WORKING PAPER - ANNO 3, NUMERO 4 - OTTOBRE 2012WORKING PAPER - anno 1, numero 2 - luglio 2010

By Federico FormentiniTommaso Milani

ABSTRACT

The Caspian Sea represents a vital source of wealth for all littoral states. The control over the hydrocarbons contained below its seabed (as well as their economic exploitation) is a fact of key strategic importance, especially for those states – e.g. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan – to which Caspian oil and gas exports constitutes the most part of GDP. No wonder that the legal determination of the ownership of the Caspian Sea’s territorial waters and seabed remains a topic of great importance for the world’s energy market and for the littoral states directly involved in the dispute. This paper will describe the history of the Caspian Sea from a legal perspective and will analyse the many different treaties and international agreements signed in the course of the last three centuries by the states that succeeded one another on the shores of the Central-Asian lake. Moreover, it will focus on current international law issues and their implications on the arrangements in place in the region.

The legal status of the Caspian Sea- History of the treaties between the riparian states -

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INTRODuction

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1. http//www.uniurb.it/MedChem/Gatti/struttur/Strutt8.doc

2. http://www.grafene.it/

Byand large, theCaspianSearepresentsavitalsourceofwealth forall littoralstates.Thecontrolover thehydrocarbonscontaineddeepbelowitsseabed(aswellastheireconomicexploitation) isafactofkeystrategicimportance,especiallyforthosestates–e.g.Azerbaijan,Turkmenistan,andKazakhstan–towhichCaspianoilandgasexportsconstitutesthemostpartofGDP.NowonderthatthelegaldeterminationoftheownershipoftheCaspianSea’sterritorialwatersandseabedremainsatopicofgreatimportancefortheworld’senergymarketandforthelittoralstatesdirectlyinvolvedinthedispute.Nevertheless,before focusingoncurrent international law issuesand their implications, it isnecessary todescribe thehistoryof theCaspianSeafromalegalperspectiveandtogobacktothemanydifferenttreatiesandinternationalagreementssignedinthecourseofthelastthreecenturiesbythestatesthatsucceededoneanotherontheshoresoftheCentral-Asianlake.

Figure 1 – Map of the Caspian Sea region, present day

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ThefirsteverinternationaltreatyregardingtheCaspianSeawassignedbetweenRussiaandPersiain1732.Thistreaty,knownasthetreatyofRashtfromthePersiancityinwhichitwassigned,wasindeedthefirsttocontainsomereferencesonfreedomofnavigationandcommerceonthewatersoftheenclosedsea1.Farfromcontaininganycleardefinitionofthereciprocal“territorialwaters”(letaloneofsearesourcesexploitation),thetreatyofRashtwasprincipallyatradeandcooperationtreatybetweentworegionalpowersinterestedinsolvingsomeminordisputesintheCaspianareainordertoconcentratetheireffortsagainsttheOttomanEmpire,theircommonenemyatthetime2.ThetreatyofRasht,whosedispositionswereconfirmedinthetreatyofGandzha(or“Ganja”asthecity isalsoknown)of1735,wasfollowedbyothersimilaragreementswhichgraduallyestablishedaframeworkofinternationaltreatiesbetweentheRussianEmpireandPersia.FollowingtheRussiancolonizationofallthenorthernandeasternshoreoftheCaspianSea(culminatedwiththeannexationofTurkestaninthelate19thcentury),RussiaandPersiabecamethesoleandonlyriparianstatesfacingthesea.TheywouldremainassuchuntilthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991.TheTreatyofGulistan,signed in1813after the thirdRusso-PersianWar (1804-1813),grantedRussia thecontrolofall theCaspianWesternshore, fromDaghestantomoderndayAzerbaijan,by forcingtheShahofPersia torenouncehisclaimsofsovereigntyoverGeorgia,Mingrelia,Abkhazia,Ganja,Qarabag,Qobba,Darband,Baku,DagestanandSakki3.Besidesthehugeterritorialtransfer,theTreatyalsoincludedsometradedispositionthroughwhichPersiaexpresslyrenounced“allrightstonavigatetheCaspianSea”andalsogaveImperialRussiatheexclusiverighttodeployamilitarynavyontheenclosedsea4.ThissituationwaslaterconfirmedbytheTreatyofTurkmanchai(followingthefourthRusso-PersianWarof1826-1828),throughwhichPersiarenouncedagaintosailanykindofvessel(militaryorcommercialalike)onthewatersoftheCaspianSeaandallowedRussiancommercialshipsfullaccesstoitsports.Duetothistreaty,therefore,ImperialRussiafounditselfasthesoleandonlyrulerofthevastCentral-Asianbodyofwater,whoseonlyotherriparianstate,Persia,didnotevenhavetherighttosetsailonit,nortriedfortherestofthecenturytoregainitslostsovereignty.Mamedovgivesapossibleexplanationforthepeace-orientedCaspianforeignpolicyadoptedbyPersiaforthesecondhalfofthe19thcenturyandthebeginningofthe20thbystatingthat“Tehran,havingagreedwithunofficialRussiancontrolovertheCaspianSea,hasgotaphantomrightandguaranteeofstablepeacewithRussiaandassistanceincaseofthirdcountries’aggressionsagainstIran.Asthematteroffact,Iranconsentedtolooseterritory,possessionandsphereofinfluenceinreturnforawarrantyofexistencewithinthebordersandshapeinwhichitcontinuedtoexistthroughoutthe20thcentury”5.Hencetheperiodbetween1828to1917wasoneofrelativepeaceintheregion,atleastfromthepointofviewofinternationallaw.

1.ZONNetal(2010),464.2.Ibidem.WorthrememberingthatthefirstexplorationoftheshoresoftheCaspianSeawasorderbyPetertheGreatonlyagenerationbefore,in1701.BeforethatdatetherewereveryfewcontactsbetweenthetwoverydistantEmpiresandbothconsideredtheCaspianSearegionasadistant“frontier”.AlthoughtheRussianalwaysknewofthegiantlakesincethetimesoftheexpeditionofGranDukeIgorintheregionin913,thefirstmapshowingconsiderabledetailoftheentireCaspianSeawasnotdrawnuntil1730.3.Article3oftheTreatyofGulistanasreportedinDANIEL(2001).4.Article5ofthesametreatyasreportedinDANIEL(2001).5.MAMEDOV(2000),1176.Thesmallnationknewashort-livedperiodofindependencein1918beforebeingreoccupiedbyRussianforces,thistimeunderthebanneroftheCommunistRevolution.7.SeeMIRBABAYEV(2010).8.MAMEDOV(2000),1229.Thetreatyincludedanumberofclauses(clauses6and7inparticular)forbiddingPersiatohostforeigntroopsonitsterritorywhichcausedmanyproblemsduringthedecadesfollowingtheendoftheRussiancivilwar.

•1. The Imperial Russian Period (1732-1917)

•2. The Soviet Period (1918-1991)TheRussianRevolutionof1917representedamajorgeopoliticalchangefortheCaspianregionandunderminedthelegalframeworkatitscore.ThenewBolshevikstateinfactrefusedtosucceedtoanyoftheinternationaltreatiessignedbyimperialRussia,includingthosewithPersia.DuringthecivilwarthatfollowedthecollapseofTsaristRussiachaosspreadinthearea,forbothfactionsoccupiedandabandonedtheirpositionsintheregion.Externalactorsalsotriedtotakeadvantageofthesituation:Britishforcesweresentto“defendtheindependence”oftheDemocraticRepublicofAzerbaijan forawhile6,andtheTurkishrogue forcesofEnverPashamaraudedtheregion forseveralyears in thevainattemptofestablishinga“GreatTurkestan”7.OncetheRedArmysucceededinrestoringorderintheregion,theoverallpoliticalgeographyoftheCaspianregiondidnotpresentanychangeworthofnotice:RussiawasstillincontrolofthreeoutoffourshoresoftheseaandtheRussianEmpireitself,albeitunderdifferentcolours,appearedtobeevenstrongerthanbefore.KeentoestablishsoliddiplomaticrelationsandrecognizingtheneedtorebuildanewinternationaltreatybasisfortheCaspianregion,PersiaandtheU.S.S.R.negotiatedwhatbecameknownastheRusso-PersianTreatyofFriendship,signedinMoscowonFebruary261921.Thetreaty,byrefusingtorecognisethepreviousTreatyofTurkmenchai,inauguratedacompletelyneweraofinternationalrelationsforthetwocountriesandthedevelopmentofInternationallawinthearea8.Formalequalitybetweenthetwocountrieswasrecognizedasafoundingprincipleoftherelationshipbetweenthecontractingparties.Asaresult,equalrightofnavigationwasgrantedtoPersia.Russiarenouncedallprevious‘colonial’privilegesgrantedbyTurkmenchai(suchas,forexample,theexclusivityontheconcessionoffisherylicensestoRussianconsulsinPersiancoastalcities)andobtainedinreturnrecognitionforthenewregimeinMoscowaswellastheneutralityoftheShah9.

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FurthermoretheprincipleofequalitygrantedPersiatherighttopracticefishery(clause14)and,inclause11,the“...equalrightoffreefloatingintheCaspianSeaundertheirownflags”or,inotherwords,therighttodeployamilitaryfleet10.Bothcountriesalsoagreedonsharingtheresponsibilityforthesecurityoftheseaandestablishedtheprincipleoftheexclusiveuseoftheseabythetwolittoralcountries(clause7).AlthoughconstitutingintheoryagoodstartingpointforfuturetreatiesthatwouldhavefurtherexpandedtheapplicationofInternationallawintheregion,the1921TreatycontainedaflawthatimpededitsreconfirmationandconditionedtheevolutionofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSea.Atthebeginningofthetreatyinfact(clause3)thetwocountrieshadindeed“declaredtheirrespect”towardstheoldRussian-PersianborderassetbytheConciliatoryCommissionof188111,neitherdelimitingtheactualmaritimebordersoftheCaspianBasinnorclearlyoptingforthecondominiumsolution.Thematterwaslefttofuturedealingsandin1927theAgreementonDevelopmentoftheFishingResourcesoftheSouthernCoastoftheCaspianSea12referredtotheAstara-GasanKulilineasthelimitofefficacyoftheagreementitself.ThisstraightlinebetweenthetwomostsouthernpointsofRussianterritoryonbothsidesofthesea,whichAsriyandoesnothesitatetocallmere“gentlemandemarcation”13,wasnotinanywayintendedtohaveapermanentstatusnortobecometheofficiallysanctionedmaritimeborderbetweenthetwocountries.Theobjectiveofthe1927agreement(validfor25years)wasinfactonlythatofestablishingajointSoviet-PersianfishingcompanyinordertoimprovethefishingindustryontheIraniancoast(andtherealone)inapplicationofclause14oftheTreatyofFriendship.Aftertheprescribed25yearsofduration,in1953,PersiadidnotextendthevalidityoftheagreementthusrenderingthejointfisheryagreementlegallyinvalidtogetherwithanypossibleclaimonthevalidityAstara-GasanKulilineasofficialmaritimeborderbetweenthetwocountries14.While,ontheonehand,theTreatyofFriendshipandthefollowingagreementof1927legalizedtheinternationalstatusoftheCaspianSeaandfreeditfromtheoldRussianpolicyofcolonialoccupation,ontheotherhandthelong-termcontributionofthesetwotreatiestotheoveralldevelopmentofanewCaspianinternational-legalframeworkwasgreatlyreducedbythelimitedscopeandviewofthetwosignatorystates15.NoneofthetreatiesinfacthadasmainobjectivethedeterminationofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSea.Acoherentviewofthelatterstartedtocomeintoexistencemanyyearslaterandonlythrougha(highlydebated)processofdeductionmadebyInternationallawscholarsontheexistingtreatiesandonlittoralstates’behaviour.TheTreatyofFriendshipwasfollowedbytheTreatyofEstablishmentCommerceandNavigationof1935,whichconfirmedthedispositionsoftheprevioustreatyof1921andreaffirmedtheprincipleofexclusivityintheuseoftheseainfavourofthetwolittoralcountries:notonlyforeignflagswereforbiddentosailontheCaspianSeabutalsoforeigncrewmenwerenottobeallowedonboardanyvessel,commercialandmilitaryalikeofthetworiparianstates.ThetreatyalsoreaffirmedtheequalrightofthetwosignatoriestojointlyexploitsearesourcesanywhereontheSea,withtheexceptionofatennautical-miles-widestripfromthecoastinwhichfisherywouldhaveremainedanationalprerogative16.FarfromactuallydividingtheSeaintoexclusiveeconomiczones,thetreatyseemstostatetheprincipleofcondominiumofthetworiparianstatesovertheenclosedsea,leavingonlya10milewideareatoexclusivenationalexploitation17.All thesedispositionswere substantially confirmedand reinforcedby theTreatyofCommerceandNavigationof194018. This treaty, aswellasallpreviousones,regulatedonlyfishery,navigationandcommerce,omittinganyreferencetoseabedresourcesormaritimeborderdemarcation.Surprisinglyenough,notevenafterthediscoveryofoiloffthecoastofAzerbaijaninthe1940sthetwostatesbegantodiscussonadelimitationtreatyofsomesorttoaddressthequestionofseabedresources.nthe1956agreement,namedTreatyonSettlementofFrontierandFinancialQuestions,noreferencetoseabedresourcesortomaritimeborderdemarcationwasmade.Tobesurethe1956treatydefinedanadministrativefrontierontheoldAstara-GasanKuliline,butonlyonthelandsonbothsidesoftheCaspian,andnotthroughtheSeaitself19.ThisapparentincoherenceinthedevelopmentofinternationallawintheCaspianregioncanbeexplainedbytakingintoaccountthehistoryofInternationalrelationsinthearea,aswellasinthewholeworld,duringtheperiod.Infact,fromthefirstTreatyofFriendshipof1921tothe1950sdiplomaticrelationsbetweenthetwocountrieshavefrequentlychangedfrommomentsofneutralitytomomentsofopenhostility.So,whentheShahinauguratedhispro-Germanpolicyinthe1930sbyrefusingtorenewtheTreatyofEstablishmentCommerceandNavigationsignedonlyafewyearsearlier,hepavedthewaytoaperiodofdiplomaticconfrontationduringwhichtheshareoftheU.S.S.R.intheIranianforeigntradeturnoverdroppedtoonly0.5%in194020.Lateron,theGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnionledtoajointoccupationofIranbyRussianandBritishtroopsinthesummerof1941.WiththedestitutionofRezaShahinSeptember1941,Iranlostpartofitssovereigntyandafterthewar,undertheruleofRezaPahlavi,finallyenteredintheAnglo-Americanpoliticalsphereofinfluence.Soviet-IraniandiplomaticrelationsremainedmoreorlesstenseduringtheentireColdWar.Moreover,theoverthrowoftheShahandtheestablishmentoftheIranianIslamicRepublicin1979certainlydidnothelptoimprovetherelationsbetweenthetwocountries21.DuringallthisperiodtheCaspianSearemaineddividedonlybythe“pragmatical demarcation”oftheAstara-GasanKulilinewhichgrantedthe Soviet Union the control of over 86%of the sea’s surface22. Until 1991 no treatywas signed on the subject of seabed resourcesexploitationormaritimeborderdemarcation.

10.MAMEDOV(2000),123.11.MAMEDOV(2000),123.12.Apossibilityalreadyenvisagedbyclause14oftheTreatyofFriendshipof1921.13.SeeASRIYAN(2003).14.SeeMAMEDOV(2000).ThelineremainedinuseuntilthecollapseoftheSovietUnionasan“informalgeographicalreference”forjurisdictionandflightpathsdetermination.OnthepointseeKARBUZ(2010).15.SeeMAMEDOV(2000).16.SeeKARBUZ(2010);MAMEDOV(2000).17.SeeKARBUZ(2010).18.Thetreatyof1935wasexpiredduetothePersianunwillingnesstorenewit.SeeMAMEDOVA(2009).19.SeeHAGHAYEGHI(2003).20.Inthe1920sandtheearly30stheSovietUnion,bybuying100%ofallIranianfishandambaryexports,97%ofriceandcattle,90%ofcotton,86%ofwool,68%ofsilkwormcocoonsand47%ofleatherandhides,wasthemainexportpartnerofIran.SeeMAMEDOVA(2009).21.SeeMAMEDOVA(2009)22.SeeASRIYAN(2003)

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Theonlyactinthisdirectionofwhichthereisnotice,isanadministrativedecisiontakenbytheU.S.S.R.MinistryforOilandGasIndustry.Intheearly1970sthisinstitutiondividedtheSovietpartoftheCaspianSeaintofourregionalsectors,oneforeachofthelittoralSocialistrepublics(Russia,Azerbaijan,KazakhstanandTurkmenistan). Inordertodothat,theMinistrysimplyutilizedthemedianlineprinciplebyextendinganequaldistancebetweenoppositecoastlinesuptothepointinwhichthetwoareasmeetinthemiddleoftheSea.Thissubdivisionhadapurelyadministrativecharacterandwasnotintendedtogiveanyexclusiverightofexploitationtoanyofthedifferentrepublics,atthattimeallmembersoftheUnion.AccordingtothelawoftheU.S.S.R.,indeed,allnaturalresources(hydrocarbonsincluded)wereofexclusivecompetenceoftheUnionand itscentralized institutions,whichmightthenhaveestablishedregionaladministrativedivisionsandsubdivisions,asthiswasthecase23.Allinall,thelooselegalframeworkcreatedbytheseveraltreatiesbetweentheU.S.S.R.andPersia(laterIran)didnotprovideasolidlegalfoundationforthedivisionofCaspianSearesourcesbetweentheriparianstatesnoritgaveanagreedupondefinitiononwhetherornotthelandlockedbodyofwaterwasconsideredlake,seaor“enclosedsea”bytheparties.Rather,thepre-1991seriesoftreatiesfocusedonestablishing theprincipleof thesea’sexclusivityandon regulatingfishery,navigationand tradeon itswaters24.AsnoticedbyDiPlacido,thetwocountries(U.S.S.R.andIran)appearedtohavecreatedanunofficialandunsanctionedcondominiumovertheresourcesoftheCaspianSea25.Yetitmustbestressedthatnotallscholars(letalonegovernments)agreeonthisinterpretationofthelegalbasiscreatedbySoviet-Iranianinternationalrelationsduringthe20thcentury.Regardless of themanypossible interpretations, there is nodoubt that theSoviet-Iranian international legal framework for the jointmanagement of the common body of water was largely non-formalised and incomplete. Furthermore the very same constitutionalstructureoftheSovietUnion,duetoitscentralisedcontrolonnaturalresourcesandthescarceautonomyenjoyedbyitsmemberstates,preventedthedevelopmentofatruebodyofinternationallaw.Bythesametoken,untilthegeopoliticalorderofthearearemainedstable,asithappenedduringtheColdWar,allpossibledisputearisingfromthisabsenceofregulationhadbeensilently(or,forbettersaying,administratively)solvedinsidetheSovietbloc.ItwasthesuddencollapseoftheU.S.S.R.in1991whichleftalegalvoidstillnegativelyaffectingtheregiontoday.

23.SeeKARBUZ(2010)24.SeeHAGHAYEGHI(2003)25.DIPLACIDO(2010),49.26.MAMEDOV(2002),21827.SeeDIPLACIDO(2010).28.MAMEDOV(2002),21929.MAMEDOV(2002),220

•3. The Downfall of the U.S.S.R. and theEmergence of a New Regional System (1991 - today)Thelongpeacethatcharacterizedtheareaforthemostpartofthe20thcenturycametoendwiththecollapseoftheU.S.S.R..Largelyunexpected,thisgeopoliticalshockhadalong-lastingimpactontheCaspianareaasmuchastheBolshevikRevolution.SincethebreakdownoftheSovietUnionfournewsubjectsofinternationallawhaveappearedontheshoresoftheCaspianSea:theRussianFederation,Turkmenistan,KazakhstanandAzerbaijan.Thesenewactorsimmediatelystartedtocompete(togetherwithIran)forthehydrocarbonresourcescontainedintheCaspianbasinbyunilaterallyclaimingpossessionoverarbitrarilydefinednationalmaritimeborders. As a consequence international relations in the region after the end of theSovietUnion became rather unstable, for newoverlappingmultilateralinterestscontributedtodismantletheold,fragileinternationallegalframework26.Onebyone,all riparianstates,except for theRussianFederation,declaredtheir intentionnot torecognisethebindingnatureof theSoviet-IraniancontractualbasiswithregardtotheCaspianSea.Apparently,thisactwentagainstwhatSovietUnion’ssuccessorstateshadjustdeclaredintheAlma-AtaProtocols(December1991)inwhichtheysubstantiallyreaffirmedthevalidityoftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinRespectofTreatiesof1978forwhatregardedtheirparticipationtotheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(C.S.I.)andtheirconsequentsuccessioninallthetreatiessignedbytheU.S.S.R.27.everyissueregardingthelandlockedbodyofwatertheyweretoshare:fromfisheryandenvironmentalprotectiontopartitionandborderdelimitation,everygovernmentappearedtohaveadifferentviewandtoproposeadifferentsolution.AsMamedovpointedout,intheearlynineties“all Caspian states accepted that an internationally accepted legal status of the Caspian Sea was not properly developed during the Soviet period, and to assume that it was developing was a wrong assumption”28.Nevertheless,theurgetofindadiplomaticsolutiontothecontestedlegalstatusoftheseawasstronglyfeltbyalllittoralstates,especiallyby theones, likeKazakhstanandAzerbaijan, thathadhugehydrocarbonsreservesnear theircoastanddesperatelyneededforeigninvestments to develop them. So, from 1992 onwards, a complexweb of both bilateral andmultilateral negotiations on the futuredefinitionofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSeastartedtotakeplaceamongthefivelittoralstates,withtheoccasionalinvolvementofotherexternalactors,notablytheU.S.,theE.U.andChina.Asamatterofclarity,insummingupalltheevents,conferences,roundtablesandnegotiationsthattookplaceoverthelasttwentyyearswewillherebyrefertothehistoricclassificationmadebyMamedovwhoclusteredthemintophases29.Inthenextparagraphs,wewillfocusontwooutofthreeofthem:thefirstone(1995-1999),characterizedbyinvestigation,acquaintanceandsearchafterreasonablesolutions,asMamedovputit;andthesecondone(1995-1999)inwhichlittoralstateseventuallymaturedtheirownnationalclaimsandpreferencesoverparticularinterpretationsoftheinternationallawapplicabletotheCaspianSea.

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a.The First Phase of Multilateral Negotiations (1991-1994)

AftertheinitialchaosanduncertaintygeneratedbytheSovietwithdrawalfromtheregion,littoralstatesandotherexternalactorsstartedtorealizethegeopoliticalimportancethatCaspian’shydrocarbonreserveswouldhaveinthenewworldorder.TheIslamicRepublicofIranwasthefirstonetoseektotakeadvantagefromtheregionalpowervoidandtoredrawtheCaspianSealegalframeworkinlinewithitsnationalinterest.MakingthemostoftheEconomicCooperationOrganisation(ECO)conference30,heldinTehraninFebruary1992,Iranproposedtheconstitutionofan“OrganisationoftheCaspianSea”inordertofosterregionalcooperationaimedatexploitingnaturalresources.InIran’sutterances,byjoiningtheECO,formerSovietrepublicsoftheCaspianshouldhavealsobecomepartofthisnewlyfoundedorganisationandTehranwasmorethanwillingtohostthenewlyfoundedorganization’sheadquarterswithinitsterritory.DespiteIranian’seffortstobringforwardtheideaofaCaspianStatesCooperationOrganization(OCSC),itsproposalwasturneddownbyAzerbaijanandKazakhstanwho“decided to work together in other directions”31.This,however,didnotpreventthetwostatesfromjoiningtheECOthefollowingfalltogetherwithTurkmenistan,andtomeetagaininTehranduringthesameyeartodiscusstheestablishmentofacommonlegalframeworkfortheCaspianSea.ThenumerousissuesonthetableatthisfirstCaspianSeaconferencespannedfromenvironmentalprotectionandborderdelimitation,tosecuritycooperationandlegalstatusdefinition.Byandlarge,duetothechaosfuelledbytheeventsof1989-1991,therewereveryfewaspectsalreadyregulated.Itwastheactualimplementationofacommonsolutiontothiswidespectrumofissues,ratherthantheissuesthemselves,thatformedthemainobjectofdiscussionattheconference:TehrancontinuedtopushforthecreationoftheOCSCwhileAzerbaijanproposed,forthefirsttime,toagreeaboutacommondefinitiononthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSea32.Bothproposalswereturneddownbyotherparticipanttotheconferenceand,fromthatmomenton,comprehensiveapproachestotheproblemsaffectingtheregionwereallsetaside.Thissetbacknotwithstanding,theissuebyissuenegotiationsthatfollowedallowedthepartiesatleasttofindconsensusonaseriesofjointactionprogramsregardingnaturalresourcesprotection,implementationofecologicalstandardsanddeterminationofsearoutes.Inadditiontothat,allstatesagreedtoorganisesixspecializedcommitteesinordertoaddresstheissuesoflegalstatus,economicdevelopment,navigation,scientificresearch,environmentalprotectionandhydrocarbonsexploitation.Ontheotherhand,onlythehydrocarbonscommittee(euphemisticallycalled‘committeeontheprotectionofbiologicalresources’)everactuallycameintofunction,mostlythankstoRussia’srenewedinteresttowardstheCaspianSeaanditsriches.Aftertheendoftheconference,thecommitteeofficiallyinvitedallriparianstatestomeetagainassoonaspossibleonthegroundsthatthe“protection of biological resources of the Caspian Sea was so important that it made necessary further discussion and resolution of the issue on a contractual legal basis”33.Henceforth, all participants to the secondTehran conferencemet again in 1993 at theintergovernmental forumon theuseandprotectionofbiological resourcesof theCaspianSeaheld in the IraniancityofRasht.Thisconferenceprovedapivotalmoment for international relations in the regionsince the irreconcilablenatureof thediverging nationalinterestsofthelittoralstates,appearedthenverycleartoallparticipantstotheconference.TheconferencehadstartedunderthebestauspiceswiththepresentationoftheplanpreviouslyelaboratedbytheCommitteeontheprotectionofbiologicalresourcesbutthediscussionofthedraftagreementsuddenlycametoanhaltwhenAzerbaijan’sproposaltodefinethestatusoftheCaspianSeaasa“boundarylake”(anddivideitaccordingly)wasutterlyrejectedbyRussiaandIran.Theproposalalsoreceiveda“coldwelcome”fromKazakhstan that agreedon theprinciplesbehind it but refused todiscuss the issueany further; the samedidTurkmenistanwhosedelegationdidnotrevealitsofficialpositiononthematter.AsecondAzerbaijaniproposaltointroduceinthedraftConventiontheprincipleofnationaldivisionofthenaturalresourcesoftheCaspianSeawasrejectedaswell,leavingnofurtherroomforreconciliation34.AtRasht,therefore,participantsnotonlyfailedtoreachanagreementonthelegalstatusofthesea,butclashedalsooverthegeneralprinciplestoagreeandthusdumpedthedraft.DespitethestalemateatRasht,riparianstatesdidnotgiveuptheideaofseekingacommondiplomaticsolutiontotheproblemoftheCaspianSea.TwoothermeetingswereputinplaceinAstrakhanandAshkabad,in1993.Bothmeetingshoweverendedupunsuccessfully.Eachmeetingappearedtohavemadethesituationworsebywideningthegapbetweenthedifferentpositions.ThegrowingdivergenceofopinionswasmadeclearduringtheMoscowsummitoftheSpecialrepresentativesoftheCaspianstatesinthefallof1994,wherethreedifferentdraftsonthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSeaweresubmittedtodiscussionbyAzerbaijan,KazakhstanandRussia35.TheKazakhstan’splanwouldcategorizetheCaspianSeaasaclosedseaandthereforeregulatedbythenormsofpositiveinternationallawandthe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS).Plainlyenough,hadthisoptionbeenadopted,itwouldhaverenderedanyspecialdelimitationagreementpointlesssincebordersontheenclosedseawouldhavebeendeterminedautomaticallybytheapplicationoftheUNCLOS.InadditionthedraftalsocontainedprovisionsthatdefinitelydeclaredalltheoldSoviet-Iraniantreatiesobsoleteandinactive.AzerbaijansubmittedagainitsplanforthedefinitionoftheCaspianSeaasa“boundarylake”andthereforetobeentirelydividedamonglittoralstatesintoterritorialwaterareas.ThesenationalsectorsweredefinedbyBakuas“partofwaterarea,bottomandbosom,adjoiningtothecoastalstateandbeinganintegralpartoftheCaspianstateterritorythatwaslimitedbyterritorialwaterboundaries”36.ThereforethedifferentnationalsectorsoftheCaspianSeawouldhaveconstitutedbyallmeansanintegralpartofeachlittoralstate’sterritory.DifferentlyfromtheUNCLOSsolution,thisarrangementwouldhaveleftthedelimitationofthenationalportionsoftheSeatothefreedeterminationofthelittoralstatesbybilateralandmultilateralagreements37.Russia,jointlywithIran,immediatelyrejectedthetwootherdrafts,refusedtodiscussthem,andpresentedadraftofitsowncontainingnodefinitionwhatsoeverofthestatusoftheCaspianSea.Article2oftheRussiandraftinfactleftthedeterminationofthelegalstatusof theSea toa“special Convention” tobeheld in the future38.According toMoscow,as longas littoralstateswouldnotagreeonacommon legaldefinitionwithin the “special Convention”, theprevious legal regime (Soviet-Iranian treaties)was tobeapplied.Thisaccommodation,welcomedbyIran,wasutterlyrejectedbyAzerbaijanandKazakhstan,fearingthat,byde factorefusingtoapplyanyparticularinternationallawregime,RussiaandIranwouldsplittheregionintolessrigidspheresofinfluence.Secondly,makingreferencetothepreviouslegalregimeoftheSoviet-IraniantreatieswouldimplytherecognitionoftheprincipleofcondominiumovertheresourcesoftheCaspianSea.AstheRussianplanwasrejectedthemeetingcametoanend,andsodidthefirsteffortstofindacommonlegaldefinitionofthestatusoftheCaspianSea.

30.ECOisanintergovernmentalcreatedbyIran,PakistanandTurkeyin1985withtheaimof“promotingeconomic,technicalandculturalcooperationamongtheMemberStates”.Forfurtherinformation,seetheofficialorganizationwebsitehttp://www.ecosecretariat.org/asretrievedonAprilthe10th2012.31.FromtheFinalCommuniquèoftheTeheranECOConferenceofFebruary1992,asquotedinMAMEDOV(2002),222.32.MAMEDOV(2002),222.33.MAMEDOV(2002),222.34.MAMEDOV(2002),223.35.MAMEDOV(2002),224.36.MAMEDOV(2002),226.37.Article4oftheAzerbaijaniproposal,asreportedinMAMEDOV(2002),22638.MAMEDOV(2002),227.

B.The Second Phase of Multilateral Negotiation (1995-1999)

Thefailureof theMoscowmeetingcoincidedwiththefirstarrivalof foreign investors intheregion. InSeptember1994thesocalled‘contractofthecentury’wassignedinAzerbaijan,inauguratinganewerafortheCaspianregion.Fromthatmomenton,thelegaldisputesonthestatusoftheCaspianSeaandtheownershipofitsresourcesbecameamatterofgreatinterestformanypowerfulexternalactors39.Sincethenegotiationshadbeenfosteredbyseveralexternalpressures(bothdirectandindirect)comingfromcountriessuchastheU.S.,Britain,TurkeyandFrance.AllofthemsharedaninterestinpromptingacleardefinitionforthelegalstatusoftheCaspiansea,andthereforeeventuallytookthesideofAzerbaijanandKazakhstanwithinthedispute40.Thisinvolvementinevitablyheatedthediplomaticsituationandprovokedinturnangeredreactions,especiallyonbehalfofRussia.OnDecember 5, 1994, theRussian ForeignMinistry sent anofficial note to theUNGeneralAssembly expressingdiscontent formanyviolationsofinternationallawcommittedbysomelittoralstates(AzerbaijanandKazakhstan),chargingthemofunilateralappropriationoftheCaspianSeafortheirownuse.DespitethisnoteofcomplainttotheGeneralAssembly,negotiationsproceededinthefollowingyearthroughagreatnumberofofficialmeetingsandconferences.Nevertheless,thedivideamongdifferentcoastalstatespointsofviewremainedunchangedand,incertaincases,mutualrelationshipsevenappearedtobeworsening.DuringtheconferenceheldinAlmaataintheSpringof1995,whosemainobjectwasdefiningtheinternationallegalstatusoftheCaspian,differentinterestsclashedwithayetunseenhostility.WhiletheAzerbaijaniwereinsistingontheirviewoftheCaspianasalake,andtheKazakhstanidelegationwasstillsustainingtheapplicationoftheUNCLOStoanenclosedsea,Russiandeputyforeignminister,AndreiChernishevdeclared: “Russia is against rough division of the Caspian Sea, when everyone hogs what he wants. We are against plunder of mineral resources of the Caspian Sea. The interests on the Caspian Sea are our interests. We are open to cooperation but on our terms. We are pitted against each other. Opportunities for achievement of compromise do persist, but we are against unilateral production on the Caspian Sea until the agreement of five states is reached. We have already felt a fear of imperial ambitions; we want to solve the problem fairly and according to conscience. If unilateral actions are accepted Russia will have an opportunity to take due measures should business go beyond the mark”.AlthoughthethreatsmadebyRussiaattheconferencehadnoconcreteconsequence,theyconfirmedonceandforallMoscow’scontrarietynotonlytowardsanynationalzonesdelimitationbutalsotowardsthealleged“unilateral production”intheCaspianSeaitself41.Moscow,supportedbyTehran, in factcontinuedto insistonthecondominiumsolutionwhichwouldgiveall riparianstatesanequalshareoftheSearesourcesregardlessfromtheirproximitytothecoastofone’sstate.NowonderAzerbaijanandKazakhstanrefusedtoabandontheirownpositionsinfavourofMoscow’sandtheconferenceendedupasanotherfiasco.TheonlysmallstepforwardmadeinAlmaatawastheformationofa“permanent negotiating mechanism on determination of the international legal status of the Caspian in the form of working groups”composedbyhighofficialsoftherespectiveriparianstategovernment42.Neverthelesseventhissmallresultsoonfailedtobringpositivediplomaticoutcomes:duringitsfirstmeetingthegroupenteredintoseriousconflictsincenobodyappearedwaspronetomakeanyconcessiononthelegalstatusissue.Thepartiescouldagreeononlyonething:theconsensusofallriparianstateswasneededinordertoapproveanymultilateralagreementonthestatusoftheCaspianSea.ThesecondmeetingofthegrouptookplaceinAlmaataafewmonthslater,withoutthepresenceoftheRussiandelegationwhichrefusedtoparticipateoutofdisappointmentfortheoutcomeofthepreviousmeeting.WithoutakeyparticipantandstillsufferingfromreciprocaldisagreementsthestatesinvolvedconcludedonlythatafinalagreementdefiningthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSeawouldhavebeencontainedinasingle“uniformed”documentelaboratedbythegroupinafuturemeeting.Nevertheless,inthefollowingmonthsthemeagreresultsoftheSeptembermeetingwerenotimplementedandthewhole“permanentworkinggroup”initiativewasunofficiallysuspendedsine die.Russia’sintransigentpositionattheAlmaataconferenceanditssubsequentrefusaltoparticipatetoothermeetingscertainlyplayedamajorpartinbringingmultilateralnegotiationstoadeadend.Ontheotherhandinthesummerof1995allriparianstateshadalreadyrealizedthat,withorwithoutRussia,anagreementamongthemwouldhavebeenimpossibletoreachanyway.SuchastalematewassanctionedbyAzerbaijanthat“having arrived at a conclusion of futility of its efforts to determine a new international legal status for the Caspian Sea”proceededunilaterallyinthedeterminationofitsownexclusivenationalsectoroftheSeaaccordingtotheboundarylakeprinciple43.Baku’sradicalmoveinitiallyprovokednegativereactionsfromallriparianstatesbutinthefollowingtwoyearsKazakhstanandTurkmenistantookasimilarstandand“appropriated”themselvesoftheirownexclusivezones44.Itishardlysurprisingthat,afteralltheeventsthattookplaceinthecourseof1995,diplomacylanguishedand,forsometime,wasunabletodoanythingbutacknowledgingthequickdeteriorationofthesituation.Inthewinterof1996,IrantriedonceagaintoputforwardtheideaofanorganisationoftheCaspianSeastatestosolvealleconomicandpoliticalproblemsoftheregionunderonecommonlegalframework.AccordingtoTeheran,infact,thisintergovernmentalorganisationwouldtakecontroloverall thehydrocarbonscontained intheCaspianbasinandadministeredthemfortheadvantageofall riparianstates.Needless to say, thisproposal for theconstitutionof an institutionalisedcondominiumof resourcesand jurisdictionover theCaspianSeawasstronglyopposedbytheotherriparianstatesuptothepointofrefusingeventodiscussitspossibleimplementation.Afterthislast(ratherdesperate)attempttofindacommonregionalsolutiontotheproblemoftheCaspianSea,riparianstatesdividedintotwomaingroupofinterest:oneformedbythosestateswhichsupportedthedivisionofthebodyofwaterintonationalsectors(eithertroughtheboundarylakeortheenclosedseasolution)andanotherformedbythosecountries–namelyRussiaandIran–thatsustainedtheideaofacondominium(eitherdefactoorinstitutionalised).ThetwogroupshardlycommunicatedbetweeneachotherandonlytheRepublicofTurkmenistanappearedtobeswingingbetweenthetwoextremes.

39.Asitwasalreadyduringthe19thandtheearly20thcenturywhentheBritishEmpiretriedtoincreaseitsinfluenceovertheregion.40.ChinaandtheE.U.willstarttoexerttheirinfluenceonlysomefewyearslater.41.MAMEDOV(2002),231.42.MAMEDOV(2002),232.43.MAMEDOV(2002),233.44.MAMEDOV(2002),243.

7

Inaddition,itmustbestressedthattheproblemofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSeahadalreadybecomeakeyglobalgeopoliticalissueand, inthesecondhalfofthedecade,non-Caspianpowersstartedtogetactively involved.AssuggestedbytheteamledbyCobyVanderLyndeinthereportStudy on Energy Security and Geopolitics45aswellasbySoligoandMyersJaffe46,thepresenceofhugehydrocarbonsreserveswithinthenationalterritoryofthreeformerSovietRepublicsoutsideofMoscow’spoliticalorbit(Azerbaijan,KazakhstanandTurkmenistan)inevitablyarousedtheattentionoftheU.S.andotherEuropeancountriesaswellasofprivateoilcompanies.Thegradualstabilizationoftheregionafterthechaosoftheearlynineties,togetherwithapartialreductionofbothPersianandRussianinfluenceovertheCaspianSeaduetothelegalstatus’dispute,providedtheWestagoodopportunitytointerveneinthearea.AresolutionoftheEUParliamentaryAssemblyof1997acknowledgedthevastamountofinvestmentsmadebyWesternoilcompaniesintheCaspianSeaduringthepreviousfewyearsandstressedouttheneedformorecoordinationbetweenprivatecompanies,theE.U.andlocalstateactors.TheE.U.therefore,afterhavingsentanumberofexpertsintheregionwithintheframeworkTechnicalAssistancetotheCIS(TACIS),implementedtheInterstateOilandGastoEurope(INOGATE)programmeintheCaspianarea47.Thelatterconsistsofaprogrammedesignedtosupportandfacilitatethedevelopmentoftheenergysectorinthetargetedcountriesbyprovidingtechnicalsupportandattractinginvestmentstowardsprojectsofcommonregional interestsuchaspipelines,refineriesandrenewedelectricitygrids.OperatingincloseconnectionwiththeU.S.andTurkey,theEuropeandiplomaticeffortaimedatestablishingasafeenergysupplycorridorbetween theCaspianSeaand theMediterranean.Thiswaspartiallyachievedby theUnionand itspartnersadecade laterwith theconstructionoftheBaku-Tbilisi-CeyhanandtheBaku-Tbilisi-Erzerumpipelines.Theconstructionofthetwopipelines,however,wastheresultofalongandcomplexmultilateraldiplomaticprocesswhichinvolvedmanydifferentinternationalactorsrangingfromtheEuropeanCommissiontotheU.S.,OECDandTurkeyplusalltheCaspianlittoralstateswiththeexceptionofRussiaandIran.ThisprocessisstillongoinganditsbroaderaimshavebeendescribedinadeclarationoftheCouncilofEuropeas“to overcome the remaining obstacles to … cooperation and to reach an overall agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, as well as on the division of the Caspian seabed and the rights of exploitation of energy resources; to improve legal and regulatory regimes and to ensure transparent state administrations in order to encourage investment, enhanced competition and energy efficiency; to reduce political tensions between them (the countries in the Caspian Sea Region) that delay the construction of transportation routes for oil and gas to international markets”48.Besides itsgeopolitical implications, thearrivalon thesceneofexternalactorshad theeffectofbolsteringdiplomaticactivityon thedefinitionofthesealegalstatus:havinglanguishedfortwoyearsafterthefailureofdirectmultilateraltalksin1995,negotiationsspeededuponabilateralbasis.AftertheunilateraldelimitationofanationalsectorbyAzerbaijanhowever,itwasonlyamatteroftimebeforeallotherstatesrecognizedthedefactosubdivisionoftheseaintoexclusivezonesandproceededaccordingly.OnJuly6,1998,RussiaandKazakhstanconcludedabilateralagreementthatsanctionedthedivisionofthenorthernCaspianbasin(anditshugereservesofhydrocarbons)intotwodistinctnationalsectors.ThisagreementwasnotwelcomedbyTehran,whointerpretedithasanimplicitabandonmentbyMoscowoftheprincipleofcondominiumovertheCaspianSea.InaconferenceoftheCaspianstatesheldinMoscowinDecember1998(threeyearsafterthepreviousone),thedisagreementbetweenIranandRussiasurfacedand,attheend,Tehranfounditselfisolatedindefendingtheideaofcondominium,whenMoscowagreedonsigningthefinaldeclarationoftheconferenceinwhichalllittoralstates(exceptforIran)recognizedthenecessityofadivisionoftheCaspianSea.Russia’ssuddenchangeofplanswasadirectconsequenceofboththeAzerbaijanunilateraldelimitationof1995andinterferencebythirdparties.AsMamedovputit,“having realized that Russia was left behind in opportunities of oil transportation, as some Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) began to realise projects bypassing Russia, Russia was compelled to refuse the concept of condominium and recognize what it did not wish: sectional division of the Caspian Sea49”.TheearthquakeprovokedbyRussia’s(apparent)shift forcedIrantochangeitsposition inordernottoremaincompletely isolatedashappenedat thepreviousMoscowsummit.Thenew Iranianpositionwasofficiallypresentedat the InternationalConferenceon theCaspianSeaheldinTeheraninJune1999.AccordingtotheIslamicRepublic,theCaspianSeawastobeconsideredneitherseanorlakebuttobedividedintofiveidenticalparts(sothateachstatewouldpossess20%oftheseasurface).Theproposalwasobviouslyrejectedattheconferencebutotherriparianstatessustainedthat,bymakingit,evenIranimplicitlyrecognizedthepartitiondefactooftheCaspianSea.Onthatregard,thethenMinisterofForeignAffairsrepliedthat“On the issue of the Caspian Sea regime, Iran considers that new legal status of the Caspian sea should be made out and accepted unanimously with all coastal countries. While there is no new legal regime, the old one should stand in force (i.e. the Soviet-Iranian regime). Any unilateral and unreasonable exploitation of the Caspian Sea, considering its uniqueness will not be recognised by us before acceptance of the new legal status, as all resources of this sea, before definition of a new legal regime, belong to all coastal states50”.Allinall,eventhe1999Tehranconferencefailedinbringingriparianstates’reciprocalpositioncloser.DelegationslefttheIraniancapitalwithouthavingchangedtheirmindsregardingthedefinitionoftheCaspianSeaandwithouthavingreachedanyotherminoragreementthatcouldhavebroughttheprocessforward.Afterthisconferencethemultilateralnegotiationscometoanotherhalt,therebyendingthesecondphaseofnegotiations(1995-1999).

45.SeeAA.VV.(2004).46.SeeSOLIGO,JAFFE(1998).47.Atthemomentofwriting(2012)INOGATEincludesallCaspianriparianstatesexceptforRussiaandIran.TogetherwithINOGATE,theE.U.Implementedothernon-energyrelatedprogrammesinthearealiketheTRACECA.48.COUNCILOFEUROPE(2002).TheVanDerLyndeReportgivesalsoaninterpretationoftheU.S.policygoalsvis-à-visthisdiplomaticprocess:“...the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey (AGT) pipeline system has been the most likely project as the US aims to get Central Asian countries away from Russian influence and isolate Iran. At the same time the AGT would bring to the Eastern Me 49. MAMEDOV (2002), 243.50. Declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, K. Kharrazi, as reported in MAMEDOV (2002), 245.diterrranean a supply of oil that is non-OPEC, non-Arab, and from secularised Muslim”.InAA.VV(2004),175.

8

C.The Last Decade of Negotiations (1999-PRESENT)

TheCaspianregionduringthe1990sstilllackedacoherentinternationallegalframework.Thefailuretoreachamultilateralagreementbetweenthefiveriparianstatespavedthewaytobilateraltreatiesandunilateralmoves.Yet,inthisapparentlychaoticsituation,someprogresseshavebeenmade.Thedecadestartedwith the rise topowerofVladimirPutinwho renewedRussia’seffort tosolve theCaspianSea issue throughamultilateralagreement51.Thiseffort,soonabandoneddue toother riparianstates’disagreements,signalled the importantchangeofview(or,bettertosay,ofstrategy)whichhadbeentakingplaceinMoscowsincethe1998agreementwithKazakhstan,dubbed“OndifferentiationoftheNorthernPartoftheCaspianSeawiththePurposesofRealisationoftheSovereignRightstotheBosom”.Moscow’snewpositionwasasortofpragmaticcompromisebetweenthecondominiumideaandthepartitionofthesea’snaturalresources.Initsagreementproposaltotheotherstatesin2000,Russiaarguedthat“the Caspian Sea should be divided into national sectors, which are fixed to the appropriate coastal states. The surface of the Caspian Sea remains in the common usage, only the bottom is divided into national sectors52”.To this proposal however,which acknowledged the principle of partition into national sectors, Russia added another point therebysuggestingthatdisputableoilandgasdepositsshouldbesharedona50/50basisamongthecontestants.Consideringthenumberandtheimportanceofdisputedhydrocarbondepositsatthattime,littlewonderthattheRussianproposalwasnotwelcomedbyotherriparianstates.Curiouslyenough,thepragmaticcompromiseproposedbyMoscoweventuallyupsetthesupportersofcondominiumnolessthanthosewhochampionedacompletepartitionofthesea.IndeedIrancontinuedtosustaintheideaofatotalcondominiumovertheCaspianSeawithrenewedstrengthandrefusedtodiscussanysubdivisionoftheseaassuch53.Turkmenistaninsistedthat,untilasummitofallriparianstateswoulddecideforalegaldefinitionoftheSea,Ashgabatwouldnotagreeonanypartitionofsort,andKazakhstanadvanceditsproposalonthepartitionoftheCaspianintodifferentexclusiveeconomiczonesequidistantfromthecoast.Despitethefailuretorevivemultilateraltalks,Moscow’seffortsbroughttothesignatureofanimportantbilateralagreementwithAzerbaijanin2001.InthelineofthatsignedwithKazakhstanthreeyearsbefore,theagreementof2001aimedatdividingtheseabedbetweenthetwocountriesaccordingtothemedianlineprinciplemoderatedbytheapplicationoftheprincipleofequity54.TheseabeddelimitationagreementbetweenRussiaandAzerbaijanmarkedamajorturningpoint:withitssignaturethenorthernCaspianSeafinallyhada(quasi)coherentlegalframeworkofbilateralagreementsregulatingresourceexploitationandpartitionoftheseabed.Incombinationwiththe1998agreementbetweenRussiaandKazakhstanandanothersimilarpartitionagreementsignedbetweenthelatterandAzerbaijan,the2001agreementeffectivelysanctionedthepartitionof66%oftheCaspianseabedamongthreelittoralstates55.However, being the result of a series of bilateral agreements, such a partition lacked the strength of a comprehensivemultilateralagreement,especiallyconsideringthatonlythreeoutoffiveriparianstatesagreedtoit.Secondly,thethreeseparateagreementsprovidedonlyadivisionoftheseabedbutweresilentonalltherest.Inparticular,noneoftheagreementsoutlinedadefinitionofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSea.Inotherwords,theyrepresentedapragmaticsolutiontopracticalproblems(ownershipofhydrocarbonsfields)butavoidedanylong-termsettlementoftheentireCaspianSeaissue.DuringavisittoMoscowin2004,Azerbaijan’sPresidentdeclaredthatthecurrentlegalframeworkcoveringthenorthernhalfofthesea“must form the basis of a comprehensive treaty on the Caspian56”.Inrealitynocomprehensivetreatywasevertofollowthesebilateralagreements.Inthesameyear,riparianstatesclashedagainontheissueofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSeaandtherightofriparianstatestobuildpipelinesthroughtheirnationalsections.Thiseventwastriggeredbytheprojectedattemptofaprivateconsortium(backedbytheU.S.andtheE.U.)ofconstructingagaspipelinethroughtheCaspianSeafromTurkmenistantoAzerbaijan57.RussiaandIran,bothstronglyopposingtheideaoftrans-Caspianpipelinesforobviousgeopoliticalreasons,raisedtheissueduringmultilateralnegotiationsonaCaspianSeaConventioninMarch200458.Morespecifically,Russiapointedoutthat,duetoseriousenvironmentalconcernsandtheparticularseismologyofthearea,nopipelineshouldhavebeenbuiltwithouttheconsensusofallcoastalstatesandbeforetheissueofthelegalstatusoftheCaspianhadbeensolvedonceandforall59.Allotherriparianstates(Turkmenistanincluded)disagreedwiththisview,buttheyfailedtoreachacompromisewithMoscowandTehranonthepoint,leavinganotherimportantobstacleonthepathtoamultilateralagreement60.SubsequentnegotiationsonadrafttoaconventiononthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSealanguishedinamyriadofconferencesandinter-governmentalmeetingsthatmadeevenplainerthedifferencesamongriparianstates’positions.So,atthe15thmeetingoftheforeignministersoftheCaspianstatesheldinMoscowonOctober26thand27th2004,negotiationscametoastalemateonceagain,thistimeduetotheAzeri-Turkmendisputeovertheirrespectiveportionsofthesea61.TheclashbetweenAzerbaijanandTurkmenistanwascausedbythelatter’sofficialsupporttotheIranianproposalofdividingtheCaspianSea intoequalparts (20%of thebottom toeachcoastal state).Thiswouldhaveextended the Iraniancontrolledzonesomeeightykilometres beyond the historical Astara–Gasan Kuli line to include the Alov, Araz and Sharg oil deposits, at that time exploited byan international consortiumunderaproductionsharingagreement (PSA)with theAzeri government.Furthermore,under the Iranianproposal,TurkmenistantoowouldhaveextendeditsownpartoftheseatocoverpartoftheSharg(namedAltyn-AsyrdepositinTurkmendocuments)aswellastheimmenseChiragandAzerifield(namedOsmanandKhazardepositsinTurkmendocuments)currentlyunderBaku’sinfluence.ThisproposalwasindeedunacceptableforAzerbaijan62andsubstantiallybroughtanendtothenegotiationsthatafterthisdiplomaticfailureremainedvirtuallysuspendedformorethanthreeyears63.

51.MAMEDOV(2002)52.AsreportedbyMamedovinMAMEDOV(2002),247.53.ThisevenifTeheranhadpreviouslyadvancedaproposalforapartitiononanequalbasisoftheCaspianSea(20%ofitssurfacetoeachriparianstate).54.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004a).55.Asoftoday,Kazakhstanowns29%ofthesea’sbottom,Azerbaijan19%andRussia18%.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004a).56.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004a).57.Forthegeopoliticalimplicationsoftheprojectedtrans-CaspianpipelineseeFISHELSON(2007).58.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004b).59.In2004ViktorKalyuzhny,Russia’DeputyMinisterofForeignAffairsdeclared“The Caspian is a unique reservoir, and whatever man-caused accident there may bring a huge disaster. Russia has always been stressing the point. Meanwhile, none of the Caspian countries has sufficient technical opportunities to cope with whatever emergency single-handed”. RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004March).SeealsoRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004c).60.RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004b).61.RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004d)62.NoritwaswelcomedinKazakhstanandRussia.TurkmenistanhoweverlaterstoppedtosupporttheIranianproposalwhenitwasreleasedthat,accordingtothesameprinciple,IrancouldhaveadvancedclaimsoverTurkmenoffshoregasdeposits.63.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004d) 9

DuringthatperiodthelegalstatusoftheCaspianSea,thoughalwaysanimportantissueintheinternationalagendaoftheregion,wastemporarilyleftasideintheeventofothercrisisliketheintensificationoftheAfghanwar,thedeathofTurkmenistan’sdictatorTurkmenbashiand,ofcourse,Iran’srenewednuclearambitions.RiparianstatesstartedtodiscussthelegalstatusissueagainattheCaspianstatesconferenceofOctober2007,onlytofindoutthatnothinghadchangedandthattheconditionstoreachanagreementwerenotinplace.Duringthesummit,VladimirPutindeclaredthatthe(loosed)legalframeworkoftheNorthernpartoftheseashallbeextendedtothesouthsince“to reach an agreement on delimiting the seabed for mineral use, there is no need to wait for a convention to be drawn upon its legal status”.InfurtherexplainingRussianpositionheassertedthatthemoreoftheCaspianSeawastobelefttothecommonuseofthefivelittoralstatesthebetterandthat,ingeneralterms,thesea“should not be covered by numerous borders, sectors and exclusive zones65”.Thisapparentlyincoherentdeclarationcanbeexplainedonlyifweconsider,asMoscowactuallydoes,thedelimitationagreementsoftheNorthernpartoftheseaasrelatingonlytomineralresourcesandnottobordersor“proper”economiczonesperse.Inotherwords,accordingtoRussia,existingnationalsectorsshoulddelimitoffshorehydrocarbonfields’ownershipandnothingmore,inasimilarwaytotheadministrativepartitionoftheseaactuatedbytheMinistryofOilandGasIndustryoftheU.S.S.R.intheearly1970s65.Intheend,theconferenceofOctober2007failedatrevivingnegotiationsovertheCaspiansealegalstatusandriparianstatescouldagreeonlyonacommondeclarationto“repelallaggressors”,inwhichthefivecountriesconfirmedthattheywouldnothaveallowedothercountriestousetheirterritoriesforactsofaggression(orothermilitaryoperations)againsttheotherriparianstates66.Afterthisfurthersetbackinmultilateraltalks,realnegotiationsremainedconfinedtothebilateraldimensionforsomemoreyears,whichsaw intensetalks (though insofarunsuccessful) betweenAzerbaijanandTurkmenistanforthedelimitationof therespectivenationalzonesandtheconstructionofthetrans-Caspianpipeline67.In2010RussianPresidentMedvedevcalledforarenewedeffortbyallriparianstatestoreachadefinitiveagreementoverthecommonbodyofwaterthat,startingfromthelegalstatus,coulddefineallissues,fromenvironmentalprotectiontomaritimeborderdelimitation.From that moment on negotiations appeared to have proceeded at an increased pace but, since then, many public declarationsnotwithstanding,noconcreteresulthasbeenachievedandtheCaspianSealegalstatusstillremainsundefined.

64.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2007)65.SeeKARBUZ(2010).66.Thisonemaywellhavebeentherealobjectiveofthesummit.RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(October2007).67.SeeFISHELSON(2007).68.SeeRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2010).

CONCLUSIONSThethirdphaseofnegotiations(from2000tothepresent)hasbeengenerallycharacterizedbythesamedegreeofantagonismamonglittoralstatesseensincetheearlyninetiesand,insofar,hasfailedtobringtheperspectiveofamultilateralagreementanycloser.Thelegalframeworkthathasbeenslowlyemergingsincethe1990sisacomplexpatchworkofbilateralagreements,unilateraldeclarationsandtacitunderstandings.Interestinglyenough,whilethepreviouslegalframeworkgeneratedbytheSoviet-Iraniantreaties(1921-1940)mayhaveappearedasacondominiumdefacto,whatemergedafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnionisatacitpartitionoftheCaspianSea.From1991topresentday,littoralstateshavefailedingivingthebodyofwateranorganizedlegalframeworkwithacommonsetofrules.Instead,divisionsamongthemgrewandconsolidatedduringthisperiod, thusdeepeningoneof themostrelevant international lawdisputeofourtime.

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BIBLIOGRAPHYAA.VV,(2004),StudyonEnergySupplySecurityandGeopolitics,InstituteforInternationalRelationsClingendael,TheHague,availablefrom:http://www.nog.se/files/EU_energy_strategy_2004.pdf

ASRIYAN,V.(2003),“TheCaspian:ASeaofCooperationoranAppleofDiscord?”,RIANovosti,July23.

COUNCILOFEUROPE(2002),EuropeandtheDevelopmentofEnergyResourcesintheCaspianSeaRegion,ParliamentaryAssembly,Doc9635,12December,availablefrom:http://assembly.coe.int/documents/workingdocs/doc02/edoc9635.htm

DANIEL,E.L.(2001),“GolestanTreaty”,inEnciclopoediaIranica,London,availablefrom:http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/golestan-treaty

DIPLACIDO,L.(2010),“IlBacinodelMarCaspio,SituazioniTendenzeeCriticitànelcuoreenergeticodell’Eurasia”inRivistaMarittima,March2010,availablefrom:http://www.marina.difesa.it/documentazione/editoria/marivista/Documents/2010/03_mar/DiPlacido.pdf

FISHELSON,J.(2007),“FromtheSilkRoadtoChevron:TheGeopoliticsofOilPipelinesinCentralAsia”,TheJournalofRussianandAsianStudies,availablefrom:http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia

HAGHAYEGHI,M.(2003),“TheComingofConflicttotheCaspianSea”inProblemsofPost-Communism,vol.50,no.3,May/June2003,32-41.

KARBUZ,S.(2010),“TheCaspianUnsettledLegalFramework:EnergySecurityImplications”inJournalofEnergySecurity,May2010,available from: http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=244:the-caspians-unsettled-legal-framework-energy-security-implications&catid=106:energysecuritycontent0510&Itemid=361MAMEDOV, R. F. (2000), “International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in its Historical Development” in The Turkish Yearbook ofInternationalRelations,vol.XXX,Ankara,availablefrom:http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/670/8530.pdfMAMEDOV,R.F. (2002), “InternationalLegalStatusof theCaspianSea: IssuesofTheoryandPractice” inTheTurkishYearbookofInternationalRelations,Vol.XXXII,Ankara,availablefrom:http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/672/8561.pdf

MAMEDOVA,N.M(2009),“Iranian-SovietRelations(1917-1991)”inEnciclopediaIranica,availablefrom:http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/russia-ii-iranian-soviet-relations-1917-1991

MIRBABAYEV,M.(2010),ConciseHistoryofAzerbaijaniOil,SOCAR,Baku.RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004a),“AzerbaijanPresidentBacksIdeatoDivideCaspianintoSectors”,RIANovosti,Moscow,05February,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040205/39906918.html

RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004b),“AdHocTeamFailstoSettleCaspianPipelineDifferences”,RIANovosti,Moscow,17March,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040317/39911164.html

RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004c),“RussiaObjectstoPipelinesBeingBuiltAcrossCaspianSeabed”,RIANovosti,Moscow,05April,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040405/39913104.htmlRUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWAGENCY(2004d),“TehranTriestoGainBaku’sSupportonCaspianSea”,RIANovosti,Moscow,24May,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040524/39916892.html

RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2004e),“FinalizingtheCaspianSea’sLegalStatus”,RIANovosti,Moscow,26October,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20041026/39771990.html

RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2007),“PutinCallsforSharedUseofMostoftheCaspianSea”,RIANovosti,Moscow,16October,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071016/84133969.html

RUSSIANINTERNATIONALNEWSAGENCY(2010),“MedvedevCallsforQuickAgreementonCaspianSeaLegalStatus”,RIANovosti,Moscow,18November,availablefrom:http://en.rian.ru/world/20101118/161394961.html

SOLIGO,R.,JAFFE,A.M.(1998),TheEconomicsofPipelineRoutes:TheConundrumofOilExportsfromtheCaspianBasin,Institutefor Public Policy, Rice University, available from: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/the-economics-of-pipeline-routes-the-conundrum-of-oil-exports-from-the-caspian-basin

ZONN,A.,KOSTIANOY,KOSAREV,A.,GLANTZ,M. (2010),TheCaspianSeaEncyclopedia,SpringerVerlag,Berlin.

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CREDiTSCOS’E` ECESA?

ECESA Occasional Paper n.2Inserto online del quotidiano Equilibri.netRegistrazione presso il Tribunale di Firenze del 19 Gennaio 2004 numero 5320 Tutti i diritti riservati: è permesso l’uso personale deicontenuti pubblicati da Equilibri.net solo a fini noncommerciali. L’utilizzo commerciale, la riproduzione, lapubblicazione e la distribuzione può avvenire solo

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Ladisponibilitàdifornitureenergeticherappresentaunacondizionesine-qua-nonperognitipodisocietàcomplessaelalorosicurezzaèdasempreunadelleprioritàdigovernieistituzionipolitiche.

Negliultimianni,lacrescentedipendenzadeitradizionaliconsumatorioccidentalidafornitureesterneel’integrazionenelsistemaproduttivoglobaledieconomieemergentiassetatedibenessereerisorsehannocreatofortipressionisulsistemadiproduzione,distribuzioneeconsumodienergiaalivelloglobale.Talipressionirappresentanounadellequestionidecisivedelventunesimosecolo:nell’attualecontestodiespansioneeconomicaedemograficasaràinfattiestremamentecomplessogarantireapprovvigionamentisicuriecompetitivisenzascatenareconflittiperilcontrollodirisorsescarseodanneggiareirrimediabilmentegliequilibriambientalidelpianeta.

Ciòhaportatolequestionienergetichealcentrodellerelazioniinternazionalicontemporaneeelalorocomprensioneèdivenutafondamentaleperunacorrettainterpretazionedelledinamichepoliticheglobali.

DaquestaideanasceloEuropean Center for Energy Security Analysis (ECESA).Fondatonelfebbraio2010comepartediEquilibri.net,thinktankdeditoallostudioeall'analisideglieventiedelledinamicheinternazionali,ECESAèunosservatorioindipendentechepuòfareaffidamentosuun'estesaretedistudiosi,analistieprofessionistinelcampodellerelazioniinternazionaliechesiavvaledellacollaborazionedelmondodell'università,dellaricercaedell’industria.

Cercandodisuperareschemipredefinitieparadigmidisciplinari,ECESAsiproponedipromuovereedivulgareanalisiliberedapregiudiziideologiciologichepartigianechefavoriscanoladiffusionediunaconsapevolezzacircaledimensionipoliticheedeconomichedellequestionienergetichecontemporanee.

IllavorodiECESAsiarticolaattornoaquattrodiretticiprincipali,lacuicomprensioneeintegrazioneènecessariaadunacorrettainterpretazionedegliaffarienergeticieperlaformulazionedipoliticheadeguate.

Paesi produttori.L’inevitabiledipendenzadaimportazionirendelostudiodellecomplessedinamicheinterneaipaesiproduttori,spessoinstabilioapertamenteostili,unfattorefondamentalechevanisognid’indipendenzaenergeticanonpotrannoeliminare.

Industria.Purrappresentandounacomponentedecisivanelfunzionamentodellesocietà,ilsettoreenergeticoèdominatodagrandiattoriindustriali,ilcuiknow-howtecnicoefinanziariorappresentaun'insostituibilerisorsapersoddisfareifabbisognienergeticialivelliglobale.

Processi di decision-making.Dallenormativealivellolocaleallepletoricheconferenzedell’UNFCC,passandoperleautoritànazionalieledirettivedellaCommissioneEuropea,l’energiaèunsettoreincuiregoleeleggisvolgonounruolodecisivo.

Sviluppi tecnologici.Spessoignoratidaanalistiedecisoriperpocalungimiranzaeoggettivacomplessità,essihannopiùvolterivoluzionatolequestionienergeticheeillororuolosaràsicuramentedecisivonell’affrontarelesfidedelfuturo.

Matteo Monti-CoordinatoreECESALaurea Triennale in Relazioni Internazionali presso l’Universitàdi Pavia, ha studiato all’IEP de Bordeaux e si sta specializzandoalla School of International Studies di Trento. Ha collaboratocon l’Italian Center for Turkish Studies, con Equilibri.net e con Geopolitica.info, nonché con l’Ambascita Italiana in Marocco.

Federico Formentini-Gruppod’AnalisiECESALaureato in Scienze Giuridiche all’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano e specializzando in Studi Europei ed Internazionali presso la School of International Studies di Trento, ha frequentato corsi di specializzazione sull'industria degli idrocarburi presso l'Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy ed ha collaborato con le trading companies VartegEnergy e Trans-Oil S.A. entrambe con sede a Ginevra. Per ECESA si occupa di geopolitica energetica dell’Asia Centrale.

Tommaso Milani -Gruppod’AnalisiECESALaurea in Scienze Politiche presso la LUISS Guido Carlidi Roma, è attualmente specializzando in Studi Europeie Internazionali presso la School of International Studiesdi Trento. Ha frequentato corsi presso l’Istituto di Studi di PoliticaInternazionale (I.S.P.I.), area European Affairs, e l’Alta Scuola diEconomia e Relazioni Internazionali (A.S.E.R.I) di Milano.

Antonio G. Luzzi -Gruppod’AnalisiECESALaureato in Scienze Politiche e Relazioni Internazionali all’Università Roma Tre, con esperienze all’Università di Liegi in Belgio. In seguito, ha conseguito il Master in Studi Europei presso il Collegio d’Europa di Bruges, promozione Marco Aurelio, con una tesi sulla Politica Energetica dell’Ue nel Mediterraneo. Esperto di politica estera dell’Unione europea e delle politiche di vicinato, tra le sue aree d’interesse figurano le questioni mediorientali contemporanee, la sicurezza internazionale e le dinamiche della diplomazia multilaterale.Dopo aver lavorato al Parlamento europeo, collabora attualmente presso il Segretariato Generale dell’Interpol a Lione, dove si occupa di terrorismo internazionale. Collabora con ECESA-Equilibri dall’ottobre 2010.

Nicolò Rossett o-Gruppod’AnalisiECESADottorando in Economia, Diritto e Istituzioni presso lo Iuss di Pavia, si occupa di aspetti economici e di regolazione dei mercati energetici. In precedenza si è laureato prima in Scienze Politiche e poi in Economia, Politica e Istituzioni Internazionali presso l’Università di Pavia. Ha svolto uno scambio Erasmus presso l’Università di Warwick (UK). Alunno del Collegio Borromeo, i suoi campi d’interesse si estendono alla politica europea e alla teoria economica. A livello non accademico ha avuto esperienze lavorative presso il Ministero dell’Economia e la Rappresentanza a Bruxelles della regione Veneto.