Post on 24-Feb-2016
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PowerPoint-Prsentation
Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant StrategiesClemens ThielenSven O. Krumke
3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
15 September 2010
krumke@mathematik.uni-kl.de
TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: AAAAAAAAAAAA1Problem DefinitionSocial choice setting with private information:
Strong Implementability
In this talk: The objective function will always be weighted sum of completion times.2MechanismsTypesBidsSocial Choices...Mechanism:
...
strategy 1strategy ngStrong Implementability
Agent 1
Agent nWork_i = total size of the jobs assigned to I
Hence: work_i/s_i is the total time machine i will be busy
3Utilities and Equilibria Definition:Strong Implementability
valuation of the outputpayment obtained
Intuitively: Small changes in the speeds induce only small changes in the objective value
Technique used in the proof: Geometric rounding(all speeds are rounded to powers of 1+epsilon)4Utilities and EquilibriaStrong Implementability
Definition:
Definition:
Intuitively: Small changes in the speeds induce only small changes in the objective value
Technique used in the proof: Geometric rounding(all speeds are rounded to powers of 1+epsilon)5Strong ImplementationDefinition:
Strong Implementability
Intuitively: Small changes in the speeds induce only small changes in the objective value
Technique used in the proof: Geometric rounding(all speeds are rounded to powers of 1+epsilon)6 Strong Implementability ProblemThe Strong Implementability Problem:
Strong ImplementabilityEncoding length:
Intuitively: Small changes in the speeds induce only small changes in the objective value
Technique used in the proof: Geometric rounding(all speeds are rounded to powers of 1+epsilon)7 Augmented Revelation MechanismsStrong ImplementabilityDefinition:
Augmented Revelation Principle:[Mookherjee, Reichelstein 1990]incentive compatibility8Previous Results
Strong Implementability9Previous Results (2)
Strong Implementability10Our Results
Strong Implementability
11Augmented Revelation PrincipleStrong ImplementabilityAugmented Revelation Principle:[Mookherjee, Reichelstein 1990]
Augmented Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategies:[this paper]
12General Idea (I)Strong ImplementabilityTo obtain an augmented revelation mechanism:
Definition:
see definition to follow soon13Selective EliminationStrong Implementability
agent i
14Selective EliminationStrong Implementability
15Bad Pairs and Elimination Definition:
Definition:
Definition:Strong ImplementabilityTwo Important Steps
Theorem 2 (selective elimination is necessary):
Theorem 3 (selective elimination is sufficient):Strong ImplementabilityStructure of the Algorithm
guess
guess
verifyTheorem 3 + close look at the proofDefinition of selective eliminationStrong Implementability The VerificationStrong ImplementabilityGeneral Approach:
Main Observation:
19 The Payment Polyhedron
Strong Implementability20 The Payment Polyhedron (I)Strong Implementability
Inequalities encode which bids are dominant bids.Incentive compatibility&dominant bids21 The Payment Polyhedron (II)Strong ImplementabilityInequalities encode conditions of selective elimination
22 The Payment Polyhedron (II)Strong ImplementabilityInequalities encode conditions of selective elimination
23Verification Issues
Strong Implementability
Here I am!Verification IssuesWe have to handle strict inequalities.To do so, we must find a point in the relative interior of the polyhedron.This can be done by means of the Ellipsoid Method (directly) or by solving a sequence of LPs.
Byproduct: Payments are of polynomial encoding length.Strong ImplementabilityConclusionStrong Implementability in dominant strategiesNP
Characterization result generalizes to infinite type spaces
Open: Is the problem in P?
Useful(?) results:Augmented Revelation PrincipleSelective elimination procedure with polynomially many stepsPayments of polynomial encoding sizeStrong Implementability
NP-complete!
Thank you!Strong Implementability27