The International System in the Twenty First Century

Abstract

A speculative analysis of disturbing trends evident now which will require attention from decision-

makers in twenty-five years time identifies a number of problems with structural implications.

Assets for broaching these problems are analysed leading to an assessment of the requirements for

global leadership. A comparison between the situation in 2010 and 2030 demonstrates the

necessity for and likelihood of change. Options range from global suicide to a consortium of rising

and declining great Powers. The outcome will need to reflect forces rising from the bottom-up in

global society. Examples of the strengths and weaknesses of India’s contribution are given.

Introduction

It is a singular honour and pleasure for me as an Englishman to be invited to contribute to a special

edition of International Relations devoted to the life and work of such an eminent Indian scholar as

Professor M. S. Rajan. My own ties with Professor Rajan go back many years since he invited me on

two occasions to make a contribution to a journal he was editing at the time entitled The Non-

Aligned World. Apart from our intellectual collaboration, he was also extremely hospitable to me

and to my family. When we visited the campus of JNU we had a little cultural imperialism in reverse

when he instructed us in over twenty ways in which to prepare potatoes. However, that was not his

only skill! He was also extremely well known for his work in the field of international organisation

which was widely read well beyond the bounds of the sub-Continent. His work was always exact and

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judicious, but it was also always that of an Indian scholar. In short, he was the epitome, Indian style,

of a scholar and gentleman.

Identifying Trends

Any attempt to undertake a worthwhile critical examination of likely trends throughout the twenty

first century is probably one of science fiction. Imagine a person in 1815 attempting to trace through

the major trends of the nineteenth century, or again, in 1918 attempting to do this task for the

twentieth century. While that does not mean that we should simply give up, it does mean that we

need to concentrate on structure, rather than on agency, even if we are only peering into the future

in a speculative manner, for perhaps, a quarter of a century. Structures form the stage on which the

political scene is enacted, and when that stage is rickety, and collapses, it takes the actors with it. So

perhaps we can perceive glimpses of the structural framework within which the early decades of the

twenty first century may be played out.

Looking back it is clear that over the last 500 years one of the great engines of history has been the

spread of capitalism, bringing with it a process of globalisation. However, we cannot assume that

such a trend is likely to continue well into the next century. One of the important characteristics of

trends is that they always stop. Moreover, they can be self-correcting, or self-magnifying, and they

may be linear or circular, so that any trend analysis is fraught with complications and pitfalls.

Nevertheless, it can be useful. For example, when the Indian sub-Continent became independent its

implications for UK global security dispositions were obvious, yet it took Britain twenty years

thereafter to abandon its role East of Suez. If the trend had been analysed and had been acted

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upon, either to further it, or to countermand it, then a more rational policy could have been

pursued. Some nasty colonial wars might have been averted.

An end of term activity that I like to undertake with my students is to ask them to identify trends

that exist now, which are likely to throw items on to their desks as decision-makers in, say, a quarter

of a century’s time. I regret that I have not kept a record of their suggestions over the last 30 years

or more when I have undertaken this task. It would make an interesting contrast to see the evolution

of what concerns educated young people from various countries in global political issues. For

example, the nuclear question, both civil and military, was very important in the 1970s, whereas in

the 1980s development issues were crucial. Now it is much more a question of the environment.

So, what are the trends that we might identify now? They can constitute a sort of structure within

which decision-makers must act although they can be amenable to amendment by individuals or a

group of actors. They are not deterministic. Nevertheless, these are structures which will make

themselves felt over the longer period and be in sharp contrast to decision-makers’ time span, which

is often the main evening news bulletin on a national television. Harold Wilson’s famous comment

that a week is a long time in politics could be reduced, with twenty four hour news channels, to an

afternoon being a long time in politics. Political decision-makers may ignore the long term, since

their prime concern is to manage problems of the immediate political scene, because if they fail to

do this, they will be voted out of office in a democracy, or overthrown in a more authoritarian

regime. However, in the long run, chickens come home to roost, and decisions taken now are likely

to influence the political scene in the future. It does, therefore, make sense for academics to

speculate, even if such speculation is no more than a reasonably educated guess. It has no

pretentions to any scientific value, but can, perhaps, excite the imagination and enhance awareness

of future possibilities.

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My purpose is to identify various themes, some disturbing trends if you will, which are likely to

throw issues on to the desks of decision-makers sometime in the period around 2035, as we get

through roughly a third of the twenty first century. 1

An agenda of trends for the future

The first such trend is the continuation of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is a

major consideration for the well-being of the world that no actual military use has been made of

nuclear weapons in any shape or form, since the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Japan in

1945. Indeed, a whole culture has developed around the idea that such weapons are only a means

of deterrence to preserve basic core values which, in any case, if such weapons are used, are likely

literally to go up in smoke, as well as figuratively be destroyed. In the Cold War the major nuclear

Powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China − developed a set of rules

which reinforced the nuclear taboo. These included the London Suppliers Agreement of Weapons

Material, and of course, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was a set of rules, which, certainly after the

Cuban Missile Crisis, was well understood.

Since then there has been a proliferation of nuclear weapons to include such countries as India,

Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and some other near nuclear countries, which makes the relationship

and the preservation of the nuclear taboo more difficult to manage, and that is the threat.

Deterrence is no longer a relationship rooted in the Cold War. It now involves deterrence not only at

the global level, but at the regional level too, as well as rules to manage the linkages between

1 I have twice before undertaken such a survey. See ‘After 1984: Ten Disturbing Trends’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1977 and ‘Nach uns die Sinflut?’ in Gerald Mader, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Wolfgang R. Vogt (eds.), Europa im Umbruch, Münster, agenda Verlag, 1997.

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regional and global deterrence systems. The obvious case is the mutual deterrence in nuclear

matters between Pakistan and India, and the linkages of that particular relationship with the

relationship between, say, the United States and China, not to mention Russia. Moreover, the

moment any nuclear weapon is used in anger, no matter how small, and no matter where, the

nuclear taboo is broken, and the many near nuclear countries will then feel pushed to develop their

own nuclear capacities as a deterrent force. Iranian officials must be comparing themselves with

North Korea, which is surrounded by hostile nuclear Powers, or allies of hostile nuclear Powers, such

as South Korea and Japan, where the United States is held off by North Korea’s nuclear and

conventional threat. But Iran, too, is surrounded by nuclear Powers, including the United States,

Russia, Israel, Pakistan, and for that matter, India and China, who are in the region. So what is the

relationship of nuclear deterrence at the local level with that at the global level, and how can it be

managed? This is, of course, not to say that the decision-makers in new nuclear countries or

potential nuclear countries are more irresponsible than those of existing nuclear countries. It is to

say that the relationship becomes more difficult to manage, the more complex it is, and its

complexity is increasing. Can we preserve the nuclear taboo that has existed since 1945?

Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction and they have never been used except in 1945.

What is striking about the twenty first century already, and indeed, well before that period, is the

contrast between the mutual deterrence of the Cold War and the effectiveness of low level violence

the use of which is almost an every day occurrence. In a way there has been an increased access to

effective violence by small groups, both intra- and transnational, who can make highly proficient use

of it. This constitutes my second theme, which begins with ‘democratisation’ of access to effective

means of low level violence by small groups, a consequence of which is the growth of civilian

casualties when compared with military ones. Developed countries tend to be rich because they are

open societies, but by being open societies, often in a web of complex interdependence with other

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such societies, they are also vulnerable to disruption. If they attempt to close down the threat they

also have thereby to close down their own society to the detriment of what is a principal source of

their high level of development. It is, therefore, a dilemma. There is, at the same time, among small

groups who are not accommodated in society, a loss of restraint and they cannot be deterred, nor

can they be defeated if a society is to remain open. Moreover, small determined groups may have

an asymmetric capacity to bear pain.

Big states do lose small wars, in part because big states can go elsewhere since they have a large

number of interests throughout the world and to give up one is not a calamity. 2 A small determined

group, however, has no choice but to continue the struggle since it has few ,if any, other options.

The only alternative is its destruction. It is therefore willing to bear more pain, and eventually the

asymmetry in commitment in favour of the small group may well outweigh an asymmetry in armed

force favouring the major Power.

Again, imagine a situation in which, on a stormy winter’s night, a group of people are in a warm

room enjoying a social event, and others are outside on the pavement in the cold and wet. Those

inside the room are unlikely to throw a stone through the window, since it would let the cold and

wind in, whereas those outside the room have nothing to lose if they throw stones through the

window. This has two important implications. One is the degree of vulnerability of those cheerfully

inside the room and the conclusion is that they must be more willing than in the past to think in

terms of consensual decision-making, rather than majoritarian ones. The tyranny of the majority can

be turned against that majority. There are many such examples of effective means that can be used

by the so-called weak against the so-called strong in India’s history.

2 Andrew Mack: ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars’, World Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1975.

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The need for consensual rather than majoritarian decision-making points to the pervasive nature of

structural violence. Of course, the term is a tricky one, since structures are not violent in the sense

of manifest overt violence, but they can have a similar effect. What is more, the communications

revolution, and nowhere is this more startling than in India, has given a greater knowledge of the

existence of such structures which deprive some people of possibilities (and not others) so that they

are unable to contribute and participate fully in their societies. What is more they now have the

ability to do something about it, as we have just seen. Once there is awareness of the existence of

structural violence and access to effective forms of low level violence, and, crucially, there is no

effective response to demands for change then open violence is on the cards. What this requires

then is a growing legitimisation of role differentiation. There will always be structures which implies

role differentiation but these require legitimising so that they are changed to become equitable

rather than violent in their effects.

This is linked to the growing ubiquity of demands for participation and the increased questioning of

established authority. The demand for participation is a subjective demand and it is manifest at all

levels. Participation means playing what the actor considers to be an appropriate role in the

decision-making systems of its choice. Children now wish to participate more fully in family

decision-making, as do students in university decision-making. Japan, India or Brazil wish to

participate more fully by having a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or the

Third World to play a more important role in global governance.

The other side of the coin from participation is authority, which can be both ascriptive, in that like

Prince Charles you are born into it as the Monarch’s eldest son, or bureaucratic. In this case your

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authority comes from holding a position, such as Prime Minister, or a title such as Professor . But it

may also come from providing a service such as that of global leader in a manner acceptable to

others. The point is that now, more than ever, the exercise of authority, if it is to be acceptable,

needs to be earned otherwise it will be ineffective or require to be imposed by coercion which is

inefficient. It does not occur automatically. Authority has to be legitimised by the constituency over

and within which it is exercised. The United States may think that it is bound to lead, but it is

another question about whether the rest of us are bound to follow. 3 A high level of participation

does not necessarily mean pulling the levers of power, it means playing the role that you think is

important in the decision-making systems of your choice, which may be a minimal role. The exercise

of authority is greatly facilitated when those who exercise it are fully legitimised in their role.

It is for good reason that we are often enjoined to ‘think global’ as well as to ‘act local’. The

existence of global problems has long been evident, but they have become more salient over the last

fifty years. A global problem is one which necessarily affects everybody, and from which there is no

escape. To give an example, the Second World War touched all the continents of the globe, but an

indigenous person in the Brazilian rainforest might well have been completely unaware and

unaffected by the existence of such a world-wide war. If however, there is a nuclear war, then that

person will be affected and cannot escape from those effects, even if the individual is not aware of

what is happening. This is because nuclear fall-out or nuclear winter are going to affect everybody.

Since 1960 there have been a growing salience of such issues which are global issues rather than

world issues in the sense that I have defined them. These include, not only nuclear weapons, but

also the global economy, the communications revolution, climate change, resource depletion, and,

thinking positively, a greater awareness and development of human rights. All of these issues

necessarily affect us all. You may be able to buy a little time before the effects make themselves felt,

3 Joseph S. Nye: Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 1990 stimulated a continuing debate.

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but you cannot buy-out. This has a pressure on decision-making, which means that we can only

broach issues together. Everyone suffers the consequences and everyone has to be part of the

solution. Without all the major actors we cannot manage the issues effectively. We need a real

sense that the community interest is an integral part of self-interest. Yet we are slow, too slow, to

learn. We have already seen in the question of climate change how difficult it is to hang together. If

we fail in this task we shall surely hang separately.

International institutions, through which we can broach such problems, need to reflect the

movement from local, regional and world problems to another level, which is that of global

problems. Such institutions themselves face significant difficulties in adjustment. Institutions are

often set up to meet human needs, but they then develop their own institutional needs. Neither

prima face is wrong in some sense, but there can be a drifting apart between the human needs and

the institutional needs. Clearly, an intergovernmental institution, for example, the World Bank, the

IMF or UNDP, has to have its bureaucratic rules about what is an appropriate claim and what is not.

In order to make this judgement it requires information, but it may well be that some countries are

incapable of supplying that information, not because they refuse to do so, but because they are

unable to do so. They might have, for example, no statistical service capable of providing the quality

of data with which to justify a request to the IMF or World Bank. The consequence is often that

institutional needs take precedence over human needs. We need to ensure that the balance is kept

in a more equitable manner, as, after all, human needs have generated institutional needs, and not,

for the most part, the opposite.

We need also to think of an institutional framework which can enfranchise the full range of actors

who are relevant for the matters under discussion. To some degree this has already taken place

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through the opening of UN global conferences to a plethora of NGOs. In this manner global civil

society has made its entrée into the interstate system in many different ways, but that is not enough.

There are new concerts of states and others, but they tend to be from the top down, even if the

opening of global conferences has more a bottom-up feel to it, but not entirely so, since the growth

of NGOs is primarily a function of the rich developed part of the globe. NGOs are much thinner on

the ground in the areas which have the greatest need for development or they do not fit the

Western organisational model which rules the roost in the international system.

This suggests that greater attention needs to be paid to the individual, to human needs, to human

rights and to human security. If individuals feel that the system cannot meet its basic human needs,

its basic human rights, and provide basic human security, then that individual is ready to be

mobilised to change the system, if necessary, by violent means, and those means are effectively at

hand. It is also true, not only for individuals who are living below the threshold of poverty, but also

for the individuals in other societies where the provision of material goods and access to basic

education, health, food and shelter is assured. Here we find that societies are frequently becoming

atomised, in the sense that they do not treat the individual as a whole. If you watch television you

are part of rival TV ratings, if you go into a supermarket it is not necessary to speak one word of the

language of the country in which that supermarket is located, since everything can be done by signs

and pictures. Immediately you have made your purchases your bill is analysed to decide what sort

of products that particular supermarket should offer, reflecting the socio-political and economic

background of the people living in the area. Within five minutes of leaving the supermarket it may

be that the purchaser cannot remember whether the checkout person was male or female, and the

checkout person will have no reason to remember the person passing through the checkout outlet.

It is a far cry from the village store or the corner shop.

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This indicates that we have a very Gesellschaft-like society. A Gesellschaft-like society works well for

those for whom it works well and the devil takes the others. Mrs Thatcher was famous for saying

there is no such thing as society, but the decline in shared social values and in solidarity that was

characteristic of Britain during the Thatcher era has had very sad results which are likely to be

repeated as the current Cameron cuts play havoc with the welfare state. On the other hand, we do

not wish to perpetrate the notion of a Gemeinschaft, since that is slow to change, its roles are

ascribed and it is suffocating in terms of both social, political and economic activity. Our task over

the next quarter of a century is to have a better balance and fusion between a Gemeinschaft on the

one hand and a Gesellschaft on the other. We need to put back some of the elements of solidarity,

but still benefit from the notions of rationality and meritocracy. Increasingly in the Western World,

and particularly in those areas where there are large minorities who are frequently discriminated

against, or who refuse to join the broader system, the balance does not appear to be correct. If we

fail to get this balance right it will lead to gated communities of the rich, and indeed, of the poor,

and these gated communities will be glaring at each other. In short, it will be like Apartheid South

Africa, or Israel within a world writ large.

This concern raises the question of the two sorts of development which are fundamental for our

present well-being. The first one involves an element of self-actualisation through the provision of

basic human needs such as freedom from fear and want and access to adequate forms of

participation, education and health. This will provide the basis for an individual then to develop his

or her capacities and put a requirement upon society to provide, where possible, the means for this

to occur. The other element is that of bridging the gap between the rich and the poor to make it

sufficiently worthwhile for the poor to look to reform in the present system, rather than to its

overthrow.

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The penultimate trend points to one of the most striking changes in global society over the last

century. This is the increasing rate of change in some areas compared with others. Whereas, in the

past, if there was a scientific development there was also a long period of time before this

development became generalised throughout the system. For example, from the first use of gun

powder in Europe to its generalised use took a century, whereas for the first powered flight of

human beings to putting a man on the moon, which are vastly different tasks, only took fifty years.

The striking trend is an enormous and exponential increase in scientific knowledge, in contrast to our

social and political ideas which are evolving much more slowly. Many of the great ‘isms’ of the

beginning of the twenty first century could be found in previous centuries, whether it be

conservatism, liberalism, fascism, socialism, communism, or a wide range of religious faiths. Where

are the ‘isms’ of the twenty first century? Only one suggests itself at the moment, which is that of

globalism. The consequence of this is that we are broaching questions of the twenty first century

with the intellectual, social, political and economic tools of, at best, the nineteenth century. Clearly,

the gap is worrying, and, seemingly, we do not have any clear idea of ways of bridging that gap. Is it

therefore time for the biggest change of all, a change of civilisation?

Michael Mann in his analyses of the social bases of power, points to four separate, but integrated,

forms of power, which are political, economic, military and ideological.4 Any specific civilisation has

always been characterised by the domination of one, or perhaps more, of these different bases of

power. For example, the Roman Empire was essentially political and military, and for the last 500

years our own global civilisation has been dominated by economic factors with the spread

throughout the world of capitalism. But will that continue? All civilisations have come to an end and

Mann suggests that they come to an end not because of a revolution in the centre of power, since

those in the centre of power tend to conform to its rules and regulations because they are usually

beneficiaries. Rather, either there is a tectonic shift, or the growth of a new ideology in the far 4 Michael Mann: The Sources of Social Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Vol. I, 1986.

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distant reaches of a civilisation. Perhaps there are some straws in the wind for ourselves, in the

sense that, although clearly, the world system is presently dominated by the economic bases of

power, those straws of the wind suggest the movement to ideological power. It can be seen in the

Southern United States with its strong rightwing radical groups and its fundamentalist churches, it

can be seen in Afghanistan or in Pakistan, it can be seen in the Jewish colons on the West Bank to

name but a few. In the further reaches of the global economic capitalistic civilisation there is the

beginnings of revolt − an ideological revolt − which takes little account of the importance of

economic rationality, and it is prepared to use coercive force, which is readily available to small

groups, to signal its presence and to make itself felt. If it is successful, it will signal the end of global

capitalism as we know it, and the beginning of a new age of ideology. It is in no sense a question of

‘the West versus the Rest’, as some have crudely put it 5 , but much more a question of

cosmopolitans against fundamentalists within Western societies and elsewhere. Facing these, for

the most part, alarming trends, do we have some assets to broach the sort of issues that they are

likely to throw on to the desks of decision-makers in a quarter of a century’s time?

Assets

We live in an anarchical global society. It is anarchical because there is no central authority, but

there is enough governance to constitute a society, even if it is a rather weak one. To be sure, the

process is not uniform with stronger assets in some areas than in others, nevertheless, the system

has existed in one form or another since roughly 1500. It is however clear, that as the number of

global problems and the sort of trends set out above, have become more evident, there is a growing

need for governance ( as opposed to world government). Even a society which is anarchical implies

5 Samuel Huntington: ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, 1993, provoked an interesting debate characterised more by heat than by light.

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that there are some shared values and rules, procedures and institutions to enable its members to

live a better life by being able to deal with the various problems confronting it as well as taking

advantage of opportunities. Global governance is not one thing, it is a hybrid, it is not a government,

but rather a process to identify issues, form an agenda, arrive at an outcome and to implement it

before assessing feedback. It is therefore multi-polar and has many different actors. It is also multi-

dimensional. It deals, above all, with global problems, in the sense that these are problems which

necessarily affect everybody, and from which, therefore, there is no escape.

Much of the developed world is enveloped in a system of global and complex interdependence.

Given the nature of interdependence we are necessarily interested in the well-being of others, even

if our concerns focus largely on our particular interests. Keohane and Nye 6 have analysed such

complex interdependence by stressing the variables of sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is the

extent to which one actor is likely to be influenced by the behaviour of another actor, whereas

vulnerability concerns the extent to which the sensitive actor has alternatives. They use these

concepts to analyse the politics of interdependence, largely between Western Europe and the

United States, and more widely too, to include the rest of the developed world, notably Japan. In so

doing they are interested in the degree to which benefits and costs are allocated, even though it is a

situation where all gain. What they fail to do is to add a further dimension, which is the notion of

upgrading the common interest. 7 This is the idea that behaviour is also motivated by overriding

goals which are so important that there is a willingness to forego short-term benefits in order to

have longer-term benefits. In short, it is based on the idea that the common interest is an integral

part of the individual interest.

6 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye: Power and Interdependence, Boston, Little, Brown, 1977.7 Ernst B. Haas: Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964, makes good use of this concept in the context of the early years of the European integration.

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There have been a number of striking examples of this in the past, particularly in the case of Europe,

whereby the overriding necessity to bring a true resolution to the Franco-German conflict meant

that many actors in the European integration process were willing to pay over the odds in order to

secure the greater goal of Franco-German reconciliation. If the ties which come from complex

interdependence are based on advantages for all, even though their relative incidence may vary,

then everyone has an interest in a successful outcome. If however, that interdependence is simply

an imposition, then it is no more or less than old-fashioned imperialism. Empires, after all, were an

example of complex interdependence, but they are unlikely to be the answer to the sorts of

problems that we have identified above. Complex interdependence therefore, is a major asset,

where it provides common interests and the willingness to act together, since only by acting

together can we broach the nature of the problems that we have identified. It is also likely to

enhance the degree of shared values. Values need an institutional framework through which to be

most effective, since they can then permeate the structures and thereby have an influence over a

long period of time.

It is often thought that the UN Security Council is the pinnacle of the institutional framework for

global governance in questions of peace and security, and particularly, the P5 Powers which, each,

hold a veto.8 In so far as Chapter VII coercive activities are concerned, P5 in a sense is still relevant,

except for the exclusion of India. However, the Security Council is more than a military body, it is

also a political body, dealing with Chapter VI activities and a range of other functions. In this regard

it is not only India that is missing, but also a significant number of other players, notably, Japan and

Brazil, to mention but two. Germany is a different case since it is likely that the major European

Powers will, under the stress of financial cuts, either push the European Union towards being a

global soft Power, or develop a collective military framework which will then require a foreign policy,

8 A.J.R.Groom: ‘The Security Council: A Case for Change by Stealth?’ in Vincent Chetail (ed.): Conflicts, Security and Cooperation, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007.

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and perhaps, in the longer term, but within the period that we are considering, of 25 years or so,

constitute, eventually, an EU seat with British and French participation. There remains the knotty

problem not of an ‘African’ seat but of who should hold it.

Global economic governance takes place through a plethora of organisations, some of which are in

the United Nations itself, such as the IMF and the World Bank, some of which are outside, such as

the World Trade Organisation, OECD, G7/8 and G20. These are in turn buttressed by many regional

organisations, and indeed, other UN bodies such as UNDP and UNCTAD. Beyond the formal system

itself are informal institutions such as the Davos Meetings, the Social Forum and the Global

Compact. As we have already seen, global conferences have developed within the broad framework

of the UN system, which enables global civil society, or at least part of it, to play a major role. The

UN system is further expanded by the range of Specialised Agencies and programmes. There is,

therefore, in both the political-military and the economic and financial sphere some notions of

governance albeit of a top-down nature.

In terms of cultural and social questions, the existing framework is much weaker. To be sure there

are Specialised Agencies such as UNESCO, but the institutional framework for human rights has not

been sufficiently well developed. Indeed, there are grounds for thinking that some parts of it are

nothing more than an hypocrisy. But it should be remembered that after peace and security, human

rights are given the most salience in the UN Charter, and there has been, since the founding of the

UN, an impressive development and refining of human rights, as well as a greater acceptance of

their validity across cultures. We now seem to agree much more than we used to do, although of

course, implementation is a different matter.

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Institutional assets therefore, are sufficiently strong, sufficiently widespread and have sufficient

capacity for growth to provide an embryonic framework for governance. But they need to be more

democratic, to be more participatory and to be more concerned with human needs than institutional

values. They are too much top-down organisations, but there is a beginning, indeed, a forced entry,

by global civil society, into their working methods. Even then global civil society is itself

unrepresentative and in many ways undemocratic. Nevertheless, it is better to have it in, whatever

its deficiencies, than to have it out.

Global Leadership

The nature of global problems means that henceforth global leadership cannot be seen in terms of

imperial rivalries such as characterised global politics in the nineteenth century, for to do this would

be to end in suicide. George Modelski in his studies, with others, has pointed to the notion of global

leadership and five cycles of such leadership, each lasting roughly a century, that characterise the

last half millennium.9 The leading Powers were, in turn, Portugal, Holland, Britain with two cycles,

and the United States, which is now in a period of decline. In each case historically the change of

leadership was the result of a systems war, and the victor established a new world order which

embodied more of its values and interests than those of any other major Power, although it was not

a matter of global domination, but simply a matter of primus inter pares. Robert Gilpin supports this

thesis in his studies of the rise and fall of Powers.10 The stimulus comes when a particular country is

an innovator and gets a lead which enables it to establish itself as a global leader. It then has a long

period of consolidation before a process of delegitimisation occurs, rivalry increases and disruption

finally breaks out into global war. This is a generally accepted historical analysis, but if it were to

9 The work of Modelski and his colleagues permeates my thought and is reflected in much of this essay. See George Modelski: Long Cycles in World Politics, London, Macmillan, 1987.10 Robert Gilpin: War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

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become the future it would be catastrophic. In short, it would be a form of collective suicide since

the globe could not sustain such a conflagration.

In the past, as now, a global leader needs to have a number of attributes, which can be summarised

in the following manner. First of all, a leader needs a military capability which enables it to project

military force anywhere in the globe, although it also needs to be remembered that the change of

nature of conflict and effective use of violence is such that traditional super Powers may be like

muscle-bound Leviathans. Secondly, it needs to have a powerful economy which may not be the

largest economy, but it is one which will be extremely innovative. In other words, its economic

prowess should be at the cutting edge. It also needs to exhibit a cultural attraction, in the sense that

its values, its religion, its language, and the like, are attractive to others. All of this is of little import

without an element of political will. It needs to want to act as a global leader and to pay the

necessary price for acting as a global leader, because there are costs as well as benefits. And finally,

if it is to accomplish this task effectively, it needs a high degree of legitimisation in the role of global

leader. It is no good feeling and asserting that you are bound to lead if the others do not feel bound

to follow.

There is, at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty first century, a number of actors with

the potential for global leadership, including the United States, Russia, the European Union, India,

China, Japan, Indonesia and Brazil. If we assign a score in the form of a tick indicating a strong

capacity, a question mark meaning potential and a cross meaning little capacity, then the situation in

2010 can look as follows.

Figure 1. 2010

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USA Russia EU India China Japan Indonesia Brazil

Projection of

military capability

X ? ? X X X

Economic cutting

edge and capacity

X ? X ?

Cultural attraction X ? ? X

Political will ? ? ? ? X X

Legitimacy ? X ? X X

If we extend this analysis 25 years to 2035 the situation might look as follows.

Figure 2. 2035

USA Russia EU India China Japan Indonesia Brazil

Projection of

military capability

? ? X ?

Economic cutting

edge and capacity

? X

Cultural attraction ? X ? X ?

Political will ? ? ? ? ?

Legitimacy ? X ? X X

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To be sure, the values put in the chart are simply ones coming from quick reflection, but the lesson is

clear, change there is going to be. The question, therefore, is whether or not it is likely to be a

peaceful change, which reflects the interests of all concerned. It should also be remembered that

this again is simply looking at the world through a lens of actual and potential global leaders.

There can be little doubt that the United States was the accepted global leader from 1947 until

towards the end of the Cold War. At that point there was a uni-polar moment when the Soviet

Union had collapsed, the Europeans were primarily concerned with the question of the reunification

of Germany and the Japanese were entering a period of economic turmoil. Quickly a multi-polar

situation re-established itself, because, while there was only one super Power, namely, the United

States, there were countervailing Powers in some of the major dimensions of global leadership. In

the economic sphere the EU and Japan were powerful independent global actors as was the EU in

the cultural sphere. There was a decline in legitimacy of the United States, which found it difficult to

act in a consensual manner. In the military sphere new forms of military threats, or coercive threats,

became important and the United States demonstrated that it was ill-fitted to respond to them in an

effective manner. It was fighting new wars with the methods of old wars. Moreover, the nuclear

genie was out of the bottle in that more countries than hitherto had nuclear weapons.

We are therefore faced with a dilemma given that the United States is declining. In the past such a

decline led to a global war. Yet a global war is unsustainable. Nevertheless there are new actors at

the global level that wish to make themselves felt in terms of global politics. After all, India, China,

Japan, the EU, and others, have been primarily concerned with domestic problems over the last fifty

or sixty years. The EU, to take its case, has been concerned with creating a single market and a

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currency. Now all of these actors are beginning to look at their global role, and this is manifesting

itself ever more strongly in the twenty first century.

Will the United States attempt to maintain its position as a global hegemon, or will it begin to look

for a change in its position as it finds the task of global leadership ever more onerous? If the United

States is willing to change, then will others accept that change? In short, will it be possible to give

the United States a soft landing as it ceases to be the global hegemon? Are others willing to restrain

their ambitions to give the United States a soft landing? Indeed, can we move to a kind of global

leadership which is in effect a consortium of a number of different Powers and entities, perhaps

differentiated between different fields of activity from security to economic and from cultural to

human rights and the like? Thinking through this conundrum would have exercised the mind of

Professor Rajan!

Bottom Up

This analysis so far has been, in essence, from the top down, but can we predicate the world on a

top down basis? The strength of the argument of the trends analysed earlier, is that we cannot do

so. We have to think global to be sure, but we also have to act local. If we fail to analyse the world

from the bottom up, we shall end up with delegitimised institutions, the perpetual challenge to

authority, unrelenting demands for participation, and when this is not accepted, the murderous use

of effective means of coercion. We cannot impose, we must therefore join together. This does not

mean to say that every wish of every local leader is our command. It does mean to say that we need

to look at the world through a different lens, one which is not only top down, but also bottom up.

Otherwise we shall, as mentioned earlier, end up as a garrison state and gated community, such as

was the Republic of South Africa and Israel is now.

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Do we have, in fact, things in common? What is more, do we want to be open, integrated and

interdependent societies? And, can that be successful? The answer is in the affirmative only if the

‘other’ feels that his, her and their basic human needs, such as human security, are met, that their

hopes are fulfilled, and that their fears are mitigated. In short, that it is no longer conceived as the

‘Other’. Then, but only then, can those of us who are privileged and rich be safe. It is not the

security of the armed camp which will be our salvation, but rather peace by association, what

Mitrany called, in a wonderful essay, a working peace system.11 Europe in some ways has learned

this lesson, but it learned it the hard way, and what is more we Europeans must not forget it, and it

is one of our functions as actors in global society to make our experience known to others so they do

not repeat our mistakes.

We must ask as well, whether there will be a single system or many systems. Will they be

antagonistic towards each other? Or cooperative? Certainly, diversity is an asset if it does not lead

to a collapse into anarchy. Our international system grew out of the Christian, capitalist, coercive

world of Westphalia and it was an exclusive club based on sovereignty and similarity with a notion of

the ‘Other’. The ‘Other’ was not sovereign, and was not equal. Our institutions still reflect this

notion of Westphalia versus the ‘other’, and we must overcome it and create structures which are

multi-level, multi-lateral and multi-layered. Something again, in which a contribution from the likes

of Professor Rajan is sorely lacking.

The Indian Contribution

As we have seen in our little charts above, India is a major global actor, and a natural participant in a

consortium for global leadership, but it is more than that. It is not just a case of membership of the

Security Council, it is also a case of the cutting edge in its economic system, and its economy has

11 David Mitrany: A Working Peace System, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1966.

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become a major engine of growth for the world economy. Above all, however, India is an exemplar,

it is an exemplar of the world writ small. Multi-ethnic, multi-faith, it has diversity but also unity, it

has a democratic culture and it has aspirations. It also has a political philosophy which could be very

useful in the concept of juggling in the global consortium. The ideas of non-alignment which were

fashioned in their origins in the 1930s and came to fruition in the 1950s and 1960s can be, and

indeed should be, refashioned for a world of global management at both the global level and at the

local level. But India is not only an asset, it is also a problem. Already the relationship with Pakistan

has raised the fear of a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for the rest of the world, even if

the use of nuclear weapons is severely limited. India has its problems and the readers of this Journal

are fully aware of what they are, even if they cannot agree on their precise delineation and the way

to resolve them. But as we in Europe faced the terrible century of struggle between France and

Germany, and eventually, at the expense of much blood and treasure, managed to find a true

resolution, so can others continue to strive to achieve such a goal. And above all, where one

stumbles, the other must pick it up. It is in our interest, the common interest, as well as the

individual interest, to do so.

AJR Groom

Canterbury, November 2010

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