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66The Sense/Reference The Sense/Reference Distinction RevisitedDistinction Revisited

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Sense Sense quaqua Identifying Identifying DescriptionsDescriptions

See Donnellan, 1970 “Speaking of Nothing” See Donnellan, 1970 “Speaking of Nothing” and Kripke, 1972 and Kripke, 1972 Naming and NecessityNaming and Necessity

General assumptionGeneral assumption

The sense of a proper name corresponds to The sense of a proper name corresponds to a (several) identifying definite description(s). a (several) identifying definite description(s).

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Russell: proper names are disguised Russell: proper names are disguised definite descriptions. definite descriptions.

Frege: the sense of a name is an Frege: the sense of a name is an identifying description.identifying description.

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““In the case of genuinely proper names like In the case of genuinely proper names like ‘Aristotle’ opinions as regard their sense ‘Aristotle’ opinions as regard their sense diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested: diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested: Plato’s disciple and the teacher of Alexander Plato’s disciple and the teacher of Alexander the Great. Whoever accepts this sense will the Great. Whoever accepts this sense will interpret the meaning of the statement interpret the meaning of the statement “Aristotle was born in Stagira”, differently “Aristotle was born in Stagira”, differently from one who interpreted the sense of from one who interpreted the sense of ‘Aristotle’ as the Stagirite teacher of ‘Aristotle’ as the Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great. As long a the Alexander the Great. As long a the nominatum remains the same, these nominatum remains the same, these fluctuations in sense are tolerable. But they fluctuations in sense are tolerable. But they should be avoided in a perfect language.” should be avoided in a perfect language.” (Frege: “(Frege: “Sinn und Bedeutung”Sinn und Bedeutung”))

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Principle of Identifying Principle of Identifying DescriptionsDescriptions

See Donnellan 1970See Donnellan 1970

What we associate with the name cannot be What we associate with the name cannot be a single description. a single description.

For, if “Aristotle” meant the teacher of A. the For, if “Aristotle” meant the teacher of A. the Great, then saying “Aristotle was the teacher Great, then saying “Aristotle was the teacher of A. the G.” would be a mere tautology. But of A. the G.” would be a mere tautology. But this is something we could discover to be this is something we could discover to be false. false.

So, being the teacher of Alexander the Great So, being the teacher of Alexander the Great cannot be part of the sense of the name. cannot be part of the sense of the name.

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The Cluster TheoryThe Cluster Theory

What we associate with the name is a What we associate with the name is a family of descriptions (cf. Wittgenstein, family of descriptions (cf. Wittgenstein, Strawson, Searle)Strawson, Searle)

Since it is possible that one or some Since it is possible that one or some descriptions associated with a name turn descriptions associated with a name turn out to be false, we have to introduce some out to be false, we have to introduce some vague notions such as “sufficient number vague notions such as “sufficient number of descriptions”, etc. (Cf. Wittgenstein on of descriptions”, etc. (Cf. Wittgenstein on “Moses”; “Moses”; PIPI: § 79): § 79)

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The cluster of descriptions is both: The cluster of descriptions is both:

(1)(1) what what determines reference,determines reference, and and

(2)(2) what is what is synonymous synonymous with the with the associated associated namename

““Frege should be criticized for using the Frege should be criticized for using the term ‘sense’ in two senses. For he takes the term ‘sense’ in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way the and he also takes it to be the way the reference is determined.” (Kripke 1972: 59)reference is determined.” (Kripke 1972: 59)

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The principle of identifying descriptions is The principle of identifying descriptions is a two-stages thesis: the second stage a two-stages thesis: the second stage depends on the first.depends on the first.

11.. The speaker must be able to supply a The speaker must be able to supply a set of set of no question-begging no question-begging descriptions. descriptions.

E.g.: the item I have in mind, the individual E.g.: the item I have in mind, the individual I intend to refer to, ... are question-I intend to refer to, ... are question-begging descriptions.begging descriptions.

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22.. The referent of the name the speaker The referent of the name the speaker uses, uses, if any, must satisfy the set of if any, must satisfy the set of descriptions.descriptions.

One can endorse 2 without endorsing 1. One can endorse 2 without endorsing 1.

The relevant descriptions may be the ones The relevant descriptions may be the ones the experts furnish (cf. Dummett’s public the experts furnish (cf. Dummett’s public sense).sense).

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Arguments in favor of Arguments in favor of identifying descriptionsidentifying descriptions

See Kripke 1972: 64-71See Kripke 1972: 64-71

(1) To every name or designating (1) To every name or designating expression ‘expression ‘XX’, ’, there corresponds a cluster there corresponds a cluster of properties, of properties, namely the family of those namely the family of those properties properties such such that that AA believes ‘ believes ‘XX’.’.

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(2) One of the properties, or some (2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, conjointly, are believed by A to pick are believed by A to pick out some individual out some individual uniquely.uniquely.

(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the (3) If most, or a weighted most, of the ’s ’s are are satisfied by one unique object satisfied by one unique object yy, then , then yy is is the referent of ‘the referent of ‘XX’.’.

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(4) If the vote yields no unique object, ‘(4) If the vote yields no unique object, ‘XX’ ’ does does not refer.not refer.

(5) The statement, “If (5) The statement, “If XX exists, then exists, then XX has has most most of the of the ’s” is known ’s” is known a prioria priori by by the speaker.the speaker.

(6) The statement, “If (6) The statement, “If XX exists, then exists, then X X has has most most of the of the ’s” expresses a necessary ’s” expresses a necessary truthtruth (in (in the idiolect of the speaker).the idiolect of the speaker).

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Conclusion: Conclusion:

For any successful theory, the account For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminateeliminate..

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The case from examplesThe case from examples

See Donnellan 1970See Donnellan 1970

11. Whether the relevant descriptions are . Whether the relevant descriptions are the the ones associated by the speaker or by ones associated by the speaker or by a a community of speakers, the referent community of speakers, the referent ought ought to satisfy them. to satisfy them.

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If so, it may turn out that “Plato” does not If so, it may turn out that “Plato” does not refer to Plato if we discover that he does refer to Plato if we discover that he does not satisfy the descriptions we commonly not satisfy the descriptions we commonly associate with “Plato”. associate with “Plato”.

It could also be that the name “Plato” It could also be that the name “Plato” refers to someone else who happens to refers to someone else who happens to satisfy the relevant descriptions.satisfy the relevant descriptions.

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22.. One can refer to someone even if she One can refer to someone even if she is is unable to furnish identifying unable to furnish identifying descriptions. descriptions.

So, So, thesis (5) is falsethesis (5) is false. .

[(5) The statement, “If [(5) The statement, “If XX exists, then exists, then XX has has most of the most of the ’s” is known ’s” is known a prioria priori by the by the speaker.]speaker.]

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““Imagine ... a conversation ... in which the Imagine ... a conversation ... in which the student relates what happened at the party. student relates what happened at the party. He might begin by saying, “Last night I met He might begin by saying, “Last night I met J.L. Aston-Martin and talked to him for almost J.L. Aston-Martin and talked to him for almost an hour”. To whom does he refer at this an hour”. To whom does he refer at this point? I strongly believe the answer should point? I strongly believe the answer should be, ‘to the famous philosopher’ and not, ‘to be, ‘to the famous philosopher’ and not, ‘to the man he met at the party’. What the the man he met at the party’. What the student says is simply false; a friend ‘in the student says is simply false; a friend ‘in the know’ would be justified in replying that he know’ would be justified in replying that he did not meet J.L. Aston-Martin, but someone did not meet J.L. Aston-Martin, but someone who had the same name and no more who had the same name and no more philosopher than Milton Berle.” (Donnellan philosopher than Milton Berle.” (Donnellan 1970: 3501970: 350

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See also Kripke “Gell-Man”-“Feynman” See also Kripke “Gell-Man”-“Feynman” story:story:

One can use these names to refer to the One can use these names to refer to the relevant individuals even if one is unable relevant individuals even if one is unable to furnish identifying descriptions of them.to furnish identifying descriptions of them.

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The Modal ArgumentThe Modal ArgumentSee Kripke 1972See Kripke 1972

Rigid designatorsRigid designators

The designate the same object in all The designate the same object in all possible worlds (or counterfactual possible worlds (or counterfactual situations) where it exists. situations) where it exists.

If the object exits in all possible worlds (it If the object exits in all possible worlds (it is a necessary existent), the designator is is a necessary existent), the designator is strongly rigidstrongly rigid..

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Non-rigid (accidental) designatorsNon-rigid (accidental) designators

They may change reference across They may change reference across possible worlds.possible worlds.

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Proper namesProper names are rigid designators, are rigid designators, while while definite descriptionsdefinite descriptions are non-rigid are non-rigid designators. designators.

Unless a description picks out an essential Unless a description picks out an essential property (e.g. mathematical descriptions property (e.g. mathematical descriptions such as “the successor of 3” which such as “the successor of 3” which designates 4 in all possible worlds).designates 4 in all possible worlds).

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Reference cannot be explained in terms Reference cannot be explained in terms of identifying descriptionsof identifying descriptions. .

for:for:

An individual, in a given possible world, may An individual, in a given possible world, may fail to possess the property(ies) picked out by fail to possess the property(ies) picked out by the description(s) (unless the latter pick(s) the description(s) (unless the latter pick(s) out essential property(ies) of that individual) out essential property(ies) of that individual) associated with the name (rigid designator). associated with the name (rigid designator).

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E.g.: E.g.:

Aristotle may not have been the teacher of Aristotle may not have been the teacher of A. the Great, Gödel may not have been the A. the Great, Gödel may not have been the discoverer of the incompleteness of discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic, etc.arithmetic, etc.

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Fixing the referenceFixing the reference vsvs. . determiningdetermining the referencethe reference

Descriptions may be used to Descriptions may be used to fix the fix the reference reference and not, and not, pacepace Frege, to give the Frege, to give the meaning of the name. meaning of the name.

E.g.: Let’s call “Jack”, the man who E.g.: Let’s call “Jack”, the man who committed all the murders. Being the committed all the murders. Being the murderer, though, is not an essential murderer, though, is not an essential property of Jack.property of Jack.

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E.g.:E.g.:

Hitler might have spent all his days quiet Hitler might have spent all his days quiet in Linz. In that case we would not say that in Linz. In that case we would not say that then this man would not have been Hitler, then this man would not have been Hitler, for we use of the name “Hitler” just as the for we use of the name “Hitler” just as the name of that man, even in describing name of that man, even in describing other possible worlds. (cf. Kripke 1972: 75)other possible worlds. (cf. Kripke 1972: 75)

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Moral:Moral: thesis (6) is also falsethesis (6) is also false..

[The statement, “If [The statement, “If XX exists, then exists, then X X has has most of the most of the ’s” expresses a necessary ’s” expresses a necessary truthtruth (in the idiolect of the speaker).](in the idiolect of the speaker).]

General MoralGeneral Moral

Sense cannot be equated with identifying Sense cannot be equated with identifying descriptions.descriptions.

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Direct ReferenceDirect Reference

Or: Causal theory of reference, Millianism Or: Causal theory of reference, Millianism (Cf. J-S. Mill, (Cf. J-S. Mill, A system of LogicA system of Logic))

J.-S. Mill: names have denotation but not J.-S. Mill: names have denotation but not connotation.connotation.

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E.g.: E.g.:

DartmouthDartmouth is called ‘Dartmouth’ because is called ‘Dartmouth’ because it lies at the mouth of the Dart, but even if it lies at the mouth of the Dart, but even if the river changed its course so that the river changed its course so that Dartmouth no longer lays at the mouth of Dartmouth no longer lays at the mouth of the Dart, we could still properly call this the Dart, we could still properly call this place “Dartmouth”. It is no part of the place “Dartmouth”. It is no part of the meaning of “Dartmouth” that the referent meaning of “Dartmouth” that the referent lies at Dart’s mouth.lies at Dart’s mouth.