1.9 - Schweikert, David - Reflections on Anti- Marxism. Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labour...

7/30/2019 1.9 - Schweikert, David - Reflections on Anti- Marxism. Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labour Theory Value (en)

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Reflections on Anti- Marxism: Elster on Marx's Functionalism and LabourTheory Value

Reflections on Anti- Marxism: Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labour TheoryValue

by David Schweikert

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1 / 1988, pages: 109-122, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=d1bdefd8-6d05-473d-baba-ef37a525117ahttp://www.ceeol.com/


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L " l l i . T l I I A ~ r ' 6 " f 1 1 " " " ~ " " I I i i C ' " on Anti-Marxism: Elster on .Marx'sLabor Theory ofValueSchweikert

Brian 'Barry has dubbed him "the prince of foxes," and the title is notinappropriate .. l Jon Elster knows many things. He has command of theMarxian corpus; he grasps many facets of technical economics, politicaltheory, history, philosophy, even psychology.. In addition he has an acutesense for subtle distinctions and the ability to articulate them precisely .. Yetfor all these talents, his Making Sense ofMarx2 is a problematic work ..Left intellectuals have been kind to the book .. Michael Walzer raved in the

New York Review ofBook.3 Andrew Levine gave it high marks in TheJournalof Philosophy ..4 In this journal Rolf Zimmermann called it "a penetratingstudy .." 5 In a recent issue of Inquiry devoted to the book it was hailed as "lucidand illuminating," "refreshingly irreverent," awork of "genius .. "6 I think thisis much too generous.To begin with, Making Sense ofMarx is chock full of bad argument. Elstersays his book is largely about details,7, but if one looks closely at the details,much of its argumentative force dissipates. Such is my claim. The first twosections of this paper will aim at substantiation .. In successive sections I willexamine two of Elster's theses: that Marx is repeatedly guilty of illicitfunctionalism and that Marxian economic theory has been proven rigorouslyto be wrong .. I confine myself to only two of Elster's many provocative chargesso as to be able to pay suitable attention to details, but I think a similaranalysis could be given ofmany others. In addition to bad argument, MakingSense ofMarx is laden with casual, gratuitous jibes that play a significant rolethe book's overall rhetorical strategy. In Section 11 I will offer somereflections on this strategy, particularly as it involves Elster's curious antiMarx Marxism.

IAs all who have followed the Cohen-Elster debates know well, Ion Elster is

the arch-foe of functional explanation.8 The anti-functionalist drum beatcontinues in Making Sense ofMarx .. In the opening chapter Elster asks, "DidMarx practice functional explanation? If so, was he successful? If not, couldhis explanations be improved?" (p. 27). EIster asserts that he will mainlyexplore the first two questions. Moreover, "in this book I shall be concernedwith functional explanations of a rather crude kind. These are attempts toexplain behavior simply {Elster's emphasis] by pointing to the fact that it hasbeneficial consequences for some agent or agents" (p .. 28) .. More defensible varietiesPraxis International 8: 1April 1988 0260-8448 $2.00


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110 Praxis Internationaloffunctional explanation need not be considered, "since it is certain thatMarx didnot propose any of these sophisticated versions of functionalism" (p. 29).We observe that since Elster proposes to consider only crude functionalexplanations, the second question has been answered. IfMarx has engaged in"functional explanation" as Elster will use the term, he cannot have succeeded. No one, certainly not Cohen, the foremost defender of functionalexplanation in Marx, thinks that crude functional explanations are satisfactory. So the three questions have been pared to one: did Marx engage in crudefunctional explanation?Elster is quite certain he did. Elster announces that he will "survey the maininstances of [objectionable] functional explanation in Marx" (p. 27), andproceeds with a seven-page indictment: On page 29:

It is certainly because Marx believed history to be directed to a 'goal - theadvent of a communist society - that he felt justified in explaining, not onlypatterns of behavior, but even individual events, in terms of their contribution tothat end.On page 31:

From recognizing the long-run benefits to the capitalist class of state actions that(in the short run) go against its interest, there was but a short step to theconclusion that the benefits explain the concessions made to the workers . . .

Two pages later:There is a strong tendency in Marxism to explain, say, religion or bourgeoispolitical economy in terms of their stabilizing influence on the prevailingrelations of production.If one reads these pages with care, one is struck by a large omission. Noeffort has been made to show that Marx explained the various phenomena in

question simply by pointing to their beneficial effects. It is important to beclear. There is nothing methodologically illicit in pointing out that certainphenomena have beneficial consequences. There is nothing wrong in sayingthat a giraffe's long neck is beneficial for its survivaL Crude functionalismasserts that the giraffe has a long neck simply because it is beneficial for itssurvival. That is, crude functionalism asserts a) that the long neck isfunctional, b) that the long neck exists because it is functional, and c) that itsbeing functional is a sufficient condition for its existence. Assertion c) is theproblematic one, since it amounts to a denial that any account need besupplied as to how the beneficial consequence (survival, in this case) shouldbring about the long neck.9 For seven pages Elster is content to charge Marxwith crude functionalism, but he offers no proof.Elster seems suddenly to recognize that "1 have given relatively little textualevidence so far of Marx's tendency to engage in functional explanation,referring the reader to later chapters for examples and details" (p. 34). In factElster's admission falls short. Looking back over this "survey of the maininstances of functional explanation in Marx," we see that he has not supplied asingle quote from Marx.

AccessviaCEEOL NL Germany


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Praxis International I I IThis oversight is remedied in his final s u b - ~ e c t i o n on functional explanation- in amanner that bears close examination. Elster introduces a selection from

Volume ofCapital with the remark that it reveals Marx's "cavalier attitudeto the canons of explanation" (p. 35). relevant section of the quote readsas follows:The circumstance that a man without fortune, but possessing energy, solidityand business acumen may become a capitalist in this manner . . . is greatlyadmired by apologists of the capitalist, system. Although this circumstancecertainly brings an unwelcome number of new soldiers of fortune into the fieldand into competition with the already existing individual capitalists, it alsoreinforces the supremacy of capital itself, expands its base and enables it torecruit ever new forces for itself out of the substratum of society.

social interms ofno attempt to suggest av . . . . . n .. .. .." ' t - ... The statement is both a

an instance invalid functional

Elster comments: readits beneficial consequencesmechanism beyond thatviolation ofmethodologicalexplanation" 35).I would ask reader to look again at the quote. Is it an instance of crudefunctionalism? Is it an attenlpt at any sort of functional explanation, crude orotherwise? Leave aside the fact that Volume III ofCapital was an unfinished,unpolished work. The statement Elster has quoted asserts a true proposition:social mobility is beneficial to capitalism. Nothing more. Marx has notclaimed that social mobility is explained by its beneficial consequences. Marxdoes not say that there is social mobility under capitalism because it isbeneficial to capitalism. It is Elster, not Marx, who gives the passage thatmeaning. 10 To repeat what was said above: there is nothing illicit in pointingout that a certain phenomenon has beneficial consequences. What is methodologically problematic is to claim that these consequences in and of tllemselvesexplain the phenomenon. I find it astonishing that a thinker so capable ofobserving distinctions - and so harsh on those who do not - should beso careless.Nor is this an isolated example. Elster's index lists twenty-six entries under

"functional explanation." They are scattered throughout the book, so it takessome effort to examine the evidence comprehensively and in toto. I wouldinvite reader to do so. I have looked at all the indexed instances and havefound not one convincing case of crude functionalism. In many instancesElster remarks that a passage "suggests" a functional explanation (pp. 188,285, 370, 389, 499). In some instances his interpretations are exotic as, forexample, when reads Marx as implying that business cycles are to beexplained terms of their beneficial effect on working class militancy (p.Ill). Ponder this interpretation for an1oment. To think that business cyclesare to be explained in terms their beneficial effect on working classmilitancy is to think that business cycles occur because such cycles promotemilitancy. Seriously now ... does anyone imagine that Marx thought that?I do not mean to say that there are no passages in Marx thatmight be read asinstances of bad functionalism. 1 do mean to say that they are few, and that


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1

they are two sorts:enhances suvivability,_ " " " , , - ~ . a . J 1 . J L , . l l . . o I l . . l i . ~ " " ' _ . Alternatively (or in

" - '_ . I I.a._ .....Jl. ..... .ll. consequences of A and act

disagreement. if Elster's original position. l \.U\".lL.A.IL.............. on methodological grounds only if hethere exists no plausible causalanalyzing, Marx must be read asis beneficial to capitalism, and other

_ " ' l I l . ~ . J J I . " " " . " . 4 . A U capitalism's stability. mustn'O' ..... . , . " '1 IC'O it T " \ " " ' 4 " " , , ' l l " " l r O l . r " " 1 l - ~ J I l C '


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1131 I o J . A . ~ U U . l . l \ J . A . " ' " account as to how_ from suchmobility andasserts no more a), andis more reasonable than c). I would

JI. by Marx, it need not be regarded as.l\,lI.4.1..I."" ' \.Ji. 'U' .A..l.I.... .l.Jl.O";'JI..I..JI., since d) might well true. I take it as notthe capitalist state at least sometimes acts to promote thegeneral interests of bourgeoisie. 14foregoing analysis is meant to demonstrate not only the flimsiness of

Elster's case against Marx specific instance, to highlight just howr i la l l " ' l r ' \o '" ) nr1 l1Inn- it is in' general to charge of functionalism. One

an instance effects are alleged; one must establish. . . . . . . . . ..ll. ... _ . . . . , ... ., not a causal, is intended; and one must show

JI.,,..a..ll..Il. .JI."U'.lI.Ji\.,,.4 .. . explanation any plausible causal supplement. Thecharge is easy to (any of beneficial effect can be so construed),but difficult to prove. Elster rests content the easy part.

At the same time, I was discovering Marxist economic theory in the wake of the"capital controversy." I was excited at these rigorous formulations of Marx'stheory, and then when it turned out that their main use was to provethat it was wrong. (p. xiii).

labor theory value is three-fold. argues that theground because it cannot with heterogeneousobjection, he analyzes four distinct claims that might

substance of theory as a theory of price formation.dismisses two "transcendental" interpretations of the

defends this rather dramatic claim his chapter on Marxianeconomics. He claims to be mainly reporting has been demonstrated inthe recent work von Weizsaecker, Samuelson, Steed-man Roemer. argues Marx's analysis of capitalism as aneconomic system rests on two pillars, each of which has been conclusively.shown to be false: labor theory of value and the law of falling rate ofprofit. us concentrate our attention on first, which is the more centralof two.Elster's attack ontheory cannot getlabor. Setting asidebe to constitute

he examinestheory.The labor theory of value cannot get off ground, says Elster, because the

labor value of a commodity cannot be unambiguously defined. His is ayou-can't-add-apples-and-oranges critique: an hour's worth of skilled labor ofa non-producible sort or an hour's worth particularly unpleasant laborcannot be set to an hour's worth of simple, unskilled labor or even tosome multiple standard. There exists "genuinely and irreduciblyheterogeneous labor" (p. 131).

problem here is that Elster has not given us a statement of the laborof value, nor have we he


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114 Praxis Internationalis supposed to accomplish. He alludes to "the intentions behind the labourtheory of value" (p. 131), these remain unspecified. Yet they are crucial.The fact of the matter is, we can add apples and oranges. Among other ways:we can abstract from physical differences and add their weights or volumes;we can regard them as marketable commodities and add their production costsor selling prices; we can add up the labor that went into producing them,choosing, if we wish, to abstract from labor differences altogether or to weighcertain types of labor according to selected standards. Which aggregativetechnique is appropriate depends on the project. (If they are to serve as ballastfor a boat, the first would be best.) If the labor theory of value is not meant tobe a theory of relative prices - and few Marxists think it is - thenheterogeneous labor need not be a problem. Like all economic theories,Marx's involves simplification and abstraction. The issue must be whether aparticular simplification - in this case, an assumption that alllabor is equallyskilled and equally unpleasant - is useful or not.Elster takes up this question, but after his a priori objection, and in aless-than-satisfactory manner. Even if definitional difficulties could be resolved, he says, "The theory of labor value fails because there is no use to whichthe concept can-be put" (p.131). To substantiate this charge, Elster specifies,then refutes, four claims that he takes to be versions of t ~ e theory regarded asa theory of price formation: 1) prices are proportional to labor values; 2) ifprices are normalized so that the sum of all prices equals the sum of alllaborvalues, then the totality of surplus-value equals the totality on ptofit; 3) laborvalues can be determined independently of prices, but not conversly; 4) pricesare independent of the composition of final demand. 16 He argues (correctly)that none of these claims is true, even ofMarx's own general model.But consider: Marx did not think 1) was true of his general model, andthere is no textual evidence that he held either 3) or 4). Elster acknowledges asmuch - though not without a bit of self-contradiction. He proclaims that "allhave some textual support in Marx," then concedes immediately that 1) "wasasserted in Capital I as a convenient simplification only," and that "nothingquite as specific as 3) is found in Marx" (p. 135). As evidence for 4) he quotesa passage from Capital I l l , then comments, "I believe that Marx intended tosay not only what he actually states in the first sentence, that changes in labourvalues are a sufficient condition for price changes, but that they are anecessary condition as well" Cp. 136; emphasis mine). So much for textualsupport for 1), 3) or 4).It is true that Marx believed 2), but, Robert Paul Wolff to the contrarynotwithstanding, this proposition is not a central theoretical claim, nor was itso regarded by Marx. 17 Three points are worth noting. Marx nowhere arguesfor 2); it appears to him, wrongly, to be self-evident. However, the claim isnot far wrong; it is a reasonable approximation in general, and it holdsrigorously in certain models. I8 Finally (and most importantly) nothingsignificant turns on the fact that it is not universally true. Whatever one mightwant to make of 2), it is hardly a "pillar ofMarxian economics."Elster concludes his attack on the labor theory of value by consideringwhathe calls "transcendental" interpretations of the theory, (pp. 138-41).


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Praxis International 115In 1973 Michio Morishima proved what he labeled "the fundamental

theorem of Marxian economics": the economy-wide rate of profit will bepositive if and only if the rate of exploitation is positive. 19This result spurredRobert Paul Wolff to constuct, then critique, a rather peculiar argument forthe labor theory of value. Marx is held to be reasoning in Capital I that profitis possible only if labor is the source of all value. 20 Elster, like Wolff, sees thisargument as failing because "in fact, similar 'fundamental theorems' can beproved with respect to steel or any other basic commodity" (p. 141).Again the problem here is interpretation. It is ingenious, but surelyimplausible, to read the central argument of Capital I (the locus of thisinterpretation) as a defense ofa particular theory ofvalue rather than as a critique ofcapitalism. Surely what Marx is arguing is that capitalist profit is based on theexploitation ofworkers, not that profit is inexplicable unless we regard labor asthe source of all value. 21 Again Elster refutes a view thatMarx does not hold.Elster sees another transcendental argument in Capital I, this time in theopening pages. So far as I can tell, this interpretation is unique to Elster. Hereads Marx as trying to establish that a condition for the possibility ofcommodity exchange is that each item be the product of human labor. Elsterthen counters: not all exchangeable products are producted by labor;moreover, products exchange in virtue of the fact that they are useful andscarce, not because they are products labar (pp. 138-141).

Both sophistication and superficiality are in evidence in this analysis. Manycritics read the opening pages of Capital I as Marx's attempt to show thatcommodities will exchange only when they embody equal quantities of abstracthuman labor. But it has now been conclusively established thatMarxwas wellaware when composing this text that the price/labor-value correspondenceholds only under very special circumstances. 22 It is a mark of Elster'sacuteness that he does not repeat the usual criticisms.Unfortunately, his interpretation is little better. Knowing that Marx doesnot think that exchange-values are in general proportional to labor-values,Elster abstracts completely from the quantitative problem and interpretsMarx as attempting to answer a qualitative question: what property orproperties must a commodity possess in order to become an object ofexchange? quotes from the well-known passage where Marx examines cornand iron for signs of exchange-value, then interprets it thus:This famous pasage can be broken down into two steps, (i) For exchange to bepossible, the goods exchanged must have some common element. (ii) Thiscommon element can only be the property of being products of human labor (p.139).

But this cannot be what Marx is arguing, for he knows well that commodities,in order to exchange, must be useful. Two pages before the quote excerptedby Elster, Marx writes, "A commodity is, in the first place ... a thing thatby its properties satisfies human wants.,,23 Clearly, Marx does not subscribe to(ii).What Marx is arguing is masked by an ellipsis Elster has inserted in hisMarx quote: "Each of them, so far as it is exchange value, must therefore be


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116.lI. .....u.u ....... Jl.U.ll1o,.. to commongeometrical, a chemical, or any other natural139). The ellipsis represents a COIltal.nlrlgexchange-value of cqmmodities mustsomething common to ofquantity. "24We see that Marx is ....... 1" ' .. ' II"1II1''\"7knows, and says so

must be useful. but does notargues those opening pages. (Presumablyscarcity.) A theoretical account of an economicthematize the quantitative nature of exchange.tative dimension is not so simple as proportionality,l a b o r ~ being the only obviously quantifiable variable,determinant.Marx mayor may not be right on score. Neoclassical economists havelabored mightily to construct a quantitative theory prices onnotions of utility scarcity. Sraffa and the neo-Ricardians ""'_.,. ........ 'fI- ........... .. rI1powerfully .. 25 Marx's argument is by no means .......U.l,J. .....J . 'U0. . lLElster's reconstruction the qualification that the common 1I..-A...... Jl.Jl.Jl.'... ..LJl.Lfiable, it is se silly as Elster it appear.To recapitulate briefly: Elster's "conclusive" refutation the theoryof value consists of seven arguments, six of which invoke distinct interpretations of the theory. first argues that the theory founders on heterogeneouslabor. He proceeds to refute four interpretations of the theory as a theoryprice formation, then two transcendental interpretations. His first argument,

the one devoid of interpretation, fails for precisely that reason. We cannotassess the charge that heterogeneous labor undermines theory withoutknowing what the theory is intended to accomplish. Of the remaining six onlyone refutes a proposition actually believed by Marx (so far as we can tell fromthe textual evidence), and that proposition is not theoretically significant.short, an invisible man, five straw men, and one bit player.I don't mean to be unfair to Elster. After all, Marx himselfdid not provide asystematic statement of, or rationale for, a labor theory of value, and it iscertainly the case that manyMarxists have been muddled as to what is at stakewith the theory. It has too often served as a touchstone for True Believers withlittle care given to specification or justification. Still - to make an analyticaldistinction - failing to specifiy adequately or to justify is a different matterfrom relying on a theory that has been conclusively refuted.Moreover, it seems to me that a reasonable interpretation is not so hard tocome by - if one is seriously interested in making sense ofMarx. One wouldbegin by recognizing that Marx did not explicitly champion a distinctivetheory of value. He did not even use the term "labor theory of value."Therefore, the question should be: what to make of certain practices of Marxthat seem constitutive ofwhat now might be called "value theory"? Above all,what'to make of the practice of regarding commodities as ......O .. .,iI".a.C'o.a.,..... 1.\- .... d f - ~ ......., ...........definite quantities of abstract, socially-necessary human


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By regarding commodities as "'lI w . . & f A , J l . J L ~ . , " " L J L ~... U' IS

1


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118 Praxis Internationalsomething else that is central to any real understanding of a capitalisteconomy. He is able to do macro-analysis. To investigage macroeconomicrelationships - growth, unemployment, instability, crises - one must addapples and oranges. Until the advent of Leontief input-output analysis and theneo-Ricardian theoretical analogues, the only available aggregative optionswere market prices and labor values. The unsuitability of the former isevidenced by an almost complete lack of macroeconomic analysis during thehalf century following the neoclassical triumph over labor-oriented classicaleconomics. It took the Great Depression and Keynes to reintroduce macroeconomics to the profession, and even Keynes, aggregating by using ratioofmarket prices to the wage rate, could only theorize short-run instabilities. 30Given Marx's concern to investigate the "laws of motion" of a capitalisteconomy, his allegiance to a labor theory of"value was a quite rational decision.It is not obvious that labor-value analysis has been wholly superseded eventoday. A case can certainly be made that for certain purposes equilibriumprices (i.e., neo-Ricardian theory) is a more suitable instrument, but if theproject is to study development and disequilibrium, a labor-value orientataionremains useful. I think Harvey's Limits to Capital demonstrates this point, asdoes the work of Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel, and many others whoregularly employ Marxian value categories. To write all this off as resting on aconclusively refuted theory is, to put it mildly, ungenerous.

If his sustained arguments are ungenerous, Elster's casual comments areeven more so. These are the elements that leap out at the reader, evoking,depending on one's orientation to Marx, a smile or a wincee ,Marx's views arevariously judged to be "incoherent," "rather absurd," "rambling,""downright silly," "massively Utopian," "confused," "lacking intellectualdiscipline," "boring," "extreme and exaggerated," "pointless," "trivial,""obscure," "illogical," "narrow," etc., etc. Alien Wood finds all this"refreshingly irreverent." I find it excessive.Yet Elster still claims to be a Marxist (p. 531). Elster claims that "most ofthe views I hold to be true and important, I can trace back to Marx." (p. 531).even allows workers are usually exploited by capitalists, and that thisis unjust. 31 It is worth considering what to make of this self-identification.I think it pointless to engage in a debate as to whether Elster is or is not aMarxist. It is worth considering, however, the rhetorical effect of his publicprofession on the readers of his book. I think tllat Making Sense ofMarx isstructured to elicit certain responses, and that Elster's self-identification as aMarxist is a key component of the book's rhetorical strategy.32I take it as obvious that readers' responses to Elster will vary, depending onwhether or not they see themselves as Marxists. Consider the non-Marxistreader. Here Elster's self-identification as a Marxist functions to lendcredibility to his anti-Marxist attacks in the expected fashion. When an authorproclaims ,himself to be a Marxist, his defenses of Marx will be scrutinizedcarefully; "concessions" will be accepted without much question. Michael


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Praxis International 119Walzer's reactioll to Elster fits this model'exactly. Walzer finds the anti-Marxarguments wholly persuasive. "I find little to quarrel with any of this. Elstermakes a strong case against Marx; it is hard to imagine a stronger one."Walzer's only objection is Elster's intimation that there remain good reasons'for calling oneself a Marxist. This, Walzer asserts, "is mere sentimentalMarxism (not quite a rational choice)."33The Marxist reaction to Elster is more complicated. Many will be put off by

the rhetorical excesses and will respond in kind. Meikle and Slaughter, twocontributors to the Inquiry symposium, take this tack, but it is not effective.Elster takes the high road, dismissing their charges as the rantings of "Marxistfundamentalists. "34Other Marxists, particularly those of an analytical bent, face anothertemptation: to enter the fray by accepting Elster's agenda and playingaccording to his rules. This temptation is quite powerful. Elster is a worthyopponent. It is fun to match wits with one so intelligent as he, all the more sosince the game has the illusion of danger while being perfectly safe. It is aboutMarxism, so it has affective bonds to deep emotional currents, yet the issuesjoined are wholly non-threatening to any entrenched power, political oracademic.35 There is no place in the debate for a sustained critique ofcapitalism, nor for a sustained critique ofmainstream academic methodology.Since it is an argument among "Marxists," the former may be presumed andneed not be discussed; since the rules of the game are precisely the prevailingconventions, these will not be questioned either.36I don't think it necessary to resist this temptation always. Parts I and 11 ofthis paper testify'to that. But I do worry about Elster's overall effect on Leftscholarship, especially analytical Marxism. His is an influential presence. Heholds positions at two prestigious institutions. He's an editor of the Cambridge series, Studies in Marxism and Social Theory. He is a prolific writer. Heengages in many debates and comments on many papers. Unfortunately, hereinforces what I take to be three distressing tendencies of analytical Marxism.First, there is the tendency to sidetrack discussion onto inconsequentialdetails that do not in any way challenge capitalist hegemony nor contribute toMarxian revitalization. The Cohen-Elster exchanges on functional explanationconstitute a case in point. Secondly, there is the tendency to regard onlyanalytical methodology as reputable, that is, to think that the only way toproceed is to extract from Marx clear and unambiguous propositions that canthen be tested for falsity or inconsistency. It is not at all clear to me that this isthe best way to "make sense ofMarx." It is clear to me that it is not the onlyway.Finally, there is the tendency to consider worthy of respect only thoseMarxists willing to write off most of Marx as "inaccurate, incoherent,confused or misguided. "37 Apart from a small circle of friends, Elster hasnothing good to say about otherMarxists. He proclaims on the last page of hisbook that "it is not possible today, morally or intellectually, to be Marxist inthe traditional sense," to accept "all or most of the views that Marx held to betrue and important." This is surely unfair - appropriate for the temper of thetimes, perhaps, but unfair.


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120 Praxis InternationalElster claims, also on the final page, that "in the sense that was to him themost important - Marx's life and ~ o r k were in vain." It seems to me thatmost important to Marx was the project of replacing capitalism with a moredecent and humane social order. I am not convinced that Elster's work doesmuch to advance this project. Analytical Marxists who are seriously concernedabout doing so would do well to resist this "prince of foxes" who is also, I'mafraid, a bit of a Pied Piper.

NOTES1. Brian Barry, "Superfox," Political Studies (January 1980), 136.2. Jon Elster, Making Sense ofMarx (Cambridge: 1985). Page references to this work will be given inparentheses in the text.3. Michael Walzer, "What's Left ofMarx," New York Review ofBooks (November 21, 1985), 43-8.4. Andrew Levine, book review,]ournal ofPhilosophy (December, 1986), 721-28.5. Rolf Zimmermann, "Making Sense of Human Liberation: Jon Elster, Analytical Marxism andSocialist Perspectives," Praxis International 6 (January 1987), 488.6. By Michel Thomas, Allen Wood and Douglas North respectively. Inquiry (March 1986), 4, 12, 58.Less flattering assessments are given by the contributors Scott Meikle and Cliff Slaughter.7. JonElster, "Reply to Comments," Inquiry (March 1986), 66.8. The debate began with Elster's review ofKarl Marx's Theory ofHistory (Princeton, 1978) in Political

Studies (1980). It developed further in their Theory and Society (1982) exchange, and has continued intheir contributions to John Roemer, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge, 1986). In this latestexchange, however, Elster has softened somewhat. More on this below.9. I am simplifying slightly. A functional explanation in sensu strictus (crude or otherwise) denies thatsuch a causal account must be given. Cohen argues that an explanation can be valid in the absence of acausal account, if one can cite a "consequence law" with guarantees that whenever long necks arebeneficial to survival they occur. Crude functionalism denies the need for either a causal account or aconsequence law: the benefit in and of itself explains the occurrence of the phenomenon. Cf. JonElster, "Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory," Theory and Society 11 (1982),453-82, and G.A.Cohen, "Reply to Elster," 483-96. More on this issue below.1O. Presumably Elster sniffs functionalism in the claim "the circumstance that aman without fortune maybecome a capitalist enables capital to recruit ever new forces for itself." But consider: "thecircumstance that migrant workers cross easily into the United States enables growers to recruit farmlaborers without difficulty" does not assert that the circumstance of easy passage is brought about bythe actions of the growers. To read it thus would surely reveal a cavalier att itude to the canons ofinterpretation.11. That Marx might be arguing thus is suggested by the rest of the paragraph: "In a similar way, thecircumstances that the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages formed its hierarchy out of the best brainsin the land, regardless of their estate, birth or fortune, was one of the principal means of consolidatingecclesiastical rule and suppressing the laity. The more a ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost

minds of a ruled class, the more stable and dangerous becomes its rule." Capital, v. II I (New York,1967), 601. IfMarx is explaining anything here, it would seem to be the stability of a ruling stratum,not social mobility.12. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, 248-77. Cohen calls established claims of this sort "consequence laws," and the causal mechanisms "functional elaborations." His thesis is that a functionalexplanation is legitimate, even without an elaboration, provided it incorporates a consequence law.13. See the references in No 8, in particular, Elster, "Further Thoughts on Marxism, Functionalism andGame Theory," in Roemer, ed. Analytical Marxism, 204. '14. It seems to me absurd to suggest, as Elster does, that Marx held some esoteric conception of theorigins of class mobility. Marx's general account is plain enotigh: the bourgeoisie struggled against

feudal restrictions because these restrictions were obviously contrary to their own interests. Oncethese feudal restrictions were removed, there were no legal barriers prohibiting "a man without


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Praxis International 121fortune, but possessing energy, solidity and business acumen from becoming a capitalist." ~ o w , onemight wonder why some new set of restrictions was not imposed. Part of the answer m'lght be aperception on the pan of many capitalists that such restrictions would not be to their long-runadvantage. So far as I know, no such restrictions were proposed in Marx's day, but i f they were, somesort of functional explanation might be in order as to why such restrictionswere, not adopted. That is,c) might be true - though I see no reason for thinking Marx is asserting c) in the quote underdiscussion.15. Elster's treatment of the second is equally problematic. He is right that the law of the falling rate ofprofit cannot be rigorosly demonstrated, but that is scarcely news. Paul Sweezy's influential andhighly sympathetic interpretation ofMarx, The Theory ofCapitalist Development (New York, 1942)made exactly the same point (96-108), as have countless commentators since. But Sweezy, unlikeElster, goes on to examine what is surely the crucial issue: does such a tendency in fact exist, and if so,does it exist for the reasons Marx suggests. Instead, Elster makes a counter-assertion: that Marx'sclaim that the rate of profit falls as a result of th e increase of the productive force is "contrary not onlyto intuition, but to truth as well" (155) - an assertion that can no more be demonstrated rigoroslythan can Marx's claim.

16. Making Sense, 135. I have reformulated 2) slightly. As Elster presents it (the two clauses are set outindependently), it is not a meaningful interpretation.17. Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Marx: A Reconstruction and Critique o/Capital (Princeton, 1984),117-140. Wolff argues that 2) constitutes Marx's solution to the classical problem of natural prices. Idon't find this interpretation convincing; there is certainly no textual evidence thatMarx thought of 2)this way.18. Wolff, Understanding Marx.; also Michio Morishima, Marx's Economics (Cambridge, 1973), Chapter7.19. Morishima, Marx's Economics, 53 ff.20. Robert Paul Wolff, "A Critque and Reinterpretation of Marx's Labor Theory of Value, I ~ h i l o s o p h yand Public Affairs 2 (Spring, 1981), 89-120. Elster (curiously) does not cite Wolff, and his ownformulation is slightly different (and less coherent): "labor power [is] the condition of possibility forthe existence of a general surplus" (39).21. See my "On Robert Paul Wolff's Transcendental Interpretation ofMarx's Labor Theory of Value,"

22. See Wolff, Understanding Marx, 93-97.23. Wolff, Understanding Marx, 351.24. Marx, Capitall, 37 (emphasis mine).25. Piero Sraffa's Production 0/ Commodities by Means of Commodities (Cambridge, 1960) provoked adebate that has not yet ended. In presenting a model in which prices are determined without anyreference to utility or scarcity, he dealt neoclassical theory a body-blow from which it may neverrecover.26. For a compelling articulation of a richer, more complicated answer compatible with what follows, seeDavid Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago, 1982), especially 5-24 and 35-38.27. In this sense the neo-Ricardian analysis of Steedman and others should not be regarded as being inopposition to Marx's methodology, since neo-Ricardian analysis - in sharp contradistinction toneoclassical analysis - also emphasizes real costs. In fact, it specifies them even more concretely.This analysis should properly be regarded as an extension of the labor theory of value, not as anon-Marxian alternative. Whether or not this- concreteness is more useful or not in clarifying the realworkings of a capitalist economy remains an open, much debated, question. See lan Steedman,MarxAfter Straffa (London, 1977) for a defense of this approach. See Ben Fine and Laurence Harris,Rereading Capital (New York, 1979) for a critique.28. Marx, Capital I, 218.29. See Morishima,Marx's Economics, 63 ff. for the proof. The proof is not trivial, and it may be doubtedthat Marx had the requisite mathematical skills or techniques at hand to accomplish such a proof.Nonetheless, his intuition was quite sound.30. See Morishima, Marx's Economics, 89 ff. for more on this issue.31. "Reply to Comments," 66.

32. I am not positing here a conscious intention. I am reflecting on the way the book seems to work on itsreaders.


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122 Praxis International33. Walzer, "What's Left of Marx?", 45.34. Jon Elster, "Reply to Comments," Inquiry (March 1986), 69.35. I am thinking here of the West, specifically the United States. How the book might be read elsewhere

is a very different matter.36. It might be maintained that this criticism applies to all analytical Marxists, not just to Elster. I find

this conclusion premature, although, as I note below, analytical Marxism does often exhibit certainunfortunate tendencies. I do not mean to suggest either that the only efforts in which Marxistintellectuals should engage are criticism of capitalism and criticism of conventional methodology. Itake it as self-evident that if Marxism is to be a living philosophy and not a corpse, it requiresself-criticism and self-renewal.37. "On almost every point of detail Marx can be shown to have been inaccurate, incoherent, confused ormisguided." Elster, "Reply to Comments," 66.

1.9 - Schweikert, David - Reflections on Anti- Marxism. Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labour...

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