Post on 16-May-2022
dRCN/SRN Policy Actors Workshop:
Institutional Collective Action Framework
Richard C. FeiockLocal Governance Research Laboratory
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy
Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas
ICA dilemmas arise from problems of fragmented authority
Horizontal – jurisdiction/boundaries too small to achieve scale economies or avoid spillovers
Vertical – organizations at multiple levels pursuing overlapping policy objectives
Functional – spillovers across related or unrelated policy arenas
Governance Mechanisms to Mitigate ICA Dilemmas
Two Dimensions
AuthoritySocial Embeddedness
Contracting/Legal Obligations
Delegated Authority
Imposed AuthorityEncompassingness – complexity/scope
Narrow-single issue/bilateralIntermediate-multilateralEncompassing-complex/collective
ICA Mitigation Mechanismsin US Metros
EncompassingComplex/Collective
MultiplexSelf-organizing
Systems
CouncilsofGovernments/MPOs
RegionalAuthorities
ExternallyImposedAuthority/Annexation
Intermediate/multilateral
WorkingGroups
Partnerships/MultilateralILAs
Multi-PurposeDistricts
ManagedNetwork
Narrowsingleissue/bilateral
InformalNetworks
ServiceContracts
SinglePurposeSpecialDistricts
ImposedDistrict/Mandated Agreements
Embeddedness Contracts DelegatedAuthority
ImposedAuthority
Transaction Cost Imposed by Governance
Complexity and Authority Impose Decision and Autonomy Costs on Participants
Decision Costs - information, bargaining etc.
Autonomy Cost – loss of individual autonomy to make choice based on individual interests
ICA Mitigation Mechanismsin US Metros
EncompassingComplex/Collective
MultiplexSelf-organizing
Systems
CouncilsofGovernments/MPOs
RegionalAuthorities
ExternallyImposedAuthority/Annexation
Intermediate/multilateral
WorkingGroups
Partnerships/MultilateralILAs
Multi-PurposeDistricts
ManagedNetwork
Narrowsingleissue/bilateral
InformalNetworks
ServiceContracts
SinglePurposeSpecialDistricts
ImposedDistrict/Mandated Agreements
Embeddedness Contracts DelegatedAuthority
ImposedAuthority
ICA Mitigation Mechanismsin US Metros
EncompassingComplex/Collective
MultiplexSelf-organizing
Systems
CouncilsofGovernments/MPOs
RegionalAuthorities
ExternallyImposedAuthority/Annexation
Intermediate/multilateral
WorkingGroups
Partnerships/MultilateralILAs
Multi-PurposeDistricts
ManagedNetwork
Narrowsingleissue/bilateral
InformalNetworks
ServiceContracts
SinglePurposeSpecialDistricts
ImposedDistrict/Mandated Agreements
Embeddedness Contracts DelegatedAuthority
ImposedAuthority
Low decision andautonomy cost
High decision and autonomy cost
Collaboration Risk Risks that a specific governance mechanisms
will failThree forms of collaboration risk
Incoordination – finding partners
Division problems – fair allocation of costs and benefits
Defection – free riding or reneging on commitments
Where collaboration risk is high actors prefer encompassing and authoritative institutions
Collaboration Risk in Mechanism Choice
Three Sources of Collaboration RiskProblems – type/nature of the problemActors – actors involved and their preferencesInstitutions – existing institutions in place
Empirical tests of ICA seek to explain governance mechanisms to mitigate ICA dilemmas based on collaboration risk
Empirical StudiesLarge body of research on horizontal and vertical
collaboration in the USsingle and multiple mechanisms
case studies, network analysis, large n models (using ICSD and other data)
range of policy areas: land use, environment, energy, development, sustainability
Recent extensions:Internal functional ICA within cities
Cities/metro regions of Central America, Europe, and Asia
Empirical Study #1: Functional Collective Action of Sustainability
Feiock,R.Krause,R,HawkinsC.(2018).TheImpactofAdministrativeStructureontheAbilityofCityGovernmentstoOvercomeFunctionalCollectiveActionDilemmasJournalofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory,28.forthcoming.
Functional Collective Action Problems§ Fragmentation of authority among policy areas, services, and
departments and agencies within a single government
§ Two questions§ What factors account for the internal admirative apparatus to
govern sustainability within cities?§ What types of governance institutions produce the
integrative portfolios of sustainability actions?
AdministrativeDesignDimensionsScopeofLeadAgencyAuthority
Numberofagenciesinvolvedindevelopingplansandinitiatives
§ Three factors will shape cities’ administrative design: § Political institutions§ Governmental capacity;§ Community and interest group support;
§ Broad lead agency authority and participation by more administrative units will produce more functionally integrated portfolios of sustainability policy.
Methods to Answer Question 1
§ CombinesICSDwitha2015sustainabilitypolicyinstrumentsurveybyFSULocalGovernanceLab
§ Descriptiveanalysis§ Estimationofpredictivemodels
§ Dependentvariable- LocationofLeadAgency§ Multinomiallogit
§ Dependentvariable– CountofNumberofPartners§ Negativebinomialregression
Descriptive Analysis of Governance
FactorsInfluencingtheScopeofHeadquartersforSustainability
Headquarter: Elected Official’s Office
Headquarter: Manager’s Office
Headquarter: Line Department
Political Institutions Mayor-council form of government
0.760* (0.447)
-1.304*** (.451)
-0.258 (.371)
Council elected at-large 0.010* (.005)
0.011** (.005)
0.004 (.004)
Council size 0.018 (.047)
0.024 (.048)
-0.048 (.049)
Government Capacity Per-capita own source revenue -0.123***
(.045) -0.068** (.031)
-0.099 *** (.029)
Budgetary conflict 0.185 (.0183)
0.181 (.161)
0.192 (.144)
Population size 0.005 (.004)
-0.050*** (.018)
-0.018** (.009)
Community Support Public support 0.316
(.274) 0.504** (.256)
0.369* (.214)
Neighborhood group support -0.923*** ( .298)
-0.683** (.273)
-0.634** (.249)
Constant 1.939 (1.768)
1.701 (1.647)
3.544** (1.474)
n = 492, LR χ2 = 102.06, p = 0.000 Multinomial regression, Independent Sustainability Unit base outcome * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Standard errors in parentheses
Coefficient
Incidence Rate Ratio
Political Institutions Mayor-council form of government -0.092
(0.073) 0.912
(0.066) Council elected at-large -0.002**
(0.000) 0.998**
(0.001) Council size -0.001
(0.003) 0.999
(0.002) Government Capacity Per-capita own source revenue 0.008
(0.006) 1.008
(0.064) Budgetary conflict -0.056**
(0.001) 0.946**
(0.027) Population size 0.001*
(0.001) 1.002* (0.001)
Community Support Public support 0.068
(0.046) 1.070
(0.050) Neighborhood group support 0.227***
(0.045) 1.255***
(0.057) Constant -0.116
(0.275) 0.891
(0.245) n = 492, LR χ2 = 49.66, p = 0.000 Negative binomial regression * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Standard errors in parentheses
Number of Functional Partners for Sustainability
Question 2 Design
§ DependentVariable- IntegrationPortfolioScore§ Negativebinomialregression
§ Dependentvariableisacitypolicyintegrationportfolio§ Portfolioofsevenpoliciesin2015
§ encourageorrequiremembersofthecommunitytomakeenergyefficiencyimprovementstobuildingsthatundergosignificantretro-fits
§ providechargingstationsforpluginelectricvehiclesinthecity
§ incorporateenergyuseconsiderationsintolandusedecisions
§ purchaseelectricityfromrenewablesources
§ developaclimateactionplantoreducecommunity-widegreenhousegasemissions
§ requiregreenprocurementpractices
§ utilizedemonstrationprojectstoexposecommunitymemberstotechnologyinnovationsrelatedtoclimateandenergy.
PercentofCitieswithEachPortfolioComponentinPlace
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Green procurement
Buildings Transport Climate planning Renewables Land use Tech innovation
Perc
ent o
f citi
es
Policy Integration Portfolio Component (n=258)
DistributionofSustainabilityIntegrationPortfolioScore
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Num
ber o
f citi
es
Number of portfolio policies in place (n=258)
Coefficient
Incidence Rate Ratio
Administrative Structure Number functional partners 0.064*
(0.037) 1.066* (0.040)
Hdqtr: Elected official’s office -0.423 (0.313)
0.655 (0.205)
Hdqtr: Manager’s office -0.620** (0.246)
0.537** (0.132)
Hdqtr: Line department -0.270 (0.198)
0.764 (0.152)
Hdqtr: Independent sustainability unit (excluded) (excluded) Political Institutions Mayor-council form of government 0.162
(0.152) 1.176
(0.178) Council elected at-large 0.003
(0.002) 1.003
(0.002) Council size 0.018
(0.027) 1.018
(0.028) Government Capacity Per-capita own source revenue 0.027
(0.017) 1.028
(0.002) Budgetary conflict -0.011
(0.055) 0.989
(0.054) Population size 0.008*
(0.005) 1.008* (0.005)
Community Support Public support 0.164*
(0.090) 1.178* (0.107)
Neighborhood group support -0.015 (0.091)
0.985 (0.090)
Constant -0.386 (0.559)
0.679 (0.380)
n = 214, LR χ2 = 30.32, p = 0.003 Negative binomial regression * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Standard errors in parentheses
Impact of Administrative Structure on Sustainability Policy Integration
Summary§ Insights into intra-jurisidictional functional collective action dilemmas
can be gained building on the rich research on inter-jurisdictional ICA dilemmas.
§ Administrative structure and constituencies matter§ Community support for sustainability, form of government, and support of
certain types of interest groups influence the organization and structure of sustainability.
§ Administrative headquarters and number of agency partners influence policy integration.
§ Manager office, population and public support for sustainability are linked to integration
EmpR. Zhang J. Ramaswami, A. Feiock, R. (2018). Regional irical Study #2: ICA Agreements on Regional Environmental Issues in China
What are environmental policy collaboration mechanisms among local governments in China?
What factors account for use of different regional collaboration mechanisms in China?
How well does ICA framework fit the context of Chinese local governance?
Yi, H., Suo, L. Shen, Governance and Institutional Collective Action for Environmental Sustainability in China. Public Administration Review, forthcoming.
Four Regions Studied
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei
Pearl River DeltYangtze River DeltaChengdu Plain
Data Collection
China City Statistical Yearbook (2009-2012)289 prefecture cities in China
Demographic information (population, economy, budget, energy consumption, education, environment quality)
Digital Newspaper Dataset from China Digital Library
Media Search of media reports of every city
Daily and other papers; full text information
Central media reports, government annual work report
Research Design
Unit of analysis - Inter-governmental agreements
Method: Ordinal Logit Regression Analysis Dependent Variable: ICA mechanisms: informal, formal,
and imposed authority (1,2,3)
Independent VariablesProblem situation: Environmental quality
Contract characteristics: Multiple function or single function
Actor characteristics: Number of policy actors; scope of variation in administrative levels of cities involved; involvement of national government; involvement of provincial governments
HypothesesContract complexity
Single issue agreements are more likely to be enforced through social embeddedness,
Multiple issue agreements are more likely to be enforced through delegated authority
Actor characteristicsInvolvement of national/provincial governments will more
likely lead to delegated authority than informal agreement.
The fewer the number of policy actors involved in the agreement, the more informal the agreement.
The more the levels of cities involved in the agreement, the more hierarchical (delegated authority) the agreement.
Ordinal Logit Regression AnalysisDependent variable: ICA agreement type
(informal, formal, imposed)
Variables Coefficient SE PredictedRelationship
Environmentalquality -0.002 0.002 +
multiplefunctioncontract
0.559*** 0.199 +
numberofpolicyactors 0.048*** 0.018 +
levelsofcitiesinvolved -0.299* 0.157 +
involvementofnationalgovernment
0.888*** 0.192 +
involvementofprovincialgovernment
0.412** 0.182 +
N 287
Summary
More actors and functions lead to more formal agreements
Differences in levels among cities leads to more formal agreements
Involvement of higher governments leads to more formal agreements
ExtensionsCity as Unit of Analysis - Hierarchical Linear Model
Dyads as Units of Analysis - Network Analysis
ICA: What is Next?
Applications of ICA within SRNInternalcoordinationofWHEe withincities
RegionalCoordinationthroughMPOsandotherregionalentities
MultistateAgreements
InternationalAgreements
Applications of ICA across scaleAll situations of fragmented authority
FSU Local Governance Labhttp://localgov.fsu.edu