2011/09/13 Areva EPR DC - DRAFT Response to U.S. …PATTON Jeff (AREVA) Subject: DRAFT Response to...

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ArevaEPRDCPEm Resource

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (AREVA) [[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 4:33 PMTo: Tesfaye, GetachewCc: BENNETT Kathy (AREVA); CRIBB Arnie (EXTERNAL AREVA); DELANO Karen (AREVA);

HALLINGER Pat (EXTERNAL AREVA); HATHCOCK Phillip (AREVA); ROMINE Judy (AREVA); RYAN Tom (AREVA); KOWALSKI David (AREVA); BALLARD Bob (AREVA); PATTON Jeff (AREVA)

Subject: DRAFT Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9,Questions 09.04.01-3 thru -5, 09.04.03-4 thru -6 and 09.04.05-3 & -4

Attachments: RAI 461 Response US EPR DC - DRAFT.pdf

Getachew, Attached is a draft response for all 8 questions in RAI No. 461 (FSAR Ch 9). An official deferral of the response date to these questions will be sent in a follow-up e-mail to give an opportunity for NRC staff to review and provide feedback prior to sending these responses as final. Let me know if the staff has questions or if these responses can be sent as final. Thanks, Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (RS/NB) Sent: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:21 PM To: [email protected] Cc: BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); RYAN Tom (RS/NB); KOWALSKI David (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9, Supplement 4 Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. provided a schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions in RAI No. 461 on March 2, 2011. Supplement 1, Supplement 2 and Supplement 3 responses to RAI No. 461 were sent on April 29, 2011, June 8, 2011 and July 7, 2011, respectively, to provide a revised schedule. The schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions has been changed and is provided below.

Question # Response Date

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-3 September 13, 2011

2

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-4 September 13, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-5 September 13, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-4 September 13, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-5 September 13, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-6 September 13, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-3 September 13, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-4 September 13, 2011

Sincerely, Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (RS/NB) Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2011 4:39 PM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew' Cc: BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); RYAN Tom (RS/NB); KOWALSKI David (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9, Supplement 3 Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. provided a schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions in RAI No. 461 on March 2, 2011. Supplement 1 and Supplement 2 responses to RAI No. 461 were sent on April 29, 2011 and June 8, 2011, respectively, to provide a revised schedule. The schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions has been changed as provided below.


RAI 461 — 09.04.01-3 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-4 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-5 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-4 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-5 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-6 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-3 August 12, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-4 August 12, 2011

Sincerely,

3

Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (RS/NB) Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 8:00 AM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew' Cc: BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); RYAN Tom (RS/NB); KOWALSKI David (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9, Supplement 2 Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. provided a schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions in RAI No. 461 on March 2, 2011. Supplement 1 response to RAI No. 461 was sent on April 29, 2011 to provide a revised schedule. The schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions has been changed and is provided below.


RAI 461 — 09.04.01-3 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-4 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-5 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-4 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-5 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-6 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-3 July 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-4 July 8, 2011

Sincerely, Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

From: WELLS Russell (RS/NB) Sent: Friday, April 29, 2011 8:11 AM To: Tesfaye, Getachew Cc: KOWALSKI David (RS/NB); BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); RYAN Tom

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(RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9, Supplement 1

Getachew, AREVA NP Inc. provided a schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions in RAI No. 461 on March 2, 2011. To provide additional time to interact with the NRC, a revised schedule is provided in this e-mail. The schedule for technically correct and complete responses to the questions is provided below.


RAI 461 — 09.04.01-3 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-4 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-5 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-4 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-5 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-6 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-3 June 8, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-4 June 8, 2011

Sincerely, Russ Wells U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP, Inc. 3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935 Mail Stop OF-57

Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935 Phone: 434-832-3884 (work) 434-942-6375 (cell) Fax: 434-382-3884

[email protected]

From: WELLS Russell (RS/NB) Sent: Wednesday, March 02, 2011 2:14 PM To: 'Tesfaye, Getachew' Cc: BENNETT Kathy (RS/NB); DELANO Karen (RS/NB); ROMINE Judy (RS/NB); KOWALSKI David (RS/NB) Subject: Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9 Getachew, Attached please find AREVA NP Inc.’s response to the subject request for additional information (RAI). The attached file, “RAI 461 Response US EPR DC,” provides a schedule since technically correct and complete responses to the eight questions are not provided.

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The following table indicates the respective pages in the response document, “RAI 461 Response US EPR DC.pdf,” that contain AREVA NP’s response to the subject questions.

Question # Start Page End Page

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-3 2 2

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-4 3 3

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-5 4 4

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-4 5 5

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-5 6 6

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-6 7 7

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-3 8 8

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-4 9 9

The schedule for technically correct and complete responses to these questions is provided below.


RAI 461 — 09.04.01-3 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-4 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.01-5 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-4 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-5 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.03-6 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-3 April 29, 2011

RAI 461 — 09.04.05-4 April 29, 2011

Sincerely, Russ Wells U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP, Inc. 3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935 Mail Stop OF-57

Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935 Phone: 434-832-3884 (work) 434-942-6375 (cell) Fax: 434-382-3884

[email protected]

From: Tesfaye, Getachew [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2011 10:29 AM To: ZZ-DL-A-USEPR-DL Cc: ODriscoll, James; Jackson, Christopher; McKirgan, John; Hearn, Peter; Colaccino, Joseph; ArevaEPRDCPEm ResourceSubject: U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461(5223, 5292, 5293), FSAR Ch. 9

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Attached please find the subject requests for additional information (RAI). A draft of the RAI was provided to you on December 8, 2010, and on February 3, 2011, you informed us that the RAI is clear and no further clarification is needed. As a result, no change is made to the draft RAI. The schedule we have established for review of your application assumes technically correct and complete responses within 30 days of receipt of RAIs. For any RAIs that cannot be answered within 30 days, it is expected that a date for receipt of this information will be provided to the staff within the 30 day period so that the staff can assess how this information will impact the published schedule.

Thanks, Getachew Tesfaye Sr. Project Manager NRO/DNRL/NARP (301) 415-3361

Hearing Identifier: AREVA_EPR_DC_RAIs Email Number: 3410 Mail Envelope Properties (2FBE1051AEB2E748A0F98DF9EEE5A5D48A7E1D) Subject: DRAFT Response to U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 461, FSAR Ch. 9,Questions 09.04.01-3 thru -5, 09.04.03-4 thru -6 and 09.04.05-3 & -4 Sent Date: 9/13/2011 4:32:41 PM Received Date: 9/13/2011 4:32:56 PM From: WILLIFORD Dennis (AREVA) Created By: [email protected] Recipients: "BENNETT Kathy (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "CRIBB Arnie (EXTERNAL AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "DELANO Karen (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "HALLINGER Pat (EXTERNAL AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "HATHCOCK Phillip (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "ROMINE Judy (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "RYAN Tom (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "KOWALSKI David (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "BALLARD Bob (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "PATTON Jeff (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "Tesfaye, Getachew" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None Post Office: auscharmx02.adom.ad.corp Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 9451 9/13/2011 4:32:56 PM RAI 461 Response US EPR DC - DRAFT.pdf 1510415 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date: Recipients Received:

Response to

Request for Additional Information No. 461 (5223, 5292, 5293), DRAFT

2/3/2011

U.S. EPR Standard Design Certification AREVA NP Inc.

Docket No. 52-020 SRP Section: 09.04.01 - Control Room Area Ventilation System

SRP Section: 09.04.03 - Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Ventilation System SRP Section: 09.04.05 - Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System

Application Section: 9.4.

QUESTIONS for Containment and Ventilation Branch 1 (AP1000/EPR Projects) (SPCV)

e e

9.4. 9.4.

on Branch 1 (AP100on Branch 1 (AP10PCV) CV)

AREVA NP Inc.

Response to Request for Additional Information No. 461, DRAFT U.S. EPR Design Certification Application Page 2 of 14

Question 09.04.01-3:

One of the safety-related functions of the SBVSE described in FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.6 is to maintain hydrogen concentration below allowable limits. EPR Tier 1 states that the Electrical Division of the Safeguards Building Ventilation System (SBVSE) provides the safety-related function of providing ventilation for the battery rooms, and Hydrogen concentrations are to remain below “allowable limits during accident conditions”. Existing ITACC Tables have line items solely for battery room temperature alarms, displays controls. There exists an ITAAC requirement to 1) verify battery room coil size via inspection and 2) Perform a test to verify room is maintained between specified limits, verify outside air supply fan flow rate and recirculation flow rate are at specified values.

There is no proposed ITAAC for the tier 1 design commitment to maintain hydrogen control below any numerical criteria. In addition, the Tier 2 section 9.4.6 does not describe methods by which this safety-related design basis function is achieved, nor reference associated NRC guidance such as RG 1.128. The NRC staff considers that hydrogen concentration should be maintained below allowable limits both during normal and accident conditions. Therefore, discuss:

a. Controlling the hydrogen concentrations during both normal and during accident conditions.

b. Provide the design basis allowable limits are for the battery rooms, and justify these limits. Discuss the use of the applicable regulatory guidance (RG 1.128) in establishing these limits, and

c. Describe the verification program that will assure the system’s capability to control hydrogen concentration. Also,

d. Propose an ITAAC to demonstrate, via test or analysis, that the exhaust ventilation from the battery rooms is sufficient to assure that acceptable hydrogen concentrations are maintained. Define specific acceptance criteria.

e. Revise Tier 1 and 2 as appropriate.

Response to Question 09.04.01-3:

a. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1, Section 2.6.7 and Table 2.6.7-3, “Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System ITAAC”, will be revised to state:

“The SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below 1% by volume.”

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.6.1, will be revised to indicate that the SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below the maximum allowable limits of RG 1.128 and IEEE Standard 484.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.6.6, will be revised to include two additional references: (1) RG 1.128, and (2) IEEE Standard 484.

b. The battery rooms are designed to maintain hydrogen concentration levels less than one percent by volume in accordance with the guidelines in RG 1.128 and IEEE Standard 484. Testing will be performed to verify that the air flow exhausted from the battery rooms is greater than or equal to the required design air flow rate.

DRAFT

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09.04.01-3: 09.04.01-3:

11

AREVA NP Inc.


c. See the Response to Question 09.04.01-3, Part (a).

d. See the Response to Question 09.04.01-3, Part (a).

e. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1, Section 2.6.7 and U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 9.4.6.1 and 9.4.6.6, will be revised to incorporate this response.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1, Section 2.6.7, and Table 2.6.7-3 and Tier 2, Section 9.4.6.1 and Section 9.4.6.6, will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.

Note that some of the U.S. EPR FSAR changes associated with this RAI response were already processed and included in Revision 3. Other portions of the FSAR changes will be incorporated into Interim Rev. 4 as identified in the FSAR markups.

R cR c

AREVA NP Inc.



During review of FSAR Tier 2 revision 2, the staff noted that FSAR Tier 2 Paragraph 9.4.13.2.1 refers to FSAR drawings that have been deleted. The paragraph discusses the SCS Supply and Exhaust Air Subsystem for the Interconnecting Passageway between Safeguards Building Division 2 and Division 3. Therefore:

a. Clarify the paragraph to delete references to deleted drawings.

b. Provide drawings or further illustration that clarifies the arrangement that you describe.


a. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.13, currently refers to one figure, Figure 9.4.13-1, “Typical Configuration of Smoke Confinement System”. This figure was revised in U.S. EPR FSAR, Revision 3, to remove an incorrect title.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.13-2, “Smoke Confinement System Interconnecting Passageway” was deleted in U.S. EPR FSAR, Revision 2.

b. See the Response to Question 09.04.01-4, Part (a).

FSAR Impact:

The U.S. EPR FSAR will not be changed as a result of this question.

DRAFT

ThisThise. e.

onfinement SystonfinemeRevision 2. Revision 2.

Part (a). Part (

as a result of this quess a result of this qu

AREVA NP Inc.



During review of FSAR Tier 2 revision 2, the staff noted that the third paragraph in FSAR Tier 2 9.4.1.2.3, “Abnormal operating conditions” section has been changed. The described response of the CRACS to a toxic gas event is different from that described in the previous revision of the FSAR and your previous response to RAI No. 135 Question 09.04.05-1 part 3b.

Notwithstanding COL Item 6.4-1, which requires a COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification to identify any Seismic Category I Class IE toxic gas sensors necessary for control room operator protection and COL Item 6.4-3, to evaluate the results of a site specific toxic gas analysis and the impact on the control room habitability in accordance with RG 1.78, the FSAR describes the response of the CRACS design to a toxic gas event. This description includes details of toxic gas monitoring equipment, and visual audible MCR alarms. Similarly FSAR Section 6.4 describes control room habitability systems that detect toxic gases, specifically carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. Tier 2 Section 6.4.6, Instrumentation Requirements, refers to Section 9.4.1 for details on these instruments. Tier 2 Section 9.4.1.5, Instrumentation Requirements only discusses CREF instrumentation. This list does not include any instrumentation, alarms displays and controls used to detect and respond to a toxic gas event, yet FSAR section 9.4.1.2.3 describes automatic actuation of CRACS components by such instruments. In FSAR section 9.4.1, Table 9.4.1-1 includes a list of minimum instrumentation, indication and alarm features for that portion of the CRACS that functions to respond to a toxic gas event. Alternatively, include a new COL Item for section 9.4 to ensure that a COL applicant that references the EPR standard design provides details of the toxic gas instrumentation in the COL FSAR, to include not only the types of toxic gas sensors, but also the details of automatic actuation of CRACS SSCs, the minimum inventory of required MCR alarms displays and controls for such instrumentation.


The response to this question is addressed in the Response to RAI 462, Question 06.04-7.

FSAR Impact:

The U.S. EPR FSAR will not be changed as a result of this question.

DRAFT

at dat don 6.4.6on 6

nstruments. Tinstrumerumentation. This lrumentation.

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04.01-5: .01-5

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AREVA NP Inc.



In FSAR revision 2 Tier 2, Section 9.4.3., you state the following:

“The exhaust air from the NAB, FB, Safeguard Building (SB), Containment Building and the annulus is processed through the NABVS filtration trains prior to release to the environment via the vent stack.”

In FSAR revision 2 Tier 2, Section 9.4.3.1, you state the following:

“The NABVS performs no safety-related functions and the system is not required to operate during a design basis accident.”

A review of Figure 9.4.3-3 apparently shows the FB and vent stack as non seismic and non safety related structures. This conflicts with Table 3.2.2.1-1 for those structures. Since the plant stack is used by safety related ventilation systems such as the AVS, this structure should be correctly designated on this figure as safety-related and Seismic Category 1. Since the vent stack is part of the AVS, which is relied upon to establish a negative pressure in the annulus and fission product removal after a design basis accident, the Quality group for the vent stack should be Quality Group B.

1. Clarify Figure 9.4.3-3 to indicate that the plant stack, which serves as the exhaust path of the FBVS, is SSC seismic Class 1 and SSC Quality Group B, and a safety-related portion of the system.

2. Clarify the Seismic and Quality Classification breaks for the vent stack as they are shown in the FSAR in the same manner for the following Systems/ P&IDs:

a. Safeguard Building Controlled-Area Ventilation System Figure 9.4.5-2

b. Radioactive Waste Exhaust/ Figure 9.4.8-2

c. Reactor Building Exhaust/ Figure 9.4.7-2

d. Annulus Accident Filtration Train Exhaust/ Figure 6.2.3-2


1. The safety and seismic classification of the plant vent stack have been upgraded to safety-related, Seismic Class I. This change includes the installation of a safety-related check damper in the discharge of the Nuclear Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (NABVS) to the vent stack; this check damper will close during accident conditions to isolate the non-safety-related portions of the NABVS from the safety-related plant vent stack. The quality group for the HVAC ducting will be shown as N/A, per the guidelines of RG 1.26.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.3.1, will be revised to reflect the change in safety and seismic classification of the plant vent stack.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.3-3, “Nuclear Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filtration Trains Subsystem,” will be revised to reflect the change in safety and seismic classification of the plant vent stack.

DRAFT

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sh a negative pressuresh a negative precident, the Quality groucident, the Quality gro

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09.04.03-4:09.04.03-4

AREVA NP Inc.


U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Table 3.2.2-1, “Classification Summary” and Table 3.10-1, “List of Seismically and Dynamically Qualified Mechanical and Electrical Equipment” will be revised to reflect the change in safety and seismic classification of the plant vent stack.

2. The following clarifications for the vent stack will be made for selected U.S. EPR FSAR figures:

a. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.5-2, “Safeguard Building Controlled-Area Ventilation System Exhaust Air Subsystem” will be revised to clarify seismic and quality classification breaks for the vent stack.

b. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.8-2, “Radioactive Waste Building Ventilation System Exhaust Air Station” will be revised to clarify seismic and quality classification breaks for the vent stack.

c. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.7-2, “Containment Building Low Flow and Full Flow Purge Exhaust Subsystem” will be revised to clarify seismic and quality classification breaks for the vent stack.

d. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 6.2.3-2, “AVS Accident Trains” will be revised to clarify seismic and quality classification breaks for the vent stack.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Table 3.2.2-1, Table 3.10-1, Section 9.4.3.1 and Figure 6.2.3-2, Figure 9.4.3-3, Figure 9.4.5-2, Figure 9.4.7-2, and Figure 9.4.8-2 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


DRAFT

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Table 3.10-1, Section 93.10-1, Section 9e 9.4.7-2, and Figure 9e 9.4.7-2, and Figure 9

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AREVA NP Inc.



Follow-up to RAI 135, Question 09.04.05-1

In RAI 135, Question 09.04.05-1, item #7, the staff requested you to clarify the testing requirements for the NABVS and the RWBVS as they relate to guidance contained in RG 1.140 regulatory position C3.6, which states:

“Normal atmosphere cleanup system housings and ductwork should be designed to exhibit, on test, a maximum total leakage rate as defined in Article SA-4500 of ASME AG-1-1997 (Ref. 3). Duct and housing leak tests should be performed in accordance with Section TA of ASME AG-1-1997”

In a response supplement #1 to RAI 135, dated February 27, 2009, you provided a response to question number 09.04.05-1, item #7 that included FSAR Tier 1 and Tier 2 mark ups. The staff has reviewed the response and FSAR revision 2 and the following information is required:

1. The FSAR is still unclear as to timing and method of the performance of the duct and housing leak tests on the NABVS and RWBVS. The applicable criteria, of AG-1 as written only applies to the components listed in section 9.4.3.2.2 for the NABVS and section 9.4.8.2.2 for the RWBVS of the FSAR. The system startup tests in chapter 14 of the FSAR do not list acceptance criteria for system leakage; therefore,

a. Revise the FSAR to add a “Ductwork and accessories section for the RWBVS” to Tier 2 section 9.4.8.2.2, in order to clarify that the testing requirements are also applicable to RWBVS ductwork.

b. Add total system leakage acceptance criterion to the respective startup test acceptance criteria section.

2. Item 1.b also applies to all ventilation system startup tests for those systems that are subject to either RG 1.52 or RG 1.140. These systems include the FBVS, CBVS, CRACS, SBVS, SBVSE, and the ABVS. Clarify the FSAR for these systems as it applies to item 1.b.


1. Refer to the Response to RAI 462, Question 06.05-01-5, for clarification of testing requirements of the Nuclear Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (NABVS) and Radioactive Waste Building Ventilation System (RWBVS) and the use of ASME AG-1-2003 and ASME AG-1-1997.

a. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.8.2.2, will be revised to clarify that the testing requirements are also applicable to the RWBVS ductwork.

b. A statement will be added to the testing method and acceptance criteria section of the NABVS, RWBVS and Access Building Ventilation System (ABVS) to verify that the total system leakage acceptance criterion is satisfied per the guidelines of RG 1.140.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 9.4.3.4, 9.4.8.4, 9.4.14.5 and 9.4.14.7 will be revised to reflect updated testing requirements information.

DRAFT

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09.04.03-509.04.03-5

AREVA NP Inc.


2. A statement will be added to the testing method and acceptance criteria section of the Annulus Ventilation System (AVS), Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS), Containment Building Ventilation System (CBVS), Main Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS), and Safeguard Building Controlled-Area Ventilation System (SBVS) to verify that total system leakage acceptance criterion is satisfied per the guidelines of RG 1.52.

Note that the Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System (SBVSE) is a clean air system for the Safeguard Building and is not designed to be an engineered safety feature (ESF) atmosphere cleanup system. ESF atmospheric clean up is completed for the Safeguards Building by the SBVS, which is designed to meet the guidelines of RG 1.52.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 6.2.3.4, 9.4.1.4, 9.4.2.4, 9.4.2.6, 9.4.5.4, 9.4.7.4, and 9.4.7.4.1 will be revised to reflect updated testing requirements information.

The following U.S. EPR preoperational test procedures will also be revised to reflect updated testing requirements information:

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.1, Containment Building Cooling (Test #073).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.6, Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System (Test #078).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.7, Nuclear Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (Test #079).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.8, Radioactive Waste Building Ventilation System (Test #080).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.9, Fuel Building Ventilation System (Test #081).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.10, Main Control Room Air Conditioning System (Test #082).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.11, Safeguard Building Controlled Area Ventilation System (Test #083).

� U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.12.8.19, Access Building Ventilation System (Test #224).

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 6.2.3.4, 9.4.1.4, 9.4.2.4, 9.4.2.6, 9.4.3.4, 9.4.5.4, 9.4.7.4, 9.4.7.4.1, 9.4.8.2.2, 9.4.8.4, 9.4.14.5, 9.4.14.7, 14.2.12.8.1, 14.2.12.8.6, 14.2.12.8.7, 14.2.12.8.8, 14.2.12.8.9, 14.2.12.8.10, 14.2.12.8.11 and 14.2.12.8.19 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


DRAFT

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SAR Tier 2, Section 14.Tier 2, Section 14.1). 1).

EPR FSAR Tier 2, SectEPR FSAR Tier 2, Secitioning System (Testitioning System (Test

R FSAR Tier 2R FSAR Tier ation Sysation Sys

AREVA NP Inc.



The Tier 2 FSAR section 9.4.14 and Figure 9.4.14-2 describes the Access Building Ventilation System as servicing an Access Building that is divided into a radiological controlled area, which presumably has the potential to become contaminated. Both the controlled area of this building and a supervisory area are serviced by the ABVS. The ABVS as shown in the FSAR has two different exhaust subsystems. The subsystem that services the controlled areas exhausts through HEPA filters and is monitored for radioactivity. The exhaust subsystem that services the supervisory area releases directly to the environment with no devices to filter radioactivity or monitor for radioactivity. Based on the review of this system the staff requests the following information:

1. Provide justification for not subjecting the Supervisory area of the Access Building to GDC 60. i.e., provide the location in the FSAR for the description of the controls that separate the contaminated areas from clean areas in the Access Building.

a. The description should include a general discussion of the controls that prevent the migration of contamination from contaminated areas to clean areas of the Access Building. Also identify the monitoring devices that are used in the supervisory areas to ensure the potential for an unmonitored release of radioactivity does not occur.

b. The description should specifically address the ABVS functions in the event of an indication, via plant stack radiation monitor or other means, of radioactive contamination downstream of the ABVS HEPA filtration units.

2. Alternatively, since the Access Building is a EPR Standard Design Interface item, Include a COL information item that requires a COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR standard design to provide details on the site specific access building and ABVS design that:

a. Prevent the migration of gaseous or particulate radioactive contamination from controlled areas of the building to clean areas of the building.

b. Describe the monitoring devices that are needed in the supervisory area to ensure that radioactivity in the access building would not leave the building through the ABVS supervisory area exhaust subsystem.

c. Describe the SSCs that are required to clean up the Access Building atmosphere in the event of indication, via plant stack radiation monitor or other means, of radioactive contamination downstream of the ABVS HEPA filtration units.


1. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 9.4.14.1 and 9.4.14.4, state that the access building ventilation system (ABVS) is subject to the requirements of GDC 60.

a. The controlled areas of the Access Building are maintained at a negative pressure, while the supervised areas adjacent to the controlled areas, are maintained at ambient pressure. Clean air from the supervised areas will flow to potentially contaminated controlled areas and will then be filtered by a HEPA filtration unit and be exhausted to the plant vent stack. The system design configuration maintains air flow from clean areas to potentially contaminated

DRAFT

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SCSC

AREVA NP Inc.


controlled areas, thus preventing the migration of contamination from contaminated areas to clean areas of the Access Building.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 9.4.14.1, 9.4.14.2.1, and 9.4.14.3.1 will be revised to include this clarifying information.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.14-2, “Access Building Ventilation System - Supply and Exhaust Air Subsystem,” will be revised to include this clarifying information.

b. An alarm is annunciated in the main control room (MCR) if radiation is detected by radiation monitors downstream of the HEPA exhaust filtration units. To prevent the release of potential airborne contaminants, operators can secure the ABVS supply and exhaust fans, and close the supply and exhaust isolation dampers from the MCR.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.14.3.1, will be revised to include this clarifying information.

2. See the Response to Question 09.04.03-6, Part 1.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Sections 9.4.14.1, 9.4.14.2.1 and 9.4.14.3.1, and Figure 9.4.14-2 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


DRAFT

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4.14.2.1 and 9.4.14.3.1and 9ndicated on the enclosdicated on the en

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n the FSAR markups. n the FSAR marku

AREVA NP Inc.



The FSAR describes the Safeguard Buildings as being divided into controlled areas, which are potentially contaminated. These controlled areas are serviced by the SBVS. The balance of the SB is serviced by the SBVSE. The Tier 2 FSAR section 9.4.6.1 does not state that that SBVSE is subject to GDC 60. FSAR section 9.4.6.2.1 states that the SBVSE contains connections providing air to the mechanical controlled areas. FSAR section 3.8.4.1.3 states that the lower levels of the SBs, which contain the mechanical equipment, and the upper levels of the SBs contain electrical equipment. Cable pipe and duct shafts are located within the SBs for routing distribution between the various elevations of the buildings. Based on this review the staff requests the following information:

1. Justify not subjecting the SBVSE to GDC 60. i.e., identify in the FSAR, the controls that separate contaminated areas from clean areas in the safeguards buildings.

a. The justification should include a general discussion of controls that exist to prevent the migration of contamination from contaminated areas to clean areas of the SB. (Areas serviced by the SBVS to areas serviced by the SBVSE).

b. The justification should specifically address the function of the SBVSE in the event of a RCP thermal barrier failure, or the escape of contamination contained within the CCW system.

c. Alternatively, clarify that the SBVSE is subject to GDC 60, and provide appropriate justification.

d. Alternatively, clarify the utilization of the NABVS or the SBVS or other atmosphere cleanup system with the SBVSE to clean up the SBVSE atmosphere if required.

2. Figure 9.4.6.1, Safeguards Building Electrical Divisions 1 and 4 air intake is missing the supply air fan. Add the symbol to the drawing.


1. The following clarification will be made in the U.S. EPR FSAR to identify the controls that separate contaminated areas from clean areas in the Safeguard Buildings:

a. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.5.2.3, will be revised to include a general discussion of the controls that exist to prevent the migration of contamination from contaminated areas to clean areas of the SB.

The “Normal Plant Operation” section will be revised to state:

“A negative pressure is maintained in the SB controlled areas for the iodine risk rooms (safety injection, residual heat removal, and severe accident heat removal systems equipment rooms) relative to the outside environment. The air supplied to the SB controlled areas by the electrical division of the Safeguard Building ventilation system (SBVSE) is automatically adjusted by a damper in the supply air ducting that receives a pressure control signal, which maintains a negative pressure in the SB controlled areas, relative to the outside environment (ambient pressure). The SBVS maintains the SB Electrical Division at ambient pressure. This system design configuration maintains potentially contaminated SB controlled areas at a negative pressure, relative to the clean areas of the SB Electrical Division.”

DRAFT

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Building Electrical DiviBuilding Electrical Dsymbol to the drawing. mbol to the drawing.

n 09.04.05-3: n 09.04.05-3:

arification will be madarification will be ated areas fromated areas fro

R Tier 2,R Tier 2,concon

AREVA NP Inc.


The “Loss of Coolant Accident” section will be revised to state:

“In the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a containment isolation signal initiates isolation of the SB controlled areas from the supply to the SBVSE and the exhaust from the NABVS. Air is supplied from the SB controlled areas and exhausted through the SBVS iodine exhaust filtration trains (located in the FB) and discharged to the plant vent stack. To support the operation of plant equipment, recirculation cooling units maintain rooms in the SB controlled areas at ambient conditions.

In the event of a LOCA, the containment isolation signal initiates isolation of the FB from NABVS supply and exhaust duct to limit leakage into the FB. The SBVS maintains negative pressure in the FB and exhaust air from the FB is directed to the SBVS iodine filtration trains (refer to Section 9.4.2).”

b. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.6.1, will be revised to include a general discussion addressing the function of the SBVSE in the event of an RCP thermal barrier failure or contamination contained within the CCWS.

The following discussion will be added to this section:

“During normal plant operation, the SBVSE supplies air to the SB controlled areas. The flow of air is automatically adjusted by a damper in the supply air ducting that receives a pressure control signal, which maintains a negative pressure in the SB controlled areas, relative to the outside environment. The SBVS maintains the SB Electrical Division at ambient pressure. With a negative pressure maintained in the SB controlled areas and an ambient pressure maintained in the SB Electrical Division, a clean air environment is sustained within the SB Electrical Division.

Following the receipt of a containment isolation signal, supply air to the SBVSE is automatically closed to maintain isolation between the clean areas of the SB Electrical Division and the potentially contaminated SB controlled areas.

The SB Electrical Division is maintained as a clean air environment. In the event of a RCP thermal barrier failure or if radiation is detected within the component cooling water system (CCWS), the SBVSE can be shut down and isolated from the main control room. The affected areas can then be isolated to prevent the potential release of contaminants.”

c. See the Response to Question 09.04.05-3, Parts 1a and 1b.

d. See the Response to Question 09.04.05-3, Parts 1a and 1b.

2. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Figure 9.4.6-1, “Safeguard Building Electrical Divisions 1 and 4 Air Intake,” will be revised to reflect the addition of the supply air fan to the air intake.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.5.2.3, Section 9.4.6.1 and Figure 9.4.6-1 will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.


DRAFT

sed to ised toin the evenin th

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AREVA NP Inc.



FSAR section 9.4.9.1 “Design Basis” states “The EPGBVS maintains acceptable temperatures and air renewals in each of the four divisions to support operation of the emergency diesel generators (EDG) and electrical control panels”. Based on this statement, the staff considers the EPGBVS an Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System. NUREG-0800 section 9.4.5 is used by the staff to review such systems. Section II of this SRP “Acceptance Criteria” states that such systems are subject to GDC 17. Part III “Review Procedures states the following:

“The ESFVS is reviewed to ensure that adequate means is provided in the system design for control of airborne particulate material (dust) accumulation. The system arrangement is reviewed to verify that a minimum of seven meters (20 feet) exists from the bottom of all fresh air intakes to grade elevation, or that electrical cabinets are provided with suitable seals or gaskets”.

There is currently sufficient information in the FSAR for the staff to review this criterion and make a finding with respect to GDC 17, however the design basis section of the EPGBVS description does not declare GDC 17 as a design criterion.

The following clarification is needed in the FSAR:

In Section 9.4.9.1 of the FSAR, declare that the EPGBVS is subject to GDC 17. Justify that the EPGBVS complies with GDC 17.


U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.9.1, will be revised to state that GDC 17 is a required general design criterion for the emergency power generating building ventilation system (EPGBVS).

The U.S. EPR contains an onsite and offsite electric power system that supports the functioning of structures, systems and components important to safety in the event of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences. The EPGBVS maintains a minimum clearance of 20 feet from the bottom of fresh air intakes to grade elevation, and electrical cabinets are provided with suitable seals or gaskets. These features maintain proper functioning of the essential electric power system by meeting the guidelines of NUREG-CR/0660 (Reference 1), as related to the accumulation of dust and particulate material.

The essential onsite electrical power systems meet the guidance of NUREG-CR/0660 (Subsection A - Item 2 and Subsection C - Item 1) for protection of essential electrical components (such as contactors, relays, circuit breakers) from failure due to the accumulation of dust and particulate materials. This is accomplished by the use of filters and supply air units in the EPGBVS.

FSAR Impact:

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Section 9.4.9.1, will be revised as described in the response and indicated on the enclosed markup.

DRAFTstaff to reviewstaff to

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U.S. EPR Final Safety Analysis Report Markups

DRAFT

U.S. EPR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

Tier 1 Revision 3—Interim Page 2.6-78

2.6.7 Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System

1.0 Description

The electrical division of safeguard building ventilation system (SBVSE) provides ventilation of the electrical areas of Safeguard Buildings 1. 2, 3, & 4 to control the building ambient conditions for design basis accidents, personnel comfort, and equipment protection. The SBVSE provides cooling, heating, filtration, and ventilation for the electrical areas of the Safeguard Buildings to remove equipment heat and heat generated from other sources. The system is also capable of providing heat to maintain a minimum temperature in the buildings.

The SBVSE provides the following safety-related functions:

� Maintains acceptable ambient conditions for the safety related components in the electrical and I&C rooms of the Safeguard Buildings during accident conditions.

� Maintains acceptable ambient conditions inside the emergency feed water system pump rooms and component cooling water system rooms of the Safeguard Buildings during accident conditions.

� Ventilates the battery rooms and safety chilled water system rooms in the Safeguard Buildings to maintain the hydrogen concentration and the refrigerant concentration below allowable limits during accident conditions.

The SBVSE provides the following non-safety related functions:

� Maintains acceptable ambient conditions in the Safeguard Buildings for equipment operation and personnel comfort during normal plant operation and plant maintenance.

� Ventilates the battery rooms and safety chilled water system rooms in the Safeguard Building to maintain the hydrogen concentration and the refrigerant concentration below allowable limits during normal plant operation and plant maintenance.

� Supplies air to the safeguard building controlled area ventilation system (SBVS) during normal plant operation.

2.0 Arrangement

2.1 The functional arrangement of the SBVSE is as shown on the following figures:

� Figure 2.6.7-1—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System Division 1 and Division 4 Air Intake Functional Arrangement.

� Figure 2.6.7-2—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System Division 1 and Division 4 Air Supply and Exhaust Functional Arrangement.

� Figure 2.6.7-3—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System Division 2 and Division 3 Air Intake Functional Arrangement.

DRAFT

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� Figure 2.6.7-4—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System Division 2 and Division 3 Air Supply and Exhaust Functional Arrangement.

2.2 The location of the SBVSE equipment is as listed in Table 2.6.7-1—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System Equipment Mechanical Design.

2.3 Physical separation exists between the safety- related trains of the SBVSE.

3.0 Mechanical Design Features

3.1 Deleted.

3.2 Equipment listed in Table 2.6.7-1 can perform the functions listed in Table 2.6.7-1 under system operating conditions.

3.3 Components identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the function listed in Table 2.6.7-1.

3.4 Components listed in Table 2.6.7-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

3.5 Components listed in Table 2.6.7-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements, including welding requirements.

3.6 Components listed in Table 2.6.7-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are inspected and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

4.0 Displays and Controls

4.1 Displays listed in Table 2.6.7-2—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System Equipment I&C and Electrical Design, are retrievable in the main control room (MCR) and the remote shutdown station (RSS) as listed in Table 2.6.7-2.

4.2 The SBVSE equipment controls exist in the MCR and RSS as listed in Table 2.6.7-2.

4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a priority and actuator control system (PACS) module in Table 2.6.7-2 responds to the state requested by a test signal.

5.0 Electrical Power Design Features

5.1 The equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.6.7-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.6.7-2 in a normal or alternate feed condition.

5.2 Deleted.

6.0 Equipment and System Performance

6.1 The SBVSE provides conditioned and recirculated air to maintain design temperature in the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.Each SBVSE air intake train has the capability to remove the design heat load.

e 2.6.7-e 2.6sted in Table sted in

E AG-1 Code are designE AG-1 Code are

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6.2 The recirculation cooling units start and stop automatically in the emergency feedwater system (EFWS) and the component cooling water system (CCWS) pump rooms when the room temperature reaches preset maximum and minimum temperatures in the pump rooms.

6.3 The SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent by volume.

7.0 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)

Table 2.6.7-3 lists the SBVSE ITAAC.

09.04.01-3

DRAFT



Table 2.6.7-3—Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System ITAAC (4 Sheets)

Commitment Wording Inspections, Tests,

Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.2 The recirculation cooling

units start and stop automatically in the emergency feedwater system and the component cooling water system EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the room temperature reaches preset maximum and minimum temperatures in the pump rooms

A test will be performed to verify that recirculation cooling units start and stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset maximum and minimum temperatures in the pump rooms.

a. The recirculation cooling units start automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms prior to allowing the pump rooms to exceed the maximum design temperature.The recirculation cooling units start automatically when the pump room temperature is greater than or equal to 95°F.

b. The recirculation cooling units stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms prior to allowing the pump rooms to fall below the minimum design temperature.The recirculation cooling units stop automatically when the pump room temperature is less than or equal to 85°F.

6.3 The SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent by volume.

Tests and analysis of the system will be performed to demonstrate the air flow capability of the SBVSE is adequate to maintain the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent.

The air flow capability of the as-built SBVSE is adequate to maintain the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent.

Next File

09.04.01-3

DRAFT

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I461

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DRAF RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRARARRARRRRRRRARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARARRRRRRARARRRRRRARARARARARRRRRRRRRRRARARARARARARARARARA DRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARAAAAAAAARARARARARARARARAARARARAAAAAAAARARARA DRARARARARARA DRDDDDDDDDDDDDDDRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRDRRRRRRARRARARRRARARRRRRRAFTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT AFAF



If a fire is detected in the annulus during normal operation, the continuous ventilation of the annulus is stopped manually from the MCR by closing the fire dampers located at the wall penetration between the Fuel Building and Nuclear Auxiliary Building ventilation supply and exhaust shafts to reduce the possibility for fire propagation.

Analyses have demonstrated the ability of the AVS to depressurize and maintain a subatmospheric pressure in the annulus during normal operation and following a design basis LOCA. The LOCA is assumed to occur concurrent with a loss of off-site power, and a loss of one of the accident trains. The total thermal and pressure expansion of the primary containment structure is assumed to occur prior to the start of the remaining accident train, resulting in a starting pressure of 14.712 psia. The drawdown of the annulus is started 60 seconds after the start of the postulated accident. Analytical results indicate that the pressure in the annulus reaches a subatmospheric pressure sufficient for the AVS to perform its safety function with substantial margin. Analytical specifications and results are presented in Table 6.2.3-2.

6.2.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements

The AVS major components, such as dampers, motors, fans, filters, heaters, and ducts are located to provide access for initial and periodic testing to verify their integrity.

Initial in-place acceptance testing of the AVS is performed as described in Section 14.2 (test abstracts #077 and #203), Initial Plant Test Program, to verify the system is built in accordance with applicable programs and specifications.

The AVS is designed with adequate instrumentation for differential pressure, temperature, and flow indicating devices to enable testing and verification of equipment function, heat transfer capability and air flow monitoring.

During normal plant operation, periodic testing of AVS is performed to demonstrate system and component operability and integrity.

Isolation dampers are periodically inspected and damper seats replaced as required.

Per IEEE 334 (Reference 17), type tests of continuous duty class 1E motors for AVS are conducted to confirm ESF system operation and availability.

Fans are tested by manufacturer in accordance with Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) standards (References 18, 19, and 20). Air filters are tested in accordance with the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air- Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standards (Reference 21).

Housings and ductwork are leak-tested in accordance with the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association (SMACNA) technical manual "HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test Manual" (Reference 22), American Society of Mechanical

DR, g,

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Engineers, ASME N510 (Reference 23), ASME AG-1 (Reference 24), and RG 1.52 (Reference 25).

Heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 24).

Emergency filtration units are tested by manufacturer for housing leakage, filter bypass leakage and airflow performance. Periodically and subsequent to each filter or adsorber material replacement, the unit is inspected and tested in-place in accordance with the requirements of RG 1.52 (Reference 25), ASME N510 (Reference 23) and ASME AG-1 (Reference 24). The charcoal adsorber samples are tested for efficiency in accordance with RG 1.52 (Reference 25) and ASTM D3803 (Reference 26). Air filtration and adsorption unit heaters are tested in accordance with ASME N510 (Reference 23).

Periodic testing and inspections identify systems and components requiring corrective maintenance, and plant maintenance programs correct deficiencies.

In-service test program and test frequency requirements are described in Section 16, "Technical Specification" Subsections 3.6.6, 3.6.7 and per Ventilation Filter Test Program (VFTP) described in Section 16, "Technical Specification" Subsection 5.5.10.

Refer to Section 14.2 (Test Abstract #077) for initial plant testing of the AVS. Refer to the technical specifications (Chapter 16) Section 3.6.6 and Section 3.6.7 for surveillance requirements. Inspections and testing of the ESF filter system components are described in Section 6.5.1.

The following AVS component functions are tested for operability:

� Temperature sensor measurement validation.

� Damper closing and opening.

� Fire damper closing and opening.

� Emergency button operability.

� Efficiency of HEPA and carbon filters.

� In-place leakage testing of the filters.

The functionality of the AVS is verified by testing alarms and indications and by confirming the availability of selectors in the MCR and by manual operation of heaters and dampers. A periodic switchover of system fans is performed during operation to check the functioning of each fan.

The AVS system is designed to permit access and periodic inspection of the system components. The operating equipment is accessible for visual inspection during all

RAI 461Q. 09.04.03-5

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CREF (iodine filtration) trains are placed in the filtered alignment manually from the control room.

9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation

The CRACS is designed to maintain ambient conditions inside the CRE area for personnel comfort and to allow safe operation of the equipment during normal plant operation, outages, and under all anticipated occurrences including postulated accidental events (refer to Section 15.0.3 for a discussion of radiological consequences).

The CRACS keeps the CRE area at a positive pressure of 0.125 inches water gauge at a minimum with respect to the surrounding area to provide habitability in the event of radioactive contamination of the environment, and to prevent uncontrolled incoming air leakage.

During a site radiological contamination event, the fresh air intake is redirected through the CREF (iodine filtration) trains. The CRACS also can be operated in full recirculation mode without fresh air during abnormal operation or postulated accident events.

Redundancy for air cooling and iodine filtration is provided by multiple independent trains for critical functions. Sufficient redundancy is provided for proper operation of the system when one active component is out of service.

In case of fire in any room within the CRE area, the room air supply and exhaust are isolated by fire dampers and, if necessary, the plant is controlled by the remote shutdown station (RSS). The four air conditioning trains are installed in four different fire zones. Two of these zones contain the two CREF (iodine filtration) trains.

Capability for withstanding or coping with an SBO event is met by the design of the AAC power source satisfying the ten minutes criteria; that is, the AAC power source can be started from the MCR within ten minutes after the onset of an SBO event. The SBODGs are designed to operate for a minimum of twenty-four hours with available onsite fuel supplies.


The CRACS major components, such as dampers, motors, fans, filters, coils, heaters, and ducts are located to provide access for initial and periodic testing to verify their integrity.

Test and analysis will be completed during normal operation with the system operating in an accident alignment. Analysis will use as-built information from equipment to extrapolate the performance of the air-conditioning system. Analysis

DRAFTt, the fresh air int, the fresh

The CRACS also can The CRACS alring abnormal operatring abnormal operation io

d iodine filtration is provd iodine filtration Sufficient redundancy iufficient redundancy

tive component is out ofmponent is out o

ny room within the CREny room within the dampers and, if necessardampers and, if necessa

tation (RSS). The four aiation (RSS). The four aies. Two of these zones coes. Two of these zon

ility for withstandinility for withstanwer source satiswer source sati

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will show that the equipment performance is adequate to maintain design conditions during plant operating conditions.

Initial in-place acceptance testing of the CRACS is performed as described in Section 14.2 (test abstracts #082 and #203), Initial Plant Test Program, to verify the system is built in accordance with applicable programs and specifications.

The CRACS is designed with adequate instrumentation for differential pressure, temperature, and flow indicating devices to enable testing and verification of equipment function, heat transfer capability and air flow monitoring.

During normal plant operation, periodic testing of CRACS is performed to demonstrate system and component operability and integrity.

During normal operation, equipment rotation is utilized to reduce and equalize wear on redundant equipment during normal operation.


Per IEEE 334 (Reference 9), type tests of continuous duty class 1E motors for CREF are conducted to maintain ESF system operation and availability.

Air handling units are tested by manufacturer in accordance with Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) standards (References 4, 5, and 6). Air filters are tested in accordance with the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standards (Reference 2). Cooling coils are hydrostatically tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 (Reference 1) and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 10).

Housings and ductwork are leak-tested in accordance with the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association (SMACNA) technical manual "HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test Manual" (Reference 11), American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME N510 (Reference 3), ASME AG-1 (Reference 1), and RG 1.52 (Reference 12).

Outside air inlet heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 1).

Emergency filtration units are tested by manufacturer for housing leakage, filter bypass leakage and airflow performance. Periodically and subsequent to each filter or adsorber material replacement, the unit is inspected and tested in-place in accordance with the requirements of RG 1.52 (Reference 12), ASME N510 (Reference 3) and ASME AG-1 (Reference 1). The charcoal adsorber samples are tested for efficiency in accordance with RG 1.52 (Reference 12) and ASTM D3803 (Reference 13). Air

09.04.03-5 DRg ( )g ( )RAFT

utilized to rutilize

Tation.ation. Tcted and damper seats rected and damper seats

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The FBVS is designed with adequate instrumentation and temperature indicating devices to enable testing and verification of equipment function and heat transfer capability.

During normal plant operation, periodic testing of FBVS is performed to demonstrate system and component operability and integrity.


Recirculation cooling units are tested by manufacturer in accordance with Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) standards (References 4, 5, and 6). Cooling coils are hydrostatically tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 (Reference 1) and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 7).

Ductwork is leak-tested in accordance with the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association (SMACNA) technical manual "HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test Manual" (Reference 8), American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME N510 (Reference 9), ASME AG-1 (Reference 1), and RG 1.52 (Reference 11).

Fan heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 1).

Periodic testing and inspections identify systems and components requiring corrective maintenance, and plant maintenance programs correct deficiencies.Refer to Section 14.2 (test abstracts #081and #203) for initial plant startup test program. Initial in-place acceptance testing of FBVS components will be performed in accordance with Reference 1.

9.4.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements

Indication of the operational status of the equipment, position of dampers, instrument indications and alarms are provided in the MCR. Fans, motor-operated dampers, heaters and cooling units are operable from the MCR. Local instruments are provided to measure flow, temperature, and pressure. The fire detection and sensors information is delivered to the fire detection system. The radiation instrumentation requirements for controlling airborne radioactivity releases via the vent stack are addressed in Section 11.5Section 11.5.3.1.7 and Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-17, R-18, and R-19.

9.4.2.6 References

1. ASME AG-1-2003, “Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment,” The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 19972003 (including the AG-1a, -20002004 “Housings” Addenda).

09.04.03-5

DRAF

dance with ASME AG-1dance with ASME

AFpections identify systemsidentify system

RAant maintenance programant maintenance p

RAabstracts #081and #203) abstracts #081and #2RAtance testing of FBVS comnce testing of FBVS comRA.

umentation Requiremumentation Requirem

n of the operatin of the operaand alarmand alarm

linlin

AFTG-1 (Reference 1), and RG-1 (ReferencFTFT

7).7).

Te e Sheet Metal anSheet MTNA) techNA) te nical manual "Hal ma

FTmerican Society of Mechmerican Society of Mec

FTAFT



2. UL 555, “Standard for Fire Dampers,” Underwriter’s Laboratories, Sixth Edition, June 1999.

3. “ASHRAE Handbook Fundamentals,” American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 2005.

4. ANSI/AMCA-210-1999, "Laboratory Methods of Testing Fans for Aerodynamic Performance Rating," American National Standards Institute/Air Movement and Control Association International, December 1999.

5. ANSI/AMCA-211-1987, "Certified Ratings Program-Air Performance," American National Standards Institute/Air Movement and Control Association International, December 1987.

6. ANSI/AMCA-300-1985, "Reverberant Room Method of Testing Fans for Rating Purposes," American National Standards Institute/Air Movement and Control Association International, December 1987.

7. ANSI/ ARI Standard 410-2001, "Forced-Circulation Air-Cooling and Air-Heating Coils," Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, 2001.

8. "HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test Manual," Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association, 1985.

9. ASME N510-1989 (R1996), "Testing of Nuclear Air-Treatment Systems," The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1989.

10. ASME N509-1989, "Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components," The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1989.

11. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 3, "Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," 2001.

Next File

09.04.03-5

DRAFT

hoho

Tute/Air ute/A

Td-Circulation Air-Coolid-Circulation Air

FTeration Institute, 2001.eration Institute, 2001.

FTt Manual," Sheet Metal anual," She

AFiation, 1985.iation, 1985.

AF996), "Testing of Nuclea"Testing of NucleaAof Mechanical Engineersf Mechanical Engineers

RA1989, "Nuclear Power Pl1989, "Nuclear PowerRAcan Society of Mechanican Society of MechanicRRegulatory Guide 1.52, RRegulatory Guide

DRr Filtration and Adsorptir Filtration and AdsorpDRtmosphere Cleanup Sytmosphere Cleanup SyD11 DR



9.4.3 Nuclear Auxiliary Building Ventilation System

The nuclear auxiliary building ventilation system (NABVS) provides conditioned air to the Nuclear Auxiliary Building (NAB) to maintain acceptable ambient conditions, to permit personnel access, and to control the concentration of airborne radioactive material during normal operations and anticipated occupational occurrences. The system also provides conditioned air to the Fuel Building (FB), Containment Building, and the annulus area between the Containment Building and the Shield Building.

The exhaust air from the NAB, FB, Safeguard Building (SB), Containment Building, and the annulus is processed through the NABVS filtration trains prior to release to the environment via the vent stack.

9.4.3.1 Design Basis

The NABVS provides a safety-related function to provide isolation between the vent stack and the NABVS exhaust. A safety-related Seismic Category I check damper is located in the NABVS exhaust at the vent stack.

All remaining components of the NABVS are non-safety related and Non-Seismic, as specified in Section 3.2.

� The NABVS meets GDC-2 for all components as it relates to meeting the seismic design criteria based on the guidance of RG 1.29 Position C.2 (GDC-2).

� The NABVS has no shared systems or components with other nuclear power units (GDC-5).

� The NABVS meets GDC-60, as it relates to the ability of the system to limit release of gaseous radioactive effluents to the environment. The NABVS exhaust iodine filtration trains meet the guidance of RG 1.140 Positions C.2 and C.3. RG 1.52 is not applicable because the NABVS is not required to operate during post-accident engineered safety features (ESF) atmospheric cleanup. The air flow rate of a single cleanup filtration unit will not exceed 30,000 cfm.

The NABVS performs no safety-related functions and the system is not required to operate during a design basis accident.The NABVS performs the following safety-related function:

� A safety-related check damper is located in the NABVS exhaust at the vent stack. This check damper isolates the NABVS as required from the other safety systems exhausting to the vent stack during accident operation.

� The remaining portions of the NABVS perform no safety-related functions and the system is not required to operate during a design basis accident.

The NABVS performs the following important non-safety-related system functions:

09.04.03-4

09.04.03-5

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pplicable becaupplicable becared safetyred safety

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In case of a DBA, the NABVS is isolated from the HVAC systems of other buildings by isolation dampers.

The NABVS provides adequate capacity and redundant trains to maintain proper temperature levels in the NAB, FB, Containment Building, and annulus.


The NABVS major components, such as dampers, motors, fans, filters, coils, heaters, and ducts are located to provide access for initial and periodic testing to verify their integrity.

Initial in-place acceptance testing of the NABVS is performed as described in Section 14.2 (test abstracts #079 and #203), Initial Plant Test Program, to verify the system is built in accordance with applicable programs and specifications.

The NABVS is designed with adequate instrumentation for differential pressure, temperature, and flow indicating devices to enable testing and verification of equipment function, heat transfer capability and air flow monitoring.

During normal plant operation, periodic testing of NABVS is performed to demonstrate system and component operability and integrity.

During normal operation, equipment rotation is utilized to reduce and equalize wear on redundant equipment during normal operation.


Fans and air handling units are tested by manufacturer in accordance with Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) standards (References 4, 5, and 6). Air filters are tested in accordance with the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standards (Reference 2). Cooling coils are hydrostatically tested and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 8).


Outside air inlet heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 1).

Carbon filtration units are tested by manufacturer for housing leakage, filter bypass leakage and airflow performance. Periodically and subsequent to each filter or

RAI 461,Q. 09.04.03-5

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Recirculation Cooling Units

The recirculation cooling units consist of a fan section, a water cooling section, and a moisture separator. The fan is driven by an electric motor. The cooling coils are finned coil type and are connected to the safety chilled water system (SCWS). The total cooling capacity for the SBVS recirculation cooling units is as follows:

� KLC 51/54 AN001

64,800 Btu/hr.

� KLC 51/54 AN002

32,400 Btu/hr.

� KLC 51/54 AN003

21,600 Btu/hr.

� KLC 52/53 AN001

54,000 Btu/hr.

� KLC 52/53 AN002

32,400 Btu/hr.

The cooling coils are designed in accordance with Reference 2. The moisture separator collects condensate which is directed to drain system.

9.4.5.2.3 System Operation

Normal Plant Operation

During normal plant operation, the fresh conditioned air is supplied to four divisions of the SBs independently for each division by the SBVSE (refer to Section 9.4.6). The isolation dampers on each supply duct are in the open position and the volume control dampers on each supply duct are set to a flow rate in order to maintain a negative pressure in the controlled areas compared to the atmospheric pressure.

The room air conditioning is obtained by the supply and exhaust air flows based on the minimum air renewal rate, equipment heat load, and heat balance between the rooms. The air is heated or cooled to maintain the required ambient conditions of the rooms.

The operational air exhaust from the four divisions of the SBs (hot area) is processed by the NABVS. The isolation dampers on each exhaust duct are in open position, and the volume control dampers on each exhaust duct are set to a flow rate in order to maintain negative pressure in the controlled areas.

DRAFT

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The accident air exhaust isolation dampers are in open position, and the iodine filtration trains located in the FB are in a standby mode.

Isolation dampers for switching the fuel handling accident exhaust from both FB and Containment Building are in the closed position.

The associated dampers for the following areas are in the open position:

� Supply air flow to the rooms where safety injection and residual heat removal system equipment is located in divisions 1 and 4.

� Supply and exhaust air flow to the rooms where severe accident heat removal system components are located in division 4.

� Supply and exhaust air flow to and from the personnel air lock area in division 2.

A negative pressure is maintained in the SB controlled areasSBs relative to the outside environment by regulating the SBVS supply and exhaust flows. A negative pressure is also maintained for the iodine risk rooms (safety injection, residual heat removal, and severe accident heat removal systems equipment rooms) relative to adjacent roomsthe outside environment. The air supplied to the SB controlled areas by the electrical division of the safeguard building ventilation system (SBVSE) is automatically adjusted by a damper in the supply air ducting that receives a pressure control signal, which maintains a negative pressure in the SB controlled areas, relative to the outside environment (ambient pressure). The SBVS maintains the SB Electrical Division at ambient pressure. This system design configuration maintains potentially contaminated SB controlled areas at a negative pressure, relative to the clean areas of the SB Electrical Division.

The electrical air heating convectors are used in the service corridors, interconnecting passageway, and stairways to maintain comfortable temperatures in these areas. The operation of convectors is automatically controlled by the temperature sensors located in these areas.

The recirculation cooling units provide recycled cool air to the rooms where high heat load equipment is located. The operation of recirculation cooling units is automatically controlled by the temperature sensors located in these rooms.

Plant Outage Condition

During the plant outage condition, the system configuration will remain the same as during normal plant operation except the following:

� Air supply and exhaust of the rooms where the safety injection and residual heat removal systems equipment are located in SB divisions 1 and 4 are isolated by closing the associated dampers.

09.04.05-3

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� If the personnel air lock is open, the air supply and exhaust air flow to and from the personnel air lock area is placed in service by manually closing or opening the associated dampers.

� If maintenance is performed on the equipment or systems which pose delayed iodine release hazard, the exhaust air from these areas is diverted to the iodine filtration plenum of the NABVS prior to discharge through the plant stack (refer to Section 9.4.3).

Abnormal Operating Conditions

Loss of Recirculation Cooling or Area Ventilation

Failure of recirculation cooling or area ventilation in one SB division has no effect on safety function of SBVS since other three unaffected SB divisions are capable of performing the necessary safety function.

Two supply and exhaust dampers are provided for isolation of the hot mechanical area of each SB division. If one damper fails, the other damper can perform the safety function.

Loss of an Accident Iodine Exhaust Filtration Train

The SBVS provides two accident exhaust iodine filtration trains. Failure of one filtration train has no effect since the unaffected train can perform the necessary filtration function.

Redundant switching dampers are arranged in parallel configuration. As such failure of one damper has no consequence since the unaffected damper can perform the necessary function.

If both SBVS exhaust iodine filtration trains fail, the negative pressure and filtering function of SB hot mechanical area, and fuel handling accident exhaust in the FB can be provided by the exhaust filtration trains of NABVS (See Section 9.4.3). The fuel handling accident exhaust in the RB can be provided by the exhaust filtration trains of CBVS (refer to Section 9.4.7).

Loss of Offsite Power

The following equipment will remain operational during loss of offsite power (LOOP). The power supply for this equipment is supplied from the corresponding emergency diesel generators.

� Dampers in all divisions of SB.

� Iodine exhaust filtration trains located in the FB.

� Dampers to the zones that need to be isolated and confined.

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Station Blackout

Station black out (SBO) does not lead to release of radioactivity inside the SB, FB and RB. The system filtering function is therefore not required during SBO. However, the following components are supplied from the SBO diesel generators alternate AC (AAC) power:

� Supply air control dampers to the controlled areas in divisions one and four, to isolate air supply when exhaust is not in operation due to SBO.

� Recirculation cooling units in the SB divisions one and four, where the EFW valves are located.

Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink

During loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS), the air flow of the recirculation cooling units is cooled by the chilled water provided by the SCWS. Two water-cooled chillers are located in divisions two and three, and two air-cooled chillers are located in divisions one and four. In case of LUHS, the water-cooled chillers are not available. With the safety chilled water divisions 1/2 and 3/4 interconnect, the safety chilled water is then supplied by air-cooled chillers which provide the cooling function for the recirculation cooling units located in divisions one, two, three and four.

Loss of Coolant Accident

In the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the air supply from the SBVSE and the exhaust to the NABVS are closed automatically. Exhaust air is then diverted by opening or closing the associated dampers to process the exhaust air through the SBVS iodine exhaust filtration trains located in the FBa containment isolation signal initiates isolation of the SB controlled areas from the supply to the SBVSE and the exhaust from the NABVS. Air is supplied from the SB controlled areas and exhausted through the SBVS iodine exhaust filtration trains (located in the FB) and discharged to the plant vent stack. To support the operation of plant equipment, recirculation cooling units maintain rooms in the SB controlled areas at ambient conditions.

In the event of a LOCA, the containment isolation signal or high radiation signal in the RB initiates isolation of the FB from NABVS supply and exhaust duct to limit leakage into the FB. The SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the FB and exhaust air from the FB is directed to the SBVS iodine filtration trains (refer to Section 9.4.2).

Iodine Presence in the SB Rooms

In the event of a failed fuel element and residual heat removal pump seal leakage, high iodine is expected to be present in only one of the four divisions at a time, and it is necessary to purify the air in this division for personnel access. The air supply and exhaust flow for the affected division is increased to purge the possibly contaminated

09.04.05-3

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Redundant components are powered from different electrical divisions to remain available in case of failure of one division. As a backup, power is supplied to the engineered safety equipment by the emergency diesel generators (EDG).

Capability for withstanding or coping with an SBO event is met by the design of the AAC power source satisfying the ten minute criteria; (i.e., the AAC power source can be started from the main control room (MCR) within ten minutes of the onset of an SBO event). The SBO diesel generators are designed to operate for a minimum of twenty-four hours with available onsite fuel supplies.


The SBVS major components, such as dampers, motors, fans, filters, coils, heaters, and ducts are located to provide access for initial and periodic testing to verify their integrity.

Test and analysis will be completed during normal operation with the system operating in an accident alignment. Analysis will use as-built information from equipment to extrapolate the performance of the air-conditioning system. Analysis will show that the equipment performance is adequate to maintain design conditions during plant operating conditions.

Initial in-place acceptance testing of the SBVS is performed as described in Section 14.2 (test abstracts #083 and #203), Initial Plant Test Program, to verify the system is built in accordance with applicable programs and specifications.

The SBVS designed with adequate instrumentation for differential pressure, temperature, and flow indicating devices to enable testing and verification of equipment function, heat transfer capability and air flow monitoring.

During normal plant operation, periodic testing of SBVS is performed to demonstrate system and component operability and integrity.


Per IEEE 334 (Reference 12), type tests of continuous duty class 1E motors for SBVS are conducted to confirm ESF system operation and availability.

Recirculation cooling units and fans are tested by manufacturer in accordance with Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) standards (References 5, 6, and 7). Air filters are tested in accordance with the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standards (Reference 3). Cooling coils are hydrostatically tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 (Reference 2) and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 13).

DRAFT

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In-service test program and test frequency requirements are described in Section 16, "Technical Specification" Subsection 3.7.12 and per Ventilation Filter Test Program (VFTP) described in Section 16, "Technical Specification" Subsection 5.5.10.

Refer to Section 14.2 (test abstracts #083 and #203) for initial plant startup test program. Initial inplace acceptance testing of SBVS components is performed in accordance with Reference 2, and Reference 4.

Refer to Section 16 (SR 3.7.12) for surveillance requirements.


Indication of the operational status of the equipment, position of dampers, instrument indications and alarms are provided in the MCR. Fans, motor-operated dampers, heaters and cooling units are operable from the MCR. Local instruments are provided to measure differential pressure across filters, flow, temperature and pressure. The fire detection and sensors information is delivered to the fire detection system. The radiation instrumentation requirements for controlling airborne radioactivity releases via the plant stack are addressed in Section 11.5Section 11.5.3.1.9 and Table 11.5-1, Monitor R-25.

The minimum instrumentation, indication and alarms for the SBVS ESF filter systems are provided in Table 9.4.5-1 per the requirements of ASME N509 (Reference 9).

09.04.03-4

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9.4.6 Electrical Division of Safeguard Building Ventilation System (SBVSE)

The electrical division of the Safeguard Building (SB) ventilation system (SBVSE) is designed to maintain the ambient conditions for the safety-related electrical equipment, emergency feedwater pump rooms and component cooling water system component rooms in the SB during normal plant operation and accident conditions. The SBVSE also maintains the ambient conditions in the SB during maintenance operations and provides ventilation for the remote shutdown station (RSS) which is located in division 3 of the SB. Ventilation of the RSS can be provided by the SBVSE of the SB division 2 or division 3.

9.4.6.1 Design Bases

The SBVSE is primarily a safety-related system with portions serving non-safety-related functions. The safety-related portion is designed to Seismic Category I criteria. The non-safety-related portion of the SBVSE is designated as Non-Seismic category.

The U.S. EPR meets:

� GDC 2, as it relates to meeting the guidance of RG 1.29 (position C.1 for the safety-related portions of the SBVSE and position C.2 for those non-safety-related portions of which failure could reduce the functioning of any safety-related or Seismic Category I system components to an unacceptable safety level).

� GDC 3, as it relates to the SBVSE remaining functional following the postulated hazards of a fire. The SBVSE accomplishes this by the design and location of the system components to minimize the effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat-resistant materials are used wherever practical.

� GDC 4, as it relates to the SBVSE, by design, to protect against adverse environmental conditions and dynamic effects. The SBVSE accommodates the effects of, and is compatible with, the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.

� GDC 5, as it relates to the SBSVE system because safety-related components are not shared with any other nuclear power units.

� GDC 17, as it relates to the SBVSE because the U.S. EPR design has an onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety in the event of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences. In addition, the SBVSE maintains a minimum of 20 feet from the bottom of all fresh air intakes to grade elevation and the electrical cabinets are provided with suitable seals or gaskets. This is provided to maintain the proper functioning of the essential electric power system by meeting the guidelines of NUREG-CR/0660 (Reference 1) as related to the accumulation of dust and particulate material.

DRAFT

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� 10CFR 50.63, as it relates to the SBSVE because during a station blackout (SBO), two of the four SBs are backed up by the SBO diesel generators alternate AC (AAC) power. An analysis to determine capability for withstanding or coping with a station blackout event as described by RG 1.155, position C.3.2.4, will be performed. The safety chilled water system (SCWS) chillers which provide cooling to the division 1 and 4 SBVSE air coolers and recirculation units are also powered by the SBO diesels and are available.

The SBVSE maintains acceptable ambient conditions in the SB during SBO conditions. It also ventilates the battery rooms and SCWS rooms in the SB during SBO conditions to maintain the hydrogen concentration and refrigerant concentration below the maximum allowable limits of RG 1.128 (Reference 11) and IEEE Std 484 (Reference 10). The SBVSE also ventilates the SCWS rooms during SBO conditions to maintain the refrigerant concentration below the maximum allowable limits.

During normal plant operation, the SBVSE supplies air to the SB controlled areas. The flow of air is automatically adjusted by a damper in the supply air ducting that receives a pressure control signal, which maintains a negative pressure in the SB controlled areas, relative to the outside environment. The SBVS maintains the SB Electrical Division at ambient pressure. With a negative pressure maintained in the SB controlled areas and an ambient pressure maintained in the SB Electrical Division, a clean air environment is sustained within the SB Electrical Division.

Following the receipt of a containment isolation signal, supply air to the SBVSE is automatically closed to maintain isolation between the clean areas of the SB Electrical Division and the potentially contaminated SB controlled areas.

The SB Electrical Division is maintained as a clean air environment. In the event of an RCP thermal barrier failure or if radiation is detected within the component cooling water system (CCWS), the SBVSE can be shut down and isolated from the main control room. The affected areas can then be isolated to prevent the potential release of contaminants.

The SCWS chillers which provide cooling to the division 1 and 4 SBVSE air coolers and recirculation units are also powered by the SBO diesels and are available.

Air conditioning and heating loads for the SBVSE rooms are calculated using methodology identified in ASHRAE Handbook (Reference 3).

� Summer air conditioning loads will be calculated with a maximum outside air design temperature 0 percent exceedance value, using U.S. EPR Site Design Envelope Temperature (See Table 2.1-1). The analysis will be completed for both a normal and accident plant alignment configuration.

� The cooling supply units are designed to provide cooling as required to prevent the SBVSE room temperatures from exceeding their maximum design temperature.

09.04.01-3

09.04.05-3

DRAFT

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2. ASME AG-1-2003, “Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment,” The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 20031997 (including the AG-1a, -20042000, “Housings” Addenda).

3. “ASHRAE Handbook Fundamentals,” American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 2005.




7. ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 52.2-1999, "Method of Testing General Ventilation Air-Cleaning Devices for Removal Efficiency by Particle Size," American National Standards Institute/American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning, 1999.



10. IEEE Std 484-2002, “IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications,” Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2002.

11. Regulatory Guide 1.128, Rev. 2, “Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead Acid Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants.” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Next File

09.04.01-3

DRAFT

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hydrostatically tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 (Reference 1) and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 10).



Internal carbon filtration units are tested for housing leakage, filter bypass leakage and airflow performance. Periodically and subsequent to each filter or adsorber material replacement, the unit is inspected and tested in-place in accordance with the requirements of RG 1.140 (Reference 14), ASME N510 (Reference 3) and ASME AG-1 (Reference 1). The charcoal adsorber samples are tested for efficiency in accordance with RG 1.140 (Reference 14) and ASTM D3803 (Reference 13). Air filtration and adsorption unit heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 1).


In-service test program requirements are described per Ventilation Filter Test Program (VFTP) in Chapter 16, "Technical Specification" Section 5.5.10. ESF filtration unit testing will be completed at least once every 24 months.

9.4.7.4.1 Preoperational Tests

Refer to Section 14.2 (test abstracts #073, #075, #076, and #203) for initial plant startup test program. Initial in-place acceptance testing of CBVS components will be performed in accordance with ASME AG-1 (Reference 1), ASME N510 and (Reference 3), and RG 1.52 (Reference 12).

09.04.03-05

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9.4.8.2.2 Component Description

The major components of the RWBVS are described in the following paragraphs. Refer to Section 3.2 for the seismic and system quality group classification of these componentsTable 3.2.2-1 provides the seismic design and other design classifications for components in the RWBVS.

Ductwork and Accessories

The supply and exhaust air ducts are structurally designed for fan shutoff pressures. The ductwork is designed, tested, and constructed in accordance with ASME N509 (Reference 11) and ASME N510 (Reference 3)

Supply Air Handling Units

Each of the two supply air handling units consists of a housing, a preheater, a heater, a cooler, a prefilter, and a filter. The outlets of the air handling units combine into a common duct that provides supply air to two parallel supply fans. The outlet of the two supply fans combine into a common duct with a supply air humidifier.

System Exhaust Air Handling Units

Each of the two exhaust air handling units consists of an airtight housing, a prefilter, a HEPA filter, a carbon adsorber, a HEPA post-filter, and motor operated inlet and outlet dampers. The outlets of both air handling units join into a single line and then separate to supply the inlets of the two parallel exhaust fans, allowing each air handling unit to supply either exhaust fan. Upstream of the two exhaust air handling units in the common duct are electric heaters to maintain proper air inlet temperature to the filtration system.

Room Exhaust Air Handling Units

Each of the five parallel room exhaust air filtration units consists of an air-tight housing, a prefilter, a HEPA filter, and the associated manual dampers. The manual dampers align the filter units to the room exhaust fans or the iodine filtration unit. These parallel air filtration units supply air to two parallel room exhaust fans. The units can also be aligned to a single room exhaust air iodine filtration unit.

Room Exhaust Air Iodine Filtration Unit

The room exhaust air iodine filtration unit consists of an air-tight housing, an electric air inlet heater, a carbon adsorber, a HEPA post-filter, and associated manual air dampers. The manual air dampers reroute air to the two parallel iodine filter booster fans, which supply air to the inlet of the room exhaust air fans.

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and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 8).


Heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 1). Carbon filtration units are tested for housing leakage, filter bypass leakage and airflow performance. Periodically and subsequent to each filter or adsorber material replacement, the unit is inspected and tested in-place in accordance with the requirements of RG 1.140 (Reference 8), ASME N510 (Reference 3) and ASME AG-1 (Reference 1). The charcoal adsorber samples are tested for efficiency in accordance with RG 1.140 (Reference 8) and ASTM D3803 (Reference 10). Air filtration and adsorption unit heaters are tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section CA (Reference 1).


Refer to Section 14.2 (test abstracts #080 and #203) for initial plant startup test program. Initial inplace acceptance testing of RWBVS components is performed in accordance with Reference 1, and Reference 3.


Indication of the operational status of the equipment, position of dampers, instrument indications and alarms are provided in the MCR. Fans, motor-operated dampers, heaters, and cooling units are operable from the MCR. Local instruments are provided to measure differential pressure across filters, flow, temperature and pressure.

The fire detection and sensors information is delivered to the fire detection system.

The radiation instrumentation requirements for controlling airborne radioactivity releases via the plant stack are addressed in Section 11.5Section 11.5.3.1.8 and Table 11.5-1, monitor/sample points R-20, R-21, R-22, and R-23 and R-24.

All instrumentation provided with the filtration units is as required by RG 1.140.

9.4.8.6 References

1. ASME AG-1-2003, “Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment,” The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 19972003 (including the AG-1a, -2000, “Housings,”2004 Addenda).

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9.4.9 Emergency Power Generating Building Ventilation System

The emergency power generating building ventilation system (EPGBVS) maintains acceptable ambient conditions and air renewals of the diesel hall, electrical room, and main tank room of each of the four divisions of the Emergency Power Generating Buildings (EPGB). Each division has its own independent heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system which is not connected to other divisions. Two divisions are located in each of the two EPGBs.


The EPGBVS is safety related and designed to meet Seismic Category I requirements. The EPGBVS performs the following safety-related system function and complies with the general design criteria (GDC) indicated below:

� The EPGBVS maintains acceptable temperatures and air renewals in each of the four divisions to support the operation of the emergency diesel generators (EDG) and electrical control panels. The EDGs are required to provide onsite emergency power for the safety-related equipment to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition following a design basis accident, including loss of offsite power (LOOP).

� In accordance with GDC 2, the EPGBVS components are located inside the EPGBs, which are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, floods and external missiles.

� In accordance with GDC 4, the EPGBVS components remain functional and continue to perform their intended safety function after anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents, such as fire, internal missiles, or pipe breaks.

� In accordance with GDC 5, the safety-related components and systems of the EPGBVS are not shared with other nuclear power units.

� In accordance with GDC 17, the U.S. EPR contains an onsite and offsite electric power system that supports the functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety in the event of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences. The EPGBVS maintains a minimum clearance of 20 feet from the bottom of fresh air intakes to grade elevation, and electrical cabinets are provided with suitable seals or gaskets, These features maintain proper functioning of the essential electric power system by meeting the guidelines of NUREG-CR/0660 (Reference 1), as related to the accumulation of dust and particulate material.

The essential onsite electrical power systems meet the guidance of NUREG-CR/0660 for protection of essential electrical components (such as contactors, relays, circuit breakers) from failure due to the accumulation of dust and particulate materials. This is accomplished by the use of filters and supply air units in the EPGBVS.

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9.4.14 Access Building Ventilation System

The access building ventilation system (ABVS) maintains room ambient conditions inside the Access Building to permit personnel access to the Nuclear Island (NI), and to control the concentration of airborne radioactive material in the controlled areas of the building during normal operation, including maintenance and refueling shutdowns, and during anticipated operational occurrences. The ABVS is composed of the following three subdivisions:

� The supply of fresh air to all areas of the Access Building and the prestressing gallery underneath the Reactor Building (RB).

� The controlled area exhaust with radiation classification.

� The supervised areas exhaust with no radiation classification.


The ABVS performs no safety-related functions and is not required to operate during a design basis accident (DBA).

The ABVS monitors the controlled area exhaust air for potential radioactivity upstream of the prefilter and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters by the sampling activity monitoring system (SAMS) prior to discharge into the plant vent stack. This complies with the requirements of GDC-60.

The controlled areas in the Access Building are maintained at a negative pressure, while the adjacent supervised areas are maintained at ambient pressure. Clean air from the supervised areas will flow to potentially contaminated areas in the controlled area, is filtered by a HEPA filtration unit, and is then exhausted to the plant vent stack.

The ABVS environmental operating conditions are specified in Table 9.4.14-1—ABVS Environmental Conditions.

9.4.14.2 System Description

9.4.14.2.1 General Description

Two of the three ABVS subdivisions are located in the Access Building:

� The supervised areas (i.e., non-controlled areas with no radiation classification).

� The controlled areas (i.e., areas with radiation classification).

The ABVS also provides supply and exhaust air to the prestressing gallery, located in the RB at elevation -50 ft. The ventilation system is designed for fresh supply air and exhaust air operation; there is no air recirculation.


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Refer to Section 12.3.6.5.6 for ventilation system design features which demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1406.

Supply Air Subsystem

The ABVS supplies air to the Access Building and to the prestressing gallery underneath the RB. Figure 9.4.14-1—Access Building Ventilation System – Supply Air Subsystem, provides a simplified diagram of the supply air subsystem of the ABVS. Depending on the outdoor air conditions, the supply air can be cooled or heated, and humidified. The supply air is filtered with prefilters and roughing filters.

The supply air subsystem upstream of the fans is a two-train system arranged in a parallel configuration. Horizontal air ducts and vertical air shafts distribute the fresh air to both the supervised and controlled areas. The negative pressure in the controlled areas is maintained by a control damper in the controlled area supply air duct after the separation from the general supply air.

A pressure control damper is located in the supply ducting that provides ventilation air to the controlled areas in the Access Building. This damper modulates between open and close to adjust the supply of air flow, as required, to maintain a negative pressure in the controlled areas.

Controlled Area Exhaust Air Subsystem

The controlled area exhaust air subsystem of the ABVS is shown in Figure 9.4.14-2—Access Building Ventilation System – Supply and Exhaust Air Subsystem. The ABVS controlled area exhaust subsystem has the following functions:

� Maintains a negative pressure in the controlled areas of the Access Building, with respect to adjacent areas.

� Reduces airborne radioactivity by filtration of exhaust air from the controlled areas.

� Maintains airflow within the Access Building from the clean areas towards the controlled areas.

The exhaust air from the controlled areas of the Access Building is brought together through air ducts and vertical shafts. The combined exhaust air is routed through filter banks that consist of three trains of prefilters and HEPA filters, each designed for 50 percent of the volumetric air flow. The exhaust air filtering takes place continuously. After passing through the filters, the controlled area exhaust air is routed through a concrete duct outside the Access Building to the Nuclear Auxiliary Building (NAB) where two fans discharge the exhaust air to the vent stack. The controlled area exhaust is monitored for potential radioactivity upstream of the filters by the sampling activity monitoring system (SAMS).



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The supervised areas adjacent to the controlled areas are maintained at ambient pressure, while the controlled areas are maintained at a negative pressure. The clean air from the supervised areas will flow towards the controlled areas, where it is filtered by a HEPA filter and then exhausted to the vent stack.

If contamination is detected by radiation monitors downstream of the HEPA exhaust filtration units, the control room receives an alarm. To prevent the release of potential airborne contaminants to the vent stack, the control room operators will shut down the ABVS supply fans, exhaust fans, inlet isolation dampers, and exhaust isolation dampers.

Supervised Area Exhaust Air Subsystem

The supervised area exhaust air subsystem of the ABVS is also shown in Figure 9.4.14-2. The ABVS supervised area exhaust subsystem exhausts the air of the Access Building cold rooms. The air is collected in ducts and vertical shafts. There are two exhaust fans, each sized for 100 percent of the volumetric flow. The supervised area exhaust air is discharged directly to the atmosphere.

The exhaust air unit of the prestressing gallery is considered part of the supervised area exhaust system. The prestressing gallery has its own exhaust fan that discharges directly to the atmosphere.

9.4.14.2.2 Component Description

The major components of the ABVS are described in the following paragraphs. Table 3.2.2-1 provides the seismic design and other design classifications for components in the ABVS.

Fans

The supply air fans, the controlled area exhaust fans, and the supervised area exhaust fans are centrifugal and are directly connected to the motor shaft. These fans are equipped with local heating units. The exhaust air fan of the prestressing gallery is axial. The fan operating characteristics (i.e., flow rate and pressure) provide required air delivery flow rates.

Dampers

The actuator-driven control damper is located in the supply air duct of the controlled area. The damper maintains a constant sub-pressure inside the controlled area of the Access Building by gradual reduction or increase of supply air flow. The actuator-driven control damper maintains a constant exhaust flow rate, compensating for the increased pressure loss through the exhaust air filters by gradually increasing the damper opening.


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Fire Dampers

Fire dampers are installed where ductwork penetrates a fire barrier. Fire damper design meets the requirements of UL 555 (Reference 1) and the damper fire rating is commensurate with the fire rating of the barrier penetrated.

Ducts

The supply air ducts are folded galvanized steel ducts. The exhaust air ducts are similar with the exception that the ducts inside the filter rooms are of air-tight welded construction.

9.4.14.3 System Operation

9.4.14.3.1 Normal Operation

Supply Air Subsystem

The ABVS supply air subsystem operates continuously. The ABVS supply air subsystem, as well as the controlled area and supervised area exhaust subsystems, are each operated from the main control room (MCR). The control functions work automatically and maintain the air flow constant. A pressure control damper is located in the supply ducting that provides ventilation air to the controlled areas in the Access Building. This damper controls the supply airflow, as required, to maintain a negative pressure in the controlled areas, while the ABVS exhaust fan provides continuous exhaust from this area. The system is designed for fresh supply air and exhaust air operation; there is no air recirculation.

During operation, only one of the two supply air fans is running; the second is in standby. The supply air subsystem conditions the air by filtration, heating or cooling, and humidification, as required. The subsystem also supplies air to the supervised area, controlled area, and the prestressing gallery.

Air filter loading is monitored by regular inspection of the local differential pressure instrumentation at the filters. The prefilters and roughing filters can be replaced with the plant in operation or shutdown. Before a supply air filter train is taken out of service the damper in the supervised area exhaust air subsystem is moved to a predefined maintenance position. The train that requires the filter replacement is isolated while the other train remains in operation.

Controlled Area Exhaust Air Subsystem

The controlled area exhaust air subsystem operates continuously. The subsystem is operated from the MCR, along with the supply air subsystem and the supervised area exhaust air subsystem. The control functions work automatically, and the air flow is maintained constant. During operation, only one of the two fans located in the NAB is



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running; the other is in standby. The exhaust air of the controlled area of the Access Building is filtered continuously through prefilters and HEPA filters and released to the atmosphere via the vent stack. Potential radioactivity in the controlled area exhaust air is monitored by the SAMS that takes samples upstream of the filter banks.

The areas within the Access Building adjacent to the controlled areas are clean areas. During normal operation, these clean areas are maintained at ambient pressure, while the controlled areas are maintained at a negative pressure relative to the outside ambient pressure. The ABVS is designed with a pressure control damper located in the supply ducting. This damper modulates between open and close to adjust the supply of air flow, as required, to maintain a negative pressure in the controlled areas, while the ABVS exhaust fan continuously operates to exhaust air from the controlled areas. Since the controlled areas are maintained at a negative pressure relative to the adjacent clean areas, air from clean areas flows towards the controlled areas.

There are three filter trains. Transferring operation from one filter train to another can be performed for maintenance and is possible during operation without changing the exhaust air flow capacity. The air-tight dampers of the standby train can be opened and those of the train to be maintained can be closed manually.

Air filter loading is monitored by regular inspection of the local differential pressure instrumentation at the filters.

Supervised Area Exhaust Air Subsystem

The supervised area exhaust air subsystem operates continuously. The subsystem is operated from the MCR, along with the supply air subsystem and the controlled area exhaust air subsystem. The control functions work automatically, and the air flow is maintained constant.

During normal operation, only one of the two fans is running; the other is in standby. The exhaust air of the supervised area of the Access Building is released continuously via a concrete air shaft to the atmosphere.

The exhaust air fan of the prestressing gallery operates in conjunction with its manual supply air damper. The ventilation of the prestressing gallery operates continuously.

9.4.14.3.2 Shutdown

When the plant is shut down, the operation of the supply air subsystem and exhaust air subsystems is the same as described in Section 9.4.14.3.1.

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The ABVS is designed with adequate instrumentation for differential pressure, temperature, and flow indicating devices to enable testing and verification of equipment function, heat transfer capability and air flow monitoring.

During normal plant operation, periodic testing of ABVS is performed to demonstrate system and component operability and integrity.


Fans are tested by the manufacturer in accordance with Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) standards (References 5, 6, and 7). Air filters are tested in accordance with the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standards (Reference 8). Cooling coils are hydrostatically tested and their performance is rated in accordance with the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standards (Reference 9).

Housings and ductwork are leak-tested in accordance with ASME N510 (Reference 3), RG 1.140 (Reference 11), and the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association (SMACNA) technical manual "HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test Manual" (Reference 10), American Society of Mechanical Engineers.



Indication of the operational status of the equipment, position of dampers, instrument indications and alarms are provided in the MCR. Fans, motor-operated dampers, heaters and cooling units are operable from the MCR. Local instruments are provided to measure differential pressure across filters, flow, temperature and pressure. The fire detection and sensors information is delivered to the fire detection system.

The radiation instrumentation requirements for controlling airborne radioactivity releases via the plant stack are addressed in Section 11.5.3.1.1 and Table 11.5-1, measurement point R-31.

9.4.14.7 References

1. UL 555, “Standard for Fire Dampers,” Underwriter’s Laboratories, Sixth Edition, June 1999.

2. ASME N509-1989, “Nuclear Power Plant Air-Cleaning Units and Components,” The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1989.

3. ASME N510-1989 (R1995), “Testing of Nuclear Air-Treatment Systems,” The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1989.


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4. ASME AG-1, “Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment,” The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2003 (including the AG-1a-2000, “Housings,” Addenda).




8. ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 52.2-1999, " Method of Testing General Ventilation Air-Cleaning Devices for Removal Efficiency by Particle Size," ANSI/ American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers, 1999.



11. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.140, “Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Normal Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants,” 2001.

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�� Perform air balance as appropriate for each subsystem.

�� Verify that duct/housing total leakage requirements are met.

4.0 DATA REQUIRED

�� Operation of interlocks and set points.

�� Air balancing report, including fan operating data.

�� Containment building temperature data.

�� Prefilter, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, and carbon adsorber data for containment air clean up filtration units.

5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

�� The CBVS perform as designed (refer to Section 9.4.7):

�� Containment Building cooling alarms, interlocks, protective devices, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� Containment Building cooling fan performance meets design requirements.

�� Containment Building cooling dampers/valve performance (i.e., thrust, opening times, closing times, and ability to control flow) meets design requirements.

�� Containment Building cooling air balance meets design requirements.

�� Containment Building meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.

14.2.12.8.2 Containment Building Cooling Subsystem (Test #074)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To verify the proper operation of the containment building cooling subsystem. This system provides cool air to the reactor coolant pumps (RCP), steam generators (SG), chemical and volume control system (CVCS), control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) system and vent and drain system.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities on the containment building cooling subsystem are complete.

�� Permanently installed instrumentation is functional and calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Test instrumentation is available and calibrated.

�� Plant systems required to support testing are functional.



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�� Damper operating data.

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�� Temperature data for each of the SBVSE.


�� The SBVSE operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.6):

�� Safeguard Building cooling alarms, interlocks, protective devices, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� Safeguard Building cooling fan performance meets design requirements.

�� Safeguard Building cooling dampers/valve performance (thrust, opening times, closing times, and ability to control flow) meets design requirements.

�� Safeguard Building cooling air balance meets design requirements.

�� SBVSE meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.�� Verify that safety-related components meet electrical independence

and redundancy requirements.

14.2.12.8.7 Nuclear Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (Test #079)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To demonstrate the operation of the nuclear auxiliary building ventilation system (NABVS).

�� To demonstrate electrical independence and redundancy of power supplies.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities in the nuclear auxiliary building are complete with penetrations sealed.

�� Construction activities on the NABVS have been completed.

�� NABVS instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.



DRAFT

refer to Secrefer

ooling alarms, interloling alarmols (manual and automaols (manual and au

uilding cooling fan perfolding coolingents.

uard Building cooling daard Building coolinhrust, opening times, closopening times, clo

flow) meets design requlow) meets design requSafeguard Building cSafeguard Buirequirements.quirements.

��

�� Verify that safety-Verify that

DRA

SBVSE meets SBVSE meets

DRand redundancnd redundan

r Auxiliary Buildr Auxiliary Bu

CTIVECTIVEDRA



�� Support systems required for operation of the NABVS are functional.


3.0 TEST METHOD

�� Verify control logic.

�� Verify the operation of the air handling units or fans or both.

�� Verify alarms, indicating lights and status lights are functional.

�� Perform air flow balancing of the NABVS.

�� Verify that operation of dampers meets design requirements.

�� Perform HEPA filter and carbon adsorber efficiency tests.

�� Verify operation of the NABVS radioactivity monitors (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-11 through R-15).

�� Check electrical independence and redundancy of power supplies for safety-related functions by selectively removing power and determining loss of function.


4.0 DATA REQUIRED



�� Setpoints at which alarms and control occur.

�� Temperature data for each of the NABVS.

�� HEPA filter and carbon adsorber efficiency data.


�� The NABVS operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.3):

�� NABVS alarms, interlocks, protective devices, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� NABVS fan performance meets design requirements.�� NABVS dampers/valve performance (i.e., thrust, opening

times, closing times, and ability to control flow) meets design requirements.

�� NABVS air balance meets design requirements.�� The NABVS meets design requirements to monitor radiation

(refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-11 through R-15).�� NABVS meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.



DRAFT

actiactugh R-15)ugh R

e and redundancye and reduselectively removing pselectively remo

tion.tion.

using total leakage requiring total leakFTperating data.ng data.

ow and balancing verificow and balancing

etpoints at which alarmsetpoints at which alar

Temperature data for emperature data for

�� HEPA filter and cHEPA filter

ACCEPTANCE CRIACCEPTANCE CRI

The NAhe NA

��

AFT



14.2.12.8.8 Radioactive Waste Building Ventilation System (Test #080)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To demonstrate the proper operation of the radioactive waste building ventilation system (RWBVS) to maintain design condition.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities on the RWBVS have been completed.

�� RWBVS instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the RWBVS are complete and functional.


3.0 TEST METHOD


�� Verify that operation, stroking speed and position indication of dampers meets design requirements.

�� Verify the capacity of the HVAC system to maintain the area temperature.

�� Verify the system maintains the Radioactive Waste Processing Building at a negative pressure.

�� Verify that operation of the general ventilation supply units and fans meets design requirements.

�� Verify that operation of the general ventilation exhaust units and fans meets design requirements.

�� Perform HEPA filter and carbon adsorber efficiency tests.

�� Verify the systems rated air flow and air balance.

�� Verify that operation of protective devices, controls, interlocks instrumentation and alarms using actual or simulated inputs meets design requirements.

�� Verify that operation of the RWBVS response to high radiation monitor signal meets design requirements (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-20 and R-22).


4.0 DATA REQUIRED

�� Air balancing verification.

�� Fan and damper operating data.

�� Temperature data.


DRAFT

nd calibnd ca

n, stroking speed and postroking speesign requirements.equirem

pacity of the HVAC acity of the HVAC systre.

y the system maintains thy the system maintains thilding at a negative pressilding at a negative

Verify that operation oVerify that operation omeets design requireets design require

�� Verify that operVerify that omeets design ets design

�� Perform Hform

VerifVerif



�� Setpoints of alarms interlocks and controls.

�� The Radioactive Waste Building negative pressure readings.

�� RWBVS performance data in response to radiation monitor signals.

�� HEPA filter and carbon adsorber efficiency data.


�� The RWBVS operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.8):

�� RWBVS alarms, interlocks, protective devices, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� RWBVS fan performance meets design requirements.�� RWBVS dampers/valve performance (i.e., thrust, opening

times, closing times, and ability to control flow) meets design requirements.

�� RWBVS air balance meets design requirements.�� RWBVS meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.

�� The RWBVS responds as designed to radiation monitor signals designed (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-20 through R-22).

14.2.12.8.9 Fuel Building Ventilation System (Test #081)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To demonstrate the proper operation of the fuel building ventilation system (FBVS) to maintain design conditions.


2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities on the FBVS have been completed.

�� FBVS instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the FBVS are complete and functional.


3.0 TEST METHOD


�� Verify that operation, stroke speed and position indication of dampers meet design requirements.

�� Verify the system maintains the Fuel Building at a negative pressure.

�� Verify the NABVS supplies and exhausts air to the Fuel Building.


lity tolity t

meets design requireets designct/housing total leakage ct/housing total lea

FTas designed to radiationas designed to radiationable 11.5-1, Monitors R-le 11.5-1, M

System (Test #081)ystem (Test #08

demonstrate the proper odemonstrate the prystem (FBVS) to maintaystem (FBVS) to maint

To demonstrate electdemonstrate electsupplies.supplies.

PREREQUISITESPREREQUISIT

�� Construonstr

FBVFBV

FT



�� Verify that the operation of the fuel handling area ventilation exhaust units and fans meet design requirements.

�� Verify that operation of the heating and cooling units meet design requirements.

�� Verify HEPA filter efficiency, carbon adsorber efficiency, and air flow capacity.

�� Verify the systems rated air flow and air balance.

�� Verify that operation of protective devices, controls, interlocks instrumentation, and alarms using actual or simulated inputs.

�� Verify system response to a high radiation signal (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-17, R-18, and R-19)).

�� Verify that operation of the FBVS radiation monitors meet design requirements (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-17, R-18, and R-19).



4.0 DATA REQUIRED



�� Temperature data in the Fuel Building.

�� Setpoints at which alarms, interlocks, and controls occur.

�� Fuel Building negative pressurization data during normal and postulated emergency conditions.

�� Filter and carbon adsorber data.

�� FBVS performance data in response to radiation monitor signals.


�� The FBVS operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.2):

�� FBVS alarms, interlocks, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� FBVS valves and dampers function as design.�� FBVS maintains the Fuel Building at the required negative

pressure.� Table 14.3-2 Item 2-9.

�� FBVS recirculation rate (e.g., through the HEPA filters, carbon adsorber) meet design requirements.

�� FBVS normal operation heating and ventilation system performs as designed.


DRAFT

iatiat1, Monit1, Mo

and redundancy and reduselectively removing pselectively rem

ion.ion.

sing total leakage requireing total leakage requireFTing verification.erification.

nd damper operating datand damper operating data

emperature data in the Femperature data in th

Setpoints at which alaetpoints at which ala

�� Fuel Building negFuel Buildipostulated emeostulated em

�� Filter and cr a

FBVS pFBVS p

TATA

AFT



�� FBVS meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.�� The FBVS responds to radiation monitor signals as designed (refer to

Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-17, R-18, and R-19).

�� Verify that safety-related components meet electrical independence and redundancy requirements.

14.2.12.8.10 Main Control Room Air Conditioning System (Test #082)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To verify that operation of the main control air conditioning system (CRACS) establishes that a proper environment for personnel and equipment under postulated conditions in the following areas:

�� MCR.�� Technical Support Center.�� Other offices and equipment areas of the control room

envelope (CRE).�� To demonstrate electrical independence and redundancy of power

supplies.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities in the MCR complex have been completed and penetrations sealed.

�� Construction activities on the CRACS have been completed.

�� The CRACS system instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the CRACS are complete and functional.


3.0 TEST METHOD


�� Verify that operation, stroke speed and position indication of dampers meet design requirements.

�� Verify in manual operating mode that system rated air flow and air balance meet design requirements.

�� Demonstrate in automatic mode the transfer to emergency-operations as a result of the following:

�� Detection of radiation in one of the outside inlets places the CREF (iodine filtration) units in the filtered alignment.

�� Safety injection actuation/primary containment isolation signal.


DRAFTipment areas of thepment area

cal independence and redcal independence and re

ion activities in the MCRtivities in the MCRations sealed.ations sealed.

nstruction activities on tnstruction activities

The CRACS system insThe CRACS system insoperating satisfactoroperating satisfactor

�� Support systemsSupport systefunctional.ctional.

�� Test instrins

METHMETH



�� Verify the HEPA filter efficiency, carbon adsorber efficiency, and filter bank air flow capacity.

�� Verify that operation of protective devices, controls, interlocks, instrumentation, and alarms using actual or simulated inputs meets design requirements.

�� Verify that the system maintains the CRE at the required positive pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

�� Demonstrate the operation of the battery room exhaust fans.

�� Verify the CRE air in-leakage rate when aligned in the emergency mode.

�� Verify that operation of CRACS in response to radiation monitors meets design requirements (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-29 and R-30).


�� Verify that duct/housing leakage requirements are met.

4.0 DATA REQUIRED



�� Temperature data in the CRE.

�� Response to radioactivity and smoke.

�� Setpoints of alarms, interlocks, and controls.

�� Pressurization data for the CRE.

�� Filter and carbon adsorber data.

�� CRE in-leakage rate when aligned in the emergency mode.

�� The CRACS response to radiation monitors.


�� The CRACS operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.1).

�� CRACS alarms, interlocks, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� CRACS valves and dampers function as design.�� CRACS responds as designed to a simulated smoke signal.�� CRACS recirculation flow rate meets design requirements.

� Table 14.3-2 Item 2-7.�� CRACS unfiltered air in-leakage rate while in recirculation

mode meets design requirements.


DRAFT

ng verification.verification.

d damper operating data.damper operating data.

mperature data in the CRmperature data in th

Response to radioactivitResponse to radioactivi

Setpoints of alarmsSetpoints

�� Pressurization ressurization

�� Filter and cr a

CRE inCRE in

FTng leakage requirementsng leakage requirementsFTFTand redundancand red

lectively removing ectively remon.on.

ThTh

FT



� Table 14.3-2 Item 2-8.�� CRACS is capable of generating a positive MCR pressure

relative to adjacent areas, as designed.� Table 14.3-2 Item 2-6.

�� CRACS responds as designed to a simulated SIS signal.� Table 14.3-2 Item 2-5.

�� CRACS meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.�� The CRACS radiation monitors perform as designed (refer to

Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-29 and R-30):

�� CRACS responds as designed to a simulated high radiation signal.� Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-29 and R-30.� Table 14.3-2 Item 2-5.

�� Verify that safety-related components meet electrical independence and redundancy requirements.

14.2.12.8.11 Safeguard Building Controlled Area Ventilation System (Test #083)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To demonstrate the operation of the safeguard building controlled area ventilation system (SBVS):

�� Hot mechanical area serviced by the SBVS.�� SBVS air supply subsystem.�� SBVS air exhaust subsystem.�� Electric air heating convectors (area heaters).


2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities in the safeguard building mechanical area are complete with penetrations sealed.

�� Construction activities on the SBVS have been completed.

�� Safeguard building mechanical area ventilation subsystem instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the SBVS are functional.


3.0 TEST METHOD



DRAFTponents meet eleponents m

nts.nts.

ea Ventilation Systemea Ventilation System

rate the operation of thee the operation of thon system (SBVS):em (SBVS):

Hot mechanical area Hot mechanica�� SBVS air supply sVS air supply

�� SBVS air exhaSBVS air exha�� Electric aiEle

�� To demonstrademonstrasupplies.lie

EREQUISIEREQUISI



�� Verify the operation of air handling units or fans or both.

�� Verify operation of the operational air exhaust mode in the mechanical area.

�� Verify operation of the accident air exhaust mode in the mechanical area.

�� Verify operation of the electric air convectors (area heaters).

�� Verify operation of the filter air heaters, prefilters, HEPA filters, and adsorbers.

�� Verify operation of the recirculation cooling units.

�� Verify alarms, indicating lights and status lights are functional.

�� Perform air flow balancing of the SBVS.

�� Verify that operation of dampers meet design requirements.


�� Verify that operation of the SBVS radiation monitors meet design requirements (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-25 and R-26).


4.0 DATA REQUIRED



�� Setpoints at which alarms, center backs and control occur.

�� Temperature data for each of the SBVS.


�� The SBVS operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.5):

�� SBVS air handlers/fans perform as designed.�� The operation of the SBVS operational air exhaust mode in the

mechanical area meets design requirements.�� The operation of the SBVS accident air exhaust mode in the

mechanical area meets design requirements.�� The operation of the SBVS electric air convectors (area

heaters) meets design requirements.�� The operation of the SBVS filter air heaters, prefilters, HEPA

filters, and adsorber meets design requirements.�� The operation of the SBVS recirculation cooling units meets

design requirements.


DRAFED

mper operating data.mper operating dat

Air flow and balancing Air flow and balancing

Setpoints at which Setpoints

�� Temperature daTemperature

ACCEPTANCE CACCEPTANCE

The SThe S

AFuct/housing leakage requict/housing leakage

AFAFT

meet desimeet d

and redundancyand reduselectively removing pselectively rem

ion.ion.

n of the SBVS radiation mof the SBVS radiation mer to Table 11.5-1, MonitTable 11.5

AF



�� SBVS alarms, indicating lights and status lights meet design requirements.

�� SBVS meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.�� Verify that safety-related components meet electrical independence

and redundancy requirements.

�� The SBVS meets design requirements to monitor radiation (refer to Table 11.5-1, Monitors R-25 and R-26).

14.2.12.8.12 Emergency Power Generating Building Ventilation System (Test #084)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To demonstrate proper operation of the emergency power generating building ventilation system (EPGBVS).

�� To demonstrate proper operation of the EPGBVS.


2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities on the EPGBVS have been completed.

�� EPGBVS instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the EPGBVS are complete and functional.


3.0 TEST METHOD


�� Verify design air flow with each EPGBVS in operation.

�� Verify design temperature can be maintained in each Emergency Power Generating Building.

�� Verify alarms, indicating instruments, and status lights are functional.


4.0 DATA REQUIRED


�� Air flow verification

�� Setpoint at which alarms, interlocks, and controls occur.

�� Temperature data of each Emergency Power Generating Building.


DRAFT

).).

of the EPGof th

ependence and redependence a

tivities on the EPGBVS htivities on the E

strumentation has been cumentation has beenrily prior to performing or to performing

ort systems required for ort systems requird functional.d functiona

Test instrumentation iest instrumentation i

TEST METHODTEST METHOD

�� Verify contfy

�� Verify derify

VerVer



�� Perform vendor supplied startup checks and calibrations for all laboratory equipment that analyze or measure isotopic concentrations of radioactive samples.

4.0 DATA REQUIRED

�� Inspection report from verification of laboratory equipment drains.

�� Inspection report from verification of ventilation hood flow and routing.

�� Completed vendor specified laboratory equipment startup procedures.


�� The laboratory equipment drain interface with the plant systems performs as designed.

�� The laboratory equipment ventilation hood interface with the plant systems performs as designed.

�� The laboratory equipment checkout and calibration procedures meet design requirements as described in Sections 11.5 and 13.4.

14.2.12.8.19 Access Building Ventilation System (Test #224)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To verify the access building ventilation system (ABVS) can maintain the space temperature as required.

�� To verify that radiological alarms are provided in the control room for the operator to manually isolate the building exhaust to the vent stack (refer to Section 11.5.3.1.2 and Table 11.5-1, Monitor R-31..

2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities on the ABVS have been completed.

�� ABVS instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the ABVS are complete and functional.

�� Test Instrumentation is available and calibrated.

3.0 TEST METHOD

�� Verify control logic and interlock.

�� Verify design air flow of each fan.

�� Verify alarms, indicating instruments and status lights are functional.

�� Verify design temperatures can be maintained in the structure.



lation hood inlation

nt checkout and calibratint checkout and calibs described in Sections 1s described in Sections 1

System (Test #224)m (Test

rify the access building vrify the access building vspace temperature as respace temperature

To verify that radiologiTo verify that radiologithe operator to manuoperator to manu(refer to Section 1(refer to Sec

PREREQUISITESPREREQUISIT

Construonstr

ABAB



4.0 DATA REQUIRED

�� Temperature data for the structure from each HVAC unit.

�� HVAC unit operating data.

�� Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur.


�� The ABVS operates as designed (refer to Section 9.4.14, Section 11.5.3.1.10 and Table 11.5-1, Monitor R-31):

�� ABVS alarms, interlocks, protective devices, and controls (manual and automatic) function as designed.

�� ABVS fan performance meets design requirements.�� ABVS dampers/valve performance (i.e., thrust, opening times,

closing times, and ability to control flow) meets design requirements.

�� ABVS air balance meets design requirements.�� ABVS meets duct/housing total leakage requirements.

14.2.12.9 Auxiliary Systems

14.2.12.9.1 Leak-off System (Test #091)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

�� To demonstrate the functionality of the leak-off system (LOS) to collect and route bypass leakage from selected penetrations in the Containment Building containing primary fluid to the annulus sump.

�� To demonstrate the functionality of the LOS to provide a flow path for inflating/deflating the containment in support of ILRT.

�� To demonstrate the functionality of the LOS to provide a flow path for measuring leak tightness of the containment in support of ILRT.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

�� Construction activities on the LOS have been completed.

�� LOS instrumentation has been calibrated and is operating satisfactorily prior to performing the following test.

�� Support systems required for operation of the LOS are completed and functional.

3.0 TEST METHOD

�� Verify the bypass leakage flow path from the personnel air locks to the annulus sump.


DRAFT

rmancermany to control fly to co

meets design requirememeets design requiuct/housing total leakageuct/housing total leakagFT091))

To demonstrate the functTo demonstrate the funcollect and route bypaollect and route bypaContainment BuildContainm

�� To demonstrateo demonstrainflating/defating/def

�� To demodemmeasumeasu

FT

2011/09/13 Areva EPR DC - DRAFT Response to U.S. …PATTON Jeff (AREVA) Subject: DRAFT Response to...

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Transcript of 2011/09/13 Areva EPR DC - DRAFT Response to U.S. …PATTON Jeff (AREVA) Subject: DRAFT Response to...