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Republic of the PhilippinesCongress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6735             August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

I. — General Provisions

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.

(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.

Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

II. — National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.

Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. — Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.

Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.

Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.

Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

IV. — Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.

Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."

Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests

in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system.

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.

Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.

Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.

Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.

Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved, March 3, 1995.

CASES:

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs.HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and

the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Case Digest on Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 

FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the national elections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions participated.  On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.

Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps.  Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps.

HELD:1.         Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC: The 20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory.

2.         Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system.3.         How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC:  As to the method of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The formula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no.of votes of concerned party divided by no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. ( 5% = 2 seats ). The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719)

FACTS:

         The COMELEC issued  Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections.

         April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latter’s nominees not be proclaimed

         April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.

        April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785

        May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it.

ISSUES:

1.    Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections2.Whether or not the party- list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

HELD:

       This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party- list participants.

BANAT VS. COMELEC

Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’snational board of canvassers to declare the petition moot andacademic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC. 

Issues: (1)     Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? 

(2)    Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 

(3)     Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections? 

Held:(1)    Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. 

(2)    No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is  unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the  House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” 

(3)    No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided tocontinue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. 

Aquino III V. ComelecIssue:This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?

Held:We deny the petition.

Ruling:There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. –(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Bai Sandra Sema vs.   COMELEC July 16, 2008

Facts:On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.In an answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 “maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.”However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsan Province withCotabato City”.Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City” prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

Issues:1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.Held:1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, “only x x x anAct of Congress” can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:“Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the House of Representatives.”Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,“Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member”.Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under  Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The “power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws”, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.

Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only “within its territorial jurisdiction.” (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

G.R. NO. 203818-19: AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (“AKB”) VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS   EN BANC

FACTS: Petitioner AKB is a regional political party with three incumbent partylist representatives in the 15th Congress. On October 10, 2012, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution cancelling the accreditation of petitioner as a partylist candidate in the 2013 elections. AKB filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Injunction to assail the same COMELEC Resolution.

ARGUMENTS:

1. COMELEC has no power to determine the qualifications of party list representatives;2. COMELEC ignored petitioner’s evidence showing that it represents marginalized and underrepresented constituencies;3. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled

petitioner’s accreditation as a party list on the arbitrary assumption that to be qualified as a PARTY-LIST, petitioner must represent financially poor and destitute constituents

4. The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” does not necessarily refer to sectors mentioned in the Constitution or to LGBTs but to those who are unable to win in district elections but in a different arena and with different constituency, can compete in the part list system

5. COMELEC’s questioned resolution does not show that petitioner violated the provisions of RA 7941, sec. 6, so as to warrant the cancellation of its accreditation as a PARTY-LIST

6. Chairman Brillantes’ opinion that because petitioner does not represent any of the sectors mentioned in the constitution or RA 7941, it is an ordinary political party that would duplicate the function of the district representative and will give the districts in the Bicol Region greater representation in the House, is without any basis

PRAYER/S:

1. Immediately issue a TRO and/or Writ of Injunction, enjoining the COMELEC and those acting for and/or under it from implementing the Resolution dated 10 October 2012, from continuing any further proceedings relevant to, arising out of, or in connection with the same

2. After further proceedings, grant the petition (a) declaring respondent COMELEC to have acted without jurisdiction in issuing its 10 October 2012 Resolution; (b) declaring the assailed Resolution null and void and of no force and effect, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction; (c) ordering the respondent COMELEC to reinstate petitioner’s accreditation as a party list qualified to participate in the 13 May 2012 elections; (d) ordering the COMELEC to include the petitioner in the List of Candidates and in the official ballots and other materials to be used in the conduct of the 13 May 2013 elections; and (e) declaring the injunction permanent. Petitioner prays for such further and other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises.

WHEREFORE, 54 petitions are granted.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC248 SCRA 300

Facts:Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On

March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29,

1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President

Marcos.

Held:For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner,

despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in  the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Taclobanbecame petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal orchange of  domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

AQUINO vs COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400

Facts:On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration on the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue:Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative fo the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

En Banc

Doctrine: citizenship

Date: July 30, 1991

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.

 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1.             Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2.             Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3.             Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4.             Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs.HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.

Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

 DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:

The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate

what action was taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.

In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:

A.

IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

B.

COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.

Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:

Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:

Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:

Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.

It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for

President and Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:

MR. PALMARES:

In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.

Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...

Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:

MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

Thank you, Mr. Spe

G.R. No. L-15905             August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:

It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellant’s "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that –

1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest – not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that–

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellant’s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one’s liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his willdepriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual’s status in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.[17]

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant’s claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the main and separate opinion.

ANTERO POBRE VS. SEN. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO            In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor: 

          x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice  Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.                                                

                       To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. 

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.     

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.  No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun,  said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”[1]

 As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of

perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.  Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.   The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.[2]

  This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity

and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.  Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. [3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]

  

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

 The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech

and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.” 

 The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have

taken to heart in the first place: 

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

   

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

 Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,

offensive or otherwise improper. 

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

  

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.   Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.

 As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This

allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said.  We quote the passage once more: 

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice  Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. Iwould rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)  A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and

frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

 To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive

personalities. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an “unjust act” the JBC

had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

 At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art.

VIII of the Constitution that provides: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 

 x x x x 

            (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

  

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

 (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the

assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

  x x x x (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]

  

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11]  that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

 x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that “[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to

maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.” That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against “unjust criticism and clamor.” And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be “with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.”

  

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that: 

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.” Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.” Thus has it been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and

not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”[13] The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that

profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]

 Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects

their want of probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.  When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.[16]

 This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently

exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

 The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would

have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

 We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended

to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability  thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

  The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from

using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.”[19]  But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. [20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

  Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be

undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]

 Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in

question.  Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

 WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to

Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.                                                              Associate Justice

BENGZON VS DRILON (G.R. NO. 103524)Veto Power of the President

FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.

When is it allowed?

The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

3 ways how a bill becomes a law.

1. When the President signs it2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.