PUB CORP - CHAPTER 2 – CASE DIGESTS

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.GR 135962March 27, 2000

FACTS:On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body politic and corporate” – one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU’s corporate powers] provided under the Code.”

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

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MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005)Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.Issue:1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed

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security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

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Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development AuthorityRespondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.

Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media

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applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.

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MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners, vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.

EN BANC

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

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(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:

Regional Trial Court’s Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

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Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTC’s Decision

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set

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timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

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Francisco Jr v. Fernado, 507 SCRA 173

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila DevelopmentAuthority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its “wet flag scheme” (“Flag Scheme”). Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and(4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was valid. HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. Nor is there meritto petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the “transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation. On the FlagScheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within theMMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisionsfor pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents’implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the FlagScheme in that city.

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Abbas vs Comelec (179 SCRA 287)Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaireStandardFacts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that “[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.” Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

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Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 1 Issues on Delegation of Legislative Power (Filling in the Details: authority to reorganize) Chiongbian vs Orbos Chiongbian - Congressman in third district, South Cotabato; Orbos - Executive Secretary Date of Promulgation: June 22, 1995 Ponente: Mendoza Motion: Certiorari and Prohibition; Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court Background In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it.Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government. Facts The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA 6743) pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some provinces which resulted to 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing administrative regions provided, however,that the President may merge the existing regions through administrative determination.President Cory then issued the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be “merged,” transferringprovinces from their existing region to another. The petitioners who are members of the Congressrepresenting legislative districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there isno law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing regions andrestructure them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the existing structures of the government. The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president tomerge existing regions and cannot be construed as reorganizing them. Issue W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) incharacter or executive as the respondents contend ● Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through administrative determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated● Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power tofill up or provide the details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

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Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED. The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power to merge the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. (RA5453) This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:“to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.

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Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL

Facts: RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140—November 26, 2001, RA 9333—2nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.

Issue/s:

1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.

2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013 elections.

Held:1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the “national government” and the “local governments,” and does not make a distinction between the “local government” and the “regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from the power of control or “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”

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The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

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Ordillo v. COMELECG.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990Gutierrez, J.FACTS- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for anOrganic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet,Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 inthe rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the provinceof Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably –then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”- March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 amemorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of morethan one constituent unit.- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose; declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and theCordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and thesame is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUEWON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

HELDa- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The keyword in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities,municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution,as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and thatthe words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed.

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b.The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting theRegion.- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitutethe autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V,sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces andcities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a commonregional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate theletter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical andillogical.

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Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on AuditG. R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

Facts:Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that they are to:

Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

Ruling:The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government in the autonomous region),the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

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In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 459 May 17, 1991

DEVOLVING TO THE AUTONOMOUS REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO CERTAIN POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

OVER ITS OFFICES IN THE REGION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XV of Republic Act No. 6734 provides "That the Autonomous Region shall establish, maintain and support a complete and integrated system of quality education and adopt an educational framework that is meaningful, relevant and responsive to the needs, ideals and aspirations of the people in the Region";WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee created under the said Act, recognizing the primacy of education as a necessary pillar for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), has recommended the evaluation of certain powers and that the offices of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports within the ARMM may be transferred to the Autonomous Regional Government to carry out this mandate;NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Policy to be Adopted. The Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) shall be responsible for the regional educational framework within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and shall adopt the policy of the National Government as embodied in Chapter I, Title VI, of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Sec. 2. General Functions. The powers and functions with regard to the formulation, planning, implementation and coordination of policies, plans, programs and projects of various aspects of education are hereby transferred to the ARG, specifically in the following areas:a. Elementary, secondary, physical and international education;b. Non-formal and vocational or technical education;c. Higher education;d. Development of culture;e. Foreign and locally-assisted projects and other activities relative to (a), (b,) (c), and (d) above; andf. Such other functions as may be provided by law.

Sec. 3. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) within the ARMM including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control and supervision of the ARG.

Sec. 4. Transfer of Functions and Powers of the DECS Regional Offices. The following functions and powers of DECS Regional offices are hereby transferred to the ARG:A. General Functions and Powers

a.1. Formulate the regional plan of education based on the national plans taking into account the specific needs and traditions of the region;a.2. Implement laws, rules and regulations, policies, programs and projects of the Regional Department;a.3. Provide economical, efficient, and effective education service to the people;a.4. Coordinate with regional offices of other departments, offices and agencies in the region;a.5. Coordinate with local government units; anda.6. Perform such other functions as may be provided for by law.

B. Specific Functions and PowersB.1 Administrative Management

a. Act on all matters concerning appointment, promotion and transfer; hiring of casual employees, resignation, filling-up of positions and granting of leaves of absence and other personnel transactions;b. Legal and administrative investigation, recommendation decision on cases, complaints and other related matters;c. Act on requests to teach, engage in business, and exercise of professions;d. Act on request to render overtime services;e. Act on request for authority for domestic/outside travel;f. Conferring of incentives or recognition;g. Acceptance of donations such as titled real properties and personal properties;h. Act on requests for attendance of personnel to conferences, meetings, seminars and the like;i. Upkeep of records and records management;j. Supply management;k. Medical and Dental services; andl. Delivery of general administrative services.

B.2 Educational Supervision and School Administrationa. Conduct school visitations and teaching supervision;b. Conduct educational statistical researches, experiments, studies, planning and organizations; andc. Preparation of data and statistical reports.

B.3 Financial Managementa. Budget preparation and submission;b. Fiscal control, accounting and auditing of expenditures;c. Vouchers and claims processing for payment or disbursement of funds;d. Claims processing and payment of retirement pay, hazard pay, allowances, extra compensation, salary differentials and the like;e. Implementation of salary standardization/adjustment/merit increases;f. Recommend position classification/readjustment/conversion;g. Requisition and procurement of supplies, materials, equipment and others;h. Negotiation of contracts for services and goods;i. Signing and countersigning of checks; andj. Preparation and submission of financial reports.

B.4 Private School Regulationsa. Grant authority to establish/operate new schools;b. Grant permits for operation of schools and summer classes;c. Approval of classes and teacher programs;

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d. Act/decide on problems and disputes arising from private school employment;e. Approval of applications of private school teachers for teaching overload;f. Approval of requests for temporary enrollment, late enrollment, subject load and overload of students;g. Administer validation placement examinations;h. Issue special orders for graduation of students;i. Approval of applications for change of name of private schools;j. Approval of application for change of text books and other materials;k. Act on tuition fee increases;l. Verification and authentication of student credentials/records;m. Decide Administrative complaints arising from school decisions, rules and regulations;n. Grant/cancel/withdraw government, recognition, or restore cancelled or revoked government recognition;o. Decide on appeals regarding decisions on awards of graduation honors;p. Decide administrative complaints of private school personnel;q. Investigate and initiate action on cases involving illegal operation;r. Approval of proposed modifications of school curriculum; ands. Authentication of school records.

Sec. 5. Administrative Responsibility. The ARG shall be responsible for all outstanding obligations, liabilities and commitment under existing and continuing contracts, memoranda of agreement, undertakings, and the like, in connection with the operation of school divisions located in the Autonomous Region: Provided, That the National Government shall continue such levels of expenditure as may be necessary to assure all obligations and liabilities transferred to the ARG.

Sec. 6. Board of Higher Education. The functions and powers of the Board of Higher Education shall be retained by the National DECS: Provided, That the Regional Director of the Regional DECS when established, shall sit as a member of the Board with the right to vote on matters pertaining to the four provinces within ARMM.

Sec. 7. DECS Bureaus. The functions and powers of the following DECS Bureaus as provided for under Chapter 6, Title VI, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 are hereby transferred to the ARG.a. Bureau of Elementary Education;b. Bureau of Secondary Education;c. Bureau of Technical and Vocational Education;d. Bureau of Higher Education;e. Bureau of Non-Formal Education; andf. Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports.

Sec. 8. Locally-Funded Programs and Projects. All locally-funded projects of the DECS within the four provinces of the ARMM shall be transferred to the ARG.

Sec. 9. Foreign-funded Programs. The implementation of foreign-funded projects shall continue to be the responsibility of the DECS Central Office: Provided, That the project components situated in the provinces of the ARMM may be implemented by the ARG by way of a Memorandum of Agreement with the DECS.

Sec. 10. Regulations and Standards Governing the Educational System. (1) Rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Educational Act of 1982 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 232) shall be strictly adhered to and considered as minimum standards by the ARG.(2) Formulation of regional standards should recognize national standards as minimum requirements. No regionally-defined standard should be below accepted national standards. All DECS circulars on standards will be given to the ARMM for information and consideration in drafting future regional standards. Similarly, the ARG shall furnish the DECS with all circulars issued prescribing regional educational standards.

Sec. 11. Assets, Equipment, Offices and Land. Assets and equipment including public elementary and secondary schools already existing, being utilized or programmed for use in the four (4) provinces covered by the ARMM shall be turned over the ARG: Provided, That the National Government shall continue such levels of expenditures as may be necessary to carry out the functions mandated under R.A. No. 6734.Office buildings including the land where these edifices are built, within the provinces of ARMM shall immediately be transferred to the ARG in compliance with R.A. No. 6734.

Sec. 12. Personnel/Position. (1) By operation of law, all plantilla positions (filled and unfilled) of the DECS effectively assigned or within the provinces of ARMM, shall immediately be placed under the control and supervision of the ARG.(2) All personnel of the National Government shall be absorbed by the ARG and shall retain their seniority rights, compensation and other benefits.(3) Personnel who decline to transfer to the ARG for any reason whatsoever shall have the following options as outlined by the Civil Service Commission: (a) regular retirement; (b) absorption by their line department in another office or region subject to the availability of positions and at the discretion of management; (c) transfer to another department subject to the availability of positions; or (4) voluntary resignation.(4) The position and classification plan of the ARG shall conform to national standards classification/categories set by Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law.(5) From the date of transfer and for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months, the DECS Payroll Servicing Division shall continue to pay the salaries of public elementary school teachers and other DECS personnel within the ARMM covered by the centralized payroll servicing scheme. The Department of Budget and Management, the DECS and the ARG shall, within the said period, formulate the necessary mechanisms for the payroll system within the ARMM.

Sec. 13. Budget. All outstanding budget balances duly appropriated for the operations of DECS in the provinces within the ARMM for FY 1991 shall be turned over to the ARG as of the date transfer. Budget balances shall include appropriations for personal services of public secondary school teachers and other personnel not covered by the DECS-IBM Payroll servicing schedule, maintenance and other operating expenses, capital outlay. lawphi1.net

Sec. 14. State Colleges and Universities. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 6734, all state colleges and universities in the ARMM shall assist and support the full development of the people and shall serve as regional centers for tertiary and postgraduate education in their respective areas of competence: Provided, That they shall enjoy academic freedom and fiscal autonomy and shall continue to be

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governed by their respective charters: Provided, further, That the DECS Regional Director shall be a member of the governing boards of state colleges and universities in the ARMM.

Sec. 15. Control and Supervision of DECS Attached Agencies and Councils. Department attached agencies and councils, including government corporations shall continue to be controlled and supervised by their respective line departments. The attached agencies shall extend maximum assistance to the ARG and Regional DECS in carrying this programs and projects.

Sec. 16. Scholarship Program. Student scholarship programs shall be retained by the DECS.

Sec. 17. Free Public Secondary Education. In accordance with Republic Act No. 6655, the ARMM shall give free public secondary education to students enrolled in national high schools, general comprehensive high schools, state colleges and universities, specialized schools, trade, technical, vocational, fishery and agricultural schools, and in schools administered, maintained and funded by local government units, including city, provincial, municipal and barangay high schools, and those public schools established by law within the provinces of the ARMM.

Sec. 18. Instructional Materials. The Instructional Material Council (IMC) shall continue to be primarily responsible for the formulation of policies and for the selection and adoption of textbooks, supplementary and reference books for use in public elementary and secondary schools as well as the approval of textbooks for private elementary and secondary schools in the ARMM: Provided, That the significance of the contribution of the different ethnic groups in the Philippines shall be emphasized.The ARG may develop curricular materials with reference to regional history subject to the approval of the IMC.

Sec. 19. Effective Date of Transfer. The effective date of transfer on which budget and assets shall be computed and/or listed shall be 1 May 1991 to allow the schools and field offices to wind up matters related to Schoolyear 1990-1991 and for the regional DECS to prepare for Schoolyear 1991-1992.

Sec. 20. Separability Clause If for any reason, any part or provision of this Executive Order shall be held unconstitutional or invalid other parts or provision thereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Sec. 21. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a national newspaper of general circulation and one (1) local newspaper of general circulation in the ARMM.DONE in the City of Manila, this 17th day of May, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-one.

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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 103

DIVIDING REGION IV INTO REGION IV-A AND REGION IV-B, TRANSFERRING THE PROVINCE OF AURORA TO REGION III AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, Article X, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units;

WHEREAS, the administrative regions were established to promote efficiency in the Government, accelerate social and economic development and improve public services;

WHEREAS, to further accelerate the social and economic development of the provinces and cities comprising Region IV and improve the delivery of public services, there is a need to divide Region IV and transfer the Province of Aurora to Region III.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Region IV is hereby divided into Region IV-A and Region IV-B.

SECTION 2. Region IV-A shall be known as CALABARZON and shall be composed of the following provinces and cities:

a. Provinces

i. Batangasii. Caviteiii. Laguna iv. Quezonv. Rizal

b. Cities

i. Antipolo Cityii. Batangas Cityiii. Calamba Cityiv. Cavite Cityv. Lipa Cityvi. Lucena Cityvii. San Pablo Cityviii. Tagaytay Cityix. Tanauan Cityx. Trece Martires City

SECTION 3. Region IV-B shall be known as MIMAROPA and shall be composed of the following provinces and cities:

a. Provinces

i. Marinduque

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ii. Mindoro Occidentaliii. Mindoro Orientaliv. Palawanv. Romblon

b. Cities

i. Calapan Cityii. Puerto Princesa City

SECTION 4. The Province of Aurora is hereby transferred to and shall form part of Region III.

SECTION 5. The Department of the Interior and Local Government is hereby directed to supervise the division of Region IV into Region IV-A and Region IV-B and the transfer of the Province of Aurora to Region III.

SECTION 6. All orders, rules, regulations and issuances, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 7. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon approval.

City of Manila, May 17, 2002.

By the President:

AVELINO U. CRUZ, JR.OIC, Office of the Executive Secretary

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ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA, JR.252 SCRA 695 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – LGU Requirement – Income – Inclusion of IRAs

In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.

In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.

In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).

Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).

2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

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SEC. 1, CHAPTER I, TITLE XII, E.O. 292 (THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987)

Title XII

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER 1GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. For this purpose, it shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. The allocation of powers and resources to local government units shall be promoted, and inter-local government grouping, consolidation and coordination of resources shall be encouraged. The State shall guarantee the local government units their just share in national taxes and their equitable share in proceeds from the use of natural resources, and afford them a wider latitude for resources generation.

Section 2. Mandate. - The Department shall assist the President in the exercise of general supervision over local governments and in ensuring autonomy, decentralization and community empowerment.

Section 3. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall:

(1) Advise the President on the promulgation of policies, rules, regulations and other issuances relative to the general supervision of local government units;

(2) Establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units;

(3) Provide assistance in the preparation of national legislation affecting local government units;

(4) Establish and prescribe plans, policies, programs and projects to strengthen the administrative, technical and fiscal capabilities of local government offices and personnel;

(5) Formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects to meet national and local emergencies arising from natural and man-made disasters; and

(6) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

Section 4. Organization Structure. - The Department, shall be composed of the Office of the Secretary and the staff and line offices which shall consist of the following:

(1) Bureau of Local Government Supervision;

(2) Bureau of Local Government Development;

(3) National Barangay Operations Office;

(4) Project Development Services;

(5) Department Services;

(6) Office of Public Affairs; and

(7) Regional and Field Offices.

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Malonzo v. Zamora323 SCRA 875

FACTS:  A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three readings held on the same day.  They were charged with misconduct.

HELD:  There is no law prohibiting the holding of the three readings of a proposed ordinance in one session day.

Consistent with the doctrine that local government does not mean the creation of imperium in imperii or a state within a State, the Constitution has vested the President of the Philippines the power of general supervision over local government units. Such grant of power includes the power of discipline over local officials, keeping them accountable to the public, and seeing to it that their acts are kept within the bounds of law. Needless to say, this awesome supervisory power, however, must be exercised judiciously and with utmost circumspection so as not to transgress the avowed constitutional policy of local autonomy. As the facts unfold, the issue that obtrudes in our minds is: Should the national government be too strong vis--vis its local counterpart to the point of subverting the principle of local autonomy enshrined and zealously protected under the Constitution? It is in this light that the instant case shall now be resolved.

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Case Digest on Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.  AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments.  A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.  The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country.  It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met:  (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld.  A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.  This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.  Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.

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Province of Batangas vs. RomuloPosted on November 20, 2012GR 152774May 27, 2004

The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

FACTS:In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.

The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.

HELD:Yes.The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.

According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.

The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.

Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.

The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

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Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, et. al. vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, et. al.December 21, 2009Leonardo-De Castro, J.

SUMMARYThis case stemmed from an election protest by incumbent Mayor Sampiano against his uncle Ogka. Pending the resolution of the “double proclamation” election protest, COMELEC allowed Sampiano to temporarily assume the duties of a Mayor “to prevent paralysis to the Public Service.” However, Ogka wrote to PNB thru PNB’s chief legal counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, to suspend the release of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. Atty. Go however allowed the release of IRA. To prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge issued ex parte a TRO which lasted for 11 days total. SC subjected the judge to disciplinary fine of 10,000 pesos for violating the Rules of Court. Ex-parte TROs can only last 72 hours, and a 20-day TRO only after a summary hearing. The SC also stated that the automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while such rights are still being determined.

FACTSAdministrative case against Judge Cader P. Indar of the RTC Branch 12 of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, by Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, charging him with gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and serious acts of impropriety.

Prior to that, Sampiano filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur composed of Vadria Pungginagina and Zenaida Mante. The Comelec issued an order allowing Sampiano to act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor "to prevent paralysis to public service" pending determination and final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of the Municipality of Balabagan.

Ogka however filed for an MR of the said COMELEC order and informed in writing PNB’s Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, not to release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for Municipality of Balabagan pending the resolution of double proclamation. Go however directed PNB to release the IRA. Aggrieved, and to prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge Indar issued ex parte a TRO which lasted for 11 days total.

Sampiano’s arguments:1. The October 11 order is in the nature of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. As such prior notice and hearing are required. He added that a TRO has a limited life of 20 days while a writ of preliminary injunction is effective only during the pendency of the case and only after posting the required injunction bond. This is the ex-parte issuance of the October 11, 2004 order freezing the IRA of the Municipality of Balabagan "unless ordered otherwise by the Court."2. Said Order was issued in violation of Section 286 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which provides for the automatic release of the share of the local government unit from the national government. This is so as not to deprive the officials and employees of the Municipality of Balabagan from receiving their hard earned salaries, but the Judge did not heed the said request.3. Judge has no jurisdiction as the same belongs to COMELEC.

Judge Indar’s arguments:1. The October 11, 2004 order DID NOT FREEZE the IRA but merely HELD or DEFERRED its release to any person. Since said proclamation was neither annulled nor invalidated by the COMELEC pending resolution of the petitioner Ogka's Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned 3 orders. Since petitioner Ogka was left with no alternative to protect his interest in the IRA and to prevent irreparable injury, he filed the instant petition with the prayer for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.2. The provision on the automatic release of IRA is not a shield or immunity to the authority of the courts to interfere, interrupt or suspend its release when there is a legal question presented before it in order to determine the rights of the parties concerned.3. His court assumed jurisdiction as it is a petition for prohibition and injunction and not an enforcement of election laws. While he considered the said petition as an improper remedy, hence, the court should not have taken cognizance of the case, he had nevertheless acted on it since the petition prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, both an auxiliary remedy which concerns the "enforcement of legal right or a matter that partakes of a question of law" and not the enforcement of election laws.

ISSUE1. WON RTC has jurisdiction2. WON the October 11 order freezing the release of the IRA is valid.3. WON the said order partakes of a TRO.4. WON the Order contravenes the automatic release of funds to LGUs

HELD1. YES. RTC has jurisdtion.2. YES. But Judge violated the Rules when the TRO extended to 11 days, when only a 72-hour TRO is allowed ex-parte.3. YES. It is obviously one of the prayers prayed for which is subsequently granted by the judge.4. NO. This automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release.

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Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby imposed on respondent Judge for the above-mentioned violation of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

RATIO1.The petition prayed, among others, that Go should cease and desist from ordering PNB-Marawi through its branch manager to release the IRA for the month of October 2004 and the succeeding months to Sampiano and Macabato or their agents. The issue here involves the determination of whether Ogka is entitled to the issuance of a TRO or an injunction and not the application or enforcement of election law. Undeniably, RTC has jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129.

2.Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day it was filed, and without any hearing and prior notice to herein complainants. Respondent was allowed by the Rules to issue ex parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.

Respondent conducted the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004 or on the third day of the issuance of a TRO ex parte. The October 11, 2004 Order was lifted in an Order dated October 27, 2004 issued by the latter. Hence, the TRO issued ex parte was effective for 11 days from October 11, 2004 until October 22, 2004 in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO issued after a summary hearing can last for a period of 20 days. It is worthy to note that the said October 11, 2004 Order was subsequently lifted by the succeeding judge on the ground that the requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction were not present.

3. A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or preliminary injunction order. The Order directed PNB's Go and Disomangcop to hold or defer the release of the IRA to Sampiano and Macabato while the petition is pending resolution of the trial court and unless ordered otherwise by the court. This Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in respondent's petition for prohibition and injunction.

4. The automatic release of the IRA under Section 286 is a mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government unit, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government. However, this automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while such rights are still being determined.This should be considered an exercise of judicial functions and judicial prerogatives in the most cautious manner taking into account the factual and serious circumstances obtaining between petitioner Ogka and his Uncle Mayor Sampiano whose family were already at war with each other.

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PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1741

GOVERNING THE COMPUTATION OF NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

WHEREAS, internal revenue allotments are apportioned among local government units on the basis of the Tax Code, P.D. No. 144 (as amended) and various other laws;

WHEREAS, it is necessary to rationalize the system of national revenue allotments to local government units, in the light of the termination of P.D. No. 1231 on December 31, 1980 and the various forms in which national assistance is presently extended to local government units;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby Order and Decree:

Section 1. Statement of Policy. It shall be the policy of the State to strengthen the fiscal operations of local government units, consistent with the principle of decentralization in government operations. Part of the collections of the national government obtained from internal revenue sources shall accrue to local government units, comprising national assistance to the said local government units. The amount of assistance shall be determined, taking into account local requirements and available national funds, particularly as determined by the cost of implementing the national development plan.

Section 2. Magnitude of Assistance. A maximum of twenty per cent (20%) of national internal revenue taxes shall be available for national assistance to local government units: Provided, That the national revenue used as basis in computation shall exclude receipts accruing to Special or Fiduciary Funds and to Special Accounts in the General Fund, amounts authorized by law to be used by the collecting agency, and amounts recorded as income of the General Fund but which are charged to appropriations in the General or other Appropriations Laws.

The amount of assistance shall be computed on the basis of collections received by the national government during the third fiscal year preceding the fiscal year during which the assistance is distributed. Compliance shall be reckoned taking into account general budgetary assistance and assistance specifically intended for local schools, reforestation projects, or other priority local activities supported by the national government.

Section 3. Allocation. The total amount available shall be allocated among local government units as follows: provinces thirty per cent (30%); municipalities forty-five per cent (45%); and cities twenty-five per cent (25%).

The share of each local government unit shall be determined on the basis of population seventy per centum (70%); land area twenty per centum (20%); and equal sharing ten per centum (10%).

Section 4. Rate of Change. The annual allotment of any local government unit shall not increase by more than twenty-five per cent (25%) of, nor shall be less than, its actual allocation for the preceding year, except when otherwise approved by the President (Prime Minister) upon recommendation of the Ministry of the Budget and the Minister of Local Government and Community Development.

Section 5. Development Fund. No less than twenty per cent (20%) of the allotments received by a local government unit under this Act shall be appropriated and used by the recipient local government unit for development projects, except as may be otherwise approved by the Minister of the Budget. The nature and cost of the programs, projects and activities supported by the Development Fund shall be determined by the local government unit following such policies and guidelines jointly issued by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development and the Minister of the Budget.

Section 6. Rules and Regulations. The Minister of the Budget shall issue the necessary rules and regulations for the prompt and effective implementation of this Decree.

Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts of law inconsistent herewith, particularly P.D. No. 144 and 1231, are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.

Done in the City of Manila, this 31st day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

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PIMENTEL, JR. V. OCHOA, 676 SCRA 551

...constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2011

which provides a P21 Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare & Development (DSWD). ....stop implementing the said program on the ground that it amounts to a "recentralization" of government functions that have already been devolved from the national government to the local government units.

FACTS: In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target

beneficiaries.2 Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino,"... upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and Management

On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O. No. 16, s. 2008),5 setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program"

This government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as CCTP, "provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human development goals."

A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)12 executed by the DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in detail the obligation of both parties during the intended five-year implementation of the CCTP.

Pimentel – challenges -  challenges before the Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.

ISSUE:WON THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD IN THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.

HELD: NO.

SEC. 17 of LGC - The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments... But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. 

With regard to devolution itself, it was claimed in Pimentel, Jr. v. Ochoa, 676 SCRA 551 (2012),that implementing ConditionalCashTransfer Program(CCTP)thru theDepartment ofSocialWelfareand Development (DSWD), instead of the local government units, would amount to“recentralization” ofgovernment functions already conferred on local governments. The Court held,otherwise, however. It said that while Sec. 17 of the Local Government Code charges the LGUs totake on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from thenational agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respectivejurisdictions, paragraph (c) ofthe same provision provides a categorical exception of casesinvolvingnationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. “The essence ofthis expressreservationof power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as theimplementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by thenational government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves thedelivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.” In fined, “[t]he national governmentis, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of nationaldevelopment programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUsconcerned.”

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VFP vs. ReyesFacts: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense(DND) to conduct Management Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense.Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested suspension until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-government corporation.

Issue: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public office,considering that it does not possess a portion of the sovereign functions of thegovernment and considering further that, it has no budgetary appropriation fromDBM and that its funds come from membership dues.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public officeis defined as the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of thegovernment, to be exercised for the benefit of the public.In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fallwithin the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetaryappropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by publicofficers in the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application.Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND is proper.

In Laurel v. Desierto,22 we adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office, that it is "the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public."

Petitioner’s stand that the VFP is a private corporation because membership thereto is voluntary is likewise erroneous. As stated above, the membership of the VFP is not the individual membership of the affiliate organizations, but merely the aggregation of the heads of such affiliate organizations. These heads forming the VFP then elect the Supreme Council and the other officers,45 of this public corporation.

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SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMANGR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law – Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.

HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees.

Fontanilla v. MaliamanG.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045 February 27, 1991

Paras, J.

Facts:

The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.

Issue:

                whether NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its special agent

Held:

                No. The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.

                The NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a “government-function” corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects.” Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

                The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

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Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission onAudit (2011) [Vital Role of the Youth]

Petition: petition for prohibition with preliminaryinjunction and temporary restraining order

Petitioner: Boy Scouts of the Philippines

Respondent: Commission on Audit

Ponencia: Leonardo-De Castro

DOCTRINE: An institution that molds and prepares the youth tobecome model citizens and outstanding leaders of thecountry through lessons in patriotism, civicconsciousness and moral values, ultimately redounds tothe benefit of public welfare and the state. Theaforementioned functions are undeniably sovereignfunctions enshrined under the Art. II- Sec. 13 of theConstitution

FACTS:

-The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936,and whose functions relate to the fostering of publicvirtues of citizenship and patriotism and the generalimprovement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth.-On Aug 19, 1999, COA issued Resolution No. 99-011"Defining the Commission's policy with respect to theaudit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines" whichprovides for the conduction of an annual financial auditof the Boy Scouts of the Phil. and the expression of anopinion on the fairness of their financial statements. The BSP shall also be classified among the governmentcorporations belonging to the Educational, Social,Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.- The COA resolution stated that the BSP was createdas a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No.111 and is a government-controlled corporation. The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandateunder Section 2 (1), Article IX (D).-On Nov. 26, 1999, the BSP National President Jejomar Binay sought reconsideration of the resolution statingthat the BSP is not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction because it is not a unit of the government.Moreover, RA 7278 virtually eliminated the "substantialgovernment participation" in the National ExecutiveBoard and that the BSP is not as a governmentinstrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Codewhich provides that instrumentality refers to "any agencyof the National Government, not integrated within thedepartment framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law.-On July 3, 2000, Director Sunico, Corporate AuditOfficer of the COA, furnished the BSP with a copy of the Memorandum that opined that the substantialgovernment participation is only one (1) of the three (3)grounds relied upon by the Court in the resolution of thecase. Other considerations include the character of theBSP's purposes and functions which has a public aspectand the statutory designation of the BSP as a "publiccorporation". On the argument that BSP is not "agovernment instrumentality" and "agency" of thegovernment, the Supreme Court has elucidated thismatter in the BSP vs NLRC case when it declared thatBSP is both a "government-controlled corporation withan original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of theGovernment.-Upon the BSP's request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the COA.

ISSUES: W/N the BSP is a public corporation and is subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.

PROVISIONS:

-Commonwealth Act No. 111 (Boy Scout Charter), or An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known asthe Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define itsPowers and Purposes: Section 3.The purpose of thiscorporation shall be to promote, through organization,and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boysto do things for themselves and others, to train them inscoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods whichare now in common use by boy scouts.-

Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that COA shall have the power, authority, and duty toexamine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to therevenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters-

ART II- Section 13 of the Constitution . The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-buildingand shall promote and protect their physical, moral,spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shallinculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, andencourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Article 44 of the Civil Code:

The following are juridical persons:(1)The State and its political subdivisions;(2)

Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have beenconstituted according to law ;(3)Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose

to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member

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RULING + RATIO:

Yes. BSP is a public corporation andits funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.The BSP is a public corporation whose functions relateto the fostering of public virtues of citizenship andpatriotism and the general improvement of the moralspirit and fiber of the youth. The functions of the BSPinclude, among others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues,are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under theConstitution. Any attempt to classify the BSP as aprivate corporation would be incomprehensible since noless than the law which created it had designated it as apublic corporation and its statutory mandate embracesperformance of sovereign functions. The manner of creation and the purpose for which the BSP was createdindubitably prove that it is a government agency.Moreover, there are three classes of juridical personsunder Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, aspresently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, fallsunder the second classification .The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement a Statepolicy declared in Article II, Section 13 of theConstitution.Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special lawto serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutionalmandate, comes within the class of "public corporations"defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code andgoverned by the law which creates it.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE , premises considered,the instant petition for prohibition is

DISMISSED

.

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Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals vs Commission on AuditG.R. No. 169752

September 25, 2007Facts:PSPCA was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the Philippine Commission in order to enforce laws relating to the cruelty inflicted upon animals and for the protection of and to perform all things which may tend to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1) power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws and (2) share 50% of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts pursuant to the violations of related laws.

However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled the said powers. President Quezon then issued Executive Order No. 63 directing the Commission of Public Safety, Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, Mayors of chartered cities and every municipal president to detail and organize special officers to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders of criminal-cruelty laws.

On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the Commission on Audit visited petitioner’s office to conduct a survey. PSPCA demurred on the ground that it was a private entity and not under the CoA’s jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution.

 Issues:

WON the PSPCA is subject to CoA’s Audit Authority.

Held:No.

The charter test cannot be applied. It is predicated on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19, 1905. Laws, generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws interpreting others.None of the exceptions apply in the instant case.

The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesn’t necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law and no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the legislature to create private corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not a government agency.

PSPCA’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may exercise powers generally accorded to private corporations.

PSPCA’s employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s initiative and not through the GSIS.

The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations which areprivate corporations that render public service, supply public wants and pursue other exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by the latter’s own agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.

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