THE TUPAMAROS: URUGUAY'S URBAN GUERRILLAS

by

THOMAS 0. MOORE, B.A.

A THESIS

IN

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Appi}t)ved }

Accepted

May, 1978

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. URUGUAY: UTOPIA FACES THE ONSLAUGHT OF REALITY 1

Chapter I Footnotes 18

II. THE TUPAMAROS: ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS 20

Chapter II Footnotes 33

III. 1970: PRELUDE TO DISASTER 35

Chapter III Footnotes 50

IV. THE FINAL YEARS 52

Chapter IV Footnotes 64

V. DEFEAT 66

Chapter V Footnotes 73

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 7A

CHAPTER I

URUGUAY: UTOPIA FACES THE ONSLAUGHT OF REALITY

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, Uruguay was rocked by

a state of internal war created by a group of urban guerrillas known

as the Tupamaros. To understand the appearance of the Tupamaros,

one must look into the history of Uruguay and become familiar with

the traits and traditions that characterized that country's politics

from independence until the present.

The country of Uruguay is located on the eastern coast of South

America. Its official name is La, Repdblica Oriental d_e_l Uru guay.

It took this name because of its location on the eastern bank of the

Uruguay River. This little country of 72,172 square miles, or

slightly larger than the state of Washington in the United States,

is wedged between the two giant countries of Argentina, on the south

and west, and Brazil, on the north. The Atlantic Ocean is the east­

ern boundary. The Uruguayan countryside, an extension of the Argen­

tine pampa, consists of grassy plains and gently rolling hills. The

population of Uruguay is roughly 3 million. Of that figure, eighty

per cent live in the capital city of Montevideo.

The Uruguayan population is primarily of European extraction.

The Indian element was eradicated very early in the colonial period.

Immigration from Europe was encouraged after independence. The

prospect of establishing a highly productive pastoral economy was

2 2

propagandized and many landless immigrants came from the countries

of Europe. The large majority came from the countries of Italy and

Spain because of the similarity of the language; however, there was

a sampling from other regions of Europe.

Uruguay gained its independence in 1828. Due in large part to

the intervention of the British, it was established as a buffer

state between Argentina and Brazil. This action on the part of

Britain settled the Cisplatine War (1826-1828) and the boundary dis­

pute between Argentina and Brazil. Regardless of its theoretical

independence, Uruguay could not escape interference in its internal

affairs by the Argentines and Brazilians. The ease with which the

neighboring powers could intervene in Uruguay was aided by the

instability and rivalry of the newly formed political parties.

The rivalry between the two political parties, the Blancos

(conservatives) and Colorados (liberals), dates back to the mid-

1830 's following the formation of the Uruguayan government. The

division into political camps was the result of quarrels between

the country's creators. The division became permanent in 1836 when

large scale fighting broke out between the elected president. Gener­

al Manuel Oribe, and his predecessor, General Fructuoso Rivera.

Oribe gathered around him people who were identified as Blancos

because of the identifying white ribbon they wore. Rivera, on the

other hand, was supported by the Colorados who wore a red ribbon.

After two years of fighting, Rivera marched into Montevideo as the

victor and proclaimed himself as president of the republic. The

3 3

defeated Oribe escaped to Buenos Aires and began plotting against

Rivera.

The Argentines constantly tried to exert their influence over

the Uruguayans but without much success. Then with the help of

the Blanco political faction in Uruguay led by General Manuel Oribe,

the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, made preparations to

attack Uruguay. In 1843, Rosas laid seige to Montevideo and for

the next eight and a half years tried to topple the government of

Fructuoso Rivera. Argentine forces sought to cut off Montevideo

from the rest of the world by blockading the port and by constant

land attacks around the perimeter of the city. The downfall of

Rosas in 1852 brought an end to the fighting between Argentina and

Uruguay. The country was then allowed to remain in virtual peace

for the next few years.

Between 1851 and 1864, the Colorado General Venancio Flores

twice sought assistance from the Brazilians to help him in his

struggle against the Blanco leader, Antanasio Aguirre. Because

Argentina was not in liberal (unitarian) hands, Aguirre broke the

usual pattern by turning to Paraguay for assistance. As a result,

Flores aligned Uruguay with Argentina and Brazil against Paraguay

in what was called the Paraguayan War. The war lasted from 1865 to

1870.

After the war, a type of political progress became discerni­

ble in Uruguay. In 1872 the conservative or Blanco party realized

that the liberal or Colorado party could control the government

indefinitely. To compensate for this situation, the Blancos

demanded control over the internal affairs of four departments or

states in exchange for political peace. Later, in 1897, as the

final terms of the peace accord to end a civil war, the Blancos

were given control over an additional two departments, bringing the

2 total to six that were under their domination.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Uruguay was far

behind its neighboring countires in economic and social progress.

The previous years of political instability had retarded any growth

in the development of natural resources and the investment of

foreign capital in the country. Between 1830 and 1903 there had

been at least forty armed revolts. Of the twenty-five governments

that existed during that period, "nine were forced out of power,

two were liquidated by assassination and one by grave injury, ten

rsisted one or more revolutions, and only three were free from

3 serious disturbances during their periods in office." The country

was not in a state of good health economically and socially by

1900.^

Although similar to Argentina in economic resources, Uruguay

lagged behind its larger neighbor. The principal source of income

in Uruguay was from the export of beef. Unfortunately, the majority

of the land was dominated by large but inefficiently operated

ranches or estancias and they did not produce an abundant surplus

for the commercial market. Uruguay got its first frigorifico

(packing house) in 1904, some twenty-one years after Argentina.

In 1900, almost half of the Uruguayans were s t i l l i l l i t e r a t e .

There had been some progress made s ince the 1870's when the country

s t a r t e d a na t iona l school system. The count ry ' s only u n i v e r s i t y ,

the Univers i ty of Montevideo, had been founded in 1849 to serve the

need for higher education. These educational advantages were

reserved mainly for the inhabi tan ts of the c a p i t a l c i ty of Monte-

Video.

Out of the chaos and confusion of the nineteenth century, t he re

appeard the des i r e by the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s to improve the country.

Especia l ly committed to the idea of renovating and reforming the

country was Jos 6 Bat l i e y Ordc5flez. B a t l l e , a prominent newspaper

ed i to r and p o l i t i c i a n , rose to become the leader of the Colorado

pa r ty . B a t l l e ' s program had a tremendous effect on the country, not

only through h i s e f fo r t s as a newspaperman but e spec ia l ly as twice

e lec ted president during the f i r s t quar ter of the twent ie th century .

I t was through the e f fo r t s of Ba t l l e tha t Uruguay's p o l i t i c a l

system, based on the ideas of the c o l l e g i a t e executive and the co-

p a r t i c i p a t i o n p r i n c i p l e was e s t ab l i shed . This system, modeled a f t e r

the Bundesrat of Switzerland, cal led for a National Council t o

govern in the place of a p re s iden t . This council would be made up

of nine members, s ix from the majority par ty and th ree from the

minority pa r ty . Each member was elected to a s ix year term. One-

t h i r d of the council was to be r e -e l ec t ed every two y e a r s . B a t l l e ' s

o r i g i n a l plan cal led for d i s so lv ing the of f ice of the pres ident but

in order to get Congressional approval of the new system, B a t l l e

6 6

had to compromise and allow the pos i t ion of the presidency to remain

The off ice of pres ident was mainly a figure-head type of pos i t i on

because i t was ro ta ted among members of the Council on an annual

b a s i s . The co -pa r t i c ipa t i on p r i n c i p l e was B a t l l e ' s idea on how the

leading minority par ty in the e l e c t i o n s , usual ly the Blancos, could

p a r t i c i p a t e in government even though they fa i led to win the e l e c ­

t i o n s . The p r i n c i p l e allowed the majority party two- th i rds of the

sea t s in Congress and in provinc ia l off ices and the minority par ty

received the remaining one-third of the o f f i c e s . I t was under t h i s

system that both Colorados and Blancos would have a voice in govern­

mental decis ions a t both na t iona l and provinc ia l l e v e l s . Also, the

previous arrangement where the Blancos control led four i n t e r i o r

departments was terminated.

The establishment of the National Council was not the only

change in Uruguay during the Ba t l l e e ra . Credited to B a t l l e ' s fame

were h is recommendations tha t the s t a t e e s t a b l i s h a monopoly over

insurance , e l e c t r i c l i g h t and power, and l a t e r the telephone com­

pany. Not only did he recommend these reforms but he demanded the

eight hour working day, a compulsory day's r e s t for every five

working days, r egu la t ions to control working cond i t ions , educat ion­

a l reforms, and the reorganizat ion of the s t a t e bank. Continuing

with h is s o c i a l i s t i c th ink ing , Ba t l l e proposed such r ad i ca l l e g i s ­

l a t i o n as allowing divorce at the w i l l of the wife and abolishment

of c a p i t a l punishment and b u l l f i g h t i n g . He championed the cause of

the workingman when he recommended old age pens ions , workmen's

compensation and indemnification for discharged employees. Included

in his proposals was legislation to protect illegitimate children.

He invited the wrath of the military when he initiated a reduction

in the size of the army and its influence in government. The con­

servatives were outraged at these radical innovations of Batlle's;

some politicians thought he was insane. Even with staunch opposi­

tion to his reformistic inclinations, Batlle continued to push for

their acceptance.

The constitution of 1917 incorporated these reforms of Batlle's

into practice. There was no sudden or instantaneous transformation

except in the case of the President and the National Council.

Change came as a slow progression through the years from 1919 to

1933. This constitution marked the transition of Uruguay into a

v/elfare state, thrusting it well ahead of the rest of Latin America

in social progress and reform. These social reforms have continued

to be expanded, improved and modified since their conception. How­

ever, their counterpart, the political reforms, have been abolished

and re-instated numerous times since Batlle's death in 1929.

Batlle's reforms have had a dual effect upon the country, both

good and bad. The good aspect of the reforms was that Uruguay was

brought from a semi-backv/ard nation to a modern, progressive country.

Uruguay now had one of the most advanced welfare systems in the

world - one that enabled her citizens to enjoy many democratic lux­

uries that neighbors in Argentina could but dream of. The system

of government was considered one of the most democratic in the world.

8

No matter how democratic the government appeared to be , the re

were some ser ious drawbacks and flaws. The main problem, which

plagued the government for yea r s , was tha t executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

was divided between a Pres ident and a National Council . This d i v i ­

sion of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y created no se r ious problem as long as things

ran smoothly and a l l the council members were in agreement. This

was apparent during the prosperous 1920 's . Pres idents and councils

could toss problems back and forth with no damaging effect because

of the evidence of economic affluence during tha t per iod. I t was

during the depression yea r s , 1929 to 1933, that the colegiado, as

the National Council was ca l l ed , demonstrated i t s incapaci ty for

coping with the r i s i n g i n f l a t i o n and unemployment. The f a i l u r e of

the colegiado to cor rec t Uruguay's troubled economic s t r u c t u r e lay

with the co leg iado ' s i n a b i l i t y to reach any p o s i t i v e or imaginative

so lu t ion amongst the members. The coup d ' e t a t of 1933 was a d i r e c t

r e s u l t of the indecis ion among the members of the council as to the

proper approach for curing the count ry ' s economic problems.

The world-wide depression in the ear ly 1930 's , t he re fo re , was

f e l t qu i t e severely in Uruguay. The demand for Uruguay's p a s t o r a l

exports was d r a s t i c a l l y decreased, leaving Uruguay with her main

source of income grea t ly reduced. As unemployment soared, the

na t ion became aware of the weakness of the coLjeg iadci . The ^9.l£giado

fa i led to motivate or s t imula te the economy when the council members

f a l t e red in reaching any concrete so lu t ion to the coun t ry ' s economic

i l l s . Finding a l l avenues of economic r e l i e f thwarted by the clumsy

colegiado system. President Gabriel Terra initiated a coup d' etat

against his own government. He dissolved the colegiado and Congress,

censored newspapers and established a one-man rule with himself as

president. Terra's abolishment of the colegiado was written into

the new constitution in 1934. Resembling the previous constitution,

the new one restored the one-man presidency and created a thirty

member Senate that would be permanently divided in half with fifteen

members from the Colorado party and fifteen from the Blanco party.

This constitution remained in effect until 1942, when it was changed

slightly but the one-man presidency remained until 1952.

Uruguay enjoyed a renewed economic boom as a result of World

War II. High prices were paid for wool and beef. When Uruguay

sided with the Allies, the demand for her export products increased.

This economic surge did not last for long. After the war, the demand

for Uruguayan wool decreased steadily with the appearance of the

new synthetic fibers. Since wool was a major export item, its drop

in consumer demand dragged the entire Uruguayan national economy

down. In 1950, the Uruguayan peso was valued at 50 American cents.

By 1958, its value had decreased to 7 cents. The Uruguayan economic

crisis only deepened and relief was not in sight.

The impact of the breakdown of the economy was felt in various

ways. The elaborate welfare system was severely crippled. The pay­

ments of pensions and other generous benefits were not re-adjusted in

accordance with the devaluation of the peso. For example, if a

person retired at age 60 in 1950 and drew a 400 peso a month pension.

10

i t would be worth 200 American d o l l a r s . That same pension in 1958

would be worth only 56 American d o l l a r s , a considerable decrease in

value and in purchasing power. The state-owned en t e rp r i s e s were

another sec to r to be h i t by the economic col lapse and currency de­

va lua t ion . The success of these corporat ions was dependent upon a

steady and s t a b l e income. The col lapse or c r ipp l ing of these com­

panies as a r e s u l t of the devaluat ion was i n e v i t a b l e . The American-

owned f r igor f f i cos (packing houses) of Swift and Armour closed down

in November of 1957 a f te r losing money for severa l y e a r s . Some

12,000 men were thrown out of work when they closed down. In an

attempt to save the jobs of these men, the government formed the

f r i go r i f i cos i n t o a co-opera t ive , but i t too continued to lose money.

Even the state-owned na t iona l f r i g o r l f i c o los t money. To compensate

for t h e i r l o s s e s , the company did not even pay the stockmen for the

c a t t l e they de l ive red . The col lapse of the meat-packing industry

caused many ranchers to smuggle t h e i r c a t t l e across the border i n t o

Braz i l where they could receive higher p r i ces for t h e i r c a t t l e . The

smuggling resu l ted in a shortage of beef in Uruguay and contr ibuted

Q

to the co l lapse of the meat-packing indus t ry .

To complicate the s i t u a t i o n in Uruguay, Pres ident Andres

Martfnez Trueba, a Colorado of the Ba t l l e f ac t ion , i n i t i a t e d a cam­

paign to revive the old < 2ie_g_i_ado_ system. On December 16, 1952, a

p l e b e s c i t e was held to decide the i ssue of continued ru le by a

p res iden t or r e tu rn to ru l e by a p lu ra l presidency, the colegiado.

The publ ic appeared apa the t i c to the i s sue s ince l e s s than ha l f of

11

the 1.1 million registered voters went to the polls. When the bal­

lots were counted, they showed that the colegiado was approved by a

narrow margin of 34,392 votes.

The approval of the < o_legiad_o meant that a new constitution was

needed. The constitution of 1952 incorporated only a few new fea­

tures not found in the previous constitutions of 1919, 1934 and 1942.

The principal change was that the presidency was substituted with

the colegiado. The National Council of 1952 served as the governing

body for the remaining three year's of Trueba's term. The chairman­

ship of the colegiado was rotated annually among the majority party

members.

As before, the same problems cropped up to underscore the

inefficiency of the colegiado. -Then labor violence erupted in 1952

and 1958, the council was able to effect swift action to disperse

the ones responsible. In those two examples, decisive action was

forced upon the colegiado by circumstances. When challenged by a

more perplexing problem, the sad shape of the national economy, the

colegiado failed to promote measures to counteract the situation.

At the time when the country needed to cut back on spending, govern­

ment-owned and controlled companies were adding numerous unnecessary

employees. In 1958 when the fruit and vegetable retailers and whole­

salers boycotted the markets in Montevideo in order to get the

colegiado to change the policies of the Subsidies and Price Control

Council, the colegiado failed to reach an agreement among the members

on how to intervene in the dispute. The private retailers and

12

wholesalers boycotted the markets because the high prices they had

to pay for fruits and vegetables were forcing them out of business.

The Subsidies Council, meanwhile, was subsidizing the food produced

by the co-operatives and this action forced the competing retailers

to keep prices dov/n. As a result of having to pay the high prices

for foods and then forced to sell at a low price, the retailers

could not afford to stay in business. After a week of no fruit or

vegetables, the Subsidies Council itself decided to change its poli­

cies. The public lost much faith in the colegiado after this inci­

dent, especially since it was the public that had sought the aid of

the colegiado and they, in turn, failed even to make a statement

9 concerning the problem.

The elections of 1958 brought the Blancos into power for the

first time in nearly a century. As the ruling party, the Blancos

soon came to the realization that it was far easier to shout dis­

approval of national policies from the sidelines than to alleviate

the problems that plagued the country. The Blancos continued to

liberalize the welfare system that the country could ill afford.

Government spending was far beyond the income of the country. The

promise made by the Blancos to clean up the corruption and graft

proved to be empty. The Blancos pledged to restore the value of

the peso but by the end of their two terms in office in 1966, the

peso was exchanged at a rate of 88 pesos to the dollar - a drastic

change from 15 pesos to the dollar in 1957. These were relatively

minor problems faced by the Blancos during their tenure as the

13

majority par ty in Uruguay.

To add to the headaches of the fact ion-r idden colegiado, labor

began to s t r i k e for higher wages and b e t t e r working cond i t ions . The

problem of s t r i k e s in Uruguay presented an a l toge the r d i f f e ren t

s i t u a t i o n . The s t r i k e s paralyzed one or more sec tors of the economy,

A s t r i k e agains t a f r i go r l f i co would cause a work stoppage in a l l

the n a t i o n ' s or c i t y ' s f r i g o r i f i c o s , depending upon the s ca l e of the

s t r i k e , because a l l the companies were e i the r owned or cont ro l led by

the na t iona l government. Therefore, a s t r i k e would not be against

a s i n g l e privately-owned company but ra ther against the government.

I t was the government that paid the workers ' s a l a r i e s and wage

increases would have to come from government revenues.

Labor d isputes became the focus of a t t en t i on in the early

1960 's . S t r i ke s occurred with oppressive monotony. In the case of

the municipal workers of Montevideo who went out on s t r i k e in 1963,

the c i t y of Montevideo came to a v i r t u a l s t a n d s t i l l without t h e i r

s e r v i c e s . The demands of the workers were oftentimes outrageous.

On one occasion workers demanded a 72 per cent pay i nc r ea se . An­

other t ime, the pay increase demanded by workers amounted to a

walloping 94 per cen t . When the workers of the Usinas E lgc t r i ca s y

Telgfonos del Estado (UTE), the state-owned e l e c t r i c and telephone

company, went on s t r i k e , the army was ca l led in to take t h e i r p l a c e s .

I t i s t r a g i c , but amusing, to note tha t 1,000 s o l d i e r s were q u i t e

ab le to do the job tha t had been performed by the 12,000 r egu la r ly

employed workers . This was a c l a s s i c example of the " fea ther-bedding"

14

tha t was prevalent in many of the count ry ' s i n d u s t r i e s .

The labor problem continued to ha r rass the government. Between

1965 and 1969, labor d isputes and t h e i r r e l a t ed t roub les were in

fu l l swing. The number of s t r i k e s reached epidemic p ropor t ions .

These s t r i k e s were usual ly for l eg i t ima te reasons; however, they

were sometimes used to c rea te a chaot ic s i t u a t i o n in Uruguay. The

Communist Party in Uruguay had es tabl ished members in key pos i t i ons

in many of the count ry ' s labor unions by the 1960 ' s . Through the

medium of s t r i k e s and work stoppages, the Communist par ty t r i e d to

c r i pp l e the government and thereby assume power by f i l l i n g the void

created by o f f i c i a l s who, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , would leave the government

as a r e s u l t of t h e i r f a i l u r e to overcome the chaot ic s i t u a t i o n . If

p a r t i a l work stoppages can be counted, then at times the number of

s t r i k e s reached almost 700 in one year .

S t r i k e s , unfor tunate ly , did not remain non-v io len t . The

s t r i k e s turned in to massive demonstrations and the po l ice were sent

in to d i spe r se the crowds of s t r i k i n g workers and sympathizers . I t

was t h i s ac t ion tha t sparked the v io lence . By the end of 1965, over

500 union members were under a r r e s t following a rash of s t r i k e s and

r i o t s t ha t yea r . In May of 1968, a demonstration sponsored by the

CNT, the Confederaci6n Nacional de Trabajadores (National Confedera­

t ion of Workers), became v io len t and one person was k i l l e d and f i f ty

in ju red . The scope of the s t r i k e s broadened when s tudents joined in

12 to aid the cause of the workers and to voice t h e i r own gr ievances .

After each shooting i n c i d e n t , general s t r i k e s were cal led in order t o

15

p r o t e s t the shoot ing. On August 14, 1968, during a demonstration

in which s tudents p a r t i c i p a t e d , v iolence broke out and one of the

s t u d e n t s . Liber Arce, was k i l l e d . The death of Liber Arce brought

a h a l t to the demonstrations and s t r i k e s for the remainder of 1968,

but not a permanent end. The next year , 1969, brought fur ther labor

t roubles and with i t more v io lence . Beginning in 1970, v io l en t

labor s t r i k e s and demonstrations decreased but they did not d i s -

13 appear e n t i r e l y from Uruguayan l i f e .

With the mounting economic c r i s i s , the clumsy colegiado system

came under a t t ack once more. By 1966, the colegiado had proved to

be a f a i l u r e and a motion was made to r e s t o r e the presidency. Push­

ing for the change was Oscar D. Gestido, a former mi l i t a ry general

and leader of the L is t 14 Colorado party (Lis t 14 was a factor group

or a break-away group of the Colorado p a r t y ) . Both Blancos and

r i v a l Colorado fact ions opposed any change in the system. Even

though Gestido had been out of the mi l i t a ry s ince 1955, h i s oppo­

nents considered him a m i l i t a r i s t and were convinced tha t Ges t ido ' s

r ev iva l of the presidency would cause "a generala to ins tead of the

democratic co leg iado ," that i s , r u l e by generals instead of by

co imci l . This was a well-founded fear because the mi l i t a ry had

gained cons iderable inf luence in government s ince 1958. The people

got the chance to decide whether a one-man presidency or a nine-man

counci l would ru le in Uruguay when the next e l ec t ions were held in

14 l a t e November of 1966.

The r e s u l t s of the e lec t ion were overwhelmingly in favor of

16

the Colorados. In that victory was included the proposal to do away

with the colegiado. Oscar Gestido won the presidency with 262,021 of

the Colorado total of 607,633 votes. It was hoped that "with the

retirement of the awkward coleg^iado, the new government could cope

more forcefully with the continuing scourge of inflation, labor un­

rest and the incompetence of the state enterprises." That would

be something that only time and Gestido's resourcefulness would

determine.

Gestido began immediately to combat the growing inflation,

economic woes and unrest. Once again the peso was devalued to a

rate of 200 to the dollar, a devaluation of 100 per cent. As for

the economy, Gestido tried, with some success, to stimulate an indus­

try that depended on high-priced foreign raw materials. His attempt

to reduce contraband was also somewhat successful. Gestido was able

to satisfy labor by granting them wage increases to meet the rise in

the cost of living but not the extravagant increases demanded by the

unions. Gestido's hard line policy appeared to be working. The

economy had begun to hold its own and international confidence in

Uruguay was restored. Gestido's hard work was beginning to pay off

but, unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on December 6, 1967,

only nine months after he entered office. His policies were con­

tinued, though not as effectively, by his successor, Jorge Pacheco

17 Areco.

Pacheco, the Vice-Pres ident , took over the re ins of power a f t e r

the death of Gestido. The government machinery did not run too well

for Pacheco. His adminis t ra t ion was a l so plagued by i n f l a t i o n .

17

economic woes and labor unres t . To t ry to curb i n f l a t i o n , Pacheco

devalued the peso, t h i s time to a r a t e of 250 pesos to the d o l l a r .

This measure did not help e i t h e r . By the time of the e l ec t i ons in

November of 1971, the peso was valued at 600 to the d o l l a r , a far

cry from the s t a b l e two for one r a t e of the early 1950 ' s .

Pacheco t r i e d to carry out the p o l i c i e s es tabl i shed by Gestido

but he did not have the forcefulness nor the support t ha t Gestido

had. The rev iva l of the presidency had not completely solved Uru­

guay's economic c r i s i s bu t , perhaps, i t gave the country a place

from which to s t a r t .

Perhaps the most press ing problems facing the Pacheco admini­

s t r a t i o n was labor un res t . In 1968, there were 700 s t r i k e s . Also

in 1967, the cost of l i v ing had increased 136 per cent . In add i t ion

to these d i f f i c u l t i e s , another menacing problem developed. A group

of urban g u e r i l l a s c a l l i n g themselves the Movimiento de Liberaci6n

Naciona1-Tupamarps_, National Libera t ion Movement-Tupamaros, i n i t i ­

ated a plan designed to har rass the government. Through t h e i r

a c t i o n s , the weakness of the government would be exposed to the

world.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (3rd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1968), pp. 786-789"

2 George Pendle, Uruguay (London: Oxford University Press, 1965),

pp. 25, 30-31; Marvin Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 21-23. ~

3 Pendle, Uruguay, p. 24.

4 Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 791.

^Ibid., p. 791.

Pendle, Uruguay, pp. 30-31; Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 794.

Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 31-33.

o

Herring, A History of Latin America, pp. 798-799.

9 Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 35-37.

Herring, A History of Latin America, pp. 800-802; Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, Translated by Anne Edmonson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), p. 20.

James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 177; Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, p. 88.

12 The s tudents used t h i s oppor tuni ty , plus o the r s , to voice t h e i r

anti-American f e e l i n g s . Their main anti-American theme was the American i n t e r v e n t i o n in Viet Nam. These demonstrations were s imi l a r t o those held by American s tudents and they, too, became v io len t at times .

13 Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 177.

14 Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, p. 42.

Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 805.

1 fi

Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, p. 43; Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 805. "~

18

19

Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 45-46; Herring, A History of Latin America, pp. 807-808.

18 Alisky, Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey, pp. 47-49; Gilio,

The Tupamaro Guerrillas, p. 20.

CHAPTER I I

THE TUPAMAROS: ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

The o r i g i n of t h e Tupamaros d a t e s back t o t h e e a r l y 1960 ' s when

ex-law s t u d e n t and Uruguayan S o c i a l i s t Pa r ty member Radl Sendic

t r a v e l e d t o t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of t h e count ry t o o r g a n i z e t h e s u g a r ­

cane w o r k e r s . Sendic cons idered t h e s e workers t h e "most e x p l o i t e d

of t h e r u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t " because of t h e i r impoverished c o n d i t i o n .

In t h e depar tment p rov ince of A r t i g a s , Sendic organized t h e

UTAA, or t h e Uni6n de Trabajadoreg Azucareros d_e A r t i g a s , t h e

Sugarcane Workers ' Union of A r t i g a s . The cane workers e age r ly j o i n ­

ed Sendic and h i s UTAA. On May 5, 1962, t he UTAA marched from A r t i ­

gas t o Montevideo, a d i s t a n c e of 350 m i l e s , t o inform t h e government

and t h e p u b l i c of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . They demanded the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n

of 30,000 h e c t a r e s of u n c u l t i v a t e d l a n d , b e t t e r working c o n d i t i o n s

and h i g h e r wages . According t o t h e marche r s , t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g

and t h e u n s a n i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s where they l i v e d were subhuman. Wages

were low and women and c h i l d r e n had t o work in t h e f i e l d s t o h e l p

suppo r t t h e i r f a m i l i e s . The march f a i l e d t o r e c e i v e any sympathy

from government o f f i c i a l s and Sendic and 36 o t h e r s were a r r e s t e d

when p o l i c e d i s p e r s e d the marche r s .

During t h e remainder of 1962 and p a r t of 1963, t h e UTAA c o n t i n ­

ued t o make marches t o Montevideo. The union had adopted "For t h e

F a t h e r l a n d and wi th Send i c " as t h e i r o f f i c i a l s l o g a n . Each march

proved a f a i l u r e and p o l i c e b roke up t h e marches and a r r e s t e d s e v e r a l

20

21

of the leaders. Sendic became disillusioned with the non-violent

approach of obtaining reforms. He then decided that the only chance

of reform was through armed struggle. Soon after his release from

2 jail he dropped out of sight and began organizing the guerrillas,

Sendic found recruits to join the guerrillas among the various

social classes. Many recruits were former members of the UTAA who

went underground with Sendic, The occupation of members ranged from

rural farm workers to students and university professors to techni­

cal workers. In some cases, members were the relatives of high

government officials. Some of the first confirmed Tupamaros captured

included Julio Marenales Sa^nz, a professor of fine arts; Pedro

Almiratti, a prominent engineer and building contractor; Jos6 Manuel

Lluveras, another engineer; and Rafil Bidegain Greissig, an advanced

student of agronomy, the son of a police chief, and a member of a

very wealthy family.

From 1966 to 1969, the occupations of captured Tupamaros, out

of a total of 54 captured, were as follows: 21 or 39 per cent were

students; 12 or 22 per cent were professional or technical workers;

17 or 32 per cent were farm or factory workers; and 4 or 7 per cent

were either housewives, soldiers or unemployed. By 1972, the number

of students had decreased by nearly 50 per cent, while the number of

professional or technical workers had increased by 50 per cent, with

the rest remaining about the same.

Joining the Tupamaros was not an easy task. One did not ask a

known or suspected Tupamaro sympathizer if he or she could join.

The process was long and complex. A prospective recruit was first

22

brought to the attention of the guerrilla organization through anoth­

er member or sponsor. Then the prospective member was carefully in­

vestigated. The member that sponsored a recruit would submit an

exhaustive report on that person's life, habits, friends, politics

and any other information that might be of value. Those with techni­

cal ability or skills and that could adapt to the command system were

desired by the Tupamaros. Smoking was tolerated but discouraged and

the use of alcohol was strictly forbidden. Security was an import­

ant factor to them and failure to take the proper precautions in

recruiting could prove to be disastrous or even fatal.

After receiving a security clearance, the Tupamaro recruit was

assigned to performing service work, that is, gathering intelligence,

making repairs or handling communications. At the same time, the

recruit underwent training in paramilitary skills. Completion of

the program allowed the new Tupamaro to work within the organization,

gaining the opportunity to increase his or her responsibility and

4 related active participation.

Once a recruit was accepted in the ranks of the Tupamaros, he

or she v;as then assigned to a cell. Cells were commando groups that

were named after a comrade who had been killed while battling police.

Each cell v/as made up of from four to six members and sometimes more.

Each member was known only by a n_om d_e guerre or pseudonym. True

identities were not known to regular members. Most cells operated

independently from other cells. There was an appointed cell leader

and he was the only one to know the leaders of other cells. These

leaders occasionally met together to formulate strategy and tactics.

23

The column operated on a broader scale. Several cells made up

the column. A column usually specialized in one type of activity.

Gathering intelligence, providing supplies, locating new recruits

and paramilitary activities were some of the duties of column mem­

bers. In one case, a column ran a complete medical center under­

ground near Montevideo.

Above the entire Tupamaro organization was the Executive Com­

mittee. This was the Tupamaro High Command. As individuals, the

members sought out suitable targets for guerrilla action. The Execu­

tive Committee was responsible for planning strategy and deciding

which cell would perform what task. It had the power to create or

to eliminate any cell, column, or unit as it felt necessary. Each

cell was in contact with the Executive Committee through the cell

leader.

To insure success, it was necessary for the Tupamaros to estab­

lish safe places to hide. This task was performed by acquiring

houses under assumed names and by using houses of non-combatants for

refuge. To further guarantee their safety, the Tupamaros dug out

underground rooms beneath the houses. Entrances to those underground

rooms were cleverly concealed to prevent their discovery in case a

house was searched by police. These rooms were called berratines

(little rooms). These berratines had many useful purposes; they were

used to cache arms and ammunition, to provide safe living and hiding

quarters for those guerrillas who were forced to live clandestinely,

as a place of detention for those x>7ho were sentenced to the "people's

prison," to hide printing presses for the printing of documents and

24

false identification papers, and some were large enough to conceal

medical facilities. It seems the Tupamaros thought of everything.

Military activities took various shapes. Some were to gather

supplies and others were to establish an identity with the people.

The Tupamaros performed each with delicate accuracy.

Early in the morning of July 31, 1963, a small group of men

entered the Swiss Rifle Club in Nueva Helvecia, near the capital city

of Montevideo, and stole thirty-one rifles and tv/o carbines. Inves­

tigating police attributed the robbery to common criminals. Other

sources in Montevideo contributed the crime to Radl Sendic and other

leftist militants. Sendic and his followers later took credit for

the theft. It was theorized by the police that Sendic had planned to

use the arms to take over productive sugar cane fields and give them

to the cane workers. If this theory was true, the plan fell through

and the Tupamaros became inactive for a few months.

On Christmas Eve of 1963, ten young men carrying revolvers

hijacked a truck belonging to the Manzares Company. The truck was

loaded with foodstuffs. The hijackers directed the truck to a slum

area of Montevideo where they distributed the food among the resi­

dents. At the same time the hijackers held a short propaganda

session. It was this "Hunger Command," as it later called, that

gave the Tupamaros their "Robin Hood" image, an image they were to

keep until 1970.

Tupamaro raids were not limited entirely to the city of Monte­

video and surrounding cities. On January 1, 1964, a Tupamaro com­

mando squad attacked the customs house at Bella Union, a town in the

25

northwest of the country on the border with Brazil in the department

of Artigas. The commandos obtained eleven Mausers, model 1908, a

five shot, 7 mm. gun, and eight bayonets. On April 19, 1964, the

commandos struck in the department of Lavalleja. From a company

near the town of Minas, the commandos stole 100 blasting caps and

ten meters (approx. 30 ft.) of fuse. The next day, while still in

the vicinty of Minas, the commandos broke into the Casa Ribel, S.A.

and stole five German rifles and six revolvers. In addition to the

guns, a thousand rounds of ammunition were taken. In the department

of Maldonado in the southeast, commandos hit the Compania Nacional

de CementQ, S.A., the National Cement Company. Here the Tupamaros

stole 24 cases of explosives. It was later learned that this was

540 kilograms (1188 lbs.) of gelatine, a very explosive material.

The police attributed these raids or crimes to common criminals,

unaware that they had been performed by a well-organized paramilitary

6 group.

Another avenue of Tupamaro expression was bombing. Most bombs

were d i rec ted agains t foreign companies. Some of these were Moore-

McCormack, Coca-Cola, I n t e rna t i ona l Harvester and two companies

belonging to I n t e r n a t i o n a l Telephone and Telegraph, All American

Cable and Western Telegraph. I t was the August, 1965 bombing of the

Bayer Chemical Company, a German-owned firm, tha t was important .

Pamphlets l e f t behind at the scene indica ted tha t the company was

bombed because i t manufactured gases that the United S ta tes used in

the Viet Nam War. The most s i g n i f i c a n t th ing about the inc iden t was

26

that the pamphlets were signed Movimien_t_o d_e Liberaci6n N£ci^on_al—

Tupamaros. This was the first time they had identified themselves

, 7 by a name.

Throughout 1965 and 1966, the bombings, robberies and assaults

increased steadily. The bombings were used to make the Tupamaros

known to the public, the robberies were to obtain supplies and the

assaults were to collect finances. These commando raids were not

without risk or danger to human lives.

The Tupamaros suffered their first fatality in December, 1966.

Two weeks after a robbery at an armory, police located a vehicle

that was suspected to have been involved. While in pursuit, a

fierce gun battle erupted between the police and the occupants of

the vehicle. During the battle, the vehicle ran into a tree and the

occupants fled on foot. One of the occupants, later identified as

Carlos Flores Alvarez, remained behind and covered his comrades'

retreat with machinegun fire. The police returned fire and Flores

Alvarez was killed. Inside the vehicle were two more machineguns

and two pistols. Less than a week later, another shoot-out with

police cost the life of Mario Robaina M^ndez, another Tupamaro. In­

side his house police found books on Lenin, Marx and Mao Tse Tung.

These books were considered subversive.

On many occasions the Tupamaros were applauded for their imag­

ination in carrying out their raids. At one of the local theaters

in Montevideo belonging to the Federation of Independent Theaters, a

play by Arnold Wesker was being performed. In order to make the play

a success, some of the actors needed military uniforms and rifles.

27

The array was glad to accommodate them and loaned them t h e n e c e s s a r y

equipment . La te on February 7 , 1966, the n i g h t of t h e p l a y , a group

of you ths armed wi th p i s t o l s b roke i n t o t he t h e a t e r and s t o l e t he

t e n Mausers wi th bayonets and the e i g h t e e n uniforms t h a t were be ing

used i n t h e p l a y . Although the uniforms were l a t e r r e c o v e r e d , they

had se rved t h e Tupamaros w e l l . Disgu i sed as p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , a com­

mando squad e n t e r e d t he bank. La Caja Obrera , and robbed i t of some

301,343 p e s o s , approximate ly 3,424 American d o l l a r s . On November 22,

1966, ano the r s i m i l a r a s s a u l t occurred a t the Paseo de Arena branch

of t h e Banco P o p u l a r . The Tupamaros n e t t e d some 472,642 pesos

($5,731) i n t h e r a i d . ^

By the end of 1967, t h e v i o l e n c e had i nc rea sed wi th l o s s of l i f e

on bo th s i d e s . The p o l i c e cons idered themselves s u c c e s s f u l i n com­

b a t i n g t h e g u e r r i l l a s . Many Tupamaro h i d i n g p l ace s were uncovered

and some known members a r r e s t e d . Even though they had only t h e

names of 28 known Tupamaros, t h e Uruguayan government f e l t conf iden t

t o make a s t a t e m e n t concern ing i t s s u c c e s s . The announced t h a t " they

had d e a l t a mor t a l blow to t he smal l bu t m i l i t a n t c l a n d e s t i n e o r g a n i -

9 z a t i o n of l e f t - w i n g e x t r e m i s t s , t h e ' T u p a m a r o s ' . " They did not

r e a l i z e j u s t how wrong t h a t s t a t emen t was u n t i l much l a t e r .

In 1968, t h e Tupamaros in t roduced a new t a c t i c . This t a c t i c

became known as Plan S a t a n . I t was t h e k idnapp ing of prominent

n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i g u r e s t o embarrass t h e government. The

Tupamaros f e l t t h a t to kidnap a p o l i t i c i a n and h i d e him away for

s e v e r a l days would be more e f f e c t i v e in h u m i l i a t i n g t h e government

than t o shoot o f f i c i a l s i n t h e s t r e e t .

28

On August 8, 1968, Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, president of the

state electricity and telephone company, UTE, was kidnapped as he

was leaving his home. His secretary and chauffeur were wounded by

the commandos. It was later disclosed by the guerrillas that Pereira

Reverbel was kidnapped because he advocated a hard time against the

guerrillas and, embarrassingly enough, because he was a personal

friend of Uruguayan president Jorge Pacheco Areco. Some 3,000 army

troops and policemen searched eMerywhere for Pereira Reverbel but

they were unable to locate him. After 131 hours of captivity, the

Tupamaros released their distinguished "guest" unharmed and slightly

drugged in a land rover near the Park Jos^ Batlle y Orddfiez. This

was the first of many kidnappings to follow.

One of the main goals of the Tupamaros was to root out corrup­

tion and other illegal activities of the government. To enable the

Tupamaros to perform this type of action, an excellent intelligence

network had to be devised and that was just what they constructed.

It was said that the Tupamaros had developed an intelligence network

that was far superior to that of Uruguay's police. This was in evi­

dence when the Tupamaro commando squad "Liber Arce" raided the

Financiera Monty, a Montevideo financial firm, in February, 1969.

They took the account books and $24,000 from the Financiera. The

robbery was not reported to police because, upon examination, the

account books indicated that the company had been engaged in illegal

financial transactions. Implicated in these illegal activities were

the Minister of Public Works, Walter Pinto Risso; a political candi­

date, Jorge Batlle; and the president of the state electricity and

29

telephone company, and former Tupamaro captive, Ulysses Pereira

Reverbel. The Tupamaros turned the books over to a judge after

their accountant had examined them thoroughly and discovered the

damaging evidence. The information was exposed to the public soon

after the judge received a copy of the account books. Three days

after the public exposure of the scandalous information, a fire

destroyed the offices of the Financiera and all the contents inside

were lost. A former employee had provided the Tupamaros with the

necessary information for the robbery. Unfortunately, the destruc­

tion of the evidence by the fire made it impossible to convict any

12 of those implicated in the criminal activities.

Until now, the Tupamaros had performed only small raids using

a minimum number of soldiers. On October 8, 1969, the Tupamaros

initiated their most daring and spectacular action to date. At

precisely one o'clock, members of the commando squad "Che Guevara"

attacked the town of Pando, some thirty-one kilometers (18 miles)

from Montevideo. The commandos arrived in the town by various means;

the most unusual method was the group that arrived using a funeral

cortege as a cover. Once inside the town, the Tupamaros located

their respective assignments (targets) and waited for the signal to

attack. At one o'clock the signal was given and the commandos put

on white armbands to identify themselves and to prevent confusion,

and they moved against their targets. All the commandos acted out

their roles simultaneously. The police commissary, the police sta­

tion, the fire department and two local banks were the targets of

the coordinated Tupamaro attack. Taken by surprise, the firemen

30

policemen, and bank personnel offered little resistance. At the

commissary a policeman attempted to flee but vjarning shots fired by

a Tupamaro convinced the man to stay. The shots, fortunately for

the Tupamaros, did not draw the attention of the townfolk.

At the Bank of Pando there was another group of Tupamaros, all

armed with machineguns and pistols. While two commandos were re­

moving the money from the vault a third, a female named Ana, was

distributing leaflets to the people inside and explaining the pur­

pose of the raid. After gathering nearly four million pesos from

the vault, the commandos prepared to leave. A policeman, somehov;

alerted that a raid was in process at the bank, positioned himself

behind the Tupamaros' get-away car. A brief battle ensued and the

policeman was wounded and disarmed, thus allowing the robbers to

escape in the car. In leaving the scene, two of the car tires were

shot by the wounded policeman, who managed to reload his gun and

fire at the fleeing vehicle. Miraculously the car arrived at the

tov/n's cemetery, the rendezvous of all the white arm-banded Tupa­

maros. Here, the guerrillas loaded the money, some forty million

pesos all totalled, into an awaiting van; then the ones from the

useless car split into two groups and climbed into two other vehi­

cles. It was at this point that the raid lost its organization

because the occupants of the cars did not know each other or which

of them were officers or soldiers. This added to the confusion when

this group was later stopped by a police roadblock in the area of

Toledo Chico, near Montevideo.

The Tupamaros escaped from Pando without any casualties and the

31

only mishap was t h e d i s a b l e d c a r . Now for the miss ion t o be a s u c ­

c e s s , t h e t h i r t y - o n e k i l o m e t e r t r i p back t o the c o n c r e t e j u n g l e of

Montevideo had to be accompl i shed . The g u e r r i l l a s hoped t h a t they

could s a f e l y reach t h e o u t s k i r t s of Montevideo b e f o r e t h e p o l i c e

could a c t i v e l y become involved in t h e i r p u r s u i t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y for

t h e Tupamaros, t h a t was not t o happen. In any a r ea near Montevideo

known as Toledo Chico and about two minutes from s a f e t y , t h e escape

v e h i c l e s were s topped by a p o l i c e roadb lock . Only one of t h e v e h i ­

c l e s , t h e van w i th t h e money and d r iven by l e a d e r Ratil Send ic , was

a b l e t o t u r n around and e lude the p o l i c e in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . Hoping

t o l o s e themselves in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , t h e g u e r r i l l a s abandoned t h e

c a r and f led on f o o t . The p o l i c e moved in and opened f i r e on t h e

f l e e i n g g u e r r i l l a s . Some were shot wh i l e t r y i n g t o s u r r e n d e r and

wi th t h e i r hands in t h e a i r . Af ter t he shoo t ing ceased , t h r e e Tupa­

maros were dead , s e v e r a l i n ju r ed and twenty taken c a p t i v e . One of

t h e dead Tupamaros was Ricardo Zabalza Waksman, t h e son of t h e

prominent Blance s e n a t o r F ranc i sco Zaba lza . Even though t h e Tupa­

maros l o s t t h r e e members, t h e r a i d on Pando was s t i l l cons idered a

s u c c e s s b e c a u s e i t had mobi l ized over 100 g u e r r i l l a s , accord ing t o

t h e Tupamaros. O f f i c i a l s sou rces reduced t h a t number and c i t e d

around 40 t o 50 g u e r r i l l a s . The reason for t h e r a i d ? t o c e l e b r a t e

t h e second a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e dea th of Che Guevara and t o show t h e

p u b l i c t h e weakness of t h e government fo rces t o p reven t such a

•A 13 r a i d .

This was how the Tupamaros ended 1969. The weakness of the

government was exposed and it was forced to admit that the Tupamaros

32

^ere more than just common criminals. In early 1969 two Uruguayan

newspapermen, Antonio Mercader and Jorge Vera, calculated that there

were between 50 and 100 Tupamaros dedicated to direct action. The

police, by later 1969, had identified the following commando squads:

"Liber Arce," "Susana Pintos," "Carlos Flores," "Mario Robaina

Mendez," and "Che Guevara," In January, 1970, the British weekly,

Latin America, estimated that there were 800 Tupamaros and that

they were divided into three columns. Regardless of the official or

unofficial estimates of Tupamaro strength, they continued to harrass

the government. By late 1969, the Tupamaros had become well en­

trenched in the fight for power against the Uruguayan government.

The guerrillas continued to expand their organization and membership

despite pressure from the police. The Tupamaros reached their peak

between 1970 and 1971. It was during these years that the "Robin

Hood" image they had carefully cultivated disappeared in a wave of

violence.

CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

The Tupamaros took their name from an 18th century freedom fighter, Tupac Amaru (Jose Condorcanqui).

2 -Carlos Suarez y Rubin Anaya Sarmiento, Los Tupamaros (Mexico:

Editorial Extemporaneos, 1971), pp. 33-35; Ernesto Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centre Inter-cultural de Documentacion, 1971), p. 3/2; Marysa Gerassi, "Uruguay's Urban Guerrillas: The Tupamaros," Nation, September 29, 1969, p. 308.

3 Arturo C. Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban

Guerrillas (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 29; Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," Problems of Communism, September, 1971, p. 17.

4 Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 35.

Donald C. Hodges and Robert Elias Abu Shannab, NLF: National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970 (New York: Morrow, 1972), p. 2841 Robert Moss, The War for the Cities (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), p. 222; Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, pp. 33-34.

6 -Suarez, Los Tupamaros, p. 45; Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia

Documental, p. 3/4.

Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental, pp. 3/2-3/6.

Suarez, Los Tupamaros, pp. 48-49.

9 Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 3 / 8 - 3 / 9 ; Alphonse Max, Tupamaros

A P a t t e r n for Urban G u e r r i l l a Warfare in La t i n America (The Hague: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Documentation and Informat ion C e n t r e , 1970) , p . 5; "Uruguay: More of t h e Same M e d i c i n e , " L a t i n America, January 17 , 1968, p . 1 8 .

Col . Se rg io L. d ' O l i v i e r a , "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," M i l i t a r y Review, A p r i l , 1973, p . 28; Moss, The War for t h e C i t i e s , p . 223 .

11 Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental, pp. 3/13/-3/14;

New York Times, August 10, 12, 1968.

33

34

Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Anto log ia Documental , pp . 3 / 2 0 - 3 / 2 1 ; "Uruguay: Pacheco S t i l l Adamant," L a t i n America, January 9 , 1970, p . 15; "Robin Hood G u e r r i l l a s , " Time, May' 16, 1969, p . 46 .

13 Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental, p. 3/30; James

Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cam­bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 238, 2 46"-24 8, 252-253, 257-259; Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, Translated by Anne Edmonson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), p. 128; "Uruguay: Sparks Fly Again, Latin America, July 3, 1970, p. 215.

14 Suarez, Los Tupamaros, pp. 77-78, "Uruguay: Pacheco Still

Adamant," Latin America, January 9, 1970, p. 15,

CHAPTER III

1970: PRELUDE TO DISASTER

By 1970 the Tupamaro organization was a thriving entity. Mem­

bership and public sympathy were on the rise. The Tupamaros had

carefully matured their "Robin Hood" image and had cherished the fact

that they had never wantonly resorted to violence. The guerrillas

claimed that violence was used as a last resort and only in self-

defense. The establishment of a power duality, a step on the ladder

to revolutionary success, was achieved by the Tupamaros during their

peak year of 1970.

During the early months of 1970 the Tupamaros carried out a

series of raids that were designed to collect supplies and to keep

their name before the public. In countering the guerrillas, police

made unwarranted house searches to uncover possible hiding places or

caches of arms. Many times these searches were futile and fruitless.

On rare occasions, however, the police would actually locate a "safe

house" and capture the occupants, who were usually Tupamaros. As the

result of these dragnets, many guerrillas were incarcerated in the

Punto Carreta prison. Other guerrillas would be captured as a result

of an abortive raid on a bank or an assault on a supply company.

Regardless of how or why a Tupamaro became a captive, they would

invariably be taken to jail for interrogation and then sometime later

be sentenced to prison. The use of the word interrogation was only

a synonym for torture. Even though police officials denied the use

35

36

of t o r t u r e on suspected Tupamaro p r i sone r s , i t s app l ica t ion was in

widespread use .

Tor tu re , as i s well known, i s an age-old method of ex t r ac t ing

information from someone who, under normal condi t ions , refuses t o

divulge desired information. The appl ica t ion of t o r t u r e , both phys i ­

ca l and mental , has the effect of changing the person ' s mind about

what he w i l l t a l k about. In the case of Uruguay, the use of t o r t u r e

had been denied by po l ice o f f i c i a l s , but charges of i t s use caused a

Senate Commission of inquiry to be e s t ab l i shed . The findings of t h i s

Commission, headed by the Colorado senator Amilcar Vasconcellos and

comprised of both Blanco and Colorado sena to r s , "concluded unani­

mously tha t 'inhuman' t o r t u r e , including e l e c t r i c shocks, c i g a r e t t e

burns , and psychological pressure , was used by pol ice as a 'normal,

frequent and h a b i t u a l ' matter on Tupamaros, common c r imina l s , and

innocents a l i k e . "

This i l l e g a l po l ice t a c t i c was carr ied out by the members of the

I n t e l l i g e n c e and Information branch of the Montevideo po l ice depa r t ­

ment. The head (d i r ec to r ) of t h i s department was Hector Moran ,

Charquero. Moran Charquero was accused by the Tupamaros of being

the chief t o r t u r e r and persecutor of the g u e r r i l l a s . He was a lso

reputed to be the chief of the Brigada Especia l , Special Brigade,

tha t was s p e c i a l l y organized to combat the Tupamaros and was allowed

to use s pec i a l t a c t i c s ( t o r t u r e , in t imida t ion , e t c . ) . Moran Char­

quero learned these t a c t i c s from the Ac^adgmia In te rnac iona l de

P o l i c i a , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pol ice Academy, an academy sponsored by the

United S ta t e Department of S t a t e .

37

These qualifications made Moran Charquero very unpopular among

tthe Uruguayan public and, especially, the Tupamaros. As soon as his

identification was linked to the Brigada Especial, Moran Charquero

became a marked man. His fear of assassination was not unwarranted.

Although he traveled surrounded by bodyguards, he was killed by Tupa­

maro gunfire on April 13, 1970, His death was called a reprisal for

the torturing of many political prisoners. This action by the Tupa­

maros represented the first such act of selective assassinations they

had performed and demonstrated their willingness to disregard their

2 "Robin Hood" image with this new rise of violence.

As the Tupamaros progressed in their attacks against the govern­

ment to discredit and humiliate it, they still attempted to maintain

a non-violent role. The Tupamaro's schemes became more strategical

as they thrust deeper into the very center of the Uruguayan govern­

ment. To prove that no one entity was immune from Tupamaro attack,

the commando squad "Indalecio Olivera de Rosas," comprised of 20 men

and 22 women, raided the Centro de Instrucci6n de la_ Marina, the

Naval Training Center, on the morning of May 29, 1970,

At 1:45 in the morning, the orderly to the guard, Fernando

Garin, a newly recruited member of the Tupamaros, signaled to three

men in a car parked not far away. Upon arriving at the entrance gate

of the fortress, (the Naval Training Center), the three men, dis­

guised as policemen, approached the guard and demanded to see the

officer on duty. The guard motioned to Garin and ordered him to take

the policemen inside, but before they departed from the gate, a couple

walking down the street were stopped and questioned by the policemen

38

t h e r e ( t h e t h r e e t h a t had j u s t a r r i v e d ) . F a i l i n g t o produce i d e n t i ­

f i c a t i o n p a p e r s , t h e couple were ordered i n s i d e for f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n ­

i n g . While t h i s commotion was happening at t h e g a t e , Garin had

s l i p p e d i n s i d e and up t o t h e s e n t r y ' s s t a t i o n l o c a t e d near t h e g a t e

and four meters (approximate ly 12 f e e t ) above ground. Gar in e x p l a i n ­

ed t h a t he had come t o r e l i e v e t h e s e n t r y , but t h e s e n t r y f e l t t h a t

something s u s p i c i o u s was going on and h e s i t a t e d , Garin then s t r u c k

t h e s e n t r y and disarmed him of h i s AR-15 automat ic r i f l e . With t h e

s e n t r y d i sa rmed , 19 o t h e r Tupamaros t h a t had been watching emerged

from t h e i r h i d i n g p l a c e s and surrounded the guards a t t h e g a t e . R e a l ­

i z i n g t h a t he was g r e a t l y outnumbered, t h e guard su r rende red t o t h e

g u e r r i l l a s .

New t h a t the e n t r a n c e t o t h e Center was s e c u r e d , complete i n ­

f i l t r a t i o n could be c a r r i e d o u t . At each p o t e n t i a l t r o u b l e s p o t , t h e

g u e r r i l l a s p laced one of t h e i r own members, d i s g u i s e d in a nava l

uni form. As the policemen en te red t h e f o r t r e s s , they c a l l e d for t h e

o f f i c e r on d u t y . When t h i s o f f i c e r a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e , he did not

s u s p e c t any th ing amiss so he d i d n ' t sound t h e a larm t h a t would a l e r t

t h e 60-odd o f f i c e r s and men in t h e b u i l d i n g . The o f f i c e r and h i s

a i d e , a c o r p o r a l , were qu ick ly overpowered and t i e d up . Other Tupa­

maros e n t e r e d t h e men's d o r m i t o r i e s and awoke t h e men. They t o o were

overpowered and locked up in t h e g a r r i s o n ' s c e l l s . Once they were

locked away, t h e Tupamaros could roam t h e Center wi thou t a c c i d e n t a l l y

runn ing i n t o someone t h a t could r u i n t h e i r p l a n s .

A t r u c k soon e n t e r e d t he e n t r a n c e g a t e and parked in t he p a t i o .

The commandos bus ied themselves by emptying t h e a r s e n a l and g a t h e r i n g

39

up the arms l e f t behind in the dormi tor ies . By 3:30 a.m. the t ruck

was ful ly loaded and l e f t the fo r t r e s s unnoticed. The truck car r ied

a t o t a l of 300 r i f l e s , two .30 c a l i b r e machineguns on t r i p o d s ,

150 Colt .45 c a l i b r e p i s t o l s , 40 other p i s t o l s of unknown c a l i b r e ,

s eve ra l sub-machineguns, s ix AR-15 automatic r i f l e s of the type

used by the Americans in Viet Nam, 75 smoke and gas grenades and,

f i n a l l y , 60,000 rounds of ammunition — qu i t e a haul for a shor t

n i g h t ' s work. By 4:15 a.m. the remaining Tupamaros departed from

the Center. These remaining g u e r r i l l a s hois ted the Tupamaro f l ag ,

wrote revolut ionary slogans on the wall and took photographs of the

j a i l e d o f f i ce r s and men. Also l e f t behind by the commandos was a

l e t t e r from the solider-turned-Tupamaro, Fernando Garin. His l e t t e r

s t a t ed tha t he had joined the Tupamaros because he could no longer

t o l e r a t e the inhuman treatment of p o l i t i c a l pr isoners and remain a

pa r t of the establishment responsible for such cr imes.

I t was too l a t e to do anything by the time the so ld i e r s were

able to free themselves. The telephone l ines had been cut so some­

one had to run two blocks in order to notify the Army I n t e l l i g e n c e

Serv ice . Another ten blocks and the runner could have no t i f i ed the

3 p res iden t a t the P r e s i d e n t i a l Palace .

The impact of the ra id shook the government by the sheer

audaci ty of the Tupamaros to raid a mi l i t a ry es tabl ishment . This

had been the f i r s t time tha t the mi l i t a ry had been attacked in such

a manner. This ou t r igh t a t t ack was an affront to t h e i r i n t e g r i t y ,

and a humi l ia t ion they would never fo rge t . In Montevideo the rumor

had begun to c i r c u l a t e tha t the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,

40

Admiral Guillermo Fernandez, would have to res ign as a r e s u l t of the

Tupamaro r a i d . According to bureaucra t ic r i t u a l , an i nves t i ga t i on

was t o take place u t i l i z i n g the serv ices of both the armed forces

and p o l i c e . Taking charge of the i nves t i ga t i on was the defense min­

i s t e r . General C^sar Borba, and the i n t e r i o r min i s t e r . General

Antonio Francese. Their i nves t iga t ion proved l i t t l e more than what

was already known, that information concerning the layout to the

Center , the loca t ion of the guards, the the loca t ion of the arsenal

had been supplied by Fernando Garin, the so ld i e r tha t defected to

the Tupamaros. This was the f i r s t major c r i s i s tha t both Borba and

Francese had faced s ince t h e i r appointment a f te r the "execution" of

po l i ce inspec tor Hector Moran Charquero by the Tupamaros in Apr i l ,

4 bare ly two months previous to the raid on the Center.

As the number of Tupamaro a t tacks grew, so did t h e i r s t r eng th

and numbers. In accordance with revolut ionary theory, the Tupamaros

had e s t ab l i shed a grand t r a d i t i o n with the public as non-violent

r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , " s t e a l from the r ich and give to the poor" t ypes .

To the Tupamaros, t h i s was j u s t another s tep in the evolution of the

r evo lu t ion . Unfortunately, a la rge por t ion of the population only

considered the Tupamaros as clowns and did not be l i eve them to be a

se r ious t h r e a t . I t can be assumed tha t the Tuparmaros wished to

change or to s l i g h t l y a l t e r t h i s image by shedding the non-violence

of t h e i r s t r a t egy during the Uruguayan winter of 1970 (June, July

and August) .

In Ju ly , 1970, the Tupamaros ac t ive ly revived one of t h e i r

f a v o r i t e t a c t i c s , kidnapping. This ac t ion f e l l under the code name

41

of Plan Satan. The plan had been devised in 1968 to humi l ia te and

d i s c r e d i t the government by kidnapping na t iona l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l

f igures and hiding them away for awhile. Unt i l 1970, the vict ims

of Plan Satan were only na t iona l ly known f igu re s . The plan was now

to be expanded to cover i n t e r n a t i o n a l f igu res . The Tupamaros began

the second phase of t h e i r plan in Ju ly , 1970, when they kidnapped

the Braz i l i an Consul-General, Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, and an

American advisor for the U. S. Agency for I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development

(USAID), Dan Mi t r ione ,

The capture of Dias Gomide and Mitr ione was the r e s u l t of a

s epa ra t e but coordinated plan by the Tupamaros. On the fa teful F r i ­

day of July 31 , 1970, two groups of Tupamaro g u e r r i l l a s put t h e i r

s t r a t e gy i n to ac t ion . One group was assigned to abduct Dan Mitr ione,

the American advisor to the Montevideo pol ice department; the other

was assigned to abduct Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, the Braz i l i an Con­

s u l . Mitr ione was overcome when the car he was dr iv ing was run off

the road. In the confusion, he received a gun-shot wound in the

neck. Mitr ione was then whisked away by h is Tupamaro a s s a i l a n t s .

I t was almost an i n s t a n t replay when Dias Gomide was abruptly pulled

from h i s automobile, slung i n to another and zipped off to an unknown

d e s t i n a t i o n .

The kidnapping of these two was only half of the o r ig ina l p lan .

I t had been out l ined to capture two other diplomats . Singled out as

kidnap vic t ims were Nathen Rosenfeld, c u l t u r a l a t t a ch^ , and Michael

Gorden Jones , v ice -consu l , of the U. S. Embassy. The Tupamaros were

wai t ing for Rosenfeld in the garage of the apartment house where he

42

lived. When attacked, he fought back and was struck on the head.

Faking unconsciousness, he was able to escape when the commandos

could not decide what to do about his condition. Jones, who lived

in the same building as Rosenfeld, appeared in the garage about the

same time. He, too, was pounced upon by the commandos. One of the

Tupamaros hit Jones on the back of the head with a pistol, knocking

him unconscious. They proceeded to throw a blanket over his head

and tie him up. Once securely bound and gagged, Jones was thrown

into an awaiting truck. He was able to escape from the Tupamaros

when, after regaining his senses, he slowly removed the blanket from

his eyes so he could see and then he swung free from the truck,

almost knocking himself unconscious again when he hit the pavement.

He had already made a clean getaway by the time his captors realized

that he was missing. It was a frustrating failure for the Tupamaros

but the day was not lost because their kidnap raids had netted the

/I

two big prizes of Dias Gomide and Mitrione.

The abduction of the foreign dignitaries sent shock waves

through the bureaucratic ranks. It had only been the week before

that the Tupamaros had kidnapped a Uruguayan judge, Daniel Pereira

Manelli. Clues to his where-abouts were either scarce or non­

existent. The Tupamaros scored tv7o more points with the kidnapping

of Dias Gomide and Mitrione.

Now that they held international figures as captives, the

guerrillas were considered to be in a favorable position to put pres­

sure on the government. If the Tupamaros alone did not exert enough

pressure on the government, then the governments of Brazil and the

43

United States would, in order to to protect the lives of their

citizens.

It was not known for a few days the objective behind the kid­

nappings other than to discredit and humiliate the government and

the security forces in their blundering attempt to protect foreigners.

On the following Monday, August 3rd, the Tupamaros released Daniel

Pereira Manelli, who had been abducted the week before. Upon report­

ing to the police, Pereira Manelli relayed a message from the Tupa­

maros. The guerrillas demanded that al l political prisoners be

released in exchange for Dias Gomide and Mitrione. The fate of the

two men would rest in the decision of the government. A negative

decision would be like signing a death warrant for the men but

releasing the prisoners would certainly set a precedent for the

future, not only in Uruguay, but in other South American countries,

for political blackmail. The pros and cons of that argument would

be tossed around government circles for several days before any

decisive statement on the matter would be declared. The word that

circulated around Montevideo was that President Jorge Pacheco Areco

would refuse to negotiate with those he considered common criminals.

There were only two alternatives facing the president. First,

to continue a hardline policy against the Tupamaro demands and refuse

to negotiate with them could cause death for the captives. If this

were the case, and harm did come to the men, then Pacheco would have

to "bear the wrath of Washington and of the Brazilian military govern-

o

ment." Recent experience in Guatemala earlier that same year proved

disasterous when that government refused to negotiate with guerrilla

44

demands. The result was the death of the West German Ambassador.

This was not the solution the Uruguayan government sought to their

problem.

Another route that Pacheco Aerco could follow would be to give

in to the demands of the Tupamaros. Before Pacheco Areco could do

that, he had to consider the repercussions. His supporters would

certainly reconsider their status at election time. The Army and

police chiefs stated that if the president bowed to the Tupamaros'

demands, it would be difficult to prevent rebellious officers from

initiating action against the government. Not only domestic affairs

were under attack, but Uruguay also felt the pangs of international

pressure. Argentina, Uruguay's neighbor to the south, favored a

strong line against conciliation because of similar problems there.

Brazil, the northern neighbor, would be furious if anything happened

to Dias Gomide. The United States would use its economic influence

to manipulate the government into adapting measures to possibly cor­

rect the economic ills of the country, a proposal that would be un­

acceptable in Uruguay. The main opposition to this proposal was that

it was considered as selling out the country to foreigners. The

president, literally, had the fate of Uruguay resting on his shoulders

when he decided not to bargain with the guerrillas in hope that their

threats were only a bluff.

While government officials pondered over the many possible solu­

tions to the crisis, the Army and police did not sit by in idleness.

As soon as it was known that the Tupamaros had kidnapped the two

foreign dignitaries, the Army and police began their search. To

45

facilitate their efforts, blank search warrants were carried and this

made it "lawful" to carry out a house-to-house search. When the Tupa­

maros issued the ultimatum that either the guerrillas held as prison­

ers were released or the two foreigners, Dias Gomide and Mitrione,

would be executed by August 7th, the police escalated their efforts.

By the sixth of August, there were over 20,000 army and police offi­

cers involved in the massive dragnet. Their efforts were not entirely

in vain.

On August 7th, while searching for the kidnapped foreigners in

the district of Malvin, police captured several Tupamaros. Fortu­

nately for the government, there were some top Tupamaros in this haul.

Radl Sendic, the founder of the guerrillas and Ratll Bidegain Gressing,

a top leader of the guerrillas, were taken prisoner. Many political

officials considered this fortunate because they felt that with Sendic

captive, the guerrillas holding Dias Gomide and Mitrione v;ould not

carry out the planned execution. The government now felt that they

held the upper hand against the Tupamaros,

While the police were searching Montevideo for the hostages,

the Tupamaros were moving unnoticed among them. When the police cap­

tured Ratal Sendic, it was thought that the Tupamaros would be put

into a state of confusion. This was not the case because on August

7th, the Tupamaros made a raid on an agricultural laboratory and kid­

napped Dr. Claude L. Fly. Dr. Fly was an American soils expert work­

ing in Montevideo to assist the Uruguayan government in producing

better agricultural crops. Fly provided another hostage and, perhaps,

12 more bargaining power for the Tupamaros,

46

The Tupamaros now had three key hostages in their custody. For

the release of the captives, the guerrillas still demanded the re­

lease of all political prisoners, some 150 persons, mainly captured

Tupamaros. If this demand was not agreed to by the Uruguayan govern­

ment , then the guerrillas threatened to execute their hostages. The

president had decided to maintain his hardline policy toward the

guerrillas and refused to negotiate with them. In an attempt to

locate the three, police authorities questioned leader Radl Sendic,

who had been captured the previous day, as to the location of the

foreigners. Sendic replied that he V7as only a prisoner of war and

he refused to divulge any information regarding the Tupamaros. The

Uruguayan government and the world waited for the deadline of 12

noon, August 9th to see if the Tupamaros' threat would be carried

out.

On Monday morning, August 10th, 1970, a radio station in Monte­

video received a telephone call from an anonymous person saying that

Dan Mitrione, the U.S.A.I.D. agent, had been executed. The caller

failed to give the location of the body. The police, however, were

notified and they later found a grisly sight. The body of Mitrione

was found in an abandoned automobile in Montevideo covered by a

blood soaked blanket. He had been shot four times - once each in

the neck, ear, chest and back. With the death of Mitrione, officials

pondered the fate of the other captives, Brazilian Consul-General

Aloysio Dias Gomide and U. S. agronomist, Claude Fly, This outright

murder of a foreign civilian cost the Tupamaros much of their public

support and sympathy. The government would now begin to consider

47

them more than amateurish provocateurs, but as criminals guilty of

murder without provocation.

The disclosure of the execution of Dan Mitrione by the Tupamaros

brought a critical reaction against them and the police. The Tupa­

maros lost much public support because the public had held an image

of the guerrillas as being modern day "Robin Hoods," and defenders

of freedom and justice. This image was shattered when they killed

Mitrione. The people that at one time had supported them now dropped

their support and considered the guerrillas only as the lowest of the

criminal element. Faith in the police also dropped with Mitrione's

death. It was the police who failed to prevent the kidnapping, or

so the public would think. Then, after the kidnapping, the police

would surely be able to locate the abductors and punish them. But

that was not the case and when Mitrione's body was located, it became

apparent to most people that the police were incapable of protecting

either native citizens or foreign nationals. The failure of the

police was considered to be a reflection upon the government's res­

ponsibility to the country.

Immediately following the discovery of the body. President

Pacheco Areco called for a special session of Congress to convene.

Pacheco Areco put before this session of Congress a measure to enact

Article 31 of the Uruguayan Constitution. This article "suspended

individual rights of property, assembly, personal liberty and free

„15 expression.

The enactment of Article 31 also included the institution of

a state of emergency. Through the use of this article in the

48

constitution, the president was given virtual dictatorial powers.

Congress, however, would allow the suspension of rights for only 20

days and then it would be renev/ed or dropped. The president had

1 f. hoped for a longer period of time on the state of emergency.

The killing of Mitrione stunned the world. President Nixon

of the United States called the crime "despicable." The Brazilian

president, Emilio Garrastazd Medici, expressed the feeling of his

country as being profoundly disturbed. The German Ambassador to

Brazil publicly criticized the Uruguayan stand against the guerrillas,

In contrast to the views of Brazil, Germany and the United States,

Argentina, Uruguay's southern neighbor, congratulated Pacheco Areco

for his firm stand on non-negotiation. Argentina also suffered from

the attacks of urban guerrillas. There was even a one million dollar

reward offered for information leading to the capture of the kid­

nappers and murderers of Dan Mitrione. The Tupamaros, however, had

a different point of view concerning the execution of Mitrione,

The Tiip.inaros felt that in reaction to claims that Mitrione's

death was unjustified, they were compelled to make some sort of

statement concerning the matter in a communique. The Tupamaros

charged that Mitrione was the instigator of the torture tactics used

on prisoners and that he was an enemy of the people. The charges by

the Tupamaros went as far as claiming that Mitrione was an agent for

the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency. The death of Mitrione also

had a political significance because this was the first time that

such a confrontation existed with the government and the Tupamaros

when the guerrillas refused to withdraw the threat to execute

49

foreigners. When the guerrillas executed Mitrione, they considered

this a show of force indicating they were not afraid to carry out

their threats. A report that circulated soon after Mitrione's death

stated that Tupamaro leader, Radl Sendic, had expressed anger at the

shooting of Mitrione because it would tarnish the "Robin Hood" image

18 he had carefully cultivated.

Throughout the remainder of 1970, the Tupamaros decreased their

major activities and only carried out some of the less spectacular

raids such as obtaining supplies and acquiring funds. They continued

to hold the government in suspense with their detainment of the

Brazilian Consul-General, Dias Gomide, and the U. S. soils expert,

Claude Fly. The Tupamaros leaked out information that for a donation

of one million dollars, the government could obtain the release of

the captives. This change in attitude by the guerrillas from their

threatened execution of the hostages sent a surge of hope to the

relatives of the prisoners. The Tupamaros hoped that their benevo­

lence would win back some of the public support they lost over the

death of Dan Mitrione. No one knew what the future held in store for

the Tupamaros, but, unbeknown to them, the peak of their organiza­

tional success had been reached. During the next years, they would

decline until they could no longer operate as they had before.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

"Uruguay: Repression, Torture and Thaw," Latin America, June 12, 1970, p. 192; Gary MacEoin, Revolution Next Door: Latin America in the 1970's (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 216; Col. Sergio d'Oliviera, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, April, 1973, p. 32.

Ernesto Mayans, Los Tupamaros: Antologia Documental (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1971), p. 3/41; "Uru­guay: Pacheco Firmer in the Saddle, Latin America, May 1, 1970, p. 138,

3 Carlos Suarez, Los Tupamaros (Mexico: Editorial Extemporaneos,

1971), pp. 64-65; James Kohn and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 260-262; Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/43.

4 "Uruguay: Tupamaros Shake the Government Again," Latin America,

June 5, 1970, p. 181.

New York Times, August 1, 1970; "Uruguay: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," Latin America, August 7, 1970, p. 249.

Robert Peter, "It was a Terrible Scene: Kidnappings and Death by the Tupamaros," National Review , September 22, 1970, p. 1001.

"Uruguay: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," Latin America, August 7, 1970, p. 249; New York Times, August 6, 1970.

o

"Uruguay: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," Latin America, August 7, 1970, p. 249.

^Ibid, p. 249.

• Ibid, p. 249.

Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/49; New York Times, August 8, 1970.

1 2 New York Times, August 8, 1970.

13 New York Times, August 9, 1970.

Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/51; "Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 257; New York Times, August 10-11, 1970.

50

51

"Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 258.

"Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 258; New York Times , August 12, 1970.

"Hanging Tough: Ransom Demands and Kidnappings," Newsweek, August 24, 1970, p. 32; "Uruguay: Poker with Blood-Soaked Cards," Latin America, August 14, 1970, p. 257; "Uruguay: Deadlock," Latin America, August 21, 1970, p. 272; "Catch Them if you Can," Economist, August 15, 1970, p. 30.

18 "A Pawn in the Game," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 20;

"Uruguay: Still Cliff Hanging," Latin America, August 28, 1970, p. 277.

CHAPTER IV

THE FINAL YEARS

The passage in to the new year of 1971 did not mark any improve­

ments on the Uruguayan scene. Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, the B r a z i l ­

ian consu l -genera l , remained a pr isoner of the Tupamaros. The same

held t rue for Claude Fly, the U. S. s o i l s expert who had been held

cap t ive s ince August, 1970. Dias Gomide had been capt ive s ince l a t e

Ju ly , 1970. Massive searches of Montevideo and outlying areas by

the Army and po l ice had fai led to turn up any clues to the loca t ion

of these two men. Even with over 20,000 pol ice and army personnel

mobilized against the Tupamaros, the g u e r r i l l a s continued to make

t h e i r commando ra ids on various t a r g e t s .

Under the facade of i n a c t i v i t y , the Tupamaros care fu l ly out l ined

t h e i r escapade in minute d e t a i l . In t rue Tupamaro fashion, nothing

was too great an objec t ive to be attempted. In f ac t , the more dar ing

and spec tacu la r a commando raid could prove to be , the more i t would

embarrass and humi l ia te government and mi l i t a ry o f f i c i a l s . While

ac t ing under the guidel ines of Plan Satan, or ig inated in 1968, the

g u e r r i l l a s kidnapped the Br i t i sh Ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey

Jackson.

The Tupamaros abducted the Br i t i sh Ambassador shor t ly a f t e r dawn

on the morning of January 8 th . While r id ing down a one-way s t r e e t

in the Old City sec t ion of Montevideo, four cars suddenly blocked

the road in front of Jackson 's chauffeur-driven black Dainler c a r . 52

53

Afier the car came to a halt, a dozen men poured out of the cars,

seized Jackson and threw him into one of the vehicles, clubbed the

t\ o bodyguards and then drove off with their prestigious hostage.

During the scuffle, a Tupamaro disguised as a street vendor pulled

a machinegun from a hiding place in his cart and stood guard to

insure that the intended captive did not escape and to prevent anyone

from interferring with the kidnapping. The Tupamaros now had another

pawn to use as a bargaining piece in an attempt to coerce the govern­

ment to accept many of their radical demands.

An intensive search began immediately after the news of Jackson's

kidnapping reached government officials. Over 12,000 army and police

personnel were activated in the massive dragnet to locate the missing

ambassador. Optimisticall}^, officials hoped that the other kidnap

victims, namely Aloysio Dias Comide and Claude Fly, who were abducted

the previous August, would be found. This hope faded when the Tupa­

maros, in communique #14, publicly stated that Jackson had been

sentenced to the "people's prison" along \7ith Dias Gomide and Fly.

The kidnapping of Geoffrey Jackson put extreme pressure on

President Pacheco Areco. First, Pacheco didn't want to fall from

grace with Britain over the way he handled the delicate affair.

Secondly, Pacheco didn't want Montevideo to become a beseiged city

and drive away the tourists that planned to visit the country's

beaches. Even with this type of pressure, Pacheco declared on

January 8th, the day of the abduction, that he would not negotiate

with the guerrillas. He desired to maintain the same hardline

policy toward negotiations with the guerrillas that he had stated

54

six months before with the crisis that surrounded the abduction of

Dan Mitrione and others. This incident became another embarrassing

international crisis that faced Uruguay during the early days of

1971.^

The government search for the kidnap victims proved to be futile.

True to past experience, the president suspended individual rights for

40 days to facilitate the search for the hostages. The suspension

allowed army and police officials to make house searches without war­

rants, arrests without warrants, to impose a curfew on the city and

to detain suspects indefinitely. In failing to locate either Jackson,

Fly or Dias Gomide, the government could only wait to see what the

3 Tupamaros would do with their new guest,

The British were definitely shaken by the abduction of their

Ambassador. UTnat little faith the British had in the Uruguayan

security forces now was almost non-existent. When Uruguayan Presi­

dent Pacheco Areco announced that he would not negotiate \7ith the

guerrillas for the release of Jackson, the Foreign Office in England

stated that they would negotiate. On January 11, the Foreign Office

in London announced that a special British security agent had been

sent to Montevideo to attempt possible bargaining with the Tupamaros

for the release of Jackson. The agent's mission, unfortunately, was

a failure because the Tupamaros would not negotiate with him. The

police failed to locate Jackson even after the search was extended

into the interior. The Tupamaros, meanwhile, sentenced Jackson to

a stint in their famous "people's prison."

Since August, 1970, the Uruguay security forces had been searching

55

for the kidnapped diplomats without much success . The only h in t of

hope came when leader Raill Sendic was captured in one of the dragnets

ca r r ied out by the p o l i c e . When Sendic and others fa i led to cooper­

a te with the po l i ce and divulge the loca t ion of the hos tages , a l l

hopes of t h e i r r e l ea se faded av>?ay. Unof f ic ia l ly , the famil ies and

governments of the kidnapped men were t ry ing to obtain t h e i r r e l ea se

by hook or crook. The families had even met with some of the Tupa­

maro capt ives to t ry to convince them to seek the r e l ease of the

diplomats . After many months of begging and pleading, and even

making t e a r f u l appearances on t e l e v i s i o n , the wife of Alyosio Dias

Gomide, the Braz i l i an consul -genera l , obtained a communiqCie from the

Tupamaros s t a t i n g the condit ions under which her husband would be

r e l eased .

The Tupamaros took the view that t h i s could provide them with

a propaganda v ic to ry over the government. The condit ions of Dias

Gomide's r e l ea se were tha t a one mil l ion do l l a r "con t r ibu t ion" be

paid to the g u e r r i l l a s and that the government r e s t o r e ind iv idua l

r i g h t s which were removed in January a f t e r the abduction of Geoffrey

Jackson. The l a t t e r par t of the r e l ease condit ions was the hardest

to ob ta in . The Pres ident re ta ined his pos i t ion of non-negot ia t ion

\^^.th the g u e r r i l l a s . The government's s t a t e of emergency tha t had

been granted in January was nearing the end of i t s l imi t and to

extend the time l i m i t . Congressional approval would have to be obtain­

ed. Therefore , in a round-about way, the government could grant the

r e tu rn of ind iv idua l r i g h t s without los ing face with the publ ic by

not press ing Congress for an extension of the s t a t e of emergency.

56

On February 15, 1971, the Tupamaros issued a communique that

announced the impending liberation of Dias Gomide as soon as individ­

ual rights were re-established. This condition was met when Congress

failed to renew the ban on individual rights. It looked as though

there might be some difficulty when the one million dollar ransom

could not be obtained; however, the Tupamaros settled for a lesser

sum of $250,000. Therefore, in accordance with the Tupamaro communi­

que, Dias Gomide was released from captivity on the 21st of February,

whereupon he was immediately flown out of Uruguay to safety in Brazil,

ending a six and one-half month stay as a Tupamaro prisoner.

The release of Dias Gomide left only Claude Fly, the U. S. agro­

nomist, and Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador, as prisoners

in the Tupamaro's "people's prison." The confinement of these two

remained a constant embarrassment to the government of Uruguay. This

factor had an effect whenever Uruguay x ould seek aid from either the

U. S. or Britain since both countries would constantly remind the

Uruguayan's of their plight.

A totally unexpected event occurred in Montevideo on March the

first. An anonymous phone call to one of the city's hospitals indi­

cated that Claude Fly was in a vehicle parked on the hospital grounds.

Wl ile the authorities were called, attendants at the hospital rushed

out to find Fly safe, but still suffering from a heart attack. His

abductors, treating him expertly in their medical facilities, kept

excellent records of his progress and then even obtained a second

opinion of their treatment (they kidnapped a heart specialist). At

the hospital, doctors examined the record of treatment and other

57

medica l d a t a supp l i ed by t h e Tupamaros and they came to t h e c o n c l u ­

s i o n t h a t had t h e g u e r r i l l a s n e g l e c t e d t o perform what t r e a t m e n t they

d i d , t h e h e a r t a t t a c k would have been f a t a l . A s t a t emen t i s sued by

the Tupamaros soon a f t e r s t a t e d t h a t Fly had been r e l e a s e d for humani­

t a r i a n r e a s o n s because of h i s h e a l t h . They gave t h e impress ion t h a t

they did not want Fly t o d i e due to c a r e l e s s n e s s on t h e i r p a r t . They

a l s o f e l t t h a t t h i s a c t would h e l p e r a s e the memory of t h e execu t ion

of Dan M i t r i o n e the y e a r b e f o r e . As soon as he rega ined h i s h e a l t h ,

Fly r e t u r n e d to t h e Uni ted S t a t e s .

S ince Dias Gomide and Fly had been r e l e a s e d from Tupamaro con­

f inement , only Geoffrey Jackson remained as a p r i s o n e r . Rumors t h a t

Jackson had been k i l l e d or was i n i l l h e a l t h c i r c u l a t e d around Monte­

v i d e o . In order to d i s p r o v e the rumor and ma in ta in t h e i r image, t h e

Tupamaros c i r c u l a t e d many cop ies of J a c k s o n ' s pho tograph . In t h e

p i c t u r e , Jackson appeared to be h e a l t h y and was r ead ing a book. The

t i t l e of the book, Ci_e_n Aflgs d_e ^o_led_ad_ (0n_e Hundreid Y_ears_ o_f S o l i -

t u d e ) , by G a b r i e l Garc ia Marquez, could have been used t o i n d i c a t e

the p robab ly l e n g t h of J a c k s o n ' s imprisonment .

In t h e cont inued e f f o r t to embarrass t h e government, t h e Tupa­

maros kidnapped t h e c o u n t r y ' s p r o s e c u t o r - g e n e r a l , Dr . Guido Berro

O r i b e . In a t a p e - r e c o r d e d s e s s i o n , Oribe was cross-examined about

why he did not p r o s e c u t e i n d i v i d u a l s , t h o s e i n b u s i n e s s and govern­

ment, t h a t were f l a g r a n t l y g u i l t y of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . The exposd

of t hose key government o f f i c i a l s imp l i ca t ed wi th t he i r r e g u l a r i t i e s

of t h e F i n a n c g r i a Monty i n 1969 was used as an example. This and

o t h e r s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n s were asked of Dr. Or ibe . In each case he

58

answered in a manner that revealed the truthful circumstances contra­

dicting those of earlier published accounts. The result of the inter-

view with Oribe implied that a cover-up of questionable activities by

people connected directly or indirectly with the government existed

and that nothing was being done to correct the situation except by

the exposure of their activities by the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros had become a household word with running accounts

of their exploits being published in the newspapers. The government,

realizing that this was free advertisement and consequently detri­

mental to government security, forbade the mention of certain words

to describe the Tupamaros. "Cell," "commando," "terrorist," "extrem­

ist," "subversive" and "political or ideological delinquent" were

among the words that were banned from print. "Tupamaro" and guer­

rilla" were foremost on the list of forbidden nomenclatures. As a result,

the Tupamaros became known as the "nameless ones." VJith that avenue

of political expression closing down, the Tupamaros held impromptu

propaganda sessions. Movie houses, bars, and workers canteens would

be occupied by a commando squad and a short lecture would be given

on the failure of the government to assist the workingman in coping

o

with the i n f l a t i o n a r y economy of the country.

In February of that year , a new p o l i t i c a l en t i t y emerged on the

Uruguayan p o l i t i c a l scene. This new p o l i t i c a l f ac t ion , evolving from

l e f t i s t Chr i s t i an Democrats and d i s s iden t s from the t r a d i t i o n a l

p a r t i e s , became known as the Frente Amplia, or Broad Front . The

p o l i t i c a l leaning of t h i s d iverse group was to the l e f t .

Many Uruguayans, longing for the the good-old-days of economic

59

p r o s p e r i t y , supported the Frente Amg l i a. Many others who joined had

become d i s i l l u s i o n e d with the f a i l u r e of the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l

p a r t i e s to rejuvenate the decl in ing and decaying economy. Soon a f t e r

the formation of the .Fren_te_ An^lJ^a, a pol l was published i nd i ca t i ng

tha t 28 per cent of the population supported the Frent_e Amgl^ia. By

ear ly Apr i l , a su rp r i s ing ly large percentage was in support of the

Frente Amplia. Actual f igures indicated that the Frente Amplia had

the support of 35 per cent of the voting populat ion, the incumbent

Colorados had 28 per cent , the Blancos had 14 per cent and an undecid­

ed number of vo te rs cons t i tu ted the remaining 23 per cent of the

n a t i o n ' s vot ing populat ion. Growing support for the Frente Amgj ia

was i n d i c a t i v e of the f ru s t r a t i on of an overwhelming urban soc ie ty

accustomed to s o c i a l se rv ices tha t the government could no longer

afford to of fe r . The announced candidate for the par ty was r e t i r e d

mi l i t a ry genera l , Lfber Seregni .

Many Uruguayans became concerned about the F_rent_e Amplia's

apparent lead over the t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s . Their concern was not

unwarranted s ince the p a r t y ' s des i re was a "revolut ion by b a l l o t - b o x "

s imi l a r to that of Dr. Salvadore Al lende 's v ic tory in Chile in 1970.

Adding to the uneasy fee l ing surrounding the popular i ty of the Frente

Amplia was the dec la ra t ion by the Tupamaros pledging t h e i r fu l l sup-

9 por t to the pa r ty .

The p o l i t i c a l format of the Frent_e Amg_li_a followed c lose ly t ha t

of the Tupamaros. In the May 1971 issue of Cuba's T r i - c ont in ent a l

a manifest was published covering the "Program of Revolutionary

Government of the MLN," or the dec la ra t ion of Tupamaro p o l i t i c a l

60

philosophy. The manifest outlined the radical changes that would be

enacted once the Tupamaros took over complete control of the govern­

ment. Each sector of the Uruguayan economy would be affected in

some manner under the Tupamaro doctrine.

The area of agrarian reform was the foremost issue in the Tupa­

maro philosophy. They proposed complete redistribution of land owner­

ship. To do this, large plantations, whether productive or not, V7ould

be expropriated and then redistributed among the small farmer popula­

tion in order to create many small, producing farms. Other large

land holdings would be turned into collective farms, modeled after

those in the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The planned revolutionary reorganization of the industrial sector

was another large-scale change the Tupamaros intended to implement

upon gaining power. With complete government ownership, Tupamaro

style, the guerrillas planned to stimulate the economy by better

utilization of the country's resources.

The Tupamaros were anxious to obtain these revolutionary changes

in the economic and political sectors either through the ballot-box

with the Frente Amplia or through "armed-struggle" in the traditional

revolutionary method. In September, 1971, General Liber Seregni,

candidate for the Frente Amplia, released information concerning his

party's political platform for the upcoming election and it closely

paralleled the political philosophy of the Tupamaros,

In reaction to all the rumors circulating of a possible victory

in the elections by the Tupamaro-supported Frent_e Amg_l_i_a, another

rumor circulated of a possible invasion of Uruguay by Brazil if the

61

-?.I!£1E£ .^^lil won the election. The military government of Brazil

considered any type of leftist government in Uruguay as unacceptable.

In case of a take-over by the left-wing F_ren_t_e Ampl_ia, Brazilian

military leaders planned an invasion of Uruguay and even estimated

the length of time it would take to completely subdue the country

under its control. This tactical plot of the Brazilians became

knovm as Operation 30 hours, because that was the amount of time it

was calculated to completely take control of the country. Although

strategically planned, there was never any attempt to implement the

12 mvas ion.

In support of the electoral process, the Tupamaros reduced

their activities to a minimum. To substantiate their peace proposal

in declaring a moratorium on their activities, the Tupamaros re­

leased Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador who had been

held prisoner since January, in late September, 1971. The police,

on the other hand, had not ceased their active search for guerrilla

hide-outs, kidnap victims or weapon caches. These extensive efforts

of counter-guerrilla activities were not without their rewards. Many

Tupamaro soliders were taken prisoner. In August, 1970, Radl Sendic

and several other high ranking guerrillas were taken prisoner. By

September, 1971, the police had over one hundred Tupamaros encar-

cerated in the Punta Carretas prison in Montevideo. Prison officials

allowed Tupamaro prisoners to congregate together in adjoining cell

blocks. Many were allowed to wander at will throughout the cell

blocks without much supervision. Security at the prison was lax and

it was no surprise to many that during one evening one hundred eleven

62

prisoners, mostly Tupamaros, escaped from the prison.

For many months preceding the actual escape, the plans had been

made and were being carried out. The imprisoned Tupamaros began

digging a tunnel out from the prison. They dug dov/n several feet

and then headed out under the prison walls into the neighborhood

adjoining the prison complex. When the date for the escape arrived,

a commando squad barged into a house located approximately 120 feet

from the prison walls. As members of the household watched, members

of the commando squad began breaking up the floor of the house.

Shortly thereafter, people began emerging from the hole in the floor.

As each escaping prisoner emerged from the hole, he or she was given

a set of new clothes, identification papers and escorted to an await­

ing vehicle. After several hours, the flow of prisoners ceased and

the guerrillas faded out into the darkness of Montevideo. All of

the top Tupamaro leaders escaped through the tunnel. It was not

until early morning that prison officials discovered they v;ere minus

13 all of their Tupamaro prisoners.

In the following investigation of the escape, the prison warden

was forced to resign due to neglect of duty in allowing prisoners to

mix freely among themselves and with outsiders. This massive escape

humiliated the government to such a degree that President Pacheco

handed the responsibility of counter-guerrilla warfare over to the

array in desperate hope that they could be more successful against

the Tupamaros. This move demonstrated Pacheco's distrust of the

14 police, who had been infiltrated by the Tupamaros.

The Uruguayan national elections were to be held in late

63

November, 1971. As t h i s t ime approached, each of t he major p o l i t i c a l

p a r t i e s campaigned o p t i m i s t i c a l l y . The l a t e s t p o l l i n d i c a t e d t h a t

each of t he t h r e e major p a r t i e s had an even s h a r e of t h e popu la r v o t e .

The Blanco p a r t y hos ted F e r r e i r a Aldenate as t h e i r c a n d i d a t e , t he

Colorados ran Juan Maria Bordaberry and General L iber S e r i g n i was

t h e c a n d i d a t e of t he F r e n t e Amplia. Each c a n d i d a t e promised economic

reform and governmental re forms .

The r e s u l t s were c o n t r a r y to many popula r p r e d i c t i o n s . The

F r e n t e Amplia, which had been expected t o make a s i z e a b l e showing,

p laced a very poor t h i r d . The Colorado c a n d i d a t e , Juan Maria Borda­

b e r r y , won the ma jo r i ty of the vo te s and t h e Colorado p a r t y was a b l e

to m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of t he government. The e l e c t i o n of Bordaberry

could be cons t rued by some to be a v o t e of conf idence i n t h e a b i l i t y

of t h e Colorados to d i r e c t the d e s t i n y of Uruguay, A t r a g i c r e s u l t

of t h e Colorado v i c t o r y was the d e c l a r a t i o n of an a l l - o u t war by t h e

Tupamaros. The Tupamaros had promised a one yea r c e a s e - f i r e i f t h e

F r e n t e Amplia had gained power, a s ix-month c e a s e - f i r e for a Blanco

v i c t o r y and immediate r e t u r n t o a c t i o n i f t h e Colorados were r e -

i n s t a t e d i n o f f i c e .

The r e t u r n t o an a l l - o u t war led t h e Tupamaros t o t h e i r d e f e a t .

While they had conducted a moratorium on p a r a m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y , t h e

army had only begun p r e p a r a t i o n for an e x t e n s i v e campaign a g a i n s t

t h e Tupamaros. The campaign a g a i n s t t he g u e r r i l l a s not only b rough t

about t h e i r downfal l bu t a l s o brought major changes t o t h e Uruguayan

p o l i t i c a l s c e n e .

CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES

"Machineguns in the Lettuce," Time, January 18, 1971, p. 31; "A Pawn in the Game," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 19.

2 Ernesto Mayans, Los Tupamaros; Antologia Documental (Cuerna­

vaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1971), p. 3/61; "Uruguay: Pacheco's Problem," Latin America, January 15, 1971, p. 18; "What are they After," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 37.

3 "What are they After," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 37.

4 Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 3/61-3/62; "What are they After,"

Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 37.

Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 3/63; "Uruguay: The Price of Freedom," Latin America, February 26, 1971, p. 66; "Your Money or Your Life," Economist, March 6, 1971, p. 48.

"Your Money or Your Life," Economist, March 6, 1971, p. 48; Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 3/63-3/64.

"Uruguay: Almost a Shadow Government," Latin America, March 19, 1971, p. 94.

o

Arturo Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 59; "A Pawn in the Game," Economist, January 16, 1971, p. 19.

Q

"News in Brief: Uruguay," Latin America, April 4, 1971, p. 112; "Watch the Broad Front," Economist, November 27, 1971, p. 16; Allende's Unida Popular, Popular Unity, won the 1970 National Elections in Chile.

Mayans, Los Tupamaros, p. 6/7.

"Mayans, Los Tupamaros, pp. 6/7-6/9; "Uruguay: Frente Amplia Set Out Priorities," Latin America, September 3, 1971, p. 286.

12 "Operation 30 Hours—Brazil Threatens Uruguay," Atlas, October,

1971, p. 34. 13 "Uruguay: That Damned Elusive Pimpernel," Latin America,

September 10, 1971, p. 290; "Great Escape: Tupamaro Jailbreak," Newsweek, September 20, 1971, p. 45; "Uruguay: War as Before," Latin America, January 21, 1972, p. 17.

64

65

"We Don't Need a Ransom," Economist, September 18, 1971, p. 42.

"Pon. Th^'f M'^^ ^^°^^ ^^°^'^'" Economist, November 27, 1971, p. 16; Poor Ihird," Economist, DecembI7 4, 1971, p. 51.

CHAPTER V

DEFEAT

The 1971 election results were surprising to the population of

Uruguay and the world. The predicted victory of the Frente Amplia

never materialized. The re-election of the incumbent Colorado party

was somewhat of a surprise to all. The Colorado victory was con­

sidered to be a vote of confidence in the party to continue to run

the political scene. It was an antagonizing affront to the Tupa­

maros who had hoped to have the Colorados defeated by either the

Blanco or Frente Amplia parties.

In anticipation of a continued assault on the government by the

Tupamaros following the national election, President Pacheco Areco,

on September 9, 1971, assigned the military the task of combating

the guerrillas. This action gave the military full control over the

counter-subversion arrangements. This action had been prompted by

the failure of the police and the Metropolitan Guard to accomplish

success in battling the guerrillas. The government looked to the

military in the desperate hope that they could save Uruguayan democ-

racy from dissolution by the Tupamaros.

Since the previous election, in November 1966, not only had the

government changed but so had the Tupamaros. In the case of the

latter, what had been a majority of working and professional types

now had become a mixture of students and. professional-worker types.

66

67

The Tupamaros had evolved over t he yea r s from a predominant ly worke r -

o r i e n t e d group t o a s t u d e n t - o r i e n t e d group.

Although v i r t u a l l y unknown o u t s i d e of t he Montevideo a r e a , t h e

Tupamaros i n i t i a t e d Plan Ta tu . The s t r a t e g y behind t h i s p lan was t o

i n c r e a s e t h e i r sphe re of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s i n t o the c o u n t r y s i d e .

I t was through t h i s i l l - f a t e d plan t h a t t he Tupamaros hoped t o e s t a b ­

l i s h a r u r a l - b a s e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e . To supplement t h i s p l a n , t h e

g u e r r i l l a s would d ig t a t u c e r a s , cavernous ho l e s in t h e ground, i n

which t o cache arms and to concea l themselves from p a t r o l l i n g m i l i ­

t a r y u n i t s . P lan Tatu f a i l e d to ach ieve success because of t h e i n ­

a b i l i t y of t h e Tupamaros to gain t he conf idence of t h e ma jo r i t y of

t h e count ry fo lk and because t h e c o u n t r y ' s t o p o g r a p h i c a l t e r r a i n i s

2 not s u i t a b l e for a r u r a l - b a s e d g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n .

The Tupamaros mixed t h e i r d i s a s t e r o u s p l an Tatu and t h e i r d e d i ­

c a t i o n t o an a l l - o u t war a g a i n s t t h e government i n t o a g ian t o f f en ­

s i v e a g a i n s t t h e c o u n t r y ' s combined m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . This mass ive

a t t a c k ended in a t o t a l de f ea t of t he Tupamaro o r g a n i z a t i o n .

Af t e r a c q u i r i n g t o t a l c o n t r o l of c o u n t e r - g u e r r i l l a command, t h e

m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s began p r e p a r i n g for t he Tupamaros t o r e t u r n to

a c t i v e g u e r r i l l a r a i d s . The Tupamaros had dec l a r ed a moratorium on

t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n suppor t of peace fu l e l e c t i o n s . The w e l l - p r e p a r e d

armed forced met each Tupamaro commando o p e r a t i o n wi th w e l l - o r g a n i z e d

c o u n t e r - g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s , thus fo rc ing t h e g u e r r i l l a s i n t o open gun

b a t t l e s . Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e Tupamaros su f f e r ed many l o s s e s

i n l i f e and g u e r r i l l a s c a p t u r e d . Af te r a few s h o r t months i t became

appa ren t t h a t t h e Tupamaros had " r e v e r t e d to s e l e c t i v e a c t s of

68 3

terrorism,"

In April, 1972, the Tupamaros sentenced four members of the

armed forces to death. Within hours of this proclamation, all four

were gunned down as they left their respective homes. The following

day, President Bordaberry declared that a "state of internal war

existed" and that he was suspending all constitutional rights. This

power, granted by Bordaberry's issuing a declaration of a "state of

emergency" guaranteed the president supreme powers and gave the

military the right to arrest and confine suspects under military law,

make searches without warrants, and censor press and radio. In

reality, it established martial law in the country. Within four days

a series of gun battles between guerrillas and police left 19 people

dead. The majority of those dead were Tupamaros, indicating that

4 the military had gained an upper hand in the fighting.

A major setback came for the Tupamaros when Hector Amodio Perez

defected from the guerrillas and agreed to give military officials

any information they desired. This action would not have gained much

attention if Amodio Perez were only a commando or cell leader instead

of an integral part of the Tupamaro High Command. With information

provided by Amodio Perez, the military were able to make raids on

guerrilla hide-outs with devastating accuracy. Amodio Perez's

defection was rumored to be the result of his disillusionment with

the status of the Tuupamaro organization and the belief that the

military and not the Tupamaros could rid the country of the rampant

corruption in government circles.

With information supplied to officials by Amodio Perez, military

69

and police units led raids on over th i r ty Tupamaros hideouts. On

one such raid in the res ident ia l suburb of Malvin, a gun b a t t l e

between Tupamaros and mili tary units resulted in the death of six

guer r i l las and three top ranking guerr i l las were taken prisoner.

I t was rumored that Ratll Sendic was among the group arrested but

l a t e r i t was proved false . Other raids disclosed the location of

medical un i t s , arms caches and the infamous "people's pr ison."

Released from confinement were Carlos Frick Davie, former Minister

of Agriculture and Ulises Pereira Revebel, former director of the

UTE. Both had been prisoners for over a year.

In the i r attack against the government, the Tupamaros faced

many d i f f i c u l t i e s . In documents captured from the Leandro Gomez

column, this speculation was confirmed. In the documents were out­

lined the tv7o greatest d i f f i cu l t i e s of the guer r i l l a s , the f i r s t

being the plan of attack to force the capitulat ion of the government

and secondly, how to regain the support of the public.

The counter-attack by the mili tary against the Tupamaros follow­

ing the April assassination of the four mili tary leaders took the

guer r i l l as by surpr ise . The guerr i l las had become over-confident

in the i r ab i l i t y to avoid fatal shoot-outs with police and mili tary

units to the point of feeling themselves invincible . The increased

ba t t l e s and raids by police and military patrols not only put the

guerr i l las on the defensive but shook their a t t i tude of being in­

v inc ib le . Captured documents began to reveal the demoralizing

effect of the guer r i l l a set-backs in open combat. Tupamaro actions

began to be carried out in column strength versus commando strength

70

to insu re success or to have add i t iona l fire-power in case of a gun-

b a t t l e with m i l i t a r y p a t r o l s .

By Ju ly , the increased m i l i t a r y c o u n t e r - g u e r r i l l a ac t ions had

taken t h e i r t o l l of c a s u a l t i e s . Over t h i r t y persons had been k i l l e d ,

mainly Tupamaros, wi thin the previous few months. Since the P r e s i ­

d e n t ' s dec l a r a t i on of emergency, over 1600 persons had been a r r e s t e d .

Anyone tha t was suspected of having any connections or sympathies

with the Tupamaros was a r r e s t e d . Mi l i t a ry sources indicated tha t

they were confident tha t success over the Tupamaros was imminent

but maintained tha t they were s t i l l a dangerous force to contend

wi th .

The f i n a l and f a t a l blow to the Tupamaros occurred on September

1, 1972. Pol ice were making a raid on a suspected Tupamaros house

in Bancario, a suburb of Montevideo, when a gun b a t t l e erupted

between the occupants and po l i ce . When the shooting ceased, po l i ce

entered and a r res ted a l l present . The pol ice were qui te surpr ised

when they r ea l i zed tha t they had stumbled upon a meeting of the

Tupamaro High Command. Most of the top leaders were taken p r i s o n e r .

Ratil Sendic, leader of the g u e r r i l l a s , was one of those de ta ined .

He was wounded during the b r i e f shoot -out . I t was reported t ha t a

b u l l e t had passed through both of Sendic ' s cheeks and possibly had

severed h i s tongue. Author i t i es reported tha t the High Command was

t ry ing to f igure out what to do to turn the t i d e of losses they were

having in b a t t l e s with mi l i t a ry u n i t s .

The Tupamaros had been able to function without Sendic ' s l e a d e r ­

sh ip when he was held pr isoner in 1970-1971, but with the organiza t ion

71

disoriented by arrests and losses in shoot-outs, the remaining mem­

bership would not be able to carry on as before. Military officials

were noted as saying that the battle against the Tupamaros had been

won with the capture of Sendic and the majority of the Tupamaro High

Command.

With the High Command locked up in military prison and hundreds

of other Tupamaros in either military or civil prisons, depending

on their importance as guerrillas, the Tupamaros ceased to function

as a guerrilla operation.

"Energetic and professional interrogation of Tupamaro prisoners

9 started to pay dividends." Prisoners began to talk, not to the civil

police authorities, but to the military. Not only did they give

information on the guerrillas but also information about the corrupt-

tion within the Uruguayan government. The military acted upon this

information and found out many things that had been withheld from

them. As a result of the "internal war against the Tupamaros, the

military leaders have become painfully aware of the defects of

Uruguayan society which the Tupamaros had exploited."

The Tupamaros were defeated as a military threat to the govern­

ment of Uruguay, culminating with the capture and detention of Ratll

Sendic. News from Uruguay neglected the mention of any commando

raids by Tupamaros. In January, 1973, it was recorded in the New

York Times that "over 2,500 alleged Tupamaros were in prison, 700

had fled the country and the remaining 200 or so guerrillas were in

hiding, capable of only minor terroristic acts."

The Tupamaros were defeated militarily, but the conditions they

72

wanted to change are in the process of being changed. The Tupa­

maros, through guerrilla commando raids, brought to light the extent

of corruption and manipulation of power that existed in Uruguayan

society. That corruption and misuse of power had taken roots in the

1950's and was seriously undermining the nation by the 1960's. A

coimtry with grandiose ideas of social reform and social services

became bogged down in an enlarged bureaucracy that had been created

only to handle its own overflow of bureaucratic paperwork. To ease

the burden, a style of corruption developed to handle the paperwork

which grew into a multi-headed monster of shady dealings. It was

this style of government the Tupamaros wanted to eliminate. The

only solution that appeared feasible to them was to completely dis­

solve the existing government and then to start over with a new

system.

The m i l i t a r y holds the re ins of power in Uruguay today. No one

knows the fa te of Ratil Sendic and the other Tupamaros. The m i l i t a r y

has sought to make reforms in the system to make the country more

s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Many of these reforms are those the Tupamaros

fought so despera te ly to ob ta in . The Tupamaros may have l o s t the

b a t t l e but they won the war by br inging to l i gh t the defects in the

system tha t the present government i s t ry ing to e r ad i ca t e .

CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES

Colonel Sergio L. d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review. April, 1973, p. 30.

2 Maria Ester Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, Translated by Anne

Edmonson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), pp. 76-77; d'Oliv­eira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, April, 1973, p. 34.

3 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review,

April, 1973, p. 30.

4 Arthur C. Porzencanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla

(New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 60-62; New York Times, June 15, 1972; "We are at War," Newsweek, April 24, 1972, p. 47.

"Uruguay: Under Torture," Latin America, September 1, 1972, p. 279; "Uruguay: Country at War," Latin America, April 21, 1972, p. 121; "Uruguay: Tupamaro Setback," Latin America, June 2, 1972, pp. 174-175.

"Uruguay: War as Before," Latin America, January 21, 1972, p. 18,

"Uruguay: Confrontation," Latin America, July 7, 1972, p. 213; "Uruguay: War as Before," Latin America, January 21, 1972, p. 18.

Q

"Uruguay: Raul Sendic," Latin America, September 8, 1972, p. 281; New York Times, September 2, 1972; Times of the Americas, Sept­ember 6, 1972; "Uruguay: Military Advance," Latin America, September 22, 1972, p. 301.

9 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review,

April, 1973, p. 32.

New York Times, February 16, 1973.

• • New York Times, January 28, 1973.

73

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