displacement

no longer apply.

In Angola, the first of these criteria has been generally met and the second is widely met.However, while the third criteria, that of needs, only refers to needs in addition to thoseof the non-displaced population. While the whole population has been effected by thewar and the non-displaced population also have large needs, IDPs in Angola sufferedthrough the loss of their assets. Most are still in need of support to try and rebuild theseassets so the needs-based criteria are not met.

The criteria for declassifying IDPs in Angola did not clearly fit under any of thesecriteria, but fall somewhere between the solution-based (resettled) and needs-based (nolonger displacement inspired vulnerability) criteria.

It may be more correct to consider displacement as ending when people are either able(economically as well as physically) to return without fear to, and sustain them selves intheir area of origin, or freely opt to settle permanently elsewhere. This definition encom-passes elements of all three criteria given above.

Part of the issue over the cessation of internal displacement comes from the intermin-gling of IDP status and the right to humanitarian assistance. Refugees do not necessarilylose their status when their physical needs are met. Similarly IDPs may be in the situa-tion where they do not need humanitarian assistance, but are still displaced.14

2.3 IDPs and other displaced

Taking the total population of Angola as being twelve million15, it is instructive to lookat what the total number of displaced is in Angola. As well as the 4.2 Million recordedas internally displaced by the provincial government there were another 0.4 MillionAngolan refugees outside the country and 0.5 Million people moving with UNITA.

This suggests that 5.1 Million out of the notional population of 12 Million were dis-placed in June 2002 (Nearly 42% of the population). As with all population numbers insuch complex emergencies, the numbers have to be regarded as an indicative estimaterather than an exact account of the situation.

25

13) Forced Migration Review: No 17, May 2003. Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford.14) This criteria should be fairly obvious. Poverty is not a prerequisite for refugee or IDP status.15) Estimates of the population of Angola range from 10,766,471 (July 2003 est. – CIA World Factbook

2003) to 13.5 million (World Bank World Development Indicator Database for 2001). Twelve million iswidely quoted as an estimate of the current population.

Figure 3: Angolan Population by Category - June 2002

In June 2002 34.4% of the Angolan population were IDPs and another 7.5% wereeither in refuges abroad or moving with UNITA. The death of Savimbi and the subse-quent ceasefire have dramatically changed the situation of the displaced in Angola. Thesituation of the displaced in Luanda is discussed below on page 28. All of those withUNITA were displaced, and this displacement was involuntary, either because peoplewere pressed into UNITA or through the destruction of their bases in military action bythe Government.

Figure 4: Angolan Population by Category - June 2003

The figure for Luanda IDPs in June 2003 reflects not the “unconfirmed” IDPs as wasthe case in the first chart, but the number of IDPs in Luanda that were not included inthe Central Government’s figures. It may be that some of these had returned to theirplace of origin by June 2003, giving a total number of persons returned to their areas oforigin or resettled in excess of the 2.6 Million figure suggested here.


26

Data from various OCHA reports

Confirmed IDPs11.6%

Reclassified IDPs4.0%

Pre 1998 IDPs8.7%

Resident58.1%

Refugees3.4%

UNITA and families4.1%

Luanda IDPs 5.5%

Other IDPs4.6%

Data from various OCHA reports

Confirmed IDPs5.0%

UNITA and families 0.7%

Resident58.1%

Luanda IDPs4.9%

Other IDPs6.8%

Returned IDPs etc21.0%

Returned refugees1.1%

Refugees2.3%


2.4 The life of the displaced in Angola

There are many different types of displaced and former displaced in Angola. It is moreuseful to consider the situation of all the displaced rather than just those meeting thestrict IDP definition.

Figure 5: The Life Cycle of the Displaced in Angola

When one considers the “life cycle” of an IDP in Angola, it becomes clear that the“IDP” experience is only part of the overall situation. This report considers the situationof settled, resettled, and returned IDPs in addition to those still in IDP camps.

The “life cycle” shown above greatly simplifies matters. Many of the displaced did notgo through one such cycle but through several cycles of flight and return. Some of thesecycles may have been of only a few weeks duration initially, but others may have lastedmany years.

Figure 6: Multiple Cycles of Displacement

Another complicating factor was cascading displacement, where people fled from theirvillages to a municipal capital, and then later had to flee from the municipal capitalwhen it came under attack. Sometimes IDPs passed through a whole series of temporaryrefuges before reaching the destination that they were in at the ceasefire in April 2002.

27

Trigger

Flight

IDP Camp

Resettlement

Return

“Settled”by 2 years

Flight Return

For some IDPs living in border areas, displacement may have included movement acrossthe border into Zambia or DR Congo. The numbers given above for displacement arelikely to understate the extent of displacement as only a minority of the Angolan popu-lation were not displaced at some stage since 1961.

Refugees in Angola

There are only about 12,000 refugees in Angola. These are largely Congolese refugees16,including some dating from the suppression of the Katanga Secession. Many of theserefugees were displaced from their camps during the conflict in the same way as the gen-eral population.

Refugees returning to Angola in organised movements

The first organised return took place during the evaluator’s visit. UNHCR registeredabout 150,000 refugees wishing to return with UNHCR in 2003. However, the opera-tion is under-funded17 and has started relatively late.

UNHCR has made a careful assessment of the areas of return and has found that inmany cases the minimum conditions for return have not been met, and that a large partof the organised return will not be possible. UNHCR are only organising return tothose areas where there is humanitarian access (i.e. access for humanitarian relief agen-cies) and where minimum conditions can be met.

UNHCR note that those registering for return include a large proportion of elderly andof female headed households.

Table 4: Refugees Returning to Angola, 2002

County Angolan Refugees

Zambia 190,000 150,000

Congo Brazzaville 30,000 Namibia 25,000South Africa 5,000 Botswana 2,000Western Countries 7,000

Total 409,000

Refugees returning to Angola spontaneously

The Government estimates that some 130,000 refugees have returned from the 395,000or so refugees in the neighbouring countries. These returnees find themselves in thesame situation as returning internally displaced. What assistance they receive depends onwhere they go to and what the policy is in that province.


28

16) There are also small numbers of largely urban refugees from Rwanda, Sudan, and Congo Brazzaville.17) Partners complain that UNHCR is slow to sign sub-agreements. Donor reluctance may stem from the fact

that previous efforts to return refugees to Angola have failed because of the internal situation in Angola.


In the sites visited, the evaluator found that the situation of spontaneously returnedrefugees was the same as that of returned IDPs.

Displaced in Luanda

The displaced in Luanda are a special case. Agency interviewees reported that the centralgovernment has always discouraged agencies from assisting IDPs in Luanda for fear ofencouraging further movement towards the overcrowded city18.

Luanda has a number of special features including:

• A very rapid increase in the population. • The movement of Bakongo people from the north of Angola to Luanda.• Displacement to Luanda during the war.• Economic migration to Luanda because of the economic impact of the war.

The population of Luanda has grown from half a million prior to independence to overthree million now.

The movement of Bakongo people to Luanda is complex. It appears to be due in part tothe urbanisation of the Bakongo while taking refuge in DR Congo after the 1961 upris-ing. Whatever the reason, Luanda now boasts a large Bakongo population, many ofwhom live by petty trading. Interviewees reported that many refugees returning fromDR Congo in the organised repatriation asked for transport to Luanda despite havingregistered their place of origin as lying in the Northern provinces. Refugees justifiedtheir request by saying that their whole extended family was now in Luanda. UNHCRwould only transport them to their place of origin in the provinces with the result, inter-viewees reported, that many returnees were only spending a few nights in the transitcamp before moving on to Luanda.

During the war, some populations moved to Luanda in response to the difficulty ofmaking a living in provincial capitals or in rural areas. These can be regarded as econom-ic migrants. It is difficult to distinguish between these and the IDPs who flocked to

29

0

1

2

3

4Millions

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997

18) In June 2002 there were nearly 600,000 persons in Luanda registered as IDPs by the provincial govern-ment who were not included in the central government’s figures

Provincial Govt

Central Govt

OCHA

0 250,000 500,000 750,000 1, 000,000

Figure 7: Estimated Population of Luanda Figure 8: IDP numbers in Luanda according to OCHA, Central and Provincial government

Luanda at various stages. Some IDPs such as the families of functionaries or of the mili-tary were evacuated to Luanda during the war and these became relatively privilegedIDPs.

Many less privileged IDPs seem to have built a life for themselves in Luanda and do notcontemplate returning to the provinces. There is again a special issue with the Bakongowho live by trading. Normally trade links are within the family with goods beingsourced by one family member and passed to another family member for marketing.Families that are broadly spread, with members in a number of locations have a tradingadvantage. Interviewees therefore expected that for this population, some family mem-bers would be sent to the provinces, but the bulk of the family would remain in Luanda.Overall those interviewed regarded IDPs in Luanda as being unlikely to return in largenumbers to the countryside given the investment they will already have made to survivein Luanda. Those that might consider returning are unlikely to receive any assistance todo so as they are not so much a forgotten caseload as an invisible one.

“Hard-Core” IDPs

In July 2003, one UN source referred to the remaining IDPs as “hard-core” IDPs. Thereare still some 600,000 confirmed IDPs who are receiving assistance from the interna-tional community in July 2003. While one UN interviewee dismissed this number as“nothing” and said that there are effectively no IDPs now in Angola, it still represents5% of the national population.

The Government estimates that at the end of May 2003 there were 1.4 million IDPs intotal. OCHA appears to have moved towards accepting that the government estimate isrealistic and was planning, in mid-July to carry out a study to investigate why there were still so manyIDPs who had not returned. However, the centralgovernment number ignores 600,000 of those per-sons registered as IDPs by the provincialGovernment in Luanda. However, as noted above,many of these can be expected to remain in Luanda.

The evaluator, in discussion with IDPs who had notreturned to their area of origin noted that there wereseveral reasons why IDPs had not returned.

• Concern over the peace process.• Economic interest in remaining.• Inaccessibility of area of origin.• Vulnerability/inability to move.• “Failed” returnees, who have abandoned

attempts to resettle in their areas of origin.

Doubts about the peace process

This might not seem like a soundly based concern but the 2002 cease fire is the fourthsince 1989. While it looks now that any new outbreak of civil war is extremely unlikely,many displaced have gone through previous cycles of displacement and resettlement andwant to be sure before placing themselves in peril again.


30

Adriano earns a living as a metal worker inMoxico, He does not plan to return to hisarea of origin.


Interviewees tended to refer indirectly to this cause of concern rather than directlystating it. The concern was reflected in statements such as “we suffered a lot when wehad to flee” etc. Interviewees stated that they would “return after…” without specifyingwhat exactly they were waiting for.

Economic interest in remaining

Some of those remaining in the former IDP camps have settled there and were earning aliving either through paid employment, petty trading, or craft work. Such intervieweesnormally stated their clear intention to remain where they were.

Inaccessible areas

Some displaced populations continue in place, such as in Mavinga, because their areas oforigin are still inaccessible, either because of mines or the lack of roads. There is also alimit to the distance that a peasant family can travel on foot, while carrying food, waterand whatever they will need to restart life in their area of origin. This category of “stuck”IDPs is limited to those from certain specific areas of origin.

Vulnerables / unable to move

In the old IDP camps, the most common reason for not moving was the simple inabilityto do so. This was particularly the case with female headed households.

The elderly also have problems with returning. Most of the returnees interviewed werereceiving little or no assistance to return. Returnees have to organise their own transport

(most simply walk) to their areas of origin. Some ofthose interviewed had walked for 7 days to reachtheir areas of origin. For others it is even further.

When walking to their area of origin people have tocarry food not only for the journey, but also for thefirst month after arrival. In some cases families haveto carry sufficient water to get past areas with nosurface water sources or wells.

On arrival they have to clear a small plot andarrange a simple shelter. The families interviewedstated that they relied on casual labour or petty trad-ing for their income. Casual farm labouring wasdone on the farms of those who have remained inplace or had returned earlier.

Other interviewees indicated that families generallyreturned only after one family member had first vis-ited the area of origin to see what the possibilitieswere.

Such vulnerable IDPs are being overlooked at present and form part of the “forgottencaseload” of the displaced in Angola.

31

Anita has stayed on at Enama Camp inMoxico. She fled from Luacano inSeptember 1998 with her husband andseven children. Her husband died leavingher with the children, the youngest of whomis two years old.

She lives by working as a washerwomen andthe children earn money by carrying waterfrom the well to peoples’ homes.

Returning to Luacano is not an option forher.

“Failed” returnees

The difficulties of re-establishing life in the areas of return should not be underestimat-ed. Oxfam reported that in Bie and Malange, small numbers of families, in the tensrather than in hundreds so far, are returning to IDP camps having abandoned theirattempt to restart their lives in the areas of origin. Oxfam stated that food distributionswere still being made in the IDP camps in Bie and Malange. In Moxico no food distri-butions were being made in the IDP camps.

Temporarily resettled IDPs

A number of returnees were met who had not returned directly to their place of originin 2003, but had first moved to some intermediate point in 2002. This makes sense ifone considers that returns to nearby locations were assisted in some areas in 2002. IDPstook advantage of these to begin their journey.

Spending an agricultural season at an intermediatepoint may have given access to food distributions,resettlement kits, or to agricultural labour. Access tolabouring opportunities may be an important con-sideration for those returning to areas where therewas no humanitarian access.

Resettled IDPs

During the war there were a number of attempts toresettle IDPs in areas where they could be agricultur-ally self –sufficient. Visiting these sites, the evaluatorfound that some families had left to return to theirareas of origin, while others who had no reason toreturn, intended to stay put.

Interviewees intending to resettle typically gave theirreason as “it’s Angola here too” or even “it’s the sameprovince here also”.

In some cases those staying had bought houses fromthose departing. In other cases, IDPs leaving resettle-ment sites had sold their houses to local residents.

UNITA Ex-combatant displaced

The worst population seen, in terms of resources and general condition, were theUNITA ex-combatants and their families in Sambo. The total number of UNITA ex-combatants and their families displaced is not clear. Some 50,000 were expected todemobilise but in the event, some 87,763 UNITA soldiers were demobilised and anoth-er 5,007 were incorporated into the Angolan armed forces (GoA, 2003).

The Government’s own figures are contradictory, with more than 7,000 more combat-ants demobilised or transferred than were registered in the first place (GoA, 2003).Combatants and their families entered the Gathering Areas19 rapidly in April to May,


32

Paulina was taken by UNITA together withher mother and two sisters in 1997. She hadthree children by “friends” in Unita. Herfamily plans to stay in the Luchazes resettle-ment site.


and the numbers continued to grow until the end of the year. It is not clear if this con-tinued rise happened because of the delay in communicating with some units, or thedesire of some who had “demobilised” themselves to gain the benefit of official demobil-isation.

Agency estimates of the numbers still left in thegathering areas or transit centres range as high as212,250 (Angola Peace Monitor No 9. Vol IX).OCHA reported that there were still 49,300 peoplein 7 of the “closed” gathering areas in June 2003,plus another 39,800 in 30 transit areas throughoutAngola.

Ex-combatants interviewed at Sambo said that theyhad not received any ration since April. WFP gotspecial permission to do a distribution after the offi-cial closing date in late March 2003.

However, there was still some maize in the campduring the visit by the evaluation team in June, butthis was probably due to the distribution of a threemonth ration in February as the gathering areareceived no food from November to February due tothe access road being closed after a landmine inci-dents on the road from Huambo on November14th.

The population at the Sambo Gathering Area cur-rently receives no food as the Government has for-bidden assistance to the Gathering Area as it is offi-cially closed.

33

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

27 Jul '02 - Joint MilitaryCommission

04 Nov '02 - US Committee for Refugees

09 May '03 - USAID

05 Jun '03 - Angola PeaceMonitor

19 Jun '03 - IRN quoting UNDP

19 June '03 - Government of Angola

Civilians

exCombatants

0

100 ,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

20 A

pr

27 A

pr

04 M

ay

11

May

18 M

ay

25 M

ay

01 J

un

08 J

un

15 J

un

22 J

un

29 J

un

06 J

ul

13 J

ul

20 J

ul

27 J

ul

Adelina with her surviving children (3 and 6years old). Her new baby died last month,within a few weeks of being born. Her hus-band is a UNITA combatant who lost a legin a mine incident.

19) The Gathering Areas were the areas specified for the collection of UNITA forces and their families prior todemobilisation.

Figure 10:

UNITA arrivals in gathering areas in 2002

Source: Joint Military Commision press releases

Figure 9:

Estimates of UNITA combatants and families

Total in ‘000 by date and source

The Government also forbade the supply of seeds and tools to the populations in theGathering Areas in order to discourage them from settling there instead of returning totheir areas of origin. Interviewees suggested that the government policy was driven bythe government’s wish to avoid having places under UNITA authority which could formthe nuclei of future armed opposition.

The population in this camp showed signs of chronic malnutrition with children being smallfor their age. Signs of poverty were also evident in the state of the clothing being worn.

One sign of poverty was the lack of mortars forpounding maize. Maize was instead pounded on arock outcrop with wooden hand hammers. Whilesuch hammers are normally used by mobile popula-tions, one would expect that once the populationwere in an area for a few months, families wouldmake or buy wooden mortars as these take less workto grind maize than beating it on a rock.

At Sambo some 613 ex-combatants are waiting fortheir documents and demobilisation allowance(probably 3,000 people in all including their fami-lies). Another five to seven thousand are waiting fortransport to their areas of origin.

The ex-Combatants are currently surviving by working as labourers on neighbouringfarms, and by making and trading in charcoal. There must be some concern about thesecurity implications in having large numbers of trained military with no obvious meansof earning a living, and who presumably know where arms have been cached.

The UNITA ex-combatants waiting for assistance and transportation are part of a largergroup of “forgotten displaced” in Angola. There is a broader question about the UNITAdisplaced. Many of these did not opt for displacement with UNITA but had it forcedupon them20. The two groups have not been treated in the same way.

Even despite these flaws, the World Bank note that this is the most successful demobili-sation ever held. The Government certainly performed better than expected when facedwith nearly twice the original estimate of UNITA combatants to be demobilised21.

Resettled ex combatants

Outside of the Gathering Area none of those interviewed would acknowledge that they hadbeen with UNITA even where it was clear from the context. It was the same story for civil-ians who had been with UNITA. They were generally very reluctant to acknowledge this,although sometimes reference was made to family members who had been taken by UNITA.


34

Eight year old Florinda pounding maize ona rock for her widowed mother at Sambo.Like most of the children here she was smallfor her age, reflecting a history of inadequatenutrition.

20) Service with UNITA was not optional either. Although some UNITA interviewees said that they hadjoined to fight for Angolan freedom, the majority acknowledged that they had been taken from their vil-lages by UNITA. Some former government soldiers interviewed had had the same experience.

21) The evaluator asked one interviewee what the difference was between those who took refuge in the govern-ment controlled town and those who remained with UNITA in one district. The interviewee explainedthat those who were too late to cross the rising river between the district and the town remained withUNITA. Many of these were later displaced with them.


Government soldiers have remained with their units and have not been quartered fordemobilisation. However, those who are staying in the army are being allowed to transferto their provinces of origin. This occasionally causes some family problems as the soldiersmay have wives and children in the province of origin as well as in their current posting.

Returned IDPs

Returned IDPs were visited at a number of locations. It was clear from these visits thatwhat returnees received depended both on theprovince they returned to (overall policy and thepresence of humanitarian agencies), and on the partof the province that they returned to (humanitarianaccess, the presence of humanitarian agencies andthe policies pursued).

Several OCHA reports suggest that 220,000 IDPshad assistance to return to their places of origin(UN, 2003). Given the Government’s estimate ofapproximately 2.4 million returnees, this suggeststhat only 9% of returned IDPs got assistance withtheir transport.

In late 2002 the government’s priority switched frommoving IDPs to clearing the Gathering Areas.Transport of IDPs to their areas of origin effectivelystopped. The rains interrupted the return of the ex-combatants to their areas of origin and itnever really resumed on a large scale in 2003. Neither was there any resumption of assistedtransport for IDPs.

The current situation of the returned IDPs depends on a wide range of factorsincluding:

• The province they are returning to and the policies being applied by the governmentand humanitarian actors in that province.

• The level of access to where they return to. (Access may be constrained by poorroads, damaged bridges or concerns about mine contamination).

• The cropping system (some root crops require nearly two seasons to be fully productive).

• The access to land. There is a concern that UNITA ex-combatants may have theiraccess to land restricted by traditional rulers in response to popular discontent withthe behaviour of UNITA in the last few years. In other areas spontaneously retur-ning refugees found that ex-combatants had occupied their land.

• The opportunities for petty trading or other economic activity in the area. This isclosely related to the existing population of an area. As the population increases inthe areas of return, the opportunities for paid labour or petty trading increase.

The last factor partly explains one of the features seen, that of a staged return, withsome families returning at the first opportunity and the others returning when thingswere somewhat more developed. The lack of access to some areas also favours a stagedreturn. The following map from OCHA for May 2003 illustrated the continuing accessproblems.

35

Returnees building houses in Moxico. Thefamilies will shelter for two to three monthsbehind the grass screens while they buildtheir new houses. These returnees, profitingfrom trading in fish, plan to build theirhouses with sun-dried blocks.

Map 2: Accessibility May 2003 (OCHA)

When people flee their homes, they bear almost all the cost, the cost of abandoningtheir assets and livelihoods, of transporting themselves to a place of safety. If they arelucky they will get some assistance to establish and maintain themselves in their place ofrefuge. However, when they return, not only do they need maintenance support, butthey also need assistance to re-establish their livelihoods and assets22. The fact that therewas no huge surge in donor spending in Angola since the ceasefire illustrates that thelow level of services seen in the provinces visited is indicative of the situation in thewhole country.

Categorisation

All interviewees used categorisation to identify different types of beneficiary23. Even theWorld Food Programme’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit took care to distin-guish between resident, settled, resettled, and displaced beneficiaries.


36

22) This need to pay for things like transport and to try and re-establish shelter and livelihoods (whose cost wasoriginally borne by the refugees) is what makes refugee repatriation programmes so expensive.

23) Examples of categories are New IDP, Old IDP, Refugee, Returned Refugee, Settled, Resettled, etc.

AccessibilityGood

Difficult

Isolated Areas

No Information


Categories are used widely in Angola, not only by aid agencies and government but alsoby displaced communities themselves24. Angolan interviewees were generally of the viewthat, where communities consisted of different categories of beneficiaries, providingassistance to one category only could lead to communal tension. Interviewees gaveexamples of where there was tension between old and new displaced, between returningrefugees and residents, or between those who had been displaced with UNITA and otherdisplaced.

However, interviewees noted that in some cases, the categories reflected very real differ-ences in needs between populations.

IDP food security

The most recent Vulnerability Analysis for Angola (released in June 2003) shows 79% ofthose in the food-insecure or highly vulnerable category25 are internally displaced, reset-tled, or returned. Comparing both populations shows that while only 6% of the residentpopulation is highly vulnerable or food-insecure, 30% of the displaced, settled, orreturned population is.

The WFP figures (which may understate the problem because of the lack of access tosome areas) suggest that those who are, or have recently been, displaced are more thanfive times as likely to be in the food-insecure or highly vulnerable category.

Figure 11: Vulnerability for Resident, IDPs, Resettled and Returned (June 2003).

37

24) Birkeland and Gomes (2001) refer to multiple axes of identity used by IDPs in Angola. They note that theterm deslocado (dislocated) in Angola has the connotation of forcible displacement.

25) The Food Insecure vulnerability category means that people need food assistance now, the HighlyVulnerable category means that they will need it before the next harvest. The Moderately Vulnerable cate-gory are those who may need food before the next harvest.

IDP, Resettled or ReturnedResident

HighlyVulnerable

Not HighlyVulnerable

Not HighlyVulnerable

HighlyVulnerable

2.5 Minimum Conditions for Return

The legal instruments

Angola shares with Columbia the distinction of having the Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement written into national law26. The Angolan legislation is particularly interestingin that it goes beyond the Guiding Principles to establish minimum conditions for return.

The legislation was established on foot of a long process of advocacy and consultancy byOCHA. UNHCR also played a role in this.27

The two Angolan decrees, Number 1of 2001 and Number 79 of 2002 areso interesting they are presented intranslation in Appendix 9 The legalinstruments: The Norms andAppendix 10 The legal instruments:The Regulations. A comparison of thestandards with those of Sphere andUNHCR is presented in Appendix 11The Angolan Regulations comparedwith the indicators for other stan-dards. Some aspects of the Angolanstandards are more detailed than inSphere, but in other cases the stan-dards are less demanding than thosepresented in Sphere.

Practical situation

Despite the excellence of the legislations, almost all persons interviewed agreed that theywere not being implemented. Interviewees made comments like “In Angola laws onlyexist on paper and never in reality”.

OCHA have estimated that 30% of those returning returned to places where the mini-mum conditions were met. The evaluator considers that it is very unlikely that as manyas 30% are returning to locations which meet the minimum conditions. It is probably ofthe order of ten to fifteen percent at most. Even many settled villages do not meet theminimum conditions in terms of access to health services or water.

Angola has the second worst ranking in the UNDP’s Human Development Index forSouthern Africa. Only one other country in Southern Africa spends less on Health andEducation combined than Angola. This reflects a low level of service provision of basicservices by the government.

The regulations place a very large load on the provincial government, especially for theconstruction of infrastructure for health and education. However, only very limited con-struction of social infrastructure is underway in a few limited provinces.


38

Relief StandardsFor many years the standards for relief workwere effectively set by the field handbooks of such agencies as the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) orthe United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID).

In 1997, NGOs and the Red Cross beganthe Sphere Project to develop a set of uni-versal minimum standards in core areas ofhumanitarian assistance. One outcome ofthis process was the Sphere Handbook in2000.

26) Law 387 in Columbia.27) Personal communication from Ole Stage.


Interviewees were divided into two broad classes:

• Those who believed that there had been so little progress because the governmentcared nothing for the people in the rural areas (or for those in the low income andvirtually un-serviced musseques28 on the periphery of Luanda).

• Those who believed that while the government was far from perfect, it had made aneffort and the situation was complex.

The Government and the rural areas

Several interviewees made the point that the government is very corrupt and quoted theexample of the leaked World Bank report that highlighted that four billion US dollarshad gone missing from the national accounts over the previous five years. Many otherinstances of corruption were quoted by interviewees.

A second factor cited by interviewees was that whatever services the government pro-vides are focused on the urban elite, especially in Luanda. One interviewee gave theexample of the Government bringing a foreign entertainer to sing in Angola at enor-mous cost when there are so many unmet social needs in Angola.

When one looks at the few schools that are being built by the government, almost all arein municipal or provincial capitals. It appears to be only NGOs that are building schoolsin rural areas.

Some interviewees stated that the Government position was that the crisis in Angola wasa result of Cold War politics and that dealing with the problems arising was the respon-sibility of the international community rather than the government.

39

South Africa 1Namibia 2

Botswana 3

Lesotho 5

Zimbabw e 7Zambia 9

Mozambique 11Swaziland 4

Congo 6

Malawi 8

Angola 10

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Percentage of GDP spend on Health

Perc

enta

ge o

f GD

P Sp

end

on E

duca

tion

28) Musseques are the unplanned and unserviced suburbs surrounding Luanda. They are named for the easilyeroded red soil in the area.

Figure 11: HDI Ranking and Social spending - Southern Africa

One interviewee described what is happening in the Angolan countryside as a form ofinternal colonisation with a government only interested in economic exploitation ofwhatever resources are there without demonstrating any care for the people. Severalexamples, where communities have been moved off good land that is wanted by seniorfigures, were quoted in support of this.

Limits of capacity

The government has only a limited capacity. Civil servants in Angola are poorly paidand many treat their jobs in the style of a medieval fief, using it to extract what moneythey can to compensate for their low pay. Even teachers were found to be charging chil-dren for starting school, even though education is notionally free.

Angola maintains a very bureaucratic system in spite of the limited capacity to manageit. One of the forms seen in Municipal Offices was an application for a permit forpeople to repair their own houses. Informants said that all such permits are usually onlyprocessed if some gasosa (Portuguese for a soda – in this context meaning a small bribe)is given.

It would hardly be realistic to expect a government which has not had the capacity toservice IDPs when they were concentrated to do so when they are dispersed. Otherinterviewees argued that it was a matter of will rather than of capacity. In support of thisargument is the apparent lack of any attempt to meet the needs of the returnees in manyplaces.

It was clear also that NGOs only have a limited capacity even though they are notalways willing to acknowledge this immediately. The change from servicing concentratedgroups of people within quite small areas to servicing dispersed populations spread overprovinces has been difficult for Danida’s partners. It will not be possible to meet theneeds in Angola through NGOs alone, only the government can develop the capacity todo this.

The Government and the donors

Some interviewees were critical of the position taken by the donors. One interviewee saidthat “for the donors the Government is too corrupt to give aid to, but not too corrupt tobuy oil from”. Another quoted the founder of a National NGO as saying “The govern-ment is neither as bad as the donors say, nor as good as the people of Angola deserve.”

Donors generally have only very limited development assistance programmes in Angolaand the majority have Humanitarian Assistance programmes only. None of the donorsinterviewed plan to increase their assistance to Angola. Most expect assistance todecrease significantly over the next three years.The donors have successfully maintained a common front on issues such as the DonorConference. One of the donor representatives prepared a “crib sheet” of key issues toraise with the government whenever individual donors are meeting the government.

One interviewee noted that donor relationships with the government are complicated bythe fact that some countries have substantial business interests in Angola and that thesetake precedence over Aid.


40


Donor interviewees acknowledged that the Donors have very little leverage with theGovernment. Angola has large sums from oil and diamonds and the sums available fromDonors are small by comparison. Several interviewees quoted the example of the govern-ment taking an unconditional 1.15Bn USD commercial credit from a consortium ofbanks at 10% rather than accepting a 1Bn USD credit from the IMF that had trans-parency and governance conditions attached.

The government is susceptible to pressure in one area, that of its image. Angola nowholds one of the rotating UN Security Council seats and sees a large role for itself in theregion. The government is very unhappy with corruption allegations and negative pub-licity abroad. The apparent order of priority for dealing with different sorts of displacedillustrates this point.

• Demobilised: First priority due to the security implications.• Returning refugees: Next priority because of the impact on Angola’s image in the

regio

83892 ANGOLA v1 - OECD · 2016. 3. 29. · FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, The...

Documents

Transcript of 83892 ANGOLA v1 - OECD · 2016. 3. 29. · FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, The...