USF ReformNARUC Panel Presentation

Dale LehmanDirector, Executive MBA in Information and

Communication TechnologyAlaska Pacific University

dlehman@alaskapacific.edu

A Budgeting Problem

• Current high cost fund (HCF) ($4.096B)

• Projected increases in CETC funding (conservative estimate: +$1.5B)

• AT&T Broadband “pilot” (+$1B/year)

• Eliminating Rural/Nonrural distinction (at wire center level: +$3B)

• Funding at sub-wire center level (conservative estimate: +$15B)

• ILEC “inefficiencies” (-$1B) are not credible

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Current HCF Addt'l CETCs

Broadband "pilot" Nonrural

Sub-wire center ILEC "inefficiencies"

Essential Reforms and Diversions

• These are all interesting issues, but most are not essential and threaten to divert the Joint Board (and FCC) from needed reforms

• Necessary reforms: decide whether to support 1 or 2 network technologies; fix wireless CETC support; fix funding mechanism

• The other issues are more complex than usually portrayed and require further analysis

One Technology or Two?

• If One, it should be the most efficient• Reverse auctions cannot determine this• RFP specifications will determine “the

winner”• Stranded investment an issue, except in

“greenfield” applications• Evidence from other nations supports

these conclusions• If Two, reverse auctions may play a role

Nonrural Carriers and De-averaged Support Calculations

• Price cap carriers differ from rate-of-return regulated (RoRR) carriers

• Symmetry between regulatory commitment and carrier commitment: both are required for incentive regulation to work

• RoRR guarantees an “opportunity” to earn a competitive return

• Evidence required; appropriate intervention could involve USF, but there are alternatives

• Acquired exchanges raise similar issues• Broadband makes things different

Adding Broadband as a Supported Service

• Price cap carriers have no obligation to undertake “uneconomic” investments

• However, incentive regulation plans sometimes involve infrastructure investments

• Many States have done so; will “early adopters” need to be compensated?

• Plan renewals with investment requirements should be voluntary (fallback to RoRR otherwise)

• More study needed on why broadband adoption lags in rural areas (is it availability or adoption? What is the best policy intervention?)

• “universal” broadband speed is likely to be slower than what economic development requires

The Wireless CETC Mechanism is Broken

• ETC designation and the Identical Support Rule produce absurd results

• Funding is tied to handsets (multiple) and addresses (no service guarantee, people move, etc.)

• ILECs receive funding based on total costs; CETCs are funded based on per-line costs of a different carrier/technology

Ratio of CETC/ILEC lines, in relation to ILEC cost, by study area, 2Q 2004 and 2Q 2007

• 13 study areas had ratio > 1 in 2004; 88 in 2007• CETC study areas increased by 24%, CETC lines

increased by 89%, while ILEC lines decreased by 8%

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MTA: a case study

• 4 wireless CETCs; total CETC lines > total ILEC lines• Coverage area has not markedly changed• Competitive neutrality between wireless carriers is what

is being funded

Ideas about a Mobility Fund

• Decide what needs to be supported: construction of towers in under-served areas? (operation of service is more questionable)

• Attach appropriate conditions to support: cost-based collocation and roaming?

• Reverse auctions, cost models, and cost reporting are alternative methods for determining and awarding support

Conclusions

• Broadband, deaveraging, and mobility are all important, but complexities require more analysis

• They should not divert the Joint Board’s attention from the essential reforms

• These are: deciding whether to support one network technology or two; fixing the wireless CETC funding mechanism; and, fixing the contribution mechanism