2nc- new

2nc – interpretationOur interpretation is that surveillance is the human agent intervention in data analysis

That’s Bennett ‘13

2nc- limitsThe impact is limits

They explode the topic allows for…

- Any infinite number of transparency measures - Any number of infinite reforms like FISC judge term lengths, publicizing

trials- Or any number of thousands of data reforms and collection changes

The impact is fairness – it ensures a meaningful debate by creating rigorous tests off affirmatives through creation of specific strategies and better advocacy skills from equal argumentation.

You prefer our interpretation, still allows for sufficient aff ground-

- Data mining affirmatives - Physical surveillance affirmatives allow for FBI wiretapping, stopping human

reading of emails, text messages, etc which access all of the core of the topic arguments

2nc- at: Ball (ci)They don’t meet their counter interpretation- Balls defines categorization of information as surveillance – he separates storage and collection of data as a different process.

2nc- extra tGroup all the extra t- arguments

It’s a voter- severing out doesn’t solve -

1) No neg ground- Allows changes to surveillance frameworks prior to analysis which non-uniques disads, counterplans, and neg offense

1) Impossible Neg rounds- makes the 2nr spend 2 mins to win T and then go for independent substance

2) Bad Model- Incentivizes affs to add extra topical plans to skew the 2nr

Potential abuse is a voter – t is about the model of debate we create, if they create a bad model, they should lose

At: counterplan outCounter-planning out is worse-

Skews strategy- constrains neg strategy to net benefits for the particular counterplan- gets rid of USFG based disads

Gives aff offense- allows the aff to go for theory in every round by forcing conditional options

At: reasonabilityReasonability is bad – default to competing interpretations

1) Not reasonable- that was the limits debate 2) It’s arbitrary---there’s no bright line to what’s reasonably topical, which

judge intervention when norms should generate from debaters3) It’s inevitable---you wouldn’t vote on a “reasonable no link” to a DA---it

logically doesn’t make sense for the game

No race to the bottom – we still have to win our interpretation is meaningfully debatable which checks abuse

Condo

Condo- 1 k 1 cpCondo is good—

Counter interpretation:

1K and 1 CP- still test with multiple mindsets but stops infinite conditional off case positions

1. Ideological box in: Forces the aff to defend their plan from both sides of the political spectrum simultaneous preventing going too far in either direction

2. Pedagogy of Paradox: analyzing and synthesizing solutions when working through contradictions is beneficial

3. Argument innovation: While condo may allow weaker arguments, it incentivizes new strategies we wouldn’t be willing to introduce without knowing in round interactions

4. Info Processing: School and the workplace overloads us with information, it is valuable to practice processing this

5. Skew’s inevitable- we could’ve read more Das or T violations, some teams will be faster6. Judge is a referee: should decide whether a debate was fair enough to occur 7. Reject the argument not the team

K

*2nc- legalism turn If the government is truly bigoted then racist practices will continue despite a warrant – 3 reasons

- The FISC approves 99.97% of applications, and is a rubber stamp on practically all prejudiced ones- The two-hop law allows officials to target relationships with Arab-Americans post-warrant- EO 12 triple 3 from bigoted investigations on foreign subjects

Vote neg on presumption because if you are right the government is intrinsically inclined to be prejudice, then the government will find ways to do so without a convoluted surveillance structure. That’s Kumar and Kundani

(IF A TURN) This disrupts any of the current anti-surveillance, grassroots movements like the Domain Awareness Center which funded because of Social Protests in California or the LAPD unit that would have monitored based off of racial and religious identities was shut down after campaigns against it . That’s Kumar & Kundnani ‘15

Privacy

*2nc- utilPrefer consequentialism- The aff’s moral absolutism prevents political effectiveness as policy makers are stuck in endless questioning on whether they might engage in privacy violations. This prevents any passage of further reforms on surveillance that could later assist in preserving privacy.

That’s Isaacs 02

We still win under their framework- a (INSERT IMPACT) would cause massive suffering, paranoia, emotional trauma, and ostrcization of the contagious which should still be avoided.

*2nc- security framing You should default to security framing-

1) Rights aren’t absolute- Privacy is not a guaranteed when it comes into conflict with another right like the right to life, the only way to resolve these tensions is to analyze the context of the issue and possible outcomes of either side. That’s Himma 7

2) *Collective Security outweighs personal security because it entails the personal interest of many people, each of whom matter.

Himma ‘7Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458

As it turns out, the concept of security is ambiguous as between two interpretations. My interest in personal security extends no

further than my having an interest in my own security. Accordingly, my interest in personal security is concerned with my being protected from violent acts of assault and theft, but is indifferent with respect to

other people being protected from such acts. My interest in collective security is an interest I

have in the continuing existence of the social group I inhabit as providing an environment in which I and other people are free from the threats of violence and theft, and hence, which provides necessary, though not sufficient, prerequisites for the possibility of leading a meaningful human life. My interest in “national security,” of course, is an interest in collective security—in particular, an interest in the continuing existence of the national group to which I belong. There is, of course, an obvious relation between the two: if I live in a society that lacks collective security, then it is highly probable that I will also lack personal security. If people everywhere are rioting, then my individual, or personal, well-being is threatened—to some extent—even if I am sitting at home with all the doors bolted shut. If I feel I have to sit in a “safe room” to escape the direct threat to my security, then I am no longer leading a meaningful, flourishing life. For all practical purposes, my life is organized

around defending myself from attacks on my life—surely not a desirable state of affairs for any practically rational being. It might be that some persons are so selfish that they care about collective security only insofar as it impacts their own security, but I would be surprised—at the risk of overestimating the capacity for human empathy—if this were generally true. There is no doubt that there are many people with pathological psychological conditions who care only about their own interests and would hence care about collective security only because it bears on their personal security; for these people, the interests of other people count for nothing. But most people who share a communal life with us in society form social bonds—bonds that extend to people we have never met in virtue of their being a member of the same tribe or community. Although the empathetic bonds extended to those solely in virtue of tribe membership will be considerably weaker than those extended in virtue of the development of mutually satisfying personal relationships, they are significant bonds. Most of us who watched the floodwaters rise on people clinging for life on their roofs in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina cared

very deeply about what was happening to them. We care, of course, about our own security, but we also care a great deal about the security of our community—and not just because it bears on our safety and security. I believe that morality protects some of these interests in collective and personal security to such an extent that they rise to the level of a right. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear how to draw the line between those interests not covered by a right to security and those interests covered by a right to security—and I cannot attempt to do so

here. The point I want to make here is that I am perfectly comfortable assuming our moral interests in privacy rise to the level of a right that a legitimate state is obligated to protect

as a precondition of its legitimacy, and that, as I will show from a number of vantage points, the same is true of the right to security. In addition, I will provide a number of arguments—some of them

grounded in individual morality and some grounded in major approaches to theorizing about the

conditions a state must satisfy to be morally legitimate—that the right to security trumps the right to privacy when the two come into conflict.

3) We don’t invert the error. Out author doesn’t think security is absolute – just that it tends to outweigh privacy.

Himma ‘7Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458

The meaning of the claim that security trumps privacy is not immediately obvious. At the outset, this much has been clear: if it is true that security

trumps privacy, then it is also true that privacy is not an absolute right. Since the slogan that security trumps privacy entails that when security and privacy are in some sort of direct conflict, security defeats privacy, it follows that privacy is not absolute.24 But, quite frankly, this does not tell us much; the claim that privacy is nonabsolute does not tell us anything about how it should be

weighed against other nonabsolute rights, and I do not wish to claim that security is an absolute right because I think this thesis is as counterintuitive as the thesis that privacy is an absolute right. If it were true, for example, that security was an

absolute right, and privacy necessarily yields in the event of any conflict at all, then it would follow that it is morally justifiable for the state to sacrifice all interests in privacy if necessary to achieve just the slightest gain in security. I take this to be so obviously false as to constitute a counterexample to the claim that security is absolute, at least relative to privacy. The claim that security trumps privacy is meant to express the more intuitive, but admittedly vague, idea

that security and privacy are commensurable values and that, as a general matter, security is a more important value from the standpoint of morality than privacy. This does not commit me to the claim that all values are commensurable; perhaps there are two values that simply cannot be weighed against one another. But it does commit me to the claim that there is a hierarchy of commensurable morally protected interests and rights, which include security, privacy, and perhaps others, and that security has a higher position in the hierarchy than privacy. Indeed, I am tempted to think that security interests—construed to include freedom from grievous threats to well-being, which include death, grievous bodily injury, and financial damage sufficiently extensive to threaten the satisfaction of basic needs and hence survival of a person—are at the top of the moral hierarchy, encompassing as they do the rights to life and physical preservation.

4) Security turns privacy interestsHimma ‘7Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458

The last argument I wish to make in this essay will be brief because it is extremely well known and has been made in a variety of

academic and nonacademic contexts. The basic point here is that no right not involving security can be meaningfully exercised in the absence of efficacious protection of security. The right to property means nothing if the law fails to protect against threats to life and bodily security. Likewise, the right to privacy has little value if one feels constrained to remain in one’s home

because it is so unsafe to venture away that one significantly risks death or grievous bodily

injury. This is not mere ly a matter of describing common subjective preferences; this is rather an objective fact about privacy and security interests. If security interests are not adequately protected, citizens will simply not have much by way of privacy interests to protect. While it is true, of course, that

people have privacy interests in what goes on inside the confines of their home, they also have legitimate privacy interests in a variety of public contexts that cannot be meaningfully exercised if one is afraid to venture out into those contexts

because of significant threats to individual and collective security—such as would be the case if terrorist attacks became highly probable in those contexts. It is true, of course, that to say that X is a prerequisite for exercising a particular right Y does not obviously entail that X is morally more important than Y, but this is a reasonable conclusion to draw. If it is true that Y is meaningless in the absence of X, then it seems clear that X deserves, as a moral matter,

more stringent protection than Y does. Since privacy interests lack significance in the absence of adequate protection of security interests, it seems reasonable to infer that

security interests deserve, as a moral matter, more stringent protection than privacy interests. In this essay, I have argued that the moral interest in or right to privacy is not absolute and is sometimes outweighed by the moral interest in or right to security. I have done so from two points of view. First, at the beginning of the essay, I have sketched intuitions to that effect, which I assume are widely shared among persons in cultures like ours. Second, I have argued that all the mainstream approaches to normative theories of state legitimacy presuppose, assert, or imply that privacy is less important from the standpoint of political morality than security. Accordingly,

under ordinary intuitions and each of these theories, security interests trump, or

outweigh, privacy interests when the two come into conflict.

5) Security is a prerequisite to enjoying individual privacy Himma ‘7Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458

It is fairly easy to see, however, that my intuitions are widely shared in the U nited S tates . As an empirical matter, citizens in the United States frequently indicate a willingness to trade privacy for enhanced security. For example, a Harris poll conducted on October 4, 2004, three years after the attacks of 9/11, produced the

following results: Two-thirds (67%) percent favor “closer monitoring of banking and credit card transactions” up slightly from 64 percent in February (and down from 81 percent in September 2001). • Six in ten (60%) favor “adoption of a national I.D. system for all U.S. citizens” up from February’s 56 percent (down from 68% in

September 2001). • Those who favor “law enforcement monitoring of Internet

discussions” [have] increased significantly from 50 percent earlier this year to a current 59 percent. This is only somewhat lower than the 63 percent who felt this way in September 2001. • Those who favor “expanded government monitoring of cell phones and email” have risen to 39 percent, with 56 percent opposed. In February this year, a somewhat lower 36 percent minority favored this. 83 percent continue to favor “stronger document and physical security checks for travelers,” basically unchanged since February (93% in September 2001). • 82 percent continue to support “expanded undercover activity to penetrate groups under suspicion,” up from 80 percent in the February poll (93% in September 2001). •

60 percent continue to support “expanded camera surveillance on streets and in public places,” virtually unchanged since February (63% in September 2001).25 One might be tempted to argue that these results should not be taken as typical because the poll was taken only three years after the 9/11 attacks, and people have become

somewhat more critical of late of the government’s efforts to combat terrorism that implicate privacy. But the claim is not that the people always favor enhanced security measures even when they

impinge on privacy interests; the claim is rather that when people are convinced that they face a credible deadly threat of some sort—that is, one that satisfies some threshold level of

probability for success—they are generally willing to sacrifice privacy interests,

even important ones, to reduce the probability of success. Criticisms of recent measures primarily express the view that they impinge upon privacy without significantly reducing the probability of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. That, unlike the poll results described above, tells us nothing about common intuitions regarding how to balance security and privacy as a general matter.

2nc- counter biasAffirmative doesn’t solve – Their epistemology is bankrupt

Counter-bias: surveillance criticisms are ivory tower speculation without data or concrete foundations for personal violence. Default to our archival sources and studies

That’s McDonough ’15

And – err Neg. The current bias is presumptively anti-security. It all derives from flawed scholarship. Our methods delve deeper than the Aff’s. McDonough ‘15(Shannon McDonough – Instructor in Social Sciences at Allen University. The author holds a B.A. in Sociology from Miami University, Ohio and an M.A. Sociology from The University of South Carolina. This article is co-authored by Mathieu Deflem – a Professor at the University of South Carolina in the Department of Sociology. His research areas include law, policing, terrorism, popular culture, and sociological theory. “The Fear of Counterterrorism: Surveillance and Civil Liberties Since 9/11” – From the Journal: Society - February 2015, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 70-79 – obtained via the Springer database collection).

In recent years, especially since the events of 9/11, a new social-science field of surveillance studies has been developing (Ball et al. 2012; Contemporary Sociology 2007; Lyon 2007). Briefly

reviewing this new burgeoning area, it can be observed that most contributions exhibit a

critical and, implicitly or explicitly, fearful view of surveillance as a powerful and deeply invasive social force. Such worrying observations are particularly made in the context of the development of technologically advanced means of information gathering

that can threaten privacy and civil liberties. Surveillance expert David Lyon (2003, 2007), for example, laments the inherent consequences of the new surveillance methods as a powerful tool for profiling that would produce and reinforce long-term social inequalities. Surveillance scholars have suggested such novel concepts as a ‘surveillant assemblage’ to denote the convergence of once separate and discrete surveillance systems in order to mark nothing short of a gradual destruction of privacy (Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Surveillance technologies are argued to turn into instruments of totalitarian control that create or exacerbate inequality and lack accountability (Haggerty and Ericson 2006). Some differences in perspective on the impact of surveillance are to be noted among social-science scholars (Deflem 2008; Dunér 2005), but the research community has nonetheless not sufficiently acknowledged whatever gains and positive contributions have been made in providing

security. Besides surveillance scholars, major civil liberties organizations have greatly criticized the post-9/11 expansion of the surveillance powers of government

and intelligence agencies by means of aggressive public campaigns, critical reports, and lawsuits. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is one of the most active and prolific of such groups oriented at protecting the rights granted to US citizens by the constitution. The ACLU has instituted a so-called ‘Safe and Free’ campaign to address a number of issues related to surveillance and civil liberties on the basis of the notion that “there has never been a more urgent need to preserve fundamental privacy protections and our system of checks and balances than the need we face today, as illegal government spying, provisions of the Patriot Act and government-sponsored torture programs transcend the bounds of law and our most treasured values in the name of national security” (ACLU website). The ACLU claims that post-9/11 systems of mass surveillance threaten civil liberties more than that they can effectively combat terrorism. Yet, ACLU campaign tacticsmay aggravate the fear of surveillance by exaggerating the actual threat to civil liberties. For example, an analysis of an ACLU ‘Safe and Free’ commercial regarding the FBI’s authority to perform ‘sneak-and-peek’ searches shows that the ACLU overstates the extent of the threat to civil liberties imposed by counterterrorism laws (Factcheck.org 2004). The ACLU’s ad claims that the Patriot Act authorizes government agencies to search homes without notification, leaving out the condition of obtaining a warrant from a judge on the basis of regular probable-cause criteria. Campaigns similar to those launched by the ACLU have also been established by other civil liberties organizations. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), for example, set up the FLAG (FOIA Litigation for Accountable Government) Project, which “aims to expose the government’s expanding use of new technologies that

invade Americans’ privacy… [and] to protect individual liberties” (EFF website). The project utilizes Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to reduce government secrecy and thwart potential abuses of power in regard to government surveillance. Likewise, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) works to “focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values” (EPIC website). EPIC has set up a ‘Watching the Watchers’ program to assess the impact of public surveillance programs proposed following 9/11 (ObservingSurveillance.org). An EPIC report reviewing a budget plan of the Department of Justice criticizes the proposed surveillance programs for their inadequate

public scrutiny and possible violations of civil rights under the telling title of “Paying for Big Brother” (EPIC 2002). Using such strong imagery and provocative language, civil liberties groups may effectively contribute to create a fear of surveillance and counterterrorism

irrespective of actual practices concerning rights violations. It is striking that a predominantly negative attitude towards surveillance can be detected both among a substantial number of social-science scholars

interested in the study of surveillance as well as among civil liberties advocates. Our central argument is that such shared concerns are, at least in part, a manifestation of a culture of fear towards surveillance, which, as a result, contributes to accelerate the number

of civil liberties allegations made against security agencies irrespective of the

actual incidence of such violations. To test this hypothesis, our analysis must first reveal such discrepancies and next substantiate the existence of a broader cultural pattern. To examine the relative weight of

claims and incidents of civil liberties violations, we rely on various sources. First, we review reports from the Office of the Inspector General in the US Department of Justice concerning claims made pertaining to abuses of the Patriot Act involving Department of Justice employees,

such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Second, we additionally reviewed news reports of incidents of civil rights violations by the FBI, with special attention to the use of National Security Letters.

India

2nc- new FA solves

You prefer the status squo because the aff has not identified a threshold for triggering Indian support.

1nc HRW quotes an international perception of the New Freedom Act as “stepping in the right direction” because it limits phone metadata collection

USA Freedom Act does send a sufficient anti-surveillance signal Mascaro ‘14 Lisa Mascaro – winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service. She covers Congress for the LA Times. She is an economics and political science graduate of UC Santa Barbara, she also studied in Budapest, Hungary. “House passes NSA reform bill limiting collection of phone data” – LA Times – 5-22-14http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nsa-house-spying-20140522-story.html

Lawmakers acknowledged the bill was not perfect, but said it represented a first step in halting the dragnet- style sweep of data disclosed by former NSA contractor Edward

Snowden a year ago. “ The USAFreedom Act is an important step in the right direction,” said the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House Judiciary Committee, which crafted the bill, in a joint statement after passage. They called it “the

first significant rollback of government surveillance” since the post-Watergate era. The bill seeks to end the NSA’s bulk collection of metadata by requiring the government to make specific requests for phone or other business records . It also requires the government to obtain a court order, except in emergency situations, before conducting surveillance. Privacy advocates withdrew their support for the bill after

changes were made in the final days before the vote. Chief among their objections was the

White House insistence on broadening the definition of the types of searches that can be conducted. However, the advocates did not encourage a "no" vote and vowed to seek to reinstate privacy protections as the bill heads

to the Senate. “While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the out-of-control NSA, ” said Laura W. Murphy, director of the American Civil Liberties Union Washington Legislative Office. “While we share the concerns of many -- including members of both parties who rightly believe the bill does not go far enough -- without it we would be left with no reform at all.”

*New Freedom Act bill checks dragnet data and changes the appearance the US doesn’t care about surveillance Chappell ‘15Internally quoting ACLU Deputy Legal Director Jameel Jaffer and US Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis. Bill Chappell is a producer who currently works on The Two Way, NPR's flagship blog. In the past, he has coordinated digital features for Morning Edition and Fresh Air, and edited the rundown of All Things Considered. Prior to joining NPR in late 2003, Chappell worked on the Assignment Desk at CNN International, handling coverage in areas from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America, and coordinating CNN's pool coverage out of Qatar during the Iraq war. “Senate Approves USA Freedom Act, Obama Signs It, After Amendments Fail” - The Two Way - June 02, 2015 - http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/02/411534447/senateis-poised-to-vote-on-house-approved-usa-freedom-act

Update at 4:30 p.m. ET: The Bill Has Passed In the final tally of the vote, 67 senators were in favor of the measure

and 32 against. The legislation needed a simple majority to pass. Last November, the Freedom Act failed in the Senate after not receiving enough support to avoid a filibuster. Its critics say the act doesn't go far enough to curtail surveillance programs that can access huge databases of information about Americans. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., voted against the measure today, as he did last fall. Also voting against the bill Tuesday was independent Sen. Bernie Sanders, who is seeking the Democratic presidential nomination. The lead sponsor of

the bill in the House, Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., promises it will "rein in the dragnet collection of data" by the NSA and others, and "increase transparency of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." Calling today's passage "a milestone," ACLU Deputy Legal Director Jameel Jaffer says, "This is the most important surveillance reform bill since 1978, and its passage is an indication that Americans are no longer willing to give the intelligence agencies a blank check . "

**2nc- international surveillance key

Domestic surveillance doesn’t solve –

US can’t bolster company’s claims when it still demands foreign nations and companies to give over warrantless data. India would continue the same practices through this justification.

PRISM destroys US global credibility and causes countries to refuse the USSinger ‘14Peter W. Singer- Director, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, “The National Security Agency Debate: One Year Later Part One: The International Implications” – Brookings - 6/4/14, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/06/04-international-implications-nsa-leaks

One year after The Washington Post and The Guardian first reported on Prism , the National Security Agency’s secret electronic data surveillance program, the ripple effects are still being felt around the globe. Former NSA contractor Edward

Snowden, who admitted to the initial intelligence leaks, went on to disclose the existence of multiple other Internet and telephone monitoring activities. Claiming he

was acting to better inform the public, Snowden created a domestic and international backlash whose impact on national security, diplomacy and commerce will be felt long into the future .

Countries don’t model U.S. policy – it’s a myth.Moravcsik ‘5Andrew - Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, January 31, 2005, Newsweek, “Dream On, America,” lexis

Not long ago, the American dream was a global fantasy. Not only Americans saw themselves as a beacon unto nations. So did much of the rest of the world. East Europeans tuned into Radio Free Europe. Chinese students erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. You had only to listen to George W. Bush's Inaugural Address last week (invoking "freedom" and "liberty" 49 times) to appreciate just how deeply Americans still believe in this founding myth. For many in the world, the president's rhetoric confirmed their worst fears of an imperial America relentlessly pursuing its narrow national interests. But the

greater danger may be a delusional America--one that believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the American Dream lives on, that America remains a model for the world, one whose mission is to spread the word. The gulf between how Americans view themselves and how the world views them was summed up in a poll last week by the BBC. Fully 71 percent of Americans see the United States as a source of good in the world. More than half view Bush's election as positive for global security. Other studies report that 70 percent have faith in their domestic institutions and nearly 80 percent believe "American ideas and customs" should

spread globally. Foreigners take a n entirely different view : 58 percent in the BBC poll see Bush's re-election as a threat to world peace. Among America's traditional allies, the figure is strikingly higher: 77 percent in Germany, 64 percent in Britain and 82 percent in Turkey. Among the 1.3 billion members of the Islamic world, public support for

the United States is measured in single digits. Only Poland, the Philippines and India viewed Bush's second Inaugural positively. Tellingly, the anti-Bushism of the president's first term is giving way to a more general anti-Americanism. A plurality of voters (the average is 70 percent) in each of the 21 countries surveyed by the BBC oppose sending any troops to Iraq, including those in most of the countries that have done so. Only one third, disproportionately in the poorest and most dictatorial countries, would like to see American values spread in their country. Says Doug Miller of GlobeScan, which conducted the BBC report: "President Bush has further isolated America from the world. Unless the administration changes its approach, it will continue to erode America's good name, and hence its ability to effectively influence world affairs." Former Brazilian president Jose Sarney expressed the sentiments of the 78 percent of his countrymen who see America as a threat: "Now that Bush has been re-elected, all I can say is,

God bless the rest of the world." The truth is that Americans are living in a dream world. Not only do others not share America's self-regard, they no longer aspire to emulate the country's social and economic achievements. The loss of faith in the American Dream goes beyond this swaggering administration and its war in Iraq. A President Kerry would have had to confront a similar disaffection, for it grows from the success of something America holds dear: the spread of democracy, free

markets and international institutions--globalization, in a word. Countries today have dozens of political,

economic and social models to choose from. Anti-Americanism is especially virulent in Europe and Latin America, where countries have established their own distinctive ways--none made in America. Futurologist Jeremy Rifkin, in his

recent book "The European Dream," hails an emerging European Union based on generous social welfare, cultural

diversity and respect for international law--a model that's caught on quickly across the former nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In Asia, the rise of autocratic capitalism in China or Singapore is as much a "model" for development as America's scandal-ridden corporate culture. "First we emulate," one Chinese businessman recently told the board of one U.S. multinational, "then we overtake."

2nc- financial markets

No financial markets internal link – 1) Other sectors- other sectors like agriculture and manufacturing drive economic growth and would fill in

The internal link to the impact in 1ac Bush is predicated off of a collapse of the ENTIRE economy which none of their internal links claim.

2) Resiliency – Indian economy is struggling now and has struggled before but nothing happened – dips are a common occurrence.

That’s 1nc Indian Express

3) *India’s financial markets aren’t key Khan ‘13Address by Mr H R Khan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India – “Indian financial markets – fuelling the growth of the Indian economy” - Comments at the ADB Annual Conference, Greater NOIDA, Delhi NCR, 4 May 2013. http://www.bis.org/review/r130514d.pdf

Dr. Arvind Mayaram, Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Mr. S. Gopalakrishnan, President, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Mr. Jignesh Shah, Chairman, CII National Committee on Financial Markets, Mr. Chandrajit Banerjee, Director General, CII, distinguished delegates. Let me start by complimenting CII for selecting Indian Financial

Markets: Fuelling the Growth of the Indian Economy as the theme of the session. It is now well known that a well-developed financial sector plays an important role in economic growth. As John Hicks observed, the technology that made industrial revolution in England possible was in existence for a long time before it was commercially exploited; it had to wait till the financial sector developed well enough to make the necessary

resources available1. But it has to be recognized that while absence of a robust financial sector can

retard growth, financial development on its own cannot secure growth. Finance thus is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic growth . In India, we have traversed a long way since the economic reforms started in the early 1990’s. The reforms of the early 90’s were focused on three pillars – Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization

(LPG). The financial sector has also undergone significant changes during the

period to not only to support the rapid growth but also to do so without disruptive episodes. Let me briefly mention some of these changes, if only to stress that our confidence to meet future challenges is based on the bedrock of past achievements. I am deliberately not touching upon the issues relating to capital markets as they are not my areas of competence.

4) *Resiliency noting can shake the economy Wolf ‘11Martin Wolf is a British journalist, widely considered to be one of the world's most influential writers on economics. He is the associate editor and chief economics commentator at the Financial Times. He holds a a master of philosophy degree in economics from Oxford - “In the grip of a great convergence” – Financial Times - January 4, 2011 - http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:AU6qxSkE2FwJ:www.ft.com/cms/s/0/072c87e6-1841-11e0-88c9-00144feab49a.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us#axzz3d327QUO7

Until recently, political, social and policy obstacles were decisive. This has not been true for several decades. Why should these re-emerge? True, many reforms will be required if growth is to proceed, but growth itself is likely to transform societies and politics

in needed directions. True, neither China nor India may surpass US output per head: Japan failed to do so. But they are far away today. Why should they be unable to reach, say, half of US productivity? That is Portugal's level. Can China match Portugal?

Surely. Of course, catastrophes may intervene . But it is striking that even world wars and depressions merely interrupted the rise of earlier industrialisers. If we leave aside nuclear war, nothing seems likely to halt the ascent of the big emerging countries, though it may well be delayed. China and India are big enough to drive growth

2nc- no indo pak war

No risk of Indo-Pak war – 1) There’s a gaping internal link – there’s no reason why India would lash out against Pakistan after a

cyber-attack, it would just create more instability and chaos. 2) Deterrence solves – India won’t engage Pakistan because it is too far behind in terms of nuclear

capacity, it would be demolished.

Takes out the impact because their escalation scenario relies on India first strike. That’s Tellis 2

3) *Deterrence checks Tellis ‘2 (Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 24-5)In the final analysis, this situation is

made objectively "meta-stable" by the fact that neither India, Pakistan , nor China has the

strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage-limiting first strike s that might justify initiating

nuclear attacks either "out of the blue" or during a crisis. Even China, which of the three comes closest to possessing such

capabilities (against India under truly hypothetical scenarios), would find it difficult to conclude that the

capacity for "splendid first strikes" lay within reach. Moreover, even if it could arrive at such a

determination, the political justification for these actions would be substantially lacking given the

nature of its current political disputes with India. On balance , therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a high degree of deterrence stability , at least with respect to wars of unlimited aims, exists within the greater South Asian region.

4) South Asia is stable – no spill over Tellis ‘2 (Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 23-4)

Where deterrence stability is concerned, both the Indo-Pakistani and the Sino-Indian dyads will likely experience reasonably high levels of stability in the policy-relevant future because the two most important states, China and India, are not currently locked into the pursuit of any reciprocal revisionist objectives. Both India and China have also adopted a pacific posture with respect to their outstanding territorial disputes.35 Pakistan, in contrast, is the most prominent revisionist entity in South Asia, given its commitment to altering the prevailing status quo in Kashmir. But even Islamabad has for all practical purposes ruled out the alternative of securing political change through the pursuit of nuclear or conventional war, though it continues to engage in nuclear coercion at the subconventional level and could occasionally lapse into the temptation of engaging in shallow cross-border operations in order to attract international attention to its claims on Kashmir. 36 These actions, in turn, might provoke comparable Indian counterresponses, but such eventualities probably

represent the current limits of premeditated war in South Asia. 37 The prospects for deterrence stability are therefore relatively high , because no South Asian state is currently committed to securing any political objectives through the medium of major conventional, and by implication nuclear , wars of unlimited aims. This condition is only reinforced by the high levels of "defense dominance" obtaining at the military level. Deterrence stability in South Asia today flows from the Indian, Pakistani and Chinese inability to successfully prosecute decisive conventional military operations

quickly, especially in the context of wars of unlimited aims. As research elsewhere has demonstrated, India’s gross numerical superiorities over Pakistan are misleading and do not enable it to rapidly win a high-intensity land war, even if it acquits itself favorably in the air and naval campaigns occurring in the theater. 38 India and Pakistan can both defend their territorial integrity adequately with the forces they currently have in place, but would be hard pressed to dramatically change the territorial status quo through a quick conventional, or even nuclear, attack. The Sino-Indian balance along the Himalayas is similarly stable for now because the Chinese do not have the logistics capability to sustain any major conventional conflict in support of their more ambitious territorial claims, while the strong and refurbished Indian land defenses, coupled with the Indian superiority in air power, enables New Delhi to adequately defend its existing positions but not to sustain any large-scale acquisition of new territory. Consequently, deterrence stability exists along this frontier as well.

2nc- no solvencyThe aff can’t solve for hypocrisy –

- Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, refusal to denuclearize, failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol are all FAR more politically charged failures – there’s no reason Internet Freedom wipes the slate clean of other hypocrisies.

That’s Wadwa

2nc- DPT wrong (war)

There’s no causality between democracy and peace- 1) Interventionism- the US has entered and started multiple conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan.

2) No root cause- democratic peace theory predictions rely upon a high economy to create peace without guaranteeing economic growth

Even if democracies don’t go to war with each other, they still engage in war with non-democratic nations like Russia and China have arsenals that independently cause extinction.

That’s Mousseau

Democracy doesn’t solve warTaner ‘2 (Binner, PhD Candidate – Syracuse U., Alternatives: Turkish Journal of Int’l Relations, 1(3), p. 43-44, http://www.alternativesjournal.com/binnur.pdf)

The discussion above suggests that the most important drawback of the “democratic peace” theory is the essentialization of the political regime as the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The ‘democratic peace’ theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects , the importance of other domestic factors such as political culture ,35 degree of development, socio-economic and military considerations ,36 the role of interest-groups and other domestic constituencies,37 strategic culture 38 among others in decision-making . In other words, it is easily the case that the “democratic peace theory” lacks sensitivity to context and decisionmaking process. Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political structure/regime type is an important component of any analysis of war and peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives respect to a number of other factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave many details in decision-making unaccounted for . Consequently, although “democratic peace” theory should not be discarded entirely, current emphasis on the importance of “democracy” in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the fact that “democratic peace” is theoretically and empirically overdetermined.

Democracy doesn’t prevent the main threats to peaceOstrowski ‘2 (James, Staff – Rockwell, “The Myth of Democratic Peace, Spring, http://www.lewrockwell.com/ ostrowski/ostrowski72.html)

Spencer R. Weart alleges that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other. Even if this is true, it distorts reality and makes people far too sanguine about democracy’s ability to deliver the world’s greatest need today – peace . In reality, the main threat to world peace today is not war between two nation- states, but (1) nuclear arms proliferation ; (2) terrorism; and (3) ethnic

and religious conflict within states . As this paper was being written, India, the world’s largest democracy, appeared to be itching to start a war with Pakistan, bringing the world closer to nuclear war than it

has been for many years. The U nited S tates, the world’s leading democracy, is waging war in Afghanistan, which war relates to the second and third threats noted above – terrorism and ethnic/religious conflict. If the terrorists are to be believed – and why would they lie?─they struck at the

U nited S tates on September 11th because of its democratically-induced interventions into ethnic/religious disputes in their parts of the world.

Tech

2nc- squo solves The Status squo solves company perception-

1) The current Freedom Act restores confidence A) Transparency and commitment restores trust

CEA 15 (June 2, 2015, “Washington: CEA Praises Senate Passage of USA FREEDOM Act” http://www.ce.org/News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2015-Press-Releases/CEA-Praises-Senate-Passage-of-USA-FREEDOM-Act.aspx, ekr)The Consumer Electronics Association has issued the following news release: The following statement is attributed to Michael

Petricone, senior vice president of government and regulatory affairs, Consumer Electronics Association (CEA)®, regarding the U.S. Senate’s passage of H.R. 2048, the Uniting and Strengthening America by

Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015: “We welcome this important reform to U .S. intelligence gathering which takes critical steps to increase transparency and restore trust in American businesses , all while maintaining our commitment to preserving our national security . The

bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act is common-sense reform to our nation’s intelligence gathering programs, which

will preserve American businesses’ competitiveness worldwide , while continuing to protect our national security. “Following the Senate passage, the legislation now heads to the White House, where we anticipate swift action by President Obama to sign this legislation into law.”

2nc- econNo risk of economic decline –

1) New scholarship- Post 2008, predictions of protectionism, lost capital flows, and rejection of neoliberalism were debunked – Drezner concludes the analysts theories were wrong and continue to project inaccurate predictions based upon empirics

That’s Drezner 14

1) Global economic governance create resiliency Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

Prior to 2008, numerous foreign policy analysts had predicted a looming crisis in global economic governance. Analysts only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis, declaring that we live in a “G-Zero” world. This paper takes a closer look at the global response to the financial crisis. It reveals a more optimistic picture . Despite initial shocks that were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global economic governance structures responded quickly and robustly. Whether one measures results by economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, g lobal e conomic g overnance has displayed surprising resiliency since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed w ell in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies, especially in contrast to the 1930s. While there are areas where governance has either faltered or failed, on the whole, the system has worked . Misperceptions about global economic governance persist because the Great Recession has disproportionately affected the core economies – and because the efficiency of past periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated. Why the system has worked better than expected remains an open question. The rest of this paper explores the possible role that the distribution of power, the robustness of international regimes, and the resilience of economic ideas might have played.

2) Consensus and statistics proveOliver ‘9Business columnist for the Star, a Canadian newspaper, “David Olive: Will the economy get worse?,” http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/598050, AM

Should we brace for another Great Depression ? No . The notion is ludicrous. Conditions will forever be such that the economic disaster that helped define the previous century will never happen again . So why raise the question? Because it has suited the purposes of prominent folks to raise the spectre of a second Great Depression. Stephen Harper has speculated it

could happen. Barack Obama resorted to apocalyptic talk in selling his economic

stimulus package to the U.S. Congress. And British author Niall Ferguson, promoting his book on the history of money, asserts "there will be blood in the streets" from the ravages dealt by this downturn. Cue the

famished masses' assault on a latter-day Bastille or Winter Palace. As it happens, the current economic

emergency Obama has described as having no equal since the Great Depression has not yet reached the severity of the recession of 1980-82, when U.S.

unemployment reached 11 per cent. The negativism has become so thick that Robert Shiller was prompted to warn against it in a recent New York Times essay. Shiller, recall, is the Yale economist and author of Irrational Exuberance who predicted both the dot-com collapse of the late 1990s and the likely grim

outcome of a collapse in the U.S. housing bubble. Shiller worries that the Dirty Thirties spectre "is a cause of the current situation – because the Great

Depression serves as a model for our expectations, damping what John

Maynard Keynes called our `animal spirits,' reducing consumers' willingness to spend and businesses' willingness to hire and expand. The Depression narrative could easily end up as a self-fulfilling prophecy." Some relevant points, I think:

LOOK AT STOCKS Even the prospects of a small -d depression – defined by

most economists as a 10 per drop in GDP for several years – are slim. In a recent Wall Street Journal essay,

Robert J. Barro, a Harvard economist, described his study of 251 stock-market crashes and 97 depressions in 34 nations dating back to the mid-19th century. He notes that only mild recessions followed the U.S. stock-market collapses of 2000-02 (a 42 per cent plunge) and 1973-74 (49 per cent). The current market's peak-to-trough collapse has been 51 per cent. Barro concludes the probability today of a minor depression is just 20 per cent, and of a major depression, only 2 per cent . LOOK AT JOBS NUMBERS In the Great Depression, GDP collapsed by 33 per cent, the jobless rate was 25 per cent, 8,000 U.S. banks failed, and today's elaborate social safety net of state welfare

provisions did not exist. In the current downturn, GDP in Canada shrank by 3.4 per cent in the last

quarter of 2008, and in the U.S. by 6.2 per cent. A terrible performance, to be sure. But it would take another 10 consecutive quarters of that rate of decline to lose even the 10 per cent of GDP that qualifies for a small-d depression. Allowing that 1,000 economists laid end to end still wouldn't reach a conclusion, their consensus view is economic recovery will kick in next year, if not the second half of this

year. The jobless rate in Canada and the U.S. is 7.2 per cent and 8.1 per cent, respectively. Again , the consensus among experts is that a worst-case scenario for U.S. joblessness is a peak of 11 per cent . There have been no bank failures in Canada. To the contrary, the stability of Canadian banks has lately been acclaimed worldwide. Two of America's largest banks, Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., are on government life support. But

otherwise the rate of collapse of U.S. lenders outside of the big "money centre " banks at the heart of the housing-related financial crisis has been only modestly higher than is usual in recessionary times. LOOK AT INTERVENTIONS In the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover and R.B.

Bennett, just prior to the appearance of the Keynesian pump-priming theories that would soon dominate modern economic management, obsessed with balanced budgets, seizing upon precisely the wrong cure. They also moved very slowly to confront a crisis with no precedent. (So did Japan's economic administrators

during its so-called "lost decade" of the 1990s.) Most earlier U.S. "panics" were directly tied to abrupt collapses in stock or commodity values not accompanied by the consumer-spending excesses of the Roaring Twenties and greatly exacerbated by a 1930s global trade war.

Today, only right-wing dead-enders advance balanced budgets as a balm in this hour of economic emergency. In this downturn, governments from Washington to Ottawa to Beijing have been swift in crafting

Keynesian stimulus packages. Given their recent legislative passage – indeed,

Harper's stimulus package awaits passage – the beneficial impact of these significant jolts is only beginning to be felt. And, if one believes, as I long have, that this is a financial crisis – the withholding of life-sustaining credit from the economy by a crippled global banking

system – and not a crisis with origins on Main Street, then the resolution to that banking failure may trigger a much faster and stronger economic recovery than anyone now imagines. tune out the static It's instructive that there was much talk of another Great Depression during the most painful recession since World War II, that of 1980-82. Indeed, alarmist talk about global systemic collapses has accompanied just about every abrupt unpleasantness , including the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican default in 1995, the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s , financial havoc in Argentina early this decade, and even the failure of U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in the late 1990s. Modern economic recoveries tend to be swift and unexpected . The nadir of the 1980-82 downturn, in August 1982, kicked off the greatest stock-market and economic boom in history. And no sooner had the dot-com and telecom wreckage been cleared away, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average bottoming out at 7,286 in October 2002, than the next stock boom was in high gear.

It reached its peak of 14,164 – 2,442 points higher than the previous high, it's worth noting – just five years later. look at the big picture Finally, the case for a sustained economic miasma is difficult to make. You'd have to believe that the emerging economic superpowers of China and India will remain for years in the doldrums to which they've recently succumbed; that oil, steel, nickel, wheat and other

commodities that only last year skyrocketed in price will similarly fail to recover, despite continued global population growth, including developing world economies seeking to emulate the Industrial Revolutions in China and South Asia.

2nc- tech not key Technological innovation doesn’t drive competition – the aff has the direction of the link wrong

1) Foundation- Economic foundation at regional and local levels in education, healthcare, communications infrastructure, research institutions, and work skills are prerequisites to tech innovation and competition. Even with trust in companies, the economy will inevitably fail without fixing these prerequisites.

That’s 1nc Porter and Rivkin

2) No correlation – the Halo Effect is false Easterly 9 - William Easterly is Professor of Economics at New York University and Co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute, which won the 2009 BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge in Development Cooperation Award. (“Tiger Woods thoughtfully explodes “Halo Effect” myth in development,” http://aidwatchers.com/2009/12/tiger-woods-thoughtfully-offers-to-explode-%E2%80%9Chalo-effect%E2%80%9D-myth-in-development/ 12/14/2009) STRYKER

Our expectation that celebrities will be model citizens, contrary to vast evidence, is based on the Halo Effect. The Halo Effect is the idea that someone that is really, really good at one thing will also be really good at other things . We thought because Tiger was so good at being a golfer, he also must be very good at to have and to hold, forsaking all others, keeping thee only unto

her as long as you both shall live… What Tiger considerately did for our education was to show how the Halo Effect is a myth. This blog has a undying affection for those psychological foibles that cause us to strongly believe in mythical things, and the Halo Effect is a prime example (and the subject of a whole book on its destructive effects in business.) Why would marital fidelity and skillful putting have any correlation? OK fine and good, but many of you are asking: What the Vegas Cocktail Waitress does this have to do with development? The Halo Effect was discussed in a previous blog, but when assaulting psychological biases, you can never repeat the attack enough. Not to mention that we all remember the psychology literature more easily when

illustrated by a guy with 10 mistresses. So if we observe a country is good at say,

tech nological innovation , we assume that this country is also good at other good things like, say, visionary leadership , freedom from corruption, and a culture of trust. Since the latter three are imprecise to measure

(and the measures themselves may be contaminated by the Halo Effect), we lazily assume they are all good. But actually, there are plenty of examples of successful innovators with mediocre leaders , corruption , and distrustful populations. The US assumed world technological leadership in the late 19th century with presidents named Chester Arthur and Rutherford B. Hayes,

amidst legendary post-Civil War graft. Innovators include both trusting Danes and suspicious Frenchmen. The false Halo Effect makes us think we understand development more than we really

do, when we think all good things go together in the “good” outcomes. The “Halo Effect ” puts heavy weight on some explanations like “visionary leadership” that may be spurious . More subtly, it leaves out the more complicated cases of UNEVEN determinant s of success: why is New York City the world’s premier city, when we can’t even manage decent airports (with 3 separate failed

tries)? The idea that EVERYTHING is a necessary condition for development is too facile . The principles of specialization and comparative advantage suggest you DON”T have to be good at everything all the time.

2nc- alt cause Multiple alt causes to innovation decline –

Framing: It’s a yes or no question, if we win there are alt causes to tech innovation, the aff’s internal link is not strong enough to resolve them and the risk of the advantage is substantially decreased with the drastic weakness of the internal link.

1) No investment- shrinking defense budgets and increased research cuts all delay US modernization to maintain competitiveness and hamstring companies’ ability to innovate

That’s Jayakumar 14

Alt cause to tech innovation declineJayakumar 14 (Amrita Kayakumar, staff writer, quoting Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s top official, on military innovation, “Kendall, Hagel stress innovation to maintain military superiority” , http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/kendall-hagel-stress-innovation-to-maintain-military-superiority/2014/09/04/8a10e984-3464-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html ekr)Kendall offered few details about the program, which he plans to elaborate on soon. In his speech, Kendall said the acquisition process, which has been blamed for slowing down the pace of government programs, was not as big a concern as investment in new technology, especially in light of foreign competition. Russia and China are “building things that are designed to be effective against the power projection capabilities of the United States

and of our allies,” he said. “And they’re doing a reasonably good job of it, particularly China.” The shrinking defense budget and cuts to research and development in particular are a source of deep concern to him , Kendall said. Such cuts were tantamount to “delaying mode rnization ,” he said. “As we delay modernization,

we basically lose the time that it takes us to get things into the force,” he said. Kendall also added that the Pentagon’s budget would try and invest more in technology that moves capabilities forward. His remarks echoed those of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who

spoke on the same topic at a conference in Rhode Island Wednesday. Hagel also stressed the need for American companies to innovate in order to keep pace with the rest of the world. “We cannot assume, as we did in the 1950s and ’70s, that the Department of Defense will be the sole source of key breakthrough technologies,” he said.

Tons of insurmountable alt causes to competitivenessPorter and Rivkin 12 (Michael Porter is an economist, researcher, author, advisor, speaker and teacher. Throughout his career at Harvard Business School, he has brought economic theory and strategy concepts to bear on many of the most challenging problems facing corporations, economies and societies, including market competition and company strategy, economic development, the environment, and health care. His extensive research is widely recognized in governments, corporations, NGOs, and academic circles around the globe. His research has received numerous awards, and he is the most cited scholar today in economics and business. Jan W. Rivkin is the Senior Associate Dean for Research and a Professor in the Strategy Unit at Harvard Business School. His research, course development, and teaching efforts examine the interactions across functional and product boundaries within a firm – that is, the connections that link marketing, production, logistics, finance, human resource management, and other parts of a firm. //From the March 2012 edition of the Harvard Business Review, “The Looming Challenge to U.S. Competitiveness” https://hbr.org/2012/03/the-looming-challenge-to-us-competitiveness ekr)

Even with more consumer support, the overall American economy can’t remain competitive- rising unemployment, falling workforce participation, and depressed wages undercut competitiveness as a whole. Without these forces pushing the economy up, economic performance will always be capped and inevitably outplaced. That’s Porter and Rivikin 12

To support the interpretation that America’s problems are cyclical, not structural, one could point to the facts that labor productivity has held up in America and corporate profits hit record highs in 2010. Unfortunately, that snapshot masks deeper signs of an incipient competitiveness problem—one that began before the Great Recession and in some ways contributed to it.

The problem shows up in a range of economic performance measures as well as in the trajectories of the underlying factors that drive competitiveness. Productivity . America’s long-run rate of growth in labor productivity was strong

relative to that of other advanced economies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but it began to trail off before the financial crisis. Productivity has been sustained since the crisis largely by rising unemployment and falling workforce participation, ominous signs for U.S. competitiveness . Job creation . Even more

unsettling is the country’s job-creation picture. Long-term growth in private-sector employment has dipped to historically low levels , a trend that started well before the

Great Recession. (See the exhibit “Disappearing Job Growth.”) In industries exposed to international competition, job growth has virtually stopped . Wages. American wages have been under pressure for more than a decade. In 2007, before the downturn, U.S. median household income stood below 1999 levels in real terms—and has fallen even more since. In the two decades prior to 2007, median income grew, but at an anemic annual rate of just 0.5%. Most affected have been middle- and lower-income workers, many of whom are more exposed to international competition today than ever before.

2nc- compNo risk of economy or heg decline - competitiveness theory is falseFallows ‘10[James, correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, studied economics at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. He has been an editor of The Washington Monthly and of Texas Monthly, and from 1977 to 1979 he served as President Jimmy Carter's chief speechwriter. His first book, National Defense, won the American Book Award in 1981; he has written seven others. “How America Can Rise Again”, Jan/Feb edition, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/201001/american-decline]

There’s no risk of heg decline even if China outplaces the US

1) Mutually beneficial- the population of China ensures US will comparatively decline, but a prosperous Chinese economy stabilizes the global economy ensuring US stability

2) Overall leadership – competition is still generated in the US despite being outpaced – an open economy, rewards for innovation, flexibility, higher education, and company basing all ensures the US remains the lead magnet for innovation DESPITE some data giants losing consumer faith. Businesses still comparatively prefer the US and bring customers with them.

That’s Fallows 10

This is new. Only with America’s emergence as a global power after World War II did the idea of American “decline” routinely involve falling behind someone else. Before that, it meant falling short of expectations—God’s, the Founders’, posterity’s—or of the previous virtues of America in its lost, great days. “The new element in the ’50s

was the constant comparison with the Soviets,” Michael Kazin told me. Since then, external falling-behind comparisons have become not just a staple of American self-assessment but often a crutch. If we are concerned about our schools, it is because children are learning more in Singapore or India; about the development of clean-tech jobs, because it’s happening faster in China. ¶ Having often lived outside the United States since the 1970s, I have offered my share of falling-behind analyses, including a book-length comparison of Japanese and American strengths (More Like Us) 20 years ago. But at this point in America’s national life cycle, I think the exercise is largely a distraction, and that Americans should concentrate on what are,

finally, our own internal issues to resolve or ignore. ¶ Naturally there are lessons to draw from other countries’ practices and innovations; the more we know about the outside world the better, as long as we’re collecting information calmly rather than glancing nervously at our reflected foreign image. For instance, if you have spent any time in places where tipping is frowned on or rare, like Japan or Australia, you view the American model of day-long small bribes, rather than one built-in full price, as something similar to baksheesh, undignified for all concerned. ¶ Naturally, too, it’s easier to draw attention to a domestic problem and build support for a solution if you cast the issue in us-versus-them terms, as a response to an outside threat. In If We Can Put a Man on the Moon …, their new book about making government programs more effective, William Eggers and John O’Leary emphasize the military and Cold War imperatives behind America’s space program. “The race to the moon was a contest between two systems of government,” they wrote, “and the question would be settled not by debate but by who could best execute on this endeavor.” Falling-behind arguments have proved

convenient and powerful in other countries, too. ¶ But whatever their popularity or utility in other places at other times, falling-behind concerns seem too common in America now. As I have thought about why overreliance on this device increasingly bothers me, I

have realized that it’s because my latest stretch out of the country has left me less and less interested in whether China or some other country is “overtaking” America. The question that matters is not whether America is

“falling behind” but instead something like John Winthrop’s original question of whether it is falling short—or even falling apart. This is not the mainstream American position now, so let me explain. ¶

First is the simple reality that one kind of “decline” is inevitable and therefore not worth worrying about. China has about four times as many people as America does. Someday its economy will be larger than ours. Fine! A generation ago, its people produced, on average, about one-sixteenth as much as Americans did; now they produce about one-sixth. That change is a huge achievement for China—and a plus rather than a minus for everyone else, because a business-minded China is more benign than a miserable or rebellious one. When the Chinese produce one-quarter as much as Americans per capita, as will happen barring catastrophe, their economy

will become the world’s largest. This will be good for them but will not mean “falling behind” for us. We know that for more than a century, the consciousness of decline has been a blight on British politics, though it has inspired some memorable, melancholy literature. There is no reason for America to feel depressed about the natural emergence of China, India, and others as world powers. But second, and more important, America may have reasons to feel actively optimistic about its prospects in purely relative terms. ¶ The Crucial American Advantage ¶ Let’s start with the more modest claim, that China has ample reason to worry about its own future. Will the long-dreaded day of reckoning for Chinese development finally arrive because of environmental disaster? Or via the demographic legacy of the one-child policy, which will leave so many parents and grandparents dependent on so relatively few young workers? Minxin Pei, who grew up in Shanghai and now works at Claremont McKenna College, in California, has predicted in China’s Trapped Transition that within the next few years, tension between an open economy and a closed political system will become unendurable, and an unreformed Communist bureaucracy will

finally drag down economic performance. ¶ America will be better off if China does well than if it flounders. A prospering China will mean a bigger world economy with more opportunities and probably less turmoil — and a China likely to be

more cooperative on environmental matters. But whatever happens to China, prospects could soon brighten for

America. The American culture’s particular strengths could conceivably be about to

assume new importance and give our economy new pep. International networks will matter more with each passing year. As the one truly universal nation, the U nited S tates continually refreshes its connections with the rest of the world—through languages, family, education, business—in a way no other nation does , or will. The countries that are comparably open—Canada, Australia—aren’t nearly as large; those whose economies are comparably large —Japan, unified Europe, eventually China or India—aren’t nearly as open . The simplest measure of whether a culture is dominant is whether outsiders want to be part of it. At the height of the British Empire, colonial subjects from the Raj to Malaya to the Caribbean modeled themselves in part on Englishmen: Nehru and Lee Kuan Yew went to Cambridge, Gandhi, to University College,

London. Ho Chi Minh wrote in French for magazines in Paris. These days the world is full of businesspeople, bureaucrats, and scientists who have trained in the United States. ¶ Today’s China attracts outsiders too, but in a particular way. Many go for business opportunities; or because of cultural fascination; or, as my wife and I did, to be on the scene where something truly exciting was under way. The Haidian area of Beijing, seat of its universities, is dotted with the faces of foreigners who have

come to master the language and learn the system. But true immigrants? People who

want their children and grandchildren to grow up within this system? Although I met many foreigners who hope to stay in China indefinitely, in three years I encountered only two people who aspired to citizenship in the People’s Republic. From the physical rigors of a badly polluted and still-developing country, to the constraints on free expression and dissent, to the likely ongoing mediocrity of a university system that emphasizes volume of output over independence or excellence of research, the realities of China heavily limit the appeal of becoming Chinese. Because of its scale and internal diversity, China (like India) is a more racially

open society than, say, Japan or Korea. But China has come nowhere near the feats of absorption and opportunity that make up much of America’s story, and it is very difficult to imagine that it could do so—well, ever. ¶

Everything we know about future industries and technologies suggests that they will offer ever-greater rewards to flexibility , openness, reinvention , “crowdsourcing,” and all other manifestations of individuals and groups keenly attuned to their surroundings. Everything about American society should be hospitable toward those traits—and should foster them better and more richly than other societies can. The American advantage here is broad and atmospheric, but it also depends on two specific policies that, in my view, are the absolute pillars of American strength: continued openness to immigration, and a continued concentration of universities that people around the world want to attend. ¶ Maybe I was biased in how I listened, but in my

interviews, I thought I could tell which Americans had spent significant time outside the country or working on international “competitiveness” issues. If they had, they predictably emphasized those same two elements of long-term American advantag e . “My favorite statistic is

that one-quarter of the members of the National Academy of Sciences were born abroad,” I was told by Harold Varmus, the president of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering

Cancer Center and himself an academy member (and Nobel Prize winner). “We may not be so good on the pipeline of producing new scientists, but the country is still a very effective magnet .” ¶ “We scream about our problems, but as long as we have the immigrants, and the universities, we’ll be fine,” James McGregor, an American businessman and author who has lived in China for years, told me. “I just wish we could put LoJacks on the foreign students to be sure they stay.” While, indeed, the United States benefits most when the best foreign students pursue their careers here, we come out ahead even if they depart, since they take American contacts and styles of thought with them. Shirley Tilghman, a research biologist who is now the president of Princeton, made a similar point more circumspectly. “U.S. higher education

has essentially been our innovation engine,” she told me. “I still do not see the overall model for higher education anywhere else that is better than the model we have in the United States, even with all its challenges at the moment.” Laura Tyson, an economist who has been dean of the business schools at UC Berkeley and the University of London,

said, “It can’t be a coincidence that so many innovative companies are located where they are”— in California, Boston, and other university centers. “There is not another country’s system that does as well —although others are trying aggressively to catch up.” ¶ Americans often fret about the troops of engineers and computer scientists marching out of Chinese universities. They should calm down. Each fall, Shanghai’s Jiao Tong University produces a ranking of the world’s universities based mainly on

scientific-research papers. All such rankings are imprecise, but the pattern is clear. Of the top 20 on the

latest list, 17 are American, the exceptions being Cambridge (No. 4), Oxford (No. 10), and the University of Tokyo (No. 20). Of the top 100 in the world, zero are Chinese. ¶ “On paper, China has the world’s largest higher education system, with a total enrollment of 20 million full-time tertiary students,” Peter Yuan Cai,

of the Australian National University in Canberra, wrote last fall. “Yet China still lags behind the West in scientific discovery and technological innovation .” The obstacles for Chinese scholars and universities range from grand national strategy—open economy, closed political and media environment—to the operational traditions of Chinese academia. Students spend years cramming details for memorized tests; the ones who succeed then spend years in thrall to entrenched professors. Shirley Tilghman said the modern American model of advanced research still shows the influence of Vannevar Bush, who directed governmental science projects during and after World War II. “It was his very conscious decision to get money into young scientists’ hands as quickly as possible,” she said. This was in contrast to the European “Herr Professor” model, also prevalent in Asia, in which, she said, for young scientists, the “main opportunity for promotion was waiting for their mentor to die.” Young Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Dutch know they will have opportunities in American labs and start-ups they could not have at home. This will remain America’s advantage, unless we throw it away.