Post on 07-Jul-2022
THE TUPAMAROS: URUGUAY'S URBAN GUERRILLAS
by
THOMAS 0. MOORE, B.A.
A THESIS
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Appi}t)ved }
Accepted
May, 1978
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. URUGUAY: UTOPIA FACES THE ONSLAUGHT OF REALITY 1
Chapter I Footnotes 18
II. THE TUPAMAROS: ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS 20
Chapter II Footnotes 33
III. 1970: PRELUDE TO DISASTER 35
Chapter III Footnotes 50
IV. THE FINAL YEARS 52
Chapter IV Footnotes 64
V. DEFEAT 66
Chapter V Footnotes 73
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 7A
CHAPTER I
URUGUAY: UTOPIA FACES THE ONSLAUGHT OF REALITY
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, Uruguay was rocked by
a state of internal war created by a group of urban guerrillas known
as the Tupamaros. To understand the appearance of the Tupamaros,
one must look into the history of Uruguay and become familiar with
the traits and traditions that characterized that country's politics
from independence until the present.
The country of Uruguay is located on the eastern coast of South
America. Its official name is La, Repdblica Oriental d_e_l Uru guay.
It took this name because of its location on the eastern bank of the
Uruguay River. This little country of 72,172 square miles, or
slightly larger than the state of Washington in the United States,
is wedged between the two giant countries of Argentina, on the south
and west, and Brazil, on the north. The Atlantic Ocean is the east
ern boundary. The Uruguayan countryside, an extension of the Argen
tine pampa, consists of grassy plains and gently rolling hills. The
population of Uruguay is roughly 3 million. Of that figure, eighty
per cent live in the capital city of Montevideo.
The Uruguayan population is primarily of European extraction.
The Indian element was eradicated very early in the colonial period.
Immigration from Europe was encouraged after independence. The
prospect of establishing a highly productive pastoral economy was
2 2
propagandized and many landless immigrants came from the countries
of Europe. The large majority came from the countries of Italy and
Spain because of the similarity of the language; however, there was
a sampling from other regions of Europe.
Uruguay gained its independence in 1828. Due in large part to
the intervention of the British, it was established as a buffer
state between Argentina and Brazil. This action on the part of
Britain settled the Cisplatine War (1826-1828) and the boundary dis
pute between Argentina and Brazil. Regardless of its theoretical
independence, Uruguay could not escape interference in its internal
affairs by the Argentines and Brazilians. The ease with which the
neighboring powers could intervene in Uruguay was aided by the
instability and rivalry of the newly formed political parties.
The rivalry between the two political parties, the Blancos
(conservatives) and Colorados (liberals), dates back to the mid-
1830 's following the formation of the Uruguayan government. The
division into political camps was the result of quarrels between
the country's creators. The division became permanent in 1836 when
large scale fighting broke out between the elected president. Gener
al Manuel Oribe, and his predecessor, General Fructuoso Rivera.
Oribe gathered around him people who were identified as Blancos
because of the identifying white ribbon they wore. Rivera, on the
other hand, was supported by the Colorados who wore a red ribbon.
After two years of fighting, Rivera marched into Montevideo as the
victor and proclaimed himself as president of the republic. The
3 3
defeated Oribe escaped to Buenos Aires and began plotting against
Rivera.
The Argentines constantly tried to exert their influence over
the Uruguayans but without much success. Then with the help of
the Blanco political faction in Uruguay led by General Manuel Oribe,
the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, made preparations to
attack Uruguay. In 1843, Rosas laid seige to Montevideo and for
the next eight and a half years tried to topple the government of
Fructuoso Rivera. Argentine forces sought to cut off Montevideo
from the rest of the world by blockading the port and by constant
land attacks around the perimeter of the city. The downfall of
Rosas in 1852 brought an end to the fighting between Argentina and
Uruguay. The country was then allowed to remain in virtual peace
for the next few years.
Between 1851 and 1864, the Colorado General Venancio Flores
twice sought assistance from the Brazilians to help him in his
struggle against the Blanco leader, Antanasio Aguirre. Because
Argentina was not in liberal (unitarian) hands, Aguirre broke the
usual pattern by turning to Paraguay for assistance. As a result,
Flores aligned Uruguay with Argentina and Brazil against Paraguay
in what was called the Paraguayan War. The war lasted from 1865 to
1870.
After the war, a type of political progress became discerni
ble in Uruguay. In 1872 the conservative or Blanco party realized
that the liberal or Colorado party could control the government
indefinitely. To compensate for this situation, the Blancos
demanded control over the internal affairs of four departments or
states in exchange for political peace. Later, in 1897, as the
final terms of the peace accord to end a civil war, the Blancos
were given control over an additional two departments, bringing the
2 total to six that were under their domination.
At the beginning of the twentieth century Uruguay was far
behind its neighboring countires in economic and social progress.
The previous years of political instability had retarded any growth
in the development of natural resources and the investment of
foreign capital in the country. Between 1830 and 1903 there had
been at least forty armed revolts. Of the twenty-five governments
that existed during that period, "nine were forced out of power,
two were liquidated by assassination and one by grave injury, ten
rsisted one or more revolutions, and only three were free from
3 serious disturbances during their periods in office." The country
was not in a state of good health economically and socially by
1900.^
Although similar to Argentina in economic resources, Uruguay
lagged behind its larger neighbor. The principal source of income
in Uruguay was from the export of beef. Unfortunately, the majority
of the land was dominated by large but inefficiently operated
ranches or estancias and they did not produce an abundant surplus
for the commercial market. Uruguay got its first frigorifico
(packing house) in 1904, some twenty-one years after Argentina.
In 1900, almost half of the Uruguayans were s t i l l i l l i t e r a t e .
There had been some progress made s ince the 1870's when the country
s t a r t e d a na t iona l school system. The count ry ' s only u n i v e r s i t y ,
the Univers i ty of Montevideo, had been founded in 1849 to serve the
need for higher education. These educational advantages were
reserved mainly for the inhabi tan ts of the c a p i t a l c i ty of Monte-
Video.
Out of the chaos and confusion of the nineteenth century, t he re
appeard the des i r e by the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s to improve the country.
Especia l ly committed to the idea of renovating and reforming the
country was Jos 6 Bat l i e y Ordc5flez. B a t l l e , a prominent newspaper
ed i to r and p o l i t i c i a n , rose to become the leader of the Colorado
pa r ty . B a t l l e ' s program had a tremendous effect on the country, not
only through h i s e f fo r t s as a newspaperman but e spec ia l ly as twice
e lec ted president during the f i r s t quar ter of the twent ie th century .
I t was through the e f fo r t s of Ba t l l e tha t Uruguay's p o l i t i c a l
system, based on the ideas of the c o l l e g i a t e executive and the co-
p a r t i c i p a t i o n p r i n c i p l e was e s t ab l i shed . This system, modeled a f t e r
the Bundesrat of Switzerland, cal led for a National Council t o
govern in the place of a p re s iden t . This council would be made up
of nine members, s ix from the majority par ty and th ree from the
minority pa r ty . Each member was elected to a s ix year term. One-
t h i r d of the council was to be r e -e l ec t ed every two y e a r s . B a t l l e ' s
o r i g i n a l plan cal led for d i s so lv ing the of f ice of the pres ident but
in order to get Congressional approval of the new system, B a t l l e
6 6
had to compromise and allow the pos i t ion of the presidency to remain
The off ice of pres ident was mainly a figure-head type of pos i t i on
because i t was ro ta ted among members of the Council on an annual
b a s i s . The co -pa r t i c ipa t i on p r i n c i p l e was B a t l l e ' s idea on how the
leading minority par ty in the e l e c t i o n s , usual ly the Blancos, could
p a r t i c i p a t e in government even though they fa i led to win the e l e c
t i o n s . The p r i n c i p l e allowed the majority party two- th i rds of the
sea t s in Congress and in provinc ia l off ices and the minority par ty
received the remaining one-third of the o f f i c e s . I t was under t h i s
system that both Colorados and Blancos would have a voice in govern
mental decis ions a t both na t iona l and provinc ia l l e v e l s . Also, the
previous arrangement where the Blancos control led four i n t e r i o r
departments was terminated.
The establishment of the National Council was not the only
change in Uruguay during the Ba t l l e e ra . Credited to B a t l l e ' s fame
were h is recommendations tha t the s t a t e e s t a b l i s h a monopoly over
insurance , e l e c t r i c l i g h t and power, and l a t e r the telephone com
pany. Not only did he recommend these reforms but he demanded the
eight hour working day, a compulsory day's r e s t for every five
working days, r egu la t ions to control working cond i t ions , educat ion
a l reforms, and the reorganizat ion of the s t a t e bank. Continuing
with h is s o c i a l i s t i c th ink ing , Ba t l l e proposed such r ad i ca l l e g i s
l a t i o n as allowing divorce at the w i l l of the wife and abolishment
of c a p i t a l punishment and b u l l f i g h t i n g . He championed the cause of
the workingman when he recommended old age pens ions , workmen's
compensation and indemnification for discharged employees. Included
in his proposals was legislation to protect illegitimate children.
He invited the wrath of the military when he initiated a reduction
in the size of the army and its influence in government. The con
servatives were outraged at these radical innovations of Batlle's;
some politicians thought he was insane. Even with staunch opposi
tion to his reformistic inclinations, Batlle continued to push for
their acceptance.
The constitution of 1917 incorporated these reforms of Batlle's
into practice. There was no sudden or instantaneous transformation
except in the case of the President and the National Council.
Change came as a slow progression through the years from 1919 to
1933. This constitution marked the transition of Uruguay into a
v/elfare state, thrusting it well ahead of the rest of Latin America
in social progress and reform. These social reforms have continued
to be expanded, improved and modified since their conception. How
ever, their counterpart, the political reforms, have been abolished
and re-instated numerous times since Batlle's death in 1929.
Batlle's reforms have had a dual effect upon the country, both
good and bad. The good aspect of the reforms was that Uruguay was
brought from a semi-backv/ard nation to a modern, progressive country.
Uruguay now had one of the most advanced welfare systems in the
world - one that enabled her citizens to enjoy many democratic lux
uries that neighbors in Argentina could but dream of. The system
of government was considered one of the most democratic in the world.
8
No matter how democratic the government appeared to be , the re
were some ser ious drawbacks and flaws. The main problem, which
plagued the government for yea r s , was tha t executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
was divided between a Pres ident and a National Council . This d i v i
sion of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y created no se r ious problem as long as things
ran smoothly and a l l the council members were in agreement. This
was apparent during the prosperous 1920 's . Pres idents and councils
could toss problems back and forth with no damaging effect because
of the evidence of economic affluence during tha t per iod. I t was
during the depression yea r s , 1929 to 1933, that the colegiado, as
the National Council was ca l l ed , demonstrated i t s incapaci ty for
coping with the r i s i n g i n f l a t i o n and unemployment. The f a i l u r e of
the colegiado to cor rec t Uruguay's troubled economic s t r u c t u r e lay
with the co leg iado ' s i n a b i l i t y to reach any p o s i t i v e or imaginative
so lu t ion amongst the members. The coup d ' e t a t of 1933 was a d i r e c t
r e s u l t of the indecis ion among the members of the council as to the
proper approach for curing the count ry ' s economic problems.
The world-wide depression in the ear ly 1930 's , t he re fo re , was
f e l t qu i t e severely in Uruguay. The demand for Uruguay's p a s t o r a l
exports was d r a s t i c a l l y decreased, leaving Uruguay with her main
source of income grea t ly reduced. As unemployment soared, the
na t ion became aware of the weakness of the coLjeg iadci . The ^9.l£giado
fa i led to motivate or s t imula te the economy when the council members
f a l t e red in reaching any concrete so lu t ion to the coun t ry ' s economic
i l l s . Finding a l l avenues of economic r e l i e f thwarted by the clumsy
colegiado system. President Gabriel Terra initiated a coup d' etat
against his own government. He dissolved the colegiado and Congress,
censored newspapers and established a one-man rule with himself as
president. Terra's abolishment of the colegiado was written into
the new constitution in 1934. Resembling the previous constitution,
the new one restored the one-man presidency and created a thirty
member Senate that would be permanently divided in half with fifteen
members from the Colorado party and fifteen from the Blanco party.
This constitution remained in effect until 1942, when it was changed
slightly but the one-man presidency remained until 1952.
Uruguay enjoyed a renewed economic boom as a result of World
War II. High prices were paid for wool and beef. When Uruguay
sided with the Allies, the demand for her export products increased.
This economic surge did not last for long. After the war, the demand
for Uruguayan wool decreased steadily with the appearance of the
new synthetic fibers. Since wool was a major export item, its drop
in consumer demand dragged the entire Uruguayan national economy
down. In 1950, the Uruguayan peso was valued at 50 American cents.
By 1958, its value had decreased to 7 cents. The Uruguayan economic
crisis only deepened and relief was not in sight.
The impact of the breakdown of the economy was felt in various
ways. The elaborate welfare system was severely crippled. The pay
ments of pensions and other generous benefits were not re-adjusted in
accordance with the devaluation of the peso. For example, if a
person retired at age 60 in 1950 and drew a 400 peso a month pension.
10
i t would be worth 200 American d o l l a r s . That same pension in 1958
would be worth only 56 American d o l l a r s , a considerable decrease in
value and in purchasing power. The state-owned en t e rp r i s e s were
another sec to r to be h i t by the economic col lapse and currency de
va lua t ion . The success of these corporat ions was dependent upon a
steady and s t a b l e income. The col lapse or c r ipp l ing of these com
panies as a r e s u l t of the devaluat ion was i n e v i t a b l e . The American-
owned f r igor f f i cos (packing houses) of Swift and Armour closed down
in November of 1957 a f te r losing money for severa l y e a r s . Some
12,000 men were thrown out of work when they closed down. In an
attempt to save the jobs of these men, the government formed the
f r i go r i f i cos i n t o a co-opera t ive , but i t too continued to lose money.
Even the state-owned na t iona l f r i g o r l f i c o los t money. To compensate
for t h e i r l o s s e s , the company did not even pay the stockmen for the
c a t t l e they de l ive red . The col lapse of the meat-packing industry
caused many ranchers to smuggle t h e i r c a t t l e across the border i n t o
Braz i l where they could receive higher p r i ces for t h e i r c a t t l e . The
smuggling resu l ted in a shortage of beef in Uruguay and contr ibuted
Q
to the co l lapse of the meat-packing indus t ry .
To complicate the s i t u a t i o n in Uruguay, Pres ident Andres
Martfnez Trueba, a Colorado of the Ba t l l e f ac t ion , i n i t i a t e d a cam
paign to revive the old < 2ie_g_i_ado_ system. On December 16, 1952, a
p l e b e s c i t e was held to decide the i ssue of continued ru le by a
p res iden t or r e tu rn to ru l e by a p lu ra l presidency, the colegiado.
The publ ic appeared apa the t i c to the i s sue s ince l e s s than ha l f of
11
the 1.1 million registered voters went to the polls. When the bal
lots were counted, they showed that the colegiado was approved by a
narrow margin of 34,392 votes.
The approval of the < o_legiad_o meant that a new constitution was
needed. The constitution of 1952 incorporated only a few new fea
tures not found in the previous constitutions of 1919, 1934 and 1942.
The principal change was that the presidency was substituted with
the colegiado. The National Council of 1952 served as the governing
body for the remaining three year's of Trueba's term. The chairman
ship of the colegiado was rotated annually among the majority party
members.
As before, the same problems cropped up to underscore the
inefficiency of the colegiado. -Then labor violence erupted in 1952
and 1958, the council was able to effect swift action to disperse
the ones responsible. In those two examples, decisive action was
forced upon the colegiado by circumstances. When challenged by a
more perplexing problem, the sad shape of the national economy, the
colegiado failed to promote measures to counteract the situation.
At the time when the country needed to cut back on spending, govern
ment-owned and controlled companies were adding numerous unnecessary
employees. In 1958 when the fruit and vegetable retailers and whole
salers boycotted the markets in Montevideo in order to get the
colegiado to change the policies of the Subsidies and Price Control
Council, the colegiado failed to reach an agreement among the members
on how to intervene in the dispute. The private retailers and
12
wholesalers boycotted the markets because the high prices they had
to pay for fruits and vegetables were forcing them out of business.
The Subsidies Council, meanwhile, was subsidizing the food produced
by the co-operatives and this action forced the competing retailers
to keep prices dov/n. As a result of having to pay the high prices
for foods and then forced to sell at a low price, the retailers
could not afford to stay in business. After a week of no fruit or
vegetables, the Subsidies Council itself decided to change its poli
cies. The public lost much faith in the colegiado after this inci
dent, especially since it was the public that had sought the aid of
the colegiado and they, in turn, failed even to make a statement
9 concerning the problem.
The elections of 1958 brought the Blancos into power for the
first time in nearly a century. As the ruling party, the Blancos
soon came to the realization that it was far easier to shout dis
approval of national policies from the sidelines than to alleviate
the problems that plagued the country. The Blancos continued to
liberalize the welfare system that the country could ill afford.
Government spending was far beyond the income of the country. The
promise made by the Blancos to clean up the corruption and graft
proved to be empty. The Blancos pledged to restore the value of
the peso but by the end of their two terms in office in 1966, the
peso was exchanged at a rate of 88 pesos to the dollar - a drastic
change from 15 pesos to the dollar in 1957. These were relatively
minor problems faced by the Blancos during their tenure as the
13
majority par ty in Uruguay.
To add to the headaches of the fact ion-r idden colegiado, labor
began to s t r i k e for higher wages and b e t t e r working cond i t ions . The
problem of s t r i k e s in Uruguay presented an a l toge the r d i f f e ren t
s i t u a t i o n . The s t r i k e s paralyzed one or more sec tors of the economy,
A s t r i k e agains t a f r i go r l f i co would cause a work stoppage in a l l
the n a t i o n ' s or c i t y ' s f r i g o r i f i c o s , depending upon the s ca l e of the
s t r i k e , because a l l the companies were e i the r owned or cont ro l led by
the na t iona l government. Therefore, a s t r i k e would not be against
a s i n g l e privately-owned company but ra ther against the government.
I t was the government that paid the workers ' s a l a r i e s and wage
increases would have to come from government revenues.
Labor d isputes became the focus of a t t en t i on in the early
1960 's . S t r i ke s occurred with oppressive monotony. In the case of
the municipal workers of Montevideo who went out on s t r i k e in 1963,
the c i t y of Montevideo came to a v i r t u a l s t a n d s t i l l without t h e i r
s e r v i c e s . The demands of the workers were oftentimes outrageous.
On one occasion workers demanded a 72 per cent pay i nc r ea se . An
other t ime, the pay increase demanded by workers amounted to a
walloping 94 per cen t . When the workers of the Usinas E lgc t r i ca s y
Telgfonos del Estado (UTE), the state-owned e l e c t r i c and telephone
company, went on s t r i k e , the army was ca l led in to take t h e i r p l a c e s .
I t i s t r a g i c , but amusing, to note tha t 1,000 s o l d i e r s were q u i t e
ab le to do the job tha t had been performed by the 12,000 r egu la r ly
employed workers . This was a c l a s s i c example of the " fea ther-bedding"
14
tha t was prevalent in many of the count ry ' s i n d u s t r i e s .
The labor problem continued to ha r rass the government. Between
1965 and 1969, labor d isputes and t h e i r r e l a t ed t roub les were in
fu l l swing. The number of s t r i k e s reached epidemic p ropor t ions .
These s t r i k e s were usual ly for l eg i t ima te reasons; however, they
were sometimes used to c rea te a chaot ic s i t u a t i o n in Uruguay. The
Communist Party in Uruguay had es tabl ished members in key pos i t i ons
in many of the count ry ' s labor unions by the 1960 ' s . Through the
medium of s t r i k e s and work stoppages, the Communist par ty t r i e d to
c r i pp l e the government and thereby assume power by f i l l i n g the void
created by o f f i c i a l s who, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , would leave the government
as a r e s u l t of t h e i r f a i l u r e to overcome the chaot ic s i t u a t i o n . If
p a r t i a l work stoppages can be counted, then at times the number of
s t r i k e s reached almost 700 in one year .
S t r i k e s , unfor tunate ly , did not remain non-v io len t . The
s t r i k e s turned in to massive demonstrations and the po l ice were sent
in to d i spe r se the crowds of s t r i k i n g workers and sympathizers . I t
was t h i s ac t ion tha t sparked the v io lence . By the end of 1965, over
500 union members were under a r r e s t following a rash of s t r i k e s and
r i o t s t ha t yea r . In May of 1968, a demonstration sponsored by the
CNT, the Confederaci6n Nacional de Trabajadores (National Confedera
t ion of Workers), became v io len t and one person was k i l l e d and f i f ty
in ju red . The scope of the s t r i k e s broadened when s tudents joined in
12 to aid the cause of the workers and to voice t h e i r own gr ievances .
After each shooting i n c i d e n t , general s t r i k e s were cal led in order t o
15
p r o t e s t the shoot ing. On August 14, 1968, during a demonstration
in which s tudents p a r t i c i p a t e d , v iolence broke out and one of the
s t u d e n t s . Liber Arce, was k i l l e d . The death of Liber Arce brought
a h a l t to the demonstrations and s t r i k e s for the remainder of 1968,
but not a permanent end. The next year , 1969, brought fur ther labor
t roubles and with i t more v io lence . Beginning in 1970, v io l en t
labor s t r i k e s and demonstrations decreased but they did not d i s -
13 appear e n t i r e l y from Uruguayan l i f e .
With the mounting economic c r i s i s , the clumsy colegiado system
came under a t t ack once more. By 1966, the colegiado had proved to
be a f a i l u r e and a motion was made to r e s t o r e the presidency. Push
ing for the change was Oscar D. Gestido, a former mi l i t a ry general
and leader of the L is t 14 Colorado party (Lis t 14 was a factor group
or a break-away group of the Colorado p a r t y ) . Both Blancos and
r i v a l Colorado fact ions opposed any change in the system. Even
though Gestido had been out of the mi l i t a ry s ince 1955, h i s oppo
nents considered him a m i l i t a r i s t and were convinced tha t Ges t ido ' s
r ev iva l of the presidency would cause "a generala to ins tead of the
democratic co leg iado ," that i s , r u l e by generals instead of by
co imci l . This was a well-founded fear because the mi l i t a ry had
gained cons iderable inf luence in government s ince 1958. The people
got the chance to decide whether a one-man presidency or a nine-man
counci l would ru le in Uruguay when the next e l ec t ions were held in
14 l a t e November of 1966.
The r e s u l t s of the e lec t ion were overwhelmingly in favor of
16
the Colorados. In that victory was included the proposal to do away
with the colegiado. Oscar Gestido won the presidency with 262,021 of
the Colorado total of 607,633 votes. It was hoped that "with the
retirement of the awkward coleg^iado, the new government could cope
more forcefully with the continuing scourge of inflation, labor un
rest and the incompetence of the state enterprises." That would
be something that only time and Gestido's resourcefulness would
determine.
Gestido began immediately to combat the growing inflation,
economic woes and unrest. Once again the peso was devalued to a
rate of 200 to the dollar, a devaluation of 100 per cent. As for
the economy, Gestido tried, with some success, to stimulate an indus
try that depended on high-priced foreign raw materials. His attempt
to reduce contraband was also somewhat successful. Gestido was able
to satisfy labor by granting them wage increases to meet the rise in
the cost of living but not the extravagant increases demanded by the
unions. Gestido's hard line policy appeared to be working. The
economy had begun to hold its own and international confidence in
Uruguay was restored. Gestido's hard work was beginning to pay off
but, unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on December 6, 1967,
only nine months after he entered office. His policies were con
tinued, though not as effectively, by his successor, Jorge Pacheco
17 Areco.
Pacheco, the Vice-Pres ident , took over the re ins of power a f t e r
the death of Gestido. The government machinery did not run too well
for Pacheco. His adminis t ra t ion was a l so plagued by i n f l a t i o n .
17
economic woes and labor unres t . To t ry to curb i n f l a t i o n , Pacheco
devalued the peso, t h i s time to a r a t e of 250 pesos to the d o l l a r .
This measure did not help e i t h e r . By the time of the e l ec t i ons in
November of 1971, the peso was valued at 600 to the d o l l a r , a far
cry from the s t a b l e two for one r a t e of the early 1950 ' s .
Pacheco t r i e d to carry out the p o l i c i e s es tabl i shed by Gestido
but he did not have the forcefulness nor the support t ha t Gestido
had. The rev iva l of the presidency had not completely solved Uru
guay's economic c r i s i s bu t , perhaps, i t gave the country a place
from which to s t a r t .
Perhaps the most press ing problems facing the Pacheco admini
s t r a t i o n was labor un res t . In 1968, there were 700 s t r i k e s . Also
in 1967, the cost of l i v ing had increased 136 per cent . In add i t ion
to these d i f f i c u l t i e s , another menacing problem developed. A group
of urban g u e r i l l a s c a l l i n g themselves the Movimiento de Liberaci6n
Naciona1-Tupamarps_, National Libera t ion Movement-Tupamaros, i n i t i
ated a plan designed to har rass the government. Through t h e i r
a c t i o n s , the weakness of the government would be exposed to the
world.
CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES
Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (3rd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1968), pp. 786-789"
2 George Pendle, Uruguay (London: Oxford University Press, 1965),
pp. 25, 30-31; Marvin Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 21-23. ~
3 Pendle, Uruguay, p. 24.
4 Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 791.
^Ibid., p. 791.
Pendle, Uruguay, pp. 30-31; Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 794.
Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 31-33.
o
Herring, A History of Latin America, pp. 798-799.
9 Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 35-37.
Herring, A History of Latin America, pp. 800-802; Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, Translated by Anne Edmonson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), p. 20.
James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 177; Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, p. 88.
12 The s tudents used t h i s oppor tuni ty , plus o the r s , to voice t h e i r
anti-American f e e l i n g s . Their main anti-American theme was the American i n t e r v e n t i o n in Viet Nam. These demonstrations were s imi l a r t o those held by American s tudents and they, too, became v io len t at times .
13 Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 177.
14 Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, p. 42.
Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 805.
1 fi
Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, p. 43; Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 805. "~
18
19
Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 45-46; Herring, A History of Latin America, pp. 807-808.
18 Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 47-49; Gilio,
The Tupamaro Guerrillas, p. 20.
CHAPTER I I
THE TUPAMAROS: ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS
The o r i g i n of t h e Tupamaros d a t e s back t o t h e e a r l y 1960 ' s when
ex-law s t u d e n t and Uruguayan S o c i a l i s t Pa r ty member Radl Sendic
t r a v e l e d t o t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of t h e count ry t o o r g a n i z e t h e s u g a r
cane w o r k e r s . Sendic cons idered t h e s e workers t h e "most e x p l o i t e d
of t h e r u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t " because of t h e i r impoverished c o n d i t i o n .
In t h e depar tment p rov ince of A r t i g a s , Sendic organized t h e
UTAA, or t h e Uni6n de Trabajadoreg Azucareros d_e A r t i g a s , t h e
Sugarcane Workers ' Union of A r t i g a s . The cane workers e age r ly j o i n
ed Sendic and h i s UTAA. On May 5, 1962, t he UTAA marched from A r t i
gas t o Montevideo, a d i s t a n c e of 350 m i l e s , t o inform t h e government
and t h e p u b l i c of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . They demanded the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n
of 30,000 h e c t a r e s of u n c u l t i v a t e d l a n d , b e t t e r working c o n d i t i o n s
and h i g h e r wages . According t o t h e marche r s , t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g
and t h e u n s a n i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s where they l i v e d were subhuman. Wages
were low and women and c h i l d r e n had t o work in t h e f i e l d s t o h e l p
suppo r t t h e i r f a m i l i e s . The march f a i l e d t o r e c e i v e any sympathy
from government o f f i c i a l s and Sendic and 36 o t h e r s were a r r e s t e d
when p o l i c e d i s p e r s e d the marche r s .
During t h e remainder of 1962 and p a r t of 1963, t h e UTAA c o n t i n
ued t o make marches t o Montevideo. The union had adopted "For t h e
F a t h e r l a n d and wi th Send i c " as t h e i r o f f i c i a l s l o g a n . Each march
proved a f a i l u r e and p o l i c e b roke up t h e marches and a r r e s t e d s e v e r a l
20
21
of the leaders. Sendic became disillusioned with the non-violent
approach of obtaining reforms. He then decided that the only chance
of reform was through armed struggle. Soon after his release from
2 jail he dropped out of sight and began organizing the guerrillas,
Sendic found recruits to join the guerrillas among the various
social classes. Many recruits were former members of the UTAA who
went underground with Sendic, The occupation of members ranged from
rural farm workers to students and university professors to techni
cal workers. In some cases, members were the relatives of high
government officials. Some of the first confirmed Tupamaros captured
included Julio Marenales Sa^nz, a professor of fine arts; Pedro
Almiratti, a prominent engineer and building contractor; Jos6 Manuel
Lluveras, another engineer; and Rafil Bidegain Greissig, an advanced
student of agronomy, the son of a police chief, and a member of a
very wealthy family.
From 1966 to 1969, the occupations of captured Tupamaros, out
of a total of 54 captured, were as follows: 21 or 39 per cent were
students; 12 or 22 per cent were professional or technical workers;
17 or 32 per cent were farm or factory workers; and 4 or 7 per cent
were either housewives, soldiers or unemployed. By 1972, the number
of students had decreased by nearly 50 per cent, while the number of
professional or technical workers had increased by 50 per cent, with
the rest remaining about the same.
Joining the Tupamaros was not an easy task. One did not ask a
known or suspected Tupamaro sympathizer if he or she could join.
The process was long and complex. A prospective recruit was first
22
brought to the attention of the guerrilla organization through anoth
er member or sponsor. Then the prospective member was carefully in
vestigated. The member that sponsored a recruit would submit an
exhaustive report on that person's life, habits, friends, politics
and any other information that might be of value. Those with techni
cal ability or skills and that could adapt to the command system were
desired by the Tupamaros. Smoking was tolerated but discouraged and
the use of alcohol was strictly forbidden. Security was an import
ant factor to them and failure to take the proper precautions in
recruiting could prove to be disastrous or even fatal.
After receiving a security clearance, the Tupamaro recruit was
assigned to performing service work, that is, gathering intelligence,
making repairs or handling communications. At the same time, the
recruit underwent training in paramilitary skills. Completion of
the program allowed the new Tupamaro to work within the organization,
gaining the opportunity to increase his or her responsibility and
4 related active participation.
Once a recruit was accepted in the ranks of the Tupamaros, he
or she v;as then assigned to a cell. Cells were commando groups that
were named after a comrade who had been killed while battling police.
Each cell v/as made up of from four to six members and sometimes more.
Each member was known only by a n_om d_e guerre or pseudonym. True
identities were not known to regular members. Most cells operated
independently from other cells. There was an appointed cell leader
and he was the only one to know the leaders of other cells. These
leaders occasionally met together to formulate strategy and tactics.
23
The column operated on a broader scale. Several cells made up
the column. A column usually specialized in one type of activity.
Gathering intelligence, providing supplies, locating new recruits
and paramilitary activities were some of the duties of column mem
bers. In one case, a column ran a complete medical center under
ground near Montevideo.
Above the entire Tupamaro organization was the Executive Com
mittee. This was the Tupamaro High Command. As individuals, the
members sought out suitable targets for guerrilla action. The Execu
tive Committee was responsible for planning strategy and deciding
which cell would perform what task. It had the power to create or
to eliminate any cell, column, or unit as it felt necessary. Each
cell was in contact with the Executive Committee through the cell
leader.
To insure success, it was necessary for the Tupamaros to estab
lish safe places to hide. This task was performed by acquiring
houses under assumed names and by using houses of non-combatants for
refuge. To further guarantee their safety, the Tupamaros dug out
underground rooms beneath the houses. Entrances to those underground
rooms were cleverly concealed to prevent their discovery in case a
house was searched by police. These rooms were called berratines
(little rooms). These berratines had many useful purposes; they were
used to cache arms and ammunition, to provide safe living and hiding
quarters for those guerrillas who were forced to live clandestinely,
as a place of detention for those x>7ho were sentenced to the "people's
prison," to hide printing presses for the printing of documents and
24
false identification papers, and some were large enough to conceal
medical facilities. It seems the Tupamaros thought of everything.
Military activities took various shapes. Some were to gather
supplies and others were to establish an identity with the people.
The Tupamaros performed each with delicate accuracy.
Early in the morning of July 31, 1963, a small group of men
entered the Swiss Rifle Club in Nueva Helvecia, near the capital city
of Montevideo, and stole thirty-one rifles and tv/o carbines. Inves
tigating police attributed the robbery to common criminals. Other
sources in Montevideo contributed the crime to Radl Sendic and other
leftist militants. Sendic and his followers later took credit for
the theft. It was theorized by the police that Sendic had planned to
use the arms to take over productive sugar cane fields and give them
to the cane workers. If this theory was true, the plan fell through
and the Tupamaros became inactive for a few months.
On Christmas Eve of 1963, ten young men carrying revolvers
hijacked a truck belonging to the Manzares Company. The truck was
loaded with foodstuffs. The hijackers directed the truck to a slum
area of Montevideo where they distributed the food among the resi
dents. At the same time the hijackers held a short propaganda
session. It was this "Hunger Command," as it later called, that
gave the Tupamaros their "Robin Hood" image, an image they were to
keep until 1970.
Tupamaro raids were not limited entirely to the city of Monte
video and surrounding cities. On January 1, 1964, a Tupamaro com
mando squad attacked the customs house at Bella Union, a town in the
25
northwest of the country on the border with Brazil in the department
of Artigas. The commandos obtained eleven Mausers, model 1908, a
five shot, 7 mm. gun, and eight bayonets. On April 19, 1964, the
commandos struck in the department of Lavalleja. From a company
near the town of Minas, the commandos stole 100 blasting caps and
ten meters (approx. 30 ft.) of fuse. The next day, while still in
the vicinty of Minas, the commandos broke into the Casa Ribel, S.A.
and stole five German rifles and six revolvers. In addition to the
guns, a thousand rounds of ammunition were taken. In the department
of Maldonado in the southeast, commandos hit the Compania Nacional
de CementQ, S.A., the National Cement Company. Here the Tupamaros
stole 24 cases of explosives. It was later learned that this was
540 kilograms (1188 lbs.) of gelatine, a very explosive material.
The police attributed these raids or crimes to common criminals,
unaware that they had been performed by a well-organized paramilitary
6 group.
Another avenue of Tupamaro expression was bombing. Most bombs
were d i rec ted agains t foreign companies. Some of these were Moore-
McCormack, Coca-Cola, I n t e rna t i ona l Harvester and two companies
belonging to I n t e r n a t i o n a l Telephone and Telegraph, All American
Cable and Western Telegraph. I t was the August, 1965 bombing of the
Bayer Chemical Company, a German-owned firm, tha t was important .
Pamphlets l e f t behind at the scene indica ted tha t the company was
bombed because i t manufactured gases that the United S ta tes used in
the Viet Nam War. The most s i g n i f i c a n t th ing about the inc iden t was
26
that the pamphlets were signed Movimien_t_o d_e Liberaci6n N£ci^on_al—
Tupamaros. This was the first time they had identified themselves
, 7 by a name.
Throughout 1965 and 1966, the bombings, robberies and assaults
increased steadily. The bombings were used to make the Tupamaros
known to the public, the robberies were to obtain supplies and the
assaults were to collect finances. These commando raids were not
without risk or danger to human lives.
The Tupamaros suffered their first fatality in December, 1966.
Two weeks after a robbery at an armory, police located a vehicle
that was suspected to have been involved. While in pursuit, a
fierce gun battle erupted between the police and the occupants of
the vehicle. During the battle, the vehicle ran into a tree and the
occupants fled on foot. One of the occupants, later identified as
Carlos Flores Alvarez, remained behind and covered his comrades'
retreat with machinegun fire. The police returned fire and Flores
Alvarez was killed. Inside the vehicle were two more machineguns
and two pistols. Less than a week later, another shoot-out with
police cost the life of Mario Robaina M^ndez, another Tupamaro. In
side his house police found books on Lenin, Marx and Mao Tse Tung.
These books were considered subversive.
On many occasions the Tupamaros were applauded for their imag
ination in carrying out their raids. At one of the local theaters
in Montevideo belonging to the Federation of Independent Theaters, a
play by Arnold Wesker was being performed. In order to make the play
a success, some of the actors needed military uniforms and rifles.
27
The array was glad to accommodate them and loaned them t h e n e c e s s a r y
equipment . La te on February 7 , 1966, the n i g h t of t h e p l a y , a group
of you ths armed wi th p i s t o l s b roke i n t o t he t h e a t e r and s t o l e t he
t e n Mausers wi th bayonets and the e i g h t e e n uniforms t h a t were be ing
used i n t h e p l a y . Although the uniforms were l a t e r r e c o v e r e d , they
had se rved t h e Tupamaros w e l l . Disgu i sed as p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , a com
mando squad e n t e r e d t he bank. La Caja Obrera , and robbed i t of some
301,343 p e s o s , approximate ly 3,424 American d o l l a r s . On November 22,
1966, ano the r s i m i l a r a s s a u l t occurred a t the Paseo de Arena branch
of t h e Banco P o p u l a r . The Tupamaros n e t t e d some 472,642 pesos
($5,731) i n t h e r a i d . ^
By the end of 1967, t h e v i o l e n c e had i nc rea sed wi th l o s s of l i f e
on bo th s i d e s . The p o l i c e cons idered themselves s u c c e s s f u l i n com
b a t i n g t h e g u e r r i l l a s . Many Tupamaro h i d i n g p l ace s were uncovered
and some known members a r r e s t e d . Even though they had only t h e
names of 28 known Tupamaros, t h e Uruguayan government f e l t conf iden t
t o make a s t a t e m e n t concern ing i t s s u c c e s s . The announced t h a t " they
had d e a l t a mor t a l blow to t he smal l bu t m i l i t a n t c l a n d e s t i n e o r g a n i -
9 z a t i o n of l e f t - w i n g e x t r e m i s t s , t h e ' T u p a m a r o s ' . " They did not
r e a l i z e j u s t how wrong t h a t s t a t emen t was u n t i l much l a t e r .
In 1968, t h e Tupamaros in t roduced a new t a c t i c . This t a c t i c
became known as Plan S a t a n . I t was t h e k idnapp ing of prominent
n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i g u r e s t o embarrass t h e government. The
Tupamaros f e l t t h a t to kidnap a p o l i t i c i a n and h i d e him away for
s e v e r a l days would be more e f f e c t i v e in h u m i l i a t i n g t h e government
than t o shoot o f f i c i a l s i n t h e s t r e e t .
28
On August 8, 1968, Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, president of the
state electricity and telephone company, UTE, was kidnapped as he
was leaving his home. His secretary and chauffeur were wounded by
the commandos. It was later disclosed by the guerrillas that Pereira
Reverbel was kidnapped because he advocated a hard time against the
guerrillas and, embarrassingly enough, because he was a personal
friend of Uruguayan president Jorge Pacheco Areco. Some 3,000 army
troops and policemen searched eMerywhere for Pereira Reverbel but
they were unable to locate him. After 131 hours of captivity, the
Tupamaros released their distinguished "guest" unharmed and slightly
drugged in a land rover near the Park Jos^ Batlle y Orddfiez. This
was the first of many kidnappings to follow.
One of the main goals of the Tupamaros was to root out corrup
tion and other illegal activities of the government. To enable the
Tupamaros to perform this type of action, an excellent intelligence
network had to be devised and that was just what they constructed.
It was said that the Tupamaros had developed an intelligence network
that was far superior to that of Uruguay's police. This was in evi
dence when the Tupamaro commando squad "Liber Arce" raided the
Financiera Monty, a Montevideo financial firm, in February, 1969.
They took the account books and $24,000 from the Financiera. The
robbery was not reported to police because, upon examination, the
account books indicated that the company had been engaged in illegal
financial transactions. Implicated in these illegal activities were
the Minister of Public Works, Walter Pinto Risso; a political candi
date, Jorge Batlle; and the president of the state electricity and
29
telephone company, and former Tupamaro captive, Ulysses Pereira
Reverbel. The Tupamaros turned the books over to a judge after
their accountant had examined them thoroughly and discovered the
damaging evidence. The information was exposed to the public soon
after the judge received a copy of the account books. Three days
after the public exposure of the scandalous information, a fire
destroyed the offices of the Financiera and all the contents inside
were lost. A former employee had provided the Tupamaros with the
necessary information for the robbery. Unfortunately, the destruc
tion of the evidence by the fire made it impossible to convict any
12 of those implicated in the criminal activities.
Until now, the Tupamaros had performed only small raids using
a minimum number of soldiers. On October 8, 1969, the Tupamaros
initiated their most daring and spectacular action to date. At
precisely one o'clock, members of the commando squad "Che Guevara"
attacked the town of Pando, some thirty-one kilometers (18 miles)
from Montevideo. The commandos arrived in the town by various means;
the most unusual method was the group that arrived using a funeral
cortege as a cover. Once inside the town, the Tupamaros located
their respective assignments (targets) and waited for the signal to
attack. At one o'clock the signal was given and the commandos put
on white armbands to identify themselves and to prevent confusion,
and they moved against their targets. All the commandos acted out
their roles simultaneously. The police commissary, the police sta
tion, the fire department and two local banks were the targets of
the coordinated Tupamaro attack. Taken by surprise, the firemen
30
policemen, and bank personnel offered little resistance. At the
commissary a policeman attempted to flee but vjarning shots fired by
a Tupamaro convinced the man to stay. The shots, fortunately for
the Tupamaros, did not draw the attention of the townfolk.
At the Bank of Pando there was another group of Tupamaros, all
armed with machineguns and pistols. While two commandos were re
moving the money from the vault a third, a female named Ana, was
distributing leaflets to the people inside and explaining the pur
pose of the raid. After gathering nearly four million pesos from
the vault, the commandos prepared to leave. A policeman, somehov;
alerted that a raid was in process at the bank, positioned himself
behind the Tupamaros' get-away car. A brief battle ensued and the
policeman was wounded and disarmed, thus allowing the robbers to
escape in the car. In leaving the scene, two of the car tires were
shot by the wounded policeman, who managed to reload his gun and
fire at the fleeing vehicle. Miraculously the car arrived at the
tov/n's cemetery, the rendezvous of all the white arm-banded Tupa
maros. Here, the guerrillas loaded the money, some forty million
pesos all totalled, into an awaiting van; then the ones from the
useless car split into two groups and climbed into two other vehi
cles. It was at this point that the raid lost its organization
because the occupants of the cars did not know each other or which
of them were officers or soldiers. This added to the confusion when
this group was later stopped by a police roadblock in the area of
Toledo Chico, near Montevideo.
The Tupamaros escaped from Pando without any casualties and the
31
only mishap was t h e d i s a b l e d c a r . Now for the miss ion t o be a s u c
c e s s , t h e t h i r t y - o n e k i l o m e t e r t r i p back t o the c o n c r e t e j u n g l e of
Montevideo had to be accompl i shed . The g u e r r i l l a s hoped t h a t they
could s a f e l y reach t h e o u t s k i r t s of Montevideo b e f o r e t h e p o l i c e
could a c t i v e l y become involved in t h e i r p u r s u i t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y for
t h e Tupamaros, t h a t was not t o happen. In any a r ea near Montevideo
known as Toledo Chico and about two minutes from s a f e t y , t h e escape
v e h i c l e s were s topped by a p o l i c e roadb lock . Only one of t h e v e h i
c l e s , t h e van w i th t h e money and d r iven by l e a d e r Ratil Send ic , was
a b l e t o t u r n around and e lude the p o l i c e in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . Hoping
t o l o s e themselves in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , t h e g u e r r i l l a s abandoned t h e
c a r and f led on f o o t . The p o l i c e moved in and opened f i r e on t h e
f l e e i n g g u e r r i l l a s . Some were shot wh i l e t r y i n g t o s u r r e n d e r and
wi th t h e i r hands in t h e a i r . Af ter t he shoo t ing ceased , t h r e e Tupa
maros were dead , s e v e r a l i n ju r ed and twenty taken c a p t i v e . One of
t h e dead Tupamaros was Ricardo Zabalza Waksman, t h e son of t h e
prominent Blance s e n a t o r F ranc i sco Zaba lza . Even though t h e Tupa
maros l o s t t h r e e members, t h e r a i d on Pando was s t i l l cons idered a
s u c c e s s b e c a u s e i t had mobi l ized over 100 g u e r r i l l a s , accord ing t o
t h e Tupamaros. O f f i c i a l s sou rces reduced t h a t number and c i t e d
around 40 t o 50 g u e r r i l l a s . The reason for t h e r a i d ? t o c e l e b r a t e
t h e second a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e dea th of Che Guevara and t o show t h e
p u b l i c t h e weakness of t h e government fo rces t o p reven t such a
•A 13 r a i d .
This was how the Tupamaros ended 1969. The weakness of the
government was exposed and it was forced to admit that the Tupamaros
32
^ere more than just common criminals. In early 1969 two Uruguayan
newspapermen, Antonio Mercader and Jorge Vera, calculated that there
were between 50 and 100 Tupamaros dedicated to direct action. The
police, by later 1969, had identified the following commando squads:
"Liber Arce," "Susana Pintos," "Carlos Flores," "Mario Robaina
Mendez," and "Che Guevara," In January, 1970, the British weekly,
Latin America, estimated that there were 800 Tupamaros and that
they were divided into three columns. Regardless of the official or
unofficial estimates of Tupamaro strength, they continued to harrass
the government. By late 1969, the Tupamaros had become well en
trenched in the fight for power against the Uruguayan government.
The guerrillas continued to expand their organization and membership
despite pressure from the police. The Tupamaros reached their peak
between 1970 and 1971. It was during these years that the "Robin
Hood" image they had carefully cultivated disappeared in a wave of
violence.
CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES
The Tupamaros took their name from an 18th century freedom fighter, Tupac Amaru (Jose Condorcanqui).
2 -Carlos Suarez y Rubin Anaya Sarmiento, Los Tupamaros (Mexico:
Editorial Extemporaneos, 1971), pp. 33-35; Ernesto Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centre Inter-cultural de Documentacion, 1971), p. 3/2; Marysa Gerassi, "Uruguay's Urban Guerrillas: The Tupamaros," Nation, September 29, 1969, p. 308.
3 Arturo C. Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban
Guerrillas (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 29; Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," Problems of Communism, September, 1971, p. 17.
4 Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 35.
Donald C. Hodges and Robert Elias Abu Shannab, NLF: National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970 (New York: Morrow, 1972), p. 2841 Robert Moss, The War for the Cities (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), p. 222; Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, pp. 33-34.
6 -Suarez, Los Tupamaros, p. 45; Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia
Documental, p. 3/4.
Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental, pp. 3/2-3/6.
Suarez, Los Tupamaros, pp. 48-49.
9 Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 3 / 8 - 3 / 9 ; Alphonse Max, Tupamaros
A P a t t e r n for Urban G u e r r i l l a Warfare in La t i n America (The Hague: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Documentation and Informat ion C e n t r e , 1970) , p . 5; "Uruguay: More of t h e Same M e d i c i n e , " L a t i n America, January 17 , 1968, p . 1 8 .
Col . Se rg io L. d ' O l i v i e r a , "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," M i l i t a r y Review, A p r i l , 1973, p . 28; Moss, The War for t h e C i t i e s , p . 223 .
11 Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental, pp. 3/13/-3/14;
New York Times, August 10, 12, 1968.
33
34
Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Anto log ia Documental , pp . 3 / 2 0 - 3 / 2 1 ; "Uruguay: Pacheco S t i l l Adamant," L a t i n America, January 9 , 1970, p . 15; "Robin Hood G u e r r i l l a s , " Time, May' 16, 1969, p . 46 .
13 Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental, p. 3/30; James
Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 238, 2 46"-24 8, 252-253, 257-259; Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, Translated by Anne Edmonson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), p. 128; "Uruguay: Sparks Fly Again, Latin America, July 3, 1970, p. 215.
14 Suarez, Los Tupamaros, pp. 77-78, "Uruguay: Pacheco Still
Adamant," Latin America, January 9, 1970, p. 15,
CHAPTER III
1970: PRELUDE TO DISASTER
By 1970 the Tupamaro organization was a thriving entity. Mem
bership and public sympathy were on the rise. The Tupamaros had
carefully matured their "Robin Hood" image and had cherished the fact
that they had never wantonly resorted to violence. The guerrillas
claimed that violence was used as a last resort and only in self-
defense. The establishment of a power duality, a step on the ladder
to revolutionary success, was achieved by the Tupamaros during their
peak year of 1970.
During the early months of 1970 the Tupamaros carried out a
series of raids that were designed to collect supplies and to keep
their name before the public. In countering the guerrillas, police
made unwarranted house searches to uncover possible hiding places or
caches of arms. Many times these searches were futile and fruitless.
On rare occasions, however, the police would actually locate a "safe
house" and capture the occupants, who were usually Tupamaros. As the
result of these dragnets, many guerrillas were incarcerated in the
Punto Carreta prison. Other guerrillas would be captured as a result
of an abortive raid on a bank or an assault on a supply company.
Regardless of how or why a Tupamaro became a captive, they would
invariably be taken to jail for interrogation and then sometime later
be sentenced to prison. The use of the word interrogation was only
a synonym for torture. Even though police officials denied the use
35
36
of t o r t u r e on suspected Tupamaro p r i sone r s , i t s app l ica t ion was in
widespread use .
Tor tu re , as i s well known, i s an age-old method of ex t r ac t ing
information from someone who, under normal condi t ions , refuses t o
divulge desired information. The appl ica t ion of t o r t u r e , both phys i
ca l and mental , has the effect of changing the person ' s mind about
what he w i l l t a l k about. In the case of Uruguay, the use of t o r t u r e
had been denied by po l ice o f f i c i a l s , but charges of i t s use caused a
Senate Commission of inquiry to be e s t ab l i shed . The findings of t h i s
Commission, headed by the Colorado senator Amilcar Vasconcellos and
comprised of both Blanco and Colorado sena to r s , "concluded unani
mously tha t 'inhuman' t o r t u r e , including e l e c t r i c shocks, c i g a r e t t e
burns , and psychological pressure , was used by pol ice as a 'normal,
frequent and h a b i t u a l ' matter on Tupamaros, common c r imina l s , and
innocents a l i k e . "
This i l l e g a l po l ice t a c t i c was carr ied out by the members of the
I n t e l l i g e n c e and Information branch of the Montevideo po l ice depa r t
ment. The head (d i r ec to r ) of t h i s department was Hector Moran ,
Charquero. Moran Charquero was accused by the Tupamaros of being
the chief t o r t u r e r and persecutor of the g u e r r i l l a s . He was a lso
reputed to be the chief of the Brigada Especia l , Special Brigade,
tha t was s p e c i a l l y organized to combat the Tupamaros and was allowed
to use s pec i a l t a c t i c s ( t o r t u r e , in t imida t ion , e t c . ) . Moran Char
quero learned these t a c t i c s from the Ac^adgmia In te rnac iona l de
P o l i c i a , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pol ice Academy, an academy sponsored by the
United S ta t e Department of S t a t e .
37
These qualifications made Moran Charquero very unpopular among
tthe Uruguayan public and, especially, the Tupamaros. As soon as his
identification was linked to the Brigada Especial, Moran Charquero
became a marked man. His fear of assassination was not unwarranted.
Although he traveled surrounded by bodyguards, he was killed by Tupa
maro gunfire on April 13, 1970, His death was called a reprisal for
the torturing of many political prisoners. This action by the Tupa
maros represented the first such act of selective assassinations they
had performed and demonstrated their willingness to disregard their
2 "Robin Hood" image with this new rise of violence.
As the Tupamaros progressed in their attacks against the govern
ment to discredit and humiliate it, they still attempted to maintain
a non-violent role. The Tupamaro's schemes became more strategical
as they thrust deeper into the very center of the Uruguayan govern
ment. To prove that no one entity was immune from Tupamaro attack,
the commando squad "Indalecio Olivera de Rosas," comprised of 20 men
and 22 women, raided the Centro de Instrucci6n de la_ Marina, the
Naval Training Center, on the morning of May 29, 1970,
At 1:45 in the morning, the orderly to the guard, Fernando
Garin, a newly recruited member of the Tupamaros, signaled to three
men in a car parked not far away. Upon arriving at the entrance gate
of the fortress, (the Naval Training Center), the three men, dis
guised as policemen, approached the guard and demanded to see the
officer on duty. The guard motioned to Garin and ordered him to take
the policemen inside, but before they departed from the gate, a couple
walking down the street were stopped and questioned by the policemen
38
t h e r e ( t h e t h r e e t h a t had j u s t a r r i v e d ) . F a i l i n g t o produce i d e n t i
f i c a t i o n p a p e r s , t h e couple were ordered i n s i d e for f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n
i n g . While t h i s commotion was happening at t h e g a t e , Garin had
s l i p p e d i n s i d e and up t o t h e s e n t r y ' s s t a t i o n l o c a t e d near t h e g a t e
and four meters (approximate ly 12 f e e t ) above ground. Gar in e x p l a i n
ed t h a t he had come t o r e l i e v e t h e s e n t r y , but t h e s e n t r y f e l t t h a t
something s u s p i c i o u s was going on and h e s i t a t e d , Garin then s t r u c k
t h e s e n t r y and disarmed him of h i s AR-15 automat ic r i f l e . With t h e
s e n t r y d i sa rmed , 19 o t h e r Tupamaros t h a t had been watching emerged
from t h e i r h i d i n g p l a c e s and surrounded the guards a t t h e g a t e . R e a l
i z i n g t h a t he was g r e a t l y outnumbered, t h e guard su r rende red t o t h e
g u e r r i l l a s .
New t h a t the e n t r a n c e t o t h e Center was s e c u r e d , complete i n
f i l t r a t i o n could be c a r r i e d o u t . At each p o t e n t i a l t r o u b l e s p o t , t h e
g u e r r i l l a s p laced one of t h e i r own members, d i s g u i s e d in a nava l
uni form. As the policemen en te red t h e f o r t r e s s , they c a l l e d for t h e
o f f i c e r on d u t y . When t h i s o f f i c e r a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e , he did not
s u s p e c t any th ing amiss so he d i d n ' t sound t h e a larm t h a t would a l e r t
t h e 60-odd o f f i c e r s and men in t h e b u i l d i n g . The o f f i c e r and h i s
a i d e , a c o r p o r a l , were qu ick ly overpowered and t i e d up . Other Tupa
maros e n t e r e d t h e men's d o r m i t o r i e s and awoke t h e men. They t o o were
overpowered and locked up in t h e g a r r i s o n ' s c e l l s . Once they were
locked away, t h e Tupamaros could roam t h e Center wi thou t a c c i d e n t a l l y
runn ing i n t o someone t h a t could r u i n t h e i r p l a n s .
A t r u c k soon e n t e r e d t he e n t r a n c e g a t e and parked in t he p a t i o .
The commandos bus ied themselves by emptying t h e a r s e n a l and g a t h e r i n g
39
up the arms l e f t behind in the dormi tor ies . By 3:30 a.m. the t ruck
was ful ly loaded and l e f t the fo r t r e s s unnoticed. The truck car r ied
a t o t a l of 300 r i f l e s , two .30 c a l i b r e machineguns on t r i p o d s ,
150 Colt .45 c a l i b r e p i s t o l s , 40 other p i s t o l s of unknown c a l i b r e ,
s eve ra l sub-machineguns, s ix AR-15 automatic r i f l e s of the type
used by the Americans in Viet Nam, 75 smoke and gas grenades and,
f i n a l l y , 60,000 rounds of ammunition — qu i t e a haul for a shor t
n i g h t ' s work. By 4:15 a.m. the remaining Tupamaros departed from
the Center. These remaining g u e r r i l l a s hois ted the Tupamaro f l ag ,
wrote revolut ionary slogans on the wall and took photographs of the
j a i l e d o f f i ce r s and men. Also l e f t behind by the commandos was a
l e t t e r from the solider-turned-Tupamaro, Fernando Garin. His l e t t e r
s t a t ed tha t he had joined the Tupamaros because he could no longer
t o l e r a t e the inhuman treatment of p o l i t i c a l pr isoners and remain a
pa r t of the establishment responsible for such cr imes.
I t was too l a t e to do anything by the time the so ld i e r s were
able to free themselves. The telephone l ines had been cut so some
one had to run two blocks in order to notify the Army I n t e l l i g e n c e
Serv ice . Another ten blocks and the runner could have no t i f i ed the
3 p res iden t a t the P r e s i d e n t i a l Palace .
The impact of the ra id shook the government by the sheer
audaci ty of the Tupamaros to raid a mi l i t a ry es tabl ishment . This
had been the f i r s t time tha t the mi l i t a ry had been attacked in such
a manner. This ou t r igh t a t t ack was an affront to t h e i r i n t e g r i t y ,
and a humi l ia t ion they would never fo rge t . In Montevideo the rumor
had begun to c i r c u l a t e tha t the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
40
Admiral Guillermo Fernandez, would have to res ign as a r e s u l t of the
Tupamaro r a i d . According to bureaucra t ic r i t u a l , an i nves t i ga t i on
was t o take place u t i l i z i n g the serv ices of both the armed forces
and p o l i c e . Taking charge of the i nves t i ga t i on was the defense min
i s t e r . General C^sar Borba, and the i n t e r i o r min i s t e r . General
Antonio Francese. Their i nves t iga t ion proved l i t t l e more than what
was already known, that information concerning the layout to the
Center , the loca t ion of the guards, the the loca t ion of the arsenal
had been supplied by Fernando Garin, the so ld i e r tha t defected to
the Tupamaros. This was the f i r s t major c r i s i s tha t both Borba and
Francese had faced s ince t h e i r appointment a f te r the "execution" of
po l i ce inspec tor Hector Moran Charquero by the Tupamaros in Apr i l ,
4 bare ly two months previous to the raid on the Center.
As the number of Tupamaro a t tacks grew, so did t h e i r s t r eng th
and numbers. In accordance with revolut ionary theory, the Tupamaros
had e s t ab l i shed a grand t r a d i t i o n with the public as non-violent
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , " s t e a l from the r ich and give to the poor" t ypes .
To the Tupamaros, t h i s was j u s t another s tep in the evolution of the
r evo lu t ion . Unfortunately, a la rge por t ion of the population only
considered the Tupamaros as clowns and did not be l i eve them to be a
se r ious t h r e a t . I t can be assumed tha t the Tuparmaros wished to
change or to s l i g h t l y a l t e r t h i s image by shedding the non-violence
of t h e i r s t r a t egy during the Uruguayan winter of 1970 (June, July
and August) .
In Ju ly , 1970, the Tupamaros ac t ive ly revived one of t h e i r
f a v o r i t e t a c t i c s , kidnapping. This ac t ion f e l l under the code name
41
of Plan Satan. The plan had been devised in 1968 to humi l ia te and
d i s c r e d i t the government by kidnapping na t iona l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
f igures and hiding them away for awhile. Unt i l 1970, the vict ims
of Plan Satan were only na t iona l ly known f igu re s . The plan was now
to be expanded to cover i n t e r n a t i o n a l f igu res . The Tupamaros began
the second phase of t h e i r plan in Ju ly , 1970, when they kidnapped
the Braz i l i an Consul-General, Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, and an
American advisor for the U. S. Agency for I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development
(USAID), Dan Mi t r ione ,
The capture of Dias Gomide and Mitr ione was the r e s u l t of a
s epa ra t e but coordinated plan by the Tupamaros. On the fa teful F r i
day of July 31 , 1970, two groups of Tupamaro g u e r r i l l a s put t h e i r
s t r a t e gy i n to ac t ion . One group was assigned to abduct Dan Mitr ione,
the American advisor to the Montevideo pol ice department; the other
was assigned to abduct Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, the Braz i l i an Con
s u l . Mitr ione was overcome when the car he was dr iv ing was run off
the road. In the confusion, he received a gun-shot wound in the
neck. Mitr ione was then whisked away by h is Tupamaro a s s a i l a n t s .
I t was almost an i n s t a n t replay when Dias Gomide was abruptly pulled
from h i s automobile, slung i n to another and zipped off to an unknown
d e s t i n a t i o n .
The kidnapping of these two was only half of the o r ig ina l p lan .
I t had been out l ined to capture two other diplomats . Singled out as
kidnap vic t ims were Nathen Rosenfeld, c u l t u r a l a t t a ch^ , and Michael
Gorden Jones , v ice -consu l , of the U. S. Embassy. The Tupamaros were
wai t ing for Rosenfeld in the garage of the apartment house where he
42
lived. When attacked, he fought back and was struck on the head.
Faking unconsciousness, he was able to escape when the commandos
could not decide what to do about his condition. Jones, who lived
in the same building as Rosenfeld, appeared in the garage about the
same time. He, too, was pounced upon by the commandos. One of the
Tupamaros hit Jones on the back of the head with a pistol, knocking
him unconscious. They proceeded to throw a blanket over his head
and tie him up. Once securely bound and gagged, Jones was thrown
into an awaiting truck. He was able to escape from the Tupamaros
when, after regaining his senses, he slowly removed the blanket from
his eyes so he could see and then he swung free from the truck,
almost knocking himself unconscious again when he hit the pavement.
He had already made a clean getaway by the time his captors realized
that he was missing. It was a frustrating failure for the Tupamaros
but the day was not lost because their kidnap raids had netted the
/I
two big prizes of Dias Gomide and Mitrione.
The abduction of the foreign dignitaries sent shock waves
through the bureaucratic ranks. It had only been the week before
that the Tupamaros had kidnapped a Uruguayan judge, Daniel Pereira
Manelli. Clues to his where-abouts were either scarce or non
existent. The Tupamaros scored tv7o more points with the kidnapping
of Dias Gomide and Mitrione.
Now that they held international figures as captives, the
guerrillas were considered to be in a favorable position to put pres
sure on the government. If the Tupamaros alone did not exert enough
pressure on the government, then the governments of Brazil and the
43
United States would, in order to to protect the lives of their
citizens.
It was not known for a few days the objective behind the kid
nappings other than to discredit and humiliate the government and
the security forces in their blundering attempt to protect foreigners.
On the following Monday, August 3rd, the Tupamaros released Daniel
Pereira Manelli, who had been abducted the week before. Upon report
ing to the police, Pereira Manelli relayed a message from the Tupa
maros. The guerrillas demanded that al l political prisoners be
released in exchange for Dias Gomide and Mitrione. The fate of the
two men would rest in the decision of the government. A negative
decision would be like signing a death warrant for the men but
releasing the prisoners would certainly set a precedent for the
future, not only in Uruguay, but in other South American countries,
for political blackmail. The pros and cons of that argument would
be tossed around government circles for several days before any
decisive statement on the matter would be declared. The word that
circulated around Montevideo was that President Jorge Pacheco Areco
would refuse to negotiate with those he considered common criminals.
There were only two alternatives facing the president. First,
to continue a hardline policy against the Tupamaro demands and refuse
to negotiate with them could cause death for the captives. If this
were the case, and harm did come to the men, then Pacheco would have
to "bear the wrath of Washington and of the Brazilian military govern-
o
ment." Recent experience in Guatemala earlier that same year proved
disasterous when that government refused to negotiate with guerrilla
44
demands. The result was the death of the West German Ambassador.
This was not the solution the Uruguayan government sought to their
problem.
Another route that Pacheco Aerco could follow would be to give
in to the demands of the Tupamaros. Before Pacheco Areco could do
that, he had to consider the repercussions. His supporters would
certainly reconsider their status at election time. The Army and
police chiefs stated that if the president bowed to the Tupamaros'
demands, it would be difficult to prevent rebellious officers from
initiating action against the government. Not only domestic affairs
were under attack, but Uruguay also felt the pangs of international
pressure. Argentina, Uruguay's neighbor to the south, favored a
strong line against conciliation because of similar problems there.
Brazil, the northern neighbor, would be furious if anything happened
to Dias Gomide. The United States would use its economic influence
to manipulate the government into adapting measures to possibly cor
rect the economic ills of the country, a proposal that would be un
acceptable in Uruguay. The main opposition to this proposal was that
it was considered as selling out the country to foreigners. The
president, literally, had the fate of Uruguay resting on his shoulders
when he decided not to bargain with the guerrillas in hope that their
threats were only a bluff.
While government officials pondered over the many possible solu
tions to the crisis, the Army and police did not sit by in idleness.
As soon as it was known that the Tupamaros had kidnapped the two
foreign dignitaries, the Army and police began their search. To
45
facilitate their efforts, blank search warrants were carried and this
made it "lawful" to carry out a house-to-house search. When the Tupa
maros issued the ultimatum that either the guerrillas held as prison
ers were released or the two foreigners, Dias Gomide and Mitrione,
would be executed by August 7th, the police escalated their efforts.
By the sixth of August, there were over 20,000 army and police offi
cers involved in the massive dragnet. Their efforts were not entirely
in vain.
On August 7th, while searching for the kidnapped foreigners in
the district of Malvin, police captured several Tupamaros. Fortu
nately for the government, there were some top Tupamaros in this haul.
Radl Sendic, the founder of the guerrillas and Ratll Bidegain Gressing,
a top leader of the guerrillas, were taken prisoner. Many political
officials considered this fortunate because they felt that with Sendic
captive, the guerrillas holding Dias Gomide and Mitrione v;ould not
carry out the planned execution. The government now felt that they
held the upper hand against the Tupamaros,
While the police were searching Montevideo for the hostages,
the Tupamaros were moving unnoticed among them. When the police cap
tured Ratal Sendic, it was thought that the Tupamaros would be put
into a state of confusion. This was not the case because on August
7th, the Tupamaros made a raid on an agricultural laboratory and kid
napped Dr. Claude L. Fly. Dr. Fly was an American soils expert work
ing in Montevideo to assist the Uruguayan government in producing
better agricultural crops. Fly provided another hostage and, perhaps,
12 more bargaining power for the Tupamaros,
46
The Tupamaros now had three key hostages in their custody. For
the release of the captives, the guerrillas still demanded the re
lease of all political prisoners, some 150 persons, mainly captured
Tupamaros. If this demand was not agreed to by the Uruguayan govern
ment , then the guerrillas threatened to execute their hostages. The
president had decided to maintain his hardline policy toward the
guerrillas and refused to negotiate with them. In an attempt to
locate the three, police authorities questioned leader Radl Sendic,
who had been captured the previous day, as to the location of the
foreigners. Sendic replied that he V7as only a prisoner of war and
he refused to divulge any information regarding the Tupamaros. The
Uruguayan government and the world waited for the deadline of 12
noon, August 9th to see if the Tupamaros' threat would be carried
out.
On Monday morning, August 10th, 1970, a radio station in Monte
video received a telephone call from an anonymous person saying that
Dan Mitrione, the U.S.A.I.D. agent, had been executed. The caller
failed to give the location of the body. The police, however, were
notified and they later found a grisly sight. The body of Mitrione
was found in an abandoned automobile in Montevideo covered by a
blood soaked blanket. He had been shot four times - once each in
the neck, ear, chest and back. With the death of Mitrione, officials
pondered the fate of the other captives, Brazilian Consul-General
Aloysio Dias Gomide and U. S. agronomist, Claude Fly, This outright
murder of a foreign civilian cost the Tupamaros much of their public
support and sympathy. The government would now begin to consider
47
them more than amateurish provocateurs, but as criminals guilty of
murder without provocation.
The disclosure of the execution of Dan Mitrione by the Tupamaros
brought a critical reaction against them and the police. The Tupa
maros lost much public support because the public had held an image
of the guerrillas as being modern day "Robin Hoods," and defenders
of freedom and justice. This image was shattered when they killed
Mitrione. The people that at one time had supported them now dropped
their support and considered the guerrillas only as the lowest of the
criminal element. Faith in the police also dropped with Mitrione's
death. It was the police who failed to prevent the kidnapping, or
so the public would think. Then, after the kidnapping, the police
would surely be able to locate the abductors and punish them. But
that was not the case and when Mitrione's body was located, it became
apparent to most people that the police were incapable of protecting
either native citizens or foreign nationals. The failure of the
police was considered to be a reflection upon the government's res
ponsibility to the country.
Immediately following the discovery of the body. President
Pacheco Areco called for a special session of Congress to convene.
Pacheco Areco put before this session of Congress a measure to enact
Article 31 of the Uruguayan Constitution. This article "suspended
individual rights of property, assembly, personal liberty and free
„15 expression.
The enactment of Article 31 also included the institution of
a state of emergency. Through the use of this article in the
48
constitution, the president was given virtual dictatorial powers.
Congress, however, would allow the suspension of rights for only 20
days and then it would be renev/ed or dropped. The president had
1 f. hoped for a longer period of time on the state of emergency.
The killing of Mitrione stunned the world. President Nixon
of the United States called the crime "despicable." The Brazilian
president, Emilio Garrastazd Medici, expressed the feeling of his
country as being profoundly disturbed. The German Ambassador to
Brazil publicly criticized the Uruguayan stand against the guerrillas,
In contrast to the views of Brazil, Germany and the United States,
Argentina, Uruguay's southern neighbor, congratulated Pacheco Areco
for his firm stand on non-negotiation. Argentina also suffered from
the attacks of urban guerrillas. There was even a one million dollar
reward offered for information leading to the capture of the kid
nappers and murderers of Dan Mitrione. The Tupamaros, however, had
a different point of view concerning the execution of Mitrione,
The Tiip.inaros felt that in reaction to claims that Mitrione's
death was unjustified, they were compelled to make some sort of
statement concerning the matter in a communique. The Tupamaros
charged that Mitrione was the instigator of the torture tactics used
on prisoners and that he was an enemy of the people. The charges by
the Tupamaros went as far as claiming that Mitrione was an agent for
the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency. The death of Mitrione also
had a political significance because this was the first time that
such a confrontation existed with the government and the Tupamaros
when the guerrillas refused to withdraw the threat to execute
49
foreigners. When the guerrillas executed Mitrione, they considered
this a show of force indicating they were not afraid to carry out
their threats. A report that circulated soon after Mitrione's death
stated that Tupamaro leader, Radl Sendic, had expressed anger at the
shooting of Mitrione because it would tarnish the "Robin Hood" image
18 he had carefully cultivated.
Throughout the remainder of 1970, the Tupamaros decreased their
major activities and only carried out some of the less spectacular
raids such as obtaining supplies and acquiring funds. They continued
to hold the government in suspense with their detainment of the
Brazilian Consul-General, Dias Gomide, and the U. S. soils expert,
Claude Fly. The Tupamaros leaked out information that for a donation
of one million dollars, the government could obtain the release of
the captives. This change in attitude by the guerrillas from their
threatened execution of the hostages sent a surge of hope to the
relatives of the prisoners. The Tupamaros hoped that their benevo
lence would win back some of the public support they lost over the
death of Dan Mitrione. No one knew what the future held in store for
the Tupamaros, but, unbeknown to them, the peak of their organiza
tional success had been reached. During the next years, they would
decline until they could no longer operate as they had before.
CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES
"Uruguay: Repression, Torture and Thaw," Latin America, June 12, 1970, p. 192; Gary MacEoin, Revolution Next Door: Latin America in the 1970's (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 216; Col. Sergio d'Oliviera, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, April, 1973, p. 32.
Ernesto Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1971), p. 3/41; "Uruguay: Pacheco Firmer in the Saddle, Latin America, May 1, 1970, p. 138,
3 Carlos Suarez, Los Tupamaros (Mexico: Editorial Extemporaneos,
1971), pp. 64-65; James Kohn and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 260-262; Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/43.
4 "Uruguay: Tupamaros Shake the Government Again," Latin America,
June 5, 1970, p. 181.
New York Times, August 1, 1970; "Uruguay: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," Latin America, August 7, 1970, p. 249.
Robert Peter, "It was a Terrible Scene: Kidnappings and Death by the Tupamaros," National Review , September 22, 1970, p. 1001.
"Uruguay: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," Latin America, August 7, 1970, p. 249; New York Times, August 6, 1970.
o
"Uruguay: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," Latin America, August 7, 1970, p. 249.
^Ibid, p. 249.
• Ibid, p. 249.
Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/49; New York Times, August 8, 1970.
1 2 New York Times, August 8, 1970.
13 New York Times, August 9, 1970.
Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/51; "Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 257; New York Times, August 10-11, 1970.
50
51
"Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 258.
"Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 258; New York Times , August 12, 1970.
"Hanging Tough: Ransom Demands and Kidnappings," Newsweek, August 24, 1970, p. 32; "Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 257; "Uruguay: Deadlock," Latin America, August 21, 1970, p. 272; "Catch Them if you Can," Economist, August 15, 1970, p. 30.
18 "A Pawn in the Game," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 20;
"Uruguay: Still Cliff Hanging," Latin America, August 28, 1970, p. 277.
CHAPTER IV
THE FINAL YEARS
The passage in to the new year of 1971 did not mark any improve
ments on the Uruguayan scene. Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, the B r a z i l
ian consu l -genera l , remained a pr isoner of the Tupamaros. The same
held t rue for Claude Fly, the U. S. s o i l s expert who had been held
cap t ive s ince August, 1970. Dias Gomide had been capt ive s ince l a t e
Ju ly , 1970. Massive searches of Montevideo and outlying areas by
the Army and po l ice had fai led to turn up any clues to the loca t ion
of these two men. Even with over 20,000 pol ice and army personnel
mobilized against the Tupamaros, the g u e r r i l l a s continued to make
t h e i r commando ra ids on various t a r g e t s .
Under the facade of i n a c t i v i t y , the Tupamaros care fu l ly out l ined
t h e i r escapade in minute d e t a i l . In t rue Tupamaro fashion, nothing
was too great an objec t ive to be attempted. In f ac t , the more dar ing
and spec tacu la r a commando raid could prove to be , the more i t would
embarrass and humi l ia te government and mi l i t a ry o f f i c i a l s . While
ac t ing under the guidel ines of Plan Satan, or ig inated in 1968, the
g u e r r i l l a s kidnapped the Br i t i sh Ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey
Jackson.
The Tupamaros abducted the Br i t i sh Ambassador shor t ly a f t e r dawn
on the morning of January 8 th . While r id ing down a one-way s t r e e t
in the Old City sec t ion of Montevideo, four cars suddenly blocked
the road in front of Jackson 's chauffeur-driven black Dainler c a r . 52
53
Afier the car came to a halt, a dozen men poured out of the cars,
seized Jackson and threw him into one of the vehicles, clubbed the
t\ o bodyguards and then drove off with their prestigious hostage.
During the scuffle, a Tupamaro disguised as a street vendor pulled
a machinegun from a hiding place in his cart and stood guard to
insure that the intended captive did not escape and to prevent anyone
from interferring with the kidnapping. The Tupamaros now had another
pawn to use as a bargaining piece in an attempt to coerce the govern
ment to accept many of their radical demands.
An intensive search began immediately after the news of Jackson's
kidnapping reached government officials. Over 12,000 army and police
personnel were activated in the massive dragnet to locate the missing
ambassador. Optimisticall}^, officials hoped that the other kidnap
victims, namely Aloysio Dias Comide and Claude Fly, who were abducted
the previous August, would be found. This hope faded when the Tupa
maros, in communique #14, publicly stated that Jackson had been
sentenced to the "people's prison" along \7ith Dias Gomide and Fly.
The kidnapping of Geoffrey Jackson put extreme pressure on
President Pacheco Areco. First, Pacheco didn't want to fall from
grace with Britain over the way he handled the delicate affair.
Secondly, Pacheco didn't want Montevideo to become a beseiged city
and drive away the tourists that planned to visit the country's
beaches. Even with this type of pressure, Pacheco declared on
January 8th, the day of the abduction, that he would not negotiate
with the guerrillas. He desired to maintain the same hardline
policy toward negotiations with the guerrillas that he had stated
54
six months before with the crisis that surrounded the abduction of
Dan Mitrione and others. This incident became another embarrassing
international crisis that faced Uruguay during the early days of
1971.^
The government search for the kidnap victims proved to be futile.
True to past experience, the president suspended individual rights for
40 days to facilitate the search for the hostages. The suspension
allowed army and police officials to make house searches without war
rants, arrests without warrants, to impose a curfew on the city and
to detain suspects indefinitely. In failing to locate either Jackson,
Fly or Dias Gomide, the government could only wait to see what the
3 Tupamaros would do with their new guest,
The British were definitely shaken by the abduction of their
Ambassador. UTnat little faith the British had in the Uruguayan
security forces now was almost non-existent. When Uruguayan Presi
dent Pacheco Areco announced that he would not negotiate \7ith the
guerrillas for the release of Jackson, the Foreign Office in England
stated that they would negotiate. On January 11, the Foreign Office
in London announced that a special British security agent had been
sent to Montevideo to attempt possible bargaining with the Tupamaros
for the release of Jackson. The agent's mission, unfortunately, was
a failure because the Tupamaros would not negotiate with him. The
police failed to locate Jackson even after the search was extended
into the interior. The Tupamaros, meanwhile, sentenced Jackson to
a stint in their famous "people's prison."
Since August, 1970, the Uruguay security forces had been searching
55
for the kidnapped diplomats without much success . The only h in t of
hope came when leader Raill Sendic was captured in one of the dragnets
ca r r ied out by the p o l i c e . When Sendic and others fa i led to cooper
a te with the po l i ce and divulge the loca t ion of the hos tages , a l l
hopes of t h e i r r e l ea se faded av>?ay. Unof f ic ia l ly , the famil ies and
governments of the kidnapped men were t ry ing to obtain t h e i r r e l ea se
by hook or crook. The families had even met with some of the Tupa
maro capt ives to t ry to convince them to seek the r e l ease of the
diplomats . After many months of begging and pleading, and even
making t e a r f u l appearances on t e l e v i s i o n , the wife of Alyosio Dias
Gomide, the Braz i l i an consul -genera l , obtained a communiqCie from the
Tupamaros s t a t i n g the condit ions under which her husband would be
r e l eased .
The Tupamaros took the view that t h i s could provide them with
a propaganda v ic to ry over the government. The condit ions of Dias
Gomide's r e l ea se were tha t a one mil l ion do l l a r "con t r ibu t ion" be
paid to the g u e r r i l l a s and that the government r e s t o r e ind iv idua l
r i g h t s which were removed in January a f t e r the abduction of Geoffrey
Jackson. The l a t t e r par t of the r e l ease condit ions was the hardest
to ob ta in . The Pres ident re ta ined his pos i t ion of non-negot ia t ion
\^^.th the g u e r r i l l a s . The government's s t a t e of emergency tha t had
been granted in January was nearing the end of i t s l imi t and to
extend the time l i m i t . Congressional approval would have to be obtain
ed. Therefore , in a round-about way, the government could grant the
r e tu rn of ind iv idua l r i g h t s without los ing face with the publ ic by
not press ing Congress for an extension of the s t a t e of emergency.
56
On February 15, 1971, the Tupamaros issued a communique that
announced the impending liberation of Dias Gomide as soon as individ
ual rights were re-established. This condition was met when Congress
failed to renew the ban on individual rights. It looked as though
there might be some difficulty when the one million dollar ransom
could not be obtained; however, the Tupamaros settled for a lesser
sum of $250,000. Therefore, in accordance with the Tupamaro communi
que, Dias Gomide was released from captivity on the 21st of February,
whereupon he was immediately flown out of Uruguay to safety in Brazil,
ending a six and one-half month stay as a Tupamaro prisoner.
The release of Dias Gomide left only Claude Fly, the U. S. agro
nomist, and Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador, as prisoners
in the Tupamaro's "people's prison." The confinement of these two
remained a constant embarrassment to the government of Uruguay. This
factor had an effect whenever Uruguay x ould seek aid from either the
U. S. or Britain since both countries would constantly remind the
Uruguayan's of their plight.
A totally unexpected event occurred in Montevideo on March the
first. An anonymous phone call to one of the city's hospitals indi
cated that Claude Fly was in a vehicle parked on the hospital grounds.
Wl ile the authorities were called, attendants at the hospital rushed
out to find Fly safe, but still suffering from a heart attack. His
abductors, treating him expertly in their medical facilities, kept
excellent records of his progress and then even obtained a second
opinion of their treatment (they kidnapped a heart specialist). At
the hospital, doctors examined the record of treatment and other
57
medica l d a t a supp l i ed by t h e Tupamaros and they came to t h e c o n c l u
s i o n t h a t had t h e g u e r r i l l a s n e g l e c t e d t o perform what t r e a t m e n t they
d i d , t h e h e a r t a t t a c k would have been f a t a l . A s t a t emen t i s sued by
the Tupamaros soon a f t e r s t a t e d t h a t Fly had been r e l e a s e d for humani
t a r i a n r e a s o n s because of h i s h e a l t h . They gave t h e impress ion t h a t
they did not want Fly t o d i e due to c a r e l e s s n e s s on t h e i r p a r t . They
a l s o f e l t t h a t t h i s a c t would h e l p e r a s e the memory of t h e execu t ion
of Dan M i t r i o n e the y e a r b e f o r e . As soon as he rega ined h i s h e a l t h ,
Fly r e t u r n e d to t h e Uni ted S t a t e s .
S ince Dias Gomide and Fly had been r e l e a s e d from Tupamaro con
f inement , only Geoffrey Jackson remained as a p r i s o n e r . Rumors t h a t
Jackson had been k i l l e d or was i n i l l h e a l t h c i r c u l a t e d around Monte
v i d e o . In order to d i s p r o v e the rumor and ma in ta in t h e i r image, t h e
Tupamaros c i r c u l a t e d many cop ies of J a c k s o n ' s pho tograph . In t h e
p i c t u r e , Jackson appeared to be h e a l t h y and was r ead ing a book. The
t i t l e of the book, Ci_e_n Aflgs d_e ^o_led_ad_ (0n_e Hundreid Y_ears_ o_f S o l i -
t u d e ) , by G a b r i e l Garc ia Marquez, could have been used t o i n d i c a t e
the p robab ly l e n g t h of J a c k s o n ' s imprisonment .
In t h e cont inued e f f o r t to embarrass t h e government, t h e Tupa
maros kidnapped t h e c o u n t r y ' s p r o s e c u t o r - g e n e r a l , Dr . Guido Berro
O r i b e . In a t a p e - r e c o r d e d s e s s i o n , Oribe was cross-examined about
why he did not p r o s e c u t e i n d i v i d u a l s , t h o s e i n b u s i n e s s and govern
ment, t h a t were f l a g r a n t l y g u i l t y of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . The exposd
of t hose key government o f f i c i a l s imp l i ca t ed wi th t he i r r e g u l a r i t i e s
of t h e F i n a n c g r i a Monty i n 1969 was used as an example. This and
o t h e r s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n s were asked of Dr. Or ibe . In each case he
58
answered in a manner that revealed the truthful circumstances contra
dicting those of earlier published accounts. The result of the inter-
view with Oribe implied that a cover-up of questionable activities by
people connected directly or indirectly with the government existed
and that nothing was being done to correct the situation except by
the exposure of their activities by the Tupamaros.
The Tupamaros had become a household word with running accounts
of their exploits being published in the newspapers. The government,
realizing that this was free advertisement and consequently detri
mental to government security, forbade the mention of certain words
to describe the Tupamaros. "Cell," "commando," "terrorist," "extrem
ist," "subversive" and "political or ideological delinquent" were
among the words that were banned from print. "Tupamaro" and guer
rilla" were foremost on the list of forbidden nomenclatures. As a result,
the Tupamaros became known as the "nameless ones." VJith that avenue
of political expression closing down, the Tupamaros held impromptu
propaganda sessions. Movie houses, bars, and workers canteens would
be occupied by a commando squad and a short lecture would be given
on the failure of the government to assist the workingman in coping
o
with the i n f l a t i o n a r y economy of the country.
In February of that year , a new p o l i t i c a l en t i t y emerged on the
Uruguayan p o l i t i c a l scene. This new p o l i t i c a l f ac t ion , evolving from
l e f t i s t Chr i s t i an Democrats and d i s s iden t s from the t r a d i t i o n a l
p a r t i e s , became known as the Frente Amplia, or Broad Front . The
p o l i t i c a l leaning of t h i s d iverse group was to the l e f t .
Many Uruguayans, longing for the the good-old-days of economic
59
p r o s p e r i t y , supported the Frente Amg l i a. Many others who joined had
become d i s i l l u s i o n e d with the f a i l u r e of the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s to rejuvenate the decl in ing and decaying economy. Soon a f t e r
the formation of the .Fren_te_ An^lJ^a, a pol l was published i nd i ca t i ng
tha t 28 per cent of the population supported the Frent_e Amgl^ia. By
ear ly Apr i l , a su rp r i s ing ly large percentage was in support of the
Frente Amplia. Actual f igures indicated that the Frente Amplia had
the support of 35 per cent of the voting populat ion, the incumbent
Colorados had 28 per cent , the Blancos had 14 per cent and an undecid
ed number of vo te rs cons t i tu ted the remaining 23 per cent of the
n a t i o n ' s vot ing populat ion. Growing support for the Frente Amgj ia
was i n d i c a t i v e of the f ru s t r a t i on of an overwhelming urban soc ie ty
accustomed to s o c i a l se rv ices tha t the government could no longer
afford to of fe r . The announced candidate for the par ty was r e t i r e d
mi l i t a ry genera l , Lfber Seregni .
Many Uruguayans became concerned about the F_rent_e Amplia's
apparent lead over the t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s . Their concern was not
unwarranted s ince the p a r t y ' s des i re was a "revolut ion by b a l l o t - b o x "
s imi l a r to that of Dr. Salvadore Al lende 's v ic tory in Chile in 1970.
Adding to the uneasy fee l ing surrounding the popular i ty of the Frente
Amplia was the dec la ra t ion by the Tupamaros pledging t h e i r fu l l sup-
9 por t to the pa r ty .
The p o l i t i c a l format of the Frent_e Amg_li_a followed c lose ly t ha t
of the Tupamaros. In the May 1971 issue of Cuba's T r i - c ont in ent a l
a manifest was published covering the "Program of Revolutionary
Government of the MLN," or the dec la ra t ion of Tupamaro p o l i t i c a l
60
philosophy. The manifest outlined the radical changes that would be
enacted once the Tupamaros took over complete control of the govern
ment. Each sector of the Uruguayan economy would be affected in
some manner under the Tupamaro doctrine.
The area of agrarian reform was the foremost issue in the Tupa
maro philosophy. They proposed complete redistribution of land owner
ship. To do this, large plantations, whether productive or not, V7ould
be expropriated and then redistributed among the small farmer popula
tion in order to create many small, producing farms. Other large
land holdings would be turned into collective farms, modeled after
those in the Soviet Union and Cuba.
The planned revolutionary reorganization of the industrial sector
was another large-scale change the Tupamaros intended to implement
upon gaining power. With complete government ownership, Tupamaro
style, the guerrillas planned to stimulate the economy by better
utilization of the country's resources.
The Tupamaros were anxious to obtain these revolutionary changes
in the economic and political sectors either through the ballot-box
with the Frente Amplia or through "armed-struggle" in the traditional
revolutionary method. In September, 1971, General Liber Seregni,
candidate for the Frente Amplia, released information concerning his
party's political platform for the upcoming election and it closely
paralleled the political philosophy of the Tupamaros,
In reaction to all the rumors circulating of a possible victory
in the elections by the Tupamaro-supported Frent_e Amg_l_i_a, another
rumor circulated of a possible invasion of Uruguay by Brazil if the
61
-?.I!£1E£ .^^lil won the election. The military government of Brazil
considered any type of leftist government in Uruguay as unacceptable.
In case of a take-over by the left-wing F_ren_t_e Ampl_ia, Brazilian
military leaders planned an invasion of Uruguay and even estimated
the length of time it would take to completely subdue the country
under its control. This tactical plot of the Brazilians became
knovm as Operation 30 hours, because that was the amount of time it
was calculated to completely take control of the country. Although
strategically planned, there was never any attempt to implement the
12 mvas ion.
In support of the electoral process, the Tupamaros reduced
their activities to a minimum. To substantiate their peace proposal
in declaring a moratorium on their activities, the Tupamaros re
leased Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador who had been
held prisoner since January, in late September, 1971. The police,
on the other hand, had not ceased their active search for guerrilla
hide-outs, kidnap victims or weapon caches. These extensive efforts
of counter-guerrilla activities were not without their rewards. Many
Tupamaro soliders were taken prisoner. In August, 1970, Radl Sendic
and several other high ranking guerrillas were taken prisoner. By
September, 1971, the police had over one hundred Tupamaros encar-
cerated in the Punta Carretas prison in Montevideo. Prison officials
allowed Tupamaro prisoners to congregate together in adjoining cell
blocks. Many were allowed to wander at will throughout the cell
blocks without much supervision. Security at the prison was lax and
it was no surprise to many that during one evening one hundred eleven
62
prisoners, mostly Tupamaros, escaped from the prison.
For many months preceding the actual escape, the plans had been
made and were being carried out. The imprisoned Tupamaros began
digging a tunnel out from the prison. They dug dov/n several feet
and then headed out under the prison walls into the neighborhood
adjoining the prison complex. When the date for the escape arrived,
a commando squad barged into a house located approximately 120 feet
from the prison walls. As members of the household watched, members
of the commando squad began breaking up the floor of the house.
Shortly thereafter, people began emerging from the hole in the floor.
As each escaping prisoner emerged from the hole, he or she was given
a set of new clothes, identification papers and escorted to an await
ing vehicle. After several hours, the flow of prisoners ceased and
the guerrillas faded out into the darkness of Montevideo. All of
the top Tupamaro leaders escaped through the tunnel. It was not
until early morning that prison officials discovered they v;ere minus
13 all of their Tupamaro prisoners.
In the following investigation of the escape, the prison warden
was forced to resign due to neglect of duty in allowing prisoners to
mix freely among themselves and with outsiders. This massive escape
humiliated the government to such a degree that President Pacheco
handed the responsibility of counter-guerrilla warfare over to the
array in desperate hope that they could be more successful against
the Tupamaros. This move demonstrated Pacheco's distrust of the
14 police, who had been infiltrated by the Tupamaros.
The Uruguayan national elections were to be held in late
63
November, 1971. As t h i s t ime approached, each of t he major p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s campaigned o p t i m i s t i c a l l y . The l a t e s t p o l l i n d i c a t e d t h a t
each of t he t h r e e major p a r t i e s had an even s h a r e of t h e popu la r v o t e .
The Blanco p a r t y hos ted F e r r e i r a Aldenate as t h e i r c a n d i d a t e , t he
Colorados ran Juan Maria Bordaberry and General L iber S e r i g n i was
t h e c a n d i d a t e of t he F r e n t e Amplia. Each c a n d i d a t e promised economic
reform and governmental re forms .
The r e s u l t s were c o n t r a r y to many popula r p r e d i c t i o n s . The
F r e n t e Amplia, which had been expected t o make a s i z e a b l e showing,
p laced a very poor t h i r d . The Colorado c a n d i d a t e , Juan Maria Borda
b e r r y , won the ma jo r i ty of the vo te s and t h e Colorado p a r t y was a b l e
to m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of t he government. The e l e c t i o n of Bordaberry
could be cons t rued by some to be a v o t e of conf idence i n t h e a b i l i t y
of t h e Colorados to d i r e c t the d e s t i n y of Uruguay, A t r a g i c r e s u l t
of t h e Colorado v i c t o r y was the d e c l a r a t i o n of an a l l - o u t war by t h e
Tupamaros. The Tupamaros had promised a one yea r c e a s e - f i r e i f t h e
F r e n t e Amplia had gained power, a s ix-month c e a s e - f i r e for a Blanco
v i c t o r y and immediate r e t u r n t o a c t i o n i f t h e Colorados were r e -
i n s t a t e d i n o f f i c e .
The r e t u r n t o an a l l - o u t war led t h e Tupamaros t o t h e i r d e f e a t .
While they had conducted a moratorium on p a r a m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y , t h e
army had only begun p r e p a r a t i o n for an e x t e n s i v e campaign a g a i n s t
t h e Tupamaros. The campaign a g a i n s t t he g u e r r i l l a s not only b rough t
about t h e i r downfal l bu t a l s o brought major changes t o t h e Uruguayan
p o l i t i c a l s c e n e .
CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES
"Machineguns in the Lettuce," Time, January 18, 1971, p. 31; "A Pawn in the Game," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 19.
2 Ernesto Mayans, Los Tupamaros; Antologia Documental (Cuerna
vaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1971), p. 3/61; "Uruguay: Pacheco's Problem," Latin America, January 15, 1971, p. 18; "What are they After," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 37.
3 "What are they After," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 37.
4 Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 3/61-3/62; "What are they After,"
Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 37.
Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/63; "Uruguay: The Price of Freedom," Latin America, February 26, 1971, p. 66; "Your Money or Your Life," Economist, March 6, 1971, p. 48.
"Your Money or Your Life," Economist, March 6, 1971, p. 48; Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 3/63-3/64.
"Uruguay: Almost a Shadow Government," Latin America, March 19, 1971, p. 94.
o
Arturo Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 59; "A Pawn in the Game," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 19.
Q
"News in Brief: Uruguay," Latin America, April 4, 1971, p. 112; "Watch the Broad Front," Economist, November 27, 1971, p. 16; Allende's Unida Popular, Popular Unity, won the 1970 National Elections in Chile.
Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 6/7.
"Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 6/7-6/9; "Uruguay: Frente Amplia Set Out Priorities," Latin America, September 3, 1971, p. 286.
12 "Operation 30 Hours—Brazil Threatens Uruguay," Atlas, October,
1971, p. 34. 13 "Uruguay: That Damned Elusive Pimpernel," Latin America,
September 10, 1971, p. 290; "Great Escape: Tupamaro Jailbreak," Newsweek, September 20, 1971, p. 45; "Uruguay: War as Before," Latin America, January 21, 1972, p. 17.
64
65
"We Don't Need a Ransom," Economist, September 18, 1971, p. 42.
"Pon. Th^'f M'^^ ^^°^^ ^^°^'^'" Economist, November 27, 1971, p. 16; Poor Ihird," Economist, DecembI7 4, 1971, p. 51.
CHAPTER V
DEFEAT
The 1971 election results were surprising to the population of
Uruguay and the world. The predicted victory of the Frente Amplia
never materialized. The re-election of the incumbent Colorado party
was somewhat of a surprise to all. The Colorado victory was con
sidered to be a vote of confidence in the party to continue to run
the political scene. It was an antagonizing affront to the Tupa
maros who had hoped to have the Colorados defeated by either the
Blanco or Frente Amplia parties.
In anticipation of a continued assault on the government by the
Tupamaros following the national election, President Pacheco Areco,
on September 9, 1971, assigned the military the task of combating
the guerrillas. This action gave the military full control over the
counter-subversion arrangements. This action had been prompted by
the failure of the police and the Metropolitan Guard to accomplish
success in battling the guerrillas. The government looked to the
military in the desperate hope that they could save Uruguayan democ-
racy from dissolution by the Tupamaros.
Since the previous election, in November 1966, not only had the
government changed but so had the Tupamaros. In the case of the
latter, what had been a majority of working and professional types
now had become a mixture of students and. professional-worker types.
66
67
The Tupamaros had evolved over t he yea r s from a predominant ly worke r -
o r i e n t e d group t o a s t u d e n t - o r i e n t e d group.
Although v i r t u a l l y unknown o u t s i d e of t he Montevideo a r e a , t h e
Tupamaros i n i t i a t e d Plan Ta tu . The s t r a t e g y behind t h i s p lan was t o
i n c r e a s e t h e i r sphe re of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s i n t o the c o u n t r y s i d e .
I t was through t h i s i l l - f a t e d plan t h a t t he Tupamaros hoped t o e s t a b
l i s h a r u r a l - b a s e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e . To supplement t h i s p l a n , t h e
g u e r r i l l a s would d ig t a t u c e r a s , cavernous ho l e s in t h e ground, i n
which t o cache arms and to concea l themselves from p a t r o l l i n g m i l i
t a r y u n i t s . P lan Tatu f a i l e d to ach ieve success because of t h e i n
a b i l i t y of t h e Tupamaros to gain t he conf idence of t h e ma jo r i t y of
t h e count ry fo lk and because t h e c o u n t r y ' s t o p o g r a p h i c a l t e r r a i n i s
2 not s u i t a b l e for a r u r a l - b a s e d g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n .
The Tupamaros mixed t h e i r d i s a s t e r o u s p l an Tatu and t h e i r d e d i
c a t i o n t o an a l l - o u t war a g a i n s t t h e government i n t o a g ian t o f f en
s i v e a g a i n s t t h e c o u n t r y ' s combined m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . This mass ive
a t t a c k ended in a t o t a l de f ea t of t he Tupamaro o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Af t e r a c q u i r i n g t o t a l c o n t r o l of c o u n t e r - g u e r r i l l a command, t h e
m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s began p r e p a r i n g for t he Tupamaros t o r e t u r n to
a c t i v e g u e r r i l l a r a i d s . The Tupamaros had dec l a r ed a moratorium on
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n suppor t of peace fu l e l e c t i o n s . The w e l l - p r e p a r e d
armed forced met each Tupamaro commando o p e r a t i o n wi th w e l l - o r g a n i z e d
c o u n t e r - g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s , thus fo rc ing t h e g u e r r i l l a s i n t o open gun
b a t t l e s . Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e Tupamaros su f f e r ed many l o s s e s
i n l i f e and g u e r r i l l a s c a p t u r e d . Af te r a few s h o r t months i t became
appa ren t t h a t t h e Tupamaros had " r e v e r t e d to s e l e c t i v e a c t s of
68 3
terrorism,"
In April, 1972, the Tupamaros sentenced four members of the
armed forces to death. Within hours of this proclamation, all four
were gunned down as they left their respective homes. The following
day, President Bordaberry declared that a "state of internal war
existed" and that he was suspending all constitutional rights. This
power, granted by Bordaberry's issuing a declaration of a "state of
emergency" guaranteed the president supreme powers and gave the
military the right to arrest and confine suspects under military law,
make searches without warrants, and censor press and radio. In
reality, it established martial law in the country. Within four days
a series of gun battles between guerrillas and police left 19 people
dead. The majority of those dead were Tupamaros, indicating that
4 the military had gained an upper hand in the fighting.
A major setback came for the Tupamaros when Hector Amodio Perez
defected from the guerrillas and agreed to give military officials
any information they desired. This action would not have gained much
attention if Amodio Perez were only a commando or cell leader instead
of an integral part of the Tupamaro High Command. With information
provided by Amodio Perez, the military were able to make raids on
guerrilla hide-outs with devastating accuracy. Amodio Perez's
defection was rumored to be the result of his disillusionment with
the status of the Tuupamaro organization and the belief that the
military and not the Tupamaros could rid the country of the rampant
corruption in government circles.
With information supplied to officials by Amodio Perez, military
69
and police units led raids on over th i r ty Tupamaros hideouts. On
one such raid in the res ident ia l suburb of Malvin, a gun b a t t l e
between Tupamaros and mili tary units resulted in the death of six
guer r i l las and three top ranking guerr i l las were taken prisoner.
I t was rumored that Ratll Sendic was among the group arrested but
l a t e r i t was proved false . Other raids disclosed the location of
medical un i t s , arms caches and the infamous "people's pr ison."
Released from confinement were Carlos Frick Davie, former Minister
of Agriculture and Ulises Pereira Revebel, former director of the
UTE. Both had been prisoners for over a year.
In the i r attack against the government, the Tupamaros faced
many d i f f i c u l t i e s . In documents captured from the Leandro Gomez
column, this speculation was confirmed. In the documents were out
lined the tv7o greatest d i f f i cu l t i e s of the guer r i l l a s , the f i r s t
being the plan of attack to force the capitulat ion of the government
and secondly, how to regain the support of the public.
The counter-attack by the mili tary against the Tupamaros follow
ing the April assassination of the four mili tary leaders took the
guer r i l l as by surpr ise . The guerr i l las had become over-confident
in the i r ab i l i t y to avoid fatal shoot-outs with police and mili tary
units to the point of feeling themselves invincible . The increased
ba t t l e s and raids by police and military patrols not only put the
guerr i l las on the defensive but shook their a t t i tude of being in
v inc ib le . Captured documents began to reveal the demoralizing
effect of the guer r i l l a set-backs in open combat. Tupamaro actions
began to be carried out in column strength versus commando strength
70
to insu re success or to have add i t iona l fire-power in case of a gun-
b a t t l e with m i l i t a r y p a t r o l s .
By Ju ly , the increased m i l i t a r y c o u n t e r - g u e r r i l l a ac t ions had
taken t h e i r t o l l of c a s u a l t i e s . Over t h i r t y persons had been k i l l e d ,
mainly Tupamaros, wi thin the previous few months. Since the P r e s i
d e n t ' s dec l a r a t i on of emergency, over 1600 persons had been a r r e s t e d .
Anyone tha t was suspected of having any connections or sympathies
with the Tupamaros was a r r e s t e d . Mi l i t a ry sources indicated tha t
they were confident tha t success over the Tupamaros was imminent
but maintained tha t they were s t i l l a dangerous force to contend
wi th .
The f i n a l and f a t a l blow to the Tupamaros occurred on September
1, 1972. Pol ice were making a raid on a suspected Tupamaros house
in Bancario, a suburb of Montevideo, when a gun b a t t l e erupted
between the occupants and po l i ce . When the shooting ceased, po l i ce
entered and a r res ted a l l present . The pol ice were qui te surpr ised
when they r ea l i zed tha t they had stumbled upon a meeting of the
Tupamaro High Command. Most of the top leaders were taken p r i s o n e r .
Ratil Sendic, leader of the g u e r r i l l a s , was one of those de ta ined .
He was wounded during the b r i e f shoot -out . I t was reported t ha t a
b u l l e t had passed through both of Sendic ' s cheeks and possibly had
severed h i s tongue. Author i t i es reported tha t the High Command was
t ry ing to f igure out what to do to turn the t i d e of losses they were
having in b a t t l e s with mi l i t a ry u n i t s .
The Tupamaros had been able to function without Sendic ' s l e a d e r
sh ip when he was held pr isoner in 1970-1971, but with the organiza t ion
71
disoriented by arrests and losses in shoot-outs, the remaining mem
bership would not be able to carry on as before. Military officials
were noted as saying that the battle against the Tupamaros had been
won with the capture of Sendic and the majority of the Tupamaro High
Command.
With the High Command locked up in military prison and hundreds
of other Tupamaros in either military or civil prisons, depending
on their importance as guerrillas, the Tupamaros ceased to function
as a guerrilla operation.
"Energetic and professional interrogation of Tupamaro prisoners
9 started to pay dividends." Prisoners began to talk, not to the civil
police authorities, but to the military. Not only did they give
information on the guerrillas but also information about the corrupt-
tion within the Uruguayan government. The military acted upon this
information and found out many things that had been withheld from
them. As a result of the "internal war against the Tupamaros, the
military leaders have become painfully aware of the defects of
Uruguayan society which the Tupamaros had exploited."
The Tupamaros were defeated as a military threat to the govern
ment of Uruguay, culminating with the capture and detention of Ratll
Sendic. News from Uruguay neglected the mention of any commando
raids by Tupamaros. In January, 1973, it was recorded in the New
York Times that "over 2,500 alleged Tupamaros were in prison, 700
had fled the country and the remaining 200 or so guerrillas were in
hiding, capable of only minor terroristic acts."
The Tupamaros were defeated militarily, but the conditions they
72
wanted to change are in the process of being changed. The Tupa
maros, through guerrilla commando raids, brought to light the extent
of corruption and manipulation of power that existed in Uruguayan
society. That corruption and misuse of power had taken roots in the
1950's and was seriously undermining the nation by the 1960's. A
coimtry with grandiose ideas of social reform and social services
became bogged down in an enlarged bureaucracy that had been created
only to handle its own overflow of bureaucratic paperwork. To ease
the burden, a style of corruption developed to handle the paperwork
which grew into a multi-headed monster of shady dealings. It was
this style of government the Tupamaros wanted to eliminate. The
only solution that appeared feasible to them was to completely dis
solve the existing government and then to start over with a new
system.
The m i l i t a r y holds the re ins of power in Uruguay today. No one
knows the fa te of Ratil Sendic and the other Tupamaros. The m i l i t a r y
has sought to make reforms in the system to make the country more
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Many of these reforms are those the Tupamaros
fought so despera te ly to ob ta in . The Tupamaros may have l o s t the
b a t t l e but they won the war by br inging to l i gh t the defects in the
system tha t the present government i s t ry ing to e r ad i ca t e .
CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES
Colonel Sergio L. d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review. April, 1973, p. 30.
2 Maria Ester Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, Translated by Anne
Edmonson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), pp. 76-77; d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, April, 1973, p. 34.
3 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review,
April, 1973, p. 30.
4 Arthur C. Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla
(New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 60-62; New York Times, June 15, 1972; "We are at War," Newsweek, April 24, 1972, p. 47.
"Uruguay: Under Torture," Latin America, September 1, 1972, p. 279; "Uruguay: Country at War," Latin America, April 21, 1972, p. 121; "Uruguay: Tupamaro Setback," Latin America, June 2, 1972, pp. 174-175.
"Uruguay: War as Before," Latin America, January 21, 1972, p. 18,
"Uruguay: Confrontation," Latin America, July 7, 1972, p. 213; "Uruguay: War as Before," Latin America, January 21, 1972, p. 18.
Q
"Uruguay: Raul Sendic," Latin America, September 8, 1972, p. 281; New York Times, September 2, 1972; Times of the Americas, September 6, 1972; "Uruguay: Military Advance," Latin America, September 22, 1972, p. 301.
9 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review,
April, 1973, p. 32.
New York Times, February 16, 1973.
• • New York Times, January 28, 1973.
73
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