' 9 AUG 1955 NATO SECRET
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JNATO SKCPCT SUPREME HEADQUIFETERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE PARIS 5 PRANCE AG 6160 AD SUBJECT 2a July 1955 : Improvement of Posture of SACEUR t S Air Force Units TO Secretary Standing Grotip North Atlantic Treaty Organization The Pentagon Washington 25, D.C. REFERENCES : I a) SHAPE 330/54 fSGM-600-54 b) SHARE 384/54 (SGM-601-54 c) MC 48 d } MC 49 e) MJM 24/54 I 1 # As a major consequence of the Capabilities Study, MC 48 and MC 49, my staff has undertaken extensive studies of the situation which will face the air force units under ny command in light of the growing enemy atomic threat and of the measures necessaiy to adequately improve their posture in relation thereto» The summary of these studies is attached as Enclosure A» 2. The new situation centres around the growing enesy atomic threat which gives the eneny a progressively increasing potential cap- ability of delivering an air attack of massive destructive proportions in a short space of time with great possibilities of achieving initial surprise. Since one aircraft with an atomic bomb can now deliver destructive power which would require thousands of aircraft with con- ventional bombs, a relatively small number of aircraft can potentially be routinely deployed, prepared and launched on the initial massive attack with little or no detectable warning. It is obvious that adequate measures irnst be taken to improve and further develop the posture of our air forces to meet this situation. I think that the worth of air force units whose posture cannot be adequately improved in proportion to the changing and increasing energy threat would be gravely impaireds 3» This new progressively developing situation points to the critical importance of the initial phase of an atomic war, especially the period of the initial attack, to our air forces and in turn to the possibility of success in my mission of defending the area of Allied y Command Europe. Survival and retention of adequate operational capab- ^ ility of our air forces must be our primary vital goals for the initial phase of war. This leads us to the following main objectives: a. Improve to the maximum the possibility of recexpt and dissemination of warning of enemy attack, especially the initial attack* t* b. Maintain high combat alertness in all units to react to warning of initial enemy attack, ' 9 AUG 1955 NATO SECRET DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE
Transcript of ' 9 AUG 1955 NATO SECRET
JNATO SKCPCT SUPREME HEADQUIFETERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS5 PRANCE
AG 6160 AD
SUBJECT
2a July 1955
: Improvement of Posture of SACEURtS Air Force Units
TO Secretary Standing Grotip North Atlantic Treaty Organization The Pentagon Washington 25, D.C.
REFERENCES :
I
a) SHAPE 330/54 fSGM-600-54 b) SHARE 384/54 (SGM-601-54 c) MC 48 d} MC 49 e) MJM 24/54
I
1# As a major consequence of the Capabilities Study, MC 48 and MC 49, my staff has undertaken extensive studies of the situation which will face the air force units under ny command in light of the growing enemy atomic threat and of the measures necessaiy to adequately improve their posture in relation thereto» The summary of these studies is attached as Enclosure A»
2. The new situation centres around the growing enesy atomic threat which gives the eneny a progressively increasing potential cap-ability of delivering an air attack of massive destructive proportions in a short space of time with great possibilities of achieving initial surprise. Since one aircraft with an atomic bomb can now deliver destructive power which would require thousands of aircraft with con-ventional bombs, a relatively small number of aircraft can potentially be routinely deployed, prepared and launched on the initial massive attack with little or no detectable warning. It is obvious that adequate measures irnst be taken to improve and further develop the posture of our air forces to meet this situation. I think that the worth of air force units whose posture cannot be adequately improved in proportion to the changing and increasing energy threat would be gravely impaireds
3» This new progressively developing situation points to the critical importance of the initial phase of an atomic war, especially the period of the initial attack, to our air forces and in turn to the possibility of success in my mission of defending the area of Allied
y Command Europe. Survival and retention of adequate operational capab-^ ility of our air forces must be our primary vital goals for the initial
phase of war. This leads us to the following main objectives: a. Improve to the maximum the possibility of recexp t and
dissemination of warning of enemy attack, especially the initial attack* t*
b. Maintain high combat alertness in all units to react to warning of initial enemy attack,
' 9 AUG 1955 NATO SECRET
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NATO SECRCT AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955, subj: Iraprovement of Posture of S-ACEURfS
Air Force Units
C4 Attain capability of • Initiating and sustaining maximum effective combat operations during the critical initial period of a war*
d. Heduce ground vulnerability of units to attack.
4. The concept of the situation relative to these objectives and the specific measures, related thereto, which should be taken to achieve an adequate improvement of the posture of the air forces, are covered in detail in the guidance at Enclosure B. However, our studies have shown there is no single, simple or easy solution in the immediate future to this problem, nor even any combination of measures which is completely satisfactory in light of the growing enemy threat. We have, of neccess-ity had to select the best feasible measures which, when properly inqp lernen ted, we believe will reduce the vulnerability and progressively improve to acceptable degrees the overall posture of our air forces relative to the forecast eneiqy threat.
5. By taking the necessary steps to ensure the capability of our air forces both to, survive and fight effectively in atomic war we will concurrently be improving the deterrent factor of our forces. Even mere than in the past, military readiness and capability to fight is the greatest deterrent to aggression. The main feature in this age of rapid technological developments is the difficulty of adequately and progressively modifying our posture to keep pace with the potential changing capability of the enemy.
6. I believe that the measures recommended in Enclosure B are the best for the immediate future, through i960, and the ones which will have the optimum continuing validity thereafter through capability for adaption to our forecast of the progressively changing conditions. It is doubtful that any great further change in the posture is possible until vertical take-off and landing aircraft and missiles can make a greater contribution than now appears reasonable to expect in the next five years or, more. However, the need to free air force units of dependence on runways will become progressively more urgent as the eneny's atomic stockpile increases; therefore I urge that the highest priority practicable be accorded to this development. In the meantime, I intend that the necessary expansion of the NATO airfield complex for further dispersal, flexibility and resiliency of our air forces be accomplished at minimum cost through maximum use of further suitable national airfields which national authorities make available to us. This will enable us to keep to an absolute minimum the construction of further airfields at wholly new sites as I well appreciate the nary national problems involved in land acquisition.
7. I realise that national authorities will be faced with many problems and difficulties in varying degrees in implementing the measures listed herein and may need guidance as to where specific priorities or emphasis should be given in progressive impie men tat ion of the various measures, relative to the resources and limitations of the individual nations. However, the measures listed herein are so inter-related and interdependent that I do not consider it practicable to attempt to establish a rigid overall priority list which would be applicable as a guide for their progressive implementation in all countries• Scxne of the measures can be implemented with little effort by local action; some will require great effort and additional resources; others will
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NATO SEOPTT AG- 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955, subjs Inprovement of Posture of SACEUR IS
Air Force Ifiiits
require long term planning and coordination between NATO and national authorities. Some measures directly related to units, such as provision of unit mobility, can be implemented progressively according to the priority given to the category of the units. On the other hand, inadequate or only partial implementation of some measures may well give a false sense of achievement and improvement of the posture. - IH light of this situation I, my subordinate commanders, and my SHAPE staff will be prepared to give guidance to national authorities regard«, ing any problems on priority of implementation in respect to particular national problems or limitations. Generally, of course, priority in every field of improvement must be accorded to the atomic delivery units and their direct support reconnaissance units.
8. I request that Standing Group approval be given to the SHAPE guidance on objectives and measures for improvement of the posture of SACEURfS air-force units given at Enclosure B to serve as a basis for future NATO and national actions.
^OM,:.a />, I ; 2 Encls Enclosure A - Study Enclosure B - SHAPE Guidance
General, United States Army
DISTRIBUTION (See Reverse)
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*
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AG éléO AD dated 28 July 1955, subj: Improvement of Posture of SiCEURfS Air Force lhits
DISTRIBUTION SOT SGLO SECGEN NAC (THRU SGLO) MOD BELGIUM MOD CANADA MOD DENMARK MOD FRANCE' . MOD GREECE ' MOD ITALY MAF LUXEMBOURG MOD NSTHERLANDß \ MOD NOffiiI1AX MOD PORTUGAL MOD TÜRKEI MOD UK SECDEF US CINCNORTH CINCENT CINCSOUTH CINC AFMED COMAIRNORTH COMAIRCENT • COLiAIRo OuTIl SAOLANT CINCE ASTLANT CINCAIREASTLANT SACLANT L.O. . CHhNNEL COMMITTEE EICCC ELLA MOD GERMANY NMR (SHAPE) BELGIUM & LUXEMBOURG NMR ISHARE J CiNADA
DENMARK FRANCE GREECE ITALY NETHERLANDS N0R17AY
UK US GERMANY
NMR (SHAPE NMR ISHiIPEf NMR NMR (SHAPE* nmr (shape NMR (SHŒEÎ i m ATTACHE PORTUGAL NMR (SHAPE) TURKEY nmr (shape NMR (SHAPEt NMR (SHAPE. SHAPE:
ENMR SECY DSACEUR AIRDEP NAVDEP COS DCPO DCLA ArH7UAL HCTOf PPO OANDT SIG BUDFIN IiOG AG CENTRAL FILES
English 21 6 40 5
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0052 Erench Translation will follow
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STUDY QN
IMPROVEMEIfT QF POSTURE* OF SACEURtS AIR FORCE UNITS
TO ENSURE RETENTION OF ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
UNDER ENEMY" ATOMIC*4* ATTACK
I. THE PROBLEM
1. The problem is to develop guidance on measures for adequate improvement and further development of the posture of SACEURfS presently forecast air force units which will be effective through i960 and have optimum continuing validity thereafter in light of the anticipated progressively increasing enemy atomic threat»
II.> BACKGROUND (Selected references from NATO "New Approach" documents)»
2. "Surprise will be the major factor in any future war involving NATO and the degree of surprise attained by the eneny could greatly influence the outcome of the war. The ability of NATO to withstand and react to the first blow will depend on the extent to which our forces are in an effective alert status at the time of the meny's surprise attack." (Subpara 38b, MC 49).
*
3* "Should war occur, it will most likely consist of two phasesî . a relatively short initial phase of intensive atomic exchanges ;
- a subsequent phase involving operations of indeterminable length and of lesser intensity.
The ultimate victory, however, would probably have been determined by. the outcome of the initial phase." (Subpara 32c, MC 48).
4» nThe Soviets must be assumed to .possess the initiative and mount the initial attack. This capability points to the critical importance of a D-day readiness both to absorb and deliver new weapon attacks. No period of readjustment under combat conditions can be counted upon." • (Para 5, Encl A, SHAPE 330/54 and SGM-600-54).
+ "Posture" is defined as the overall condition of the major elements of a force and the major factors related thereto which are essential to enable the force to fulfil its mission.
++ The term "atomic" whenever appearing is to be understood to mean atomic and thermonuclear.
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Sicl A to AG 6160 AD dated 28 July 1955 (26 Pages) *
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NATO 5» "A major portion of Allied forces may be destroyed during the
opening phase of hostilities unless survival measures are introduced by the Allies to reduce the vulnerability of forces, bases and facilities to atomic attack. This emphasises the over-riding importance of devel-oping in peece the best possible organization and deployment to protect our forces* Defensive measures, however, can at best furnish protection; they will not eliminate the threat, except in conjunction vith counter-air action to destroy it at its source." (Para 6,Encl A, SHAPE 330/54 and SGM-60G-54).
6» , "Studies of the ability cf allied air forces in Europe in their present "organisation and on IIATO bases as now designed and constituted to absorb attack, indicate that a relatively small Soviet atomic effort could paralyse SACEUB1s ability to launch the atomic counter-attack as planned» This is obviously unacceptable in face of the assumed Soviet atomic cap-ability by 1957." (Para 2, App A, Encl J, SHAPE 330/54 and SGM-600-54)».
7» "In view of the increasing Scviet atomic capability and the probability of a future war opening with surprise atomic attacks, it is essential that the necessary dispersal and redeployment measures are taken -to ensure the survival of NATO forces during the initial phase of hostilit-ies. We must readjust our tactical disposition, improve and augment botjh passive and active defence measures, and increase unit dispersion and mobility. These measures apply to all forces, air, Iimd and sea alike* We must particularly guard our air forces against such attacks by basing them on as many different airfields as possible, by dispersing them to the maximum extent possible on these airfields, and by improving their, ability to redeploy to and operate from alternate bases at immediate notice." (Para 5, Encl to MC 48).
III» DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTORS HEARING QN TPJE PROBLEM
Scope of the Study 8. The period from the present through i960 is the period during
which.the factors involved in this problem can nov; be identified and assess» ed with reasonable accuracy. The measures developed in this study trill be primarily those effective by i960. The projection of tho factors beyond i960 can only be done with various degrees of certainty and, there-fore, only the anticipated general validity of the measures to bo under-taken can be reasonably assessed for the period beyond i960. However, the measures necessary to adequately improve the air foret posture will involve such effort and resources that they must be intended to be worth-while over as long a period as possible. furthermore, such measures should be adaptable from the present posture and adaptable to probable future technological developments and changes in the enemy threat.
9» There are many important differences among the NATO air units; there are differences in geographic conditions, organizational practices, equipment, economic resources and national military economies. As a con-sequence, SACEIIRrS programme for improvement and further development of the posture of the air forces should be such as to be generally compatible with these differences.
10. SUCEUR1 s primary mission is deterrence over an extended time period Hence the programme for reduction of vulnerability must be capable of bein^ achieved and sustained within the peacetime capabilities of the NATO nations
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Encl A to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955 t
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NATO RFr1PTT Present Posture
11. The existing posture of air forces was developed during the period when the primary threat of enemy air attack was with conventional weapons. Against this threat the concentration of air forces at wing airfields was logical in the interests of economical operations and efficient wartime operational control. This threat carried the prospect of adequate warning in advance of a war, and an initial period during which orderly redeployments and changes of bases for flexibility purposes would be feasible. Under this concept redeployment airfields, capable of handling at the reinforced alert wings which occupy in peacetime exposed or unsuitably located airfields, were constructed, as well as alternative airfields for flexibility after D-day.
12. In accordance with this former concept, the following tactical airfields have been built or programmed throughout Allied Command Europe:
a. 91 main airfields designed normally to accommodate permanently in peacetime 3 squadrons of 16-25 aircraft each for a total of 48 to 75 combat aircraft per airfield.
b. 15 redeployment airfields capable of accommodating, at the reinforced alert, 3 squadrons which occupy, in peacetime, airfields whieh have been considered as exposed or unsuitably located.
c. 57 alternative airfields, capable also of accommodating 3 squadrons each, for flexibility of SACEUR1 s air force units after the outbreak of war.
13. „Most of the NATO airfields have been programmed for 48 double, hardstands for dispersal of the aircraft on the airfields near the run-way and taxiway area, and for most of these airfields standard length runways of 8,000 feet have been programmed. Few underground install-ations, revetments, camouflage or concealment measures have been provided*
14. However, only the 72 airfields which are presently occupied by NATO air units are really - usable in the early phases of atomic war because the other airfields are not completed or else the ones completed have not been pre stocked with POL, ammunition and supplies, and the units on the main bases do not possess adequate capability of quickly moving from the main airfields even to the designated redeployment bases, let alone to the alternatives.
15. As regards geographical distribution, the airfields are concen-trated in the Central European Region as can be seen from the following table of airfield distribution:
Main Airfields
Northern Region 7
Central Region 64
Southern Region Italy 10 Greece and Turkey 10
TOTALS 91
Encl A to AG 6160 AD dated 28 JuIy 1955
0055
Redeployment Alternative Total Airfields Airfields
1 9 17 14 28 106
8 18 12 22
15 57 163
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Approximately 65¾ of the NATO airfields now built or scheduled to be built are in the Central Region. Yet, a comparision of the number of existing airfields per sector and the number of air units to be located in each sector shows that the ratio of airfields to units in the Central Region is still less than in the Northern and Southern Regions•
16» In each country there are a certain number of airfields which, either in their existing condition or after alteration, could potentiality take SACEURf s air force units. These airfields fall into the following categories:
a. Mlitary airfields under strictly national control. b. Civil airfields used for international or national
commercial traffic. c. Other national airfield sites not used for military
or commercial purposes»
Insofar as their characteristics and locations permit, the airfields in these three-categories could be used by NATO units provided national, authorities would agree. In such cases fully adequate facilities would have to be developed and prestocking of supplies would have to be accom-plished. But bheir use by NATO depends upon national decisions and will be a matter for negotiation between the nations and the subordinate commands,.
17« As an interim measure, SHAPE has taken action to recommend suspension of construction at NATO airfields, where possible, of items which preliminary studies have shown as not warranted or of limited value in light of the changing enemy threat. SHkPE has also issued guidance for the. development of the NiiTO 1956 airfields infrastructure programme on the-basis of improving all available and suitable national airfields to support squadron operations and for the programming of squadron-level airfields to support the build-up of the German Air Force,
l8o The organizational structure of SACEUR1 s air force units differs among the various natrons' contributions. As a general rule, however, organizations consisting of one wing per base have been adopted. Some countries have, in an effort to reduce peacetime overhead costs, integ-rated the three squadrons of each v/ing rather than simply adding their strengths and support facilities together. In this way costs were reduced by grouping the t idrons at one location and using the same staff for the general support of these squadrons- requirements. This has been part-icularly true in tî e cas3 of administration, technical maintenance and, in general, the facilities required for the day-to-day activities of these units, such as messes, motor transport, medical care, etc. x The degree of this integration within the wing varies from nation to nation, and the additional cost in personnel, equipment and maintenance if the wing were broken up into squadrons for continuous separate operations would vajcy as a result.
Enemy Threat ir the Immediate Future
19. Intelligence information and the evaluation thereof in the Capabilities Plan* IC 48 and IIC 49, clearly indicate that the former threat of a primarily conventional weapon eneiqy air attack is now rapidly shifting into a threat of a primarily atomic weapon air attack as the Soviet stock-pile of atomic weapons and their capability to deliver them increases. The threat of a heavy conventional weapon attack still remains, with the quantities of such weapons employed by the enemy being in direct proportion
8 Encl A to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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INATO BVCiTmt to the nearness of the targets to the Iron Gnrtain and within range of the mass of enemy aircraft which will be primarily equipped to carry those weapons.
20# The primary feature of the eneny atomic threat is the potential capability of delivering an air attack of massive destructive or neutral-izing proportions in a short space of time with great possibilities for strategic and tactical surprise. With a relatively small number of air-craft and with little detectable preparation an atomic attack can be delivered in a matter of hours involving destructive power which would have required masses of aircraft months to deliver in an all-out war with conventional weapons. This suggests that the ability to retain adequate operational capability through the initial atomic attack is extremely critical to SACEUR's air force units and that, in addition, the first few days are likely to be the decisive period in the air war.
21. During the time period covered by this study, Soviet atomic threat can be characterized by two principal factors:
a. The stockpile of weapons available to the Soviets against HATO air complex will increase rapidly during this period. However, the estimated number based upon Standing Group intelligence information available to SHAPE will be such as to enable NATO, through a combination of defensive measures, to create a satisfactory relative posture.
b. The Soviets will have a more than adequate delivery capab-ility for this stockpile. However, it will remain largely dependent on piloted aircraft with sub-sonic performance characteristics such as to enable a well developed, efficient and alert warning and air defence net-work to inflict limited attrition upon it, and to supply airfields with warning of an approaching enemy attack varying, according to the location of the airfield, from a few minutes to three quarters of an hour. Effects of Atomic Weapons, on Air Force lfciits
u • - 1 ~ - - - ^
22. It must be assumed that the enemy will have a wide range'of weapons varying from a few kilotons to several megatons of destructive power and that he will'employ l;hem according to availability and the type and value of the target presented. This suggests that SACElJRtS defence programme cannot be designed against a weapon of some particular yield. Therefore the degree of local dispersal planned for airfields must be based on a compromise between reduction of vulnerability and operational acceptability, thereby assuming the risk that megaton weapons will not be available to the enemy for widespread use against airfields. However, QB appreciable concentration of Allied atomic delivery units might be considered as a profitable target for a megaton bomb, and therefore must be avoided.
23m The principal effects of an atomic bomb attack are blast and heat, which cause destruction, and radiation which can kill or injure personnel and contaminate areas and equipment and thereby deny their use through neutralisation; radiation and contamination effects can also occur in any fall-out which may develop from the cloud formed by surface or near-surface explosion.
24* It must be assumed that, whenever required, the enemy will employ surface or near-surface bursts since present information indicates comparable blast effects to air bursts. In addition to blast effects
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Encl A to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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these bursts will crater the area around ground zero and will produce debris and residual contamination which will deny NATO the use of air-fields for periods of time ranging from a few hours to a number of days, depending an aiming point, yield, bombing accuracy and wind conditions. This suggests that SACEURtS programme must have provisions to overcome large-scale denial of airfield facilities during the critical first few days of the war.
25. The atomic bomb may cause simultaneous physical damage to all airfield facilities, equipment and personnel, whereas conventional weapons do not have such an overall simultaneous effect. Physical vulnerability of individual resourcec varies from aircraft and personnel which are most vulnerable, to pavements and underground storage which are least vulnerable. Personnel, aircraft and equipment can be given physical protection against physical" damage and radiatjbon, ut a ftffeh degree of such protection is difficult and expensive to provade; further-more, the residual contamina tîon""eTfects may neutralise the surviving equipment and personnel through preventing their free movement within the base area. This suggests that the only feasible effective way to adequately reduce vulnerability of moveable base resources is to remove them off the airfield before bombs drop or to locate them permanently off the airfield approximately 7^ilometres from the airfield centre.
Deficiencies in the Present Posture
26. Studies based on an,analysis of the threat have shown that the present vulnerable posture of SACEUR1 s air force units to atomic attack is due to the following major deficiencies:
- a. Inadequate capability to profit sufficiently from any pre-D-day advanced warning of enemy attack, over and above that obtainable from the early warning system, due to lack of a sufficiently large complex of pre-stocked airfields to which to dispersé presently over-concentrated air forces, ard insufficient mobility to effect such dispersal on short notice. ^
b* Almost total lack of capability to react adequately to initial D-day surprise atomic attack. This is due to:
(1) Inability of the present NATO alert system to respond to indication which might occur prior to an attempted enemy surprise attack."
(2) Inadequate radar and ground observer coverage, manning thereof, and system for dissemination of warning of unemy attack.
(3) Low state of continuous combac alertness in peacetime and lack of adequate prevision by units for utiliz-ation of radar warning time to ensure laimching of aircraft and dispersal of ground echelon of the unit before initial enemy atomic attack.
c. Lack of flexibility and resiliency for effective post D-day operations under conditions of atomic damage and reattack. This is due to:
(l) Insufficiently large airfield complex to help offset large-scale airfield denial produced by atomic after-effects.
10 Encl A to ACr 6160 AD dated 28 July 1955
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(2) Inadequate organization and facilities to direct and to support efficient post D-day operations from dispersed off-base locations under threat of atomic reattack.
(3) Lack of specific provisions and equipment for damage control and rehabilitation required on A-bombed airfields.
(4) Lack of unit mobility and pre-stocking of un-occupied airfields to permit rapid utilization of the still operational portion of the airfield complex after the initial attacks.
Expectation and Value of Warning
27* The method of enemy attack will most certainly be with complete surprise, if such can possibly be achieved. Any reasonable chance of success in the eneiqy's plans must be based upon the destruction of as much as possible of the Allied strategic and tactical atomic air power arrayed against him. He must, therefore, attempt to catch as much as possible of those forces on their bases or, if not wholly successful at this, at least to destroy those bases so that further strong effective attacks cannot be launched against him. It might well be that a diplom-atic peace offensive on the political level and no detectable unusual military manoeuvering would precede the day of actual attack. There is also a strong possibility that his offensive air forces can be positioned, pre-briefed and kept in a state of constant readiness over a prolonged period so that their launching on an actual attack might be accomplished with no additional detectable preparations.
28. Even if suspicions of enemy preparations for an actual attack were well founded the presumed delicacy of diplomatic negotiations which might then be underway might preclude any conspicuous large-scale redeployment of air units or other measures which the political level might fear could be interpreted as a provocative act on the part of NATO« Therefore, it is not considered sound for NATO military defence plans to be wholly dependent upon the possibility of receipt of advance warning which may well never be received and, if received, may not be usable "to trigger full-scale preparations.
29. Warning of imminent enemy attack or that an actual attack is under way, may well be limited to the warning received and evaluated from radarscopes or ground observers reporting the initial eneny attack in progress. Therefore, necessary emphasis must be placed upon the devel-opment of fully adequate early warning radar coverage and detection system including ground observer corps for Allied Command Europe and a reporting and evaluation system to enable full advantage to be taken of the limited time such warning would give. Even when such an adequate radar system and warning dissemination system are established, the extent of such warning may only be in the order of about 15 minutes near the Iran Curtain and up to about one hour in rear areas.
30. Having recognised the possibility of a surprise attack it would nevertheless be most unwise to exclude further actions which, though of low value against an attack without advance warning, would have greatly increased value against an attack concerning which we were able to obtain warning over and above that obtainable from the early warning system.
31« Another factor to consider is that no amount of warning is useful for the protection of fixed installations, runways, POL, and ammunition
11 ^ncl A to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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storage, etc., except possibly for night blackout. Warning can, in general, only be useful for air force units in regard to the preparation and launching of aircraft and the movement of mobile ground equipment and personnel from the possible target area, Forecast Long Term Enemy Threat
32. Intelligence estimates indicate that some time after i960 the limitations on Soviet atomic stockpile and delivery capability should disappear rapidly. The NATO air forces will then be faced with:
a. An enemy atomic stockpile which is unlimited in size when compared with any airfield target complex which the NATO air farces1 posture may logically present*
b. A delivery capability which may eventually develop to a point where supersonic unmanned and manned vehicles will substantially reduce radar warning time of the approaching initial attack as well as the Allied chances of inflicting effective attrition.
Ce The qu^tities^f megaton bombs then available to the eneiqy which may enable him to deny NATCT for extended period of time the use of any above-ground installation that he can successfully attack, or access to and egress from any underground installation due to residual contamination effects. By reattack of the installations the denial time might be able t'O be extended inde finitely «
33* If "chere should be any marked advancement of the time when this long term threat comes into being, then it would be necessary to recon-sider the entire problem* Long Term Posture for NATO Air Forces
34. Retention of operational capability in the face of an enenff capability of such proportions will require further revision in the types of aircraft- support structure, and of operational concepts over that * * * * Er t
required for the immediate future, The defensive concept then can be even less dependent on warning of an approaching attack than in the immediate future, or on presenting a target complex to the enenqy which will overtax his stockpile or his delivery capability, or on acceptable levels of att-rition to his strike forcec A high degree çf jphysiaal protection against bomb, effects will remain possible'"TüVcostlv and difficult to adapt to the needs of the tactical fœoes^ôFrapid response and flexibility.
35« A precise description of the ultimate posture for tactical air forces cannot be made at this Wmej However, general principles for such a posture can be described. As a target for enemy attack> tactical air forces when equipped with aircraft not needing runways for take-off or landing, have potential characteristics which are not shared by other target complexes such as industrial and population targets. These characteristics are the potential capability for full dispersion, high concealment and mobility* The energy's weapons and aircraft cannot be effective unless he has timely and certain knowledge of where the targets are located. By exploiting these characteristics tc the fullest extent, when the types of aircraft are available, it will be possible to deny him this knowledge.
The first principle must be denial of specific target information to the enemy* It must be coupled with continuous readiness in peacetime to react to an initial attack which comes with little or no warning.
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Since a force cannot be maintained continuously ready without great expense and without severe disruption of its peacetime operations and training, the need for readiness suggests that the tactical combat air units of the future may be a double standard force; part of each unit a standby "alert" force charged with the task of being continuously ready to respond to enemy attack, and another part of each unit an "operational training" force with the mission of maintaining combat proficiency and supporting the alert force»
Prospects of New Developments
37# Most of the currently available and programmed aircraft have been designed principally for speed, range and load-carrying capabilities and without serious regard to their take-off and landing distances. These aircraft, with certain exceptions, require airfield lengths of the order of 8,000 feet. ^he long term concept for SACEURt s air forces presents a requirement for a type of operation which is not dependent on large fixed facilities. The vertical take-off and landing aircraft, which is under development in several countries, is the major step in this direction. However, such aircraft will not be available in operational units until at least i960 and complete conversion may require an additional five to ten years. Furthermore, it is not now certain that vertical take-off and landing aircraft can replace all the present categories of aircraft because of possible operational and economic limitations.
38. In an effort to assist in bridging the gap between these two extremes, two courses of action are being followed by several countries» The first of these is to develop new aircraft which will be capable of operating from airfields approximately 3,000 feet long and which, in some cases, will have much lower tyre pressures than present types. Ifrifortunately, the first of these aircraft will not be available in operational units until 1958 and complete conversion of the units for which they are programmed is not likely to.take place until after the vertical take-off and landing aircraft start becoming available. Consequently, NATO air units will be forced to reply heavily on the present type of aircraft within the period covered by this study.
39«( The second current programme is to develop devices which will reduce airfield length requirements of the present aircraft. The following are of the greatest interest and are either now or will become operational during the time period covered by this study:
a. Assist take-off rockets (ATO). These rockets are currently capable of being used on many combat aircraft such as, for example, F-84. Large -increases in the currently used thrust to gross weight ratios could be obtained without'major structural modifications to the airframe of all aircraft. These increases could be attained within one to two years and could provide up to 50¾ reduction in runway requirement of the present aircraft. Hcwever, a major disadvantage of ATO for peacetime use by NATO is its high cost (two to three thousand dollars per launching) and therefore it is not an economical peacetime substitute for long runways. For a majority of the force its use must be reserved for wartime and emergency conditions.
b. Zero-length launching of aircraft (ZEL) represents the ultimate development of ATO. Its technic-1 feasibility has been demon ~ strated on the F-84 and the boost rocket and supporting launcher can probably be available in production quantities in 1957* ZEL is more expensive than ATO, since it requires larger rockets, as well as sane structural modifications to the aircraft. On the other hand, it offers
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great advantage over .ATO by completely freeing the aircraft from depend-ence for take-off on, a runway and thus offering the possibilities of a high degree of dispersal, concealment and mobility (if equipped with a mobile launcher)* . Subject to cost limitations, ZEL is both an attractive and practical device:for forces such as atomic delivery units whose initial retaliatory capability is a matter of the highest priority% Of course, separate means of landing are still required.
cQ The parabrake is a parachute device currently installed on, or programmed for, a number of types of NATO aircraft to reduce landing distance. It should shortly become available for F-84Fs and will reduce the ground roll requirement to about 2,000 feet with brakes. The modification cost of this device is low and its use presents few operational difficulties. • I
d0 A promising combined catapault and arrest device called "Turbo-kitten" is under development in the U.S. For F-84 operations the Turbo-kitten will require a 2,500 feet runway. Its estimated initial cost is of 'the order of #200,000 and its operational cost is nominal. Under the present development programme it could become available in quantity in time to be considered as an operational substitute for longer runways. When this device proves its operational suitability and becomes available in quantity it should be seriously considered as a substitute for remaining runway extension programmes for operational airfields and for provision of any further war reserve airfield complex.
•40. Ih the light of these facts it appears that in the near future ary increase in the number of fully operational airfields will primarily have to be made by providing regùlar runways needed by present aircraft. Increases in the airfield complex usable for emergency operations and aircraft dispersal can be made by means of the assist devices, if and when they become available and prove operationally acceptable*
41» Ih summary, future developments can be expected to reduce and perhaps eventually eliminate the present dependence on long runways. The interim aids can contribute to an expansion of the usable airfield system to include presently sub-standard airfields. However, those of the aids which are expensive for peacetime use or Have severe operational limitations should primarily be reserved for wartime emergency use. Hole of SACETJRtS Air Force units Relative to Enemy Threat
42. The primary role of the NATO forces in Earope must be that of an effective deterrent. These forces must, therefore, be so organized, disposed, trained and equipped that the Soviets, in taking account of them in their plans must come to the conclusion that, even with superior numbers and the advantage of surprise, their chances of obtaining a quick decision in the European theatre are small, and that such an attempt would involve grave risks to the Soviet Union." ' (Para 18, MC 45). .
43« "We must not assume, however, that even in these circumstances the Soviets might not precipitate a war, in which case the forces which had been built up and deployed to act as a deterrent must be capable of immediately and successfully carrying out their wartime role of preventing the rapid over-running of Europe." (Para 19, MC 48).
44* "In analyzing the pattern of NATO forces in Europe for the next few years in the light of these basic requirements, a fairly clear picture emerges. First and foremost they must be designed to provide the greatest
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possible deterrent to war. Secondly, they must be designed to give the highest probability of success in the initial phase. As it cannot safely be assumed that hostilities will terminate at the end of the initial phase, our forces must be prepared to conduct operations of a much longer duration. Our ability, however, to defeat the enemy will depend on our ability to survive and gain superiority in the initial phase. Thus, our peacetime force pattern must be designed primarily to achieve success during this initial phase and emphasis must be placed upon development of the forces which can participate most effectively in these operations." (Para 36, MC 49).
Priority of Tasks of SACEURtS Air Force Units 45. In light of these roles the tasks of SACEHRfS air forces, in
order of their priority, must be: a. To discourage aggression by providing an effective
deterrent. Primary emphasis in providing this deterrent should be placed on the retention of an effective atomic retaliatory capability. The paramount requirement for the retention of this capability i.s the launching of the air echelons and dispersal of the ground echelons of the atomic units before the first enemy attack arrives. Secondly, launching of the conventional units is needed to assist, through diversionary and saturation missions, the atomic units in the effective delivery of the atonic retaliatory strikes.
b. To preserve a continuing effective atoric delivery cap-ability, Here again the primary emphasis is on retention of operational capability of atomic units- However, for preservation of this contin-uing capability increased emphasis must also be placed on retention of operational capability of conventional units, since diversion and saturation tactics, reconnaissance, air defence and air transport are essential to the atomic capability* Particular emphasis must be placed on operation of reconnaissance units.
c. To preserve the operational capability of the conventional forces for their tasks other than support of the atomic retaliatory effort.
Order of P^iori^ of Typesi of Units
46. As the result of the roles and missions of SACEUR1 s air force, units, the priorities for the adoption of measures to improve the posture are as follows:
a - All weather atomic delivery units b. Other atomic delivery units. 0. Reconnaissance units. d. Fighter bomber units. e. Air defence units. JS» 1. Transport units.
Operational Objectives for the New Situation
47. Since the primary roles for SACEUR* s air forces are to con-tribute to the NATO deterrent against aggression and to successfully defend Europe if aggression occurs, the operational objectives and, in turn, the posture of these air forces, must be designed to contribute
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in the most effective ways to these roles, in light of the situation created by the forecast new enemy threat. If war should occur, the units must not only survive but must be capable of retaining adequate^ operational capability to fulfil their wartime missions, and especially to come out of the initial critical period advantageously. The oper-ational objectives must, therefore, be based on:
a. Improving to the maximum the possibility of receipt and dissemination of warning of initial enemy attack, to reduce to the minimum the ensny's chances of success in a surprise attack.
b. Maintaining high combat alertness in all units to react to warning of initial enemy attack, as an effective deterrent and continuous fighting capability.
c. Attaining the capability of initiating and sustaining maximum effective combat operations during the initial critical period of an atomic war.
d. Reducing ground vulnerability of units to atomic and conventional attack to minimise the damage and reduction of operational capability which the enemy could achieve.
Analysis of Jfeasures to Counter the Enemy Threat
48# Improving Chance of warning. All practical measures must be taken to improve the possibility of receipt through intelligence channels of advanced warning of possible eneny attack. It is also essential that adequate early-warning systems be developed, continuously manned, and a system of adequate and quick dissemination of information of actual enemy attack be established. However, the implementation of these measures will not ensure the receipt of adequate advanced warning but just increase the possibility of its receipt.
49« use of Warning. a. The warning which can at best be expected from the early-
warning sys terns is not adequate for an effective re.action to enemy attack unless the air units receiving them are in a high state of combat alert-ness. At the same time, full combat a:lertness cannot be permanently maintained within forces in peacetime. This poses a dilemma: effective use of D-day warning is not possible without prior préparatiens and such preparations cannot be permanently fully introduced into the entire force«
b. Since the posture of the air forces cannot, with safety, be wholly predicated on the receipt of any more advanced warning than that which can be expected from the early-warning systems, a two-fold solution suggests itself: (l) to maintain a portion of the force in a state of continuous alert readiness; (2) to periodically increase the portion of the force which is maintained in a state of continuous alert readiness to practice the action to be taken if advanced warning is received. The periods for which this increase occurs should be dictated by considerations of maintenance of proficiency in execution of the increased state of alert readiness and considerations of lew-levol indicators of possible eneny preparations for attempted surprise attack.
50. Increased Combat Alertness for SACEUR1 s Air Porce Units. Since SACEUR cannot be certain of receiving advance warning of an eneny attack, the air units must be in a posture which allows them to react favourably
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to an enemy surprise attack. Hence the goal must be as high a degree of combat alertness as is possible to maintain continuously in peacetime consistent with training requirements and other limitations. A start in this direction should be made immediately and an increase in the degree of alertness should occur by progressive improvement. The atomic delivery units shoula be üiaintained in a particularly high state of readiness with sufficient additional necessary pilots and other personnel being made available to the units for this purpose.
51. Establishment of Pre-Alert Military Measures. Significant improvements in the posture of SACEURtS air units can be effected for short intervals of time. Special measures placing air force units in the most advantageous position to survive an atomic attack and, at the same time, placing them in a better posture for implementing the EEP subsequently, if necessary, should be taken by unilateral military decision, on the basis of warning received no matter what form, how short or equivocal, without reference to national political authorities. These measures, called 'fPre-Alert IvHlitary Measures," are under separate study as a result of the Capabilities Plan and of the Programme Recommend-ations.
52. Activc Defence Measures. The improvements in air defence organization, control- and equipment, will, of course, assist in the overall defence of air force installations. However, there is no pros-pect of an air defence system for Europe within the time period principally under consideration in this paper which, at any reasonable cost, could ensure such a high degree of destruction of enemy aircraft as to justify reliance on such air defence as a major factor in the reduction of ground vulnerability of our air force units to enemy atomic attack. The air defence system for Europe must be improved as much as is reasonably possible to do, but it would be foolhardy to do it at the expense of measures for improving the posture of the offensive air units. As the Capabilities Plan states, "Defensive measures, however, can at best furnish protection; they will not eliminate the threat, except in conjunction with counter-air action to destroy it at its source." (Para 6, Encl A, SHiiPE 330/54)•
53» Value of Protected Construction. a. The Capabilities Plan includes the statement that: ttA
typical NATO base could be converted to an underground base at a cost in the general order of magnitude of 8 million dollars per base for protection against the assumed 70 kiloton bomb, and 14 million dollars for protection against a thermo-nuclear attack. If thus protected, at least 75?5 of the base components will be physically safe against the initial bomb blast and radiation. Kcmever9 due to the degrees of residual surface contamination, an underground base would probably have no sortie capability for at least four days after the attack* Consequently, an underground base fails to protect sortie capability during the most critical days of the war." (Sub para l6c, Annex C to Appendix A to Sncl J, SHAPE 330/54).
b. Por the same general reasons it is considered that extensive construction of protected facilities for personnel and vital equipment and supplies would not be a worthwhile measure against atomic attack. Even though such construction could protect, the possibility of contamination effects still neutralising the surviving personnel and supplies for extended periods of time reduce too greatly the value of extensive pro-tection of this kind, the construction of which would generally be veiy expensive. Such c cns id e rations do not apply to bulk items, to storage of POL in underground tanks and protected stoiage of ammunition supplies which it is essential and practicable to maintain on the airfield itself.
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However, reasonable protection for these against any successful attack other than a direct hit thereon can be provided at no great expense» Furthermore, some activities must continue on the airfield to sustain the all-out combat operations necessary, especially after the initial attack. To provide for these activities a "Flight Line Bunker" of small size should be provided to protect the portions of operations, engineer-ing, armament, commxmications, etc., which cannot fully effectively function continuously from dispersed locations. Otherwise, the removal of equipment, personnel and supplies, other than POL and ammunition, from the airfield is considered as a more preferable and feasible defensive measure against atomic attack than attempts to protect them an the airfield itself. • Hov/ever, in locations where terrain is part-icularly suitable to the construction of underground protection at no great expense, such construction should be considered as a supplementary or alternative measure.
c. As in the past, the protection of personnel on airfields remains à. national responsibility and the importance of providing practicable protection is strongly emphasized. The same personnel shel-ters or slit tranches and foxholes which should be prepared by local initiative against conventional attack remain as a valid measure against the continuing threat of conventional attack and as some protection against other than a direct atomic burst for personnel whose essential duties require them to be on the airfield at the time of possible enemy attack. The same consideration would apply to the provision of revet-ments for aircraft, which has been left to national desires and initiat-ive
54% Dispersal of Ground Echelons. a. Since it is not feasible to build extensive protected
facilities on the airfield, the most feasible and effective defensive measure is to permanently locate such facilities and personnel away from the airfield as are not essential to aircraft operations and maintenance, and to develop the capability to disperse the other personnel, equipment, and supplies which can be made mobile (all except bulk items, POL and ammunition). This minimum distance for dispersal sites should be about 7 kilometres from the centre of the airfield. The actual locat-ions of the sites should be determined by operational and geographical considerations«
k »
b. At those airfields still to be developed, only hangars and related aircraft maintenance buildings should be constructed above ground on the airfield- It is considered that these structures are essential to ensure that, regardless of the weather, the maximum number of aircraft can be maintained operationally ready for the crucial initial combat mission; even if these hangars are destroyed or damaged on the initial eneny attack they will have served their primary essential purpose. Moreover, these hangars are in any case necessary for prolonged peace-time use. Warehouses and all other structures including barracks, etc., should be constructed away from the airfield proper. At presently completed airfields, adequate additional warehousing should be constructed and temporary camp sites prepared off the airfield.
c. All units must be equipped as soon as possible with suff-icient additional vehicles to enable the personnel and equipment, which must be on the airfield continuously in peacetime, to move rapidly on warning of enemy initial attack to the dispersal site and, subsequently, to return the minimum personnel needed to support continuous combat air operations to the airfield as soon as the danger of initial attack is past, or as the combat operations require.
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à. Equipment and supplies maintained continuously above ground on airfields must be considered expendable unless adequate provisions can be made for their movement off the airfield before the initial enemy attack. A minimum amount of essential equipment which must be maintained on the airfield during combat operations, such as engine starters, refuelling units, etc., should be duplicated in off-base locations or maintained off-base at the redeployment airfield».
e. Fully adequate preparations must be made for launching all of the flyable aircraft upon warning cf the initial eneicy attack either on the first combat mission or to orbit in the area. This is to be achieved in part through increased combat readiness and in part through institution of the pre-alert measures. In addition, non-flyable aircraft should be towed to a dispersed parking area, where possible.
55. Deployment Levels and Areas. a. There is no level of deployment which can reasonably be
considered as presenting the enemy with an unprofitable target since a single aircraft capable of delivering an atomic bomb can do the damage hundreds of aircraft 'could do in T/orld War II. Theoretically, an airfield per aircraft would be ideal, though obviously unattainable and operationally impracticable. Hov/ever, the retention of the present concentration of a wing complement cf aircraft at one airfield with a relatively small target area would be foolhardy. Therefore, the level of deployment should be intermediate between these two extremes. Since the squadron is already the smallest unit of air force organization readily capable of being made self-sufficient, it is the most acceptable unit for further deployment in the immediate future.
b. Sufficient national airfields or readily available new sites are in prospect in the Northern and Southern Regions of Allied Command Europe to accommodate on separate airfields the squadrons fore-cast for those areas. In the Central Region the need for more airfields will be the greatest and will be especially aggravated by the build-up of the German squadrons in the period under consideration which cannot at this time be expected to be deployed other than in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.
c. It would be highly desirable from the strategic deployment standpoint to be able to thin out the "forward area" of Germany. How-ever, the investment and entrenchment of the non-German forces in Gennany gs well as the necessity for developing the airfields for the German units in their own country, precludes ar y appreciable "tüming out" in the Central Region. However, for the TT5 S units committed to SACEUR but not maintained in Europe, NATO airfields should be designated and developed as necessary in the Northern and Southern Regions as well as the Central Region for their use when deployed to Europe3 on a joint basis with nan-atomic units, both to reduce further concentration in the Central Region and to improve the theatre-wide deployment of these highly vital atomic delivery units.
d. To ensure maximum operational capability, units should be based at locations such that their range is not unduly restricted, and the necessity for staging through forward bases should be avoided, except for the staging of atomic delivery units for theat re -wide flexibility and for deception purposes.
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e. There is no intention of trying to build more airfields than the eneny can build atomic bomb3 and develop the capability for delivering them, because such a race can easily be won by the eneny. However, the more airfields occupied and fully operational would present the enemy with problems out of proportion to their number and provide less chance of any successful enemy strike markedly crippling the Allied effort» Besides, expanding the operational capability, flexibility and resiliency of SACEUR1 s air forces, the chance of success of the enemy 1S initial strike lessens out of proportion to the addition of targets since the many factors involved in the success of the operation, such as aborts, faulty navigation, errors in aiming, malfunction of equip-ment, etc., affect the odds of success as the eneny capability has to be spread out over many more targets*
56. Expand Deplcyment to Squadron Level or I^velop Capability Therefor.
a. In view of the uncertainty of the receipt of advanced warning and the possibility that warning will only be received from radar detection of the initial eneny attack being underway, the maximum practical peacetime deployment to squadron level should be attained as soon as possible.
b. Besides the great risk of a vdng complement of aircraft, equipment and personnel being caught on one airfield by lack of adequate warning, the retention of wing concentrations entails these serious operational handicaps;
(1) It takes several times as long to despatch a wing of aircraft from an airfield as it does a squadron and to receive a full wing back from a mission and launch en successive missions.
(2) The movement of the ground echelon of the squadrons which would move to separate airfields on D-day warning of attack, no matter how often practiced, would certainly result in some loss of operational capability at the most critical time. Even more serious, there would bc the possibility that the ground echelon's movement would be blocked for vital hours in the jammed roa-l traffic which would be caused by the evacuation of civilian communities. This would result in the aircraft of these redeploying squadrons having the choice of being relatively immobilized at the vacant squadron redeployment air-field without the ground echelon, or reconcentrating at the parent wing airfield and being dependent upon support from squadrons remaining there. Such prospects are hardly desirable in the time of need of maximum operational effectiveness.
c. In those cases where the squadron deployment cannot be implemented permanently in peacetime, detailed planning must be completed and repeated practice performed to perfect such a move, insofar as possible» Furthermore, whatever additional transport over that necess-ary anyway for local dispersal purposes must be especially provided.
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NATO SECRET 57. Kre-Stock All Uhoccupied NATO Airfields.
a. Any airfields which are not pre-stocked would be nearly operationally unusable in the first critical phase of an atomic war, except for aircraft dispersal parking purposes, because it is sirapjy not practical to plan the transporting along with the redeploying units of sufficient quantities of POl/and ammunition stocks to support all-out combat operations. Likewise, it is far more practicable to main-tain some stocks of aircraft and vehicle spare parts, and necessary storage of tentage, packages of food and other such items at all airfields not occupied continuously rather than to depend on a ground echelon movement to bring them. Furthermore, this pre-stocking can be achieved primarily through redistribution of present reserve stocks of supplies.
b. Any pre-stocking will require a maintenance and guard detachment to be based at each unoccupied airfield, and logistics inspection and turnover procedures to ensure the proper condition and useability of the stocks at all times.
58. Improve Kesiliency of All Airfields and Units to Attack. s. Units should have the resiliency to absorb and recover
from eneiry attack as well as the capability to move to another airfield and resume operations if their home airfield is not promptly repairable. It
is essential that during the initial phase of a war, SACEURt s air units are not forced to over-concentrate on a relatively small number of air-fields because of inability to restore promptly to use those airfields not seriously damaged during the early attacks.
b. This resiliency will require organic equipment in the units to make minor repairs and clear debris from the paved areas on the airfield.
59. Plan and Practice Transfer of Units from Damaged Airfield a. A unit must have the capability to transfer its operations
to another airfield if its home airfield is damaged or contaminated beyond immediate repair.
b. The mobility requirement to transfer operations to other airfields when necessary and the mobility requirements for local dispersal and for salvage of damaged units, overlan îr> _ _ _ — -- — -JT — — O ^ i" "*" v -IVfc Ol XV-1M--LO. LJO developed concurrently sc that duplication of vehicle requirements will not occur. The requirements for speed of dispersal off the airfield will, of course, vary between airfields due to variances in expected warning times.
, . . c. -ny movement of the ground echelons of air units during the initial phase of atomic war is going to be a difficult operation due to the probable congestion ?.nd even chaotic conditions of the main roads, •this may, in part, be compensated for by careful planning of alternate routes along secondary roads, avoiding large cities, leading to all poss-ible nearby airfields to which redeployment might have to be effected, and possibly through provision of minimal air transport capability to move a part of the ground echelon to establish emergency operations prior to arrival of the remainder of the ground echelon.
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d* The greatest need is for a detailed workable plan and practice-thereof. The feasibility of such a plan, based upon an orderly redeployment is, of course, contingent upon an effective dispersal off the airfield before an enemy attack. If a unit is' caught on the airfield by a successful enemy atomic bomb attack, it is believed that the subsequent salvage operation would, of necessity, be a makeshift undertaking.
60# Deception, CamoufIare and Concealment Measures.
a. Disception measures to mislead the enemy as to what air-fields support the atomic delivery units must be developed so that he cannot be certain of carrying out a relatively selective attack against them by attacking only a few airfields. Local deception action through simulation of runways by daytime agricultural patterning and/or night lighting and use of dummy aircraft may frequently be worthwhile measures provided by local initiative»
b# Through practicable camouflage and concealment measures without" any major cost* primarily through national initiative and local action, much can be done to reduce the conspicuousness of the airfield and conceal the aircraft and equipment thereon. These measures should include toning down of all paved surfaces and of buildings, and taking advantage of natural cover in the camp site construction where possible, undertaking agricultural pattern cultivation on the airfield to blend in with the countryside, camouflage painting of aircraft and vehicles and providing them with camouflage nets, etc. These measures will be effective in varying degrees against high flying aircraft in poor weather conditions and against IOT flying aircraft under any conditions.
c. The opportunities for concealment and dispersal offered by a zero-length launch device, especially a mobile one, is highly desirable, particularly for atomic units.
Q* Flexibility« Maximum feasible tactical flexibility should be provided in the new posture. This should- include standardization of operational and logistic procedures, widespread capability for cross-servicing of fuel, ammunition and minor repairs, capability to move units from an unrepairable airfield to a still usable one and, finally, provision cf communication links for any additional suitable and available national airfields, not included in the NATO airfield complex, for use as "last resort" emergency airfields in war.
62. Wartime Emergency Airfield Complex. As has been discussed before, the most critical danger to the air forces is denial of adequate means of take-off and landing through damage to, or contamination of, the runways accessible to the aircraft, hence it is desirable to have, in addition to the squadron deployment airfields, as large an additional reserve airfield complex as possible. A portion of this reserve complex could be the currently suitable national airfields which cannot be brought into the regular NATO complex. As assist devices for the reduction of aircraft take-off and landing distances become available, they should be utilized as feasible to further increase the number of Usable airfields throughout Allied Command Europe.
63« Auxiliary Take-off and Landing Facilities. In addition to the further deployment to squadron level and provision of the wartime emergency airfield complex, it is essential that as many as possible auxiliary and emergency means of take-off and landing be developed in the vicinity of regular airfields. When aircraft launching and
"22 «
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landing devices become available they should be used for this purpose. In the meantime, strips of autobahns, or other highways, former air-fields and other suitable fields in the vicinity of NATO airfields should be surveyed and made usable for this purpose.
64. Local Dispersal and Protection of Aircraft. a. In addition to the threat of atomic bombs there will exist'
for an indefinite time in the future the continuing threat of heavy attacks with conventional weapons, especially in the forward areas where the mass of enemy aircraft primarily equipped for such an attack can operate. It can be anticipated that such attacks would supplement the atomic attacks in the initial phases and thereafter largely supplant atomic attacks as the atomic weapon stock is expended.
b. The principal additional measures which can be taken against conventional attack are developing the capability for widespread local dispersal and concealment of the aircraft while they are on the ground and providing revetments for them. It is not considered that these meas-ures would warrant any large construction effort or appreciable cost, but should be undertken wherever local terrain conditions permit, especially in the forward area and elsewhere for atomic delivery units and their direct support reconnaissance.
65« An Illustration of Local Action in Fulfilment of the New Concept . . _ — _ - _ . _ . - - ^ . { . . - _ - , — - —
and Defensive Measures Discussed Herein. A possible operational plan for a typical fighter-bomb er squadron for the initial phase of an atomi« war might be as follows:
a. The basis of any workable operational plan must be the receipt of early warning of the possibility of immminent initial eneirçy attack. On the basis of this warning the capability must be developed to get the maximum possible number of flyable aircraft into the air and • the ground echelon of the unit prepared for attack before the enemy air-craft arrive.
b. The combat-ready aircraft would be promptly launched on pre-planned offensive missions, or on air defence missions if no specific offensive mission had utun uruered; the non-combat aircraft would be ordered to orbit locally under maximum endurance conditions. The ground echelon and non-flyable aircraft (if possible) would be evacuated from the airfield*
c. The evacuation site or sites must be prepared in advance to house, feed and otherwise support the units. Communications to these sites must link the unit commander with his next higher echelon of command and the radar warning network. The mobile main flying control facility must stay with the unit commander to enable him to retain the capability to contact his aircraft on return from their missions.
d. If the initial enemy attack ends and the unit commander receives word that none other is in progress he can order the essential part of his ground echelon to return to the airfield to receive the returning aircraft and prepare for the next mission as rapidly as possible.
e. If the initial em.-my attack has not ended or another is in progress when his aircraft start to return and must land for lack of fuel, the commander must order pre-planned or improvised dlspersal
23
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WATO
of his aircraft among the home airfield and any auxiliary landing fields he may have available to him. He would have to direct the return to the airfield and despatch to the auxiliary fields the minimum essential personnel and mobile equipment to handle the returned aircraft to get them back into the air on the next mission, By staggering the landings and the stagings of the aircraft which land r.t the auxiliary sites through the home airfield, the unit commander could limit the number of his aircraft exposed on the ground at one time at the home airfield. However, after the dispersal to avoid the initial attack, the unit would have to maintain some personnel and equipment continuously on the air-field to support the activities necessary for the intensive combat operations which must be the main feature of the initial phase.
f. If the airfield is hit by conventional attack, the commander would have to order what runway sweeping and repair equipment he has available to clear the runway, taxiway and parking areas.
g. If the airfield is hit by atomic attack, the commander would take his radiation counting equipment and carnage assessment team to the airfield to find out the extent of the damage and radiation contamination and to estimate the possibility and time necessary for repair and/or decontamination. If the assessment is that the airfield can be readily repaired, work thereon would start immediately; if the assessment is that it would be impossible to repair or would take too long, the pre-planned move of the ground echelon to another airfield would be ordered. Regardless of the extent of damage, the commander must soon find out through Iiis communications channels with higher head-quarters which airfields in his area have survived the attack and how to handle diversion of his returning aircraft. Those which can be landed on auxiliary and emergency strips nearby would be directed to do so; those which cannot be so handled would be diverted to the same still-operational airfield in the area to which the ground echelon of the unit will move if the airfield is not readily repairable.
h. At best, the situation of the first few days of an atomic war will be barely controllable, but it should be obvious hew vital will be the detailed planning and practice to handle as well as possible the nearly chaotic situation* Implications of Measures Recommended
66. Operational Implications, Betailed operational planning must be done at all levels to handle the anticipated situation at the out-break of atomic war, including planning on haw to control and support dispersed and mobile units . These plans must include pre-scheduled missions for each operational aircraft, offensive or defensive. Each unit must plan and practice dispersal of the ground echelon off the air-field and transfer of operations to any cf the airfields in the vicinity.
67. Logistical Implications. Due to the critical nature of the first few days of an atomic war, adequate modification in the logistical supply system is essential. The logistical supply system must be read-justed as necessary to adequately support the new deployment posture and the increased tempo of operations. One major requirement is for an adequate pre-stocking of all NATO airfields« Por the unoccupied redeployment airfields, some duplication of stocks and equipment would be highly desirable, e.g. a minimal amount of engine starters, oxygen, armanent loading devices and fuel transfer vehicles, as insurance against difficulties with the movement of ground echelons from wing bases.
* ' 24 Encl A to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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68. Organization Implications. Squadrons must be so organized as to be self-supporting to the extent of maintaining full operational effectiveness at separate airfields. -Any personnel not in the units in peace, but essential in war, must be available at the units within a few hours after H-hour.
* 69. Organic Equipment Implications. Sufficient mobile equipment must be added to the units so as to make them fully capable of effic-iently transferring operations to another airfield if necessary. Any units not permanently deployed in peacetime to their wartime airfields must be especially fully equipped with mobile equipment tc enable the units to quickly redeploy on alert or radar warning of attack. Each unit must have equipment for minor repairs of airfields and sweeping of paved areas. Radiation counters and protective clothing must be avail-able to each unit.
70. Communications. Implications. The telephone communications, radio networks, navigation aids, etc., must be sufficiently developed and augmented to handle this expanded dispersed and mobile posture and the operational objectives which it supports.
71. * Economici Implications. The cost of measures recommended herein must be considered in terms of their worth in relation to the requirement for tactical air units to survive enemy atomic air attacks and to operate effectively. During the "cold war" the cost, whether it be considered in terms of funds, materiel, personnel or land must be measured in terms of the increased air capability confronting the enemy as a positive deterrent in preventing a "hot war". In wartime, the cost would be measured in terms of survival of* these vital air units and their capability to fully carry out their roles. The expenditure of funds and personnel assets to obtain dispersal in peace, or the capability to disperse, must therefore be measured both in terms of the preservation cf the fighting capability and the effect on the cold war,
72. Specific. Actions Required. Illustrative lists of the actions which will be necessary for NATO and national authorities to take to implement the measures recommended in this paper are as follows:
a. NATO Actions.
(1) develop an alert system adequately responsive to attempted surprise attack.
(2) Programme and finance infrastructure for the expanded early warning radar system, the expanded airfield complex, the modification of present NÏ.TO airfields, including auxiliary take-off and landing facilities, and for the POL, communications and navigational aids to support the expanded airfield complex.
(3) Accelerate the standardization of operational and logistical procedures throughout the NATO air forces and assist in developing adequately the capability for cross-servicing of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and minor repairs.
25 Encl A to AG £l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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b. National Actions. (1) Maintain at standby combat readiness as large a
portion of the aircraft in each unit as can be so maintained continuously in peacetime consistent with training requirements and other limitations, with plans ready to increase this portion upon advance warning of possible enemy attack.
(2) Equip air force units with: (a) Sufficient mobile-type equipment and vehicles
to rapidly disperse personnel and equipment in the vicinity of the airfield and to transfer operations to other airfields.
(b) Necessary equipment for separate squadron operations including machines to sweep paved areas free of debris and to make minor repairs
/- ~v rv OXJL J. O VtuT .
(c) Instruments to measure radiological contamin-ation and sufficient protective clothing for
I personnel on contamination detection and salvage and repair teams.
(3) develop and practice frequently the capability for fast dispersal on warning of all personnel and equip-ment as far as practicable from the airfield as soon as not needed for launching combat operations.
(4) Deploy squadrons permanently to lower levels as airfields become available or develop capability to do so quickly.
(5) Modify and augment the personnel structure of squadrons as necessary to adequately support separate squadron operations.
(6) Pre-stock, maintain anu guard all assigned, unoccupied airfields.
(7) develop effective communications plans which v/ill enable unit commanders to determine which ones of the airfields in the vicinity are still operational to enable them to move their units to the proper air-fields when necessary; plan and practice an effect-ive procedure for controlling the diversion of return-ing aircraft; and plan and practice the movement of the ground echelon of units from their dispersal sitep away from their airfields to any of the airfields in the vicinity.
(8) Construct national infrastructure such as barracks at least 7 kilometres from the centre of new airfields where possible; develop temporary dispersal caxnrp sites away from completed airfields.
(9) Construct personnel shelters and aircraft revetments on airfields, as desired, primarily against conventional attack, with emphasis on such construction being given to airfields in forward areas and to those of atomic delivery units and their direct support reconnaissance«
26 Incl A to AQ 616O AD dated 28 July 1955
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"NATO SECRET Validity of Measures Relative to .Adjustment of Forces
73* It is considered that the measures discussed herein would be valid for the type and size of air force units programmed for assign-ment to SACEUR in the foreseeable future. Insofar as there may be future changes in the currently forecast composition of SACEURt s air forces, the extent of implication of these measures, especially infra-structure, could be adjusted accordingly, depending on the time at which such changes are introduced. Effectiveness of the Measures in feting Operational Objectives
74. The operational objectives for preservation of SACEUR1 s capability under atomic threat were stated in paragraph 47« Each of the measures discussed in the preceding paragraphs can contribute to meeting one or more of these objectives. There is no single measure, however, which taken by itself, can provide an adequate reducticai in the vulnerability of SACEURtS air capability. Instead, the measures are complementary ; each contributes to a part of one or several of the operational objectives.
. 75» Before a decision is taken to launch NATO on this coraprehen-sive programme, it is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the set of measures. Studies indicate that adequate implementation of the measures discussed in this study would provide for a satisfactory improvement of the posture of SACEURfS air force units for the time under consideration.
Progressive Implementation of the Measures 76. These studies further indicate that all of these measures
will not retain their full effectiveness unless the programme provide» for adequate adjustment toward the long term posture described in " paragraphs 34, 35 and 36. Full account should be taken of priorities which must be accorded to the different units as listed in paragraph 46| of the lead times required for implementation of the measures, and of the period of their full military effectiveness.
77* It should also be realised that with seme nations their available resources of money and manpower may not permit full imple-mentation of all the measures without guidance as to wte re adjustments can be made in other phases of the national defence effort, and recommendations as to which measures should be given priority and emphasis in respect to specific national problems and limitations. On the other hand, inadequate or only partial implementation of some measures may well give a false sense of achievement and improvement of the posture. SACEUR and subordinate commanders should be prepared to give such guidance when national authorities present to them specific problems relative to the progressive implementation of the programme,
78. Many steps towards implementation, such as higher alertness of units and pre-stocking of airfields, can be taken by national authorities with little or no cost. Other measures, such as equipping the units with full mobility will require considerable national effort. The major objective should be for NATO and national authorities to accept the operational objectives and measures given herein as the goals toward which to work, and for all to cooperate effectively in progressively striving toward those goals, keeping in perspective how this matter of air force posture fits into the overall NATO defence effort.
27
Encl A to AG 616O AD dated 28 July 1955 NATO SECRET
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N X T O Need for New Developments
79. Progressif implementation of SACEURf s programme cannot keep pace with the developing enemy threat unless a concerted effort is made to expedite development and procurement of new types of equipment» In particular, this applies to take-off and landing capabilities. There is an imperative need to free air forces from fixed runways, and the highest practicable priority should be accorded to the develcpuient of aircraft or devices to meet this need. New aircraft currently under development, such as jet vertical take-off and landing types and those capable of natural surface operations, should be expedited.
80. Emphasis should be placed on providing SACElIRTS air forces in the intermediate period with assist and take-off devices. In particular, use of ZEL on mobile launchers, parachute arrest, "turbo-kitten". and thrust reversal should be expanded as quickly as possible« IV. CONCLUSIONS
«1 »
81. The present posture of the air force units must be improved and further developed in order to meet the requirements of MC 48 and MC 49#
82. The posture of the air forces cannot, with reasonable prudence, be wholly predicated on the receipt of any more advanced warning of eneny air attack than that which can be expected from complete and fully functioning early warning systems. On the other hand, the contingency that more advanced warning than that which may be obtained from radar may, in fact, be obtained, cannot be ignored, and the measures to improve the, posture of the air forces must include provisions to profit from such additional warning.
83. Technological developments on which SHAPE has received inform-ation, such as new types of aircraft and aircraft take-off launching and landing arresting devices, do not have the inherent characteristics, or are not sufficiently developed to provide in themselves, in the immediate future, more than a limited, though important, contribution to improvement of the posture of the air forces.
84« Extensive construction of underground or protected facilities is generally not an adequate or feasible defensive measure for personnel and equipment against atomic attack on airfields.
85. In summary, the operational objectives and the measures for improvement of the posture of SACEUR's air force units should be as follows, in general order of their priority:
a. Improving to the maximum the possibility of receipt and dissemination of timely warning of initial eneny attack, to reduce to • the minimum the enemy* s chance of success in a surprise attack, through these measures:
(1) Improving the military and political intelligence indicators programme, and assuring maximum alert-ness and a maximum scale of continuous effort on the part of all NATO and ACE intelligence organ-izations and agencies oriented towards providing advance warning, however equivocal, of possible Soviet ELoc attempt at surprise attack.
28
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1MATO SECPCT . ti'
•
,( 2) - Expanding and improving the early warning, including low altitude, radar and ground observer corps coverage of Allied Command Europe and providing continuous manning thereof,
(3) Improving the system for reporting, evaluation and dissemination of warning.
b. Ifeintaining high combat alertness in all units to react to warning of initial enemy attack, as an effective deterrent and continuous fighting capability, through these measures:
*
(1) Maintaining at standby combat "alertness as large a portion of each unit as can be so maintained continuously iji peacetime consistent, with train-ing requirements and other limitations.
(2) Developing the capability for the remainder of the unit to promptly attain standby combat alertness upon advanced warning of possible enenjy
o f 4-¾nlr <-*. W VJWCWXV (
c. Attaining the capability of initiating and sustaining maximum effective combat operations during the initial critical period of a war, through these measures:
(1) Providing unit mobility to transfer operations to other airfields when necessary due to air-field damage from enemy attack or for pre-planned redeployment frcm wing main airfields.
(2) Prestocking unoccupied NATO airfields.
(3) Expanding the presently programmed NATO airfield complex, primarily through improvement of suit-able and available national civil airfields.
(4) Deploying squadrons to a lower level or devel-oping the capability therefor.
(5) Developing auxiliary take-off and landing facilities.
(6) Providing adequate unit capability to repair airfields.
capability for flexibility in oper-ations .
d. Reducing ground vulnerability of units to atomic and con-ventional attack to minimize the damage and reduction of operational capability which the enemy could achieve, through these measures:
(l) Dispersing of facilities and personnel camps in the vicinity of airfields wherever possible and developing capability, through use of unit mobility for quick dispersal an warning of personnel and equipment which must be an the airfield.
29
Encl A to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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NATO FrrnoET
(2) Using camouflage, concealment and deception.
(3) Providing some personnel shelters and aircraft revetments primarily against conventional attack and in forward areas.
86» To maintain an adequate posture against the forecast increas-ing enemy threat, these measures can and should be progressively modified as necessary, taking full advantage of new technological developments. V. KECOfBlENDATIQNS
87# Ehe objectives and measures listed above, and described in detail in Enclosure B, should be approved and serve as the basis for future NATO and national actions.
«
30
Saol A to AG 6160 AD dated 28 «July 1955
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SHAPE GUIDANCE
ON
OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES FOR
IMPROVEMENT OF THE POSTURE CF SACEURtS AIR FORCE UNITS •' ••"' • 1 ••• M » "!"HMllll "I "I -IIII -I Ml mi Il • I — — i—nn '• — I IWIIII • -H-II I I
TO ENSURE RETENTION OF ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
UNDER ENEMY" ATOMIC ATTACK
1. IMPROVE TO THE MAXIMUM THE POSSIBILITY OF RECEIPT AND DISSMTN-ATION CF WARNING OF INITIAL ENEMY ATTACK1
a» Concept. The enerry will likely attempt to launch his ini-tial attack with complete surprise,if such can possibly be achieved* All practical measures nrast be taken to improve the possibility of re-ceipt of advance warning of enemy attack through intelligence channels by detection of military or political indications, however equivocal. It is also essential that adequate early warning systems be developed and continuouslv manned, and a svstem of adeauate and auick dissémina-V ' V * tion of information of actual enençr attack be established. The extent of such specific warning of the initial attack may be only of the order of about 15 minutes near the Iron Curtain and up to about one hour in rear areas; however?its receipt would be of critical importance to re-duction of the vulnerability of the air forces and launching of the in-itial counter attack.
b* Implementation Measures.
(1) Improving the military and political i ntelligence indi-cators programme, and assuring maximum alertness and ..a maximum sc ale, of continuous effort on the part of all NATO and ACE intelligence organizations and agen-cies oriented towards providing advance warning, hew-ever equivocal, of possible Soviet Bloc attempt at surprise attack.
(2) Expand and improve the early warning systems of Allied Command Europe and provide continuous manning thereof.
(3) Improve the system for the reporting, evaluation and dissemination of warning.
MAINTAIN HIGH CCHBlT ALERTNESS IN ALL UNIlS TO REACT TO V&RNENG CF INITIAL ENEMI ATTACK, AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AND CONTINUOUS FIGHT-ING CAPABILITY
a* Concept.
(l) In light of the limitations of even the best warning situation and of the anticipated enemy objective of initial surprise attack, the ideal posture would be for all air force units to be maintained continüot&ly at full combat alertness to react to the warning of the initial attack. Such alertness requires a posture
31 Enlcosure B to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955 (9 Pages)
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NATO SECRET from which each unit can be promptly moved from the airfield, i.e., the aircraft launched and the ground echelon either at or capable of moving to an off-base dispersal site before the enemy can reach the airfield and drop an atomic bomb. This posture requires the aircraft to be fully combat ready, the pilots briefed and near the aircraft with starting crews standing by, and the ground echelon personnel and equipment still on the airfield loaded in vehicles ready to move, or readily loadable, and capable of getting to the dispersal site before the enemy reaches the tar-get« Such an alert posture is completely impossible of being maintained for entire units over long peri-ods of time because of the relative imnobility of such a posture; all other activities must come to a halt, including training, and; even eating and sleeping become real problems when an entire unit is maintained for more than s fcv hours in a full state of standby combat alertness«
(2) Such, however, is not the case for a portion of each unit, because the s tandly alertness of a portion can be a rotational matter of successive shifts and the portion of the unit which is not on the standby alert-ness shift can continue normal activities, including operational training, aircraft maintenance, etc« By maintaining as high a portion of each unit as possible at full standby combat alertness, an effective deter-rent against attack is created throughout Allied Cont-e n d Europe, and insurance is gained that at least this portion of the force will not be caught on the airfield by the initial enemy attack r^n if such an attack is launched with no more detected warning than that provided by early warning radar,
(3) Any additional advance warning from political or mil-itary indications should be used to increase the por-tion of the units maintained at complete standby alertness, thereby improving the posture proportion-ately. Practice alerts should be called frequently for this purpose.
(Ii) Atonic delivery units and their direct support recon-naissance units should be maintained at the highest possible status of full combat alertness to react to warning of enemy attack in progress. Increase of the ratio of flying and technical personnel to aircraft should be made to permit the maintaining of a higher portion of the unit in combat alertness posture than that to be expected of non-atomic units«
b» Implementation Measures«
(1) Maintain at standby combat alertness as large a por-tion of each unit as can be so maintained continuously in peacetiire consistent with training requirements and other limitations, with plans ready to increase this portton upon advance warning of eneny attack involving
32
fticloswe B to AO 6160 AD dated 28 July 195$
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WÀTO SECTRST the calling of any alert. Pilots, pre-hriefedU roust be in or near the combat-ready aircraft and ground crews must be standing by as necessary to launch these aircraft within the probable time of warning of the actual initial enemy attack from early warning radar.
(2) Develop the capability for the remainder of the unit to promptly attain standby combat alertness upon ad-vanced vjarning of possible enemy attack.
(3) Zero-length launchers, preferably mobile, should be obtained as soon as possible for the wide-spread con-tinuous dispersal cf a portion of the standby alert atomic delivery aircraft.
3. ATTAIN CAPABILITY CF INITIATING AND SUSTAINING MAXIMUM EFFEC-TIVE COMBlT OFERATIQrjS DURING THE CRITICAL INITIAL PERIOD CF A WAR.
a. Concept.
(1) The posture of SACEUR tS air force units must be such as to achieve success in the critical initial phase of an atomic war. They must be . able to immediately launch and sustain the counter attack. All of the airfields, personnel, and equipment which the units need to fight the initial air battle must be avail-able continuously or within a few hours after H-hour.
(2) The capability must exist to transfer units to other airfields when their home airfields are contaminated1 and/or damaged beyond possibility of adequate or early repair and to provide for initial redeployment of units remaining in peacetime in wing concentrations. Such transfers are envisaged as relatively orderly, controlled operations initiated from the local dis-persal positions of the units after the unit command-ers have determined that a transfer to other airfields * must be made, (if a unit is caught on the airfield by an effective initial atomic attack Iy tactical sur-prise, it is envisaged that the subsequent salvage operation would, of necessity, be a makeshift under-taking.) Transfer of units at the height of all-out war would be a difficult operation at best, but must be thoroughly planned for to provide for maximum op-erational effectiveness during the first critical days. Normally, transfers from damaged home airfield« should be pre—planned to be accomplished to any one of several near airfields, generally with the object of temporarily superimposing the transferred unit on an-other like unit at an airfield which is still operational.
(3) All of the airfields to be in the NATO complex must be designed, equipped and pre-stocked to support maxi-mum effective combat operations of the squadrons spe-cifically to be based thereon on D-day and thereafter. Those squadron airfields which are not occupied con-tinuously must still be capable of fully supporting a squadron Ts operations from the moment the squadron
33
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arrives, whether on manoeuvres, on alert, or after warning of attack» In view of the new forecast sit-uation in which the air war must be fought at maximum intensity and effectiveness during the short, criti-cal, initial phase, airfields rôiich are not fully pre-pared to support maximum combat operations during this phase are of extremely limited usefulness,primar-ily for dispersed parking of aircraft; none of the airfields in the NATO regular complex should be left in such a state. Reliance .on the ground echelon con-voy or on airborne transport for initial necessary stocks of POL, ammunition and aircraft parts, would be an unnecessarily great risk and would add unnecessary requirements for mobile ground or air transport* Tho. user nation must assume responsibility for providing the supplies for prestocking aid for maintaining and guarding thçm; this will require a detachment of per-sonnel sirfficient for these purposes at each unoccupied airfield.
(Ii) So long as the aircraft- are tied to runways or other . means for take-off and landing which the eneny can locate and attack, the airfields themselves will be the most critical feature of the posture of the air forces. Therefore, the more that are developed and fully equipped the better will be the posture in op-erational capability, flexibility and resiliency« A relatively attainable airfield complex would be one airfield for approximately 2$ aircraft; this is organ-izationally and operationally sound since squadrons of 10 to 25 aircraft are existing administrative and tactical organizational units in all NATO countries, and are capable now of either independent or semi-in-dependent operations, or of being so developed. Atom-ic delivery squadrons and their direct support recon-naissance squadrons should be deployed before D-day to separate airfields regardless of the size of the unit. Wherever possible, other squadrons with about 25 aircraft as unit equipment should be deployed on or before D-day to separate airfields ara those with 18 aircraft or less should be deployed at least'to a level of not more than two squadrons to an airfield* The airfields, primarily existing national airfields, which can be added to the NATO complex should be in the general area of the present NATO airfields since any sites farther removed would lose any advantage of being slightly less vulnerable to the disadvantage that the aircraft based there would have to stage through more forward airfields on some missions. All existing NATO airfields should b'e assigned to desig-nated nations for primary use of gsecifie units as wing or squadron main or squadron. redeployment air-fields, and all additional squadron main or squadron redeployment airfields added to the NATO complex should be for specifically designated units.
(5) The best posture would be for all of SACEItRtS air force units to be permanently stationed at the airfields from
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Shclostire B to AD 6l60 AD dated 28 July 1955
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which they are intended' to fight on D-day and immed-iately thereafter« This would preclude the inevitable loss of operational efficiency which must result from any redeployment of units on or shortly before D-day. Therefore,- whenever possible, peacetime deployment to squadron level should be implemented« This will re-duce somewhat the risk of the enemy achieving surprise on the. initial attack and also increase the difficulty in achieving success by such an attack» This will al-so avoid the risk of not bein^ able to redeploy for political reasons even if advanced warning were re-ceived* Where not possible the squadrons must be es-pecially maintained at full mobility and should man-oeuvre through their D-day airfields as often as prac-ticable. In all cases squadrons should be organised and equipped for separate operations with r Iriraum feasible dependence upon the wing organization;
(6) One of the most critical dangers in the first few days of a war is the drastic reduction^ through successful enemy attacks, in the number of take-off and landing facilities available to SACEURtS aircraft, thereby forcing the units to over-concentrate, and consequent-ly increasing their vulnerability and reducing their operational effectiveness. Furthenncre, sir.oe opera-tional aircraft must, of necessity, spend a good deal of time on the ground between missions where, of course, they are most vulnerable, the more auxiliary take-off and landing facilities available nearby to e&ch unit the more widespread: dispersal parking of aircraft can be achieved between missions and the greater chance can be obtained of sustaining operations despite dam-age to the regular airfields. Thereforthe maximum practicable means of auxiliary take-off and landing facilities should be developed-
(7) Insofar as possible, airfields should be able to be returned to operation after atomic and conventional attack, where the contamination level and/or destruc-tion does not render the area unapproachable or un-repairable for extended periods of time* In such cases it "will often be preferable l'or a unit to T/;ork to put its own airfield 1Oack in operation than to un-dertake transferring to another airfield*
b. Implementation Measures.
(!) Develop capability to transfer operation to -IiiOuher airfield through:
(a) Providing fully adequate unit mobility to nable units to be transferred from an airfield too dam-aged or contaminated for prompt repair > bo an-other airfield which is still Operaticnal0
(b) Developing an effective communications plan which will enable the commander of a unit to be trans-ferred to determine which ones of the airfields
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Bhclosure B to AG 6l60 AD dated 28 July 19$$
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in the vicinity are still operational so as to en-able him to move his unit to the proper airfield»
(c) Planning and practicing an effective procedure for controlling the diversion of returning aircraft.
(d) Planning and practicing the movement of the ground echelon of units fron their dispersed sites away from their airfields to any of the airfields in the vicinity, including the movement of non-fly-able aircraft, where possible«
(2) Prestock all unoccupied NATO airfields at the follow- * ing level of supplies, primarily through a redistribu-tion of present reserve stocks, and provide the neces-sary detachment to care for them: (a) POL and ammunition in protected- storage on the
airfield sufficient for seven days combat opera-tions for the squadron or squadrons to. be based there %
»
(b) Aircraft and vehicle spare parts for seven days wartime supply, tent age or other provision for housing for personnel, and packaged food as neces-sary, all in off-base storage»
(3) Expand presently programmed NATO airfield compleoc through these measures: (a) Convert all the presently programmed NATO rede-
ployment and alternative airfields to either NATO squadron main or squadron redeployment airfields to be capable of full operational use either con-tinuously in peacetime or on alert, and assign them for primary use of specifically designated NATO squadrons.
(b) Improve and/or construct sufficient additional facilities at available and suitable national airfields to accommodate specifically designated NATO squadrons for joint use with a national air activity.
(c) Improve former airfield sites not now actively used for aviation activities to be used as NATO squadron main or redeployment airfields»
(d) Develop squadron satellite airfields near present wing main airfields, where national authorities so desire and the terrain is suitable, by adding the capability for deployment in the vicinity of one or two of the squadrons based at a wing main airfield» (This arrangement may permit national economies through continuation of use in peace-» time of already constructed national facilities such as family housing, troop accommodations, etc«)
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Bnclosure Bto AQ 6160 AD dated 28 July 1955
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Such an expansion will require additional fully adequate runways or take-off launching and land-ing arresting devices generally not closer than 10 kilometers to the main airfield or to each other, other additional facilities adequate for each squadron to be self-sustaining there by D-day and, if practicable, improvements and addi-tions to existing roads for use as taxi-tracks to permit the ground transfer of the aircraft from any one airfield to the others«
{*) Insofar as land and money can be made available, construct any wholly new airfields needed to ac-commodate squadrons not adequately provided for by measures listed in (a), (b), (c) or (d) above«
(k) Deploy as many squadrons as possible permanently to their separate wartime airfields as soon as they be-come available, equip others with especially adequate mobile equipment and manoeuvre them as often as pos-sible through their redeployment airfields*
0 ) Modify and augment the squadron and -wing organizations* if necessary, to support maximum effective separate squadron operations*
(6) Develop auxiliary take-off and landing facilities« ¥
(a) All available national airfields not inçlu^ed in the NATO airfield complex but which are suitably located and of such size as to handle, at least emergency landings and take-offs should be pro- * grammed for auxiliary emergency use, as can be . arranged with national authorities« The minimum NATO investment need be only in telejh:>ne commu-nication links* These war reserve airfields should be planned for use for aircraft dispersal between missions and last-resort emergency use by entire units*
(b) Autobahn and other highways, and suitable fields in the vicinity of NATO airfields should be de-veloped, in agreement with local authorities- for use for dispersal of aircraft and, if feasible, emergency operational use if the home airfield is damaged.
(c) Aircraft launching and landing arresting devices, when and as they become available, should be ob-tained by national authorities and installed in the vicinity of NATO airfields as emergency aux-iliary runways. (Those nations now engaged in developing such devices should accord them high priority in both development and production«)
(7) Capability to repair airfields.
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Ehclosure B to AG 6160 AD dated 28 July 1955
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: (a) Instruments to measure radiological contamination should be available to every unit commander at the dispersal site , along with personnel trained in their use, Each unit should also have ade-
; quate protective clothing for personnel who must work on a contaminated airfield.
(b) Kach squadron should have as prganic equipment, \ machines to sweep the runways, taxiways and air-
craft parking area free of debris, and some earth-moving equipment capable of effecting minor dam-age repairs to runways, taxiways and parking areas. The units in every area öfO to 5 air-fields should have on call military construction battalions or civilian road building and repair units capable of making major airfield repairs especially in the first critical days of war.
(8) Accelerate the standardization of operational end logics tic procedures throughout SACEURiS air forces»
(9) Develop more widely, and completely adequately, the capability for cross-servicing of fuel, - ammunition,
; spare parts and minor repaire* <
lb BHMJCB GROUND VULNERABILITY QF UNITS TO ATOMIC AH) CONVENTIONAL * m c F :
(1) The most feasible effective defensive measure against both the blast and contamination effects of atomic at-tack is to move as far as practicable from the prob-able ground-zero point of enemy bombs which point, in the case of an airfield, would generally be the centre of the runway. At airfields still to be developed, warehousing, personnel accommodation, motor pools, etc., should be built at least_3jmiles from the air-
inf easible to provide adeqMt^pr^tection against atomic attack on the airfield for aircraft, equipment and personnel; therefore, those which are on the airfield must be quickly dispersed off the airfield upon warning of probable enemy initial attack. If the airfield is not damaged ty enemy initial atomic attack the essential personnel and equipment would return promptly to pre-pare the returning aircraft for the next mission; the remainder would remain dispersed. If the airfield is damaged by enemy atomic attack, the local unit com-mander must first assess the possibility of speed of repair and/or decontamination and decide whether the unit will return to the airfield or will execute a pre-planned move to any one of several other airfields, preferably occupied, which he learns is undamaged*
(2) In addition to atomic attack there will be a great weight of conventional attack, especially in the for-ward area, i.e., within approximately 200 nautical
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Biclosure B to AG 6160 AD dated 28 July 195? NATO SECRET
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miles of the Soviet/Satellite border, rôiich is within range of the masses of Soviet aircraft equipped pri-marily for conventional attack. Local dispersal and concealment and camouflage of aircraft, and the pro-vision of revetments for them, are the most practic-able additional measures of defence against this threat. Furthermore, through practicable measures of camouflage, concealment and deception, the difficulty of the enemy in finding and successfully attacking any and all of the NATO airfields must be increased«
,(3) The enemy must be denied the ability to strike effec-tively the vital atomic delivery units and their di-rect support reconnaissance by a relatively small se-lective attack.
V
b** Implementation of Measures.
(1) Permanently, disperse facilities around airfields by constructing at least 7 kilometers from new airfields all structures except hangars and associated buildings essential to aircraft maintenance; and by ramoving or duplicating those presently constructed on air-fields, where feasible.
<2) Develop the capability to move all other personnel, equipment and non-flyable aircraft (where possible) quickly as far as practicable off the airfield« This will require fully adequate vehicles organic to the unit to accomplish this move in a very short time» (Equipment and critical supplies must be made mobile and maintained in vehicles or readily loadable in standby vehicles.)
(3) Conc eal and camouflage aircraft and develop the capa-bility for their local dispersal in the vicinity of each airfield without involving major construction, TrTith emphasis being placed on airfields in the forward areas. Revetments, as under the farmer concept, should be provided fcy nations as desired.
(U) Special measures for atomic units. (a) The atomic delivery squadrons and their direct sup-
port reconnaissance should be based as widely as possible throughout the area of Allied Command Bur-ope; these airfields should not be identifiable 2 from the air as the base of such squadrons.
*
(b) Small flights, from the atcmic delivery units should manoeuvre through or rfitgfce through many airfields in the NATO airfield complex, both as a defensive measure and to increase the theatre-wide flexibility of this vital force. For this purpose as many NKTO airfields as feasible should be equipped to support the combat missions of the atomic units and their reconnaissance. This may entail some special pre-stocking and some special communication links.
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Enclosure B to AG 6160 AD dated 28 July 1955
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