The Travesty of a Common

M. De MoorGhent University

Martina.demoor@Ugent.bePresentation for WOW3

June 2-6, 2004, Bloomington

The management and use of a common in a changing Flanders (18th-19th Century) put into the European historical perspective

M. De Moor

Differences in approach Historians

concentrate on dissolution of commons commoners as groups of users

Insufficient attention for strategies of commoners Other social sciences (sociology, economy,...)

concentrate on PROBLEMS caused by: Functioning in groups

(intra-personal conflicts) Behaviour of individuals within groups (free-riding)

Insufficient attention for context and path dependency

M. De Moor

A 3-dimensional approach to researching commons as social-ecological systems

As a resource -> comprising a complete range of different resources -> USE of a Common Pool Resource

As a property regime -> to delimit the type and number of people allowed to use the common -> USERS of a Common Property Regime

As an institution -> to organise the interaction between resources and users -> MANAGEMENT as a Common Pool Institution

M. De Moor

ORIGINS OF COMMON LAND

POSITIVE VIEW NEGATIVE VIEW

Capable to function - dynamic institution

Important aspect of the agricultural economy

Equal distribution and equal rights of speech

Attract poverty and create poverty

Free-riders principle is main strategy of users – system is doomed to fail

Insufficient exploitation – no relevance for the economy

CAUSAL EXPLANATION EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION

MANAGEMENT OF COMMON LAND

Dissolutions are PRIMARILY caused by STRUCTURAL factors Dissolutions have INTERNAL causes

CPI

CPrR

Structuring the debates

CPR

M. De Moor

Criteria for the evaluation of the functioning of commons

Efficiency Utility

Equity

M. De Moor

Central research questions How did the use and management of

commons evolve INTERNALLY (equity, utility, efficiency)and in relation with STRUCTURAL FACTORS (demographic changes, agricultural development,…)?

Which problems did they encounter? Were these solved and if so, how?

M. De Moor

Case-study in Flanders, 18th-19th c.

Near Bruges: Gemene and Loweiden Meadow along a river Rights to the common were

hereditary Primarily used for

cattle grazing Management by the users but

period of external control and management (1862-1882) by local government

And…. Still a “common” today Excellent archives Possibility of in-depth-research

based on resolution books, lists of commoners, bookkeeping, marriage registers….

Torhout

Wingene

Oedelem

Oostkamp

Gits

Pittem

Beernem

Ruiselede

Koekelare

Gistel

Ichtegem

Aartrijke

Sijsele

Zedelgem

Ruddervoorde

Zwevezele

Moerkerke

LichterveldeKortemark

Aarsele

Houtave

Tielt+Schuiferskapelle

Loppem

Eernegem

Egem

Sint-Andries

Sint-Kruis

Klemskerke

Zarren

Bredene

Moere

Jabbeke

Damme

Vlissegem

Zuienkerke

Stalhille

Oudenburg

Handzame

Werken

Kanegem

Snellegem

Varsenare

Koolskamp

Ettelgem

Meetkerke

Assebroek

Zandvoorde

Zerkegem

Koolkerke

Sint-Michiels

Sint-Joris

SnaaskerkeRoksem

Westkerke

Oostende (Ostende)

Waardamme

Bekegem

Bovekerke

Sint-Pieters-op-de-Dijk

Brugge (Bruges)

Gemeenten in 1846Brugse VeldzoneGemene en Loweiden

M. De Moor

Changes of use, users and institution

Participation of commoners in the system: number of participants, their participation intensity, participation strategy

Exploitation: evolution of exploitation level, use of price mechanism

Organisation: origins of income and expenditures, financial balance

M. De Moor

Changes in participation of commoners

Growing group of persons entitled to use under influence of population growth

BUT from end of 18th c. onwards: Declining relative participation level from

Until 1790: 70-80% of subscribers participated

1840: 50% Exclusion process and more control of use Less and less farmers, more and more wage

labourers

M. De Moor

Changing user-profile

10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

1796

1806

1816

1826

1836

1846

1856

1866

1876

1886

1896

Year

Ave

rag

e ag

e

Average age at first marriage in the Province of West Flanders (men only)

Average age at entry in common

Average life expectancy (men only)Average age at entry in common (per 25 years)

M. De Moor

Interpretation of changes

Commoners adapted their participation strategy to the changing place of the common in agriculture and to changes in the professional structure

=> Did the commoners’ changing strategy influence their actual use of the common?

M. De Moor

Changes in the level and mode of exploitation

0

50

100

150

200

250

1699

1704

1709

1714

1719

1724

1729

1734

1739

1744

1749

1754

1759

1764

1769

1774

1779

1784

1789

1794

1799

1804

1809

1814

1819

1824

1829

1834

1839

Horses (P) Cow s (K) Pigs (Z)

Cattle Units Users 10 per. Zw . Gem. (Cow s (K))

10 per. Zw . Gem. (Users) 10 per. Zw . Gem. (Horses (P)) 10 per. Zw . Gem. (Cattle Units)

M. De Moor

Interpretation of changes

Decision to privatise the use of the common in the 1840s AND was caused by the declining utility of the common for the commoners

- > But why didn’t they privatise the management too?

M. De Moor

Changes in financial management

-5000

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1699

1709

1719

1729

1739

1749

1759

1769

1779

1789

1799

1809

1819

1829

1839

1849

1859

1869

1879

1889

1899

Year

Fran

ks

Receipts

Expenditures

Balance

Balance per 10 years

Zero profit Optimal profitMarginal profitsNo dataNo data

Marginal profits

M. De Moor

Interpretation of changes

The management was not aimed at commercialisation of the goods (cfr. exploitation level) but at the changing needs and advantages of the users

Private use, common management Private profit, common costs

M. De Moor

ConclusionsChanging agricultural system (and demografic and

professional changes)

Changes in the income strategy of the commoners

Affects the utility of the common for commoners

Participation strategy of commoners towards the common

Commoners changed the mode of exploitation of the common to their needs