Post on 04-Oct-2021
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
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WITNESS STATEMENT
Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b
Statement of: GOTTS, ANGIE
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: CONTROL STAFF
This statement (consisting of page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and beliefand I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfullystated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.
Signature: Date: 11/10/2017
Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded 0 (supply witness details on rear)
This statement relates to the night of the fire at Grenfell Tower on 13th-14th June 2017.
I am a Control Room Officer for the London Fire Brigade and have performed my role since 1981.
I have performed the same role the whole time and have been based across London, including Croydon,
Lambeth, the Docklands and Merton. I still enjoy my role and I work with a great bunch of people.
To date, I think I am the 13th longest serving member of the Control Room.
Throughout the statement I shall introduce various people who also worked that night and the roles they
undertook. I shall briefly explain the training that was undertaken to perform my role and explain various
pieces of terminology, whether it be related to equipment or relating to policy and procedure, before
explaining the events that took place that night.
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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MET00007694_0001
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG1 1(T)
Page 2 of 9
Throughout the statement I will refer to 'appliances' and 'pumps' These are our terms for fire engines
and are interchangeable.
My role as a CRO is primarily concerned with the receiving of calls from members of the public,
obtaining specific details and then dispatching appliances to best assist them. The training I undertook in
1981 was a 7-8 week course that covered the basics of understanding terminology, call handling, radio
procedure and rank structure. Once we had passed the course we went to work in the Control Room.
Since that training we have not really had much refresher training and there is nothing that would be
understood to be mandatory training. I have received training regarding Fire Survival Guidance (F'SG)
which I will expand upon. However the premise and basics of call handling have not changed in the time
I have been a CRO.
The role of a CRO is based around computer systems and I will explain the process of taking a basic call.
When a phone number is inputted in to our system an address can be displayed, especially in the case of a
landline. If a mobile number is used, the screen will show a large red circle which indicates the vicinity in
which the call is being made. We are required to get the specific address and input it so the computer can
acknowledge it. This can be a slow process because the system often does not recognise it or is simply
working slowly on that day. We would ask what is on fire; a house, small block of flats or a high rise.
This is important because it will determine what appliances are sent to the scene, for example if the
building is over six floors the system will automatically dispatch a bigger attendance. Once we know
what the building and fire is we would normally clear the line and assign the relevant appliances. Through
the system we can locate the nearest appliances with the required equipment and allocate the call to them.
We would send the allocation via a printer of the Mobile Dispatch Terminal (MDT). The allocation of
appliances is dictated by Incident Type Codes (ITaC) and the Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA),
however I can remember all the codes so do not need to use the system for this. For example, a standard
fire would be allocated an 'Al' attendance. This means a minimum of two appliances to attend the scene.
An ̀A2' code is a fire that involves rubbish or garbage that is on fire and only requires one pump. An
ITaC can be overridden manually however, if it is deemed necessary. This could occur when a greater
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Page 3 of 9attendance is required based on the information that is being received or perhaps local knowledge of an
area or a second call comes in relating to the same incident.
A CRO also performs other roles. A radio operator also forms part of our responsibilities and would be
undertaken for the duration of a shift unless called upon to take calls. The radio operator would receive
and send messages and updates to the appliances at the scene and if necessary make contact with either
the LAS or police if their attendance is required, however the overall decision as to the attendance of
another emergency service has to be made by a supervisor. A standard message that could be received as
a radio operator would be 'make pumps 4' — in the event of an 'Al' call the standard response is two
pumps, so a further 2 would be required. This would be typed out as a message and be referred to as an
'Incident Upgrade' or 'IUP'. In the event that this occurs, the radio operator could shout out "IUP" for
another member of the Control Room to assist with the amending of the incident type and update the
system so that the appliances can be upgraded.
Further responsibilities of a CRO are to monitor the 'Standby Module' if they have been trained. The
Standby Module organises all of the stations across London to make sure they have the right skills and
numbers in the right areas. This is usually completed the shift before the following so that the numbers
can be equally distributed in plenty of time. This is managed through the Staff Attendance Register
(STAR) system and shows what fire fighters are on duty for the following shift and the skills they have.
The role is normally managed by civilian staff, however they often finish at 11 pm which means that the
CROs will perform the role throughout the night shift.
CROs are supervised by Assistant Operations Managers (AOMS) and there is usually one AOM to four
or five CROs. An Operations Manager has overall control of the Control Room every shift, or 'Watch' as
it is referred to in the LFB. I am a member of 2 Watch. Our shifts are divided into three — a day shift is
Sam-8pm, followed by a 'short shift' of either Sam-4pm or 2pm-10pm and then finally a night shift which
is 8pm-Sam. At the completion of our night shifts we will then have three days off before we start the
pattern again
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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MET00007694_0003
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Page 4 of 9A FSG is a call in which a caller has said that they are trapped and cannot get out. In the event of a FSG
there are certain things that we have to do. For example, we have to inform a supervisor immediately,
usually by waving our hand, so that they can listen to the call as well. On nights however this is not
always possible because our team numbers can be smaller. The first thing I do is to make sure that an
ambulance will be in attendance if the caller is sure they cannot get out. We would give certain advice
such as making sure they block the doors with towels, have a way of getting fresh air and to make sure we
know where they are in the property so that the fire fighters can get to them. Whilst getting the
information as fast as possible I would also be typing messages for the radio operator so that the
information is passed to the fire crews. It is also very important that we get how many people are reported
to be inside and have that information passed over. The collection of names is not something that would
be routinely done. In such calls, speed is of the essence and what we really need to know is the address,
where they are and how many people are inside. Sometimes people giving their names is not clear which
will slow down the process and it is not something we really need. In the many years I have been a CRO,
I have not known the advice regarding FSGs to change. We are supposed to use a 'Reference Index File'
(RJF) in the event of an FSG. This is a step by step guide of what to do in the event of a FSG, but the
most important thing is to get the fire engines running as quickly as possible. When you are dealing with
a FSG it can be difficult to do all the tasks at once, so owing to my experience I may not use the RIF as it
is yet another thing for the computer to do.
In my experience I have dealt with a few FSGs but not many. Perhaps only four of five. I was present
during the Lakanal fire in 2009 and had others relating to a woman trapped in a skylight unable to get out
and a man trapped in flats in Paddington who could not speak English very well. The night of the Grenfell
fire there were just too many FSGs to deal with. So much so it was impossible to stay on the line with the
callers
Normal advice for calls to high rise buildings has always been to stay. This is based upon the
understanding that the construction of the building should allow about one hour's grace in which the fire
is contained and should allow plenty of time for the caller to be rescued once the fire fighters have
attended which usually takes between 4-5 minutes
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
RESTRICTED
MET00007694_0004
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Page 5 of 9I had never heard of Grenfell Tower before that night.
On the night of the 14th June we were working the night shift. I think there were eleven CROs working
along with three supervisors — AOMs Debbie REAL and Pete MAY and the Operations Manager, Alex
NORMAN. No one above the rank of OM was present. We were working from our Stratford 'fall back'
centre because of routine maintenance at Merton. This happens a few times throughout the year. The
Control Room is much smaller than Merton.
The night began like any other. I was tasked to update the Standby Module with Christine HOWSON,
another CRO. We had been having a lot of issues with the system that night which could have become a
big problem in terms of managing resources for the next day but thankfully we got the systems resolved
by about midnight and could return to call handling.
I also assisted with operating the radio (channel 4) to relieve people for their breaks. 1 did this between
midnight and lam for Sharon DARBY and then my break was between lam-2am.
I remember, whilst walking out for my break, the initial call for Grenfell Tower. I was aware of Pete
MAY discussing the attendance required. I think he said a few days before there was a fire alarm at
another high (rise) and the attendance was incorrect because the flat number was inputted and the system
did not pick it up as a high rise. I remember on the night the call was to flat 16 on the 4th floor. I was not
aware of any other calls at that point.
Shortly afterwards I heard a bang on the door from Pete MAY. He stated that there was a '10 pump fire'
and 'Persons Reported' and we needed to make our way back to the Control Room due to the influx of
calls. A 'Persons Reported' call means that there are people trapped inside. I made my way back to the
Control Room and immediately started taking calls. Between lam and 5am the Control Room was
completely manic. Just constant calls.
It all turned into a blur. I think I took a call from a man on the 8th floor and told him the fire was on the
4th and that he would be safe where he was. He seemed to be happy with that information at the time. I
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
RESTRICTED
MET00007694_0005
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Page 6 of 9think at some point there was an incident upgrade; I cannot remember if it was then a fifteen or twenty
pump fire but I remember thinking, "Oh my God, this is worse than Lakanal".
The Lakanal fire in 2009 and the fallout from it has had a profound effect on me. A friend of mine was
blamed for the advice she gave to a resident and the advice she gave her was exactly what she was
supposed to have done. She was hounded by the press because the advice she gave was for the resident to
stay in the flat and the resident sadly died. The blame was all put on her. Since then I have not been
comfortable with telling people to stay put in their flats. I will tell the caller what I can and I will certainly
pass all of their details (flat number, floor number, number of people and location) to the fire fighters but
I will not tell them to stay. I would assure the caller that the fire fighters know exactly where they were
but it was to be their own personal decision as to whether they decided to stay or go. It was not a decision
I would make for them.
Over the course of the night I think I took something in the region of about 80 calls, I was later told. I do
not really remember them. I remember one man I spoke to, a father of five, say that the fire was coming
through the walls of his flat. I felt totally useless as there was nothing I could do to help these people. I
told him there was nothing I could do and that he was better off with his family. I ended the call by saying
I would make absolutely sure the crews knew where he was — it was just horrible.
At some point, Jason OLIFFE, the Officer of the Day, was in the Control Room. He is a Station Manager
and his presence in the Control Room is not normal. An Officer of the Day is responsible for overseeing
jobs that are above a certain level — from a six to eight pump fire and above. He was with other senior
officers and I remember them writing names and addresses on white boards at the back of the room. I
remember first noticing them when I came back in from my break. They were constantly being updated
and messages passed to the Command Unit on the ground. It was quicker to write the messages by hand
on pieces of paper than it was to type them and wait for the system to send so I would write them and take
it straight to the white boards. In the end I think everyone was doing it that way.
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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MET00007694_0006
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Page 7 of 9The information we passed on was then mirrored on the ground by the Command Unit who wrote it on a
Initially the advice to give residents was to remain. I remember at some point in the night someone shouts
that the advice was to get out. I do not know what time this was said.
I constantly made sure that I had the flat numbers to pass over to the Command Unit. Normally you
would know if the people you spoke to had got out, but on this occasion there were so many it was
impossible to check. I would not normally have called them back and had no chance to do so on that
night. By that point in the night FSG advice was pointless.
It was too late. I know that some people got rescued and I know that every name and flat number I got
went straight to the white board. I simply went from one to call to another.
A blur. There were just so many that eventually we could not help. I went in to complete auto pilot;
perhaps as a way of shutting out what was happening. Luckily across London there were not many other
calls regarding other matters. I also remember that there was a red phone that rang incessantly. I think it
was BT advising us that there were calls outstanding.
After the last call, I think it was about Sam, there was a lull. That was horrible. You could not help but
think that they had all gone. Then relatives started calling and asking about family members. They feared
the worst and that was why they were ringing. The lack of calls made it eerie in the Control Room.
Someone said, "What does this mean?" but we all know what it meant. Someone looked it up on their
computer on the news and it was horrific. I could not look at it. At some point I remember Alex, the OM,
tell us to turn it off. It may have been shown on the TV in the Control Room but I cannot remember. I was
not aware of the TV being on throughout the night. I think she wanted to save us from seeing it because
she knew it would be upsetting. The first time I looked at it I wondered if anyone had managed to get out.
I remember thinking it reminded me of 9/11 and all the people who were above where the planes hit and
could not get out.
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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MET00007694_0007
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Page 8 of 9The atmosphere was one of stunned silence. I remember at some point trying to call Kensington and
Chelsea council regarding their building surveyor coming out to assess the damage. I tried three times and
could not get connected. I tried the 'out of hours' mobile number which did not work. Eventually I
managed to get through after putting a '9' at the start of the original numbers and was advised that they
could not give an ETA for the surveyor. I stressed the importance of someone needing to attend but was
again told they could not tell me when someone would be there. We even said that they could be collected
and driven on blue lights to the scene but still they would not assist nor let me call them directly. Alex
advised me to page the London Resilience Group and update them on the problems I had which I did. By
the time I left I was still unsure if they had attended or not.
The day shift had been contacted to come in early and I remember I left before Sam. The on call
counsellor had been contacted to come in and I know a number of CROs went and spoke to them. I just
wanted to leave. I wish I could have done more to help those people. All we could do was pass on the
information. A few days later we did a scene visit of the tower which completely shocked me — the
height of the building and the damage was overwhelming. I had been due to do some overtime a couple of
days after but I did not go in. I needed some time. When I came back for my normal shift I was ok. I got
straight back on with things and I think I needed to answer normal calls — that helped with dealing with
it.
There has been support for us at work if we needed it but I have been ok. Since the fire there has been a
slight change to policy with regards to high rise buildings. In the event of a call to a high rise, the
minimum attendance is now five pumps and an aerial ladder — even if it is just a fire alarm call. That is
as a direct result of Grenfell.
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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MET00007694_0008
RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)
Signature:2017
Signature witnessed by:
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